1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
243 /// Number of bytes in the id.
244 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
247 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
253 impl Readable for PaymentId {
254 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
255 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
260 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
261 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
262 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
266 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
269 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
270 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
278 impl Readable for InterceptId {
279 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
280 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
285 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
286 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
287 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
288 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
289 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
292 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
295 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
296 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
299 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
303 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
304 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
305 (0, short_channel_id, required),
306 (2, htlc_id, required),
308 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
309 (0, session_priv, required),
314 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
315 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
316 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
317 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
318 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
321 session_priv: SecretKey,
322 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
323 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
324 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
325 payment_id: PaymentId,
328 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
329 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
330 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
339 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
340 payment_id.hash(hasher);
341 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
347 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
350 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
351 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
352 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
353 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
354 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
359 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
360 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
361 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
362 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
363 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
371 struct InboundOnionErr {
377 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
378 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
381 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
382 pub enum FailureCode {
383 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
384 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
385 TemporaryNodeFailure,
386 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
387 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
388 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
389 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
390 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
391 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
392 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
393 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
394 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
395 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
398 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
399 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
402 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
403 fn into(self) -> u16 {
405 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
406 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
407 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
408 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
413 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
414 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
415 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
416 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
417 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
420 err: msgs::LightningError,
421 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
422 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
423 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429 err: LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
440 channel_capacity: None,
444 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
445 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
448 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450 err: LightningError {
452 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
453 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
459 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
460 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
461 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
465 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
468 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
470 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
471 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
475 log_level: Level::Warn,
478 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
485 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
493 shutdown_finish: None,
494 channel_capacity: None,
499 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
500 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
501 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
502 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
503 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
505 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
506 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
507 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
508 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
509 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
510 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
511 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
513 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
517 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
518 struct ClaimingPayment {
520 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
521 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
522 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
523 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
525 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
526 (0, amount_msat, required),
527 (2, payment_purpose, required),
528 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
529 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
530 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
533 struct ClaimablePayment {
534 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
535 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
536 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
539 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
540 struct ClaimablePayments {
541 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
542 /// failed/claimed by the user.
544 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
545 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
547 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
548 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
549 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
551 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
552 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
553 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
554 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
557 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
558 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
559 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
560 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
561 enum BackgroundEvent {
562 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
563 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
564 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
565 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
567 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
568 /// are regenerated on startup.
569 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
570 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
571 /// channel to continue normal operation.
573 /// In general this should be used rather than
574 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
575 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
576 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
578 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
579 /// are regenerated on startup.
580 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
581 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
582 funding_txo: OutPoint,
583 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
585 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
586 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
588 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
589 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
590 channel_id: ChannelId,
595 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
596 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
597 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
598 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
599 /// event can be generated.
600 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
601 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
602 /// operation of another channel.
604 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
605 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
606 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
607 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
609 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
610 event: events::Event,
611 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
616 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
617 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
618 (0, event, upgradable_required),
619 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
620 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
621 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
622 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
623 // downgrades to prior versions.
624 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
628 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
629 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
630 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
632 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
635 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
636 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
637 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
638 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
642 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
643 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
644 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
645 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
646 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
647 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
649 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
650 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
651 channel_id: ChannelId,
652 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
657 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
659 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
660 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
661 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
662 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
672 /// State we hold per-peer.
673 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
674 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
676 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
677 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
678 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
680 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
681 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
682 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
683 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
684 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
685 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
686 latest_features: InitFeatures,
687 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
688 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
689 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
690 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
691 /// user but which have not yet completed.
693 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
694 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
695 /// for a missing channel.
696 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
697 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
698 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
700 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
701 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
702 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
703 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
705 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
706 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
707 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
708 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
709 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
710 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
711 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
712 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
713 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
714 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
715 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
716 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
717 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
718 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
719 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
723 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
724 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
725 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
726 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
727 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
728 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
731 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
732 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
733 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
736 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
737 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
738 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
741 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
742 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
743 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
744 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
748 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
749 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
750 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
751 /// The original OpenChannel message.
752 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
753 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
754 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
757 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
758 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
759 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
761 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
762 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
764 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
767 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
768 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
769 struct PendingInboundPayment {
770 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
771 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
772 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
773 /// this payment being removed.
775 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
776 user_payment_id: u64,
777 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
778 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
779 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
782 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
783 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
784 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
785 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
786 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
787 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
788 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
789 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
791 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
792 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
800 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
802 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
803 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
804 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
809 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
810 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
811 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
812 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
813 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
814 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
815 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
816 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
817 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
819 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
820 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
829 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
831 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
832 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
833 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
838 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
839 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
840 $vis trait AChannelManager {
841 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
842 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
843 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
844 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
845 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
846 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
847 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
848 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
849 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
850 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
851 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
852 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
853 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
854 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
855 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
856 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
857 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
858 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
861 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
862 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
863 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
864 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
865 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
866 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
868 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
870 ES::Target: EntropySource,
871 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
872 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
877 type Watch = M::Target;
879 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
881 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
883 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
885 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
886 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
888 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
890 type Router = R::Target;
892 type Logger = L::Target;
894 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
897 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
898 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
900 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
901 /// to individual Channels.
903 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
904 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
905 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
906 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
908 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
909 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
910 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
911 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
912 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
913 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
914 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
916 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
917 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
918 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
920 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
921 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
922 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
923 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
924 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
926 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
927 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
928 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
929 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
931 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
932 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
933 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
935 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
936 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
937 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
938 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
939 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
941 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
942 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
943 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
944 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
945 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
946 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
947 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
948 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
951 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
952 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
953 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
954 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
955 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
959 // `total_consistency_lock`
961 // |__`forward_htlcs`
963 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
965 // |__`per_peer_state`
967 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
969 // | |__`claimable_payments`
971 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
977 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
979 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
983 // | |__`pending_events`
985 // | |__`pending_background_events`
987 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
989 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
990 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
991 ES::Target: EntropySource,
992 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
993 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
994 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
998 default_configuration: UserConfig,
999 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1000 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1006 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1008 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1010 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1011 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1013 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1014 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1015 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1016 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1018 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1019 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1021 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1022 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1023 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1024 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1025 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1026 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1027 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1028 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1030 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1032 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1033 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1035 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1037 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1038 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1039 /// and via the classic SCID.
1041 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1042 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1044 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1046 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1048 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1049 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1050 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1052 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1053 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1055 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1056 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1058 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1059 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1061 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1062 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1063 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1064 /// active channel list on load.
1066 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1067 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1069 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1071 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1072 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1073 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1075 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1076 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1077 /// the handling of the events.
1079 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1080 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1083 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1084 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1085 /// would break backwards compatability.
1086 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1087 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1088 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1090 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1091 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1093 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1095 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1096 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1097 /// confirmation depth.
1099 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1100 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1101 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1103 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1105 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1107 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1109 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1111 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1113 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1114 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1115 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1117 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1118 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1120 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1121 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1122 /// keeping additional state.
1123 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1125 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1126 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1127 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1128 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1130 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1131 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1133 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1134 /// are currently open with that peer.
1136 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1137 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1140 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1142 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1143 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1144 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1145 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1146 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1148 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1149 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1150 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1151 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1152 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1154 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1155 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1157 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1158 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1159 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1160 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1161 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1163 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1164 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1166 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1167 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1168 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1169 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1170 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1172 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1174 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1176 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1177 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1178 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1179 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1180 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1181 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1182 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1183 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1184 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1186 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1188 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1192 signer_provider: SP,
1197 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1199 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1200 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1201 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1202 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1203 pub struct ChainParameters {
1204 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1205 pub network: Network,
1207 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1209 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1210 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1213 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1220 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1221 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1222 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1223 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1224 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1225 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1227 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1228 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1229 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1230 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1231 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1233 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1234 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1237 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1238 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1239 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1240 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1242 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1243 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1244 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1245 _read_guard: read_guard,
1250 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1251 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1252 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, persist_check: F)
1253 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1254 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1256 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1257 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1258 should_persist: persist_check,
1259 _read_guard: read_guard,
1264 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1265 fn drop(&mut self) {
1266 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1267 self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
1272 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1273 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1275 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1277 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1278 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1279 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1280 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1281 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1283 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1284 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1286 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1288 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1289 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1290 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1291 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1292 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1293 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1294 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1295 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1296 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1297 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1298 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1299 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1300 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1302 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1303 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1305 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1306 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1307 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1308 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1310 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1311 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1312 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1313 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1314 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1315 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1318 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1320 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1321 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1324 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1326 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1327 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1329 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1330 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1331 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1333 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1334 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1335 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1337 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1338 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1339 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1340 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1342 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1343 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1344 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1346 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1347 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1348 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1350 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1351 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1352 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1353 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1354 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1355 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1356 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1357 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1358 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1359 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1360 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1363 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1364 /// to better separate parameters.
1365 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1366 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1367 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1368 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1369 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1370 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1371 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1372 pub features: InitFeatures,
1373 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1374 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1375 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1377 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1379 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1380 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1381 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1382 /// payments to us through this channel.
1383 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1384 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1385 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1386 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1387 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1388 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1389 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1392 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1394 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1395 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1398 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1399 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1400 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1401 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1402 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1403 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1404 /// lifetime of the channel.
1405 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1406 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1407 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1408 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1409 /// our counterparty already.
1411 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1412 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1413 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1414 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1416 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1417 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1418 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1419 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1421 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1422 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1424 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1425 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1427 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1428 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1429 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1430 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1431 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1432 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1433 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1434 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1435 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1438 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1440 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1441 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1442 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1443 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1444 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1445 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1446 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1448 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1449 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1451 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1452 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1453 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1454 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1455 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1456 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1457 /// this value on chain.
