1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
77 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
78 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
79 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
80 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
81 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::logger::Logger;
87 use core::convert::TryInto;
90 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
91 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
93 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
94 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
95 // retrieve said payment type bits.
96 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
98 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
99 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
102 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
103 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
104 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
105 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
106 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
107 /// registered with LDK.
108 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
109 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
110 /// registered with LDK.
111 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
115 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
116 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
126 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
128 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
129 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
130 unknown => Err(unknown),
135 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
136 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
138 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
140 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
141 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
142 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
144 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
145 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
146 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
147 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
149 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
150 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
151 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
154 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
155 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
157 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
158 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
159 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
160 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
162 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
163 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
165 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
168 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
169 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
173 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
174 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
175 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
177 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
179 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
180 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
181 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
182 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
183 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
184 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
186 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
187 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
188 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
193 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
194 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
195 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
196 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
198 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
199 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
200 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
202 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
205 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
207 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
208 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
211 /// The metadata is constructed as:
212 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
213 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
215 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
216 /// match what was constructed.
218 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
219 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
220 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
221 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
223 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
224 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
225 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
228 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
229 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
230 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
232 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
234 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
235 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
236 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
237 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
238 where L::Target: Logger
240 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
241 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_data.payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
242 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
244 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
245 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
246 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
247 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
250 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
251 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
252 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
253 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
254 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
255 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
256 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
258 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
260 let mut payment_preimage = None;
261 match payment_type_res {
262 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
263 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
264 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
265 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
266 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
267 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
271 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
272 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
273 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
274 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
275 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
276 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
277 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: payment preimage {} did not match", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(decoded_payment_preimage));
280 payment_preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage));
282 Err(unknown_bits) => {
283 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
288 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
289 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
293 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
294 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
301 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
302 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
304 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
305 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
307 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
309 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
310 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
312 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
314 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
315 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
317 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
327 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
329 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
330 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
331 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
333 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
334 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
335 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
336 // before we forward it.
338 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
339 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
340 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
341 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
342 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
344 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
345 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
347 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
348 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
351 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
352 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
355 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
356 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
362 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
363 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
364 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
365 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
366 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
369 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
370 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
371 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
372 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
375 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
376 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
377 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
378 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
379 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
382 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
384 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
386 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
387 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
388 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
390 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
392 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
396 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
400 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
401 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
402 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
403 short_channel_id: u64,
405 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
407 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
408 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
413 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
414 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
415 /// are part of the same payment.
416 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
417 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
418 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
421 struct ClaimableHTLC {
422 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
425 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
428 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
429 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
430 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
431 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
433 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
434 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
439 impl Readable for PaymentId {
440 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
441 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
445 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
446 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
447 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
448 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
449 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
452 session_priv: SecretKey,
453 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
454 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
455 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
456 payment_id: PaymentId,
457 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
458 payee: Option<Payee>,
461 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
462 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
463 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
465 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
467 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
469 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
472 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
473 payment_id.hash(hasher);
474 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
475 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
483 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
484 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
486 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
487 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
488 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
489 payment_secret: None,
495 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
496 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
498 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
506 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
507 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
509 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
514 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
516 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
517 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
518 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
519 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
520 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
522 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
523 err: msgs::LightningError,
524 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
525 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
527 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
529 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
531 err: LightningError {
533 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
534 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
541 shutdown_finish: None,
545 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
547 err: LightningError {
549 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
552 shutdown_finish: None,
556 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
557 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
560 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
562 err: LightningError {
564 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
565 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
571 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
572 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
576 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
579 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
581 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
583 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
585 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
587 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
590 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
596 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
598 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
599 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
607 shutdown_finish: None,
612 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
613 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
614 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
615 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
616 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
618 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
619 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
620 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
621 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
622 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
623 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
624 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
626 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
630 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
631 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
632 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
633 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
634 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
635 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
636 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
637 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
638 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
639 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
640 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
641 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
643 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
644 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
645 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
646 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
649 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
650 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
651 /// quite some time lag.
652 enum BackgroundEvent {
653 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
654 /// commitment transaction.
655 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
658 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
659 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
661 latest_features: InitFeatures,
664 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
665 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
667 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
670 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
671 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
672 struct PendingInboundPayment {
673 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
674 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
675 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
676 /// this payment being removed.
678 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
679 user_payment_id: u64,
680 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
681 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
682 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
685 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
686 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
687 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
689 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
692 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
693 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
694 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
695 pending_amt_msat: u64,
696 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
697 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
698 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
700 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
701 starting_block_height: u32,
703 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
704 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
705 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
707 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
708 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
710 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
711 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
712 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
713 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
714 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
716 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
718 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
719 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
723 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
724 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
726 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
730 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
732 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
736 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
738 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
742 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
744 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
749 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
751 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
752 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
753 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
754 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
758 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
759 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
760 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
761 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
762 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
763 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
764 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
767 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
768 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
771 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
772 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
773 let our_payment_hash;
774 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
775 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
776 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
778 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
779 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
780 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
784 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
788 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
789 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
790 let remove_res = match self {
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
795 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
799 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
800 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
801 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
802 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
803 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
804 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
811 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
812 let insert_res = match self {
813 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
815 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
817 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
818 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
821 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
822 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
823 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
824 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
825 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
832 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
835 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
836 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
837 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
844 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
845 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
846 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
847 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
848 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
849 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
850 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
851 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
853 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
854 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
855 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
856 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
857 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
858 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
859 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
860 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
861 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
863 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
864 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
866 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
867 /// to individual Channels.
