1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 use alloc::string::ToString;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
76 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
79 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
80 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
81 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
86 use util::logger::Logger;
88 use core::convert::TryInto;
91 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
94 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
95 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
96 // retrieve said payment type bits.
97 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
99 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
102 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
103 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
104 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
105 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
106 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
107 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
108 /// registered with LDK.
109 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
110 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
111 /// registered with LDK.
112 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
116 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
117 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
118 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
133 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
135 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
136 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
137 unknown => Err(unknown),
142 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
145 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
147 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
148 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
149 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
151 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
152 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
153 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
154 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
156 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
157 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
158 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
161 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
162 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
164 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
165 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
166 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
167 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
169 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
170 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
172 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
175 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
176 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
180 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
181 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
182 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
184 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
186 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
187 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
188 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
189 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
190 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
191 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
193 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
194 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
195 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
200 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
201 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
202 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
203 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
205 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
206 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
207 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
209 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
212 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
214 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
215 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
218 /// The metadata is constructed as:
219 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
220 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
222 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
223 /// match what was constructed.
225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
226 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
227 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
228 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
230 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
231 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
232 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
235 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
236 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
237 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
239 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
241 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
244 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
245 where L::Target: Logger
247 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
249 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
250 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
251 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
252 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
253 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
254 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
255 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
257 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
259 let mut payment_preimage = None;
260 match payment_type_res {
261 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
262 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
263 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
264 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
265 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
270 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
271 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
272 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
273 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
279 Err(unknown_bits) => {
280 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
285 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
290 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
298 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
299 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
301 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
302 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
303 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
304 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
305 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
308 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
309 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
311 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
315 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
316 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
317 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
318 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
320 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
321 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
322 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
323 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
326 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
329 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
331 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
332 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
333 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
334 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
335 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
336 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
337 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
339 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
343 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
345 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
346 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
347 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
349 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
350 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
351 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
352 // before we forward it.
354 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
355 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
356 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
357 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
358 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
363 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
364 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
367 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
368 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
369 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
372 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
379 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
380 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
381 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
382 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
383 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
386 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
387 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
388 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
389 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
392 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
395 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
396 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
399 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
401 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
403 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
404 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
405 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
407 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
409 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
413 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
417 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
418 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
420 short_channel_id: u64,
422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
423 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
425 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
426 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
431 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
432 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
433 /// are part of the same payment.
434 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
435 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
436 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
439 struct ClaimableHTLC {
440 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
443 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
446 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
447 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
448 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
449 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
451 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
452 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
457 impl Readable for PaymentId {
458 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
459 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
463 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
464 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
465 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
466 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
467 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
470 session_priv: SecretKey,
471 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
472 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
473 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
474 payment_id: PaymentId,
475 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
476 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
481 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
483 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
485 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
487 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
490 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
491 payment_id.hash(hasher);
492 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
493 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
494 payment_params.hash(hasher);
501 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
504 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
505 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
506 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
507 payment_secret: None,
508 payment_params: None,
513 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
514 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
516 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
524 struct ReceiveError {
530 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
531 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
533 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
538 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
540 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
551 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
553 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
555 err: LightningError {
557 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
558 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
565 shutdown_finish: None,
569 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
571 err: LightningError {
573 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
576 shutdown_finish: None,
580 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
581 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
584 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
586 err: LightningError {
588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
589 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
595 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
596 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
600 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
603 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
606 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
610 log_level: Level::Warn,
613 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
617 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
626 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
637 shutdown_finish: None,
642 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
643 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
644 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
645 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
646 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
648 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
649 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
650 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
651 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
652 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
653 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
654 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
656 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
660 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
661 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
662 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
663 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
664 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
665 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
666 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
667 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
669 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
670 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
671 /// and via the classic SCID.
673 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
674 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
675 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
676 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
677 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
678 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
679 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
681 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
682 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
683 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
684 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
687 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
688 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
689 /// quite some time lag.
690 enum BackgroundEvent {
691 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
692 /// commitment transaction.
693 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
696 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
697 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
699 latest_features: InitFeatures,
702 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
703 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
705 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
708 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
709 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
710 struct PendingInboundPayment {
711 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
712 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
713 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
714 /// this payment being removed.
716 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
717 user_payment_id: u64,
718 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
719 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
720 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
723 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
724 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
725 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
727 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
730 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
731 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
732 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
733 pending_amt_msat: u64,
734 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
735 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
736 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
738 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
739 starting_block_height: u32,
741 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
742 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
743 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
745 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
746 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
748 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
749 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
750 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
751 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
752 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
754 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
756 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
757 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
761 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
762 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
764 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
768 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
770 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
774 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
776 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
780 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
787 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
789 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
790 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
796 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
797 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
798 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
799 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
800 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
801 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
802 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
805 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
806 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
809 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
810 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
811 let our_payment_hash;
812 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
813 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
816 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
817 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
818 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
822 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
826 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
827 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
828 let remove_res = match self {
829 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
830 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
831 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
832 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
833 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
837 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
838 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
839 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
840 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
841 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
842 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
849 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
850 let insert_res = match self {
851 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
852 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
853 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
855 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
856 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
859 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
860 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
861 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
862 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
863 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
870 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
872 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
873 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
874 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
875 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
882 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
883 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
884 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
885 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
886 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
887 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
888 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
889 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
891 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
892 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
893 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
894 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
895 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
896 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
897 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
898 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
899 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
901 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
902 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
904 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
905 /// to individual Channels.
907 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
908 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
909 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
910 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
912 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
913 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
914 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
915 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
916 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
917 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
918 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
920 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
921 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
922 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
923 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
926 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
927 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
928 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
929 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
930 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
932 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
933 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
934 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
935 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
936 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
937 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
938 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
939 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
940 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
941 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
944 default_configuration: UserConfig,
945 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
951 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
953 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
954 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
956 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
957 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
958 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
959 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
961 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
962 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
963 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
964 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
965 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
966 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
968 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
969 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
970 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
971 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
972 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
973 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
974 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
975 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
977 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
979 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
980 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
982 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
983 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
984 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
985 /// active channel list on load.
986 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
988 our_network_key: SecretKey,
989 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
991 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
993 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
994 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
995 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
997 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
998 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1000 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
1001 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
1002 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
1004 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1005 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1006 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1007 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1009 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1010 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1011 /// are currently open with that peer.