1459 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1461 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1463 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1464 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1465 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1466 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1467 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1468 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1469 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1471 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1472 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1473 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1474 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1475 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1476 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1478 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1479 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1480 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1481 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1482 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1483 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1485 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1486 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1487 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1488 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1489 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1490 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1491 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1492 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1494 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1495 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1496 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1497 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1498 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1499 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1500 /// route which is valid.
1501 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1502 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1503 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1504 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1505 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1506 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1508 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1509 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1510 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1511 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1512 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1513 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1514 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1515 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1516 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1518 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1520 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1521 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1522 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1523 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1524 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1526 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1527 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1528 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1529 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1530 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1531 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1532 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1534 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1535 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1536 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1537 pub is_outbound: bool,
1538 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1539 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1540 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1541 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1542 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1544 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1545 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1546 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1547 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1548 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1549 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1550 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1552 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1553 pub is_usable: bool,
1554 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1555 pub is_public: bool,
1556 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1557 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1558 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1559 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1560 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1561 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1563 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1564 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1567 impl ChannelDetails {
1568 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1569 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1570 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1572 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1573 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1574 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1575 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1578 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1579 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1580 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1582 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1583 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1584 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1585 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1588 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1589 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1590 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1593 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1594 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1596 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1597 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1598 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1600 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1601 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1602 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1603 features: latest_features,
1604 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1605 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1606 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1607 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1608 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1609 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1610 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1611 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1612 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1613 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1615 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1616 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1617 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1618 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1619 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1620 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1621 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1622 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1623 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1624 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1625 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1626 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1627 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1628 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1629 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1630 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1631 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1632 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1633 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1634 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1635 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1636 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1637 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1638 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1639 config: Some(context.config()),
1640 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1645 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1646 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1647 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1648 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1649 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1650 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1651 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1652 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1653 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1655 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1657 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1658 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1660 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1661 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1662 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1663 /// to drop the channel.
1667 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1668 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1669 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1670 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1671 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1673 /// Identifier for the payment to ensure idempotency.
1674 payment_id: PaymentId,
1676 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1678 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1680 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1681 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1682 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1685 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1686 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1687 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1689 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1690 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1691 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1693 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1694 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1695 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1697 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1698 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1702 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1704 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1706 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1707 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1708 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1709 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1711 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1712 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1713 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1716 macro_rules! handle_error {
1717 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1718 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1719 // entering the macro.
1720 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1721 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1725 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1726 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1728 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1729 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1730 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1731 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1735 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1736 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1737 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1738 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1739 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1740 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1745 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1746 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1748 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1749 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1750 action: err.action.clone()
1754 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1755 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1756 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1757 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1758 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1762 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1767 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1770 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1771 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1772 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1778 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1779 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1780 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1781 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1782 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1783 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1785 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1786 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1787 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1788 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1789 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1791 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1792 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1794 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1798 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1799 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1800 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1802 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1803 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1805 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1806 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1808 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1809 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1810 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1811 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1812 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1813 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1815 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1816 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1820 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1821 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1823 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1824 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1826 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1827 match $channel_phase {
1828 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1829 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1831 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1832 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1834 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1835 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1841 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1842 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1846 let key = *$entry.key();
1847 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1849 $entry.remove_entry();
1857 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1858 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1862 let key = *$entry.key();
1863 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1865 $entry.remove_entry();
1873 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1874 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1876 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1877 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1883 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1884 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1885 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1886 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1887 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1889 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1890 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1891 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1892 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1893 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1894 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1895 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1896 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1897 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1898 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1903 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1904 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1905 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1906 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1907 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1908 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1909 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1910 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1911 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1913 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1918 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1919 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1920 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1921 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1922 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1923 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1924 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1925 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1926 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1928 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1933 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1934 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1935 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1936 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1937 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1938 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1939 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1940 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1941 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1942 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1943 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1945 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1946 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1947 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1953 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1954 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1956 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1957 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1958 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1959 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1960 updates.announcement_sigs);
1961 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1962 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1965 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1966 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1967 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1969 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1971 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1972 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1974 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1975 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1976 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1977 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1982 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1983 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1984 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1985 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1986 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1987 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1989 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1990 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1991 &$chan.context.channel_id());
1994 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1995 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1996 &$chan.context.channel_id());
1997 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1998 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1999 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2000 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2001 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2005 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2011 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2012 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2013 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2014 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2016 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2017 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2018 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2019 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2021 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2023 debug_assert!(false);
2024 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2025 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2026 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2027 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2028 $chan_entry.remove();
2032 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2033 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2034 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2035 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2036 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2037 // filter for uniqueness here.
2038 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2039 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2040 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2041 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2043 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2044 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2045 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2047 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2048 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2049 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2053 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2054 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2055 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2056 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2058 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2060 debug_assert!(false);
2061 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2062 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2063 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2064 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2065 $chan_entry.remove();
2071 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2072 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2073 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2074 while !processed_all_events {
2075 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2079 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2082 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2083 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2084 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2086 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2087 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2088 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2090 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2091 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2092 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2093 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2097 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2098 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2099 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2100 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2103 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2105 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2106 $event_to_handle = event;
2108 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2109 post_event_actions.push(action);
2114 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2115 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2116 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2117 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2118 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2119 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2122 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2123 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2124 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2125 processed_all_events = false;
2128 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2129 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2135 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2137 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2138 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2139 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2140 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2141 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2146 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2148 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2150 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2151 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2153 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2155 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2156 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2157 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2160 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2161 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2162 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2164 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2165 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2166 current_timestamp: u32,
2168 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2169 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2170 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2171 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2173 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2174 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2175 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2180 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2182 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2183 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2184 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2185 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2186 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2187 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2188 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2189 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2191 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2194 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2195 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2197 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2199 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2201 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2203 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2204 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2205 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2206 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2207 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2208 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2218 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2219 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2220 &self.default_configuration
2223 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2224 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2225 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2228 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2229 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2231 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2233 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2237 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2242 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2244 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2245 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2246 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2247 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2248 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2250 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2251 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2253 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2254 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2255 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2257 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2258 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2259 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2261 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2262 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2263 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2264 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2265 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2266 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2268 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2269 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2270 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2271 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2272 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2273 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2277 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2278 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2282 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2283 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2285 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2287 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2288 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2289 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2290 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2291 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2292 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2296 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2301 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2303 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2304 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2307 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2309 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2315 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2316 node_id: their_network_key,
2319 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2322 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2323 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2324 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2325 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2326 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2327 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2328 // the same channel.
2329 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2331 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2332 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2333 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2336 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2337 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2338 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2339 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2343 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2344 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2345 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2353 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2354 /// more information.
2355 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2356 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2357 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2358 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2359 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2360 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2361 // the same channel.
2362 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2364 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2366 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2367 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2368 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2369 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2370 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2371 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2379 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2380 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2382 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2383 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2385 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2386 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2387 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2388 // really wanted anyway.
2389 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2392 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2393 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2394 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2395 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2397 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2398 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2399 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2400 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2401 let context_to_details = |context| {
2402 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2404 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2406 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2407 .map(context_to_details)
2413 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2414 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2416 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2417 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2418 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2420 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2421 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2422 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2423 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2424 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2425 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2427 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2428 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2429 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2431 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2432 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2433 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2434 total_msat: *total_msat,
2437 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2438 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2440 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2441 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2443 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2448 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2449 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2450 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2451 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2452 Some(transaction) => {
2453 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2454 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2459 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2460 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2461 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2462 reason: closure_reason,
2463 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2464 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2468 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2471 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2472 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2476 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2477 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2479 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2482 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2484 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2485 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2486 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2487 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2488 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2489 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2491 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2492 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2493 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2494 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2495 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2499 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2500 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2501 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2502 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2505 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2506 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2507 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2508 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2512 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2521 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2522 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2524 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2525 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2528 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2529 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2530 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2531 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2534 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2538 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2539 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2540 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2542 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2543 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2545 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2546 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2547 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2548 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2550 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2552 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2553 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2554 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2557 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2558 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2559 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2560 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2561 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2562 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2565 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2566 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2567 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2569 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2570 /// the channel being closed or not:
2571 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2572 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2573 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2574 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2575 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2576 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2577 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2579 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2580 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2581 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2582 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2584 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2586 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2587 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2588 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2591 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2592 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2593 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2594 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2595 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2596 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2600 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2601 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2602 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2603 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2604 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2605 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2606 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2607 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2609 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2610 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2611 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2612 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2613 // ignore the result here.
2614 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2618 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2619 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2620 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2621 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2622 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2624 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2625 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2626 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2627 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2628 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2629 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2631 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2633 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2634 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2635 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2636 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2638 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2639 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2640 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2642 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2643 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2644 // Unfunded channel has no update
2645 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2648 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2649 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2650 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2651 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2653 (None, *peer_node_id)
2655 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2658 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2659 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2660 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2665 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2668 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2670 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2671 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2673 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2674 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2675 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2676 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2677 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2678 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2679 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2690 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2691 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2692 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2694 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2695 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2696 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2699 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2700 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2701 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2703 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2704 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2705 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2706 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2707 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2710 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2711 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2712 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2713 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2714 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2718 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2719 /// local transaction(s).