869 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
870 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
871 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
872 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
874 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
875 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
876 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
877 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
878 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
879 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
880 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
882 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
883 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
884 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
885 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
888 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
889 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
890 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
891 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
892 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
894 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
895 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
896 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
897 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
898 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
899 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
900 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
901 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
902 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
903 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
906 default_configuration: UserConfig,
907 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
913 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
915 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
916 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
918 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
919 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
920 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
921 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
923 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
924 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
925 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
926 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
927 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
928 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
930 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
931 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
932 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
933 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
934 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
935 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
936 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
937 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
939 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
941 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
942 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
944 our_network_key: SecretKey,
945 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
947 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
949 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
950 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
951 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
953 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
954 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
955 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
956 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
958 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
959 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
960 /// are currently open with that peer.
961 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
962 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
965 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
966 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
968 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
969 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
970 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
971 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
972 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
973 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
974 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
975 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
976 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
978 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
985 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
987 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
988 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
989 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
990 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
991 pub struct ChainParameters {
992 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
993 pub network: Network,
995 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
997 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
998 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1001 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1007 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1008 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1009 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1010 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1011 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1012 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1014 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1015 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1016 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1017 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1018 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1020 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1021 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1024 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1025 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1026 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1029 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1030 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1032 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1033 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1034 should_persist: persist_check,
1035 _read_guard: read_guard,
1040 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1041 fn drop(&mut self) {
1042 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1043 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1048 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1049 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1051 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1053 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1054 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1055 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1056 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1057 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1059 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1060 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1062 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1064 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1065 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1066 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1067 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1068 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1069 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1070 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1072 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1073 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1075 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1076 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1077 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1078 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1080 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1081 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1082 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1083 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1084 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1085 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1088 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1090 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1091 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1094 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1096 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1097 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1098 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1100 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1101 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1102 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1103 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1104 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1105 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1106 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1107 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1108 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1109 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1110 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1113 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1114 /// to better separate parameters.
1115 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1116 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1117 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1118 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1119 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1120 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1121 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1122 pub features: InitFeatures,
1123 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1124 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1125 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1127 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1129 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1130 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1131 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1132 /// payments to us through this channel.
1133 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1136 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1138 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1139 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1140 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1141 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1142 /// lifetime of the channel.
1143 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1144 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1145 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1146 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1147 /// our counterparty already.
1149 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1150 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1151 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1152 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1153 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1154 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1155 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1156 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1157 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1158 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1159 /// this value on chain.
1161 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1163 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1165 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1166 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1167 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1168 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1169 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1170 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1171 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1173 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1174 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1175 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1176 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1178 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1179 pub balance_msat: u64,
1180 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1181 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1182 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1183 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1185 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1187 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1188 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1189 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1190 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1191 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1192 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1193 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1194 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1195 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1197 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1198 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1199 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1200 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1201 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1202 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1203 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1204 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1205 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1207 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1209 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1210 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1211 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1212 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1213 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1214 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1215 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1216 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1217 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1219 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1220 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1221 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1222 pub is_outbound: bool,
1223 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1224 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1225 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1226 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1227 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1229 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1230 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1231 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1232 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1234 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1235 pub is_usable: bool,
1236 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1237 pub is_public: bool,
1240 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1241 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1242 /// states for more.
1243 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1244 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1245 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1246 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1247 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1248 ParameterError(APIError),
1249 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1250 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1251 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1252 /// payment in full.
1254 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1256 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1257 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1258 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1259 /// paths than the ones selected).
1260 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1261 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1262 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1263 /// in over-/re-payment.
1265 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1266 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1267 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1269 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1270 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1271 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1272 /// with the latest update_id.
1274 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1275 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1276 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1277 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1278 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1279 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1280 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1281 payment_id: PaymentId,
1285 macro_rules! handle_error {
1286 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1289 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1290 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1292 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1293 // entering the macro.
1294 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1295 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1298 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1300 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1301 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1302 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1303 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1307 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1308 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1309 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1310 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1315 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1316 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1318 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1319 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1320 action: err.action.clone()
1324 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1325 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1328 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1335 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1336 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1337 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1339 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1340 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1342 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1344 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1345 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1347 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1348 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1349 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1350 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1352 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1353 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1354 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1356 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1357 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1358 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1359 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1361 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1362 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1363 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1369 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1370 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1374 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1376 $entry.remove_entry();
1384 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1385 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1389 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1391 $entry.remove_entry();
1399 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1400 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1402 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1403 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1404 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1411 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1412 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1413 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1415 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1417 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1418 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1419 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1420 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1422 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1423 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1424 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1425 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1426 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1427 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1428 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1429 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1430 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1431 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1432 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1435 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1436 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1437 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1438 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1439 match $action_type {
1440 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1441 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1443 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1444 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1446 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1447 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1448 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1449 if !$resend_commitment {
1450 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1453 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1455 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1456 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1460 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1461 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1463 $entry.remove_entry();
1467 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1468 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1472 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1473 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1474 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1476 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1477 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1481 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1482 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1483 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1484 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1485 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1488 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1493 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1494 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1495 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1496 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1497 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1498 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1500 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1501 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1503 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1504 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1505 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1506 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1509 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1510 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1511 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1512 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1513 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1514 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1515 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1516 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1517 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1518 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1519 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1520 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1523 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1524 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1525 // before it should be allowed to.