1012 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1013 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1016 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1017 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1019 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1020 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1021 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1022 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1023 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1024 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1025 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1026 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1027 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1029 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1036 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1038 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1039 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1040 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1041 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1042 pub struct ChainParameters {
1043 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1044 pub network: Network,
1046 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1048 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1049 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1052 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1058 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1059 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1060 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1061 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1062 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1063 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1065 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1066 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1067 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1068 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1069 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1071 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1072 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1075 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1076 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1077 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1080 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1081 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1083 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1084 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1085 should_persist: persist_check,
1086 _read_guard: read_guard,
1091 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1092 fn drop(&mut self) {
1093 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1094 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1099 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1100 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1102 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1104 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1105 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1106 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1107 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1108 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1110 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1111 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1113 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1115 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1116 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1117 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1118 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1119 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1120 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1121 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1123 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1124 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1126 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1127 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1128 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1129 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1131 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1132 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1133 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1134 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1135 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1136 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1139 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1141 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1142 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1145 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1147 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1148 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1149 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1151 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1153 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1154 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1155 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1156 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1157 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1158 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1159 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1160 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1161 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1164 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1165 /// to better separate parameters.
1166 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1167 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1168 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1169 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1170 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1171 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1172 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1173 pub features: InitFeatures,
1174 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1175 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1176 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1178 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1180 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1181 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1182 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1183 /// payments to us through this channel.
1184 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1187 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1188 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1189 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1190 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1191 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1192 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1193 /// lifetime of the channel.
1194 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1195 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1196 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1197 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1198 /// our counterparty already.
1200 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1201 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1202 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1203 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1205 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1206 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1207 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1208 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1210 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1211 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1213 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1214 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1215 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1216 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1217 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1218 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1219 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1221 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1222 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1223 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1224 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1225 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1226 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1227 /// this value on chain.
1229 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1231 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1233 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1234 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1235 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1236 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1237 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1238 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1239 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1241 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1242 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1243 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1244 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1246 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1247 pub balance_msat: u64,
1248 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1249 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1250 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1251 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1253 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1255 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1256 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1257 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1258 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1259 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1260 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1261 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1262 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1263 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1265 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1266 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1267 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1268 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1269 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1270 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1271 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1272 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1273 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1275 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1277 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1278 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1279 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1280 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1281 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1282 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1283 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1284 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1285 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1287 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1288 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1289 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1290 pub is_outbound: bool,
1291 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1292 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1293 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1294 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1295 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1297 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1298 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1299 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1300 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1302 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1303 pub is_usable: bool,
1304 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1305 pub is_public: bool,
1308 impl ChannelDetails {
1309 /// Gets the SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments. This
1310 /// should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our counterparty
1311 /// will forward a payment to us.
1312 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1313 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1317 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1318 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1319 /// states for more.
1320 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1321 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1322 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1323 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1324 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1325 ParameterError(APIError),
1326 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1327 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1328 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1329 /// payment in full.
1331 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1333 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1334 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1335 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1336 /// paths than the ones selected).
1337 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1338 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1339 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1340 /// in over-/re-payment.
1342 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1343 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1344 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1346 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1347 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1348 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1349 /// with the latest update_id.
1351 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1352 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1353 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1354 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1355 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1356 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1357 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1358 payment_id: PaymentId,
1362 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1364 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1366 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1367 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1368 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1369 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1371 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1372 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1373 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1376 macro_rules! handle_error {
1377 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1380 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1381 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1383 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1384 // entering the macro.
1385 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1386 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1389 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1391 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1392 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1393 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1394 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1398 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1399 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1400 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1401 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1406 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1407 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1409 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1410 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1411 action: err.action.clone()
1415 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1416 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1419 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1426 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1427 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1428 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1429 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1431 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1432 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1433 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1434 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1435 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1437 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1438 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1440 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1444 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1445 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1446 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1448 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1449 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1451 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1452 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1454 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1455 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1456 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1457 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1458 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1459 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1461 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1462 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1463 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1464 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1465 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1466 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1472 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1473 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1477 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1479 $entry.remove_entry();
1487 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1488 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1492 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1494 $entry.remove_entry();
1502 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1503 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1505 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1506 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1512 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1513 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1515 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1516 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1517 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1518 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1519 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1520 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1521 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1522 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1523 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1524 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1525 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1526 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1527 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1528 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1531 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1532 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1533 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1534 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1535 match $action_type {
1536 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1537 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1539 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1540 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1542 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1543 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1544 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1545 if !$resend_commitment {
1546 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1549 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1551 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1552 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1556 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1557 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1559 $entry.remove_entry();
1563 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1564 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1565 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1567 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1568 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1570 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1571 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1573 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1574 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1578 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1579 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1580 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1582 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1583 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1587 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1588 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1589 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1590 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1591 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1594 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1599 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1600 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1601 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1602 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1603 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1605 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1606 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1607 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1608 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1609 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1610 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1611 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1612 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1613 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1618 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1619 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1620 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1621 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1622 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1624 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1625 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1626 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1628 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1629 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1630 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1631 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1634 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1635 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1636 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1637 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1638 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1639 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1640 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1641 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1642 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1643 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1644 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1645 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1648 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1649 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1650 // before it should be allowed to.
1651 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1652 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1654 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1655 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1656 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1661 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1662 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1663 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1664 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1665 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1666 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1667 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1668 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1669 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1670 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1671 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1672 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1673 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1674 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1675 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1676 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1677 let mut order = $order;
1679 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1681 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1685 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1686 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1687 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1688 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1693 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1694 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1695 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1696 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1697 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1702 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1706 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1711 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1712 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1713 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1718 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1719 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1720 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1721 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1722 assert!(res.is_ok());
1725 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1729 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1730 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1731 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1733 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1735 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1736 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1741 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1742 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1744 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1745 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1748 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1750 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1751 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1753 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1755 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1757 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1758 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1759 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1760 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1761 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1762 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1763 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1764 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1766 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1767 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1768 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1772 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1774 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1775 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1776 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1777 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1778 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1779 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1781 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1782 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1783 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1785 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1786 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1789 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1790 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1792 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1793 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1795 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1797 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1798 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1799 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1800 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1808 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1809 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1810 &self.default_configuration
1813 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1814 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1815 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1818 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1819 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1821 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1823 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1827 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1832 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1834 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1835 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1836 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1837 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1838 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1841 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1842 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1844 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1845 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1846 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1848 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1849 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1850 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1851 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1852 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1853 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1855 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1856 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1857 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1858 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1859 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1860 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1865 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1866 Some(peer_state) => {
1867 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1868 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1869 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1870 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1871 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1872 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1873 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1877 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1882 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1885 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1888 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1889 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1891 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1892 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1896 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1898 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1904 node_id: their_network_key,
1907 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1910 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1911 let mut res = Vec::new();
1913 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1914 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1915 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1916 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1917 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1918 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1919 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1920 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1921 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1922 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1923 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1924 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1925 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1926 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1928 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1929 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1930 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1931 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1932 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1933 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1934 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1935 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1937 inbound_capacity_msat,
1938 outbound_capacity_msat,
1939 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1940 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1941 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1942 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1943 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1944 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1945 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1950 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1951 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1952 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1958 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1959 /// more information.
