1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
186 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
189 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
194 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
197 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
198 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
201 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
204 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
205 struct ClaimableHTLC {
206 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
211 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
212 sender_intended_value: u64,
213 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
216 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
217 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
218 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
221 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
224 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
226 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
227 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
228 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
230 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 impl Readable for PaymentId {
237 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
238 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
243 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
245 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
246 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
247 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
249 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
250 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
255 impl Readable for InterceptId {
256 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
257 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
262 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
263 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
264 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
265 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
266 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
269 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
272 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
273 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
276 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
281 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
283 (2, htlc_id, required),
285 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
286 (0, session_priv, required),
291 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
295 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
298 session_priv: SecretKey,
299 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
300 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
301 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
302 payment_id: PaymentId,
305 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
306 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
307 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
309 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
311 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
316 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
317 payment_id.hash(hasher);
318 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
324 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
326 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
328 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
329 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
331 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
336 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
337 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
338 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
339 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
340 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
342 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
348 struct InboundOnionErr {
354 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
355 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
357 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
358 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
359 pub enum FailureCode {
360 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
361 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
362 TemporaryNodeFailure,
363 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
364 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
365 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
366 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
367 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
368 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
369 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
370 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
371 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
372 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
374 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
375 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
376 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
379 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
380 fn into(self) -> u16 {
382 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
383 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
384 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
385 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
390 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
391 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
392 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
393 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
394 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
396 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
397 err: msgs::LightningError,
398 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
399 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
400 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
402 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
404 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
406 err: LightningError {
408 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
409 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
416 shutdown_finish: None,
417 channel_capacity: None,
421 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
422 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
425 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
427 err: LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
436 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
437 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
438 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
442 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
445 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
447 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
448 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
452 log_level: Level::Warn,
455 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
459 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
461 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
462 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
470 shutdown_finish: None,
471 channel_capacity: None,
476 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
477 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
478 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
479 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
480 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
482 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
483 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
484 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
485 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
486 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
487 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
488 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
490 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
494 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
495 struct ClaimingPayment {
497 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
498 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
500 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
501 (0, amount_msat, required),
502 (2, payment_purpose, required),
503 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
506 struct ClaimablePayment {
507 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
508 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
509 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
512 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
513 struct ClaimablePayments {
514 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
515 /// failed/claimed by the user.
517 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
518 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
520 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
521 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
522 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
524 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
525 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
526 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
527 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
530 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
531 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
532 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
534 enum BackgroundEvent {
535 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
536 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
537 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
538 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
540 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
541 /// are regenerated on startup.
542 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
543 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
544 /// channel to continue normal operation.
546 /// In general this should be used rather than
547 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
548 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
549 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
551 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
552 /// are regenerated on startup.
553 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
554 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
555 funding_txo: OutPoint,
556 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
558 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
559 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
561 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
562 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
563 channel_id: [u8; 32],
568 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
569 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
570 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
571 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
572 /// event can be generated.
573 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
574 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
575 /// operation of another channel.
577 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
578 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
579 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
580 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
582 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
583 event: events::Event,
584 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
588 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
589 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
590 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
591 (0, event, upgradable_required),
592 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
593 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
594 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
595 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
596 // downgrades to prior versions.
597 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
602 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
603 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
604 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
605 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
609 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
610 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
611 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
615 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
616 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
617 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
618 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
619 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
620 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
622 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
623 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
624 channel_id: [u8; 32],
625 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
630 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
632 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
633 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
634 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
635 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
641 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
645 /// State we hold per-peer.
646 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
647 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
649 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
650 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
651 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
653 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
654 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
656 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
657 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
659 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
660 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
662 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
663 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
665 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
666 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
667 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
668 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
669 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
670 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
671 latest_features: InitFeatures,
672 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
673 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
674 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
675 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
676 /// user but which have not yet completed.
678 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
679 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
680 /// for a missing channel.
681 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
682 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
683 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
685 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
686 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
687 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
688 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
690 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
691 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
692 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
693 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
694 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
695 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
696 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
697 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
698 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
699 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
700 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
701 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
702 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
703 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
704 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
708 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
709 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
710 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
711 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
712 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
713 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
716 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
717 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
720 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
721 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
722 self.channel_by_id.len() +
723 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
724 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
725 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
728 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
729 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
730 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
731 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
732 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
733 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
737 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
738 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
739 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
740 /// The original OpenChannel message.
741 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
742 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
743 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
746 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
747 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
748 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
750 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
751 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
753 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
756 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
757 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
758 struct PendingInboundPayment {
759 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
760 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
761 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
762 /// this payment being removed.
764 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
765 user_payment_id: u64,
766 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
767 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
768 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
771 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
772 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
773 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
774 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
775 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
776 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
777 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
778 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
780 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
781 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
789 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
791 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
792 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
793 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
798 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
799 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
800 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
801 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
802 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
803 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
804 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
805 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
806 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
808 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
809 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
818 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
820 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
821 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
822 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
827 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
828 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
829 $vis trait AChannelManager {
830 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
831 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
832 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
833 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
834 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
835 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
836 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
837 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
838 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
839 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
840 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
841 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
842 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
843 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
844 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
845 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
846 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
847 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
850 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
851 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
852 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
853 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
854 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
855 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
857 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
858 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
859 ES::Target: EntropySource,
860 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
861 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
862 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
866 type Watch = M::Target;
868 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
870 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
872 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
874 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
875 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
877 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
879 type Router = R::Target;
881 type Logger = L::Target;
883 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
886 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
887 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
889 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
890 /// to individual Channels.
892 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
893 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
894 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
895 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
897 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
898 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
899 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
900 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
901 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
902 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
903 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
905 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
906 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
907 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
909 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
910 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
911 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
912 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
913 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
915 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
916 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
917 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
918 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
920 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
921 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
922 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
924 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
925 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
926 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
927 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
928 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
930 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
931 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
932 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
933 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
934 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
935 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
936 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
937 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
940 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
941 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
942 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
943 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
944 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
948 // `total_consistency_lock`
950 // |__`forward_htlcs`
952 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
954 // |__`per_peer_state`
956 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
958 // | |__`claimable_payments`
960 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
966 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
968 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
972 // | |__`pending_events`
974 // | |__`pending_background_events`
976 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
978 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
979 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
980 ES::Target: EntropySource,
981 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
982 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
983 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
987 default_configuration: UserConfig,
988 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
989 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
995 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
997 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
999 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1000 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1002 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1003 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1004 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1005 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1008 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1010 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1011 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1012 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1013 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1014 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1015 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1016 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1017 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1019 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1021 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1022 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1024 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1026 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1027 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1028 /// and via the classic SCID.
1030 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1031 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1033 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1037 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1038 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1039 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1041 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1042 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1044 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1045 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1047 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1048 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1050 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1051 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1052 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1053 /// active channel list on load.
1055 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1056 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1058 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1060 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1061 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1062 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1064 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1065 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1066 /// the handling of the events.
1068 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1069 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1072 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1073 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1074 /// would break backwards compatability.
1075 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1076 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1077 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1082 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1084 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1085 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1086 /// confirmation depth.
1088 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1089 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1090 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1092 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1094 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1096 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1098 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1100 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1102 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1103 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1104 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1106 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1107 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1109 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1110 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1111 /// keeping additional state.
1112 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1114 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1115 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1116 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1117 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1119 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1120 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1122 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1123 /// are currently open with that peer.
1125 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1126 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1129 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1131 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1132 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1133 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1134 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1135 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1137 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1138 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1139 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1140 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1141 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1143 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1144 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1146 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1147 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1148 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1149 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1150 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1152 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1153 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1155 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1156 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1157 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1158 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1159 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1161 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1163 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1165 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1166 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1167 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1168 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1169 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1170 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1171 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1172 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1173 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1175 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1177 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1181 signer_provider: SP,
1186 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1188 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1189 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1190 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1191 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1192 pub struct ChainParameters {
1193 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1194 pub network: Network,
1196 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1198 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1199 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1202 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1209 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1210 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1211 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1212 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1213 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1214 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1216 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1217 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1218 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1219 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1220 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1222 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1223 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1226 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1227 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1228 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1229 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1231 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1232 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1233 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1234 _read_guard: read_guard,
1239 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1240 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1241 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1242 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1244 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1245 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1246 should_persist: persist_check,
1247 _read_guard: read_guard,
1252 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1253 fn drop(&mut self) {
1254 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1255 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1260 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1261 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1263 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1265 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1266 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1267 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1268 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1269 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1271 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1272 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1274 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1276 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1277 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1278 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1279 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1280 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1281 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1282 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1283 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1284 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1285 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1286 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1287 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1288 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1290 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1291 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1293 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1294 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1295 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1296 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1298 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1299 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1300 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1301 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1302 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1303 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1306 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1308 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1309 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1312 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1314 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1315 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1317 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1318 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1319 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1320 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1322 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1323 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1324 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1326 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1327 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1328 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1330 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1331 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1332 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1333 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1335 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1336 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1337 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1339 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1340 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1341 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1343 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1344 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1345 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1346 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1347 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1348 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1349 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1350 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1351 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1352 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1353 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1356 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1357 /// to better separate parameters.
1358 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1359 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1360 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1361 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1362 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1363 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1364 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1365 pub features: InitFeatures,
1366 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1367 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1368 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1370 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1372 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1373 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1374 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1375 /// payments to us through this channel.
1376 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1377 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1378 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1379 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1380 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1381 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1382 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1385 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1387 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1388 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1391 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1392 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1393 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1394 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1395 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1396 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1397 /// lifetime of the channel.