1526 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1527 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1528 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1531 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1532 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1533 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1534 msg: announcement_sigs,
1537 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1540 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1541 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1542 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1543 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1544 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1545 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1546 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1547 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1548 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1549 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1550 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1551 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1552 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1553 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1554 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1555 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1556 let mut order = $order;
1558 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1560 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1564 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1565 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1566 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1567 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1572 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1573 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1574 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1575 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1576 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1581 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1585 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1590 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1591 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1592 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1597 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1598 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1599 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1600 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1601 assert!(res.is_ok());
1604 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1608 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1609 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1610 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1612 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1614 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1615 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1620 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1621 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1622 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1623 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1624 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1627 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1629 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1630 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1632 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1634 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1636 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1637 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1638 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1639 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1640 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1641 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1642 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1643 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1645 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1646 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1647 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1651 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1653 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1654 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1655 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1656 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1657 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1658 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1660 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1661 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1663 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1664 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1667 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1669 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1670 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1672 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1674 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1675 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1676 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1677 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1685 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1686 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1687 &self.default_configuration
1690 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1692 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1693 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1694 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1695 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1696 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1699 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1700 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1702 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1703 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1704 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1706 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1707 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1708 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1709 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1710 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1711 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1713 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1714 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1715 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1716 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1717 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1718 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1723 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1724 Some(peer_state) => {
1725 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1726 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1727 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1728 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1729 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1731 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1734 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1737 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1738 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1740 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1741 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1742 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1744 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1745 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1747 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1752 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1753 node_id: their_network_key,
1756 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1759 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1760 let mut res = Vec::new();
1762 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1763 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1764 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1765 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1766 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1767 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1768 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1769 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1770 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1771 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1772 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1773 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1774 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1775 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1777 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1778 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1779 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1780 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1782 inbound_capacity_msat,
1783 outbound_capacity_msat,
1784 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1785 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1786 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1787 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1788 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1789 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1790 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1795 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1796 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1797 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1803 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1804 /// more information.
1805 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1806 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1809 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1810 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1812 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1813 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1815 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1816 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1817 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1818 // really wanted anyway.
1819 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1822 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1823 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1824 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1825 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1826 Some(transaction) => {
1827 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1831 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1832 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1833 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1834 reason: closure_reason
1838 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1841 let counterparty_node_id;
1842 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1843 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1844 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1845 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1846 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1848 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1849 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1850 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1851 Some(peer_state) => {
1852 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1853 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1854 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1856 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1858 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1860 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1861 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1862 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1863 let (result, is_permanent) =
1864 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1866 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1873 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1877 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1878 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1879 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1884 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1892 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1896 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1900 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1901 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1902 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1904 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1905 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1907 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1908 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1909 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1910 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1912 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1914 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1915 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1916 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1917 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1918 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1921 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1922 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1923 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1925 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1926 /// the channel being closed or not:
1927 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1928 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1929 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1930 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1931 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1932 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1933 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1935 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1937 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1938 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1939 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1940 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1941 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1945 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1946 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1947 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1948 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1951 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1952 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1953 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1954 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1955 // ignore the result here.
1956 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1960 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1961 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1962 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1964 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1965 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1966 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1967 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1968 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1969 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1972 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1973 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1975 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1976 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1977 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1980 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1982 chan.remove_entry().1
1984 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1987 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1988 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1989 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1990 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1991 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1996 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1999 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2000 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2001 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2003 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2004 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2005 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2006 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2007 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2008 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2009 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2019 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2020 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2021 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2022 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2023 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2027 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2028 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2029 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2031 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2032 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2033 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2034 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2035 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2036 failure_code: $err_code,
2037 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2042 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2043 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2046 let shared_secret = {
2047 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2048 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2051 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2053 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2054 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2055 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2056 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2057 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2058 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2059 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2060 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2063 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2064 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2065 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2066 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2067 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2070 let mut channel_state = None;
2071 macro_rules! return_err {
2072 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2074 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2075 if channel_state.is_none() {
2076 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2078 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2079 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2080 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2081 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2082 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2087 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2088 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2089 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2090 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2092 let error_code = match err {
2093 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2094 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2095 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2096 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2097 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2099 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2102 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2103 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2104 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2111 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2114 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2115 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2116 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2117 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2118 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2119 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2120 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2121 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2122 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2123 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2124 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2125 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2129 // final_expiry_too_soon
2130 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2131 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2132 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2133 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2134 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2135 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2136 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2138 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2139 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2140 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2142 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2143 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2144 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2147 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2148 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2149 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2150 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2151 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2152 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2153 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2154 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2156 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2158 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2159 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2160 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2161 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2162 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2163 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2164 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2165 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2166 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2169 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2171 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2174 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2179 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2180 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2181 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2182 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2184 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2186 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2187 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2188 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2189 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2192 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2193 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2194 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2196 // Check two things:
2197 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2198 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2199 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2201 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2203 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2204 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2205 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2207 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2209 let blinding_factor = {
2210 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2211 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2212 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2213 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2216 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2218 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2220 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2223 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2224 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2227 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2228 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2229 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2230 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2231 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2235 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2236 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2237 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2240 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2241 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2242 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2243 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2247 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2248 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2249 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2250 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2251 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2252 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2253 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2254 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2255 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2256 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2257 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2259 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2262 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2264 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2265 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2266 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2267 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2268 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2271 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2272 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2273 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2274 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2275 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2276 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2277 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2279 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2280 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2282 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2283 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2284 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2285 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2286 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2288 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2289 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2291 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2292 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2293 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2294 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2295 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2296 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2298 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2299 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2301 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2302 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2303 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2304 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2305 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2306 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2307 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2308 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2309 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2310 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2316 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2317 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2318 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2319 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2321 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2322 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2324 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2325 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2326 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2328 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2330 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2335 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2338 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2339 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2340 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2342 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2343 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2344 if !chan.should_announce() {
2345 return Err(LightningError {
2346 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2347 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2351 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2354 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2355 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2356 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2357 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2358 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2359 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2361 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2362 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2366 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2368 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2369 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2371 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2372 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2373 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2374 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2375 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2376 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2377 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2378 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2381 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2382 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2384 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2390 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2391 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2393 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2394 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2395 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2397 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2398 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2399 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2400 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2401 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2403 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2407 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2408 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2410 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2411 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2412 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2413 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2414 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2415 err: "Payment already completed"
2420 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2421 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2422 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2425 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2427 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2428 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2429 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2430 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2431 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2432 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2433 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2434 total_msat: total_value,
2436 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2440 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2441 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2443 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2444 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2446 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2447 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2449 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2450 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2452 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2453 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2455 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2456 payee: payee.clone(),
2457 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2458 channel_state, chan)
2460 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2461 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2462 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2463 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2464 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2465 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2466 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2467 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2468 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2469 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2471 insert_outbound_payment!();
2473 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2474 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2475 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2476 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2477 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2478 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2479 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2480 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2486 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2488 } else { unreachable!(); }
2492 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2493 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2495 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2500 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2502 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2503 /// fields for more info.