1960 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1961 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1964 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1965 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1967 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1968 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1970 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1971 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1972 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1973 // really wanted anyway.
1974 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1977 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1978 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1979 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1980 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1981 Some(transaction) => {
1982 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1986 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1987 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1988 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1989 reason: closure_reason
1993 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1996 let counterparty_node_id;
1997 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1998 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1999 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2000 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2001 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2003 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2005 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2006 Some(peer_state) => {
2007 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
2008 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2009 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
2011 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
2013 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2015 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2016 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
2017 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2018 let (result, is_permanent) =
2019 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
2021 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2027 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2028 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2032 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2033 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2034 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2035 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2039 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
2047 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2048 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2051 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
2055 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2056 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2057 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2059 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2060 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2062 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2063 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2064 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2065 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2067 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2069 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2070 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2071 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2072 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2073 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
2076 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2077 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2078 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2080 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2081 /// the channel being closed or not:
2082 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2083 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2084 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2085 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2086 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2087 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2088 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2090 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2092 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2093 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2094 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2095 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2096 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2100 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2101 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2102 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2103 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2104 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2106 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2107 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2108 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2109 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2110 // ignore the result here.
2111 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2115 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2116 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2117 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2119 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2120 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2121 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2122 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2123 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2127 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2128 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2129 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2132 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2134 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
2136 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2139 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2140 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2141 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2142 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2143 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2148 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2151 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2152 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2153 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2155 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2156 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2157 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2158 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2159 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2160 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2161 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2171 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2172 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2173 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2174 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2175 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2179 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2180 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2182 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2183 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2184 return Err(ReceiveError {
2185 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2187 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2190 // final_expiry_too_soon
2191 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2192 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2193 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2194 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2195 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2196 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2197 return Err(ReceiveError {
2199 err_data: Vec::new(),
2200 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2203 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2204 return Err(ReceiveError {
2206 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2207 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2211 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2212 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2213 return Err(ReceiveError {
2214 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2215 err_data: Vec::new(),
2216 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2219 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2220 return Err(ReceiveError {
2221 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2222 err_data: Vec::new(),
2223 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2226 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2227 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2228 return Err(ReceiveError {
2229 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2230 err_data: Vec::new(),
2231 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2233 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2234 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2236 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2237 phantom_shared_secret,
2239 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2240 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2241 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2242 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2243 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2244 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2245 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2246 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2247 return Err(ReceiveError {
2248 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2249 err_data: Vec::new(),
2250 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2254 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2256 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2259 return Err(ReceiveError {
2260 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2261 err_data: Vec::new(),
2262 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2267 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2270 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2271 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2272 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2276 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2277 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2278 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2280 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2281 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2282 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2283 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2284 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2285 failure_code: $err_code,
2286 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2291 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2292 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2295 let shared_secret = {
2296 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2297 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2301 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2302 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2303 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2304 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2305 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2306 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2307 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2308 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2311 let mut channel_state = None;
2312 macro_rules! return_err {
2313 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2315 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2316 if channel_state.is_none() {
2317 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2319 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2320 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2321 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2322 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2323 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2328 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2330 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2331 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2333 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2334 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2338 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2339 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2341 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2343 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2344 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2345 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2346 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2347 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2349 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2352 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2353 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2355 let blinding_factor = {
2356 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2357 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2358 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2359 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2362 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2364 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2366 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2369 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2370 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2373 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2374 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2375 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2376 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2377 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2381 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2382 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2383 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2386 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2387 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2388 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2389 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2394 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2395 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2396 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2397 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2398 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2399 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2400 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2401 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2402 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2403 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2404 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2406 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2409 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2412 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2414 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2415 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2416 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2417 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2418 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2419 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2420 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2422 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2423 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2424 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2425 // we don't have the channel here.
2426 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2428 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2430 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2431 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2432 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2433 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2434 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2435 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2436 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2438 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2439 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2441 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2442 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2443 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2444 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2445 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2447 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2448 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2450 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2451 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2453 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2454 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2455 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2456 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2457 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2458 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2460 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2461 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2463 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2464 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2465 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2466 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2467 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2468 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2469 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2470 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2471 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2472 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2478 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
2479 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2480 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2481 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2483 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2484 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2486 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2487 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2488 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2490 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2491 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2493 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2498 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2501 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2502 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2503 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2505 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2506 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2507 if !chan.should_announce() {
2508 return Err(LightningError {
2509 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2510 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2514 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2517 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2518 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2519 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2520 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2521 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2522 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2523 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2524 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2525 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2529 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2531 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2533 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2535 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2536 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2538 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2539 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2540 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2541 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2542 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2543 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2544 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2545 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2548 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2549 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2551 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2557 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2558 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2559 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2560 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2561 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2562 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2564 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2565 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2566 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2567 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2568 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2570 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2574 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2575 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2577 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2578 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2579 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2580 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2581 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2582 err: "Payment already completed"
2587 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2588 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2589 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2592 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2594 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2595 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2596 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2597 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2598 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2599 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2600 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2601 total_msat: total_value,
2603 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2608 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2610 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2611 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2613 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2614 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2616 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2617 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2619 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2620 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2622 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2623 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2624 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2625 channel_state, chan)
2627 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2628 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2629 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2630 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2631 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2632 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2633 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2634 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2635 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2636 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2638 insert_outbound_payment!();
2640 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2641 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2642 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2643 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2644 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2645 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2646 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2647 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2653 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2655 } else { unreachable!(); }
2659 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2660 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2662 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2667 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2669 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2670 /// fields for more info.
2672 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2673 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2674 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2675 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2676 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2677 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2679 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2681 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2682 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2683 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2685 /// In general, a path may raise:
2686 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2687 /// node public key) is specified.
2688 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2689 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2691 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2692 /// relevant updates.
2694 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2695 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2696 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2698 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2699 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2700 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2701 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2703 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2704 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2705 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2706 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2707 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2710 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2711 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2712 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2714 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2715 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2716 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2717 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2718 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2720 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2721 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2723 let mut total_value = 0;
2724 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2725 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2726 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2727 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2728 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2729 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2730 continue 'path_check;
2732 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2733 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2734 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2735 continue 'path_check;
2738 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2739 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2741 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2742 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2744 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2745 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2746 total_value = amt_msat;
2749 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2750 let mut results = Vec::new();
2751 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2752 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2754 let mut has_ok = false;
2755 let mut has_err = false;
2756 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2757 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2758 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2759 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2760 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2761 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2762 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2766 } else if res.is_err() {
2767 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2768 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2771 if has_err && has_ok {
2772 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2775 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2776 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2777 Some(RouteParameters {
2778 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2779 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2780 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2786 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2787 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2788 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2789 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2795 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2797 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2798 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2799 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2800 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2801 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2803 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2804 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2805 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2806 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2807 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2808 if path.len() == 0 {
2809 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2810 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2815 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2816 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2817 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2819 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2820 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2822 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2823 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2824 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2825 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2828 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2830 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2831 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2832 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2835 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2836 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2837 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2840 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2841 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2842 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2847 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2848 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2852 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2855 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2857 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2858 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2859 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2860 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2862 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2863 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2864 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2866 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2867 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2868 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2869 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2872 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2873 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2874 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2875 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2876 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2878 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2886 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2887 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2888 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2889 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2890 /// never reach the recipient.