2720 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2721 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2722 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2726 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2727 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2728 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2729 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2730 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2731 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2732 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2734 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2735 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2739 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2740 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2741 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2742 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2743 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2744 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2745 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2746 err_data: Vec::new(),
2750 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2751 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2752 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2755 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2756 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2757 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2758 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2759 outgoing_cltv_value,
2760 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2764 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2765 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2766 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2767 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2768 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2769 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2770 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2771 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2773 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2775 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2776 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2777 err_data: Vec::new(),
2778 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2781 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2782 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2783 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2784 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2786 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2789 // final_expiry_too_soon
2790 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2791 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2793 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2794 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2795 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2796 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2797 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2798 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2799 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2800 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2801 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2802 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2803 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2806 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2807 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2808 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2810 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2812 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2813 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2817 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2818 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2819 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2820 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2821 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2822 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2823 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2824 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2825 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2826 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2827 err_data: Vec::new(),
2828 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2831 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2832 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2833 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2834 err_data: Vec::new(),
2835 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2838 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2842 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2845 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2846 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2849 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2850 phantom_shared_secret,
2854 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2855 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2856 err_data: Vec::new(),
2857 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2860 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2863 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2864 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2865 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2866 outgoing_cltv_value,
2867 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2871 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2872 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2873 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2874 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2875 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2877 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2878 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2879 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2880 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2881 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2882 failure_code: $err_code,
2888 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2889 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2892 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2893 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2894 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2896 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2897 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2898 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2899 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2900 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2901 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2902 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2903 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2905 macro_rules! return_err {
2906 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2908 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2909 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2910 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2911 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2912 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2913 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2919 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2921 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2922 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2924 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2925 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2928 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2929 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2930 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2931 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2934 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2935 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2936 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2938 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2939 // inbound channel's state.
2940 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2941 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2942 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2946 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2947 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2948 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2949 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2950 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2951 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2952 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2953 // phantom or an intercept.
2954 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2955 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2956 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2960 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2963 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2965 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2967 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2968 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2969 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2971 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2972 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2973 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2974 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
2977 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2978 // have no consistency guarantees.
2979 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2983 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2984 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2985 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2986 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2987 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2989 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2990 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2991 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2992 // we don't have the channel here.
2993 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2995 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2997 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2998 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2999 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3000 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3001 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3002 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3003 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3004 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3005 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3006 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3007 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3009 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3012 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3013 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3015 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3016 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3020 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3021 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3022 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3023 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3025 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3032 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3033 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3034 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3035 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3036 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3037 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3039 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3040 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3042 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3043 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3044 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3045 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3046 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3047 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3048 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3049 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3050 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3051 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3057 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3058 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3059 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3060 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3062 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3063 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3065 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3066 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3067 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3069 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3070 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3071 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3072 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3073 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3074 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3075 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3079 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3081 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3084 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3085 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3086 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3087 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3088 macro_rules! return_err {
3089 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3091 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3092 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3093 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3094 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3095 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3096 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3102 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3104 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3105 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3108 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3109 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3110 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3111 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3112 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3114 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3117 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3118 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3119 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3120 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3121 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3127 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3128 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3129 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3131 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3132 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3133 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3135 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3136 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3137 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3138 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3139 return Err(LightningError {
3140 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3141 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3144 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3145 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3148 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3151 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3152 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3153 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3154 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3156 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3157 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3158 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3160 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3161 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3162 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3163 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3164 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3165 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3169 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3172 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3174 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3176 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3177 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3178 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3179 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3180 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3183 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3184 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3186 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3187 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3188 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3189 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3190 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3191 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3192 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3193 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3195 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3196 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3197 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3199 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3201 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3208 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3209 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3210 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3211 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3216 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3217 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3218 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3221 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3222 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3224 log_trace!(self.logger,
3225 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3226 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3227 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3228 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3230 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3231 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3232 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3234 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3235 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3237 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3238 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3239 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3240 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3244 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3245 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3246 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3247 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3248 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3249 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3250 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3251 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3252 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3254 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3255 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3256 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3258 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3259 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3261 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3262 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3263 Some(monitor_update) => {
3264 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3265 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3267 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3268 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3269 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3270 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3271 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3272 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3273 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3281 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3284 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3285 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3286 // `channel_by_id` map.
3287 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3288 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3293 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3294 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3296 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3301 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3303 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3304 /// fields for more info.
3306 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3307 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3309 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3311 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3312 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3313 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3314 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3315 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3317 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3318 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3319 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3320 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3321 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3323 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3324 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3325 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3326 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3328 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3330 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3331 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3332 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3334 /// In general, a path may raise:
3335 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3336 /// node public key) is specified.
3337 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3338 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3340 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3341 /// relevant updates.
3343 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3344 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3345 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3347 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3348 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3349 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3350 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3351 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3352 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3353 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3354 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3356 self.pending_outbound_payments
3357 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3358 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3359 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3362 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3363 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3364 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3365 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3367 self.pending_outbound_payments
3368 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3369 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3370 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3371 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3375 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3376 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3377 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3378 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3379 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3380 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3384 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3385 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3386 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3390 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3391 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3395 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3396 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3397 /// retries are exhausted.
3399 /// # Event Generation
3401 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3402 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3404 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3405 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3406 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3408 /// # Requested Invoices
3410 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3411 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3412 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3414 /// # Restart Behavior
3416 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3417 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3418 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3420 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3421 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3423 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3426 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3427 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3428 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3429 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3430 /// never reach the recipient.
3432 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3433 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3435 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3436 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3438 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3439 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3440 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3442 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3443 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3444 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3447 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3448 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3450 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3453 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3454 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3455 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3457 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3458 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3459 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3460 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3463 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3464 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3465 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3466 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3467 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3468 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3469 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3470 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3471 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3474 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3477 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3478 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3481 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3482 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3483 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3484 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3485 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3486 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3487 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3488 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3492 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3493 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3494 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3496 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3497 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3498 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3499 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3500 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3501 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3502 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3503 } else { unreachable!(); });
3505 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3506 Err((chan, err)) => {
3507 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3508 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3510 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3511 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3512 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3518 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3519 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3521 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3522 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3525 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3526 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3527 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3531 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3532 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3535 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3537 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3539 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3540 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3541 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3542 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3544 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3551 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3552 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3553 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3557 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3559 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3560 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3562 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3563 /// across the p2p network.
3565 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3566 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3568 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3569 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3570 /// keys per-channel).
3572 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3573 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3574 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3576 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3577 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3578 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3580 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3581 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3582 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3583 /// for more details.
3585 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3586 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3587 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3590 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3591 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3592 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3594 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3600 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3601 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3602 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3603 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3604 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3605 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3606 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3607 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3611 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3612 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3613 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3614 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3618 let mut output_index = None;
3619 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3620 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3621 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3622 if output_index.is_some() {
3623 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3624 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3627 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3630 if output_index.is_none() {
3631 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3632 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3635 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3639 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3641 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3642 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3643 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3644 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3646 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3647 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3649 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3650 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3652 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3654 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3655 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3656 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3657 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3658 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3659 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3660 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3661 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3662 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3663 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3664 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3665 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3666 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3671 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3672 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3673 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3676 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3677 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3678 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3679 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3683 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3684 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3685 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3686 config.apply(config_update);
3687 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3690 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3691 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3692 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3693 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3694 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3695 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3702 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3703 debug_assert!(false);
3704 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3706 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3707 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3714 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3716 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3717 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3718 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3719 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3721 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3722 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3724 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3725 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3727 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3729 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3730 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3731 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3732 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3733 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3734 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3735 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3736 pub fn update_channel_config(
3737 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3738 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3739 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3742 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3743 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3745 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3746 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3748 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3749 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3750 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3751 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3752 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3754 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3755 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3756 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3759 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3762 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3763 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3764 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3765 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3766 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3767 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3770 let next_hop_scid = {
3771 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3772 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3773 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3776 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3777 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3778 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3779 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3780 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3783 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3785 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3786 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3787 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3789 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3790 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3791 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3796 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3797 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3798 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3801 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3802 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3803 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3805 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3807 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3808 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3809 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3810 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3811 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3814 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3815 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3816 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3817 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3818 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3820 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3824 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3825 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3827 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3830 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3831 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3834 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3835 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3836 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3839 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3840 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3841 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3842 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3843 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3844 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3845 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3846 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3849 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3850 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3851 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3852 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3857 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3859 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3860 /// Will likely generate further events.
3861 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3864 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3865 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3866 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3868 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3869 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3871 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3872 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3873 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3875 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3876 match forward_info {
3877 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3878 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3879 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3880 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3881 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3884 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3885 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3886 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3888 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3889 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3890 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3891 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3892 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3893 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3894 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3897 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3898 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3900 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3903 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3904 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3910 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3911 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3913 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3917 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3918 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3920 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3924 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3925 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3926 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3927 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3928 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3930 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3931 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3932 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3933 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3934 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3936 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3938 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3939 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3943 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3944 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3945 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3946 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3948 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3949 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3955 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3958 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3961 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3962 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3963 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3964 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3965 // problem, not ours.
3971 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3972 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3974 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3979 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3980 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3981 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3986 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
3987 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3988 match forward_info {
3989 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3990 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3991 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3992 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3993 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
3997 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3998 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3999 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4000 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4001 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4002 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4003 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4004 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4006 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4007 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4008 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4011 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4012 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4014 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4016 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4017 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4018 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4019 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4024 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4025 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4027 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4029 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4030 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4032 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4033 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4035 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4037 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4038 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4039 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4046 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4050 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4051 match forward_info {
4052 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4053 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4054 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4055 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4056 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4059 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4060 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4061 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4062 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4063 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4064 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4065 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4067 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4068 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4069 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4073 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4074 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4077 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4080 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4081 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4082 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4083 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4084 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4085 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4086 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4087 phantom_shared_secret,
4089 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4090 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4091 // if routing nodes overpay
4092 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4093 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4095 total_value_received: None,
4096 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4099 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4102 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4104 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4105 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4106 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4107 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4108 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4109 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4111 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4112 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4113 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4114 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4115 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4116 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4117 phantom_shared_secret,
4119 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4120 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4122 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4125 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4126 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4127 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4128 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4129 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4132 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4133 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4134 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4135 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4136 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4137 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4139 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4140 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4141 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4143 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4144 .entry(payment_hash)
4145 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4146 .or_insert_with(|| {
4147 committed_to_claimable = true;
4149 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4152 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4153 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4155 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4157 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4159 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4161 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4162 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4163 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4166 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4168 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4169 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4170 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4171 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4172 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4173 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4174 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4176 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4177 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4179 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4181 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4182 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4183 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4184 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4185 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4188 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4189 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4190 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4191 committed_to_claimable = true;
4193 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4194 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4195 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4196 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4197 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4198 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4199 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4200 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4201 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4202 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4206 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4207 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4208 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4209 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4210 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4212 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4214 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4215 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4217 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4218 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4219 committed_to_claimable = true;
4222 payment_claimable_generated
4226 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4227 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4228 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4229 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4230 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4231 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4232 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4233 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4235 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4236 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4237 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4238 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4239 Ok(result) => result,
4241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4242 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4245 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4246 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4247 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4249 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4250 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4253 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4254 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4255 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4257 check_total_value!(purpose);
4259 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4260 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4261 check_total_value!(purpose);
4265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4266 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4268 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4270 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4271 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4273 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4274 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4276 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4277 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4279 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4280 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4281 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4283 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4284 if payment_claimable_generated {
4285 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4291 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4292 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4300 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4301 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4302 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4303 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4305 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4308 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4310 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4311 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4312 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4314 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4316 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4317 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4318 events.append(&mut new_events);
4321 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4323 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4324 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4325 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4327 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4329 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4330 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4331 if background_events.is_empty() {
4332 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4335 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4337 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4338 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4339 // monitor updating completing.