2505 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2506 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2507 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2508 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2509 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2510 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2512 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2514 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2515 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2516 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2518 /// In general, a path may raise:
2519 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2520 /// node public key) is specified.
2521 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2522 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2524 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2525 /// relevant updates.
2527 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2528 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2529 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2531 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2532 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2533 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2534 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2536 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2537 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2538 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2539 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2540 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2543 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2544 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2545 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2547 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2548 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2549 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2550 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2551 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2553 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2554 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2556 let mut total_value = 0;
2557 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2558 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2559 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2560 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2561 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2562 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2563 continue 'path_check;
2565 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2566 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2567 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2568 continue 'path_check;
2571 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2572 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2574 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2575 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2577 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2578 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2579 total_value = amt_msat;
2582 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2583 let mut results = Vec::new();
2584 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2585 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2587 let mut has_ok = false;
2588 let mut has_err = false;
2589 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2590 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2591 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2592 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2593 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2594 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2595 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2599 } else if res.is_err() {
2600 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2601 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2604 if has_err && has_ok {
2605 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2608 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2609 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2610 Some(RouteParameters {
2611 payee: payee.clone(),
2612 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2613 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2619 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2620 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2621 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2622 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2628 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2630 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2631 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2632 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2633 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2634 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2636 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2637 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2638 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2639 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2640 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2641 if path.len() == 0 {
2642 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2643 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2648 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2649 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2650 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2652 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2653 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2655 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2656 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2657 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2658 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2661 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2663 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2664 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2665 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2668 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2669 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2670 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2673 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2674 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2675 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2680 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2681 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2685 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2688 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2690 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2691 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2692 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2693 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2695 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2696 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2697 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2699 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2700 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2701 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2702 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2705 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2706 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2707 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2708 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2709 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2711 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2719 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2720 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2721 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2722 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2723 /// never reach the recipient.
2725 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2727 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2728 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2730 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2732 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2733 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2734 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2736 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2738 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2739 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2740 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2745 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2746 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2747 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2748 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2750 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2752 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2754 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2755 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2756 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2757 } else { unreachable!(); })
2760 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2762 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2763 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2766 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2767 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2772 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2773 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2774 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2779 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2789 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2790 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2791 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2795 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2797 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2798 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2800 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2801 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2803 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2804 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2805 /// keys per-channel).
2807 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2808 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2809 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2811 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2812 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2813 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2815 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2816 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2817 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2820 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2821 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2822 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2823 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2827 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2828 let mut output_index = None;
2829 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2830 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2831 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2832 if output_index.is_some() {
2833 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2834 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2837 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2838 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2839 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2842 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2845 if output_index.is_none() {
2846 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2847 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2850 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2854 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2855 if !chan.should_announce() {
2856 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2860 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2862 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2864 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2865 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2867 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2868 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2869 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2870 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2871 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2876 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2877 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2878 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2880 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2883 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2884 // smaller than 500:
2885 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2887 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2888 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2889 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2890 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2891 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2892 /// our network addresses.
2894 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2895 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2897 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2898 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2899 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2900 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2902 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2904 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2905 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2908 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2909 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2912 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2913 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2914 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2916 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2917 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2918 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2919 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2920 rgb, alias, addresses,
2921 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2922 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2924 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2925 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2927 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2928 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2930 let mut announced_chans = false;
2931 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2932 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2935 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2940 announced_chans = true;
2942 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2943 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2944 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2948 if announced_chans {
2949 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2950 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2951 signature: node_announce_sig,
2952 contents: announcement
2958 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2960 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2961 /// Will likely generate further events.
2962 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2965 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2966 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2967 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2969 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2972 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2973 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2974 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2975 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2977 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2978 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2979 match forward_info {
2980 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2981 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2982 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2983 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2984 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2985 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2986 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2988 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2989 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2992 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2993 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2994 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2995 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2996 // problem, not ours.
3003 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3004 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3005 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3006 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3007 match forward_info {
3008 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3009 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3011 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3012 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3014 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3015 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3016 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3017 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3018 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3020 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3022 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3025 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3027 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3028 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3029 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3035 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3037 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3038 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3039 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3040 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3041 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3042 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3043 // this channel currently :/.
3049 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3050 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3052 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3054 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3056 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3057 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3059 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3061 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3062 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3063 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3066 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3068 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3069 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3070 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3071 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3072 // messages when we can.
3073 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3074 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3075 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3082 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3083 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3086 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3087 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3088 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3089 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3090 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3091 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3093 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3095 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3096 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3097 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3099 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3100 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3102 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3104 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3108 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3109 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3112 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3113 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3114 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3115 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3116 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3117 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3118 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3119 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3120 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3122 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3130 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3131 match forward_info {
3132 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3133 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3134 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3135 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3136 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3137 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3138 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3139 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3141 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3144 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3145 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3146 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3147 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3148 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3151 value: amt_to_forward,
3156 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3158 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3159 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3160 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3162 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3163 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3164 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3165 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3166 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3168 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3173 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3174 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3175 let mut total_value = 0;
3176 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3177 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3178 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3179 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3180 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3182 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3186 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3187 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3188 total_value += htlc.value;
3189 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3190 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3191 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3193 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3194 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3196 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3198 _ => unreachable!(),
3201 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3202 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3203 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3204 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3207 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3208 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3210 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3211 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3212 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3216 payment_received_generated = true;
3218 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3219 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3222 payment_received_generated
3226 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3227 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3228 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3229 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3230 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3231 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3232 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3233 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3235 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3236 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3237 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3238 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3240 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3244 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3245 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3246 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3248 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3249 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3251 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3252 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3254 amt: amt_to_forward,
3255 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3260 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3268 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3272 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3275 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3277 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3278 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3279 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3280 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3281 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3283 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3284 if payment_received_generated {
3285 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3291 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3292 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3300 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3301 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3304 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3305 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3308 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3309 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3310 events.append(&mut new_events);
3313 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3315 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3316 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3318 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3319 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3320 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3321 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3322 if background_events.is_empty() {
3326 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3328 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3329 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3330 // monitor updating completing.