2892 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2894 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2895 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2897 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2899 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2900 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2901 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2903 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2905 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2906 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2907 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2912 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2913 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2914 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2915 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2917 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2919 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2921 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2922 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2923 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2924 } else { unreachable!(); })
2927 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2929 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2930 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2933 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2934 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2939 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2940 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2941 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2944 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2946 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2956 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2957 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2958 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2962 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2964 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2965 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2967 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2968 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2970 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2971 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2972 /// keys per-channel).
2974 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2975 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2976 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2978 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2979 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2980 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2982 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2983 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2984 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2985 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2987 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2988 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2989 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2990 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2994 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2995 let mut output_index = None;
2996 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2997 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2998 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2999 if output_index.is_some() {
3000 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3001 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3004 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3006 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3009 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3012 if output_index.is_none() {
3013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3014 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3017 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3022 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
3023 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
3024 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
3026 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
3029 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
3030 // smaller than 500:
3031 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
3033 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
3034 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
3035 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
3036 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
3037 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
3038 /// our network addresses.
3040 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
3041 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
3043 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
3044 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
3045 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
3046 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
3048 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
3050 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3051 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
3052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3054 if addresses.len() > 500 {
3055 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
3058 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
3059 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
3060 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
3062 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3063 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3064 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
3065 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
3066 rgb, alias, addresses,
3067 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
3068 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3070 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3071 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3073 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3074 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3076 let mut announced_chans = false;
3077 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3078 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
3079 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3081 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
3086 announced_chans = true;
3088 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
3089 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
3090 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
3094 if announced_chans {
3095 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3096 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3097 signature: node_announce_sig,
3098 contents: announcement
3104 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3106 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3107 /// Will likely generate further events.
3108 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3111 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3112 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3113 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3114 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3116 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3119 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3120 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3121 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3122 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3124 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3125 match forward_info {
3126 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3127 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3128 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3129 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3130 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3132 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3133 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3134 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3135 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3136 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3137 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3138 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3140 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3141 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3147 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3148 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3149 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3150 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3151 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3152 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3155 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3157 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3158 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3159 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3160 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3161 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3163 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3165 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3166 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3170 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3171 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3172 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3173 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3179 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3182 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3185 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3186 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3187 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3188 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3189 // problem, not ours.
3196 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3197 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3198 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3199 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3200 match forward_info {
3201 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3202 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3204 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3205 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3207 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3208 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3209 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3210 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3211 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3212 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3213 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3215 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3217 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3220 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3222 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3223 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3224 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3230 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3232 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3233 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3234 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3235 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3236 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3237 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3238 // this channel currently :/.
3244 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3245 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3247 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3249 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3251 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3254 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3256 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3257 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3258 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3261 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3263 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3264 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3265 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3266 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3267 // messages when we can.
3268 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3269 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3270 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3277 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3278 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3281 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3282 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3283 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3284 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3285 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3286 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3288 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3290 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3291 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3292 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3294 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3296 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3300 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3301 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3304 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3305 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3306 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3307 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3308 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3309 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3310 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3311 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3312 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3314 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3322 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3323 match forward_info {
3324 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3325 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3326 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3327 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3328 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3329 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3330 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3331 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3333 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3336 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3337 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3338 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3339 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3340 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3341 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3342 phantom_shared_secret,
3344 value: amt_to_forward,
3349 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3351 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3352 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3353 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3355 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3356 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3357 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3358 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3359 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3360 phantom_shared_secret,
3362 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3367 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3368 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3369 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3370 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3371 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3372 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3373 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3375 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3379 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3380 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3381 total_value += htlc.value;
3382 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3383 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3384 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3386 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3387 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3389 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3391 _ => unreachable!(),
3394 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3396 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3397 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3398 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3399 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3400 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3402 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3403 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3404 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3408 payment_received_generated = true;
3410 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3411 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3413 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3415 payment_received_generated
3419 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3420 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3421 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3422 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3423 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3424 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3425 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3426 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3428 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3429 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3430 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3431 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3433 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3437 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3438 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3439 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3441 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3442 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3444 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3445 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3447 amt: amt_to_forward,
3448 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3453 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3461 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3465 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3468 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3471 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3473 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3474 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3476 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3477 if payment_received_generated {
3478 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3484 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3485 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3493 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3494 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3496 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3498 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3499 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3502 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3503 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3504 events.append(&mut new_events);
3507 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3509 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3510 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3512 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3513 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3514 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3515 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3516 if background_events.is_empty() {
3520 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3522 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3523 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3524 // monitor updating completing.
3525 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3532 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3533 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3534 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3535 self.process_background_events();
3538 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3539 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3540 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3541 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3543 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3544 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3546 if !chan.is_live() {
3547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3548 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3549 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3552 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3554 let mut retain_channel = true;
3555 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3558 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3559 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3563 let ret_err = match res {
3564 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3565 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3566 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3567 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3570 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3571 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3572 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3573 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3574 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3575 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3576 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3577 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3587 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3591 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3592 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3593 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3594 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3595 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3596 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3597 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3599 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3601 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3603 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3605 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3606 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3607 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3608 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3609 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3611 handle_errors.push(err);
3621 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3623 /// This currently includes:
3624 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3625 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3626 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3629 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3630 /// estimate fetches.
3631 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3632 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3633 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3634 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3636 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3638 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3640 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3641 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3642 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3643 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3644 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3645 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3646 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3647 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3649 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3651 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3653 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3654 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3655 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3656 if needs_close { return false; }
3659 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3660 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3661 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3662 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3663 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3664 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3665 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3670 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3671 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3673 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3674 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3679 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3680 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3689 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3690 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3696 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3697 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3698 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3699 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3700 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3701 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3702 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3704 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3705 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3706 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3707 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3708 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3709 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3710 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3711 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3712 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3713 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3714 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3720 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3721 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3723 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3725 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3726 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3727 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3728 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3729 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3730 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3731 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3733 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3735 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3736 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3738 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3743 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3744 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3745 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3746 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3747 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3748 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
3749 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3750 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3751 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3753 (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3754 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3755 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3757 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3758 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3759 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3760 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3761 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3765 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3766 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3767 // be surfaced to the user.
