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Merge pull request #2590 from TheBlueMatt/2023-09-default-score-params
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
82
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 //
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 //
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
93 //
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102         Forward {
103                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107         },
108         Receive {
109                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
115         },
116         ReceiveKeysend {
117                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125 }
126
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
132         /// Amount received
133         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135         /// may overshoot this in either case)
136         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
141 }
142
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
147 }
148
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
154 }
155
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
158
159         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
162         // HTLCs.
163         //
164         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
166         prev_htlc_id: u64,
167         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
169 }
170
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
173         FailHTLC {
174                 htlc_id: u64,
175                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
176         },
177 }
178
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183         short_channel_id: u64,
184         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
185         htlc_id: u64,
186         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188
189         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
191         outpoint: OutPoint,
192 }
193
194 enum OnionPayload {
195         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196         Invoice {
197                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200         },
201         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
203 }
204
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208         cltv_expiry: u32,
209         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210         value: u64,
211         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213         sender_intended_value: u64,
214         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215         timer_ticks: u8,
216         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220         total_msat: u64,
221         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
223 }
224
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231                         value_msat: val.value,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
238 ///
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
242
243 impl PaymentId {
244         /// Number of bytes in the id.
245         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
246 }
247
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
250                 self.0.write(w)
251         }
252 }
253
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
257                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
258         }
259 }
260
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
264         }
265 }
266
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 ///
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
275                 self.0.write(w)
276         }
277 }
278
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
282                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
283         }
284 }
285
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
291 }
292 impl SentHTLCId {
293         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294                 match source {
295                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298                         },
299                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
301                 }
302         }
303 }
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307                 (2, htlc_id, required),
308         },
309         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310                 (0, session_priv, required),
311         };
312 );
313
314
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
320         OutboundRoute {
321                 path: Path,
322                 session_priv: SecretKey,
323                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326                 payment_id: PaymentId,
327         },
328 }
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332                 match self {
333                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
335                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336                         },
337                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
338                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
339                                 path.hash(hasher);
340                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
343                         },
344                 }
345         }
346 }
347 impl HTLCSource {
348         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349         #[cfg(test)]
350         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
356                 }
357         }
358
359         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365                 } else {
366                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
367                         true
368                 }
369         }
370 }
371
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
373         err_code: u16,
374         err_data: Vec<u8>,
375         msg: &'static str,
376 }
377
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 ///
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386         TemporaryNodeFailure,
387         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397         ///
398         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
401 }
402
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404     fn into(self) -> u16 {
405                 match self {
406                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
410                 }
411         }
412 }
413
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421         err: msgs::LightningError,
422         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 }
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427         #[inline]
428         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429                 Self {
430                         err: LightningError {
431                                 err: err.clone(),
432                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
434                                                 channel_id,
435                                                 data: err
436                                         },
437                                 },
438                         },
439                         chan_id: None,
440                         shutdown_finish: None,
441                         channel_capacity: None,
442                 }
443         }
444         #[inline]
445         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
447         }
448         #[inline]
449         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450                 Self {
451                         err: LightningError {
452                                 err: err.clone(),
453                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
455                                                 channel_id,
456                                                 data: err
457                                         },
458                                 },
459                         },
460                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
463                 }
464         }
465         #[inline]
466         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
467                 Self {
468                         err: match err {
469                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
470                                         err: msg.clone(),
471                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
473                                                         channel_id,
474                                                         data: msg
475                                                 },
476                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
477                                         },
478                                 },
479                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480                                         err: msg,
481                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482                                 },
483                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484                                         err: msg.clone(),
485                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
487                                                         channel_id,
488                                                         data: msg
489                                                 },
490                                         },
491                                 },
492                         },
493                         chan_id: None,
494                         shutdown_finish: None,
495                         channel_capacity: None,
496                 }
497         }
498
499         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500                 self.chan_id.is_some()
501         }
502 }
503
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
509
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
517         CommitmentFirst,
518         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
519         RevokeAndACKFirst,
520 }
521
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
524         amount_msat: u64,
525         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
529 }
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531         (0, amount_msat, required),
532         (2, payment_purpose, required),
533         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
536 });
537
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
542 }
543
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547         /// failed/claimed by the user.
548         ///
549         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
551         ///
552         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
555
556         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
560 }
561
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
571         ///
572         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573         /// are regenerated on startup.
574         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576         /// channel to continue normal operation.
577         ///
578         /// In general this should be used rather than
579         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
582         ///
583         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584         /// are regenerated on startup.
585         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
589         },
590         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
592         /// on a channel.
593         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595                 channel_id: ChannelId,
596         },
597 }
598
599 #[derive(Debug)]
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604         /// event can be generated.
605         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607         /// operation of another channel.
608         ///
609         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
613         /// outbound edge.
614         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615                 event: events::Event,
616                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
617         },
618 }
619
620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
621         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
622         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
623                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
624                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
625                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
626                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
627                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
628                 // downgrades to prior versions.
629                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
630         },
631 );
632
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
634 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
635         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
636                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
637                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
638         },
639 }
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
641         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
642                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
643                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
644         };
645 );
646
647 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
648 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
649 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
650 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
651         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
652         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
653         /// durably to disk.
654         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
655                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
656                 channel_id: ChannelId,
657                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
658                 htlc_id: u64,
659         },
660 }
661
662 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667                 }
668         }
669 }
670
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
673 ;);
674
675
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
679         ///
680         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
683         ///
684         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690         latest_features: InitFeatures,
691         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695         /// user but which have not yet completed.
696         ///
697         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699         /// for a missing channel.
700         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
703         ///
704         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
708         ///
709         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
724         is_connected: bool,
725 }
726
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
733                         return false
734                 }
735                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
738         }
739
740         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
743         }
744
745         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
749         }
750 }
751
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755         /// The original OpenChannel message.
756         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
759 }
760
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
764
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
767 ///
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
769 /// here.
770 ///
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777         /// this payment being removed.
778         expiry_time: u64,
779         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780         user_payment_id: u64,
781         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
784 }
785
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
794 ///
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
797         Arc<M>,
798         Arc<T>,
799         Arc<KeysManager>,
800         Arc<KeysManager>,
801         Arc<KeysManager>,
802         Arc<F>,
803         Arc<DefaultRouter<
804                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
805                 Arc<L>,
806                 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
809         >>,
810         Arc<L>
811 >;
812
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
822 ///
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
825         ChannelManager<
826                 &'a M,
827                 &'b T,
828                 &'c KeysManager,
829                 &'c KeysManager,
830                 &'c KeysManager,
831                 &'d F,
832                 &'e DefaultRouter<
833                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
834                         &'g L,
835                         &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
838                 >,
839                 &'g L
840         >;
841
842 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
843 pub trait AChannelManager {
844         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
845         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
846         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
847         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
848         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
849         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
850         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
851         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
852         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
853         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
854         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
855         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
856         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
857         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
858         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
859         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
860         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
861         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
862         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
863         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
864         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
865         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
866         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
867         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
868         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
869         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
870         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
871         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
872         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
873         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
874         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
875         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
876         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
877         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
878         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
879         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
880 }
881
882 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
883 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
884 where
885         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
886         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
887         ES::Target: EntropySource,
888         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
889         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
890         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
891         R::Target: Router,
892         L::Target: Logger,
893 {
894         type Watch = M::Target;
895         type M = M;
896         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
897         type T = T;
898         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
899         type ES = ES;
900         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
901         type NS = NS;
902         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
903         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
904         type SP = SP;
905         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
906         type F = F;
907         type Router = R::Target;
908         type R = R;
909         type Logger = L::Target;
910         type L = L;
911         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
912 }
913
914 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
915 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
916 ///
917 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
918 /// to individual Channels.
919 ///
920 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
921 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
922 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
923 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
924 ///
925 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
926 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
927 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
928 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
929 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
930 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
931 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
932 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
933 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
934 ///
935 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
936 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
937 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
938 ///
939 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
940 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
941 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
942 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
943 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
944 ///
945 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
946 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
947 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
948 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
949 ///
950 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
951 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
952 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
953 ///
954 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
955 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
956 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
957 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
958 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
959 ///
960 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
961 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
962 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
963 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
964 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
965 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
966 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
967 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
968 //
969 // Lock order:
970 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
971 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
972 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
973 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
974 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
975 //
976 // Lock order tree:
977 //
978 // `total_consistency_lock`
979 //  |
980 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
981 //  |   |
982 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
983 //  |
984 //  |__`per_peer_state`
985 //  |   |
986 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
987 //  |       |
988 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
989 //  |       |
990 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
991 //  |           |
992 //  |           |__`peer_state`
993 //  |               |
994 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
995 //  |               |
996 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
997 //  |               |
998 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
999 //  |               |
1000 //  |               |__`best_block`
1001 //  |               |
1002 //  |               |__`pending_events`
1003 //  |                   |
1004 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
1005 //
1006 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1007 where
1008         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1009         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1010         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1011         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1012         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1013         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1014         R::Target: Router,
1015         L::Target: Logger,
1016 {
1017         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1018         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1019         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1020         chain_monitor: M,
1021         tx_broadcaster: T,
1022         #[allow(unused)]
1023         router: R,
1024
1025         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1026         #[cfg(test)]
1027         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1028         #[cfg(not(test))]
1029         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1030         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1031
1032         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1033         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1034         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1035         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1036         ///
1037         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1038         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1039
1040         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1041         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1042         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1043         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1044         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1045         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1046         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1047         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1048         ///
1049         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1050         ///
1051         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1052         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1053
1054         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1055         ///
1056         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1057         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1058         /// and via the classic SCID.
1059         ///
1060         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1061         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1062         ///
1063         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064         #[cfg(test)]
1065         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1066         #[cfg(not(test))]
1067         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1068         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1069         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1070         ///
1071         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1073
1074         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1075         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1076         ///
1077         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1079
1080         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1081         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1082         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1083         /// active channel list on load.
1084         ///
1085         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1086         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1087
1088         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1089         ///
1090         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1091         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1092         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1093         ///
1094         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1095         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1096         /// the handling of the events.
1097         ///
1098         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1099         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1100         ///
1101         /// TODO:
1102         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1103         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1104         /// would break backwards compatability.
1105         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1106         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1107         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1108         ///
1109         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1111
1112         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1113         ///
1114         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1115         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1116         /// confirmation depth.
1117         ///
1118         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1119         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1120         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1121         ///
1122         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1123         #[cfg(test)]
1124         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1125         #[cfg(not(test))]
1126         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1127
1128         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1129
1130         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1131
1132         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1133         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1134         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1135         ///
1136         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1137         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1138
1139         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1140         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1141         /// keeping additional state.
1142         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1143
1144         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1145         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1146         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1147         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1148
1149         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1150         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1151         ///
1152         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1153         /// are currently open with that peer.
1154         ///
1155         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1156         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1157         /// channels.
1158         ///
1159         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1160         ///
1161         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1163         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1164         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1165         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1166
1167         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1168         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1169         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1170         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1171         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1172         ///
1173         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1174         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1175         ///
1176         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1177         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1178         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1179         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1180         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1181
1182         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1183         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1184
1185         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1186         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1187         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1188         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1189         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1190         ///
1191         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1192         ///
1193         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1194         ///
1195         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1196         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1197         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1198         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1199         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1200         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1201         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1202         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1203         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1204
1205         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1206
1207         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1208         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1209
1210         entropy_source: ES,
1211         node_signer: NS,
1212         signer_provider: SP,
1213
1214         logger: L,
1215 }
1216
1217 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1218 ///
1219 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1220 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1221 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1222 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1223 pub struct ChainParameters {
1224         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1225         pub network: Network,
1226
1227         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1228         ///
1229         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1230         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1231 }
1232
1233 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1234 #[must_use]
1235 enum NotifyOption {
1236         DoPersist,
1237         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1238         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1239 }
1240
1241 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1242 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1243 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1244 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1245 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1246 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1247 ///
1248 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1249 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1250 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1251 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1252         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1253         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1254         should_persist: F,
1255         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1256         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1257 }
1258
1259 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1260         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1261         /// events to handle.
1262         ///
1263         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1264         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1265         /// isn't ideal.
1266         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1267                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1268         }
1269
1270         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1271         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1272                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1273                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1274
1275                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1276                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1277                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1278                         should_persist: move || {
1279                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1280                                 // processing and return that.
1281                                 let notify = persist_check();
1282                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1283                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1284                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1285                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1286                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1287                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1288                                 }
1289                         },
1290                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1291                 }
1292         }
1293
1294         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1295         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1296         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1297         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1298         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1299                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1300
1301                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1302                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1303                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1304                         should_persist: persist_check,
1305                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1306                 }
1307         }
1308 }
1309
1310 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1311         fn drop(&mut self) {
1312                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1313                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1314                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1315                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1316                         },
1317                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1318                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1319                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1320                 }
1321         }
1322 }
1323
1324 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1325 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1326 ///
1327 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1328 ///
1329 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1330 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1331 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1332 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1333 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1334
1335 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1336 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1337 ///
1338 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1339 ///
1340 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1341 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1342 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1343 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1344 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1345 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1346 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1347 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1348 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1349 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1350 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1351 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1352 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1353
1354 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1355 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1356 /// this value.
1357 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1358 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1359 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1360 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1361
1362 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1363 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1364 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1365 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1366 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1367 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1368 #[deny(const_err)]
1369 #[allow(dead_code)]
1370 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1371
1372 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1373 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1374 #[deny(const_err)]
1375 #[allow(dead_code)]
1376 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1377
1378 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1379 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1380
1381 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1382 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1383 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1384
1385 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1386 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1387 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1388
1389 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1390 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1391 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1392 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1393
1394 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1395 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1396 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1397
1398 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1399 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1400 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1401
1402 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1403 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1404 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1405         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1406         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1407         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1408         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1409         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1410         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1411         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1412         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1413 }
1414
1415 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1416 /// to better separate parameters.
1417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1418 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1419         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1420         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1421         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1422         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1423         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1424         pub features: InitFeatures,
1425         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1426         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1427         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1428         ///
1429         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1430         ///
1431         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1432         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1433         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1434         /// payments to us through this channel.
1435         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1436         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1437         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1438         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1439         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1440         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1441         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1442 }
1443
1444 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1445 ///
1446 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1447 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1448 /// transactions.
1449 ///
1450 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1451 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1452 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1453         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1454         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1455         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1456         /// lifetime of the channel.
1457         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1458         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1459         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1460         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1461         /// our counterparty already.
1462         ///
1463         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1464         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1465         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1466         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1467         ///
1468         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1469         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1470         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1471         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1472         ///
1473         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1474         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1475         ///
1476         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1477         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1478         ///
1479         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1480         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1481         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1482         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1483         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1484         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1485         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1486         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1487         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1488         /// `Some(0)`).
1489         ///
1490         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1491         ///
1492         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1493         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1494         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1495         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1496         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1497         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1498         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1499         ///
1500         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1501         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1502         ///
1503         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1504         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1505         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1506         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1507         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1508         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1509         /// this value on chain.
1510         ///
1511         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1512         ///
1513         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1514         ///
1515         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1516         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1517         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1518         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1519         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1520         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1521         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1522         ///
1523         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1524         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1525         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1526         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1527         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1528         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1529         ///
1530         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1531         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1532         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1533         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1534         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1535         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1536         ///
1537         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1538         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1539         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1540         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1541         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1542         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1543         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1544         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1545         ///
1546         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1547         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1548         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1549         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1550         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1551         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1552         /// route which is valid.
1553         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1554         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1555         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1556         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1557         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1558         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1559         ///
1560         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1561         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1562         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1563         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1564         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1565         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1566         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1567         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1568         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1569         ///
1570         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1571         ///
1572         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1573         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1574         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1575         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1576         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1577         ///
1578         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1579         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1580         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1581         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1582         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1583         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1584         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1585         ///
1586         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1587         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1588         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1589         pub is_outbound: bool,
1590         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1591         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1592         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1593         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1594         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1595         ///
1596         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1597         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1598         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1599         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1600         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1601         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1602         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1603         ///
1604         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1605         pub is_usable: bool,
1606         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1607         pub is_public: bool,
1608         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1609         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1610         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1611         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1612         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1613         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1614         ///
1615         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1616         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1617 }
1618
1619 impl ChannelDetails {
1620         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1621         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1622         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1623         ///
1624         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1625         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1626         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1627                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1628         }
1629
1630         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1631         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1632         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1633         ///
1634         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1635         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1636         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1637                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1638         }
1639
1640         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1641                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1642                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1643         ) -> Self
1644         where
1645                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1646                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1647         {
1648                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1649                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1650                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1651                 ChannelDetails {
1652                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1653                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1654                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1655                                 features: latest_features,
1656                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1657                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1658                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1659                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1660                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1661                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1662                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1663                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1664                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1665                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1666                         },
1667                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1668                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1669                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1670                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1671                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1672                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1673                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1674                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1675                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1676                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1677                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1678                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1679                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1680                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1681                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1682                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1683                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1684                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1685                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1686                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1687                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1688                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1689                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1690                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1691                         config: Some(context.config()),
1692                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1693                 }
1694         }
1695 }
1696
1697 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1698 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1699 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1700 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1701 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1702 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1703 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1704 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1705         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1706         NotShuttingDown,
1707         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1708         ShutdownInitiated,
1709         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1710         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1711         ResolvingHTLCs,
1712         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1713         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1714         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1715         /// to drop the channel.