4340 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4342 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4343 let mut updated_chan = false;
4345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4346 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4349 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4351 updated_chan = true;
4352 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4353 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4360 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4361 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4363 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4364 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4365 // however, ensure that.
4367 log_error!(self.logger,
4368 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4370 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4372 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4374 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4377 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4378 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4380 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4381 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4382 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4383 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4384 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4390 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4393 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4394 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4395 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4396 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4397 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4400 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4401 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4402 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4403 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4405 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4406 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4408 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4410 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4411 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4414 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4416 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4417 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4421 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4422 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4423 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4424 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4425 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4426 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4427 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4429 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4430 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4433 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4436 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4437 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4439 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4444 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4445 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4453 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4455 /// This currently includes:
4456 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4457 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4458 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4460 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4461 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4462 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4463 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4465 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4466 /// estimate fetches.
4468 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4469 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4470 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4471 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4472 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4474 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4475 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4477 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4478 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4479 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4481 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4482 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4483 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4484 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4485 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4486 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4488 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4489 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4490 log_error!(self.logger,
4491 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4492 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4493 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4494 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4495 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4496 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4497 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4498 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4499 channel_id: *chan_id,
4500 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4511 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4512 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4513 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4514 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4515 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4516 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4517 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4519 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4520 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4525 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4526 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4528 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4529 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4530 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4531 if needs_close { return false; }
4534 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4535 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4536 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4537 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4538 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4539 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4540 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4541 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4543 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4544 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4545 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4546 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4550 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4552 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4555 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4557 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4558 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4559 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4560 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4564 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4566 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4572 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4574 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4575 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4576 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4577 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4578 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4579 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4580 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4581 channel_id: *chan_id,
4582 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4590 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4591 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4592 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4594 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4595 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4596 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4601 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4602 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4603 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4604 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4605 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4606 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4607 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4608 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4614 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4616 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4617 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4622 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4623 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4624 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4625 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4626 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4627 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4628 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4629 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4630 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4631 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4632 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4634 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4635 // have no channels to the peer.
4636 let remove_entry = {
4637 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4638 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4641 entry.remove_entry();
4644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4649 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4650 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4651 // This should be unreachable
4652 debug_assert!(false);
4655 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4656 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4657 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4658 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4659 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4660 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4661 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4664 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4665 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4666 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4668 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4669 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4676 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4677 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4678 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4679 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4683 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4684 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4687 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4689 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4690 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4691 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4692 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4693 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4700 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4701 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4702 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4704 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4705 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4706 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4707 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4709 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4710 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4711 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4712 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4713 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4717 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4718 /// reason for the failure.
4720 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4721 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4724 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4725 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4726 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4727 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4728 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4729 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4730 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4735 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4736 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4737 match failure_code {
4738 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4739 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4740 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4741 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4742 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4743 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4745 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4746 let fail_data = match data {
4747 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4750 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4755 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4756 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4758 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4760 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4761 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4762 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4763 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4764 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4765 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4766 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4768 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4770 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4771 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4773 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4778 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4779 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4780 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4781 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4782 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4783 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4784 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4785 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4786 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4787 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4789 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4790 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4791 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4792 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4794 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4795 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4796 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4797 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4798 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4802 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4803 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4804 // be surfaced to the user.
4805 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4806 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4807 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4809 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4811 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4814 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4816 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4817 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4819 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4820 debug_assert!(false);
4821 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4826 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4829 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4830 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4831 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4832 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4836 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4837 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4838 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4839 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4840 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4841 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4842 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4843 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4844 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4847 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4848 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4849 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4852 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4853 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4854 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4856 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4857 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4858 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4859 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4860 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4862 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4863 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4864 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4866 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4867 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4868 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4869 push_forward_ev = true;
4871 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4872 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4873 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4876 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4879 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4880 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4881 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4882 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4883 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4884 failed_next_destination: destination,
4890 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4891 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4893 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4894 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4895 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4896 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4898 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4899 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4900 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4901 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4903 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4904 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4905 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4907 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4908 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4909 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4910 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4911 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4912 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4913 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4914 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4915 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4918 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4919 /// even type numbers.
4923 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4924 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4926 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4927 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4928 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4931 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4932 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4937 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4938 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4939 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4940 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4941 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4942 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4943 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4944 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4949 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4950 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4951 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4952 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4953 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4955 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4956 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4957 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4961 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4962 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4963 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4964 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4965 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4966 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4967 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4968 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4969 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4970 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4971 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4980 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4982 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4983 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4984 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4985 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4986 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4987 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4988 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4989 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4990 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4991 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4992 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4993 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4994 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4995 debug_assert!(false);
4999 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5001 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5002 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5003 debug_assert!(false);
5007 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5008 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5010 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5011 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5012 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5013 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5016 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5017 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5018 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5019 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5023 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5024 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5025 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5026 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5028 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5029 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5030 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5031 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5032 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5037 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5038 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5039 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5040 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5041 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5042 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5043 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5045 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5048 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5049 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5050 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5051 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5055 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5056 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5057 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5058 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5060 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5061 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5062 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5063 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5067 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5068 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5069 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5073 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5074 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5075 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5078 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5081 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5082 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5083 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5084 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5086 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5087 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5090 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5093 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5094 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5095 if let Err(e) = res {
5096 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5097 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5098 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5099 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5100 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5103 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5104 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5105 // monitor update as a background event.
5106 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5107 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5108 counterparty_node_id,
5109 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5110 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5119 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5120 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5121 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5127 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5128 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5129 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5130 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5131 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5132 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5133 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5134 // again on restart.
5135 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5136 payment_preimage, update_res);
5139 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5140 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5142 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5143 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5144 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5145 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5146 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5147 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5148 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5149 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5150 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5151 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5154 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5155 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5156 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5157 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5158 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5159 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5163 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5164 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5167 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5169 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5170 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5171 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5172 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5173 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5174 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5176 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5177 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5180 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5181 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5182 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5183 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5184 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5185 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5186 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5189 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5190 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5192 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5193 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5194 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5195 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5197 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5201 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5202 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5203 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5209 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5210 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5211 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5214 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5215 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5217 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5218 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5219 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5221 payment_purpose: purpose,
5224 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5226 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5230 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5232 sender_intended_total_msat,
5236 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5237 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5239 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5240 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5241 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5248 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5249 /// update completion.
5250 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5251 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5252 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5253 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5254 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5255 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5256 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5257 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5258 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5259 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5260 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5261 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5262 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5264 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5266 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5267 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5268 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5269 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5272 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5273 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5275 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5276 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5277 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5282 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5283 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5284 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5285 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5290 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5291 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5292 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5293 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5294 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5299 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5303 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5309 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5310 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5311 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5315 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5316 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5317 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5323 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5324 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5326 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5327 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5329 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5330 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5331 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5332 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5333 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5339 let mut peer_state_lock;
5340 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5341 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5342 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5345 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5348 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5349 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5350 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5351 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5352 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5355 let remaining_in_flight =
5356 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5357 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5360 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5361 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5362 remaining_in_flight);
5363 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5366 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5369 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5371 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5372 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5375 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5376 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5377 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5379 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5380 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5381 /// used to accept such channels.
5383 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5384 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5385 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5386 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5389 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5390 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5392 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5393 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5394 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5396 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5397 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5399 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5400 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5402 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5403 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5405 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5406 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5407 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5408 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5411 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5412 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5414 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5415 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5417 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5418 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5419 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5420 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5421 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5423 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5424 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5425 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5427 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5428 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5429 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5430 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5431 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5432 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5433 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5435 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5439 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5440 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5441 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5442 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5443 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5444 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5445 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5448 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5449 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5451 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5452 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5453 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5454 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5455 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5456 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5458 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5461 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5462 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5466 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5467 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5468 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5470 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5471 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5472 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5475 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5480 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5481 /// or 0-conf channels.