3768 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3769 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3771 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3772 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3773 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3775 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3779 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3780 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3781 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3783 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3784 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3785 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3786 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3787 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3788 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3789 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3790 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3791 Some(RouteParameters {
3792 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3793 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3794 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3797 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3798 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3799 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3801 rejected_by_dest: false,
3802 network_update: None,
3803 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3805 short_channel_id: None,
3812 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3813 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3815 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3821 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3828 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3829 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3830 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3831 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3832 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3833 /// still-available channels.
3834 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3835 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3836 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3837 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3840 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3841 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3842 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3844 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3845 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3846 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3847 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3848 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3849 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3850 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3851 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3852 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3855 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3856 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3859 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3860 all_paths_failed = true;
3861 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3862 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3864 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3870 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3873 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3874 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3875 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3876 Some(RouteParameters {
3877 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3878 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3879 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3882 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3884 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3885 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3887 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3889 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3890 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3891 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3892 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3893 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3894 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3895 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3896 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3903 error_code: onion_error_code,
3905 error_data: onion_error_data
3908 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3914 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3915 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3916 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3917 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3919 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3920 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3921 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3922 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3923 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3924 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3925 network_update: None,
3928 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3931 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3933 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3937 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3938 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3939 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3941 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3942 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3943 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3944 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3945 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3946 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3947 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3948 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3950 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3951 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3954 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3956 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3960 let mut forward_event = None;
3961 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3962 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3964 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3966 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3969 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3972 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3973 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3974 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3975 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3976 time_forwardable: time
3983 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3984 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3986 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3987 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3988 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3989 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3991 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3992 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3994 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3995 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3996 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3997 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3998 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3999 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4003 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4004 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4005 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
4006 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4008 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4009 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4010 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4011 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4013 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4014 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4015 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4016 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4017 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4019 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4020 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4021 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4027 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4028 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4029 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4031 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4032 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4033 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4034 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4035 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4036 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4037 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4039 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4040 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4041 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4042 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4043 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4044 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4045 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4046 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4048 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4049 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4050 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4051 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4052 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4053 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4055 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4060 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4061 // which were generated.
4062 channel_state.take();
4064 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4065 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4066 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4073 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4074 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4075 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4076 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4077 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4079 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4083 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4084 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4085 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4086 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4087 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4088 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4089 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4090 payment_preimage, e);
4091 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4092 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4093 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4094 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4097 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4098 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4099 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4100 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4101 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4102 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4103 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4104 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4105 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4106 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4112 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4114 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4117 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4118 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4119 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4120 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4121 payment_preimage, e);
4123 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4124 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4126 chan.remove_entry();
4128 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4131 } else { unreachable!(); }
4134 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4135 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4136 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4137 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4138 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4139 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4140 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4141 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4142 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4143 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4144 pending_events.push(
4145 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4147 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4152 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4160 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4162 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4163 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4164 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4165 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4166 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4167 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4168 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4169 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4170 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4171 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4172 pending_events.push(
4173 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4174 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4180 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4184 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4185 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4186 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4188 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4189 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4190 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4191 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4192 pending_events.push(
4193 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4201 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4209 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4210 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4211 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4212 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4213 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4214 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4215 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4218 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4219 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4220 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4221 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4222 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4225 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4226 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4227 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4228 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4229 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4230 payment_preimage, e);
4232 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4233 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4234 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4235 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4238 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4239 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4240 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4241 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4245 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4246 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4247 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4250 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4251 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4253 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4261 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4262 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4263 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4266 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4269 let chan_restoration_res;
4270 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4271 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4273 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4277 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4281 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4282 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4283 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4284 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4285 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4286 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4288 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4289 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4290 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4295 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4296 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4297 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4299 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4301 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4302 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4303 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4304 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4308 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4311 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4313 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4314 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4317 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4319 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4321 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4322 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4324 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4325 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4326 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4330 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4336 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4337 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4341 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4342 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4345 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4346 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4347 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4348 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4351 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4356 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4357 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4358 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4360 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4361 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4364 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4366 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4367 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4370 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4371 pending_events.push(
4372 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4373 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4374 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4375 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4376 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4377 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4382 entry.insert(channel);
4388 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4389 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4390 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4391 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4392 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4394 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4395 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4397 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4398 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4403 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4404 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4405 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4406 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4408 user_channel_id: user_id,
4413 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4414 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4415 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4416 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4420 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4423 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4428 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4429 // lock before watch_channel
4430 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4432 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4433 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4434 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4435 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4436 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4437 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4438 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4439 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4440 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4441 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4444 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4445 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4446 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4447 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4448 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4449 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4453 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4454 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4461 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4470 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4472 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4473 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4474 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4475 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4477 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4480 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4481 Ok(update) => update,
4482 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4484 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4485 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4486 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4487 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4488 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4489 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4490 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4491 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4501 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4502 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4506 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4507 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4508 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4509 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4511 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4514 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4515 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4516 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4517 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4518 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4519 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4520 msg: announcement_sigs,
4522 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4523 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4524 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4525 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4526 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4527 // announcement_signatures.
4528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4529 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4531 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4542 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4543 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4544 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4545 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4546 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4548 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4550 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4551 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4554 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4555 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4556 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4557 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4560 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4561 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4563 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4564 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4565 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4566 let (result, is_permanent) =
4567 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4569 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4575 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4576 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4577 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4587 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4588 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4591 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4595 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4596 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4599 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4601 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4604 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4605 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4606 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4607 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4612 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4613 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4614 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4615 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4616 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4617 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4618 } else { (tx, None) }
4620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4623 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4624 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4625 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4627 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4628 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4629 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4630 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4634 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4639 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4640 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4641 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4642 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4644 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4645 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4646 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4647 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4649 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4652 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4654 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4655 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4658 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4659 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4660 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4661 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4662 match pending_forward_info {
4663 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4664 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4665 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4666 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4668 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4670 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4671 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4672 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4675 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4677 _ => pending_forward_info
4680 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4687 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4688 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4689 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4690 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4691 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4693 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4694 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4696 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4701 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4705 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4706 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4707 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4708 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4710 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4711 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4713 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4720 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4721 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4722 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4723 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4724 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4725 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4726 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4728 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4729 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4730 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4732 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4739 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4740 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4741 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4742 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4744 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4747 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4748 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4749 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4750 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4751 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4752 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4753 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4758 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4759 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4761 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4762 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4763 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4765 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4766 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4767 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4768 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4769 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4770 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4771 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4772 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4774 commitment_signed: msg,
4780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4785 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4786 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4787 let mut forward_event = None;
4788 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4789 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4790 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4791 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4793 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4794 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4795 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4796 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4797 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4800 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4801 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4804 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4805 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4810 match forward_event {
4812 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4813 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4814 time_forwardable: time
4822 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4823 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4827 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4829 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4830 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4832 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4833 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4834 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4835 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4836 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4837 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4838 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4839 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4840 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4841 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4842 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4844 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4845 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4846 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4847 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4848 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4850 } else { unreachable!(); }
4853 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4854 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4855 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4859 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4860 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4861 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4862 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4863 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4868 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4870 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4871 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4873 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4876 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4877 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4884 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4885 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4886 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4887 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4889 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4892 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4899 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4900 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4905 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4906 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4908 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4912 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4913 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4914 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4915 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4916 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4917 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4925 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4926 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4927 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4928 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4929 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4930 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4932 // It's not a local channel
4933 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4938 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4939 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4940 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4941 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4942 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4943 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4947 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4948 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4949 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4950 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4952 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4957 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4960 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4961 let chan_restoration_res;
4962 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4963 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4964 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4966 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4967 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4968 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4971 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4972 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4973 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4974 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4975 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4976 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4977 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4978 let mut channel_update = None;
4979 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4981 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4984 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4985 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4986 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4987 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4988 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4989 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4990 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4995 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4996 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4997 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4998 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4999 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5002 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5007 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5008 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
5010 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5011 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
5016 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5017 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5018 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5019 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5020 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5021 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5022 match monitor_event {
5023 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5024 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5026 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
5028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5029 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5032 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5033 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5034 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5035 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5036 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5037 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5038 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5039 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5040 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5041 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5046 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5047 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5049 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5051 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5052 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5053 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5054 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5055 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5060 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5061 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5066 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5067 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5070 has_pending_monitor_events
5073 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5074 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5075 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5077 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5078 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5081 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5082 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5083 /// update was applied.