1716         ShutdownComplete,
1717 }
1718
1719 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1720 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1721 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1722 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1723         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1724         AwaitingInvoice {
1725                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1726                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1727                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1728         },
1729         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1730         Pending {
1731                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1732                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1733                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1734                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1735                 /// abandoned.
1736                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1737                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1738                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1739                 total_msat: u64,
1740         },
1741         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1742         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1743         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1744         Fulfilled {
1745                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1746                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1747                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1748                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1749                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1750                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1751         },
1752         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1753         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1754         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1755         Abandoned {
1756                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1757                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1758                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1759                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1760                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1761         },
1762 }
1763
1764 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1765 ///
1766 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1767 #[derive(Clone)]
1768 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1769         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1770         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1771         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1772         /// route hints.
1773         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1774         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1775         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1776 }
1777
1778 macro_rules! handle_error {
1779         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1780                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1781                 // entering the macro.
1782                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1783                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1784
1785                 match $internal {
1786                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1787                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1788                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1789
1790                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1791                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1792                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1793                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1794                                                         msg: update
1795                                                 });
1796                                         }
1797                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1798                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1799                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1800                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1801                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1802                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1803                                                 }, None));
1804                                         }
1805                                 }
1806
1807                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1808                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1809                                 } else {
1810                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1811                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1812                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1813                                         });
1814                                 }
1815
1816                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1817                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1818                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1819                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1820                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1821                                         }
1822                                 }
1823
1824                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1825                                 Err(err)
1826                         },
1827                 }
1828         } };
1829         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1830                 match $internal {
1831                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1832                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1833                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1834                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1835                         },
1836                 }
1837         };
1838 }
1839
1840 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1841         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1842                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1843                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1844                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1845                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1846                 } else {
1847                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1848                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1849                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1850                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1851                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1852                         // stage.
1853                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1854                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1855                 }
1856                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1857         }}
1858 }
1859
1860 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1861 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1862         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1863                 match $err {
1864                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1865                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1866                         },
1867                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1868                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1869                         },
1870                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1871                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1872                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1873                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1874                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1875                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1876
1877                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1878                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1879                         },
1880                 }
1881         };
1882         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1883                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1884         };
1885         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1886                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1887         };
1888         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1889                 match $channel_phase {
1890                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1891                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1892                         },
1893                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1894                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1895                         },
1896                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1897                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1898                         },
1899                 }
1900         };
1901 }
1902
1903 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1904         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1905                 match $res {
1906                         Ok(res) => res,
1907                         Err(e) => {
1908                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1909                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1910                                 if drop {
1911                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1912                                 }
1913                                 break Err(res);
1914                         }
1915                 }
1916         }
1917 }
1918
1919 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1920         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1921                 match $res {
1922                         Ok(res) => res,
1923                         Err(e) => {
1924                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1925                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1926                                 if drop {
1927                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1928                                 }
1929                                 return Err(res);
1930                         }
1931                 }
1932         }
1933 }
1934
1935 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1936         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1937                 {
1938                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1939                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1940                         channel
1941                 }
1942         }
1943 }
1944
1945 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1946         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1947                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1948                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1949                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1950                 });
1951                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1952                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1953                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1954                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1955                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1956                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1957                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1958                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1959                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1960                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1961                 }
1962         }}
1963 }
1964
1965 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1966         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1967                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1968                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1969                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1970                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1971                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1972                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1973                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1974                         }, None));
1975                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1976                 }
1977         }
1978 }
1979
1980 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1981         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1982                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1983                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1984                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1985                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1986                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1987                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1988                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1989                         }, None));
1990                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1991                 }
1992         }
1993 }
1994
1995 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1996         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1997                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1998                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1999                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2000                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2001                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2002                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2003                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2004                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2005                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2006                         // now.
2007                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2008                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2009                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2010                                         msg,
2011                                 })
2012                         } else { None }
2013                 } else { None };
2014
2015                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2016                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2017
2018                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2019                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2020                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2021                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2022                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2023                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2024                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2025                 }
2026
2027                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2028                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2029                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2030
2031                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2032
2033                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2034                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2035                 }
2036                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2037                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2038                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2039                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2040                 }
2041         } }
2042 }
2043
2044 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2045         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2046                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2047                 match $update_res {
2048                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2049                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2050                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2051                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2052                         },
2053                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2054                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2055                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2056                                 false
2057                         },
2058                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2059                                 $completed;
2060                                 true
2061                         },
2062                 }
2063         } };
2064         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2065                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2066                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2067         };
2068         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2069                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2070                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2071                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2072                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2073                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2074                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2075                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2076                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2077                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2078                         });
2079                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2080                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2081                         {
2082                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2083                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2084                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2085                                 }
2086                         })
2087         } };
2088 }
2089
2090 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2091         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2092                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2093                 while !processed_all_events {
2094                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2095                                 return;
2096                         }
2097
2098                         let mut result;
2099
2100                         {
2101                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2102                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2103                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2104
2105                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2106                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2107                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2108
2109                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2110                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2111                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2112                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2113                                 }
2114                         }
2115
2116                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2117                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2118                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2119                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2120                         }
2121
2122                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2123
2124                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2125                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2126                                 $handle_event;
2127                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2128                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2129                                 }
2130                         }
2131
2132                         {
2133                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2134                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2135                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2136                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2137                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2138                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2139                         }
2140
2141                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2142                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2143                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2144                                 processed_all_events = false;
2145                         }
2146
2147                         match result {
2148                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2149                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2150                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2151                                 },
2152                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2153                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2154                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2155                         }
2156                 }
2157         }
2158 }
2159
2160 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2161 where
2162         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2163         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2164         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2165         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2166         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2167         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2168         R::Target: Router,
2169         L::Target: Logger,
2170 {
2171         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2172         ///
2173         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2174         ///
2175         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2176         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2177         ///
2178         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2179         ///
2180         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2181         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2182         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2183         /// more details.
2184         ///
2185         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2186         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2187         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2188         pub fn new(
2189                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2190                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2191                 current_timestamp: u32,
2192         ) -> Self {
2193                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2194                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2195                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2196                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2197                 ChannelManager {
2198                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2199                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2200                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2201                         chain_monitor,
2202                         tx_broadcaster,
2203                         router,
2204
2205                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2206
2207                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2208                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2209                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2210                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2211                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2212                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2213                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2214                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2215
2216                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2217                         secp_ctx,
2218
2219                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2220                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2221
2222                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2223
2224                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2225
2226                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2227
2228                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2229                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2230                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2231                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2232                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2233
2234                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2235                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2236
2237                         entropy_source,
2238                         node_signer,
2239                         signer_provider,
2240
2241                         logger,
2242                 }
2243         }
2244
2245         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2246         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2247                 &self.default_configuration
2248         }
2249
2250         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2251                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2252                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2253                 let mut i = 0;
2254                 loop {
2255                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2256                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2257                         } else {
2258                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2259                         }
2260                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2261                                 break;
2262                         }
2263                         i += 1;
2264                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2265                 }
2266                 outbound_scid_alias
2267         }
2268
2269         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2270         ///
2271         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2272         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2273         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2274         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2275         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2276         ///
2277         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2278         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2279         ///
2280         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2281         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2282         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2283         ///
2284         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2285         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2286         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2287         ///
2288         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2289         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2290         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2291         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2292         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2293         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2294         ///
2295         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2296         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2297         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2298         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2299                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2300                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2301                 }
2302
2303                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2304                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2305                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2306
2307                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2308
2309                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2310                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2311
2312                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2313                 let channel = {
2314                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2315                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2316                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2317                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2318                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2319                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2320                         {
2321                                 Ok(res) => res,
2322                                 Err(e) => {
2323                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2324                                         return Err(e);
2325                                 },
2326                         }
2327                 };
2328                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2329
2330                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2331                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2332                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2333                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2334                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2335                                 } else {
2336                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2337                                 }
2338                         },
2339                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2340                 }
2341
2342                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2343                         node_id: their_network_key,
2344                         msg: res,
2345                 });
2346                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2347         }
2348
2349         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2350                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2351                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2352                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2353                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2354                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2355                 // the same channel.
2356                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2357                 {
2358                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2359                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2360                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2361                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2362                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2363                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2364                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2365                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2366                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2367                                                 _ => None,
2368                                         })
2369                                         .filter(f)
2370                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2371                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2372                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2373                                         })
2374                                 );
2375                         }
2376                 }
2377                 res
2378         }
2379
2380         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2381         /// more information.
2382         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2383                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2384                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2385                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2386                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2387                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2388                 // the same channel.
2389                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2390                 {
2391                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2392                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2393                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2394                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2395                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2396                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2397                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2398                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2399                                         res.push(details);
2400                                 }
2401                         }
2402                 }
2403                 res
2404         }
2405
2406         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2407         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2408         ///
2409         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2410         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2411         /// are.
2412         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2413                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2414                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2415                 // really wanted anyway.
2416                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2417         }
2418
2419         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2420         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2421                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2422                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2423
2424                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2425                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2426                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2427                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2428                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2429                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2430                         };
2431                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2432                                 .iter()
2433                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2434                                 .map(context_to_details)
2435                                 .collect();
2436                 }
2437                 vec![]
2438         }
2439
2440         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2441         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2442         ///
2443         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2444         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2445         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2446         ///
2447         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2448         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2449                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2450                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2451                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2452                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2453                                 },
2454                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2455                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2456                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2457                                 },
2458                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2459                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2460                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2461                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2462                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2463                                         })
2464                                 },
2465                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2466                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2467                                 },
2468                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2469                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2470                                 },
2471                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2472                         })
2473                         .collect()
2474         }
2475
2476         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2477         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2478                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2479                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2480                         Some(transaction) => {
2481                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2482                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2483                                 }, None));
2484                         },
2485                         None => {},
2486                 }
2487                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2488                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2489                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2490                         reason: closure_reason,
2491                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2492                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2493                 }, None));
2494         }
2495
2496         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2497                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2498
2499                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2500                 loop {
2501                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2502
2503                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2504                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2505
2506                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2507                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2508
2509                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2510                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2511                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2512                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2513                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2514                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2515                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2516                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2517
2518                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2519                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2520                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2521                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2522                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2523                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2524                                                 });
2525
2526                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2527                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2528
2529                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2530                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2531                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2532                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2533                                                         break;
2534                                                 }
2535
2536                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2537                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2538                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2539                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2540                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2541                                                                         });
2542                                                                 }
2543                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2544                                                         }
2545                                                 }
2546                                                 break;
2547                                         }
2548                                 },
2549                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2550                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2551                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2552                                         //
2553                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2554                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2555                                 },
2556                         }
2557                 }
2558
2559                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2560                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2561                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2562                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2563                 }
2564
2565                 Ok(())
2566         }
2567
2568         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2569         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2570         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2571         ///
2572         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2573         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2574         ///    estimate.
2575         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2576         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2577         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2578         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2579         ///
2580         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2581         ///
2582         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2583         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2584         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2585         /// channel.
2586         ///
2587         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2588         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2589         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2590         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2591         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2592                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2593         }
2594
2595         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2596         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2597         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2598         ///
2599         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2600         /// the channel being closed or not:
2601         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2602         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2603         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2604         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2605         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2606         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2607         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2608         ///
2609         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2610         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2611         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2612         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2613         ///
2614         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2615         ///
2616         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2617         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2618         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2619         /// channel.
2620         ///
2621         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2622         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2623         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2624         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2625         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2626                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2627         }
2628
2629         #[inline]
2630         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2631                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2632                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2633                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2634                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2635                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2636                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2637                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2638                 }
2639                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2640                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2641                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2642                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2643                         // ignore the result here.
2644                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2645                 }
2646         }
2647
2648         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2649         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2650         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2651         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2652                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2653                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2654                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2655                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2656                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2657                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2658                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2659                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2660                         } else {
2661                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2662                         };
2663                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2664                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2665                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2666                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2667                                 match chan_phase {
2668                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2669                                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2670                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2671                                         },
2672                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2673                                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2674                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2675                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2676                                         },
2677                                 }
2678                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2679                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2680                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2681                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2682                                 // events anyway.
2683                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2684                         } else {
2685                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2686                         }
2687                 };
2688                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2689                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2690                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2691                                 msg: update
2692                         });
2693                 }
2694
2695                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2696         }
2697
2698         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2699                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2700                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2701                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2702                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2703                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2704                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2705                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2706                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2707                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2708                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2709                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2710                                                         },
2711                                                 }
2712                                         );
2713                                 }
2714                                 Ok(())
2715                         },
2716                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2717                 }
2718         }
2719
2720         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2721         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2722         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2723         /// channel.
2724         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2725         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2726                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2727         }
2728
2729         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2730         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2731         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2732         ///
2733         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2734         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2735         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2736         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2737                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2738         }
2739
2740         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2741         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2742         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2743                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2744                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2745                 }
2746         }
2747
2748         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2749         /// local transaction(s).
2750         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2751                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2752                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2753                 }
2754         }
2755
2756         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2757                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2758                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2759                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2760         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2761                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2762                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2763                         version: 0,
2764                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2765                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2766                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2767                 };
2768
2769                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2770                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2771                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2772                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2773                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2774                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2775                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2776                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2777                                 }),
2778                 };
2779
2780                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2781                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2782                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2783                                 short_channel_id,
2784                         },
2785                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2786                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2787                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2788                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2789                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2790                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2791                 })
2792         }
2793
2794         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2795                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2796                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2797                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2798         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2799                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2800                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2801                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2802                         } =>
2803                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2804                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2805                                 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2806                         } => {
2807                                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2808                                 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2809                         }
2810                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2811                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2812                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2813                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2814                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2815                                 })
2816                         },
2817                 };
2818                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2819                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2820                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2821                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2822                                 err_code: 18,
2823                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2824                         })
2825                 }
2826                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2827                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2828                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2829                 //
2830                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2831                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2832                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2833                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2834                 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2835                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2836                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2837                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2838                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2839                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2840                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2841                         });
2842                 }
2843                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2844                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2845                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2846                 {
2847                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2848                                 err_code: 19,
2849                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2850                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2851                         });
2852                 }
2853
2854                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2855                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2856                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2857                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2858                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2859                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2860                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2861                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2862                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2863                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2864                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2865                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2866                                 });
2867                         }
2868                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2869                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2870                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2871                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2872                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2873                                 });
2874                         }
2875                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2876                                 payment_data,
2877                                 payment_preimage,
2878                                 payment_metadata,
2879                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2880                                 custom_tlvs,
2881                         }
2882                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2883                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2884                                 payment_data: data,
2885                                 payment_metadata,
2886                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2887                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2888                                 custom_tlvs,
2889                         }
2890                 } else {
2891                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2892                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2893                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2894                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2895                         });
2896                 };
2897                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2898                         routing,
2899                         payment_hash,
2900                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2901                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2902                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2903                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2904                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2905                 })
2906         }
2907
2908         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2909                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2910         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2911                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2912                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2913                                 {
2914                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2915                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2916                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2917                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2918                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2919                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2920                                         }));
2921                                 }
2922                         }
2923                 }
2924
2925                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2926                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2927                 }
2928
2929                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2930                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2931                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2932
2933                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2934                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2935                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2936                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2937                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2938                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2939                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2940                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2941                 }
2942                 macro_rules! return_err {
2943                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2944                                 {
2945                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2946                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2947                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2948                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2949                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2950                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2951                                         }));
2952                                 }
2953                         }
2954                 }
2955
2956                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
2957                         shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
2958                         msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
2959                 ) {
2960                         Ok(res) => res,
2961                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2962                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2963                         },
2964                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2965                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2966                         },
2967                 };
2968                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2969                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2970                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2971                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2972                                 }, ..
2973                         } => {
2974                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2975                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2976                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2977                         },
2978                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2979                         // inbound channel's state.
2980                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2981                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
2982                                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
2983                         {
2984                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2985                         }
2986                 };
2987
2988                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2989                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2990                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2991                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2992                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2993                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2994                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2995                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2996                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2997                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2998                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2999                                         {
3000                                                 None
3001                                         } else {
3002                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3003                                         }
3004                                 },
3005                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3006                         };
3007                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3008                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3009                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3010                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3011                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3012                                 }
3013                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3014                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3015                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3016                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3017                                 ).flatten() {
3018                                         None => {
3019                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3020                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3021                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3022                                         },
3023                                         Some(chan) => chan
3024                                 };
3025                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3026                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3027                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3028                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3029                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3030                                 }
3031                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3032                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3033                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3034                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3035                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3036                                 }
3037                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3038
3039                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3040                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3041                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3042                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3043                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3044                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3045                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3046                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3047                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3048                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3049                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3050                                         } else {
3051                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3052                                         }
3053                                 }
3054                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3055                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3056                                 }
3057                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3058                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3059                                 }
3060                                 chan_update_opt
3061                         } else {
3062                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3063                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3064                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3065                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3066                                         break Some((
3067                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3068                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3069                                         ));
3070                                 }
3071                                 None
3072                         };
3073
3074                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3075                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3076                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3077                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3078                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3079                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3080                         }
3081                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3082                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3083                         }
3084                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3085                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3086                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3087                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3088                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3089                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3090                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3091                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3092                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3093                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3094                         }
3095
3096                         break None;
3097                 }
3098                 {
3099                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3100                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3101                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3102                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3103                                 }
3104                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3105                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3106                                 }
3107                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3108                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3109                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3110                                 }
3111                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3112                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3113                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3114                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3115                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3116                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3117                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3118                                 // instead.