5483 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5484 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5485 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5486 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5487 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5488 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5490 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5491 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5492 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5493 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5494 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5495 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5496 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5500 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5503 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5504 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5506 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5507 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5509 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5510 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5511 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5512 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5513 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5515 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5518 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5519 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5520 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5523 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5524 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5529 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5532 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5533 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5534 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5537 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5541 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5542 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5543 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5544 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5545 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5547 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5548 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5550 debug_assert!(false);
5551 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5553 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5554 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5556 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5557 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5558 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5559 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5560 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5561 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5564 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5565 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5568 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5569 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5570 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5571 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5572 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5575 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5576 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5578 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5581 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5582 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5583 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5584 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5585 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5586 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5587 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5588 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5589 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5591 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5592 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5593 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5598 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5599 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5600 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5601 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5602 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5603 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5604 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5607 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5612 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5613 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5616 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5620 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5621 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5624 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5625 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5627 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5631 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5632 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5634 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5636 debug_assert!(false);
5637 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5641 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5643 match phase.get_mut() {
5644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5645 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5646 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5649 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5656 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5657 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5658 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5659 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5660 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5662 user_channel_id: user_id,
5667 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5668 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5671 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5673 debug_assert!(false);
5674 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5679 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5680 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5681 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5682 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5684 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5685 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5686 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5687 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5688 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5689 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5690 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5691 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5692 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5696 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5697 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5699 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5704 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5707 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5710 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5711 funding_msg.channel_id))
5713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5714 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5718 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5719 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5720 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5721 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5722 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5723 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5724 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5728 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5730 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5731 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5732 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5733 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5735 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5736 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5737 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5738 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5739 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5740 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5741 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5742 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5747 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5753 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5754 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5756 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5758 debug_assert!(false);
5759 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5764 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5766 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5767 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5768 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5769 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5770 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5771 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5772 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5773 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5774 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5775 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5776 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5777 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5791 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5795 debug_assert!(false);
5796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5802 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5803 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5804 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5805 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5808 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5809 msg: announcement_sigs,
5811 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5812 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5813 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5814 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5815 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5816 // announcement_signatures.
5817 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5818 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5819 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5820 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5827 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5828 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5833 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5834 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5838 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5843 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5844 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5845 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5846 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5847 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5849 debug_assert!(false);
5850 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5852 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5853 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5854 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5855 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
5857 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5858 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
5859 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5861 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5864 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5865 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5866 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5867 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5869 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5870 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5871 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5872 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5873 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5874 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5878 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5879 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5880 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5881 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
5885 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5886 let context = phase.context_mut();
5887 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5888 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5889 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
5890 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
5895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5898 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5899 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5900 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5901 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5907 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5909 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5911 debug_assert!(false);
5912 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5914 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5915 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5917 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5919 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5920 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5921 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5922 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5923 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5928 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5929 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5930 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5931 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5932 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5933 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
5934 } else { (tx, None) }
5936 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5937 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
5940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5943 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5944 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5945 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5947 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
5948 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5951 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5955 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5960 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5961 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5962 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5963 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5965 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5966 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5967 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5968 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5970 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5972 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5974 debug_assert!(false);
5975 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5979 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5981 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5982 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5983 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5984 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5985 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5986 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5988 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5989 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5990 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5991 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5992 match pending_forward_info {
5993 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5994 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5995 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5996 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5998 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5999 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6000 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6001 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6002 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6005 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6007 _ => pending_forward_info
6010 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6012 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6013 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6021 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6023 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6025 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6027 debug_assert!(false);
6028 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6032 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6034 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6035 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6036 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6039 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6040 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6046 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
6050 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6051 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6052 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6054 debug_assert!(false);
6055 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6057 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6058 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6059 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6061 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6062 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6064 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6065 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6073 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6074 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6075 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6077 debug_assert!(false);
6078 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6080 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6081 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6082 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6084 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6085 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6086 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6088 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6089 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6091 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6092 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6100 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6101 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6102 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6104 debug_assert!(false);
6105 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6107 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6108 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6109 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6111 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6112 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6113 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6114 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6115 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6116 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6119 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6120 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6128 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6129 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6130 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6131 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6132 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6133 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6134 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6135 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6136 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6137 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6138 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6140 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6141 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6143 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6144 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6145 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6147 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6148 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6151 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6152 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6154 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6155 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6156 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6158 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6159 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6160 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6161 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6162 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6165 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6166 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6169 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6170 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6171 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6172 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6173 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6174 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6175 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6176 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6179 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6180 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6181 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6186 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6187 // payments are being processed.
6188 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6189 push_forward_event = true;
6191 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6192 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6199 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6200 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6203 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6204 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6205 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6207 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6211 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6212 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6213 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6214 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6215 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6217 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6218 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6219 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6220 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6221 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6222 // real by taking more time.
6223 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6224 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6225 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6230 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6231 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6232 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6233 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6234 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6235 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6236 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6238 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6239 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6240 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6241 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6242 channel_funding_outpoint,
6243 counterparty_node_id,
6248 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6249 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6251 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6253 debug_assert!(false);
6254 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6255 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6257 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6259 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6260 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6261 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6262 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6263 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6264 *counterparty_node_id)
6266 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6267 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6268 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6269 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6270 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6271 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6272 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6274 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6276 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6277 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6283 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6287 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6291 debug_assert!(false);
6292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6296 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6298 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6299 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6301 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6302 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6310 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6311 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6312 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6314 debug_assert!(false);
6315 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6317 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6319 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6321 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6322 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6326 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6327 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6328 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6329 msg, &self.default_configuration
6330 ), chan_phase_entry),
6331 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6332 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6333 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6336 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6337 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6345 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6346 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6347 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6348 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6350 // It's not a local channel
6351 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6355 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6356 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6357 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6359 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6360 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6361 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6362 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6363 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6364 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6365 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6366 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6367 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6368 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6369 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6371 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6373 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6374 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6375 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6376 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6378 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6379 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6382 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6383 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6388 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6391 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6393 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6396 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6398 debug_assert!(false);
6399 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6403 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6405 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6406 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6407 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6408 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6409 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6410 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6411 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6412 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6413 let mut channel_update = None;
6414 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6415 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6416 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6419 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6420 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6421 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6422 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6423 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6424 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6425 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6430 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6431 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6432 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6433 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6434 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6435 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6439 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6440 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6447 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6448 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6451 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6452 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6457 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6458 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6459 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6461 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6462 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6463 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6464 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6465 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6466 match monitor_event {
6467 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6468 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6470 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6473 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6474 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6475 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6478 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6479 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6480 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6481 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6483 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6484 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6485 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6486 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6489 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6491 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6492 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6493 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6494 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6495 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6496 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6497 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6498 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6499 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6503 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6504 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6506 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6508 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6510 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6511 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6512 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6520 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6521 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6527 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6528 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6531 has_pending_monitor_events
6534 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6535 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6536 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6538 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6540 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6543 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6544 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6545 /// update was applied.
6546 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6547 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6548 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6549 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6551 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6552 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6553 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6554 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6557 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6559 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6560 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6561 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6562 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6564 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6565 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6566 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6567 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6568 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6569 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6571 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6572 has_monitor_update = true;
6574 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6575 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6576 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6577 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6579 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6581 continue 'peer_loop;
6590 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6591 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6592 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6595 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6596 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6602 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6603 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6604 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6605 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6606 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6607 let mut has_update = false;
6609 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6611 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6614 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6615 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6617 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6618 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6619 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6620 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6623 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6626 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6627 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6628 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6629 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6630 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6635 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6637 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6638 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6639 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6645 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6646 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6651 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6657 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6658 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6664 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6665 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6667 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6668 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6669 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6670 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6671 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6672 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6673 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6674 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6675 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6676 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6677 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6678 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6679 assert!(should_broadcast);
6680 } else { unreachable!(); }
6681 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6682 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6683 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6686 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6690 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6693 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6694 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6696 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6697 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6698 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6699 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6701 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6703 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6704 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6708 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6709 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6711 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6713 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6714 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6716 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6717 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6718 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6719 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6720 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6721 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6722 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6723 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6724 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6725 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6726 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6729 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6730 /// stored external to LDK.
6732 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6733 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6734 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6736 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6737 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6740 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6741 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6742 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6743 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6745 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6746 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6747 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6748 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6749 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6751 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6752 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6753 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6754 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6755 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6757 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6758 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6760 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6761 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6765 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6766 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6768 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6770 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6771 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6773 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6774 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6775 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6776 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6777 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6778 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6779 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6782 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6783 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6785 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6786 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6787 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6790 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6791 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6793 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6794 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6795 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6796 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6798 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6799 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6800 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6801 Some(_) => continue,
6802 None => return scid_candidate
6807 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6809 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6810 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6812 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6813 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6814 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6818 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6819 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6820 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6822 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6823 /// times to get a unique scid.
6824 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6825 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6826 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6828 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6829 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6830 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6831 return scid_candidate
6835 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6836 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6837 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6838 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6840 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6841 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6842 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6843 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6844 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
6845 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
6847 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6848 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6849 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6858 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6859 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6860 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6861 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6862 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6866 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6867 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6868 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6869 events.push_back((event, None));
6873 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6874 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6875 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6879 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6880 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6884 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6885 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6888 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6889 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6890 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6891 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6892 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6893 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6896 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6897 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6898 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6900 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6901 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6902 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6903 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6905 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6909 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6910 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6911 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6912 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6913 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6915 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6919 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6920 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6921 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6922 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6923 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6924 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6925 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6926 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
6928 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6930 if further_update_exists {
6931 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6936 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6937 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6942 log_debug!(self.logger,
6943 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6944 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6948 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6949 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6950 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6954 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6955 for action in actions {
6957 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6958 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6960 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6966 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6967 /// using the given event handler.
6969 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6970 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6974 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6978 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6980 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6982 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6983 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6984 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6989 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6990 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6991 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6992 /// is always placed next to each other.