5085 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5086 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5087 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5088 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5089 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5090 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5091 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5092 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5094 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5095 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5096 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5097 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5098 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5100 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5101 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5102 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5103 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5104 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
5106 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5107 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5108 has_monitor_update = true;
5109 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5110 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5111 if close_channel { return false; }
5113 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5114 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5115 updates: commitment_update,
5122 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5123 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5124 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5131 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5132 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5133 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5136 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5137 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5143 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5144 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5145 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5146 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5147 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5148 let mut has_update = false;
5150 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5151 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5152 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5153 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5154 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5156 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5157 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5158 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5159 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5161 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5162 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5165 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5166 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5167 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5168 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5169 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5174 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5176 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5177 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5178 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5184 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5185 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5192 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5193 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5199 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5200 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5202 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5203 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5204 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5205 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5206 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5207 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5208 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5209 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5210 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5211 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5212 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5213 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5214 assert!(should_broadcast);
5215 } else { unreachable!(); }
5216 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5218 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5222 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5223 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5225 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5226 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5229 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5232 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5233 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5235 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5236 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5237 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5238 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5239 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5240 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5241 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5242 // never fail a payment too early.
5243 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5245 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5253 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5256 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5257 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5259 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5260 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5261 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5263 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5265 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5266 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5270 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5271 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5273 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5275 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5276 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5277 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5278 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5279 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5280 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5283 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5284 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5286 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5289 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5291 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5293 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5294 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5295 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5296 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5297 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5300 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5301 /// stored external to LDK.
5303 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5304 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5305 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5307 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5308 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5311 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5312 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5313 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5314 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5316 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5317 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5318 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5319 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5320 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5322 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5323 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5324 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5325 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5326 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5328 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5329 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5331 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5332 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5336 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5337 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5339 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5341 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5342 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5343 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5344 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5347 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5348 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5350 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5353 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5355 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5357 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5358 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5361 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5362 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5364 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5365 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5366 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5369 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5370 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5372 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5373 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5374 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5375 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5377 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5378 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5379 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5381 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5386 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5388 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5389 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5391 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5392 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5393 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5397 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5398 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5399 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5400 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5401 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5406 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5407 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5411 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5412 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5416 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5417 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5419 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5420 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5423 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5424 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5425 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5426 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5428 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5429 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5430 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5431 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5434 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5435 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5437 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5438 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5441 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5442 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5443 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5445 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5446 events.replace(pending_events);
5455 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5457 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5458 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5459 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5460 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5463 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5465 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5466 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5468 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5469 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5470 /// restarting from an old state.
5471 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5472 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5473 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5475 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5476 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5477 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5478 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5481 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5482 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5483 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5486 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5487 handler.handle_event(&event);
5495 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5497 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5498 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5499 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5500 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5503 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5505 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5506 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5507 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5508 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5509 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5512 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5513 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5514 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5517 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5519 let new_height = height - 1;
5521 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5522 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5523 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5524 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5525 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5526 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5529 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5533 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5535 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5536 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5537 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5538 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5541 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5542 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5543 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5544 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5546 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5547 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5550 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5551 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5554 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5555 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5556 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5557 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5559 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5560 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5564 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5566 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5568 macro_rules! max_time {
5569 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5571 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5572 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5573 // having an explicit local time source.
5574 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5575 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5576 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5577 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5578 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5584 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5585 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5586 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5587 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5588 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5591 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5592 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5593 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5594 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5595 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5596 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5597 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5598 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5599 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5607 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5608 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5609 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5610 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5611 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5612 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5618 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5620 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5621 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5622 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5623 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5624 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5625 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5630 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5632 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5633 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5634 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5635 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5638 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5639 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5641 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5642 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5643 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5644 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5645 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5647 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5648 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5650 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5651 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5652 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5653 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5654 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5655 let res = f(channel);
5656 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5657 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5658 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5659 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5663 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5664 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5665 if channel.is_usable() {
5666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5667 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5668 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5669 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5677 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5678 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5679 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5680 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5681 msg: announcement_sigs,
5683 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5684 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5685 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5687 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5688 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5689 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5694 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5695 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5696 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5697 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5698 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5699 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5700 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5704 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5705 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5706 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5707 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5708 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5709 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5710 data: reason_message,
5718 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5719 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5720 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5721 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5722 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5723 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5724 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5725 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5726 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5727 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5728 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5729 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5730 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5735 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5740 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5742 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5747 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5748 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5749 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5752 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5753 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5754 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5755 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5758 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5759 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5761 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5762 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5765 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5766 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5767 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5768 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5769 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5773 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5774 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5775 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5776 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5780 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5781 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5782 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5783 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5784 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5785 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5788 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5789 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5790 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5793 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5795 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5798 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5800 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5803 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5805 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5808 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5810 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5813 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5815 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5818 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5820 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5823 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5824 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5825 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5828 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5830 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5833 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5835 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5838 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5840 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5843 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5845 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5848 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5850 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5853 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5855 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5858 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5860 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5863 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5864 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5865 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5868 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5873 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5875 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5878 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5880 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5881 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5883 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5884 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5885 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5886 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5887 if no_connection_possible {
5888 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5889 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5890 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5891 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5892 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5893 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5894 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5898 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5905 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5906 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5907 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5908 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5909 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5910 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5911 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5914 no_channels_remain = false;
5920 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5926 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5927 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5928 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5933 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5934 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5935 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5937 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5944 if no_channels_remain {
5945 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5948 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5949 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5953 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5954 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5959 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5960 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5962 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5963 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5967 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5972 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5973 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5974 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5975 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5976 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5977 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5978 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5979 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5980 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5984 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5985 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5986 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5992 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5995 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5998 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5999 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6000 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6001 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6002 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6007 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6008 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6009 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6010 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6013 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6014 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6015 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6023 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6024 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6029 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6030 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6031 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6032 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6033 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6034 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6037 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6040 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6046 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6047 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6052 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6053 let result = *guard;
6061 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6062 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6063 let current_time = Instant::now();
6065 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6066 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6071 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6072 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6073 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6074 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6075 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6077 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6078 let result = *guard;
6079 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6083 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6084 None => return result,
6090 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6092 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6093 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6094 *persistence_lock = true;
6095 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6100 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6101 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6103 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6104 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6105 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6106 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6109 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6110 (2, node_id, required),
6111 (4, features, required),
6112 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6113 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6116 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6117 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6118 (2, channel_id, required),
6119 (3, channel_type, option),
6120 (4, counterparty, required),
6121 (6, funding_txo, option),
6122 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6123 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6124 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6125 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6126 (16, balance_msat, required),
6127 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6128 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6129 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6130 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6131 (26, is_outbound, required),
6132 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
6133 (30, is_usable, required),
6134 (32, is_public, required),
6137 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6138 (2, channels, vec_type),
6139 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6140 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6143 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6145 (0, onion_packet, required),
6146 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6149 (0, payment_data, required),
6150 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6151 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6153 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6154 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6155 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6159 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6160 (0, routing, required),
6161 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6162 (4, payment_hash, required),
6163 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6164 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6168 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6169 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6171 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6173 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6174 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6175 reason.write(writer)?;
6177 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6178 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6181 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6182 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6183 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6184 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6191 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6192 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6193 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6196 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6197 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6198 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6199 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6203 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6204 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6205 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6206 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6207 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6210 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6211 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6212 // messages contained in the variants.