3119                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3120                         }
3121                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3122                 }
3123                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3124         }
3125
3126         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3127                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3128                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3129         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3130                 macro_rules! return_err {
3131                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3132                                 {
3133                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3134                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3135                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3136                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3137                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3138                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3139                                         }));
3140                                 }
3141                         }
3142                 }
3143                 match decoded_hop {
3144                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3145                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3146                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3147                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3148                                 {
3149                                         Ok(info) => {
3150                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3151                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3152                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3153                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3154                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3155                                         },
3156                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3157                                 }
3158                         },
3159                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3160                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3161                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3162                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3163                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3164                                 }
3165                         }
3166                 }
3167         }
3168
3169         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3170         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3171         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3172         ///
3173         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3174         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3175         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3176         ///
3177         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3178         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3179         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3180                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3181                         return Err(LightningError {
3182                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3183                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3184                         });
3185                 }
3186                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3187                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3188                 }
3189                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3190                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3191         }
3192
3193         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3194         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3195         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3196         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3197         ///
3198         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3199         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3200         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3201         ///
3202         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3203         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3204         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3205                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3206                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3207                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3208                         Some(id) => id,
3209                 };
3210
3211                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3212         }
3213
3214         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3215                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3216                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3217
3218                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3219                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3220                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3221                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3222                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3223                 };
3224
3225                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3226                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3227                         short_channel_id,
3228                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3229                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3230                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3231                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3232                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3233                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3234                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3235                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3236                 };
3237                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3238                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3239                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3240                 // channel.
3241                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3242
3243                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3244                         signature: sig,
3245                         contents: unsigned
3246                 })
3247         }
3248
3249         #[cfg(test)]
3250         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3251                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3252                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3253                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3254                         session_priv_bytes
3255                 })
3256         }
3257
3258         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3259                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3260                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3261                         session_priv_bytes
3262                 } = args;
3263                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3264                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3265
3266                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3267                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3268                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3269                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3270                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3271
3272                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3273                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3274                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3275
3276                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3277                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3278
3279                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3280                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3281                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3282                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3283                         };
3284
3285                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3286                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3287                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3288                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3289                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3290                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3291                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3292                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3293                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3294                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3295                                                 }
3296                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3297                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3298                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3299                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3300                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3301                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3302                                                                 payment_id,
3303                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3304                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3305                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3306                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3307                                                                         false => {
3308                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3309                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3310                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3311                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3312                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3313                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3314                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3315                                                                         },
3316                                                                         true => {},
3317                                                                 }
3318                                                         },
3319                                                         None => {},
3320                                                 }
3321                                         },
3322                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3323                                 };
3324                         } else {
3325                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3326                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3327                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3328                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3329                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3330                         }
3331                         return Ok(());
3332                 };
3333
3334                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3335                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3336                         Err(e) => {
3337                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3338                         },
3339                 }
3340         }
3341
3342         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3343         ///
3344         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3345         /// fields for more info.
3346         ///
3347         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3348         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3349         ///
3350         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3351         ///
3352         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3353         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3354         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3355         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3356         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3357         ///
3358         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3359         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3360         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3361         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3362         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3363         ///
3364         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3365         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3366         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3367         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3368         ///
3369         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3370         ///
3371         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3372         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3373         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3374         ///
3375         /// In general, a path may raise:
3376         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3377         ///    node public key) is specified.
3378         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3379         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3380         ///    failure).
3381         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3382         ///    relevant updates.
3383         ///
3384         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3385         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3386         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3387         ///
3388         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3389         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3390         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3391         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3392         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3393         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3394         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3395                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3396                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3397                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3398                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3399                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3400                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3401         }
3402
3403         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3404         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3405         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3406                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3407                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3408                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3409                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3410                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3411                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3412                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3413         }
3414
3415         #[cfg(test)]
3416         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3417                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3418                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3419                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3420                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3421                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3422         }
3423
3424         #[cfg(test)]
3425         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3426                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3427                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3428         }
3429
3430         #[cfg(test)]
3431         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3432                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3433         }
3434
3435
3436         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3437         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3438         /// retries are exhausted.
3439         ///
3440         /// # Event Generation
3441         ///
3442         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3443         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3444         ///
3445         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3446         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3447         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3448         ///
3449         /// # Requested Invoices
3450         ///
3451         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3452         /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3453         /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3454         ///
3455         /// # Restart Behavior
3456         ///
3457         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3458         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3459         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3460         ///
3461         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3462         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3463                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3464                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3465         }
3466
3467         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3468         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3469         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3470         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3471         /// never reach the recipient.
3472         ///
3473         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3474         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3475         ///
3476         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3477         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3478         ///
3479         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3480         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3481                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3482                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3483                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3484                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3485                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3486         }
3487
3488         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3489         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3490         ///
3491         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3492         /// payments.
3493         ///
3494         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3495         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3496                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3497                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3498                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3499                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3500                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3501                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3502         }
3503
3504         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3505         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3506         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3507         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3508                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3509                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3510                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3511                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3512                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3513         }
3514
3515         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3516         /// payment probe.
3517         #[cfg(test)]
3518         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3519                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3520         }
3521
3522         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3523         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3524         ///
3525         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3526         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3527                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32, 
3528                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3529         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3530                 let payment_params =
3531                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3532
3533                 let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params, final_value_msat: amount_msat };
3534
3535                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3536         }
3537
3538         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3539         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3540         ///
3541         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3542         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3543         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3544         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3545         ///
3546         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3547         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3548         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3549         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3550         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3551         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3552         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3553                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3554         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3555                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3556
3557                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3558                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3559                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3560                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3561
3562                 let route = self
3563                         .router
3564                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3565                         .map_err(|e| {
3566                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3567                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3568                         })?;
3569
3570                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3571
3572                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3573
3574                 for mut path in route.paths {
3575                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3576                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3577                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3578                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3579                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3580                                         break;
3581                                 } else {
3582                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3583                                         log_debug!(
3584                                                 self.logger,
3585                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3586                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3587                                         );
3588                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3589                                         path.hops.pop();
3590                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3591                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3592                                         }
3593                                 }
3594                         }
3595
3596                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3597                                 log_debug!(
3598                                         self.logger,
3599                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3600                                 );
3601                                 continue;
3602                         }
3603
3604                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3605                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3606                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3607                                 }) {
3608                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3609                                         let used_liquidity =
3610                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3611
3612                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3613                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3614                                         {
3615                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3616                                                 continue;
3617                                         } else {
3618                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3619                                         }
3620                                 }
3621                         }
3622
3623                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3624                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3625                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3626                         })?);
3627                 }
3628
3629                 Ok(res)
3630         }
3631
3632         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3633         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3634         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3635                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3636         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3637                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3638                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3639                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3640
3641                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3642                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3643                 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3644                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3645                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3646
3647                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3648                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3649                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3650                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3651                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3652                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3653                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3654                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3655                                 match funding_res {
3656                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3657                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3658                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3659                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3660
3661                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3662                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3663                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3664                                                 });
3665                                         },
3666                                 }
3667                         },
3668                         Some(phase) => {
3669                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3670                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3671                                         err: format!(
3672                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3673                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3674                                 })
3675                         },
3676                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3677                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3678                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3679                                 }),
3680                 };
3681
3682                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3683                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3684                         msg,
3685                 });
3686                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3687                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3688                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3689                         },
3690                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3691                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3692                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3693                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3694                                 }
3695                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3696                         }
3697                 }
3698                 Ok(())
3699         }
3700
3701         #[cfg(test)]
3702         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3703                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3704                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3705                 })
3706         }
3707
3708         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3709         ///
3710         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3711         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3712         ///
3713         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3714         /// across the p2p network.
3715         ///
3716         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3717         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3718         ///
3719         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3720         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3721         /// keys per-channel).
3722         ///
3723         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3724         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3725         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3726         ///
3727         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3728         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3729         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3730         ///
3731         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3732         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3733         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3734         /// for more details.
3735         ///
3736         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3737         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3738         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3739                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3740
3741                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3742                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3743                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3744                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3745                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3746                                         });
3747                                 }
3748                         }
3749                 }
3750                 {
3751                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3752                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3753                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3754                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3755                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3756                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3757                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3758                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3759                                 });
3760                         }
3761                 }
3762                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3763                         if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3764                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3765                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3766                                 });
3767                         }
3768
3769                         let mut output_index = None;
3770                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3771                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3772                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3773                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3774                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3775                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3776                                                 });
3777                                         }
3778                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3779                                 }
3780                         }
3781                         if output_index.is_none() {
3782                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3783                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3784                                 });
3785                         }
3786                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3787                 })
3788         }
3789
3790         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3791         ///
3792         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3793         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3794         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3795         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3796         ///
3797         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3798         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3799         ///
3800         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3801         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3802         ///
3803         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3804         ///
3805         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3806         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3807         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3808         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3809         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3810         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3811         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3812         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3813                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3814         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3815                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3816                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3817                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3818                         });
3819                 }
3820
3821                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3822                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3823                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3824                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3825                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3826                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3827                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3828                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3829                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3830                                         err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3831                                 });
3832                         };
3833                 }
3834                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3835                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3836                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3837                                 config.apply(config_update);
3838                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3839                                         continue;
3840                                 }
3841                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3842                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3843                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3844                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3845                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3846                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3847                                                         msg,
3848                                                 });
3849                                         }
3850                                 }
3851                                 continue;
3852                         } else {
3853                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3854                                 debug_assert!(false);
3855                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3856                                         err: format!(
3857                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3858                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3859                                 });
3860                         };
3861                 }
3862                 Ok(())
3863         }
3864
3865         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3866         ///
3867         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3868         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3869         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3870         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3871         ///
3872         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3873         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3874         ///
3875         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3876         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3877         ///
3878         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3879         ///
3880         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3881         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3882         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3883         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3884         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3885         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3886         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3887         pub fn update_channel_config(
3888                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3889         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3890                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3891         }
3892
3893         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3894         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3895         ///
3896         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3897         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3898         ///
3899         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3900         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3901         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3902         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3903         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3904         ///
3905         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3906         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3907         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3908         /// than expected.
3909         ///
3910         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3911         /// backwards.
3912         ///
3913         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3914         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3915         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3916         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3917         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3918         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3919                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3920
3921                 let next_hop_scid = {
3922                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3923                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3924                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3925                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3926                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3927                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3928                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3929                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3930                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3931                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3932                                                 })
3933                                         }
3934                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3935                                 },
3936                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3937                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3938                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3939                                 }),
3940                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3941                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3942                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3943                                 })
3944                         }
3945                 };
3946
3947                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3948                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3949                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3950                         })?;
3951
3952                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3953                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3954                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3955                         },
3956                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3957                 };
3958                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3959                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3960                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3961                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3962                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3963                 };
3964
3965                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3966                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3967                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3968                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3969                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3970                 )];
3971                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3972                 Ok(())
3973         }
3974
3975         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3976         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3977         ///
3978         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3979         /// backwards.
3980         ///
3981         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3982         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3983                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3984
3985                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3986                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3987                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3988                         })?;
3989
3990                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3991                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3992                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3993                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3994                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3995                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3996                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3997                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3998                         });
3999
4000                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4001                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4002                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4003                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4004
4005                 Ok(())
4006         }
4007
4008         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4009         ///
4010         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4011         /// Will likely generate further events.
4012         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4013                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4014
4015                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4016                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4017                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4018                 {
4019                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4020                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4021
4022                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4023                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4024                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4025                                                 () => {
4026                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4027                                                                 match forward_info {
4028                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4029                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4030                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4031                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4032                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4033                                                                                 }
4034                                                                         }) => {
4035                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4036                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4037                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4038
4039                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4040                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4041                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4042                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4043                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4044                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4045                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4046                                                                                                 });
4047
4048                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4049                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4050                                                                                                 } else {
4051                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4052                                                                                                 };
4053
4054                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4055                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4056                                                                                                         reason
4057                                                                                                 ));
4058                                                                                                 continue;
4059                                                                                         }
4060                                                                                 }
4061                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4062                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4063                                                                                                 {
4064                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4065                                                                                                 }
4066                                                                                         }
4067                                                                                 }
4068                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4069                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4070                                                                                                 {
4071                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4072                                                                                                 }
4073                                                                                         }
4074                                                                                 }
4075                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4076                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4077                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4078                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4079                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4080                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4081                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4082                                                                                                 ) {
4083                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4084                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4085                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4086                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4087                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4088                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4089                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4090                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4091                                                                                                         },
4092                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4093                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4094                                                                                                         },
4095                                                                                                 };
4096                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4097                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4098                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4099                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4100                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4101                                                                                                                 {
4102                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4103                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4104                                                                                                                 }
4105                                                                                                         },
4106                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4107                                                                                                 }
4108                                                                                         } else {
4109                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4110                                                                                         }
4111                                                                                 } else {
4112                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4113                                                                                 }
4114                                                                         },
4115                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4116                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4117                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4118                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4119                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4120                                                                         }
4121                                                                 }
4122                                                         }
4123                                                 }
4124                                         }
4125                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4126                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4127                                                 None => {
4128                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4129                                                         continue;
4130                                                 }
4131                                         };
4132                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4133                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4134                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4135                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4136                                                 continue;
4137                                         }
4138                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4139                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4140                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4141                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4142                                                         match forward_info {
4143                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4144                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4145                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4146                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4147                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4148                                                                         },
4149                                                                 }) => {
4150                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4151                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4152                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4153                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4154                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4155                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4156                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4157                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4158                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4159                                                                         });
4160                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4161                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4162                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4163                                                                                 &self.logger)
4164                                                                         {
4165                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4166                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4167                                                                                 } else {
4168                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4169                                                                                 }
4170                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4171                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4172                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4173                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4174                                                                                 ));
4175                                                                                 continue;
4176                                                                         }
4177                                                                 },
4178                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4179                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4180                                                                 },
4181                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4182                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4183                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4184                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4185                                                                         ) {
4186                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4187                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4188                                                                                 } else {
4189                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4190                                                                                 }
4191                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4192                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4193                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4194                                                                                 continue;
4195                                                                         }
4196                                                                 },
4197                                                         }
4198                                                 }
4199                                         } else {
4200                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4201                                                 continue;
4202                                         }
4203                                 } else {
4204                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4205                                                 match forward_info {
4206                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4207                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4208                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4209                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4210                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4211                                                                 }
4212                                                         }) => {
4213                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4214                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4215                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4216                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4217                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4218                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4219                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4220                                                                         },
4221                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4222                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4223                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4224                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4225                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4226                                                                                 };
4227                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4228                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4229                                                                         },
4230                                                                         _ => {
4231                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4232                                                                         }
4233                                                                 };
4234                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4235                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4236                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4237                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4238                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4239                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4240                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4241                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4242                                                                         },
4243                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4244                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4245                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4246                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4247                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4248                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4249                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4250                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4251                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4252                                                                         onion_payload,
4253                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4254                                                                 };
4255
4256                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4257
4258                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4259                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4260                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4261                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4262                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4263                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4264                                                                                 );
4265                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4266                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4267                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4268                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4269                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4270                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4271                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4272                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4273                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4274                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4275                                                                                 ));
4276                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4277                                                                         }
4278                                                                 }
4279                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4280                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4281                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4282                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4283                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4284                                                                 }
4285
4286                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4287                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4288                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4289                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4290                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4291                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4292                                                                                 };
4293                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4294                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4295                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4296                                                                                 }
4297                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4298                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4299                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4300                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4301                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4302                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4303                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4304                                                                                                 }
4305                                                                                         });
4306                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4307                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4308                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4309                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4310                                                                                 }
4311                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4312                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4313                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4314                                                                                 }
4315                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4316                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4317                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4318                                                                                         }
4319                                                                                 } else {
4320                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4321                                                                                 }
4322                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4323                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4324                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4325                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4326                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4327                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4328                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4329                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4330                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4331                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4332                                                                                         }
4333                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4334                                                                                 }
4335                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4336                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4337                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4338                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4339                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4340                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4341                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4342                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4343                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4344                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4345                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4346                                                                                         }
4347                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4348                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4349                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4350                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4351                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4352                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4353                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4354                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4355                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4356                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4357                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4358                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4359                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4360                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4361                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4362                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4363                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4364                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4365                                                                                         }, None));
4366                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4367                                                                                 } else {
4368                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4369                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4370                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4371                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4372                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4373                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4374                                                                                         }
4375                                                                                 }
4376                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4377                                                                         }}
4378                                                                 }
4379
4380                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4381                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4382                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4383                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4384                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4385                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4386                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4387                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4388                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4389                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4390                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4391                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4392                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4393                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4394                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4395                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4396                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4397                                                                                                         }
4398                                                                                                 };
4399                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4400                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4401                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4402                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4403                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4404                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4405                                                                                                         }
4406                                                                                                 }
4407                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4408                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4409                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4410                                                                                                 };
4411                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4412                                                                                         },
4413                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4414                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4415                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4416                                                                                         }
4417                                                                                 }
4418                                                                         },
4419                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4420                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4421                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4422                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4423                                                                                 }
4424                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4425                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4426                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4427                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4428                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4429                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4430                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4431                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4432                                                                                 } else {
4433                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4434                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4435                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4436                                                                                         };
4437                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4438                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4439                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4440                                                                                         }
4441                                                                                 }
4442                                                                         },
4443                                                                 };
4444                                                         },
4445                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4446                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4447                                                         }
4448                                                 }
4449                                         }
4450                                 }
4451                         }
4452                 }
4453
4454                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4455                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4456                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4457                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4458
4459                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4460                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4461                 }
4462                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4463
4464                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4465                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4466                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4467                 // network stack.