3331 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3338 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3339 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3340 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3341 self.process_background_events();
3344 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3345 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3346 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3347 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3349 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3350 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3352 if !chan.is_live() {
3353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3354 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3355 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3358 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3360 let mut retain_channel = true;
3361 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3364 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3365 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3369 let ret_err = match res {
3370 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3371 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3372 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3373 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3376 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3377 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3378 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3379 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3380 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3381 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3382 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3383 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3393 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3397 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3398 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3399 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3400 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3401 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3402 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3403 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3405 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3407 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3409 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3410 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3411 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3412 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3413 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3414 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3415 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3417 handle_errors.push(err);
3427 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3429 /// This currently includes:
3430 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3431 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3432 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3435 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3436 /// estimate fetches.
3437 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3438 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3439 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3440 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3442 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3444 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3446 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3447 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3448 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3449 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3450 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3451 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3452 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3453 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3455 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3457 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3459 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3460 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3461 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3462 if needs_close { return false; }
3465 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3466 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3467 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3468 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3469 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3470 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3471 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3472 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3476 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3477 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3479 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3480 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3481 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3485 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3486 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3495 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3496 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3502 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3503 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3504 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3505 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3506 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3507 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3510 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3511 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3512 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3513 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3514 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3515 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3516 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3517 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3518 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3519 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3520 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3526 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3527 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3528 // be surfaced to the user.
3529 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3530 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3532 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3533 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3534 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3536 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3537 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3539 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3544 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3545 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3546 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3548 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3549 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3550 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3551 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3552 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3553 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3554 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3555 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3556 Some(RouteParameters {
3558 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3559 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3562 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3563 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3564 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3566 rejected_by_dest: false,
3567 network_update: None,
3568 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3570 short_channel_id: None,
3577 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3578 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3580 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3586 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3593 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3594 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3595 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3596 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3597 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3598 /// still-available channels.
3599 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3600 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3601 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3602 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3605 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3606 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3607 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3609 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3610 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3611 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3612 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3613 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3614 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3615 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3616 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3617 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3620 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3624 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3625 all_paths_failed = true;
3626 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3627 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3629 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3638 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3639 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3640 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3641 Some(RouteParameters {
3642 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3643 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3644 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3647 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3649 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3650 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3652 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3654 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3655 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3656 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3657 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3658 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3659 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3660 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3661 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3668 error_code: onion_error_code,
3670 error_data: onion_error_data
3673 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3679 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3680 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3681 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3682 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3684 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3685 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3686 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3687 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3688 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3689 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3690 network_update: None,
3693 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3696 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3698 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3702 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3703 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3704 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3706 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3707 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3708 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3710 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3711 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3713 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3714 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3715 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3719 let mut forward_event = None;
3720 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3721 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3723 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3724 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3725 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3728 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3731 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3732 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3733 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3734 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3735 time_forwardable: time
3742 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3743 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3745 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3746 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3747 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3748 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3750 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3751 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3753 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3754 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3755 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3756 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3757 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3758 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3762 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3763 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3764 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3765 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3767 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3768 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3769 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3770 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3772 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3773 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3774 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3775 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3776 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3778 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3779 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3780 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3786 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3787 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3788 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3790 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3791 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3792 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3793 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3795 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3796 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3798 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3799 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3800 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3801 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3802 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3803 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3804 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3805 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3807 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3808 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3809 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3810 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3811 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3812 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3814 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3819 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3820 // which were generated.
3821 channel_state.take();
3823 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3824 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3825 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3832 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3833 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3834 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3835 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3836 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3838 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3842 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3843 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3844 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3845 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3846 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3847 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3848 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3849 payment_preimage, e);
3850 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3851 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3852 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3853 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3856 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3857 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3858 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3860 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3861 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3862 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3863 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3864 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3865 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3871 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3873 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3876 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3877 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3878 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3879 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3880 payment_preimage, e);
3882 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3883 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3885 chan.remove_entry();
3887 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3890 } else { unreachable!(); }
3893 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3894 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3895 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3896 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3897 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3898 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3899 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3900 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3901 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3902 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3903 pending_events.push(
3904 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3906 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3911 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3919 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3921 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3922 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3923 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3924 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3925 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3926 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3927 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3928 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3929 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3930 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3931 pending_events.push(
3932 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3933 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3939 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3943 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3944 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3945 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3947 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3948 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3949 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3950 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3951 pending_events.push(
3952 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3960 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3965 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3968 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3969 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3970 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3971 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3972 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3973 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3974 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3977 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3978 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3979 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3980 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3981 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3984 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3985 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3986 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3987 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3988 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3989 payment_preimage, e);
3991 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3992 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3993 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3994 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3997 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3998 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3999 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4000 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4004 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4005 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4006 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4009 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4010 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4012 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4020 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4021 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4022 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4025 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4028 let chan_restoration_res;
4029 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4030 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4031 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4032 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4036 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4040 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
4041 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
4042 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4043 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
4044 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
4045 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
4046 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4047 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4048 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4051 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
4052 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4053 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4055 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4057 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4058 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4059 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4060 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4064 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4065 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4066 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4069 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4073 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4074 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4075 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4076 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4077 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4078 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4082 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4083 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4085 entry.insert(channel);
4091 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4092 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4094 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4095 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4097 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4100 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4101 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4106 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4107 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4108 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4109 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4111 user_channel_id: user_id,
4116 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4117 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4118 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4119 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4120 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4121 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4123 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4124 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4126 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4131 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4132 // lock before watch_channel
4133 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4135 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4136 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4137 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4138 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4139 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4140 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4141 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4142 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4143 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4144 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4147 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4148 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4149 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4150 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4151 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4152 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4156 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4157 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4158 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4163 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4164 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4173 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4175 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4176 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4177 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4178 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4180 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4183 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4184 Ok(update) => update,