6213 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6214 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6215 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6217 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6218 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6219 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6220 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6221 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6224 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6225 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6226 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6227 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6228 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6230 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6235 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6240 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6241 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6242 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6243 (2, outpoint, required),
6244 (4, htlc_id, required),
6245 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6248 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6250 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6251 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6254 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6255 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6256 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6261 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6262 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6263 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6269 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6270 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6271 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6273 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6274 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6275 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6279 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6280 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6281 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6283 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6285 if payment_data.is_some() {
6286 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6288 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6291 if payment_data.is_none() {
6292 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6294 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6298 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6306 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6307 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6308 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6312 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6313 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6314 let mut payment_id = None;
6315 let mut payment_secret = None;
6316 let mut payment_params = None;
6317 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6318 (0, session_priv, required),
6319 (1, payment_id, option),
6320 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6321 (3, payment_secret, option),
6322 (4, path, vec_type),
6323 (5, payment_params, option),
6325 if payment_id.is_none() {
6326 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6328 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6330 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6331 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6332 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6333 path: path.unwrap(),
6334 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6339 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6340 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6345 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6346 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6348 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6350 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6351 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6352 (0, session_priv, required),
6353 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6354 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6355 (3, payment_secret, option),
6356 (4, path, vec_type),
6357 (5, payment_params, option),
6360 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6362 field.write(writer)?;
6369 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6370 (0, LightningError) => {
6374 (0, failure_code, required),
6375 (2, data, vec_type),
6379 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6381 (0, forward_info, required),
6382 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6383 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6384 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6387 (0, htlc_id, required),
6388 (2, err_packet, required),
6392 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6393 (0, payment_secret, required),
6394 (2, expiry_time, required),
6395 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6396 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6397 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6400 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6402 (0, session_privs, required),
6405 (0, session_privs, required),
6406 (1, payment_hash, option),
6409 (0, session_privs, required),
6410 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6411 (2, payment_hash, required),
6412 (4, payment_secret, option),
6413 (6, total_msat, required),
6414 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6415 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6418 (0, session_privs, required),
6419 (2, payment_hash, required),
6423 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6424 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6425 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6426 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6427 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6430 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6431 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6433 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6435 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6437 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6438 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6439 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6442 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6443 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6444 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6445 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6446 unfunded_channels += 1;
6449 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6450 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6451 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6452 channel.write(writer)?;
6456 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6457 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6458 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6459 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6460 for forward in pending_forwards {
6461 forward.write(writer)?;
6465 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6466 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6467 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6468 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6469 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6470 htlc.write(writer)?;
6474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6475 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6476 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6477 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6478 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6479 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6482 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6483 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6484 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6485 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6486 for event in events.iter() {
6487 event.write(writer)?;
6490 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6491 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6492 for event in background_events.iter() {
6494 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6496 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6497 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6502 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6503 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6505 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6506 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6507 hash.write(writer)?;
6508 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6511 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6512 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6513 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6514 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6515 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6518 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6519 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6521 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6522 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6523 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6524 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6527 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6528 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6532 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6533 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6534 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6536 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6537 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6538 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6543 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6544 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6545 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6546 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6547 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6554 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6556 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6558 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6559 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6560 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6561 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6562 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6563 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6564 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6565 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6566 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6567 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6568 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6569 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6570 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6572 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6573 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6575 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6576 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6578 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6579 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6580 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6581 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6582 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6583 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6585 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6586 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6587 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6588 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6589 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6590 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6593 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6594 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6596 pub keys_manager: K,
6598 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6600 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6601 pub fee_estimator: F,
6602 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6604 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6605 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6606 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6607 pub chain_monitor: M,
6609 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6610 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6611 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6612 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6613 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6614 /// deserialization.