4468                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4469
4470                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4471                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4472                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4473         }
4474
4475         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4476         ///
4477         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4478         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4479                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4480
4481                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4482
4483                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4484                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4485                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4486                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4487                 }
4488
4489                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4490                         match event {
4491                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4492                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4493                                         // monitor updating completing.
4494                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4495                                 },
4496                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4497                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4498                                         {
4499                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4500                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4501                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4502                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4503                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4504                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4505                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4506                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4507                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4508                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4509                                                                         } else {
4510                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4511                                                                         }
4512                                                                 },
4513                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4514                                                         }
4515                                                 }
4516                                         }
4517                                         if !updated_chan {
4518                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4519                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4520                                         }
4521                                 },
4522                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4523                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4524                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4525                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4526                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4527                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4528                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4529                                                 } else {
4530                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4531                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4532                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4533                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4534                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4535                                                 }
4536                                         }
4537                                 },
4538                         }
4539                 }
4540                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4541         }
4542
4543         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4544         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4545         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4546                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4547                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4548         }
4549
4550         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4551                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4552                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4553                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4554                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4555                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4556                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4557                 }
4558                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4559                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4560                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4561                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4562                 }
4563                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4564                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4565
4566                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4567                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4568         }
4569
4570         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4571         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4572         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4573         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4574         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4575         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4576                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4577                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4578
4579                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4580                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4581
4582                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4583                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4584                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4585                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4586                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4587                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4588                                 ) {
4589                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4590                                                 min_mempool_feerate
4591                                         } else {
4592                                                 normal_feerate
4593                                         };
4594                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4595                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4596                                 }
4597                         }
4598
4599                         should_persist
4600                 });
4601         }
4602
4603         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4604         ///
4605         /// This currently includes:
4606         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4607         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4608         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4609         ///    the channel.
4610         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4611         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4612         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4613         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4614         ///
4615         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4616         /// estimate fetches.
4617         ///
4618         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4619         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4620         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4621                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4622                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4623
4624                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4625                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4626
4627                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4628                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4629                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4630
4631                         let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4632                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4633                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4634                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4635                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4636                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4637                         | {
4638                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4639                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4640                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4641                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4642                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4643                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4644                                         self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4645                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4646                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4647                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4648                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4649                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4650                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4651                                                         },
4652                                                 },
4653                                         });
4654                                         false
4655                                 } else {
4656                                         true
4657                                 }
4658                         };
4659
4660                         {
4661                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4662                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4663                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4664                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4665                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4666                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4667                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4668                                                 match phase {
4669                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4670                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4671                                                                         min_mempool_feerate
4672                                                                 } else {
4673                                                                         normal_feerate
4674                                                                 };
4675                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4676                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4677
4678                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4679                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4680                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4681                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4682                                                                 }
4683
4684                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4685                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4686                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4687                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4688                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4689                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4690                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4691                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4692                                                                                 n += 1;
4693                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4694                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4695                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4696                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4697                                                                                                         msg: update
4698                                                                                                 });
4699                                                                                         }
4700                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4701                                                                                 } else {
4702                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4703                                                                                 }
4704                                                                         },
4705                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4706                                                                                 n += 1;
4707                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4708                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4709                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4710                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4711                                                                                                         msg: update
4712                                                                                                 });
4713                                                                                         }
4714                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4715                                                                                 } else {
4716                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4717                                                                                 }
4718                                                                         },
4719                                                                         _ => {},
4720                                                                 }
4721
4722                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4723
4724                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4725                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4726                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4727                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4728                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4729                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4730                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4731                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4732                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4733                                                                                         },
4734                                                                                 },
4735                                                                         });
4736                                                                 }
4737
4738                                                                 true
4739                                                         },
4740                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4741                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4742                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4743                                                         },
4744                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4745                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4746                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4747                                                         },
4748                                                 }
4749                                         });
4750
4751                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4752                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4753                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4754                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4755                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4756                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4757                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4758                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4759                                                                         },
4760                                                                 }
4761                                                         );
4762                                                 }
4763                                         }
4764                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4765
4766                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4767                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4768                                         }
4769                                 }
4770                         }
4771
4772                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4773                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4774                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4775                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4776                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4777                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4778                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4779                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4780                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4781                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4782                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4783                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4784                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4785                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4786                                                         let remove_entry = {
4787                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4788                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4789                                                         };
4790                                                         if remove_entry {
4791                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4792                                                         }
4793                                                 },
4794                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4795                                         }
4796                                 }
4797                         }
4798
4799                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4800                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4801                                         // This should be unreachable
4802                                         debug_assert!(false);
4803                                         return false;
4804                                 }
4805                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4806                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4807                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4808                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4809                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4810                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4811                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4812                                         {
4813                                                 return true;
4814                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4815                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4816                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4817                                         }) {
4818                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4819                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4820                                                 return false;
4821                                         }
4822                                 }
4823                                 true
4824                         });
4825
4826                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4827                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4828                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4829                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4830                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4831                         }
4832
4833                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4834                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4835                         }
4836
4837                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4838
4839                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4840                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4841                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4842                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4843                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4844                         }
4845
4846                         should_persist
4847                 });
4848         }
4849
4850         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4851         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4852         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4853         ///
4854         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4855         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4856         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4857         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4858         ///
4859         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4860         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4861         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4862         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4863         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4864                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4865         }
4866
4867         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4868         /// reason for the failure.
4869         ///
4870         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4871         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4872                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4873
4874                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4875                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4876                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4877                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4878                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4879                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4880                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4881                         }
4882                 }
4883         }
4884
4885         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4886         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4887                 match failure_code {
4888                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4889                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4890                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4891                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4892                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4893                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4894                         },
4895                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4896                                 let fail_data = match data {
4897                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4898                                         None => Vec::new(),
4899                                 };
4900                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4901                         }
4902                 }
4903         }
4904
4905         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4906         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4907         ///
4908         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4909         /// forwarding
4910         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4911                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4912                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4913                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4914                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4915                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4916                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4917                 } else {
4918                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4919                 };
4920                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4921                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4922                 } else {
4923                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4924                 }
4925         }
4926
4927
4928         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4929         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4930         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4931                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4932                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4933                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4934                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4935                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4936                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4937                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4938                         }
4939                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4940                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4941                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4942                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4943                 } else {
4944                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4945                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4946                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4947                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4948                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4949                 }
4950         }
4951
4952         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4953         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4954         // be surfaced to the user.
4955         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4956                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4957                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4958         ) {
4959                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4960                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4961                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4962                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4963                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4964                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4965                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4966                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4967                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4968                                                 } else {
4969                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4970                                                         debug_assert!(false);
4971                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4972                                                 }
4973                                         },
4974                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4975                                 }
4976                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4977                 };
4978
4979                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4980                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4981                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4982                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4983                 }
4984         }
4985
4986         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4987         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4988         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4989                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4990                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4991                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4992                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4993                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4994                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4995                 }
4996
4997                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4998                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4999                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5000                 //timer handling.
5001
5002                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5003                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5004                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5005                 match source {
5006                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5007                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5008                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5009                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5010                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5011                         },
5012                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5013                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5014                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5015
5016                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5017                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5018                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5019                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5020                                 }
5021                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5022                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5023                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5024                                         },
5025                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5026                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5027                                         }
5028                                 }
5029                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5030                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5031                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5032                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5033                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5034                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5035                                 }, None));
5036                         },
5037                 }
5038         }
5039
5040         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5041         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5042         ///
5043         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5044         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5045         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5046         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5047         ///
5048         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5049         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5050         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5051         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5052         ///
5053         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5054         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5055         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5056         ///
5057         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5058         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5059         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5060         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5061         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5062         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5063         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5064         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5065                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5066         }
5067
5068         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5069         /// even type numbers.
5070         ///
5071         /// # Note
5072         ///
5073         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5074         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5075         ///
5076         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5077         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5078                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5079         }
5080
5081         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5082                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5083
5084                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5085
5086                 let mut sources = {
5087                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5088                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5089                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5090                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5091                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5092                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5093                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5094                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5095                                                 break;
5096                                         }
5097                                 }
5098
5099                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5100                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5101                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5102                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5103                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5104                                 });
5105                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5106                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5107                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5108                                                 &payment_hash);
5109                                 }
5110
5111                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5112                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5113                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5114                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5115                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5116                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5117                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5118                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5119                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5120                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5121                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5122                                                 }
5123                                                 return;
5124                                         }
5125                                 }
5126
5127                                 payment.htlcs
5128                         } else { return; }
5129                 };
5130                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5131
5132                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5133                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5134                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5135                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5136                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5137                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5138                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5139                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5140                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5141                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5142                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5143                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5144                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5145                                 debug_assert!(false);
5146                                 valid_mpp = false;
5147                                 break;
5148                         }
5149                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5150
5151                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5152                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5153                                 debug_assert!(false);
5154                                 valid_mpp = false;
5155                                 break;
5156                         }
5157                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5158                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5159                 }
5160                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5161                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5162                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5163                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5164                         return;
5165                 }
5166                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5167                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5168                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5169                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5170                         return;
5171                 }
5172                 if valid_mpp {
5173                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5174                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5175                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5176                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5177                                 {
5178                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5179                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5180                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5181                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5182                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5183                                 }
5184                         }
5185                 }
5186                 if !valid_mpp {
5187                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5188                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5189                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5190                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5191                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5192                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5193                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5194                         }
5195                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5196                 }
5197
5198                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5199                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5200                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5201                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5202                 }
5203         }
5204
5205         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5206                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5207         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5208                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5209
5210                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5211                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5212                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5213                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5214
5215                 {
5216                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5217                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5218                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5219                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5220                                 None => None
5221                         };
5222
5223                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5224                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5225                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5226                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5227
5228                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5229                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5230                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5231                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5232                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5233                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5234                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5235
5236                                                 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5237                                                         if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5238                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5239                                                                         chan_id, action);
5240                                                                 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5241                                                         }
5242                                                         if !during_init {
5243                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5244                                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5245                                                         } else {
5246                                                                 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5247                                                                 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5248                                                                 // monitor update as a background event.
5249                                                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5250                                                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5251                                                                                 counterparty_node_id,
5252                                                                                 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5253                                                                                 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5254                                                                         });
5255                                                         }
5256                                                 }
5257                                         }
5258                                         return Ok(());
5259                                 }
5260                         }
5261                 }
5262                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5263                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5264                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5265                                 payment_preimage,
5266                         }],
5267                 };
5268
5269                 if !during_init {
5270                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5271                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5272                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5273                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5274                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5275                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5276                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5277                                 // again on restart.
5278                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5279                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5280                         }
5281                 } else {
5282                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5283                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5284                         // event.
5285                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5286                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5287                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5288                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5289                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5290                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5291                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5292                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5293                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5294                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5295                                 )));
5296                 }
5297                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5298                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5299                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5300                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5301                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5302                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5303                 Ok(())
5304         }
5305
5306         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5307                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5308         }
5309
5310         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5311                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5312                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5313         ) {
5314                 match source {
5315                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5316                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5317                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5318                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5319                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5320                                 }
5321                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5322                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5323                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5324                                 };
5325                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5326                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5327                                         &self.logger);
5328                         },
5329                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5330                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5331                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5332                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5333                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5334                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5335                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5336                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5337                                                         } else { None };
5338
5339                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5340                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5341                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5342                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5343                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5344                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5345                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5346                                                                 },
5347                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5348                                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5349                                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5350                                                                         } else {
5351                                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5352                                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5353                                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5354                                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5355                                                                                 // closed.
5356                                                                                 None
5357                                                                         },
5358                                                         })
5359                                                 } else { None }
5360                                         });
5361                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5362                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5363                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5364                                 }
5365                         },
5366                 }
5367         }
5368
5369         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5370         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5371                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5372         }
5373
5374         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5375                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5376                         match action {
5377                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5378                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5379                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5380                                                 amount_msat,
5381                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5382                                                 receiver_node_id,
5383                                                 htlcs,
5384                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5385                                         }) = payment {
5386                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5387                                                         payment_hash,
5388                                                         purpose,
5389                                                         amount_msat,
5390                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5391                                                         htlcs,
5392                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5393                                                 }, None));
5394                                         }
5395                                 },
5396                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5397                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5398                                 } => {
5399                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5400                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5401                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5402                                         }
5403                                 },
5404                         }
5405                 }
5406         }
5407
5408         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5409         /// update completion.
5410         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5411                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5412                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5413                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5414                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5415         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5416                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5417                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5418                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5419                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5420                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5421                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5422                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5423
5424                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5425
5426                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5427                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5428                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5429                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5430                 }
5431
5432                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5433                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5434                 }
5435                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5436                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5437                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5438                                 msg,
5439                         });
5440                 }
5441
5442                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5443                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5444                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5445                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5446                                         updates: update,
5447                                 });
5448                         }
5449                 } }
5450                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5451                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5452                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5453                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5454                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5455                                 });
5456                         }
5457                 } }
5458                 match order {
5459                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5460                                 handle_cs!();
5461                                 handle_raa!();
5462                         },
5463                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5464                                 handle_raa!();
5465                                 handle_cs!();
5466                         },
5467                 }
5468
5469                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5470                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5471                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5472                 }
5473
5474                 {
5475                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5476                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5477                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5478                 }
5479
5480                 htlc_forwards
5481         }
5482
5483         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5484                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5485
5486                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5487                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5488                         None => {
5489                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5490                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5491                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5492                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5493                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5494                                         None => return,
5495                                 }
5496                         }
5497                 };
5498                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5499                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5500                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5501                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5502                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5503                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5504                 let channel =
5505                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5506                                 chan
5507                         } else {
5508                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5509                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5510                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5511                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5512                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5513                                 return;
5514                         };
5515                 let remaining_in_flight =
5516                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5517                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5518                                 pending.len()
5519                         } else { 0 };
5520                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5521                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5522                         remaining_in_flight);
5523                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5524                         return;
5525                 }
5526                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5527         }
5528
5529         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5530         ///
5531         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5532         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5533         /// the channel.
5534         ///
5535         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5536         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5537         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5538         ///
5539         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5540         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5541         /// used to accept such channels.
5542         ///
5543         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5544         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5545         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5546                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5547         }
5548
5549         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5550         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5551         ///
5552         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5553         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5554         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5555         ///
5556         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5557         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5558         ///
5559         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5560         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5561         ///
5562         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5563         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5564         ///
5565         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5566         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5567         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5568                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5569         }
5570
5571         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5572                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5573
5574                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5575                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5576                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5577                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5578                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5579                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5580                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5581                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5582
5583                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5584                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5585                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5586                 // succeed.
5587                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5588                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5589                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5590                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5591                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5592                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5593                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5594                         }
5595                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5596                 }?;
5597
5598                 if accept_0conf {
5599                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5600                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5601                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5602                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5603                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5604                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5605                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5606                                 }
5607                         };
5608                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5609                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5610                 } else {
5611                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5612                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5613                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5614                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5615                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5616                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5617                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5618                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5619                                         }
5620                                 };
5621                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5622                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5623                         }
5624                 }
5625
5626                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5627                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5628                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5629
5630                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5631                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5632                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5633                 });
5634
5635                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5636
5637                 Ok(())
5638         }
5639
5640         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5641         /// or 0-conf channels.