4185 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4187 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4188 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4189 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4190 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4191 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4192 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4193 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4194 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4204 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4205 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4209 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4210 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4211 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4212 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4214 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4215 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4217 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4218 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
4219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4220 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
4221 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
4222 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
4223 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
4224 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
4225 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
4226 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
4227 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
4228 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
4229 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4230 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4231 msg: announcement_sigs,
4233 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4234 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4235 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4236 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4245 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4246 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4247 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4248 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4249 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4251 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4253 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4257 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4258 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4259 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4260 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4263 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4264 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4266 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4267 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4268 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4269 let (result, is_permanent) =
4270 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4272 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4278 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4279 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4280 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4290 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4291 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4294 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4298 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4299 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4300 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4301 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4302 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4304 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4305 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4307 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4308 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4309 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4310 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4315 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4316 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4317 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4318 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4319 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4320 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4321 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4323 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4324 } else { (tx, None) }
4326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4329 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4330 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4331 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4333 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4334 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4335 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4336 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4340 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4345 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4346 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4347 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4348 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4350 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4351 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4352 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4353 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4355 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4356 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4358 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4360 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4361 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4364 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4365 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4366 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4367 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4368 match pending_forward_info {
4369 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4370 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4371 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4372 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4373 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4374 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4375 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4376 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4380 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4381 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4382 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4383 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4384 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4385 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4386 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4387 // no problem just calling this
4388 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4389 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4392 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4394 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4395 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4396 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4399 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4401 _ => pending_forward_info
4404 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4411 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4412 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4413 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4414 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4417 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4418 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4420 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4425 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4429 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4430 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4434 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4437 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4444 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4445 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4446 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4447 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4449 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4450 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4452 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4453 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4454 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4456 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4463 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4464 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4465 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4466 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4468 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4471 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4472 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4473 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4474 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4475 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4476 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4477 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4482 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4483 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4485 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4486 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4487 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4489 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4491 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4492 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4493 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4494 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4495 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4496 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4498 commitment_signed: msg,
4504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4509 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4510 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4511 let mut forward_event = None;
4512 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4513 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4514 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4515 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4517 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4518 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4519 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4520 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4521 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4524 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4525 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4528 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4529 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4534 match forward_event {
4536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4537 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4538 time_forwardable: time
4546 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4547 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4549 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4550 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4551 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4553 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4554 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4556 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4557 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4558 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4559 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4560 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4561 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4562 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4563 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4564 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4565 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4566 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4568 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4569 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4570 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4571 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4572 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4574 } else { unreachable!(); }
4577 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4578 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4579 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4583 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4584 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4585 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4586 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4587 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4592 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4594 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4595 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4597 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4600 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4601 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4608 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4609 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4610 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4611 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4616 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4623 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4624 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4629 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4632 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4633 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4636 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4637 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4638 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4639 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4640 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4648 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4649 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4650 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4651 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4652 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4653 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4655 // It's not a local channel
4656 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4661 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4662 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4663 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4664 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4665 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4666 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4668 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4670 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4671 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4672 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4673 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4675 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4680 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4683 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4684 let chan_restoration_res;
4685 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4686 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4687 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4691 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4694 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4695 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4696 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4697 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4698 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4699 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4700 let mut channel_update = None;
4701 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4702 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4703 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4706 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4707 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4708 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4709 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4710 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4711 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4712 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4715 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4716 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4717 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4718 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4720 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4725 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4726 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4728 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4729 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4734 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4735 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4736 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4737 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4738 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4739 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4740 match monitor_event {
4741 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4742 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4744 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4747 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4750 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4751 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4752 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4753 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4754 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4755 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4756 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4757 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4758 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4759 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4761 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4762 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4767 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4768 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4770 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4772 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4774 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4775 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4776 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4781 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4782 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4787 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4788 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4791 has_pending_monitor_events
4794 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4795 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4796 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4797 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4798 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4799 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4802 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4803 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4804 /// update was applied.
4806 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4807 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4808 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4809 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4810 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4811 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4812 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4813 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4815 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4816 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4817 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4818 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4819 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4821 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4822 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4823 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4824 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4825 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4827 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4828 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4829 has_monitor_update = true;
4830 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4831 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4832 if close_channel { return false; }
4834 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4835 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4836 updates: commitment_update,
4843 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4844 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4845 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4852 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4853 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4854 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4857 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4858 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4864 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4865 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4866 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4867 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4868 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4869 let mut has_update = false;
4871 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4872 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4873 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4874 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4875 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4877 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4878 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4879 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4880 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4882 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4883 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4886 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4887 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4888 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4889 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4890 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4893 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4894 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4899 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4901 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4902 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4908 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4909 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4916 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4917 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4923 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4924 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4926 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4927 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4928 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4929 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4930 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4931 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4932 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4933 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4934 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4935 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4936 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4937 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4938 assert!(should_broadcast);
4939 } else { unreachable!(); }
4940 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4942 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4946 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4947 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4949 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4953 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4956 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4957 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4959 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4960 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4961 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4962 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4963 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4964 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4965 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4966 // never fail a payment too early.
4967 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4969 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4977 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4980 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4981 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
4983 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4984 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4985 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4987 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4989 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
4990 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
4994 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
4995 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
4997 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
4999 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5000 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5001 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5002 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5003 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5004 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5007 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5008 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5011 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5013 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5015 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5016 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5017 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5018 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5019 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5022 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5023 /// stored external to LDK.