1398 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1399 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1400 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1401 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1402 /// our counterparty already.
1404 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1405 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1406 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1407 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1409 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1410 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1411 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1412 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1414 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1415 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1417 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1418 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1420 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1421 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1422 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1423 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1424 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1425 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1426 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1427 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1428 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1431 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1433 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1434 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1435 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1436 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1437 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1438 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1439 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1441 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1442 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1444 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1445 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1446 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1447 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1448 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1449 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1450 /// this value on chain.
1452 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1454 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1456 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1457 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1458 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1459 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1460 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1461 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1462 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1464 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1465 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1466 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1467 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1468 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1469 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1471 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1472 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1473 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1474 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1475 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1476 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1478 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1479 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1480 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1481 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1482 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1483 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1484 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1485 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1487 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1488 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1489 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1490 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1491 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1492 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1493 /// route which is valid.
1494 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1495 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1496 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1497 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1498 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1499 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1501 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1502 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1503 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1504 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1505 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1506 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1507 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1508 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1509 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1511 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1513 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1514 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1515 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1516 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1517 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1519 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1520 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1521 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1522 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1523 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1524 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1525 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1527 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1528 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1529 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1530 pub is_outbound: bool,
1531 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1532 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1533 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1534 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1535 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1537 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1538 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1539 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1540 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1541 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1542 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1543 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1545 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1546 pub is_usable: bool,
1547 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1548 pub is_public: bool,
1549 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1550 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1551 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1552 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1553 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1554 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1556 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1557 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1560 impl ChannelDetails {
1561 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1562 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1563 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1565 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1566 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1567 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1568 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1571 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1572 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1573 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1575 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1576 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1577 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1578 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1581 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1582 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1583 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1585 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1587 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1588 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1589 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1591 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1592 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1593 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1594 features: latest_features,
1595 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1596 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1597 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1598 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1599 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1600 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1601 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1602 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1603 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1604 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1606 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1607 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1608 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1609 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1610 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1611 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1612 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1613 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1614 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1615 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1616 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1617 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1618 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1619 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1620 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1621 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1622 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1623 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1624 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1625 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1626 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1627 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1628 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1629 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1630 config: Some(context.config()),
1631 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1636 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1637 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1638 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1639 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1640 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1641 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1642 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1643 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1644 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1646 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1648 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1649 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1651 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1652 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1653 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1654 /// to drop the channel.
1658 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1659 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1660 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1661 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1662 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1664 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1666 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1667 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1668 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1671 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1672 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1673 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1675 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1676 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1677 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1679 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1680 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1681 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1683 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1684 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1688 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1690 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1692 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1693 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1694 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1695 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1697 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1698 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1699 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1702 macro_rules! handle_error {
1703 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1704 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1705 // entering the macro.
1706 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1707 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1711 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1712 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1714 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1715 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1716 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1717 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1721 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1722 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1723 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1724 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1725 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1726 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1731 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1732 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1734 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1735 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1736 action: err.action.clone()
1740 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1741 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1742 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1743 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1744 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1748 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1753 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1756 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1757 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1758 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1764 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1765 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1766 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1767 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1768 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1769 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1771 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1772 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1773 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1774 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1775 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1777 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1778 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1780 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1784 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1785 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1786 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1788 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1789 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1791 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1792 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1794 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1795 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1796 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1797 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1798 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1799 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1803 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1805 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1806 // In any case, just close the channel.
1807 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1808 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1809 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1810 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1811 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1812 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1818 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1819 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1823 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1825 $entry.remove_entry();
1833 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1834 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1838 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1840 $entry.remove_entry();
1848 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1849 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1853 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1855 $entry.remove_entry();
1863 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1864 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1866 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1867 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1873 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1874 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1875 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1876 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1877 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1879 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1880 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1881 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1882 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1883 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1884 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1885 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1886 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1887 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1888 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1893 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1894 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1895 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1896 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1897 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1898 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1899 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1900 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1901 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1903 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1908 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1909 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1910 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1911 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1912 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1913 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1914 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1915 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1916 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1918 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1923 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1924 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1925 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1926 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1927 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1928 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1929 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1930 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1931 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1932 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1933 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1935 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1936 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1937 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1943 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1944 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1946 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1947 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1948 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1949 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1950 updates.announcement_sigs);
1951 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1952 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1955 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1956 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1957 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1959 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1961 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1962 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1964 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1965 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1966 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1967 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1972 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1973 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1974 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1975 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1976 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1977 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1979 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1980 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1981 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1984 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1985 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1986 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1987 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1988 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1989 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1990 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1991 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
1995 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2001 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2002 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2003 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2004 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2006 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2007 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2009 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2010 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2011 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2012 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2013 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2014 // filter for uniqueness here.
2015 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2016 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2017 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2018 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2020 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2021 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2022 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2024 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2025 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2026 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2030 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2031 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2035 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2036 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2037 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2038 while !processed_all_events {
2039 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2043 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2046 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2047 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2048 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2050 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2051 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2052 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2054 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2055 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2056 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2057 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2061 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2062 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2063 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2064 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2067 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2069 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2070 $event_to_handle = event;
2072 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2073 post_event_actions.push(action);
2078 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2079 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2080 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2081 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2082 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2083 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2086 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2087 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2088 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2089 processed_all_events = false;
2092 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2093 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2099 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2101 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2102 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2103 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2104 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2105 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2106 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2110 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2112 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2114 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2115 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2117 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2119 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2120 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2121 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2124 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2125 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2126 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2128 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2129 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2130 current_timestamp: u32,
2132 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2133 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2134 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2135 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2137 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2138 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2139 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2144 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2146 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2147 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2148 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2149 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2150 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2151 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2152 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2153 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2155 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2158 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2159 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2161 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2163 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2165 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2167 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2168 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2169 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2170 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2171 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2172 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2182 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2183 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2184 &self.default_configuration
2187 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2188 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2189 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2192 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2193 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2195 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2197 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2201 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2206 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2208 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2209 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2210 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2211 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2212 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2214 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2215 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2217 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2218 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2219 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2221 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2222 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2223 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2225 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2226 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2227 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2228 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2229 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2230 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2232 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2233 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2234 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2235 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2236 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2237 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2241 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2242 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2246 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2247 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2249 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2251 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2252 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2253 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2254 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2255 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2256 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2260 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2265 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2267 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2268 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2271 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2273 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2279 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2280 node_id: their_network_key,
2283 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2286 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2287 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2288 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2289 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2290 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2291 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2292 // the same channel.
2293 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2295 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2296 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2297 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2298 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2299 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2300 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2301 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2302 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2303 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2311 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2312 /// more information.
2313 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2314 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2315 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2316 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2317 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2318 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2319 // the same channel.
2320 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2322 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2324 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2327 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2328 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2329 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2332 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2333 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2334 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2337 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2338 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2339 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2347 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2348 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2350 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2351 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2353 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2354 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2355 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2356 // really wanted anyway.
2357 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2360 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2361 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2362 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2365 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2366 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2367 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2368 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2369 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2370 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2372 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2374 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2375 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2376 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2377 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2383 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2384 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2386 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2387 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2388 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2390 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2391 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2392 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2393 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2394 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2395 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2396 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2397 total_msat: *total_msat,
2400 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2401 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2403 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2404 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2406 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2411 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2412 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2413 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2414 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2415 Some(transaction) => {
2416 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2417 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2422 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2423 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2424 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2425 reason: closure_reason,
2426 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2427 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2431 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2432 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2434 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2435 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2439 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2440 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2445 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2447 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2448 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2449 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2450 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2451 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2453 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2454 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2455 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2456 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2457 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2461 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2462 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2463 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2464 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2467 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2468 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2469 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2470 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2474 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2481 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2482 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2484 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2485 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2486 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2487 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2490 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2491 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2492 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2496 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2500 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2501 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2502 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2504 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2505 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2507 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2508 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2509 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2510 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2512 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2514 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2515 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2516 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2519 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2520 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2521 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2522 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2523 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2524 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2527 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2528 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2529 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2531 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2532 /// the channel being closed or not:
2533 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2534 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2535 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2536 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2537 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2538 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2539 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2541 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2542 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2543 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2544 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2546 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2548 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2549 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2550 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2553 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2554 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2555 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2556 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2557 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2558 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2562 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2563 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2564 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2565 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2566 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2567 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2568 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2569 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2571 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2572 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2573 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2574 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2575 // ignore the result here.
2576 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2580 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2581 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2582 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2583 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2585 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2586 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2587 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2590 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2591 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2593 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2595 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2596 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2597 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2598 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2599 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2600 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2601 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2602 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2603 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2604 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2605 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2606 // Unfunded channel has no update
2607 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2608 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2609 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2610 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2611 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2612 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2613 // Unfunded channel has no update
2614 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2615 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2616 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2617 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2618 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2620 (None, *peer_node_id)
2622 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2625 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2626 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2627 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2632 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2635 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2637 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2638 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2639 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2640 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2641 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2642 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2643 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2644 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2645 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2646 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2657 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2658 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2659 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2661 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2662 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2663 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2666 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2667 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2668 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2670 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2671 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2672 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2673 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2674 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2677 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2678 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2679 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2680 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2681 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2685 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2686 /// local transaction(s).