5642         ///
5643         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5644         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5645         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5646         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5647                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5648                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5649                 {
5650                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5651                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5652                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5653                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5654                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5655                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5656                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5657                                 }
5658                         }
5659                 }
5660                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5661         }
5662
5663         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5664                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5665         ) -> usize {
5666                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5667                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5668                         match phase {
5669                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5670                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5671                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5672                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5673                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5674                                         {
5675                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5676                                         }
5677                                 },
5678                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5679                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5680                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5681                                         }
5682                                 },
5683                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5684                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5685                                         continue;
5686                                 }
5687                         }
5688                 }
5689                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5690         }
5691
5692         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5693                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5694                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5695                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5696                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5697                 }
5698
5699                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5700                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5701                 }
5702
5703                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5704                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5705                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5706                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5707                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5708
5709                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5710                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5711                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5712                                 debug_assert!(false);
5713                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5714                         })?;
5715                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5716                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5717
5718                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5719                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5720                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5721                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5722                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5723                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5724                 {
5725                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5726                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5727                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5728                 }
5729
5730                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5731                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5732                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5733                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5734                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5735                 }
5736
5737                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5738                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5739                 if channel_exists {
5740                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5741                 }
5742
5743                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5744                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5745                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5746                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5747                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5748                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5749                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5750                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5751                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5752                         }, None));
5753                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5754                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5755                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5756                         });
5757                         return Ok(());
5758                 }
5759
5760                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5761                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5762                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5763                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5764                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5765                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5766                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5767                 {
5768                         Err(e) => {
5769                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5770                         },
5771                         Ok(res) => res
5772                 };
5773
5774                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5775                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5776                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5777                 }
5778                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5779                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5780                 }
5781
5782                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5783                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5784
5785                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5786                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5787                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5788                 });
5789                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5790                 Ok(())
5791         }
5792
5793         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5794                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5795                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5796                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5797                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5798                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5799                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5800                                         debug_assert!(false);
5801                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5802                                 })?;
5803                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5804                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5805                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5806                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5807                                         match phase.get_mut() {
5808                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5809                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5810                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5811                                                 },
5812                                                 _ => {
5813                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5814                                                 }
5815                                         }
5816                                 },
5817                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5818                         }
5819                 };
5820                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5821                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5822                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5823                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5824                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
5825                         output_script,
5826                         user_channel_id: user_id,
5827                 }, None));
5828                 Ok(())
5829         }
5830
5831         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5832                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5833
5834                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5835                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5836                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5837                                 debug_assert!(false);
5838                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5839                         })?;
5840
5841                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5842                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5843                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5844                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5845                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5846                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5847                                                 Ok(res) => res,
5848                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5849                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5850                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5851                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5852                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5853                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5854                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5855                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5856                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5857                                                 },
5858                                         }
5859                                 },
5860                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5861                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5862                                 },
5863                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5864                         };
5865
5866                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5867                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5868                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5869                         },
5870                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5871                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5872                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5873                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5874                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5875                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5876                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
5877                                         },
5878                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5879                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5880                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
5881                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5882                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
5883
5884                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5885                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5886                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5887                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
5888                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5889                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5890                                                                 msg: funding_msg,
5891                                                         });
5892
5893                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5894                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5895                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5896                                                         } else {
5897                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5898                                                         }
5899                                                         Ok(())
5900                                                 } else {
5901                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
5902                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5903                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5904                                                                 funding_msg.channel_id));
5905                                                 }
5906                                         }
5907                                 }
5908                         }
5909                 }
5910         }
5911
5912         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5913                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5914                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5915                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5916                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5917                                 debug_assert!(false);
5918                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5919                         })?;
5920
5921                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5922                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5923                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5924                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5925                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5926                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5927                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5928                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5929                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
5930                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5931                                                         Ok(())
5932                                                 } else {
5933                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
5934                                                 }
5935                                         },
5936                                         _ => {
5937                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5938                                         },
5939                                 }
5940                         },
5941                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5942                 }
5943         }
5944
5945         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5946                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
5947                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
5948                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5949                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5950                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5951                                 debug_assert!(false);
5952                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5953                         })?;
5954                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5955                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5956                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5957                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5958                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5959                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5960                                                 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5961                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5962                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5963                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5964                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5965                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
5966                                                 });
5967                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5968                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5969                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5970                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5971                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5972                                                 // announcement_signatures.
5973                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5974                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5975                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5976                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5977                                                                 msg,
5978                                                         });
5979                                                 }
5980                                         }
5981
5982                                         {
5983                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5984                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5985                                         }
5986
5987                                         Ok(())
5988                                 } else {
5989                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5990                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5991                                 }
5992                         },
5993                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5994                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5995                         }
5996                 }
5997         }
5998
5999         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6000                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
6001                 {
6002                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6003                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6004                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6005                                         debug_assert!(false);
6006                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6007                                 })?;
6008                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6009                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6010                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6011                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6012                                 match phase {
6013                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6014                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6015                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6016                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6017                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6018                                                 }
6019
6020                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6021                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6022                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6023                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6024
6025                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6026                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6027                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6028                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6029                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6030                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6031                                                                 msg,
6032                                                         });
6033                                                 }
6034                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6035                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6036                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6037                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6038                                                 }
6039                                         },
6040                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6041                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6042                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6043                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6044                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6045                                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6046                                                 return Ok(());
6047                                         },
6048                                 }
6049                         } else {
6050                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6051                         }
6052                 }
6053                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6054                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6055                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6056                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6057                 }
6058
6059                 Ok(())
6060         }
6061
6062         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6063                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6064                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6065                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6066                                 debug_assert!(false);
6067                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6068                         })?;
6069                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6070                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6071                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6072                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6073                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6074                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6075                                                 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6076                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6077                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6078                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6079                                                                 msg,
6080                                                         });
6081                                                 }
6082                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6083                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6084                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6085                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6086                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6087                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6088                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6089                                                 } else { (tx, None) }
6090                                         } else {
6091                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6092                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6093                                         }
6094                                 },
6095                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6096                         }
6097                 };
6098                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6099                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6100                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6101                 }
6102                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6103                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6104                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6105                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6106                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6107                                         msg: update
6108                                 });
6109                         }
6110                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6111                 }
6112                 Ok(())
6113         }
6114
6115         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6116                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6117                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6118                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6119                 //
6120                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6121                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6122                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6123                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6124
6125                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6126                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6127
6128                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6129                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6130                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6131                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6132                                 debug_assert!(false);
6133                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6134                         })?;
6135                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6136                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6137                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6138                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6139                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6140                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6141                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6142                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6143                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6144                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6145                                         };
6146                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6147                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6148                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6149                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6150                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6151                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6152                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6153                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6154                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6155                                                                 } else {
6156                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6157                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6158                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6159                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6160                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6161                                                                         reason
6162                                                                 };
6163                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6164                                                         },
6165                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6166                                                 }
6167                                         };
6168                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6169                                 } else {
6170                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6171                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6172                                 }
6173                         },
6174                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6175                 }
6176                 Ok(())
6177         }
6178
6179         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6180                 let funding_txo;
6181                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6182                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6183                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6184                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6185                                         debug_assert!(false);
6186                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6187                                 })?;
6188                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6189                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6190                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6191                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6192                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6193                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6194                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6195                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6196                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6197                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6198                                                 }
6199                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6200                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6201                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6202                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6203                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6204                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6205                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6206                                                 res
6207                                         } else {
6208                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6209                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6210                                         }
6211                                 },
6212                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6213                         }
6214                 };
6215                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6216                 Ok(())
6217         }
6218
6219         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6220                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6221                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6222                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6223                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6224                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6225                                 debug_assert!(false);
6226                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6227                         })?;
6228                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6229                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6230                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6231                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6232                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6233                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6234                                 } else {
6235                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6236                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6237                                 }
6238                         },
6239                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6240                 }
6241                 Ok(())
6242         }
6243
6244         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6245                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6246                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6247                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6248                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6249                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6250                                 debug_assert!(false);
6251                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6252                         })?;
6253                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6254                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6255                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6256                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6257                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6258                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6259                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6260                                 }
6261                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6262                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6263                                 } else {
6264                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6265                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6266                                 }
6267                                 Ok(())
6268                         },
6269                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6270                 }
6271         }
6272
6273         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6274                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6275                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6276                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6277                                 debug_assert!(false);
6278                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6279                         })?;
6280                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6281                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6282                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6283                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6284                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6285                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6286                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6287                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6288                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6289                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6290                                         }
6291                                         Ok(())
6292                                 } else {
6293                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6294                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6295                                 }
6296                         },
6297                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6298                 }
6299         }
6300
6301         #[inline]
6302         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6303                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6304                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6305                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6306                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6307                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6308                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6309                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6310                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6311                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6312                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6313                                         };
6314                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6315                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6316
6317                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6318                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6319                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6320                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6321                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6322                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6323                                                 },
6324                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6325                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6326                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6327                                                         {
6328                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6329                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6330                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6331                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6332                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6333                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6334                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6335                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6336                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6337                                                                                         intercept_id
6338                                                                                 }, None));
6339                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6340                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6341                                                                         },
6342                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6343                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6344                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6345                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6346                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6347                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6348                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6349                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6350                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6351                                                                                 });
6352
6353                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6354                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6355                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6356                                                                                 ));
6357                                                                         }
6358                                                                 }
6359                                                         } else {
6360                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6361                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6362                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6363                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6364                                                                 }
6365                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6366                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6367                                                         }
6368                                                 }
6369                                         }
6370                                 }
6371                         }
6372
6373                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6374                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6375                         }
6376
6377                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6378                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6379                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6380                         }
6381                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6382                 }
6383         }
6384
6385         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6386                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6387                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6388                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6389                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6390                 ).count();
6391                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6392                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6393                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6394                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6395                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6396                 // real by taking more time.
6397                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6398                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6399                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6400                         }, None));
6401                 }
6402         }
6403
6404         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6405         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6406         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6407         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6408         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6409                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6410                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6411         ) -> bool {
6412                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6413                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6414                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6415                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6416                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6417                                 counterparty_node_id,
6418                         })
6419                 })
6420         }
6421
6422         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6423         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6424                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6425         ) -> bool {
6426                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6427                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6428                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6429                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6430
6431                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6432                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6433                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6434                         }
6435                 }
6436                 false
6437         }
6438
6439         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6440                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6441                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6442                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6443                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6444                                         debug_assert!(false);
6445                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6446                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6447                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6448                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6449                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6450                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6451                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6452                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6453                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6454                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6455                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6456                                                 } else { false };
6457                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6458                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6459                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6460                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6461                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6462                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6463                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6464                                                 }
6465                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6466                                         } else {
6467                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6468                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6469                                         }
6470                                 },
6471                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6472                         }
6473                 };
6474                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6475                 Ok(())
6476         }
6477
6478         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6479                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6480                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6481                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6482                                 debug_assert!(false);
6483                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6484                         })?;
6485                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6486                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6487                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6488                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6489                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6490                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6491                                 } else {
6492                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6493                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6494                                 }
6495                         },
6496                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6497                 }
6498                 Ok(())
6499         }
6500
6501         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6502                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6503                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6504                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6505                                 debug_assert!(false);
6506                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6507                         })?;
6508                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6509                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6510                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6511                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6512                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6513                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6514                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6515                                         }
6516
6517                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6518                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6519                                                         &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6520                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6521                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6522                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6523                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6524                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6525                                         });
6526                                 } else {
6527                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6528                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6529                                 }
6530                         },
6531                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6532                 }
6533                 Ok(())
6534         }
6535
6536         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6537         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6538                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6539                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6540                         None => {
6541                                 // It's not a local channel
6542                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6543                         }
6544                 };
6545                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6546                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6547                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6548                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6549                 }
6550                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6551                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6552                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6553                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6554                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6555                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6556                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6557                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6558                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6559                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6560                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6561                                                 }
6562                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6563                                         }
6564                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6565                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6566                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6567                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6568                                         } else {
6569                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6570                                                 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6571                                         }
6572                                 } else {
6573                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6574                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6575                                 }
6576                         },
6577                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6578                 }
6579                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6580         }
6581
6582         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6583                 let htlc_forwards;
6584                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6585                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6586
6587                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6588                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6589                                         debug_assert!(false);
6590                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6591                                 })?;
6592                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6593                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6594                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6595                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6596                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6597                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6598                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6599                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6600                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6601                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6602                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6603                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6604                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
6605                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6606                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6607                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6608                                                                 msg,
6609                                                         });
6610                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6611                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6612                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6613                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
6614                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6615                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6616                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6617                                                                         msg,
6618                                                                 });
6619                                                         }
6620                                                 }
6621                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6622                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6623                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6624                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6625                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6626                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6627                                                 }
6628                                                 need_lnd_workaround
6629                                         } else {
6630                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6631                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6632                                         }
6633                                 },
6634                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6635                         }
6636                 };
6637
6638                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6639                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6640                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6641                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6642                 }
6643
6644                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6645                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6646                 }
6647                 Ok(persist)
6648         }
6649
6650         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6651         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6652                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6653
6654                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6655                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6656                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6657                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6658                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6659                                 match monitor_event {
6660                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6661                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6662                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6663                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6664                                                 } else {
6665                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6666                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6667                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6668                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6669                                                 }
6670                                         },
6671                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6672                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6673                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6674                                                         None => {
6675                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6676                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6677                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6678                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6679                                                         }
6680                                                 };
6681                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6682                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6683                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6684                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6685                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6686                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6687                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6688                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6689                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6690                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6691                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6692                                                                                                 msg: update
6693                                                                                         });
6694                                                                                 }
6695                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6696                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6697                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6698                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6699                                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6700                                                                                         },
6701                                                                                 });
6702                                                                         }
6703                                                                 }
6704                                                         }
6705                                                 }
6706                                         },
6707                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6708                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6709                                         },
6710                                 }
6711                         }
6712                 }
6713
6714                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6715                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6716                 }
6717
6718                 has_pending_monitor_events
6719         }
6720
6721         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6722         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6723         /// update events as a separate process method here.
6724         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
6725         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6726                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6727                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6728         }
6729
6730         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6731         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6732         /// update was applied.
6733         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6734                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6735                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6736
6737                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6738                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6739                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6740                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6741                 'peer_loop: loop {
6742                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6743                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6744                                 'chan_loop: loop {
6745                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6746                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6747                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6748                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6749                                         ) {
6750                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6751                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6752                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6753                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6754                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6755                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6756                                                 }
6757                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6758                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
6759
6760                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6761                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6762                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
6763                                                 }
6764                                         }
6765                                         break 'chan_loop;
6766                                 }
6767                         }
6768                         break 'peer_loop;
6769                 }
6770
6771                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
6772                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6773                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6774                 }
6775
6776                 has_update
6777         }
6778
6779         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6780         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6781         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6782         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6783                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6784                 let mut has_update = false;
6785                 {
6786                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6787
6788                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6789                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6790                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6791                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6792                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6793                                         match phase {
6794                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6795                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6796                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6797                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6798                                                                                 has_update = true;
6799                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6800                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6801                                                                                 });
6802                                                                         }
6803                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6804                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6805                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6806                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6807                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6808                                                                                                 msg: update
6809                                                                                         });
6810                                                                                 }
6811
6812                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6813
6814                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6815                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6816                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6817                                                                                 false
6818                                                                         } else { true }
6819                                                                 },
6820                                                                 Err(e) => {
6821                                                                         has_update = true;
6822                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6823                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6824                                                                         !close_channel
6825                                                                 }
6826                                                         }
6827                                                 },
6828                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6829                                         }
6830                                 });
6831                         }
6832                 }
6833
6834                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6835                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6836                 }
6837
6838                 has_update
6839         }
6840
6841         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6842         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6843         /// Channel object.
6844         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6845                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6846                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6847                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6848                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
6849                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6850                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6851                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6852                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6853                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6854                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6855                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6856                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
6857                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
6858                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6859                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6860                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6861                                         });
6862                         }
6863                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6864                 }
6865         }
6866
6867         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6868         /// to pay us.
6869         ///
6870         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6871         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6872         ///
6873         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6874         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6875         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6876         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6877         ///
6878         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6879         ///
6880         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6881         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6882         ///
6883         /// # Note
6884         ///
6885         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6886         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6887         ///
6888         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6889         ///
6890         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6891         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6892         ///
6893         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6894         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6895         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6896         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6897         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6898         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6899         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6900                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6901                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6902                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6903                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6904         }
6905
6906         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6907         /// stored external to LDK.
6908         ///
6909         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6910         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6911         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6912         ///
6913         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6914         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6915         /// payments.
6916         ///
6917         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6918         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6919         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6920         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6921         ///
6922         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6923         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6924         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6925         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6926         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6927         ///
6928         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6929         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6930         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6931         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6932         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6933         ///
6934         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6935         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6936         ///
6937         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6938         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6939         ///
6940         /// # Note
6941         ///
6942         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6943         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6944         ///
6945         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6946         ///
6947         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6948         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6949         ///
6950         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6951         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6952         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6953                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6954                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6955                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6956                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
6957         }
6958
6959         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6960         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6961         ///
6962         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6963         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6964                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6965         }
6966
6967         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6968         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6969         ///
6970         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6971         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6972                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6973                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6974                 loop {
6975                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6976                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6977                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6978                                 Some(_) => continue,
6979                                 None => return scid_candidate
6980                         }
6981                 }
6982         }
6983
6984         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6985         ///
6986         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6987         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6988                 PhantomRouteHints {
6989                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6990                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6991                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6992                 }
6993         }
6994
6995         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6996         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6997         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6998         ///
6999         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7000         /// times to get a unique scid.
7001         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7002                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7003                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7004                 loop {
7005                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7006                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7007                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7008                         return scid_candidate
7009                 }
7010         }
7011
7012         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7013         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7014         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7015                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7016
7017                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7018                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7019                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7020                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7021                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7022                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7023                         ) {
7024                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7025                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7026                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7027                                         }
7028                                 }
7029                         }
7030                 }
7031
7032                 inflight_htlcs
7033         }
7034
7035         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7036         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7037                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7038                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7039                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7040                 events.into_inner()
7041         }
7042
7043         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7044         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7045                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7046                 events.push_back((event, None));
7047         }
7048
7049         #[cfg(test)]
7050         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7051                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7052                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7053         }
7054
7055         #[cfg(test)]
7056         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7057                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7058         }
7059
7060         #[cfg(test)]
7061         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7062                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7063         }
7064
7065         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7066         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7067         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7068         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7069         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7070                 loop {
7071                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7072                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7073                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7074                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7075
7076                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7077                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7078                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7079                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7080                                         {
7081                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7082                                         }
7083                                 }
7084
7085                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7086                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7087                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7088                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7089                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7090                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7091                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7092                                         break;
7093                                 }
7094
7095                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7096                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7097                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7098                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7099                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7100                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7101                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7102                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7103                                                         if further_update_exists {
7104                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7105                                                                 // top of the loop.