5025 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5026 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5027 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5029 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5030 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5033 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5034 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5035 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5036 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5038 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5039 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5040 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5041 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5042 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5044 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5045 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5046 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5047 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5048 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5050 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5052 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5053 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5055 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5056 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5060 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5061 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5063 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5065 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5066 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5067 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5068 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5071 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5072 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5075 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5077 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5079 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5080 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5083 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5084 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5085 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5086 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5087 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5092 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5093 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5097 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5098 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5102 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5103 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5104 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5105 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5106 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5109 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5110 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5111 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5112 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5114 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5115 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5116 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5117 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5120 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5121 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5123 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5124 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5127 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5128 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5129 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5131 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5132 events.replace(pending_events);
5141 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5143 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5145 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5149 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5151 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5152 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5154 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5155 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5156 /// restarting from an old state.
5157 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5158 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5159 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5161 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5162 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5163 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5164 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5167 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5168 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5169 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5172 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5173 handler.handle_event(&event);
5181 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5183 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5185 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5189 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5191 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5192 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5193 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5194 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5195 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5198 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5199 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5200 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5203 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5205 let new_height = height - 1;
5207 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5208 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5209 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5210 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5211 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5212 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5215 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
5219 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5221 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5223 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5224 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5227 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5228 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5229 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5230 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5232 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5233 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5236 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
5239 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5240 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5241 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5242 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5244 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5245 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5249 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5251 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
5253 macro_rules! max_time {
5254 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5256 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5257 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5258 // having an explicit local time source.
5259 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5260 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5261 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5262 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5263 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5269 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5270 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5271 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5272 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5273 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5276 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5277 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5278 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5279 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5280 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5281 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5282 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5283 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5284 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5292 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5293 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5294 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5295 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5296 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5297 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5303 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5304 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5305 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5306 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5307 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5308 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5309 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5310 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5315 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5317 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5318 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5319 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5320 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5323 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5324 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5326 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5327 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5328 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5329 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5330 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5332 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5333 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5335 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5337 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5338 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5339 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5340 let res = f(channel);
5341 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5342 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5343 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5344 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5345 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5349 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5350 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5351 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5352 msg: funding_locked,
5354 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5356 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5357 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5358 msg: announcement_sigs,
5360 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5362 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5363 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5364 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5369 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5371 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5372 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5373 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5375 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5376 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5377 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5378 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5383 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5384 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5385 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5386 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5388 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5389 data: reason_message,
5397 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5398 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5399 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5400 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5401 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5402 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5403 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5404 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5405 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5406 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5407 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5408 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5409 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5414 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5419 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5421 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5422 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5426 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5427 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5428 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5431 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5432 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5433 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5434 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5437 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5438 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5440 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5441 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5444 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5445 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5446 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5447 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5448 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5452 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5453 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5454 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5455 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5459 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5460 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5461 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5462 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5463 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5464 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5467 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5468 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5469 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5472 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5473 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5474 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5477 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5479 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5482 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5484 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5487 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5488 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5489 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5492 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5493 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5494 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5497 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5499 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5502 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5504 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5507 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5509 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5512 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5514 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5517 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5519 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5522 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5524 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5527 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5532 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5534 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5537 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5539 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5542 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5543 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5544 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5547 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5552 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5557 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5559 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5560 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5562 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5563 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5564 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5565 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5566 if no_connection_possible {
5567 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5568 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5569 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5570 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5571 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5573 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5574 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5575 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5579 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5586 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5587 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5588 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5589 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5590 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5591 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5592 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5594 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5597 no_channels_remain = false;
5603 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5605 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5606 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5607 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5608 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5610 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5611 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5616 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5617 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5618 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5620 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5627 if no_channels_remain {
5628 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5631 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5632 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5636 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5637 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5639 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5642 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5643 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5645 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5646 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5650 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5655 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5656 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5657 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5658 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5659 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5660 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5661 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5662 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5663 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5667 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5668 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5669 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5675 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5678 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5681 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5682 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5683 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5684 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5685 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5689 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5690 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5695 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5696 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5697 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5698 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5699 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5700 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5703 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5706 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5712 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5713 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5718 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5719 let result = *guard;
5727 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5728 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5729 let current_time = Instant::now();
5731 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5732 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5737 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5738 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5739 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5740 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5741 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5743 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5744 let result = *guard;
5745 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5749 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5750 None => return result,
5756 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5758 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5759 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5760 *persistence_lock = true;
5761 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5766 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5767 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5769 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5771 (0, onion_packet, required),
5772 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5775 (0, payment_data, required),
5776 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5778 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5779 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5780 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5784 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5785 (0, routing, required),
5786 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5787 (4, payment_hash, required),
5788 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5789 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5793 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5796 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5798 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5799 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5800 reason.write(writer)?;
5802 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5803 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5806 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5807 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5808 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5809 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5816 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5817 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5818 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5821 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5822 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5823 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5824 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5828 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5829 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5830 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5831 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5832 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5835 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5836 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5837 // messages contained in the variants.