2687 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2688 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2689 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2693 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2694 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2695 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2696 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2697 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2698 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2699 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2701 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2702 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2706 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2707 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2708 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2709 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2710 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2711 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2712 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2713 err_data: Vec::new(),
2717 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2718 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2719 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2722 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2723 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2724 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2725 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2726 outgoing_cltv_value,
2727 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2731 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2732 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2733 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2734 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2735 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2736 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2737 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2738 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2740 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2742 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2743 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2744 err_data: Vec::new(),
2745 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2748 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2749 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2750 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2751 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2753 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2756 // final_expiry_too_soon
2757 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2758 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2760 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2761 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2762 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2763 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2764 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2765 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2766 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2767 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2768 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2769 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2770 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2773 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2774 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2775 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2777 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2779 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2780 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2784 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2785 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2786 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2787 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2788 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2789 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2790 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2791 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2792 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2793 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2794 err_data: Vec::new(),
2795 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2798 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2799 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2800 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2801 err_data: Vec::new(),
2802 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2805 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2809 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2812 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2813 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2816 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2817 phantom_shared_secret,
2821 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2822 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2823 err_data: Vec::new(),
2824 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2827 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2830 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2831 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2832 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2833 outgoing_cltv_value,
2834 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2838 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2839 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2840 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2841 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2842 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2844 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2845 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2846 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2847 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2848 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2849 failure_code: $err_code,
2855 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2856 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2859 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2860 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2861 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2863 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2864 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2865 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2866 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2867 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2868 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2869 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2870 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2872 macro_rules! return_err {
2873 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2875 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2876 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2877 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2878 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2879 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2880 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2886 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2888 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2889 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2891 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2892 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2895 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2896 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2897 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2898 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2901 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2902 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2903 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2905 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2906 // inbound channel's state.
2907 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2908 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2909 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2913 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2914 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2915 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2916 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2917 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2918 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2919 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2920 // phantom or an intercept.
2921 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2922 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2923 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2927 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2930 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2932 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2934 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2935 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2936 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2940 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2942 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2943 // have no consistency guarantees.
2944 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2948 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2949 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2950 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2951 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2952 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2954 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2955 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2956 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2957 // we don't have the channel here.
2958 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2960 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2962 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2963 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2964 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2965 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2966 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2967 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2968 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2969 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2970 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2971 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2972 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2974 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2977 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2978 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2980 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2981 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2985 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2986 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2987 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2988 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2990 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2997 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2998 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2999 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3000 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3001 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3002 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3004 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3005 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3007 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3008 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3009 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3010 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3011 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3012 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3013 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3014 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3015 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3016 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3022 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3023 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3024 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3025 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3027 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3028 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3030 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3031 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3032 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3034 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3035 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3036 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3037 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3038 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3039 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3040 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3044 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3046 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3049 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3050 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3051 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3052 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3053 macro_rules! return_err {
3054 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3056 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3057 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3058 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3059 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3060 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3061 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3067 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3069 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3070 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3073 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3074 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3075 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3076 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3077 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3079 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3082 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3083 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3084 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3085 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3086 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3092 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3093 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3094 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3096 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3097 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3098 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3100 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3101 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3102 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3103 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3104 return Err(LightningError {
3105 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3106 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3109 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3110 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3112 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3113 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3116 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3117 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3118 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3119 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3121 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3122 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3123 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3125 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3126 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3127 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3128 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3129 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3130 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3134 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3137 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3138 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3139 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3141 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3142 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3143 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3144 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3145 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3148 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3149 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3151 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3152 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3153 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3154 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3155 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3156 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3157 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3158 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3160 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3161 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3162 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3164 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3166 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3173 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3174 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3175 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3176 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3181 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3182 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3183 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3186 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3187 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3190 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3191 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3193 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3194 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3195 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3197 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3198 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3200 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3201 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3202 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3203 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3206 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3207 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3208 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3209 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3210 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3211 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3212 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3213 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3215 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3216 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3217 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3219 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3220 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3222 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3223 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3224 Some(monitor_update) => {
3225 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3226 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3228 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3229 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3230 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3231 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3232 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3233 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3234 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3242 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3243 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3244 // `channel_by_id` map.
3245 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3246 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3251 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3252 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3254 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3259 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3261 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3262 /// fields for more info.
3264 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3265 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3267 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3269 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3270 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3271 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3272 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3273 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3275 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3276 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3277 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3278 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3279 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3281 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3282 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3283 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3284 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3286 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3288 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3289 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3290 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3292 /// In general, a path may raise:
3293 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3294 /// node public key) is specified.
3295 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3296 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3298 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3299 /// relevant updates.
3301 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3302 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3303 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3305 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3306 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3307 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3308 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3309 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3310 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3311 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3312 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3314 self.pending_outbound_payments
3315 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3316 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3317 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3320 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3321 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3322 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3323 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3324 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3325 self.pending_outbound_payments
3326 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3327 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3328 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3329 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3333 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3334 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3336 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3337 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3338 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3342 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3343 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3344 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3348 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3349 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3353 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3354 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3355 /// retries are exhausted.
3357 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3358 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3360 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3361 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3362 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3364 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3365 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3367 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3368 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3369 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3371 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3374 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3375 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3376 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3377 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3378 /// never reach the recipient.
3380 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3381 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3383 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3384 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3386 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3387 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3388 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3390 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3391 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3392 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3395 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3396 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3398 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3401 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3402 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3403 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3405 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3406 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3407 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3408 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3411 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3412 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3413 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3414 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3415 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3417 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3418 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3419 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3422 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3425 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3426 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3429 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3430 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3431 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3432 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3433 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3435 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3436 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3440 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3442 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3444 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3445 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3446 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3447 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3448 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3449 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3450 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3451 } else { unreachable!(); });
3453 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3454 Err((chan, err)) => {
3455 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3456 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3458 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3459 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3460 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3466 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3468 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3469 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3474 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3475 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3478 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3480 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3483 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3484 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3485 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3494 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3495 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3496 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3500 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3502 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3503 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3505 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3506 /// across the p2p network.
3508 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3509 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3511 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3512 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3513 /// keys per-channel).
3515 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3516 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3517 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3519 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3520 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3521 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3523 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3524 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3525 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3526 /// for more details.
3528 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3529 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3530 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3533 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3534 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3535 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3536 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3541 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3542 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3543 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3544 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3545 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3546 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3547 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3548 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3552 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3553 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3554 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3555 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3559 let mut output_index = None;
3560 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3561 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3562 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3563 if output_index.is_some() {
3564 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3565 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3568 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3571 if output_index.is_none() {
3572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3573 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3576 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3580 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3582 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3583 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3584 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3585 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3587 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3588 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3590 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3591 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3593 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3595 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3596 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3597 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3598 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3599 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3600 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3601 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3602 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3603 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3604 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3605 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3606 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3607 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3613 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3614 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3617 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3618 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3619 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3620 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3624 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3625 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3626 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3627 config.apply(config_update);
3628 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3631 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3632 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3633 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3635 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3642 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3643 &mut channel.context
3644 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3645 &mut channel.context
3647 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3648 debug_assert!(false);
3649 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3651 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3652 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3655 let mut config = context.config();
3656 config.apply(config_update);
3657 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3658 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3659 context.update_config(&config);
3664 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3666 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3667 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3668 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3669 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3671 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3672 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3674 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3675 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3677 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3679 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3680 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3681 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3682 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3683 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3684 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3685 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3686 pub fn update_channel_config(
3687 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3688 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3689 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3692 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3693 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3695 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3696 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3698 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3699 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3700 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3701 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3702 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3704 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3705 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3706 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3709 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3712 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3713 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3714 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3715 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3716 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3717 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3720 let next_hop_scid = {
3721 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3722 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3723 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3728 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3729 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3730 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3733 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3735 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3736 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3737 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3742 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3743 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3744 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3747 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3748 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3749 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3751 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3753 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3754 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3755 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3756 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3757 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3760 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3761 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3762 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3763 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3764 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3766 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3770 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3771 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3773 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3776 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3777 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3780 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3781 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3782 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3785 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3786 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3787 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3788 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3789 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3790 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3791 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3794 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3795 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3796 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3797 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3802 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3804 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3805 /// Will likely generate further events.
3806 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3809 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3810 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3811 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3813 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3814 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3816 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3817 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3818 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3820 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3821 match forward_info {
3822 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3823 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3824 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3825 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3826 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3829 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3830 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3831 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3833 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3834 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3835 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3836 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3837 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3838 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3841 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3842 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3844 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3847 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3848 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3854 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3855 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3857 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3861 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3862 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3864 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3868 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3869 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3870 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3871 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3872 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3874 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3875 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3876 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3877 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3878 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3880 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3882 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3883 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3887 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3888 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3889 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3890 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3892 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3893 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3899 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3902 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3905 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3906 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3907 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3908 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3909 // problem, not ours.