6994 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6995 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6996 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6997 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6999 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7000 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7001 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7002 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7003 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7004 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7005 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
7007 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7008 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7009 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7010 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7013 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7014 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7016 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7017 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7020 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7022 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7023 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7024 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7025 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7026 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7030 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7031 events.replace(pending_events);
7040 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7042 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7043 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7044 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7045 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7046 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7047 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7051 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7053 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7054 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7055 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7057 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7061 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7063 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7064 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7065 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7066 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7067 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7068 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7072 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7074 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7075 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7076 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7077 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7078 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7081 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7082 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7085 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self,
7087 || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7088 let new_height = height - 1;
7090 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7091 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7092 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7093 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7094 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7095 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7098 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7102 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7104 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7105 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7106 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7107 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7108 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7109 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7113 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7114 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7115 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7116 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7118 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7119 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self,
7122 || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7123 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7124 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7126 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7127 if height < last_best_block_height {
7128 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7129 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7133 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7134 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7135 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7136 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7138 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7139 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self,
7142 || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7143 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7145 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7147 macro_rules! max_time {
7148 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7150 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7151 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7152 // having an explicit local time source.
7153 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7154 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7155 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7156 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7157 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7163 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7164 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7165 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7166 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7170 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7171 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7172 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7173 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7174 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7175 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7176 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7177 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7184 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self,
7186 || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7187 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7188 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7189 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7190 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7191 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7192 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7197 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7199 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7200 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7201 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7202 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7203 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7204 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7208 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7209 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7211 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7212 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7213 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7214 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7215 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7217 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7218 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7221 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7222 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7223 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7224 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7225 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7227 // Retain unfunded channels.
7228 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7229 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7230 let res = f(channel);
7231 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7232 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7233 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7234 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7235 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7237 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7238 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7239 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7241 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7242 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7243 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7253 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7254 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7257 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7259 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7260 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7261 msg: announcement_sigs,
7263 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7264 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7267 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7268 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7269 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7274 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7275 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7276 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7277 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7278 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7279 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7280 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7281 // is always consistent.
7282 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7283 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7284 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7285 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7286 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7289 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7290 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7291 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7292 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7293 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7294 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7295 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7299 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7300 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7301 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7302 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7304 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7305 data: reason_message,
7317 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7318 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7319 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7320 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7321 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7322 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7323 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7324 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7325 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7326 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7328 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7329 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7330 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7334 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7337 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7338 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7339 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7340 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7341 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7342 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7343 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7344 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7345 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7346 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7349 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7350 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7351 _ => unreachable!(),
7353 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7354 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7355 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7362 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7364 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7365 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7369 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7371 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7372 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7374 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7375 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7378 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7379 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7380 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7383 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7384 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7385 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7386 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7389 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7390 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7391 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7392 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7395 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7396 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7398 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7399 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7400 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7401 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7402 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7405 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7406 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7407 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7408 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7411 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7412 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7413 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7414 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7417 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7418 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7419 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7420 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7424 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7425 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7427 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7428 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7429 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7430 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7431 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7432 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7436 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7438 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7441 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7442 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7443 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7444 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7447 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7449 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7452 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7453 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7454 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7455 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7458 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7460 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7463 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7464 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7465 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7468 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7470 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7473 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7475 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7478 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7480 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7483 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7485 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7488 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7490 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7493 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7495 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7498 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7500 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7503 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7504 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7505 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7508 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7510 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7513 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7515 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7518 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7520 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7523 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7524 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7525 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7526 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7527 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7529 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7534 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7536 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7539 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7541 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7542 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7544 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7545 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7546 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7549 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7550 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7551 let context = match phase {
7552 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7553 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7554 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7555 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7560 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7561 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7564 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7568 // Clean up for removal.
7569 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7570 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7573 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7574 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7575 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7576 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7578 // V1 Channel Establishment
7579 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7580 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7581 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7582 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7583 // V2 Channel Establishment
7584 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7585 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7586 // Common Channel Establishment
7587 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7588 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7589 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7590 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7591 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7592 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7593 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7594 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7595 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7596 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7597 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7598 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7599 // Channel Operations
7600 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7603 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7604 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7605 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7607 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7608 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7609 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7610 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7611 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7618 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7619 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7620 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7621 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7624 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7626 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7628 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7629 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7633 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7634 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7635 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7639 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7641 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7642 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7643 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7644 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7645 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7646 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7649 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7650 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7652 if inbound_peer_limited {
7655 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7656 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7657 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7658 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7659 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7660 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7661 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7662 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7667 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7668 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7671 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7672 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7673 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7678 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7679 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7684 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7687 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7690 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7692 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7693 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7694 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7695 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7696 // worry about closing and removing them.
7697 debug_assert!(false);
7701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7702 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7703 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7707 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7711 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7714 match &msg.data as &str {
7715 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7716 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7718 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7719 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7720 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7721 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7722 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7723 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7724 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7725 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7727 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7728 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7729 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7730 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7731 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7733 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7737 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7738 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7739 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7740 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7741 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7742 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7744 log_level: Level::Trace,
7754 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7755 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7757 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7758 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7759 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7761 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7762 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7763 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7764 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
7766 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7767 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7768 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7772 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7774 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7775 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7776 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7777 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7778 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7779 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7780 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7781 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7789 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7790 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7794 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7795 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7798 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7799 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7802 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7803 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7806 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7807 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7808 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7809 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7812 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7813 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7814 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7815 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7818 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7819 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7820 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7821 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7824 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7825 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7826 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7827 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7830 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7831 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7832 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7833 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7836 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7837 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7838 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7839 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7842 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7843 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7844 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7845 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7848 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7849 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7850 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7851 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7854 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7855 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7856 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7857 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7861 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7862 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7863 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7864 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7865 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7869 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7870 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7872 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7873 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7874 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7875 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7876 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7879 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7880 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7881 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7882 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7885 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7886 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7887 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7888 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7891 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7892 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7893 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7894 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7895 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7896 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7897 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7898 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7899 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7900 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7901 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7902 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7903 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7904 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7905 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7906 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7907 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7908 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7909 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7910 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7915 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7916 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7918 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7919 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7920 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7921 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7925 (2, node_id, required),
7926 (4, features, required),
7927 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7928 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7929 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7930 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7933 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7934 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7935 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7936 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7937 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7938 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7939 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7940 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7941 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7942 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7943 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7944 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7945 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7946 (7, self.config, option),
7947 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7948 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7949 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7950 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7951 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7952 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7953 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7954 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7955 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7956 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7957 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7958 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7959 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7960 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7961 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7962 (32, self.is_public, required),
7963 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7964 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7965 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7966 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7967 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7973 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7974 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7975 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7976 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7977 (2, channel_id, required),
7978 (3, channel_type, option),
7979 (4, counterparty, required),
7980 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7981 (6, funding_txo, option),
7982 (7, config, option),
7983 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7984 (9, confirmations, option),
7985 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7986 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7987 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7988 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7989 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7990 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7991 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7992 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7993 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7994 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7995 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7996 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7997 (26, is_outbound, required),
7998 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7999 (30, is_usable, required),
8000 (32, is_public, required),
8001 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8002 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8003 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8004 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8005 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8008 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8009 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8010 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8011 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8012 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8014 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8018 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8020 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8021 outbound_scid_alias,
8025 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8026 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8028 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8029 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8030 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8031 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8032 confirmations_required,
8034 force_close_spend_delay,
8035 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8036 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8037 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8038 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8039 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8040 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8041 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8042 channel_shutdown_state,
8047 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8048 (2, channels, required_vec),
8049 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8050 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8053 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8055 (0, onion_packet, required),
8056 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8059 (0, payment_data, required),
8060 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8061 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8062 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8063 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8065 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8066 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8067 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8068 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8069 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8070 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8074 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8075 (0, routing, required),
8076 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8077 (4, payment_hash, required),
8078 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8079 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8080 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8081 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8085 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8086 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8088 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8090 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8091 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8092 reason.write(writer)?;
8094 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8095 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8098 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8099 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8100 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8101 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8108 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8109 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8110 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8113 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8114 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8115 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8116 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8120 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8121 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8122 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8123 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8124 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8127 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8128 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8129 // messages contained in the variants.
8130 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8131 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8132 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8134 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8135 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8136 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8137 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8138 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8141 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8142 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8143 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8144 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8145 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8147 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8152 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8157 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8158 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8159 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8160 (2, outpoint, required),
8161 (4, htlc_id, required),
8162 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8163 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8166 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8167 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8168 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8169 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8170 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8172 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8173 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8174 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8175 (2, self.value, required),
8176 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8177 (4, payment_data, option),
8178 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8179 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8180 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8181 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8187 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8188 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8189 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8190 (0, prev_hop, required),
8191 (1, total_msat, option),
8192 (2, value_ser, required),
8193 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8194 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8195 (5, total_value_received, option),
8196 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8197 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8198 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8200 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8201 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8202 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8204 if payment_data.is_some() {
8205 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8207 if total_msat.is_none() {
8208 total_msat = Some(value);
8210 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8213 if total_msat.is_none() {
8214 if payment_data.is_none() {
8215 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8217 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8219 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8223 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8226 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8227 total_value_received,
8228 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8230 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8231 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8236 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8237 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8238 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8241 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8242 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8243 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8244 let mut payment_id = None;
8245 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8246 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8247 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8248 (0, session_priv, required),
8249 (1, payment_id, option),
8250 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8251 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8252 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8253 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8255 if payment_id.is_none() {
8256 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8258 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8260 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8261 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8264 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8265 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8266 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8267 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8271 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8272 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8273 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8275 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8278 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8279 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8284 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8285 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8287 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8289 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8290 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8291 (0, session_priv, required),
8292 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8293 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8294 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8295 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8296 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8297 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8300 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8302 field.write(writer)?;
8309 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8310 (0, forward_info, required),
8311 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8312 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8313 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8314 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8317 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8319 (0, htlc_id, required),
8320 (2, err_packet, required),
8325 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8326 (0, payment_secret, required),
8327 (2, expiry_time, required),
8328 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8329 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8330 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8333 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8335 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8336 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8337 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8338 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8339 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8340 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8344 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8345 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8347 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8349 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8351 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8352 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8353 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8356 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8359 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8360 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8361 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8362 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8363 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8364 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8367 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8368 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8372 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8374 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8377 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8378 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8379 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8382 channel.write(writer)?;
8388 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8389 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8390 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8391 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8392 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8393 for forward in pending_forwards {
8394 forward.write(writer)?;
8399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8401 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8402 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8403 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8405 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8406 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8407 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8408 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8409 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8410 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8411 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8412 htlc.write(writer)?;
8414 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8415 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8418 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8419 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8420 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8421 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8422 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8423 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8424 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8427 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8428 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8429 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8430 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8431 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8433 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8434 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8435 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8436 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8437 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8438 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8439 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8444 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8445 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8446 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8447 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8448 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8449 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8450 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8451 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8452 0u64.write(writer)?;
8454 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8455 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8456 event.write(writer)?;
8460 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8461 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8462 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8463 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8464 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8465 0u64.write(writer)?;
8467 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8468 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8469 // likely to be identical.