7106                                                                 continue;
7107                                                         }
7108                                                 } else {
7109                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7110                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7111                                                 }
7112                                         }
7113                                 }
7114                         } else {
7115                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7116                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7117                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7118                         }
7119                         break;
7120                 }
7121         }
7122
7123         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7124                 for action in actions {
7125                         match action {
7126                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7127                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7128                                 } => {
7129                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7130                                 }
7131                         }
7132                 }
7133         }
7134
7135         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7136         /// using the given event handler.
7137         ///
7138         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7139         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7140                 &self, handler: H
7141         ) {
7142                 let mut ev;
7143                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7144         }
7145 }
7146
7147 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7148 where
7149         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7150         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7151         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7152         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7153         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7154         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7155         R::Target: Router,
7156         L::Target: Logger,
7157 {
7158         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7159         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7160         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7161         /// is always placed next to each other.
7162         ///
7163         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7164         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7165         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7166         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7167         ///
7168         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7169         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7170         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7171         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7172                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7173                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7174                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7175
7176                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7177                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7178                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7179                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7180                         }
7181
7182                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7183                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7184                         }
7185                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7186                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7187                         }
7188
7189                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7190                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7191                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7192                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7193                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7194                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7195                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7196                                 }
7197                         }
7198
7199                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7200                                 events.replace(pending_events);
7201                         }
7202
7203                         result
7204                 });
7205                 events.into_inner()
7206         }
7207 }
7208
7209 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7210 where
7211         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7212         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7213         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7214         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7215         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7216         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7217         R::Target: Router,
7218         L::Target: Logger,
7219 {
7220         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7221         ///
7222         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7223         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7224         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7225                 let mut ev;
7226                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7227         }
7228 }
7229
7230 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7231 where
7232         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7233         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7234         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7235         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7236         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7237         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7238         R::Target: Router,
7239         L::Target: Logger,
7240 {
7241         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7242                 {
7243                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7244                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7245                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7246                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7247                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7248                 }
7249
7250                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7251                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7252         }
7253
7254         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7255                 let _persistence_guard =
7256                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7257                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7258                 let new_height = height - 1;
7259                 {
7260                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7261                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7262                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7263                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7264                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7265                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7266                 }
7267
7268                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7269         }
7270 }
7271
7272 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7273 where
7274         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7275         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7276         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7277         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7278         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7279         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7280         R::Target: Router,
7281         L::Target: Logger,
7282 {
7283         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7284                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7285                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7286                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7287
7288                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7289                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7290
7291                 let _persistence_guard =
7292                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7293                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7294                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7295                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7296
7297                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7298                 if height < last_best_block_height {
7299                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7300                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7301                 }
7302         }
7303
7304         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7305                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7306                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7307                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7308
7309                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7310                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7311
7312                 let _persistence_guard =
7313                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7314                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7315                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7316
7317                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7318
7319                 macro_rules! max_time {
7320                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
7321                                 loop {
7322                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7323                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7324                                         // having an explicit local time source.
7325                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7326                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7327                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7328                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7329                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7330                                                 break;
7331                                         }
7332                                 }
7333                         }
7334                 }
7335                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7336                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7337                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7338                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7339                 });
7340         }
7341
7342         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7343                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7344                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7345                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7346                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7347                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7348                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7349                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7350                                 }
7351                         }
7352                 }
7353                 res
7354         }
7355
7356         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7357                 let _persistence_guard =
7358                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7359                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7360                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7361                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7362                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7363                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7364                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7365                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7366                 });
7367         }
7368 }
7369
7370 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7371 where
7372         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7373         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7374         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7375         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7376         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7377         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7378         R::Target: Router,
7379         L::Target: Logger,
7380 {
7381         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7382         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7383         /// the function.
7384         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7385                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7386                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7387                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7388                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7389
7390                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7391                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7392                 {
7393                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7394                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7395                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7396                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7397                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7398                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7399                                         match phase {
7400                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
7401                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7402                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7403                                                         let res = f(channel);
7404                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7405                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7406                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7407                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7408                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7409                                                                 }
7410                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7411                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7412                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
7413                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7414                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7415                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7416                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7417                                                                                                 msg,
7418                                                                                         });
7419                                                                                 }
7420                                                                         } else {
7421                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7422                                                                         }
7423                                                                 }
7424
7425                                                                 {
7426                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7427                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7428                                                                 }
7429
7430                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7431                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7432                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7433                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7434                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
7435                                                                         });
7436                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7437                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7438                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7439                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
7440                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7441                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7442                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7443                                                                                         });
7444                                                                                 }
7445                                                                         }
7446                                                                 }
7447                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7448                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7449                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7450                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7451                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7452                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7453                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7454                                                                                 // is always consistent.
7455                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7456                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7457                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7458                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7459                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7460                                                                         }
7461                                                                 }
7462                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7463                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7464                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7465                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7466                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7467                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7468                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7469                                                                                 msg: update
7470                                                                         });
7471                                                                 }
7472                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7473                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7474                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7475                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7476                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7477                                                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7478                                                                                 data: reason_message,
7479                                                                         } },
7480                                                                 });
7481                                                                 return false;
7482                                                         }
7483                                                         true
7484                                                 }
7485                                         }
7486                                 });
7487                         }
7488                 }
7489
7490                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7491                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7492                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7493                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7494                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7495                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7496                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7497                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7498                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7499                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7500
7501                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7502                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7503                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7504                                                 false
7505                                         } else { true }
7506                                 });
7507                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7508                         });
7509
7510                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7511                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7512                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7513                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7514                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7515                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7516                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7517                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7518                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7519                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7520                                         });
7521
7522                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7523                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7524                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
7525                                         };
7526                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7527                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7528                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7529                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7530                                         false
7531                                 } else { true }
7532                         });
7533                 }
7534
7535                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7536
7537                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7538                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7539                 }
7540         }
7541
7542         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7543         /// may have events that need processing.
7544         ///
7545         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7546         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7547         ///
7548         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7549         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7550         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7551                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7552         }
7553
7554         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7555         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7556                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7557         }
7558
7559         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7560         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7561                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7562         }
7563
7564         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7565         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7566         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7567                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7568         }
7569
7570         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7571         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7572         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7573                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7574         }
7575
7576         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7577         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7578         ///
7579         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7580         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7581         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7582         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7583                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7584         }
7585
7586         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7587         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7588         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7589                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7590         }
7591
7592         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7593         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7594         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7595                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7596         }
7597
7598         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7599         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7600         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7601                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7602         }
7603 }
7604
7605 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7606         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7607 where
7608         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7609         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7610         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7611         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7612         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7613         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7614         R::Target: Router,
7615         L::Target: Logger,
7616 {
7617         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7618                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7619                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7620                 // change to the contents.
7621                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7622                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7623                         let persist = match &res {
7624                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7625                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7626                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
7627                                 },
7628                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7629                         };
7630                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7631                         persist
7632                 });
7633         }
7634
7635         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7636                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7637                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7638                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7639         }
7640
7641         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7642                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7643                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7644                 // change to the contents.
7645                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7646                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7647                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7648                 });
7649         }
7650
7651         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7652                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7653                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7654                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7655         }
7656
7657         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7658                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7659                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7660         }
7661
7662         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7663                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7664                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7665         }
7666
7667         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7668                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7669                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7670                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7671                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7672                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7673                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7674                         let persist = match &res {
7675                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7676                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7677                         };
7678                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7679                         persist
7680                 });
7681         }
7682
7683         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7684                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7685                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7686         }
7687
7688         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7689                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7690                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7691         }
7692
7693         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7694                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7695                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7696                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7697                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7698                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7699                         let persist = match &res {
7700                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7701                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7702                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7703                         };
7704                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7705                         persist
7706                 });
7707         }
7708
7709         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7710                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7711                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7712         }
7713
7714         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7715                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7716                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7717                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7718                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7719                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7720                         let persist = match &res {
7721                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7722                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7723                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7724                         };
7725                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7726                         persist
7727                 });
7728         }
7729
7730         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7731                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7732                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7733                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7734                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7735                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7736                         let persist = match &res {
7737                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7738                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7739                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7740                         };
7741                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7742                         persist
7743                 });
7744         }
7745
7746         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7747                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7748                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7749         }
7750
7751         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7752                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7753                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7754         }
7755
7756         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7757                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7758                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7759                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7760                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7761                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7762                         let persist = match &res {
7763                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7764                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7765                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7766                         };
7767                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7768                         persist
7769                 });
7770         }
7771
7772         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7773                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7774                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7775         }
7776
7777         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7778                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7779                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7780                                 persist
7781                         } else {
7782                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7783                         }
7784                 });
7785         }
7786
7787         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7788                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7789                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7790                         let persist = match &res {
7791                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7792                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7793                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
7794                         };
7795                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7796                         persist
7797                 });
7798         }
7799
7800         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7801                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
7802                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
7803
7804                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7805                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7806                 let remove_peer = {
7807                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7808                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7809                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7810                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7811                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7812                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7813                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7814                                         let context = match phase {
7815                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7816                                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7817                                                         // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7818                                                         if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7819                                                                 return true;
7820                                                         }
7821                                                         &chan.context
7822                                                 },
7823                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7824                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7825                                                         &chan.context
7826                                                 },
7827                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7828                                                         &chan.context
7829                                                 },
7830                                         };
7831                                         // Clean up for removal.
7832                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7833                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7834                                         false
7835                                 });
7836                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7837                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7838                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7839                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7840                                         match msg {
7841                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
7842                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7843                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7844                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7845                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7846                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
7847                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7848                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7849                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
7850                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7851                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7852                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7853                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7854                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7855                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7856                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7857                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7858                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7859                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7860                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7861                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7862                                                 // Channel Operations
7863                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7864                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7865                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7866                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7867                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7868                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7869                                                 // Gossip
7870                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7871                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7872                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7873                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7874                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7875                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7876                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7877                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7878                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7879                                         }
7880                                 });
7881                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7882                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7883                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7884                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7885                 };
7886                 if remove_peer {
7887                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7888                 }
7889                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7890
7891                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7892                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7893                 }
7894         }
7895
7896         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7897                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7898                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7899                         return Err(());
7900                 }
7901
7902                 let mut res = Ok(());
7903
7904                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7905                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7906                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7907                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7908                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7909                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7910                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7911
7912                         {
7913                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7914                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7915                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7916                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
7917                                                         res = Err(());
7918                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7919                                                 }
7920                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7921                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7922                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7923                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7924                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7925                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7926                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7927                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7928                                                         is_connected: true,
7929                                                 }));
7930                                         },
7931                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7932                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7933                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7934
7935                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7936                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7937                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7938                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7939                                                 {
7940                                                         res = Err(());
7941                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7942                                                 }
7943
7944                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7945                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7946                                         },
7947                                 }
7948                         }
7949
7950                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7951
7952                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7953                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7954                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7955                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7956                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7957
7958                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7959                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7960                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7961                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7962                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
7963                                                 debug_assert!(false);
7964                                                 None
7965                                         }
7966                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
7967                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7968                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7969                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7970                                         });
7971                                 });
7972                         }
7973
7974                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7975                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7976                 });
7977                 res
7978         }
7979
7980         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7981                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7982
7983                 match &msg.data as &str {
7984                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7985                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
7986                         {
7987                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7988                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7989                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7990                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7991                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7992                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7993                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7994                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7995                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7996                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7997                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7998                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7999                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8000                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8001                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8002                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8003                                                                 msg,
8004                                                         });
8005                                                 }
8006                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8007                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8008                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8009                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8010                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8011                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8012                                                                 },
8013                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8014                                                         }
8015                                                 });
8016                                         }
8017                                 }
8018                                 return;
8019                         }
8020                         _ => {}
8021                 }
8022
8023                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8024                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8025                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8026                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8027                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8028                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8029                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8030                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8031                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8032                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8033                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8034                         };
8035                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8036                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8037                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8038                         }
8039                 } else {
8040                         {
8041                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8042                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8043                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8044                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8045                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8046                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8047                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8048                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8049                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8050                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8051                                                         msg,
8052                                                 });
8053                                                 return;
8054                                         }
8055                                 }
8056                         }
8057
8058                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8059                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8060                 }
8061         }
8062
8063         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8064                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8065         }
8066
8067         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8068                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8069         }
8070
8071         fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8072                 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8073         }
8074
8075         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8076                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8077                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8078                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8079         }
8080
8081         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8082                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8083                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8084                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8085         }
8086
8087         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8088                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8089                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8090                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8091         }
8092
8093         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8094                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8095                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8096                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8097         }
8098
8099         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8100                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8101                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8102                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8103         }
8104
8105         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8106                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8107                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8108                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8109         }
8110
8111         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8112                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8113                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8114                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8115         }
8116
8117         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8118                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8119                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8120                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8121         }
8122
8123         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8124                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8125                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8126                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8127         }
8128 }
8129
8130 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8131 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8132 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8133         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8134         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8135         node_features
8136 }
8137
8138 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8139 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8140 ///
8141 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8142 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8143 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8144 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8145         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8146 }
8147
8148 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8149 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8150 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8151         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8152 }
8153
8154 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8155 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8156 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8157         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8158 }
8159
8160 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8161 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8162 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8163         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8164         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8165         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8166         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8167         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8168         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8169         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8170         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8171         features.set_payment_secret_required();
8172         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8173         features.set_wumbo_optional();
8174         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8175         features.set_channel_type_optional();
8176         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8177         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8178         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8179                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8180         }
8181         features
8182 }
8183
8184 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8185 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8186
8187 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8188         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8189         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8190         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8191 });
8192
8193 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8194         (2, node_id, required),
8195         (4, features, required),
8196         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8197         (8, forwarding_info, option),
8198         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8199         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8200 });
8201
8202 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8203         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8204                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8205                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8206                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8207                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8208                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8209                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8210                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
8211                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
8212                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
8213                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8214                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8215                         (7, self.config, option),
8216                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8217                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
8218                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8219                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8220                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8221                         (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),  // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8222                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8223                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8224                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8225                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8226                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8227                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8228                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8229                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8230                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
8231                         (32, self.is_public, required),
8232                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8233                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8234                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8235                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8236                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8237                 });
8238                 Ok(())
8239         }
8240 }
8241
8242 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8243         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8244                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8245                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8246                         (2, channel_id, required),
8247                         (3, channel_type, option),
8248                         (4, counterparty, required),
8249                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8250                         (6, funding_txo, option),
8251                         (7, config, option),
8252                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
8253                         (9, confirmations, option),
8254                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8255                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8256                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8257                         (16, _balance_msat, option),  // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8258                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8259                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8260                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8261                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8262                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8263                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8264                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
8265                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8266                         (26, is_outbound, required),
8267                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8268                         (30, is_usable, required),
8269                         (32, is_public, required),
8270                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8271                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8272                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8273                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8274                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8275                 });
8276
8277                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8278                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8279                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8280                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8281                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8282
8283                 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8284
8285                 Ok(Self {
8286                         inbound_scid_alias,
8287                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8288                         channel_type,
8289                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8290                         outbound_scid_alias,
8291                         funding_txo,
8292                         config,
8293                         short_channel_id,
8294                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8295                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8296                         user_channel_id,
8297                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8298                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8299                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8300                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8301                         confirmations_required,
8302                         confirmations,
8303                         force_close_spend_delay,
8304                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8305                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8306                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8307                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8308                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8309                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8310                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8311                         channel_shutdown_state,
8312                 })
8313         }
8314 }
8315
8316 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8317         (2, channels, required_vec),
8318         (4, phantom_scid, required),
8319         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8320 });
8321
8322 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8323         (0, Forward) => {
8324                 (0, onion_packet, required),
8325                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8326         },
8327         (1, Receive) => {
8328                 (0, payment_data, required),
8329                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8330                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8331                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8332                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8333         },
8334         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8335                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8336                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8337                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8338                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8339                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8340         },
8341 ;);
8342
8343 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8344         (0, routing, required),
8345         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8346         (4, payment_hash, required),
8347         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8348         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8349         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8350         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8351 });
8352
8353
8354 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8355         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8356                 match self {
8357                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8358                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8359                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8360                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8361                                 reason.write(writer)?;
8362                         },
8363                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8364                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8365                         }) => {
8366                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8367                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8368                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8369                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8370                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8371                         },
8372                 }
8373                 Ok(())
8374         }
8375 }
8376
8377 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8378         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8379                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8380                 match id {
8381                         0 => {
8382                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8383                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8384                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8385                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8386                                 }))
8387                         },
8388                         1 => {
8389                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8390                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8391                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8392                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8393                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8394                                 }))
8395                         },
8396                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8397                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8398                         // messages contained in the variants.