3915 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3916 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3918 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3923 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3924 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3925 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3930 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3932 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3936 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3937 match forward_info {
3938 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3939 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3940 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3941 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3942 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3946 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3947 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3948 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3949 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3950 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3951 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3952 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3954 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3955 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3956 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3959 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3960 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3962 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3964 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3965 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3966 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3967 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3972 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3973 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3975 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3977 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3978 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3980 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3983 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3985 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3986 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3987 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3996 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3997 match forward_info {
3998 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3999 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4000 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4001 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4002 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4005 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4006 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4007 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4008 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4009 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4010 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4011 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4013 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4014 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4015 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4019 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4020 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4023 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4026 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4027 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4028 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4029 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4030 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4031 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4032 phantom_shared_secret,
4034 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4035 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4036 // if routing nodes overpay
4037 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4038 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4040 total_value_received: None,
4041 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4044 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4047 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4049 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4050 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4051 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4052 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4053 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4054 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4056 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4057 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4058 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4059 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4060 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4061 phantom_shared_secret,
4063 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4064 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4066 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4069 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4070 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4071 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4072 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4073 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4076 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4077 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4078 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4079 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4080 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4081 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4083 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4084 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4085 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4087 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4088 .entry(payment_hash)
4089 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4090 .or_insert_with(|| {
4091 committed_to_claimable = true;
4093 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4096 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4097 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4099 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4101 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4103 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4105 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4106 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4107 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4110 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4112 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4113 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4114 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4115 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4116 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4117 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4118 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4119 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4120 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4121 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4123 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4125 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4126 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4127 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4128 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4129 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4131 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4132 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4133 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4134 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4135 committed_to_claimable = true;
4137 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4138 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4139 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4140 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4141 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4142 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4143 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4144 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4145 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4146 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4150 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4151 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4152 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4153 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4154 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4156 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4158 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4159 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4161 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4162 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4163 committed_to_claimable = true;
4166 payment_claimable_generated
4170 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4171 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4172 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4173 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4174 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4175 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4176 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4177 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4179 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4180 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4181 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4182 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4183 Ok(result) => result,
4185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4186 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4189 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4190 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4191 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4193 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4194 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4197 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4198 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4199 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4201 check_total_value!(purpose);
4203 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4204 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4205 check_total_value!(purpose);
4209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4210 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4212 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4214 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4215 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4217 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4218 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4220 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4221 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4223 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4224 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4225 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4227 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4228 if payment_claimable_generated {
4229 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4235 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4236 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4244 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4245 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4246 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4247 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4249 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4250 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4252 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4254 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4255 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4256 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4258 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4260 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4261 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4262 events.append(&mut new_events);
4265 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4267 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4268 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4269 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4271 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4273 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4274 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4275 if background_events.is_empty() {
4276 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4279 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4281 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4282 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4283 // monitor updating completing.
4284 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4286 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4287 let mut updated_chan = false;
4289 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4290 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4291 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4292 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4293 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4295 updated_chan = true;
4296 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4297 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4304 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4305 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4307 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4308 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4309 // however, ensure that.
4311 log_error!(self.logger,
4312 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4314 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4316 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4317 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4318 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4319 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4320 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4321 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4322 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4324 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4325 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4326 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4327 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4328 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4334 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4337 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4338 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4339 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4340 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4341 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4344 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4345 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4346 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4347 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4349 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4350 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4352 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4354 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4355 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4358 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4360 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4361 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4365 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4366 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4367 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4368 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4369 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4370 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4371 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4373 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4374 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4376 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4377 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4380 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4381 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4386 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4387 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4395 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4397 /// This currently includes:
4398 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4399 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4400 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4402 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4403 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4404 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4405 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4407 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4408 /// estimate fetches.
4410 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4411 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4412 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4413 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4414 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4416 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4417 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4419 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4420 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4421 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4423 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4424 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4427 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4428 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4429 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4430 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4435 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4436 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4438 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4439 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4440 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4441 if needs_close { return false; }
4444 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4445 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4446 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4447 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4448 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4449 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4450 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4451 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4453 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4454 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4455 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4456 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4460 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4462 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4465 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4467 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4468 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4469 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4470 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4474 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4476 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4482 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4484 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4485 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4486 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4487 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4488 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4489 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4490 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4491 channel_id: *chan_id,
4492 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4501 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4503 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4504 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4505 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4507 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4508 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4509 log_error!(self.logger,
4510 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4511 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4513 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4514 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4515 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4516 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4517 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4518 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4519 channel_id: *chan_id,
4520 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4529 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4530 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4531 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4532 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4534 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4535 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4536 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4537 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4538 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4539 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4540 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4541 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4547 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4549 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4550 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4555 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4556 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4557 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4558 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4559 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4560 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4561 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4562 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4563 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4564 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4565 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4567 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4568 // have no channels to the peer.
4569 let remove_entry = {
4570 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4571 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4574 entry.remove_entry();
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4582 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4583 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4584 // This should be unreachable
4585 debug_assert!(false);
4588 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4589 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4590 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4591 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4592 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4593 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4594 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4597 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4598 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4599 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4601 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4602 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4609 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4610 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4611 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4612 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4613 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4616 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4617 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4620 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4622 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4623 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4624 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4625 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4626 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4633 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4634 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4635 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4637 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4638 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4639 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4640 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4642 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4643 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4644 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4645 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4646 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4647 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4650 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4651 /// reason for the failure.
4653 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4654 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4657 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4658 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4659 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4660 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4661 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4662 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4663 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4668 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4669 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4670 match failure_code {
4671 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4672 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4673 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4674 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4675 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4676 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4678 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4679 let fail_data = match data {
4680 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4683 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4688 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4689 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4691 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4693 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4694 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4695 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4696 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4697 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4698 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4699 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4701 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4703 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4704 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4706 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4711 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4712 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4713 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4714 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4715 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4716 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4717 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4718 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4719 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4720 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4722 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4723 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4724 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4725 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4727 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4728 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4729 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4730 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4731 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4735 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4736 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4737 // be surfaced to the user.
4738 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4739 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4740 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4742 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4744 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4747 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4749 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4753 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4756 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4757 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4758 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4763 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4764 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4765 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4766 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4767 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4768 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4769 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4770 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4771 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4774 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4775 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4776 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4779 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4780 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4781 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4783 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4784 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4785 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4786 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4787 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4789 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4791 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4793 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4794 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4795 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4796 push_forward_ev = true;
4798 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4800 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4803 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4806 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4807 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4808 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4809 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4810 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4811 failed_next_destination: destination,
4817 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4818 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4820 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4821 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4822 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4823 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4825 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4826 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4827 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4828 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4830 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4831 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4832 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4834 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4835 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4836 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4837 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4838 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4839 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4840 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4841 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4842 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4845 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4846 /// even type numbers.
4850 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4851 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4853 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4854 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4855 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4858 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4859 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4864 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4865 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4866 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4867 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4868 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4869 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4870 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4871 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4876 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4877 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4878 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4880 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4881 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4882 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4883 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4886 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4887 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4888 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4889 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4890 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4891 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4892 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4893 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4894 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4895 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4896 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4905 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4907 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4908 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4909 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4910 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4911 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4912 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4913 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4914 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4915 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4917 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4918 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4919 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4920 debug_assert!(false);
4924 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4926 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4927 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4928 debug_assert!(false);
4932 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4933 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4935 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4936 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4937 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4938 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4941 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4942 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4943 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4944 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4948 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4949 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4950 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4951 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4953 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4954 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4955 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4956 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4957 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4962 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4963 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4964 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4965 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4966 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4967 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4968 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4970 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4973 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4974 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4975 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4976 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4980 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4981 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4982 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4983 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4985 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4986 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4987 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4988 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4991 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4992 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4993 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4994 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4998 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4999 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5000 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5003 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5006 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5007 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5008 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5010 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5011 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5012 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5013 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5014 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5017 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5018 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5019 if let Err(e) = res {
5020 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5021 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5022 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5023 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5024 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5027 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5028 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5029 // monitor update as a background event.
5030 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5031 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5032 counterparty_node_id,
5033 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5034 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5042 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5043 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5044 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5050 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5051 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5052 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5053 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5054 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5055 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5056 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5057 // again on restart.
5058 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5059 payment_preimage, update_res);
5062 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5063 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5065 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5066 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5067 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5068 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5069 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5070 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5071 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5072 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5073 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5074 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5077 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5078 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5079 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5080 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5081 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5082 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5086 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5087 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5090 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5092 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5093 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5094 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5095 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5096 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5097 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5099 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5100 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5103 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5104 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5105 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5106 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5107 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5108 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5109 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5112 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5113 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5115 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5116 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5117 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5118 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5120 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5124 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5125 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5126 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5132 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5133 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5134 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5137 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5138 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5140 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5141 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5142 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
5143 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5144 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5148 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5149 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5151 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5152 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5153 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5160 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5161 /// update completion.
5162 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5163 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5164 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5165 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5166 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5167 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5169 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5170 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5171 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5172 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5173 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5174 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5176 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5178 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5179 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5180 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5181 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5184 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5185 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5187 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5189 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5194 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5195 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5197 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5202 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5203 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5204 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5205 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5206 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5211 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5215 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5221 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5222 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5223 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5227 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5228 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5229 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5235 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5236 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5238 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5239 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5241 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5242 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5243 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5244 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5245 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5251 let mut peer_state_lock;
5252 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5253 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5254 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5255 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5257 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5260 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5261 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5262 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5263 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5264 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5267 let remaining_in_flight =
5268 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5269 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5272 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5273 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5274 remaining_in_flight);
5275 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5278 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5281 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5283 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5284 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5287 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5288 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5289 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5291 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5292 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5293 /// used to accept such channels.
5295 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5296 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5297 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5298 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5301 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5302 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5304 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5305 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5306 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5308 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5309 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5311 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5312 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5314 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5315 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5317 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5318 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5319 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5320 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5323 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5324 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5326 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5327 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5329 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5330 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5331 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5332 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5333 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5335 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5336 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5337 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5339 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5340 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5342 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5343 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5344 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5345 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5347 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5351 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5352 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5353 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5354 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5355 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5357 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5361 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5363 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5364 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5365 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5366 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5367 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5368 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5370 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5373 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5374 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5378 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5379 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5380 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5382 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5383 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5384 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5387 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5392 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5393 /// or 0-conf channels.