8470 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8471 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8473 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8474 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8475 hash.write(writer)?;
8476 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8479 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8480 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8481 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8482 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8483 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8486 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8487 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8489 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8490 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8491 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8492 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8495 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8496 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8497 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8498 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8502 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8503 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8504 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8506 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8507 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8508 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8514 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8515 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8516 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8517 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8520 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8521 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8522 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8523 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8524 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8527 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8528 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8529 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8530 if !updates.is_empty() {
8531 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8532 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8537 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8538 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8539 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8540 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8541 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8542 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8543 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8544 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8545 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8546 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8547 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8548 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8549 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8556 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8557 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8558 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8559 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8562 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8563 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8564 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8565 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8566 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8567 // check that the event is sane here.
8568 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8569 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8570 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8571 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8577 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8578 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8579 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8580 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8581 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8582 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8585 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8586 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8587 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8588 events.push_back((ev, action));
8589 } else if action.is_some() {
8590 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8597 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8598 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8599 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8600 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8601 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8602 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8605 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8607 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8609 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8610 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8611 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8612 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8613 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8614 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8615 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8616 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8617 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8618 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8619 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8620 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8621 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8623 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8624 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8626 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8627 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8629 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8630 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8631 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8632 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8633 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8634 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8636 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8637 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8639 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8640 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8641 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8642 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8643 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8644 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8648 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8649 pub entropy_source: ES,
8651 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8652 pub node_signer: NS,
8654 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8655 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8657 pub signer_provider: SP,
8659 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8661 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8662 pub fee_estimator: F,
8663 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8665 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8666 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8667 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8668 pub chain_monitor: M,
8670 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8671 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8672 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8673 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8674 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8675 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8677 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8679 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8680 /// deserialization.
8682 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8683 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8684 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8686 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8687 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8689 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8690 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8691 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8692 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8694 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8697 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8698 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8701 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8702 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8704 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8705 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8706 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8707 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8708 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8709 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8713 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8714 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8715 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8716 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8717 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8719 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8720 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8725 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8726 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8727 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8728 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8730 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8732 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8733 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8734 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8735 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8739 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8740 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8741 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8745 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8746 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8748 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8750 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8751 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8752 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8757 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8758 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8760 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8761 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8762 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8764 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8766 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8767 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8768 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8769 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8770 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8771 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8772 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8773 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8774 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8775 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8777 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8778 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8779 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8780 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8781 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8782 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8783 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8784 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8785 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8786 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8787 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8788 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8789 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8791 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
8792 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
8793 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
8795 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
8796 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
8797 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8799 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
8800 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
8801 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8803 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8804 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8805 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8806 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8809 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8810 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8811 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8812 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8813 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8814 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8815 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8817 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8818 let mut found_htlc = false;
8819 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8820 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8823 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8824 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8825 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8826 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8827 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8828 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8829 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8830 log_info!(args.logger,
8831 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8832 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
8833 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8837 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8838 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8839 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8840 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8841 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8843 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8844 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8846 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8848 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8849 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8852 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8853 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8854 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8858 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8859 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8860 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8861 // safely discard the channel.
8862 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8863 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8864 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8865 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8866 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8867 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8868 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8871 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
8872 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8873 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8874 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8875 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8876 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8880 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8881 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8882 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8883 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
8884 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8885 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8886 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8888 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8892 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8893 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8894 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8895 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8896 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8897 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8898 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8899 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8900 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8902 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8905 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8906 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8907 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8908 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8909 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8910 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8911 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8912 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8914 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8917 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8920 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8921 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8922 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8923 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8924 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8925 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8926 is_connected: false,
8930 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8931 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
8932 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8933 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8934 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8935 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8936 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8937 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8940 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8942 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8943 for _ in 0..event_count {
8944 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8945 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8950 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8951 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8952 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8954 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8955 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8956 // on-startup monitor updates.
8957 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8958 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8960 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8964 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8965 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8967 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8968 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8969 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8970 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8971 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8975 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8976 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8977 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8978 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8979 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8980 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8981 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8983 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8988 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8989 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8990 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8991 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8992 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8993 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8994 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8995 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8996 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8997 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8998 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8999 let mut events_override = None;
9000 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9001 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9002 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9003 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9004 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9005 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9006 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9007 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9008 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9009 (8, events_override, option),
9010 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9011 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9012 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9013 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9015 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9016 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9019 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9020 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9023 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9024 pending_events_read = events;
9027 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9028 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9031 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9032 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9033 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9034 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9035 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9036 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9038 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9040 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9041 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9042 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9045 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9046 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9047 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9048 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9049 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9051 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9052 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9053 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9055 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9056 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9057 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9058 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9059 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9061 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9062 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9063 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9064 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9065 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9066 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9067 pending_background_events.push(
9068 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9069 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9070 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9071 update: update.clone(),
9074 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9075 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9076 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9077 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9078 pending_background_events.push(
9079 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9080 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9081 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9084 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9085 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9086 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9088 max_in_flight_update_id
9092 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9093 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9095 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9096 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9097 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9099 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9100 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9101 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9102 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9103 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9104 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9105 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9106 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9107 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9110 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9111 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9112 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9113 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9114 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9115 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9116 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9117 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9118 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9119 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9120 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9123 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9124 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9125 debug_assert!(false);
9126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9131 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9132 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9133 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9134 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9135 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9136 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9137 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9138 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9140 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9141 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9142 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9144 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9145 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9146 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9147 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9148 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9149 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9150 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9151 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9156 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9157 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9159 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9160 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9161 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9162 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9165 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9166 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9167 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9168 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9169 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9170 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9171 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9173 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9174 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9175 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9176 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9177 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9178 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9179 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9180 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9183 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9184 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9185 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9186 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9188 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9189 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9190 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9193 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9194 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9195 retry_strategy: None,
9196 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9197 payment_params: None,
9198 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9199 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9200 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9201 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9202 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9203 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9204 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9205 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9206 total_msat: path_amt,
9207 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9209 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9210 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9215 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9217 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9218 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9219 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9220 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9222 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9223 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9224 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9225 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9226 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9227 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9228 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9229 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9230 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9231 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9232 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9237 !forwards.is_empty()
9239 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9240 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9241 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9242 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9243 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9244 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9245 intercepted_id != ev_id
9252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9253 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9254 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9255 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9256 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9257 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9258 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9259 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9260 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9261 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9262 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9264 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9265 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9266 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9268 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9269 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9270 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9277 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9278 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9280 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9282 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9283 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9284 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9285 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9286 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9287 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9288 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9289 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9290 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9293 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9294 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9295 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9296 // channel still live case here.
9300 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9301 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9306 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9307 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9308 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9309 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9310 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9311 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9312 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9313 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9317 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9318 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9320 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9321 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9322 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9323 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9325 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9326 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9327 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9329 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9330 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9332 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9333 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9335 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9338 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9339 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9340 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9342 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9346 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9347 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9348 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9349 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9350 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9352 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9353 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9354 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9355 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9356 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9357 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9358 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9359 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9361 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9366 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9368 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9370 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9371 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9373 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9374 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9379 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9380 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9382 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9384 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9386 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9387 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9388 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9389 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9393 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9394 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9397 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9398 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9399 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9400 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9402 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9403 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9404 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9406 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9407 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9408 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9409 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9410 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9411 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9413 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9414 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9415 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9416 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9417 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9422 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9423 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9424 debug_assert!(false);
9425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9430 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9432 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9433 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9434 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9435 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9436 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9437 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9438 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9439 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9440 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9441 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9442 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9444 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9445 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9447 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9448 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9449 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9450 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9452 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9453 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9454 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9455 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9457 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9458 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9459 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9460 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9462 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9463 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9464 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9465 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9466 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9467 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9468 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9471 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9472 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9475 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9478 purpose: payment.purpose,
9479 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9480 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9481 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9487 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9488 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9489 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9490 for action in actions.iter() {
9491 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9492 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9493 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9495 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9496 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9497 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9498 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9500 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9501 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9502 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9503 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9509 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9511 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9512 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9516 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9518 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9519 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9520 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9521 router: args.router,
9523 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9525 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9526 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9527 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9528 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9530 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9531 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9532 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9533 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9534 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9535 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9537 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9542 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9544 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9546 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9547 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9548 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9549 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9550 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9551 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9553 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9554 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9555 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9557 logger: args.logger,
9558 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9561 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9562 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9563 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9564 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9565 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9568 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9569 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9570 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9571 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9572 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9573 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9576 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9577 //connection or two.
9579 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9585 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9586 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9587 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9588 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9589 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9590 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9591 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9592 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9593 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9594 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9595 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9596 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9597 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9598 use crate::util::test_utils;
9599 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9600 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9603 fn test_notify_limits() {
9604 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9605 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9609 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9611 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9612 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9613 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9614 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9615 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9617 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9619 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9620 // to connect messages with new values
9621 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9622 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9623 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9624 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9625 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9626 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9628 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9629 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9630 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9631 // ... but the last node should not.