8399                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8400                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8401                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8402                         2 => {
8403                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8404                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8405                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8406                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8407                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8408                         },
8409                         3 => {
8410                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8411                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8412                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8413                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8414                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8415                         },
8416                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8417                 }
8418         }
8419 }
8420
8421 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8422         (0, Forward),
8423         (1, Fail),
8424 );
8425
8426 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8427         (0, short_channel_id, required),
8428         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8429         (2, outpoint, required),
8430         (4, htlc_id, required),
8431         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8432         (7, user_channel_id, option),
8433 });
8434
8435 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8436         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8437                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8438                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8439                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8440                 };
8441                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8442                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8443                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
8444                         (2, self.value, required),
8445                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8446                         (4, payment_data, option),
8447                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8448                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8449                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8450                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8451                 });
8452                 Ok(())
8453         }
8454 }
8455
8456 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8457         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8458                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8459                         (0, prev_hop, required),
8460                         (1, total_msat, option),
8461                         (2, value_ser, required),
8462                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8463                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8464                         (5, total_value_received, option),
8465                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8466                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8467                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8468                 });
8469                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8470                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8471                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8472                         Some(p) => {
8473                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
8474                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8475                                 }
8476                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8477                                         total_msat = Some(value);
8478                                 }
8479                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8480                         },
8481                         None => {
8482                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8483                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
8484                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8485                                         }
8486                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8487                                 }
8488                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8489                         },
8490                 };
8491                 Ok(Self {
8492                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8493                         timer_ticks: 0,
8494                         value,
8495                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8496                         total_value_received,
8497                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8498                         onion_payload,
8499                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8500                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8501                 })
8502         }
8503 }
8504
8505 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8506         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8507                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8508                 match id {
8509                         0 => {
8510                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8511                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8512                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8513                                 let mut payment_id = None;
8514                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8515                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8516                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8517                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8518                                         (1, payment_id, option),
8519                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8520                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8521                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8522                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
8523                                 });
8524                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
8525                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8526                                         // instead.
8527                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8528                                 }
8529                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8530                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8531                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8532                                 }
8533                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8534                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8535                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8536                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8537                                                 }
8538                                         }
8539                                 }
8540                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8541                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8542                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
8543                                         path,
8544                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8545                                 })
8546                         }
8547                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8548                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8549                 }
8550         }
8551 }
8552
8553 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8554         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8555                 match self {
8556                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8557                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8558                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8559                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8560                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8561                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8562                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8563                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8564                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8565                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8566                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8567                                  });
8568                         }
8569                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8570                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8571                                 field.write(writer)?;
8572                         }
8573                 }
8574                 Ok(())
8575         }
8576 }
8577
8578 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8579         (0, forward_info, required),
8580         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8581         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8582         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8583         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8584 });
8585
8586 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8587         (1, FailHTLC) => {
8588                 (0, htlc_id, required),
8589                 (2, err_packet, required),
8590         };
8591         (0, AddHTLC)
8592 );
8593
8594 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8595         (0, payment_secret, required),
8596         (2, expiry_time, required),
8597         (4, user_payment_id, required),
8598         (6, payment_preimage, required),
8599         (8, min_value_msat, required),
8600 });
8601
8602 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8603 where
8604         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8605         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8606         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8607         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8608         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8609         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8610         R::Target: Router,
8611         L::Target: Logger,
8612 {
8613         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8614                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8615
8616                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8617
8618                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8619                 {
8620                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8621                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8622                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8623                 }
8624
8625                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8626                 {
8627                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8628                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8629                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8630                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8631                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8632                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8633                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
8634                                 }
8635
8636                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8637                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8638                                 ).count();
8639                         }
8640
8641                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8642
8643                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8644                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8645                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8646                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8647                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8648                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8649                                         } else { None }
8650                                 ) {
8651                                         channel.write(writer)?;
8652                                 }
8653                         }
8654                 }
8655
8656                 {
8657                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8658                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8659                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8660                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8661                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8662                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
8663                                         forward.write(writer)?;
8664                                 }
8665                         }
8666                 }
8667
8668                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8669
8670                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8671                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8672                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8673
8674                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8675                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8676                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8677                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8678                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8679                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8680                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8681                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
8682                         }
8683                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8684                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8685                 }
8686
8687                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8688                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8689                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8690                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8691                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8692                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
8693                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8694                 }
8695
8696                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8697                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8698                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8699                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8700                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8701                         // no channels.
8702                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8703                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8704                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8705                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8706                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8707                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8708                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8709                                 }
8710                         }
8711                 }
8712
8713                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8714                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8715                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8716                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8717                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8718                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8719                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8720                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
8721                         0u64.write(writer)?;
8722                 } else {
8723                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8724                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8725                                 event.write(writer)?;
8726                         }
8727                 }
8728
8729                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8730                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8731                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8732                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8733                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8734                 0u64.write(writer)?;
8735
8736                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8737                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8738                 // likely to be identical.
8739                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8740                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8741
8742                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8743                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8744                         hash.write(writer)?;
8745                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8746                 }
8747
8748                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8749                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8750                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8751                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8752                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8753                         }
8754                 }
8755                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8756                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8757                         match outbound {
8758                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8759                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8760                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8761                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8762                                         }
8763                                 }
8764                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8765                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8766                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8767                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8768                         }
8769                 }
8770
8771                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8772                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8773                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8774                         match outbound {
8775                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8776                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8777                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8778                                 },
8779                                 _ => {},
8780                         }
8781                 }
8782
8783                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8784                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8785                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8786                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8787                 }
8788
8789                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8790                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8791                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8792                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8793                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
8794                 }
8795
8796                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8797                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8798                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8799                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
8800                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8801                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8802                                 }
8803                         }
8804                 }
8805
8806                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8807                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8808                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8809                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8810                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8811                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8812                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8813                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8814                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8815                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8816                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8817                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8818                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8819                 });
8820
8821                 Ok(())
8822         }
8823 }
8824
8825 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8826         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8827                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8828                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8829                         event.write(w)?;
8830                         action.write(w)?;
8831                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8832                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8833                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8834                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8835                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8836                                 // check that the event is sane here.
8837                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8838                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8839                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8840                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8841                         }
8842                 }
8843                 Ok(())
8844         }
8845 }
8846 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8847         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8848                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8849                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8850                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8851                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8852                         len) as usize);
8853                 for _ in 0..len {
8854                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8855                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8856                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8857                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
8858                         } else if action.is_some() {
8859                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8860                         }
8861                 }
8862                 Ok(events)
8863         }
8864 }
8865
8866 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8867         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8868         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8869         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8870         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8871         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8872 );
8873
8874 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8875 ///
8876 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8877 /// is:
8878 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8879 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8880 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8881 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8882 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8883 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8884 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8885 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8886 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8887 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8888 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8889 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8890 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8891 ///    the next step.
8892 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8893 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8894 ///
8895 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8896 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8897 ///
8898 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8899 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8900 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8901 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8902 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8903 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8904 ///
8905 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8906 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8907 where
8908         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8909         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8910         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8911         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8912         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8913         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8914         R::Target: Router,
8915         L::Target: Logger,
8916 {
8917         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8918         pub entropy_source: ES,
8919
8920         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8921         pub node_signer: NS,
8922
8923         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8924         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8925         /// signing data.
8926         pub signer_provider: SP,
8927
8928         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8929         ///
8930         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8931         pub fee_estimator: F,
8932         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8933         ///
8934         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8935         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8936         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8937         pub chain_monitor: M,
8938
8939         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8940         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8941         /// force-closed during deserialization.
8942         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8943         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8944         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8945         ///
8946         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8947         pub router: R,
8948         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8949         /// deserialization.
8950         pub logger: L,
8951         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8952         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8953         pub default_config: UserConfig,
8954
8955         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8956         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8957         ///
8958         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8959         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8960         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8961         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8962         ///
8963         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8964         /// this struct.
8965         ///
8966         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8967         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8968 }
8969
8970 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8971                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8972 where
8973         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8974         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8975         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8976         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8977         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8978         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8979         R::Target: Router,
8980         L::Target: Logger,
8981 {
8982         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8983         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8984         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8985         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8986                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8987                 Self {
8988                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8989                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8990                 }
8991         }
8992 }
8993
8994 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8995 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8996 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8997         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8998 where
8999         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9000         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9001         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9002         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9003         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9004         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9005         R::Target: Router,
9006         L::Target: Logger,
9007 {
9008         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9009                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9010                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9011         }
9012 }
9013
9014 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9015         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9016 where
9017         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9018         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9019         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9020         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9021         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9022         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9023         R::Target: Router,
9024         L::Target: Logger,
9025 {
9026         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9027                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9028
9029                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9030                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9031                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9032
9033                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9034
9035                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9036                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9037                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9038                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9039                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9040                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9041                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9042                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9043                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9044                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9045                         ))?;
9046                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9047                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9048                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9049                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9050                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9051                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9052                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9053                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9054                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9055                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9056                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9057                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9058                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9059                                         }
9060                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9061                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9062                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9063                                         }
9064                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9065                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9066                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9067                                         }
9068                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9069                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9070                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9071                                         }
9072                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9073                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9074                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9075                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9076                                                 });
9077                                         }
9078                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9079                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9080                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9081                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9082                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9083                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9084                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9085                                         }, None));
9086                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9087                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
9088                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9089                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9090                                                 }
9091                                                 if !found_htlc {
9092                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9093                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9094                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9095                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9096                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9097                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9098                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9099                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
9100                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9101                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9102                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9103                                                 }
9104                                         }
9105                                 } else {
9106                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9107                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9108                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9109                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9110                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9111                                         }
9112                                         if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
9113                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9114                                         }
9115                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9116                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9117                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9118                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9119                                                 },
9120                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9121                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9122                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9123                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
9124                                                 }
9125                                         }
9126                                 }
9127                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9128                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9129                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9130                                 // safely discard the channel.
9131                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9132                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9133                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9134                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9135                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9136                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9137                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9138                                 }, None));
9139                         } else {
9140                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9141                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9142                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9143                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9144                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9145                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9146                         }
9147                 }
9148
9149                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9150                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9151                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9152                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9153                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9154                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9155                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9156                                 };
9157                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9158                         }
9159                 }
9160
9161                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9162                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9163                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9164                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9165                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9166                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9167                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9168                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9169                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9170                         }
9171                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9172                 }
9173
9174                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9175                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9176                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9177                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9178                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9179                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9180                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9181                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9182                         }
9183                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9184                 }
9185
9186                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9187                         PeerState {
9188                                 channel_by_id,
9189                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9190                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9191                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9192                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9193                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9194                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9195                                 is_connected: false,
9196                         }
9197                 };
9198
9199                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9200                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9201                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9202                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9203                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9204                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9205                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9206                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9207                 }
9208
9209                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9210                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9211                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9212                 for _ in 0..event_count {
9213                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9214                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9215                                 None => continue,
9216                         }
9217                 }
9218
9219                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9220                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9221                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9222                                 0 => {
9223                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9224                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9225                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
9226                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9227                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9228                                 }
9229                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9230                         }
9231                 }
9232
9233                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9234                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9235
9236                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9237                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9238                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9239                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9240                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9241                         }
9242                 }
9243
9244                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9245                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9246                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9247                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9248                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9249                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9250                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9251                         };
9252                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9253                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9254                         };
9255                 }
9256
9257                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9258                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9259                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9260                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9261                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9262                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9263                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9264                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9265                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9266                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9267                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9268                 let mut events_override = None;
9269                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9270                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9271                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9272                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9273                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9274                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9275                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9276                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9277                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9278                         (8, events_override, option),
9279                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9280                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9281                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9282                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9283                 });
9284                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9285                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9286                 }
9287
9288                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9289                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9290                 }
9291
9292                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9293                         pending_events_read = events;
9294                 }
9295
9296                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9297                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9298                 }
9299
9300                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9301                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9302                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9303                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9304                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9305                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9306                         }
9307                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9308                 }
9309                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9310                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9311                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9312                 };
9313
9314                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9315                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9316                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9317                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9318                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9319                 //
9320                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9321                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9322                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9323                 //
9324                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9325                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9326                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9327                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9328                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9329                         ) => { {
9330                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9331                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9332                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9333                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9334                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9335                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9336                                         pending_background_events.push(
9337                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9338                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9339                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9340                                                         update: update.clone(),
9341                                                 });
9342                                 }
9343                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9344                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9345                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9346                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9347                                         pending_background_events.push(
9348                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9349                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9350                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9351                                                 });
9352                                 }
9353                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9354                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9355                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9356                                 }
9357                                 max_in_flight_update_id
9358                         } }
9359                 }
9360
9361                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9362                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9363                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9364                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9365                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9366                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9367                                         // discarded.
9368                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9369                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9370                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9371                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9372                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9373                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9374                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9375                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9376                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9377                                                 }
9378                                         }
9379                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9380                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9381                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9382                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9383                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9384                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9385                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9386                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9387                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9388                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9389                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9390                                         }
9391                                 } else {
9392                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9393                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9394                                         debug_assert!(false);
9395                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9396                                 }
9397                         }
9398                 }
9399
9400                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9401                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9402                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9403                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9404                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9405                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9406                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9407                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9408                                         });
9409                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9410                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9411                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9412                                 } else {
9413                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9414                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9415                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9416                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9417                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9418                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9419                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9420                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9421                                 }
9422                         }
9423                 }
9424
9425                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9426                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9427
9428                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9429                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9430                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9431                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9432
9433                 {
9434                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9435                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9436                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9437                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9438                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9439                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9440                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9441                         // 0.0.102+
9442                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9443                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9444                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9445                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9446                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9447                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
9448                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9449                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9450                                                         }
9451
9452                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9453                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9454                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9455                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9456                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9457                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9458                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9459                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9460                                                                 },
9461                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9462                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9463                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9464                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
9465                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9466                                                                                 payment_params: None,
9467                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9468                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9469                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9470                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9471                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9472                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9473                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9474                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9475                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
9476                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9477                                                                         });
9478                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9479                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9480                                                                 }
9481                                                         }
9482                                                 }
9483                                         }
9484                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9485                                                 match htlc_source {
9486                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9487                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9488                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9489                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9490                                                                 };
9491                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9492                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9493                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9494                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9495                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9496                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9497                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
9498                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9499                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9500                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9501                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9502                                                                                                 false
9503                                                                                         } else { true }
9504                                                                                 } else { true }
9505                                                                         });
9506                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
9507                                                                 });
9508                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9509                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9510                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9511                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9512                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9513                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9514                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
9515                                                                                         } else { true }
9516                                                                                 });
9517                                                                                 false
9518                                                                         } else { true }
9519                                                                 });
9520                                                         },
9521                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9522                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9523                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9524                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9525                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9526                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9527                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9528                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9529                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9530                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9531                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9532                                                                         let compl_action =
9533                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9534                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9535                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9536                                                                                 };
9537                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9538                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9539                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9540                                                                 }
9541                                                         },
9542                                                 }
9543                                         }
9544                                 }
9545
9546                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9547                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9548                                 // payments.
9549                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9550                                         .into_iter()
9551                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9552                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9553                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9554                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9555                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9556                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9557                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9558                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9559                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9560                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9561                                                         } else { None }
9562                                                 } else {
9563                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9564                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9565                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9566                                                         // channel still live case here.
9567                                                         None
9568                                                 }
9569                                         });
9570                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9571                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9572                                 }
9573                         }
9574                 }
9575
9576                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9577                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9578                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9579                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9580                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9581                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9582                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9583                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9584                         }, None));
9585                 }
9586
9587                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9588                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9589
9590                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9591                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9592                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9593                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9594                         }
9595                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9596                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9597                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9598                                 }
9599                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9600                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9601                                 {
9602                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9603                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9604                                         });
9605                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9606                                 }
9607                         } else {
9608                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9609                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9610                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9611                                         });
9612                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9613                                 }
9614                         }
9615                 } else {
9616                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9617                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9618                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9619                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9620                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9621                                 }
9622                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9623                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9624                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9625                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9626                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9627                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9628                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9629                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9630                                                                                 Err(()) => {
9631                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9632                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9633                                                                                 }
9634                                                                         }
9635                                                                 },
9636                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9637                                                         }
9638                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9639                                         },
9640                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9641                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9642                                 };
9643                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9644                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9645                                 });
9646                         }
9647                 }
9648
9649                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9650                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9651
9652                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9653                         Ok(key) => key,
9654                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9655                 };
9656                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9657                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9658                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9659                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9660                         }
9661                 }
9662
9663                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9664                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9665                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9666                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9667                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9668                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9669                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9670                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9671                                                 loop {
9672                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9673                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9674                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9675                                                 }
9676                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9677                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9678                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9679                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9680                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9681                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9682                                         }
9683                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
9684                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9685                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9686                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9687                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9688                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9689                                                 }
9690                                         }
9691                                 } else {
9692                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9693                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9694                                         debug_assert!(false);
9695                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9696                                 }
9697                         }
9698                 }
9699
9700                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9701
9702                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9703                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9704                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9705                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9706                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9707                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9708                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9709                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9710                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9711                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9712                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9713                                         }
9714                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9715                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9716
9717                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9718                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9719                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9720                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9721                                                 //
9722                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9723                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9724                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9725                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9726                                                 // reason to.
9727                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9728                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9729                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9730                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9731                                                 // restart.