5395 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5396 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5397 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5398 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5399 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5400 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5402 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5403 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5404 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5405 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5406 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5407 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5408 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5412 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5415 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5416 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5418 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5419 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5420 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5421 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5422 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5423 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5425 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5428 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5429 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5430 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5433 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5436 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5437 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5441 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5445 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5446 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5447 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5448 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5449 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5452 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5454 debug_assert!(false);
5455 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5460 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5461 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5462 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5463 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5464 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5465 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5468 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5469 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5472 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5473 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5475 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5476 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5479 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5480 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5485 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5486 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5487 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5488 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5489 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5490 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5491 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5492 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5493 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5495 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5496 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5497 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5502 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5503 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5504 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5505 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5506 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5507 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5508 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5516 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5517 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5520 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5524 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5525 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5527 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5528 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5529 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5531 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5535 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5536 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5538 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5540 debug_assert!(false);
5541 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5545 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5547 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5548 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5553 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5554 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5555 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5556 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5557 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5559 user_channel_id: user_id,
5564 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5565 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5568 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5570 debug_assert!(false);
5571 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5576 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5577 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5578 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5579 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5581 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5582 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5583 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5584 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5585 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5586 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5587 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5589 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5593 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5596 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5598 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5601 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5603 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5604 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5605 funding_msg.channel_id))
5607 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5608 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5612 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5613 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5614 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5615 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5616 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5617 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5618 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5622 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5624 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5625 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5626 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5627 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5629 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5630 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5631 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5632 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5633 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5634 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5635 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5636 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5644 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5645 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5646 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5647 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5649 debug_assert!(false);
5650 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5657 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5658 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5659 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5660 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5661 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5662 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5663 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5664 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5665 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5666 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5675 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5676 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5677 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5679 debug_assert!(false);
5680 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5684 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5686 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5687 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5688 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5690 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5691 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5692 msg: announcement_sigs,
5694 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5695 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5696 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5697 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5698 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5699 // announcement_signatures.
5700 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5701 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5702 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5703 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5710 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5711 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5720 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5721 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5722 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5724 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5726 debug_assert!(false);
5727 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5731 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5732 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5733 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5734 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5735 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5736 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5737 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5739 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5740 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5741 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5742 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5743 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5745 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5746 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5747 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5748 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5749 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5752 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5753 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5754 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5755 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5757 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5758 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5759 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5760 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5761 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5762 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5767 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5768 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5769 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5770 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5777 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5778 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5779 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5780 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5786 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5790 debug_assert!(false);
5791 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5793 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5794 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5795 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5798 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5799 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5800 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5801 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5806 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5807 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5808 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5809 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5810 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5811 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5812 } else { (tx, None) }
5814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5817 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5818 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5819 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5821 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5822 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5825 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5829 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5834 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5835 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5836 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5837 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5839 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5840 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5841 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5842 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5844 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5845 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5846 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5848 debug_assert!(false);
5849 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5851 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5852 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5853 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5856 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5857 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5858 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5859 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5860 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5862 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5863 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5864 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5865 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5866 match pending_forward_info {
5867 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5868 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5869 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5870 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5872 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5873 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5874 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5875 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5876 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5879 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5881 _ => pending_forward_info
5884 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5891 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5893 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5895 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5897 debug_assert!(false);
5898 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5904 let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
5905 funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
5908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5911 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
5915 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5917 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5919 debug_assert!(false);
5920 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5922 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5923 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5924 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5926 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5933 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5935 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5937 debug_assert!(false);
5938 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5944 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5945 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5946 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5948 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5955 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5957 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5959 debug_assert!(false);
5960 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5964 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5966 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5967 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5968 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5969 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5970 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5978 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5979 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5980 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5981 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5982 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5983 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5984 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5985 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5986 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5987 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5988 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5990 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5991 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5993 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5994 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5995 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5997 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5998 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6001 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6002 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6004 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6005 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6006 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6008 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6009 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6010 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6011 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6012 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6015 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6016 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6019 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6020 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6021 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6022 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6023 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6024 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6025 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6028 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6029 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6030 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6035 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6036 // payments are being processed.
6037 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6038 push_forward_event = true;
6040 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6041 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6048 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6049 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6052 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6053 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6054 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6056 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6060 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6061 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6062 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6063 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6064 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6066 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6067 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6068 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6069 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6070 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6071 // real by taking more time.
6072 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6073 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6074 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6079 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6080 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6081 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6082 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6083 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6084 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6085 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6087 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6088 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6089 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6090 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6091 channel_funding_outpoint,
6092 counterparty_node_id,
6097 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6098 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6100 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6102 debug_assert!(false);
6103 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6104 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6106 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6108 let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6109 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6110 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6111 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6112 *counterparty_node_id)
6114 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
6115 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
6116 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6117 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6118 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6119 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6120 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6122 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6127 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6131 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6133 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6135 debug_assert!(false);
6136 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6140 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6141 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6142 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6149 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6151 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6153 debug_assert!(false);
6154 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6156 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6157 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6158 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6160 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6164 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6165 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6166 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6167 msg, &self.default_configuration
6169 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6170 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6171 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6179 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6180 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6181 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6182 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6184 // It's not a local channel
6185 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6189 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6190 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6191 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6195 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6197 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6198 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6199 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6200 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6201 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6202 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6206 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6207 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6208 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6209 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6211 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6212 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6217 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6220 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6222 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6225 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6227 debug_assert!(false);
6228 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6232 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6234 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6235 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6236 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6237 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6238 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6239 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6240 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6241 let mut channel_update = None;
6242 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6243 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6244 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6247 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6248 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6249 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6250 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6251 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6252 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6253 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6258 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6259 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6260 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6261 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6262 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6263 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6271 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6272 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6275 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6276 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6281 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6282 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6283 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6285 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6286 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6287 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6288 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6289 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6290 match monitor_event {
6291 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6292 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6294 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6297 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6298 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6299 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6302 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6303 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6304 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6305 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6307 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6308 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6309 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6310 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6313 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6315 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6316 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6317 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6318 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6319 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6320 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6321 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6322 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6327 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6328 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6330 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6332 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6333 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6334 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6343 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6344 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6350 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6351 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6354 has_pending_monitor_events
6357 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6358 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6359 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6361 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6362 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6363 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6366 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6367 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6368 /// update was applied.
6369 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6370 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6371 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6372 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6374 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6375 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6376 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6377 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6380 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6383 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6384 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6385 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6386 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6387 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6388 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6389 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6390 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6392 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6393 has_monitor_update = true;
6395 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6396 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6397 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6398 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6400 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6402 continue 'peer_loop;
6411 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6412 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6413 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6416 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6417 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6423 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6424 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6425 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6426 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6427 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6428 let mut has_update = false;
6430 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6432 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6435 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6436 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6437 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6438 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6439 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6442 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6445 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6446 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6447 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6448 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6449 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6454 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6456 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6457 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6458 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6464 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6465 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6473 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6474 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6480 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6481 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6483 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6484 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6485 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6486 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6487 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6488 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6489 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6490 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6491 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6492 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6493 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6494 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6495 assert!(should_broadcast);
6496 } else { unreachable!(); }
6497 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6498 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6499 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6502 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6506 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6509 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6510 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6512 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6513 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6514 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6515 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6517 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6519 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6520 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6524 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6525 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6527 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6529 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6530 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6532 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6533 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6534 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6535 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6536 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6537 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6538 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6539 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6540 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6541 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6542 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6545 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6546 /// stored external to LDK.
6548 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6549 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6550 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6552 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6553 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6556 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6557 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6558 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6559 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6561 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6562 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6563 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6564 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6565 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6567 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6568 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6569 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6570 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6571 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6573 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6574 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6576 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6577 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6581 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6582 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6584 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6586 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6587 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6589 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6590 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6591 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6592 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6593 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6594 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6595 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6598 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6599 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6601 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6602 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6603 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6606 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6607 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6609 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6610 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6611 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6612 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6614 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6615 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6616 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6617 Some(_) => continue,
6618 None => return scid_candidate
6623 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6625 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6626 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6628 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6629 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6630 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6634 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6635 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6636 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6638 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6639 /// times to get a unique scid.
6640 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6641 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6642 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6644 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6645 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6646 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6647 return scid_candidate
6651 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6652 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6653 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6654 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6656 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6657 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6660 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6661 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6662 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6663 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6672 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6673 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6674 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6675 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6676 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6680 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6681 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6682 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6683 events.push_back((event, None));
6687 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6688 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6689 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6693 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6694 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6698 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6699 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6702 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6703 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6704 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6705 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6706 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6707 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6710 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6711 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6714 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6715 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6716 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6717 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6719 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6723 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6724 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6725 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6726 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6727 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6729 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6733 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6734 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6735 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6736 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6737 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6738 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6739 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6741 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6743 if further_update_exists {
6744 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6750 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6754 log_debug!(self.logger,
6755 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6756 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6760 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6761 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6762 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6766 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6767 for action in actions {
6769 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6770 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6772 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6778 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6779 /// using the given event handler.
6781 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6782 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6786 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6790 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6792 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6793 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6794 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6795 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6796 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6797 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6801 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6802 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6803 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6804 /// is always placed next to each other.
6806 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6807 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6808 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6809 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6811 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6812 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6813 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6814 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6815 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6816 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6817 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6819 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6820 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6821 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6822 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6825 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6826 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6828 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6829 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6832 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6833 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6834 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6835 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6837 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6838 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6842 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6843 events.replace(pending_events);
6852 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6854 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6855 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6856 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6857 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6858 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6859 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6863 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6865 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6866 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6867 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6869 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6873 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6875 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6877 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6878 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6879 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6884 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6886 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6887 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6888 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6889 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6890 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6893 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6894 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6897 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6899 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6900 let new_height = height - 1;
6902 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6903 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6904 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6905 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6906 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6907 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6910 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6914 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6916 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6917 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6918 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6919 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6920 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6925 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6926 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6927 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6928 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6930 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6931 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6934 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6935 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6936 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6938 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6939 if height < last_best_block_height {
6940 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6941 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6945 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6946 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6947 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6948 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6950 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6951 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6954 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6955 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6957 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6959 macro_rules! max_time {
6960 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6962 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6963 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6964 // having an explicit local time source.