6616 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6617 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6618 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6620 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6621 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6623 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6624 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6625 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6626 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6628 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6631 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6632 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6635 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6636 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6637 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6639 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6640 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6643 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6644 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6645 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6646 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6647 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6649 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6650 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6655 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6656 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6657 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6658 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6659 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6660 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6661 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6662 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6665 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6666 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6667 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6671 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6672 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6673 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6674 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6675 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6676 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6679 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6680 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6682 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6688 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6689 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6690 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6691 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6692 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6693 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6694 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6695 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6696 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6697 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6698 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6699 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6700 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6701 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6702 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6703 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6704 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6705 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6706 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6707 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6708 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6709 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6710 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6711 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6712 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6713 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6714 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6715 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6716 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6717 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6718 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6719 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6720 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6721 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6722 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6723 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6724 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6725 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6726 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6729 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6730 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6731 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6733 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6736 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6737 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6738 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6739 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6740 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6741 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6745 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6746 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6747 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6748 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6752 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6753 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6754 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6755 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6756 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6757 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6758 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6759 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6760 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6762 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6765 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6766 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6767 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6768 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6769 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6770 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6771 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6772 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6774 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6777 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6778 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6779 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6780 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6781 let peer_state = PeerState {
6782 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6784 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6787 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6788 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6789 for _ in 0..event_count {
6790 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6791 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6795 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6796 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6797 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6798 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6799 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6800 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6801 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6802 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6806 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6807 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6808 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6809 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6810 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6811 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6815 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6816 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6820 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6821 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6822 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6826 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6828 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6829 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6830 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6832 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6834 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6835 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6839 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6840 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6841 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6842 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6843 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6844 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6845 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6846 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6847 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6848 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6850 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6851 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6854 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6855 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6856 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6857 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6858 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6859 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6861 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6863 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6864 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6865 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6866 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6867 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6868 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6869 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6871 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6872 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6873 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6874 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6875 if path.is_empty() {
6876 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6877 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6879 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6880 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6881 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6882 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6884 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6885 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6886 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6889 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6890 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6891 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6892 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6894 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6895 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6896 total_msat: path_amt,
6897 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6899 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6900 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6909 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6910 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6912 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6913 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6916 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6918 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6920 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6921 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6922 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6923 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6924 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6928 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6929 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6930 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6931 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6933 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6934 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6935 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6937 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6938 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6939 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6940 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6941 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6942 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6944 if chan.is_usable() {
6945 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6946 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6947 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6948 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6954 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6955 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6956 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6958 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6959 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6960 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6962 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6964 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6969 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6971 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6972 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6973 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6975 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6976 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6982 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6983 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6985 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6987 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6988 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6989 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6990 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6992 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6993 logger: args.logger,
6994 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6997 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6998 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7001 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7002 //connection or two.
7004 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7010 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7011 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7012 use core::time::Duration;
7013 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7014 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7015 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7016 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7017 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7018 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7020 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7021 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7022 use util::errors::APIError;
7023 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7024 use util::test_utils;
7025 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7027 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7029 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7030 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7032 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7035 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7036 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7038 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7039 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7040 thread::spawn(move || {
7042 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7043 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7044 *persistence_lock = true;
7047 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7053 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7054 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7056 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7059 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7064 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7066 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7069 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7076 fn test_notify_limits() {
7077 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7078 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7082 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7084 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7085 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7086 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7087 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7088 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7090 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7092 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7093 // to connect messages with new values
7094 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7095 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7096 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7097 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7099 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7100 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7101 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7102 // ... but the last node should not.
7103 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7104 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7105 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7106 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7108 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7109 // about the channel.
7110 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7111 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7112 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7114 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7116 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7117 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7118 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7119 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7120 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7121 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7123 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7124 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7125 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7127 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7128 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7129 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7130 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7131 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7132 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7134 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7135 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7136 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7137 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7138 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7139 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7140 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7141 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7143 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7144 // the channel info has updated.
7145 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7146 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7147 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7148 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7149 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7150 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7154 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7155 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7157 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7158 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7159 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7160 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7161 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7163 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7164 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7165 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7166 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7167 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7168 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7169 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7171 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7173 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7175 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7176 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7178 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7180 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7181 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7186 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7188 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7189 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7190 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7191 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7192 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7193 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7194 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7195 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7196 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7198 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7199 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7201 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7203 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7205 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7206 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7207 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7208 // lightning messages manually.
7209 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7211 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7212 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7213 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7215 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7216 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7218 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7219 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7221 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7222 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7223 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7225 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7226 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7227 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7229 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7231 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7233 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7234 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7237 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7238 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7239 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7242 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7243 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7244 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7245 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7247 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7250 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7251 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7252 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7253 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7258 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7259 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7260 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7261 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7268 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7269 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7270 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7271 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7272 // fails as expected.
7273 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7274 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7276 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7277 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7278 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7279 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7281 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7282 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7283 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7285 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7286 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7287 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7288 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7289 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7291 let route = find_route(
7292 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7293 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7295 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7297 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7299 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7300 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7301 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7303 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7304 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7305 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7307 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7308 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7309 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7310 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7311 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7312 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7313 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7314 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7315 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7317 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7318 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7320 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7321 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7322 let route = find_route(
7323 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7324 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7326 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7328 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7330 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7331 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7332 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7334 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7335 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7336 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7338 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7339 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7340 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7341 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7345 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7346 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7348 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7349 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7350 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7351 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7352 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7353 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7355 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7356 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7358 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7359 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7363 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7364 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7365 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7366 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7367 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7368 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7369 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7371 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7372 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7373 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7374 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7376 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7377 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7378 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7379 final_value_msat: 10000,
7380 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7382 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7383 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7384 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7385 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7386 let route = find_route(
7387 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7388 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7391 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7392 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7393 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7396 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7397 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7398 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7399 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7400 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7401 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7404 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7408 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7409 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7415 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7416 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7417 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7418 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7420 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7421 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7422 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7423 final_value_msat: 10000,
7424 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7426 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7427 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7428 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7429 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7430 let route = find_route(
7431 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7432 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7435 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7436 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7437 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7438 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7441 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7442 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7443 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7444 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7445 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7446 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7449 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7453 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7457 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7459 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7460 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7461 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7462 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7464 // Marshall an MPP route.
7465 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7466 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7467 route.paths.push(path);
7468 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7469 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7470 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7471 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7472 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7473 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7475 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7476 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7477 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7478 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7483 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7484 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7485 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7490 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7491 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7493 total_msat: 100_000,
7496 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7497 // payment verification fails as expected.
7498 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7499 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7500 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7501 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7503 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7507 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7508 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7512 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7515 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7516 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7517 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7518 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7519 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7520 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7521 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7522 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7523 use util::test_utils;
7524 use util::config::UserConfig;
7525 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7527 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7528 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7529 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7531 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7535 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7536 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7537 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7538 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7539 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7540 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7541 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7546 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7547 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7550 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7551 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7552 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7554 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7555 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7557 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7558 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7560 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7561 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7563 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7564 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7565 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7566 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7567 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7569 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7571 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7573 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7574 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7575 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7576 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7577 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7579 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7581 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7583 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7584 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7585 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7586 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7587 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7590 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7591 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7592 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7594 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7595 } else { panic!(); }
7597 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7598 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7600 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7603 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7606 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7607 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7609 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7610 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7611 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7612 match msg_events[0] {
7613 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7614 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7615 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7619 match msg_events[1] {
7620 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7624 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7626 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7627 macro_rules! send_payment {
7628 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7629 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7630 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7631 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7632 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7633 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7634 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7635 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7636 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7637 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7639 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7640 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7642 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7643 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7645 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7646 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7647 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7648 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7649 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7650 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7651 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7652 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7654 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7655 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7656 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7658 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7659 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7660 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7661 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7662 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7664 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7667 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7668 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7669 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7670 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7672 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7677 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7678 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);