9732                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9733                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9734                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9735                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9736                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9737                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9738                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9739                                                         }
9740                                                 }
9741                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9742                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9743                                                 }
9744                                         }
9745                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9746                                                 receiver_node_id,
9747                                                 payment_hash,
9748                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
9749                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9750                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9751                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9752                                         }, None));
9753                                 }
9754                         }
9755                 }
9756
9757                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9758                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9759                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9760                                         for action in actions.iter() {
9761                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9762                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9763                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9764                                                 } = action {
9765                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9766                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9767                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9768                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9769                                                         } else {
9770                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9771                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9772                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9773                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9774                                                                 // anymore.
9775                                                         }
9776                                                 }
9777                                         }
9778                                 }
9779                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9780                         } else {
9781                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9782                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9783                         }
9784                 }
9785
9786                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9787                         genesis_hash,
9788                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9789                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9790                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9791                         router: args.router,
9792
9793                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9794
9795                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9796                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9797                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9798                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9799
9800                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9801                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9802                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9803                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9804                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9805                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9806
9807                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9808
9809                         our_network_pubkey,
9810                         secp_ctx,
9811
9812                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9813
9814                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9815
9816                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9817                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9818                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9819                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9820                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9821
9822                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9823                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
9824
9825                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9826                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
9827                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9828
9829                         logger: args.logger,
9830                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
9831                 };
9832
9833                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9834                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9835                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9836                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9837                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9838                 }
9839
9840                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9841                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9842                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9843                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9844                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9845                                 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
9846                 }
9847
9848                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9849                 //connection or two.
9850
9851                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9852         }
9853 }
9854
9855 #[cfg(test)]
9856 mod tests {
9857         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9858         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9859         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9860         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9861         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9862         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9863         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9864         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9865         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9866         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9867         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9868         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9869         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9870         use crate::util::test_utils;
9871         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9872         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9873
9874         #[test]
9875         fn test_notify_limits() {
9876                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9877                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9878                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9879                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9880                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9881                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9882
9883                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9884                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9885                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9886                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9887                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9888
9889                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9890
9891                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9892                 // to connect messages with new values
9893                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9894                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9895                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9896                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9897                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9898                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9899
9900                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9901                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9902                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9903                 // ... but the last node should not.
9904                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9905                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9906                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9907                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9908
9909                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9910                 // about the channel.
9911                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9912                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9913                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9914
9915                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9916                 // parties.
9917                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9918                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9919                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9920                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9921                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9922                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9923
9924                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9925                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9926                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9927
9928                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9929                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9930                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9931                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9932                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9933                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9934
9935                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9936                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9937                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9938                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9939                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9940                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9941                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9942                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9943
9944                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9945                 // the channel info has updated.
9946                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9947                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9948                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9949                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9950                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9951                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9952         }
9953
9954         #[test]
9955         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9956                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9957                 // expected.
9958                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9959                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9960                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9961                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9962                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9963
9964                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9965                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9966                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9967                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9968
9969                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9970                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9971                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9972                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9973                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9974                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9975                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9976                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9977                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9978                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9979                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9980                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9981
9982                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9983                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9984                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9985                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9986                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9987                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9988                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9989                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9990                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9991                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9992                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9993                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9994                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9995                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9996                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9997                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9998                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9999                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10000                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10001                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10002                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10003                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10004                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10005
10006                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10007                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10008                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10009                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10010                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10011                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10012                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10013
10014                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10015                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10016                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10017                 // lightning messages manually.
10018                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10019                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10020                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10021
10022                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10023                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10024                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10025                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10026                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10027                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10028                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10029                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10030                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10031                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10032                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10033                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10034                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10035                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10036                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10037                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10038                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10039                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10040                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10041                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10042                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10043                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10044                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10045                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10046                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10047                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10048
10049                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10050                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10051                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10052                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10053                 match events[0] {
10054                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10055                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10056                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10057                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10058                         },
10059                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10060                 }
10061                 match events[1] {
10062                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10063                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10064                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10065                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10066                         },
10067                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10068                 }
10069         }
10070
10071         #[test]
10072         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10073                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10074                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10075         }
10076
10077         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10078                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10079                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10080                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10081                 //      fails as expected.
10082                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10083                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10084                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10085                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10086                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10087                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10088                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10089                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10090                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10091                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10092                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10093                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10094                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10095                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10096                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10097
10098                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10099                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10100                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10101
10102                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10103                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10104                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10105                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10106                 let route = find_route(
10107                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10108                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10109                 ).unwrap();
10110                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10111                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10112                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10113                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10114                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10115                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10116                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10117                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10118                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10119                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10120                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10121                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10122                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10123                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10124                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10125                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10126                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10127                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10128                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10129                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10130                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10131                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10132                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10133                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10134
10135                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10136                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10137
10138                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10139                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10140                 let route = find_route(
10141                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10142                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10143                 ).unwrap();
10144                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10145                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10146                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10147                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10148                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10149                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10150                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10151                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10152
10153                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10154                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10155                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10156                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10157                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10158                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10159                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10160                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10161                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10162                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10163                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10164                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10165                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10166                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10167                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10168                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10169                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10170                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10171                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10172                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10173                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10174                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10175                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10176                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10177
10178                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10179                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10180
10181                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10182                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10183                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10184                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10185                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10186                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10187                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10188                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10189                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10190                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10191
10192                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10193                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10194                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10195                         100_000
10196                 );
10197                 let route = find_route(
10198                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10199                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10200                 ).unwrap();
10201                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10202                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10203                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10204                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10205                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10206                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10207                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10208                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10209                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10210                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10211                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10212                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10213                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10215                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10216                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10217                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10218                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10219                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10220                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10221                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10222                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10223                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10224
10225                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10226                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10227         }
10228
10229         #[test]
10230         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10231                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10232                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10233                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10234                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10235                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10236                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10237
10238                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10239                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10240
10241                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10242                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10243                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10244                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10245                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10246                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10247                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10248                 let route = find_route(
10249                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10250                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10251                 ).unwrap();
10252
10253                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10254                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10255                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10256                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10257                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10258                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10260
10261                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10262                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10263                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10264                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10265                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10266                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10267                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10268
10269                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10270         }
10271
10272         #[test]
10273         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10274                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10275                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10276                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10277                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10278                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10279                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10280                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10281                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10282
10283                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10284                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10285
10286                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10287                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10288                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10289                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10290                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10291                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10292                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10293                 let route = find_route(
10294                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10295                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10296                 ).unwrap();
10297
10298                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10299                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10300                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10301                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10302                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10303                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10304                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10305                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10307
10308                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10309                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10310                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10311                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10312                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10313                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10314                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10315
10316                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10317         }
10318
10319         #[test]
10320         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10321                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10322                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10323                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10324                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10325
10326                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10327                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10328                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10329                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10330
10331                 // Marshall an MPP route.
10332                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10333                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10334                 route.paths.push(path);
10335                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10336                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10337                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10338                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10339                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10340                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10341
10342                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10343                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10344                 .unwrap_err() {
10345                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10346                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10347                         },
10348                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10349                 }
10350         }
10351
10352         #[test]
10353         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10354                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10355                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10356                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10357                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10358
10359                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10360
10361                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10362                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10363
10364                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10365                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10367                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10368
10369                 {
10370                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10371                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10372                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10373                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10374                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10375                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10376                 }
10377
10378                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10379
10380                 {
10381                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10382                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10383                 }
10384         }
10385
10386         #[test]
10387         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10388                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10389                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10390                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10391                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10392                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10393
10394                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10395                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10396                         payment_secret,
10397                         total_msat: 100_000,
10398                 };
10399
10400                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10401                 // payment verification fails as expected.
10402                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10403                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10404                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10405                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10406                         Err(()) => {
10407                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10408                         }
10409                 }
10410
10411                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10412                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10413         }
10414
10415         #[test]
10416         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10417                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10418                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10419                 // the channel is successfully closed.
10420                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10421                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10422                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10423                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10424
10425                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10426                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10427                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10428                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10429                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10430
10431                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10432                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10433                 {
10434                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10435                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10436                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10437                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10438                 }
10439
10440                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10441                 {
10442                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10443                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10444                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10445                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10446                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10447                 }
10448
10449                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10450
10451                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10452
10453                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10454                 {
10455                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10456                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10457                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10458                 }
10459                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10460
10461                 {
10462                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10463                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10464                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10465                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10466                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10467                 }
10468                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10469                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10470                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10472                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10473                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10474                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10475                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10476
10477                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10478                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10479                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10480                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10481
10482                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10483                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10484                 {
10485                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10486                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10487                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10488                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10489                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10490                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10491                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10492                 }
10493
10494                 {
10495                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10496                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10497                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10498                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10499                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10500                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10501                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10502                 }
10503
10504                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10505                 {
10506                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10507                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10508                         // closing transaction).
10509                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10510                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10511                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10512
10513                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10514                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10515                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10516                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10517                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10518                 }
10519
10520                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10521
10522                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10523                 {
10524                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10525                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10526                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10527                 }
10528                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10529
10530                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10531                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10532         }
10533
10534         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10535                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10536                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10537         }
10538
10539         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10540                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10541                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10542         }
10543
10544         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10545                 match res_err {
10546                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10547                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10548                         },
10549                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10550                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10551                         },
10552                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10553                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10554                 }
10555         }
10556
10557         #[test]
10558         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10559                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10560                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10561                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10562                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10563                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10564                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10565                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10566
10567                 // Dummy values
10568                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10569                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10570                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10571
10572                 // Test the API functions.
10573                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10574
10575                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10576
10577                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10578
10579                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10580
10581                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10582
10583                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10584
10585                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10586         }
10587
10588         #[test]
10589         fn test_connection_limiting() {
10590                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10591                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10592                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10593                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10594                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10595
10596                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10597
10598                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10599                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10600
10601                 let mut funding_tx = None;
10602                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10603                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10604                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10605
10606                         if idx == 0 {
10607                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10608                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10609                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10610                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10611                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10612
10613                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10614                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10615                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10616
10617                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10618
10619                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10620                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10621                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10622                         }
10623                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10624                 }
10625
10626                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10627                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10628                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10629                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10630                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10631
10632                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10633                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10634                 // limit.
10635                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10636                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10637                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10638                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10639                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10640                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10641                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10642                         }, true).unwrap();
10643                 }
10644                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10645                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10646                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10647                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10648                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10649
10650                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10651                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10652                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10653                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10654                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10655                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10656                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10657                 }
10658                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10659                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10660                 }, true).unwrap();
10661                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10662                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10663                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10664
10665                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10666                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10667                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10668                 }, false).unwrap();
10669                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10670
10671                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10672                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10673                 // open channels.
10674                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10675                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10676                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10677                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10678                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10679                 }
10680                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10681                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10682                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10683
10684                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10685                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10686                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10687
10688                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10689                 // "protected" and can connect again.
10690                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10691                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10692                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10693                 }, true).unwrap();
10694                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10695
10696                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10697                 // last_random_pk.
10698                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10699                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10700         }
10701
10702         #[test]
10703         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10704                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10705                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10706                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10707                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10708                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10709
10710                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10711
10712                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10713                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10714
10715                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10716                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10717                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10718                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10719                 }
10720
10721                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10722                 // rejected.
10723                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10724                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10725                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10726
10727                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10728                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10729                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10730
10731                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10732                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10733                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10734                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10735         }
10736
10737         #[test]
10738         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10739                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10740                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10741                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10742                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10743                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10744                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10745                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10746                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10747
10748                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10749
10750                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10751                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10752
10753                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10754                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10755                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10756                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10757                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10758                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10759                         }, true).unwrap();
10760
10761                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10762                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10763                         match events[0] {
10764                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10765                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10766                                 }
10767                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10768                         }
10769                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10770                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10771                 }
10772
10773                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10774                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10775                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10776                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10777                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10778                 }, true).unwrap();
10779                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10780                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10781                 match events[0] {
10782                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10783                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10784                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10785                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10786                                         _ => panic!(),
10787                                 }
10788                         }
10789                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10790                 }
10791                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10792                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10793
10794                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10795                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10796                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10797                 match events[0] {
10798                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10799                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10800                         }
10801                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10802                 }
10803                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10804         }
10805
10806         #[test]
10807         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10808                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10809                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10810                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10811                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10812                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10813                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10814                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10815                         amt_msat: 100,
10816                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10817                         payment_metadata: None,
10818                         keysend_preimage: None,
10819                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10820                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10821                         }),
10822                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10823                 };
10824                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10825                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10826                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10827                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10828                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10829                 {
10830                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10831                 } else { panic!(); }
10832
10833                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10834                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10835                         amt_msat: 100,
10836                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10837                         payment_metadata: None,
10838                         keysend_preimage: None,
10839                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10840                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10841                         }),
10842                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10843                 };
10844                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10845                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10846         }
10847
10848         #[test]
10849         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10850                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10851                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10852                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10853                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10854
10855                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10856                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10857
10858                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10859                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10860                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10861                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10862                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10863
10864                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10865                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10866
10867                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10868                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10869                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10870                 match &msg_events[0] {
10871                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10872                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10873                                 match action {
10874                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10875                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10876                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10877                                 }
10878                         }
10879                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10880                 }
10881
10882                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10883                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10884                 match events[0] {
10885                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10886                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10887                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10888                 }
10889                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10890         }
10891
10892         #[test]
10893         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10894                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10895                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10896                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10897                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10898                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10899                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10900                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10901                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10902                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10903                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10904
10905                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10906                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10907                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10908
10909                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10910                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10911                 match events[0] {
10912                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10913                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10914                         }
10915                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10916                 }
10917
10918                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10919                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10920
10921                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10922                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10923
10924                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10925                 // not have generated any events.
10926                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10927         }
10928
10929         #[test]
10930         fn test_update_channel_config() {
10931                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10932                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10933                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10934                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10935                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10936                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10937                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10938
10939                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10940                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10941                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10942
10943                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10944                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10945                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10946                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10947                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10948                 match &events[0] {
10949                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10950                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10951                 }
10952
10953                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10954                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10955                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10956
10957                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10958                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10959                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10960                         ..Default::default()
10961                 }).unwrap();
10962                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10963                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10964                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10965                 match &events[0] {
10966                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10967                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10968                 }
10969
10970                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10971                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10972                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10973                         ..Default::default()
10974                 }).unwrap();
10975                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10976                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10977                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10978                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10979                 match &events[0] {
10980                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10981                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10982                 }
10983
10984                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10985                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10986                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10987                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10988                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10989                 assert!(
10990                         matches!(
10991                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10992                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10993                                         ..Default::default()
10994                                 }),
10995                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10996                         )
10997                 );
10998                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10999                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11000                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11001                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11002         }
11003
11004         #[test]
11005         fn test_payment_display() {
11006                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11007                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11008                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11009                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11010                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11011                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11012         }
11013 }
11014
11015 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
11016 pub mod bench {
11017         use crate::chain::Listen;
11018         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11019         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11020         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11021         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11022         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11023         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11024         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11025         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11026         use crate::util::test_utils;
11027         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11028
11029         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11030         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11031         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11032
11033         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11034
11035         use criterion::Criterion;
11036
11037         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11038                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11039                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11040                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11041                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11042                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11043                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11044
11045         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11046                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11047         }
11048         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11049                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11050                 #[inline]
11051                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11052                 #[inline]
11053                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11054         }
11055
11056         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11057                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11058         }
11059
11060         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11061                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11062                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11063                 // calls per node.
11064                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11065                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11066
11067                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11068                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11069                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11070                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11071                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11072
11073                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11074                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11075                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11076
11077                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11078                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11079                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11080                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11081                         network,
11082                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11083                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11084                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11085
11086                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11087                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11088                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11089                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11090                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11091                         network,
11092                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11093                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11094                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11095
11096                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11097                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11098                 }, true).unwrap();
11099                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11100                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11101                 }, false).unwrap();
11102                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11103                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11104                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11105
11106                 let tx;
11107                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11108                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11109                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11110                         }]};
11111                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11112                 } else { panic!(); }
11113
11114                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11115                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11116                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11117                 match events_b[0] {
11118                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11119                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11120                         },
11121                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11122                 }
11123
11124                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11125                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11126                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11127                 match events_a[0] {
11128                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11129                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11130                         },
11131                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11132                 }
11133
11134                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11135
11136                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11137                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11138                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11139
11140                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11141                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11142                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11143                 match msg_events[0] {
11144                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11145                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11146                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11147                         },
11148                         _ => panic!(),
11149                 }
11150                 match msg_events[1] {
11151                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11152                         _ => panic!(),
11153                 }
11154
11155                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11156                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11157                 match events_a[0] {
11158                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11159                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11160                         },
11161                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11162                 }
11163
11164                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11165                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11166                 match events_b[0] {
11167                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11168                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11169                         },
11170                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11171                 }
11172
11173                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11174                 macro_rules! send_payment {
11175                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11176                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11177                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11178                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11179                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11180                                 payment_count += 1;
11181                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11182                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11183
11184                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11185                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11186                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11187                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11188                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11189                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11190                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11191                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11192                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11193                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11194                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11195
11196                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11197                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11198                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11199                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11200
11201                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11202                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11203                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11204                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11205                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11206                                         },
11207                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11208                                 }
11209
11210                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11211                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11212                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11213                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11214
11215                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11216                         }
11217                 }
11218
11219                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11220                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11221                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
11222                 }));
11223         }
11224 }