6965 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6966 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6967 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6968 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6969 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6975 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6976 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6977 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6978 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6982 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6983 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6984 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6985 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6986 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6987 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6988 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6989 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6996 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6998 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6999 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7000 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7001 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7002 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7003 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7004 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7009 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7011 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7012 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7013 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7014 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7015 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7016 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7020 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7021 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7023 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7024 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7025 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7026 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7027 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7029 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7030 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7033 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7036 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7037 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7038 let res = f(channel);
7039 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7040 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7041 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7042 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7043 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7045 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7046 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7047 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7048 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7049 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7050 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7051 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7061 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7062 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7065 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7066 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7067 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7068 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7069 msg: announcement_sigs,
7071 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7072 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7073 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7075 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7076 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7077 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7082 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7083 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7084 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7085 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7086 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7087 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7088 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7089 // is always consistent.
7090 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7091 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7092 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7093 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7094 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7097 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7098 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7099 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7100 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7101 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7102 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7103 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7107 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7108 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7109 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7110 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7111 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7112 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7113 data: reason_message,
7123 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7124 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7125 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7126 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7127 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7128 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7129 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7130 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7131 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7132 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7134 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7135 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7136 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7140 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7143 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7144 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7145 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7146 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7147 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7148 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7150 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7151 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7154 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7155 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7156 _ => unreachable!(),
7158 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7159 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7160 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7167 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7169 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7170 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7174 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7176 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7177 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7179 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7180 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7183 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7184 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7185 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7188 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7189 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7190 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7191 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7194 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7195 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7196 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7197 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7200 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7201 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7203 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7204 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7205 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7206 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7207 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7210 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7211 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7212 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7213 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7216 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7217 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7218 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7219 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7222 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7223 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7224 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7225 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7229 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7230 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7232 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7233 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7234 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7235 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7236 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7237 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7241 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7246 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7247 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7248 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7249 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7252 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7254 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7257 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7258 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7259 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7260 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7263 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7265 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7268 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7270 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7273 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7275 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7278 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7280 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7283 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7285 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7288 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7290 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7293 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7295 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7298 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7299 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7300 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7303 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7304 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7305 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7308 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7310 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7313 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7315 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7318 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7319 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7320 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7323 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7324 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7325 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7328 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7329 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7330 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7331 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7332 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7334 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7339 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7344 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7346 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7347 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7349 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7350 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7351 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7354 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7355 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7356 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7357 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7358 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7359 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7364 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7365 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7366 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7369 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7370 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7371 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7374 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7375 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7376 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7377 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7379 // V1 Channel Establishment
7380 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7381 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7382 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7383 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7384 // V2 Channel Establishment
7385 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7386 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7387 // Common Channel Establishment
7388 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7389 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7390 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7391 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7393 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7394 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7395 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7396 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7397 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7398 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7399 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7400 // Channel Operations
7401 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7402 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7403 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7404 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7405 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7406 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7408 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7409 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7410 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7411 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7412 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7413 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7414 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7415 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7416 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7419 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7420 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7421 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7422 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7425 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7427 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7429 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7430 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7434 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7435 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7436 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7442 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7443 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7444 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7445 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7446 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7447 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7450 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7451 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7453 if inbound_peer_limited {
7456 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7457 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7458 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7459 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7460 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7461 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7462 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7463 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7464 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7465 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7470 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7471 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7473 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7474 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7475 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7476 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7481 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7482 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7487 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7490 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7493 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7495 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7496 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7497 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7498 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7499 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7500 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7501 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7502 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7506 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7510 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7513 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7514 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7515 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7516 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7517 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7520 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7521 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7522 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7523 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7524 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7525 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7527 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7528 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7529 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7533 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7535 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7536 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7539 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7540 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7541 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7542 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7550 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7551 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7555 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7556 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7559 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7560 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7563 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7564 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7567 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7568 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7569 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7570 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7573 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7574 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7575 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7576 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7579 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7580 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7581 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7582 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7585 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7586 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7587 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7588 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7591 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7592 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7593 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7594 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7597 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7598 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7599 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7600 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7603 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7604 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7605 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7606 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7609 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7610 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7611 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7612 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7615 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7616 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7617 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7618 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7622 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7623 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7624 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7625 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7626 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7630 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7631 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7633 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7634 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7635 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7636 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7637 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7640 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7641 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7642 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7643 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7646 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7647 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7648 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7649 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7652 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7653 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7654 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7655 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7656 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7657 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7658 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7659 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7660 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7661 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7662 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7663 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7664 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7665 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7666 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7667 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7668 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7669 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7670 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7671 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7676 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7677 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7679 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7680 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7681 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7682 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7685 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7686 (2, node_id, required),
7687 (4, features, required),
7688 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7689 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7690 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7691 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7694 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7695 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7696 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7697 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7698 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7699 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7700 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7701 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7702 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7703 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7704 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7705 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7706 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7707 (7, self.config, option),
7708 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7709 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7710 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7711 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7712 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7713 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7714 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7715 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7716 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7717 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7718 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7719 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7720 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7721 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7722 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7723 (32, self.is_public, required),
7724 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7725 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7726 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7727 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7728 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7734 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7735 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7736 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7737 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7738 (2, channel_id, required),
7739 (3, channel_type, option),
7740 (4, counterparty, required),
7741 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7742 (6, funding_txo, option),
7743 (7, config, option),
7744 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7745 (9, confirmations, option),
7746 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7747 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7748 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7749 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7750 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7751 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7752 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7753 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7754 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7755 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7756 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7757 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7758 (26, is_outbound, required),
7759 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7760 (30, is_usable, required),
7761 (32, is_public, required),
7762 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7763 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7764 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7765 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7766 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7769 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7770 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7771 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7772 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7773 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7775 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7779 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7781 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7782 outbound_scid_alias,
7786 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7787 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7789 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7790 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7791 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7792 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7793 confirmations_required,
7795 force_close_spend_delay,
7796 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7797 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7798 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7799 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7800 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7801 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7802 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7803 channel_shutdown_state,
7808 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7809 (2, channels, required_vec),
7810 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7811 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7814 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7816 (0, onion_packet, required),
7817 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7820 (0, payment_data, required),
7821 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7822 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7823 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7824 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7826 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7827 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7828 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7829 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7830 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7831 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7835 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7836 (0, routing, required),
7837 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7838 (4, payment_hash, required),
7839 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7840 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7841 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7842 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7846 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7847 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7849 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7851 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7852 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7853 reason.write(writer)?;
7855 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7856 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7859 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7860 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7861 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7862 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7869 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7870 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7871 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7874 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7875 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7876 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7877 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7881 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7882 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7883 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7884 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7885 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7888 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7889 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7890 // messages contained in the variants.
7891 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7892 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7893 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7895 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7896 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7897 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7898 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7899 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7902 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7903 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7904 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7905 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7906 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7908 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7913 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7918 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7919 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7920 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7921 (2, outpoint, required),
7922 (4, htlc_id, required),
7923 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7926 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7928 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7929 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7930 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7932 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7933 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7934 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7935 (2, self.value, required),
7936 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7937 (4, payment_data, option),
7938 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7939 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7940 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7941 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7947 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7948 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7949 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7950 (0, prev_hop, required),
7951 (1, total_msat, option),
7952 (2, value_ser, required),
7953 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7954 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7955 (5, total_value_received, option),
7956 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7957 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7958 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7960 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7961 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7962 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7964 if payment_data.is_some() {
7965 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7967 if total_msat.is_none() {
7968 total_msat = Some(value);
7970 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7973 if total_msat.is_none() {
7974 if payment_data.is_none() {
7975 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7977 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7979 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7983 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7986 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7987 total_value_received,
7988 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7990 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7991 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7996 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7997 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7998 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8001 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8002 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8003 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8004 let mut payment_id = None;
8005 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8006 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8007 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8008 (0, session_priv, required),
8009 (1, payment_id, option),
8010 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8011 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8012 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8013 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8015 if payment_id.is_none() {
8016 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8018 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8020 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8021 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8022 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8024 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8025 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8026 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8027 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8031 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8032 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8033 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8035 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8038 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8039 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8044 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8045 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8047 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8049 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8050 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8051 (0, session_priv, required),
8052 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8053 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8054 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8055 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8056 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8057 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8060 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8062 field.write(writer)?;
8069 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8070 (0, forward_info, required),
8071 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8072 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8073 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8074 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8077 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8079 (0, htlc_id, required),
8080 (2, err_packet, required),
8085 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8086 (0, payment_secret, required),
8087 (2, expiry_time, required),
8088 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8089 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8090 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8093 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8095 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8096 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8097 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8098 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8099 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8100 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8105 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8107 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8109 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8111 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8112 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8113 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8116 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8118 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8119 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8120 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8121 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8122 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8123 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8124 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8125 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8127 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8128 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8129 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8130 unfunded_channels += 1;
8135 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8137 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8140 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8141 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8142 channel.write(writer)?;
8149 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8150 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8151 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8152 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8153 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8154 for forward in pending_forwards {
8155 forward.write(writer)?;
8160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8162 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8163 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8164 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8166 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8167 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8168 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8169 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8170 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8171 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8172 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8173 htlc.write(writer)?;
8175 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8176 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8179 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8180 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8181 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8182 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8183 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8184 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8185 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8188 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8189 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8190 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8191 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8192 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8194 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8195 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8196 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8197 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8198 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8199 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8200 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8205 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8206 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8207 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8208 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8209 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8210 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8211 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8212 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8213 0u64.write(writer)?;
8215 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8216 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8217 event.write(writer)?;
8221 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8222 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8223 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8224 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8225 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8226 0u64.write(writer)?;
8228 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8229 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8230 // likely to be identical.