9632 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9633 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9634 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9635 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9637 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9638 // about the channel.
9639 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9640 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9641 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9643 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9645 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9646 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9647 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9648 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9649 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9650 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9652 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9653 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9654 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9656 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9657 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9658 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9659 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9660 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9661 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9663 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9664 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9665 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9666 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9667 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9668 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9669 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9670 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9672 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9673 // the channel info has updated.
9674 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9675 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9676 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9677 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9678 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9679 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9683 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9684 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9689 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9690 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9692 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9693 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9694 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9695 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9697 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9698 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9699 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9700 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9701 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9702 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9703 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9704 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9708 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9710 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9711 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9712 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9714 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9715 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9716 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9717 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9718 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9720 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9721 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9722 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9724 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9725 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9726 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9727 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9728 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9729 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9730 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9731 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9732 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9734 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9735 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9736 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9738 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9740 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9742 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9743 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9744 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9745 // lightning messages manually.
9746 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9747 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9750 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9751 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9752 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9753 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9755 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9756 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9758 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9759 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9761 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9763 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9765 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9766 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9767 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9769 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9771 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9773 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9774 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9777 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9778 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9779 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9782 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9783 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9784 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9785 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9790 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9791 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9792 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9793 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9800 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9801 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9802 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9805 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9806 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9807 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9808 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9809 // fails as expected.
9810 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9811 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9812 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9813 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9814 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9815 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9816 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9817 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9818 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9819 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9820 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9821 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9822 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9823 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9824 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9826 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9827 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9828 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9830 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9831 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9832 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
9833 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
9834 let route = find_route(
9835 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9836 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9838 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9839 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9841 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9842 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9843 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9844 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9845 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9847 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9848 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9849 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9851 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9853 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9854 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9855 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9856 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9857 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9858 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9859 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9860 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9861 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9863 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9864 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9866 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9867 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9868 let route = find_route(
9869 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9870 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9872 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9873 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9875 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9877 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9878 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9879 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9881 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9882 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9883 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9884 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9886 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9888 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9889 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9892 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9893 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9894 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9896 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9897 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9898 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9899 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9900 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9901 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9902 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9903 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9904 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9906 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9907 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9909 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9910 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9911 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9912 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9914 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9916 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9917 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9918 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9920 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9921 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9922 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9925 let route = find_route(
9926 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9927 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9929 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9930 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9931 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9933 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9934 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9935 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9936 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9937 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9939 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9941 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9943 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9944 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9945 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9946 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9947 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9948 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9951 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9953 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9954 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9958 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9959 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9960 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9966 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9967 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9969 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9970 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9971 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
9972 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9973 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9974 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9975 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9976 let route = find_route(
9977 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9978 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9981 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9982 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9983 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9984 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9985 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9986 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9989 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9990 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9991 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9992 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9993 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9994 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9995 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9997 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10001 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10002 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10003 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10004 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10005 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10006 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10007 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10009 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10011 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10012 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10014 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10015 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10016 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10017 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10018 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10019 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10020 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10021 let route = find_route(
10022 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10023 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10026 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10027 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10028 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10029 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10030 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10031 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10032 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10033 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10036 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10037 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10038 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10039 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10040 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10041 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10044 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10048 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10052 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10054 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10055 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10056 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10057 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10059 // Marshall an MPP route.
10060 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10061 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10062 route.paths.push(path);
10063 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10064 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10065 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10066 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10067 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10068 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10070 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10071 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10073 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10074 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10076 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10081 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10082 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10083 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10084 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10085 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10087 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10089 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10090 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10092 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10093 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10095 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10098 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10099 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10100 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10101 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10102 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10103 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10106 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10109 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10110 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10115 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10116 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10117 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10120 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10122 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10123 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10125 total_msat: 100_000,
10128 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10129 // payment verification fails as expected.
10130 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10131 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10132 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10133 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10135 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10139 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10140 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10144 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10145 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10146 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10147 // the channel is successfully closed.
10148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10153 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10154 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10155 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10156 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10157 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10159 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10160 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10162 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10163 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10164 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10165 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10168 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10170 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10171 // as it has the funding transaction.
10172 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10173 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10174 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10177 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10179 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10181 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10183 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10184 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10185 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10187 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10190 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10191 // as it has the funding transaction.
10192 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10193 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10194 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10197 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10198 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10200 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10201 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10202 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10203 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10205 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10206 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10207 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10208 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10210 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10211 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10213 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10214 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10215 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10216 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10217 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10218 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10219 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10223 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10224 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10225 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10226 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10227 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10228 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10229 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10232 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10234 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10235 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10236 // closing transaction).
10237 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10238 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10239 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10241 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10242 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10243 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10244 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10245 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10248 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10250 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10252 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10253 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10254 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10256 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10258 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10259 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10262 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10263 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10264 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10267 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10268 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10269 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10272 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10274 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10275 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10277 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10278 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10280 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10281 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10286 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10287 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10288 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10289 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10290 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10291 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10292 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10293 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10296 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10297 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10298 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10300 // Test the API functions.
10301 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10303 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10305 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10307 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10309 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10311 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10313 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10317 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10318 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10324 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10326 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10327 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10329 let mut funding_tx = None;
10330 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10331 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10332 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10335 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10336 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10337 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10338 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10339 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10341 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10343 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10345 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10347 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10349 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10351 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10354 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10355 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10356 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10357 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10358 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10360 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10361 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10363 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10364 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10365 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10366 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10367 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10368 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10369 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10372 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10373 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10374 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10375 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10376 }, true).unwrap_err();
10378 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10379 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10380 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10381 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10382 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10383 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10384 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10386 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10387 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10389 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10390 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10391 }, true).unwrap_err();
10393 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10394 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10395 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10396 }, false).unwrap();
10397 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10399 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10400 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10402 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10403 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10404 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10405 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10406 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10408 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10409 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10410 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10412 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10413 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10414 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10416 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10417 // "protected" and can connect again.
10418 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10419 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10420 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10422 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10424 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10426 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10427 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10431 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10432 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10438 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10440 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10441 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10443 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10444 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10445 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10446 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10449 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10451 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10452 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10453 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10455 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10456 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10457 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10459 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10460 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10461 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10462 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10466 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10467 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10468 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10471 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10472 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10476 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10478 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10479 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10481 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10482 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10483 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10484 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10485 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10486 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10489 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10490 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10492 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10493 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10497 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10498 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10501 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10502 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10503 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10504 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10505 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10507 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10508 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10510 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10511 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10512 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10513 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10517 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10519 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10520 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10522 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10523 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10524 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10526 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10527 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10531 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10535 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10536 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10537 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10538 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10539 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10540 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10541 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10542 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10544 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10545 payment_metadata: None,
10546 keysend_preimage: None,
10547 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10548 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10550 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10552 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10553 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10554 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10555 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10556 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10558 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10559 } else { panic!(); }
10561 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10562 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10564 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10565 payment_metadata: None,
10566 keysend_preimage: None,
10567 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10568 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10570 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10572 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10573 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10577 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10578 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10579 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10580 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10581 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10583 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10584 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10589 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10590 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10592 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10593 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10595 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10596 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10597 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10598 match &msg_events[0] {
10599 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10600 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10602 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10603 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10604 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10610 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10611 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10613 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10614 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10617 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10621 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10622 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10623 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10624 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10627 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10628 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10629 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10634 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10635 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10637 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10638 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10640 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10641 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10646 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10647 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10649 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10650 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10652 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10653 // not have generated any events.
10654 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10658 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10659 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10660 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10661 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10662 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10663 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10664 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10665 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10667 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10668 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10671 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10672 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10673 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10674 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10677 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10678 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10681 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10682 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10683 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10685 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10686 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10687 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10688 ..Default::default()
10690 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10691 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10692 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10694 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10695 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10698 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10699 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10700 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10701 ..Default::default()
10703 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10704 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10705 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10708 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10709 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10712 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10713 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10714 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10715 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10716 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10719 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10720 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10721 ..Default::default()
10723 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10726 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10727 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10728 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10733 fn test_payment_display() {
10734 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10735 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10736 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10737 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10738 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10739 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10745 use crate::chain::Listen;
10746 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10747 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10748 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10749 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10750 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10751 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10752 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10753 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10754 use crate::util::test_utils;
10755 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10757 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10758 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10759 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10761 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10763 use criterion::Criterion;
10765 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10766 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10767 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10768 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10769 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10770 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10771 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10773 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10774 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10776 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10777 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10779 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10781 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10784 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10785 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10788 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10789 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10790 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10792 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10793 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10795 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10796 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10797 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10798 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10799 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10801 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10802 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10803 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10805 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10806 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10807 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10808 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10810 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10811 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10812 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10814 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10815 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10816 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10817 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10818 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10820 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10821 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10822 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10824 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10825 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10827 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10828 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10829 }, false).unwrap();
10830 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10831 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10832 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10835 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10836 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10837 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10839 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10840 } else { panic!(); }
10842 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10843 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10844 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10845 match events_b[0] {
10846 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10847 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10849 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10852 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10853 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10854 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10855 match events_a[0] {
10856 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10857 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10862 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10864 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10865 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10866 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10868 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10869 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10870 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10871 match msg_events[0] {
10872 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10873 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10874 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10878 match msg_events[1] {
10879 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10883 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10884 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10885 match events_a[0] {
10886 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10887 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10892 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10893 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10894 match events_b[0] {
10895 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10896 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10901 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10902 macro_rules! send_payment {
10903 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10904 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10905 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10906 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10907 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10908 payment_count += 1;
10909 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10910 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10912 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10913 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
10914 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
10915 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10916 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10917 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10918 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10919 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10920 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10921 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10922 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10924 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10925 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10926 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10927 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10929 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10930 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10931 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10932 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10933 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10935 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10938 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10939 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10940 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10941 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10943 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10947 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10948 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10949 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);