8231 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8232 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8234 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8235 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8236 hash.write(writer)?;
8237 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8240 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8241 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8242 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8243 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8244 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8247 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8248 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8250 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8251 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8252 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8253 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8256 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8257 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8261 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8262 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8263 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8265 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8266 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8267 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8273 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8274 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8275 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8276 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8279 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8280 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8281 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8282 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8283 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8286 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8287 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8288 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8289 if !updates.is_empty() {
8290 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8291 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8296 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8297 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8298 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8299 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8300 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8301 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8302 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8303 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8304 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8305 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8306 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8307 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8308 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8315 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8316 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8317 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8318 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8322 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8323 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8324 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8325 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8326 // check that the event is sane here.
8327 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8328 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8329 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8330 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8336 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8337 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8338 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8339 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8340 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8341 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8344 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8345 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8346 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8347 events.push_back((ev, action));
8348 } else if action.is_some() {
8349 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8356 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8357 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8358 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8359 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8360 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8361 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8364 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8366 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8368 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8369 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8370 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8371 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8372 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8373 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8374 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8375 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8376 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8377 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8378 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8379 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8380 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8382 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8383 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8385 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8386 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8388 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8389 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8390 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8391 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8392 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8393 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8395 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8396 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8398 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8399 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8400 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8401 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8402 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8403 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8407 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8408 pub entropy_source: ES,
8410 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8411 pub node_signer: NS,
8413 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8414 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8416 pub signer_provider: SP,
8418 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8420 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8421 pub fee_estimator: F,
8422 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8424 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8425 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8426 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8427 pub chain_monitor: M,
8429 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8430 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8431 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8432 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8433 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8434 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8436 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8438 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8439 /// deserialization.
8441 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8442 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8443 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8445 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8446 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8448 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8449 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8450 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8451 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8453 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8456 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8457 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8460 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8461 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8463 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8464 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8465 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8466 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8467 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8468 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8472 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8473 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8474 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8475 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8476 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8478 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8479 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8484 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8485 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8486 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8487 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8489 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8490 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8491 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8492 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8493 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8494 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8498 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8499 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8500 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8504 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8505 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8507 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8508 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8509 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8510 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8511 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8512 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8516 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8517 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8519 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8520 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8521 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8523 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8525 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8526 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8527 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8528 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8529 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8530 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8531 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8532 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8533 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8534 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8536 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8537 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8538 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8539 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8540 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8541 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8542 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8543 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8544 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8545 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8546 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8547 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8548 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8549 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8550 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8551 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8554 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8555 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8556 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8557 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8558 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8559 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8560 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8562 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8563 let mut found_htlc = false;
8564 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8565 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8568 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8569 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8570 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8571 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8572 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8573 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8574 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8575 log_info!(args.logger,
8576 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8577 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8578 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8582 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8583 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8584 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8585 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8586 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8588 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8589 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8591 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8593 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8594 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8597 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8598 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8599 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8603 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8604 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8605 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8606 // safely discard the channel.
8607 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8608 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8609 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8610 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8611 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8612 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8613 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8616 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8617 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8618 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8619 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8620 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8621 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8625 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8626 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8627 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8628 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8629 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8630 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8631 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8633 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8637 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8638 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8639 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8640 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8641 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8642 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8643 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8644 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8645 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8647 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8650 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8651 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8652 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8653 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8654 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8655 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8656 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8657 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8659 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8662 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8665 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8666 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8667 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8668 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8669 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8670 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8671 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8672 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8673 is_connected: false,
8677 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8678 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8679 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8680 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8681 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8682 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8683 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8684 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8687 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8688 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8689 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8690 for _ in 0..event_count {
8691 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8692 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8697 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8698 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8699 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8701 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8702 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8703 // on-startup monitor updates.
8704 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8705 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8707 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8711 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8712 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8714 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8715 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8716 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8717 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8722 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8723 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8724 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8725 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8726 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8727 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8728 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8730 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8731 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8735 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8736 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8737 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8738 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8739 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8740 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8741 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8742 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8743 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8744 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8745 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8746 let mut events_override = None;
8747 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8748 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8749 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8750 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8751 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8752 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8753 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8754 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8755 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8756 (8, events_override, option),
8757 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8758 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8759 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8760 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8762 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8763 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8766 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8767 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8770 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8771 pending_events_read = events;
8774 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8775 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8778 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8779 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8780 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8781 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8782 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8783 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8785 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8787 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8788 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8789 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8792 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8793 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8794 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8795 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8796 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8798 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8799 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8800 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8802 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8803 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8804 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8805 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8806 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8808 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8809 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8810 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8811 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8812 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8813 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8814 pending_background_events.push(
8815 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8816 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8817 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8818 update: update.clone(),
8821 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8822 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8823 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8824 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8825 pending_background_events.push(
8826 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8827 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8828 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8831 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8832 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8833 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8835 max_in_flight_update_id
8839 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8840 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8842 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8843 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8845 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8846 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8847 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8848 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8849 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8850 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8851 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8852 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8853 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8856 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8857 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8858 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8859 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8860 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8861 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8862 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8863 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8864 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8865 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8866 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8871 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8872 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8873 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8874 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8875 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8876 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8877 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8878 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8880 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8881 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8882 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8884 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8885 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8886 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8887 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8888 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8889 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8890 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8891 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8896 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8897 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8899 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8900 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8901 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8902 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8905 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8906 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8907 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8908 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8909 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8910 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8911 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8913 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8914 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8915 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8916 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8917 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8918 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8919 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8920 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8923 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8924 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8925 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8926 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8928 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8929 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8930 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8933 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8934 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8935 retry_strategy: None,
8936 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8937 payment_params: None,
8938 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8939 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8940 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8941 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8942 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8943 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8944 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8945 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8946 total_msat: path_amt,
8947 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8949 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8950 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8955 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8957 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8958 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8959 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8960 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8962 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8963 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8964 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8965 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8966 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8967 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8968 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8969 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8970 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8971 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8972 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8977 !forwards.is_empty()
8979 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8980 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8981 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8982 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8983 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8984 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8985 intercepted_id != ev_id
8992 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8993 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8994 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8995 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8996 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8997 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8998 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8999 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9000 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9001 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9002 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9004 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9005 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9006 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9008 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9009 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9010 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9017 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9018 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9020 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9022 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9023 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9024 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9025 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9026 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9027 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9028 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9029 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9030 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9033 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9034 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9035 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9036 // channel still live case here.
9040 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9041 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9046 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9047 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9048 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9049 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9050 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9051 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9052 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9053 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9057 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9058 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9060 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9061 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9062 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9063 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9065 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9066 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9067 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9069 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9070 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9072 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9073 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9075 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9078 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9079 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9080 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9082 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9086 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9087 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9088 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9089 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9090 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9092 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9093 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9094 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9095 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9096 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9097 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9098 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9099 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9101 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9102 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9106 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9108 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9110 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9111 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9113 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9114 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9119 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9120 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9122 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9124 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9126 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9127 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9128 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9129 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9133 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9134 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9137 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9138 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9139 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9141 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9142 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9143 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9145 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9146 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9147 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9148 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9149 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9150 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9152 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9153 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9154 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9155 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9156 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9157 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9163 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9165 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9166 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9167 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9168 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9169 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9170 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9171 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9172 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9173 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9174 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9175 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9177 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
9178 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9180 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9181 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9182 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9183 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9185 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9186 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9187 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9188 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9190 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9191 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9192 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9193 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9195 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9196 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9197 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9198 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9200 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9201 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9204 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9205 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9208 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9211 purpose: payment.purpose,
9212 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9218 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9219 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9220 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9221 for action in actions.iter() {
9222 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9223 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9224 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9226 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9227 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9228 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9229 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9231 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9232 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9233 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9234 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9240 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9242 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9247 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9249 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9250 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9251 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9252 router: args.router,
9254 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9256 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9257 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9258 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9259 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9261 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9262 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9263 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9264 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9265 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9266 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9268 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9273 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9275 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9277 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9278 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9279 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9280 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9281 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9282 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9284 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9285 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9286 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9288 logger: args.logger,
9289 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9292 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9293 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9294 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9295 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9296 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9299 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9300 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9301 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9302 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9303 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9304 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9307 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9308 //connection or two.
9310 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9316 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9317 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9318 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9319 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9320 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9321 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9322 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9323 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9324 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9325 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9326 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9327 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9328 use crate::util::test_utils;
9329 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9330 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9333 fn test_notify_limits() {
9334 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9335 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9339 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9341 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9342 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9343 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9344 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9345 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9347 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9349 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9350 // to connect messages with new values
9351 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9352 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9353 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9354 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9355 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9356 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9358 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9359 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9360 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9361 // ... but the last node should not.
9362 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9363 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9364 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9365 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9367 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9368 // about the channel.
9369 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9370 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9371 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9373 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9375 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9376 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9377 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9378 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9379 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9380 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9382 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9384 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9386 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9387 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9388 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9389 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9390 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9391 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9393 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9394 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9395 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9396 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9397 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9398 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9399 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9402 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9403 // the channel info has updated.
9404 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9405 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9406 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9407 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9408 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9409 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9413 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9414 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9419 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9422 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9423 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9424 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9425 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9427 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9428 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9429 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9430 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9431 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9432 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9433 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9434 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9436 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9438 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9440 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9441 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9442 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9444 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9446 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9447 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9450 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9451 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9452 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9454 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9455 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9456 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9457 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9458 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9459 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9460 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9461 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9462 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9464 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9465 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9466 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9468 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9470 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9472 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9473 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9474 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9475 // lightning messages manually.
9476 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9477 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9480 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9481 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9482 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9483 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9485 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9486 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9488 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9489 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9491 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9492 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9493 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9495 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9496 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9497 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9499 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9501 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9503 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9504 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9507 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9508 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9509 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9512 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9513 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9514 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9515 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9517 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9520 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9521 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9522 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9523 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9525 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9530 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9531 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9532 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9535 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9536 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9537 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9538 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9539 // fails as expected.
9540 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9541 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9542 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9543 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9544 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9545 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9548 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9549 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9551 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9552 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9553 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9554 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9556 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9557 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9558 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9560 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9561 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9562 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9563 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9565 let route = find_route(
9566 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9567 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9569 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9570 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9572 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9574 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9575 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9576 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9578 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9579 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9580 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9581 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9582 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9584 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9585 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9586 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9587 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9588 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9589 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9590 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9591 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9592 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9594 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9595 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9597 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9598 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9599 let route = find_route(
9600 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9601 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9603 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9604 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9606 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9608 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9609 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9610 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9612 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9613 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9614 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9615 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9617 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9619 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9620 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9621 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9623 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9624 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9625 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9627 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9628 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9629 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9630 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9631 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9632 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9633 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9634 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9635 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9637 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9638 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9640 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9641 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9642 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9643 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9645 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9646 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9647 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9648 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9649 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9651 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9652 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9653 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9654 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9656 let route = find_route(
9657 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9658 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9660 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9661 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9662 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9664 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9665 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9666 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9667 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9670 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9671 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9672 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9674 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9675 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9676 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9677 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9678 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9679 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9680 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9682 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9684 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9685 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9689 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9690 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9691 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9695 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9697 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9698 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9700 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9701 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9702 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9703 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9705 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9706 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9707 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9708 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9709 let route = find_route(
9710 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9711 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9714 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9715 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9716 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9717 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9718 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9719 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9722 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9723 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9724 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9725 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9726 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9727 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9728 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9730 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9734 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9735 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9736 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9737 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9738 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9739 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9741 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9742 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9744 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9745 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9747 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9748 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9749 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9750 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9752 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9753 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9754 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9755 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9756 let route = find_route(
9757 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9758 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9761 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9762 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9763 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9764 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9765 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9766 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9767 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9768 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9771 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9772 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9773 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9774 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9775 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9776 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9777 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9779 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9783 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9784 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9785 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9786 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9787 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9789 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9790 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9791 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9792 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9794 // Marshall an MPP route.
9795 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9796 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9797 route.paths.push(path);
9798 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9799 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9800 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9801 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9802 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9803 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9805 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9806 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9808 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9809 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9811 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9816 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9820 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9822 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9824 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9825 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9827 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9828 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9830 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9833 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9834 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9835 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9836 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9837 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9838 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9841 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9844 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9845 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9850 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9851 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9857 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9858 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9860 total_msat: 100_000,
9863 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9864 // payment verification fails as expected.
9865 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9866 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9867 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9868 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9870 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9874 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9875 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9879 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9880 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9881 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9882 // the channel is successfully closed.
9883 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9884 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9885 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9886 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9888 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9889 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9890 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9891 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9892 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9894 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9895 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9897 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9898 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9899 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9900 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9903 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9905 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9906 // as it has the funding transaction.
9907 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9908 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9909 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9912 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9914 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9916 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9918 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9919 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9920 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9922 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9925 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9926 // as it has the funding transaction.
9927 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9928 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9929 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9932 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9933 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9935 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9936 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9937 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9938 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9940 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9941 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9942 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9943 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9945 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9946 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9948 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9949 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9950 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9951 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9952 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9953 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9954 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9958 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9959 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9960 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9961 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9962 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9963 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9964 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9967 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9969 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9970 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9971 // closing transaction).
9972 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9973 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9974 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9976 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9977 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9978 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9979 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9980 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9983 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9985 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9987 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9988 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9989 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9991 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9993 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9994 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9997 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9998 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9999 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10002 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10003 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10004 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10007 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10009 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10010 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10012 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10013 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10015 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10016 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10021 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10022 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10023 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10024 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10025 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10026 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10027 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10028 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10031 let channel_id = [4; 32];
10032 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10033 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10035 // Test the API functions.
10036 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10038 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10040 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10042 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10044 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10046 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10048 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10052 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10053 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10054 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10059 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10061 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10062 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10064 let mut funding_tx = None;
10065 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10066 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10067 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10070 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10071 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10072 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10073 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10074 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10076 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10078 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10080 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10082 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10084 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10086 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10089 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10090 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10091 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10092 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10093 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10095 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10096 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10098 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10099 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10100 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10101 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10102 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10103 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10104 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10107 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10108 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10109 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10110 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10111 }, true).unwrap_err();
10113 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10114 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10115 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10116 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10117 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10118 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10119 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10121 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10122 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10124 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10125 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10126 }, true).unwrap_err();
10128 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10129 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10130 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10131 }, false).unwrap();
10132 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10134 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10135 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10137 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10138 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10139 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10140 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10141 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10143 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10144 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10145 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10147 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10148 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10149 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10151 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10152 // "protected" and can connect again.
10153 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10154 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10155 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10157 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10159 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10162 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10166 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10167 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10168 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10170 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10171 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10173 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10175 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10176 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10178 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10179 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10180 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10181 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10184 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10186 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10187 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10188 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10190 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10191 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10192 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10194 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10195 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10196 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10197 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10201 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10202 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10203 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10206 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10207 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10211 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10213 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10214 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10216 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10217 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10218 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10219 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10220 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10221 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10224 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10225 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10227 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10228 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10232 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10233 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10236 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10237 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10238 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10239 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10240 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10242 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10243 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10245 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10246 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10247 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10248 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10254 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10255 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10257 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10258 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10259 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10261 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10262 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10266 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10270 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10271 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10272 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10273 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10274 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10275 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10276 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10277 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10279 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10280 payment_metadata: None,
10281 keysend_preimage: None,
10282 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10283 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10285 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10287 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10288 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10289 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10290 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10291 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10293 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10294 } else { panic!(); }
10296 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10297 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10299 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10300 payment_metadata: None,
10301 keysend_preimage: None,
10302 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10303 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10305 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10307 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10308 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10312 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10313 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10314 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10315 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10316 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10318 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10319 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10324 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10325 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10327 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10328 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10330 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10331 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10332 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10333 match &msg_events[0] {
10334 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10335 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10337 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10338 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10339 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10345 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10346 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10348 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10349 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10352 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10356 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10357 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10358 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10359 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10362 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10363 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10364 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10366 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10368 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10369 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10370 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10372 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10373 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10375 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10376 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10381 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10382 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10384 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10385 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10387 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10388 // not have generated any events.
10389 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10393 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10394 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10395 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10396 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10397 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10399 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10400 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10402 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10403 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10406 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10407 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10408 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10409 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10410 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10412 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10413 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10416 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10417 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10420 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10421 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10422 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10423 ..Default::default()
10425 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10426 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10429 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10430 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10433 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10434 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10435 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10436 ..Default::default()
10438 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10439 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10440 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10441 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10443 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10444 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10447 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10448 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10449 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10450 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10451 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10454 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10455 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10456 ..Default::default()
10458 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10461 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10462 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10463 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10464 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10470 use crate::chain::Listen;
10471 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10472 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10473 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10474 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10475 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10476 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10477 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10478 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10479 use crate::util::test_utils;
10480 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10482 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10483 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10484 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10486 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10488 use criterion::Criterion;
10490 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10491 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10492 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10493 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10494 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10495 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10496 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10498 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10499 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10501 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10502 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10504 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10506 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10509 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10510 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10513 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10514 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10515 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10517 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10518 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10520 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10521 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10522 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10523 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10524 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10526 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10527 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10528 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10530 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10531 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10532 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10533 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10535 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10536 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10537 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10539 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10540 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10541 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10542 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10543 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10545 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10546 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10547 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10549 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10550 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10552 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10553 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10554 }, false).unwrap();
10555 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10556 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10557 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10560 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10561 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10562 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10564 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10565 } else { panic!(); }
10567 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10568 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10569 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10570 match events_b[0] {
10571 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10572 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10577 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10578 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10579 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10580 match events_a[0] {
10581 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10582 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10587 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10589 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10590 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10591 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10593 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10594 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10595 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10596 match msg_events[0] {
10597 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10598 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10599 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10603 match msg_events[1] {
10604 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10608 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10609 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10610 match events_a[0] {
10611 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10612 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10617 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10618 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10619 match events_b[0] {
10620 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10621 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10626 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10627 macro_rules! send_payment {
10628 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10629 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10630 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10631 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10632 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10633 payment_count += 1;
10634 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10635 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10637 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10638 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10639 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10640 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10641 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10642 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10643 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10644 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10645 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10646 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10647 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10650 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10651 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10652 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10654 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10655 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10656 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10657 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10658 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10660 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10663 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10664 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10665 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10666 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10668 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10672 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10673 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10674 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);