5838 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5839 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5840 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5842 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5843 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5844 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5845 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5846 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5849 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5850 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5851 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5852 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5853 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5855 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5860 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5865 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5866 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5867 (2, outpoint, required),
5868 (4, htlc_id, required),
5869 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5872 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5873 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5874 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5875 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5878 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5879 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5880 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5885 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5886 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5887 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5893 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5894 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5895 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5897 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5898 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5899 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5903 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5904 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5905 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5907 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5909 if payment_data.is_some() {
5910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5912 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5915 if payment_data.is_none() {
5916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5918 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5922 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5930 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5931 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5932 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5935 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5936 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5937 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5938 let mut payment_id = None;
5939 let mut payment_secret = None;
5940 let mut payee = None;
5941 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5942 (0, session_priv, required),
5943 (1, payment_id, option),
5944 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5945 (3, payment_secret, option),
5946 (4, path, vec_type),
5949 if payment_id.is_none() {
5950 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5952 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5954 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5955 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5956 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5957 path: path.unwrap(),
5958 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5963 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5964 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5969 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5970 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5972 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5974 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5975 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5976 (0, session_priv, required),
5977 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5978 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5979 (3, payment_secret, option),
5980 (4, path, vec_type),
5984 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5986 field.write(writer)?;
5993 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5994 (0, LightningError) => {
5998 (0, failure_code, required),
5999 (2, data, vec_type),
6003 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6005 (0, forward_info, required),
6006 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6007 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6008 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6011 (0, htlc_id, required),
6012 (2, err_packet, required),
6016 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6017 (0, payment_secret, required),
6018 (2, expiry_time, required),
6019 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6020 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6021 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6024 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6026 (0, session_privs, required),
6029 (0, session_privs, required),
6030 (1, payment_hash, option),
6033 (0, session_privs, required),
6034 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6035 (2, payment_hash, required),
6036 (4, payment_secret, option),
6037 (6, total_msat, required),
6038 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6039 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6042 (0, session_privs, required),
6043 (2, payment_hash, required),
6047 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6048 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6050 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6054 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6055 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6057 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6059 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6061 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6062 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6063 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6066 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6067 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6068 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6069 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6070 unfunded_channels += 1;
6073 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6074 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6075 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6076 channel.write(writer)?;
6080 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6081 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6082 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6083 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6084 for forward in pending_forwards {
6085 forward.write(writer)?;
6089 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6090 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6091 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6092 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6093 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6094 htlc.write(writer)?;
6098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6099 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6100 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6101 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6102 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6103 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6106 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6107 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6108 for event in events.iter() {
6109 event.write(writer)?;
6112 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6113 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6114 for event in background_events.iter() {
6116 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6118 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6119 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6124 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6125 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6127 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6128 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6129 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6130 hash.write(writer)?;
6131 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6134 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6135 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6136 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6137 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6138 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6139 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6142 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6143 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6145 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6146 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6147 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6148 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6151 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6152 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6156 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6157 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6158 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6160 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6161 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6162 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6167 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6168 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6169 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6176 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6178 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6180 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6181 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6182 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6183 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6184 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6185 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6186 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6187 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6188 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6189 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6190 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6191 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6192 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6194 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6195 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6197 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6198 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6200 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6201 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6202 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6203 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6204 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6205 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6207 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6208 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6209 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6210 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6211 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6212 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6215 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6216 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6218 pub keys_manager: K,
6220 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6222 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6223 pub fee_estimator: F,
6224 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6226 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6227 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6228 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6229 pub chain_monitor: M,
6231 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6232 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6233 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6234 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6235 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6236 /// deserialization.
6238 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6239 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6240 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6242 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6243 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6245 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6246 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6247 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6248 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6250 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6253 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6254 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6257 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6258 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6259 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6261 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6265 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6266 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6267 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6268 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6269 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6271 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6272 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6277 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6278 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6279 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6280 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6281 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6283 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6284 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6287 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6288 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6289 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6293 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6294 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6295 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6296 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6297 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6298 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6301 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6302 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6304 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6305 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6306 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6310 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6312 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6313 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6314 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6315 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6316 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6317 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6318 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6319 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6320 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6321 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6322 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6323 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6324 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6325 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6326 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6327 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6328 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6329 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6330 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6331 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6332 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6333 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6334 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6335 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6336 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6337 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6338 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6339 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6340 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6341 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6342 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6343 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6344 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6345 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6346 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6347 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6348 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6351 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6352 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6353 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6355 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6358 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6359 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6360 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6361 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6362 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6363 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6367 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6368 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6369 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6370 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6374 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6375 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6376 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6377 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6378 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6379 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6380 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6381 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6382 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6384 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6387 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6389 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6390 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6391 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6392 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6393 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6394 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6396 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6399 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6400 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6401 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6402 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6403 let peer_state = PeerState {
6404 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6406 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6409 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6410 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6411 for _ in 0..event_count {
6412 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6413 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6417 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6418 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6419 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6420 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6421 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6422 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6423 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6424 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6428 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6430 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6431 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6432 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6433 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6437 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6438 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6441 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6442 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6443 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6448 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6450 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6451 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6452 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6454 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6456 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6457 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6461 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6462 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6463 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6464 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6465 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6466 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6468 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6469 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6470 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6471 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6472 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6473 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6475 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6477 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6478 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6479 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6480 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6481 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6482 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6483 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6485 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6486 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6487 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6488 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6489 if path.is_empty() {
6490 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6491 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6493 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6494 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6495 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6496 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6497 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6498 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6499 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6500 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6503 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6504 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6505 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6506 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6508 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6509 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6510 total_msat: path_amt,
6511 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6513 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6514 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6523 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6524 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6526 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6527 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6530 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6531 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6532 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6534 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6535 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6536 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6538 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6540 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6545 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6547 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6548 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6549 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6551 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6552 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6555 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6556 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6558 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6560 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6561 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6562 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6563 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6565 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6566 logger: args.logger,
6567 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6570 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6571 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6574 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6575 //connection or two.
6577 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6583 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6584 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6585 use core::time::Duration;
6586 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6587 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6588 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6589 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6590 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6591 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6593 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6594 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6595 use util::errors::APIError;
6596 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6597 use util::test_utils;
6599 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6601 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6602 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6604 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6607 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6608 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6610 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6611 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6612 thread::spawn(move || {
6614 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6615 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6616 *persistence_lock = true;
6619 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6625 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6626 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6628 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6631 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6636 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6638 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6641 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6648 fn test_notify_limits() {
6649 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6650 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6654 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6656 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6657 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6658 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6659 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6660 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6662 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6664 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6665 // to connect messages with new values
6666 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6667 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6668 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6669 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6671 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6672 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6673 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6674 // ... but the last node should not.
6675 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6676 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6677 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6678 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6680 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6681 // about the channel.
6682 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6683 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6684 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6686 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6688 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6689 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6690 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6691 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6692 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6693 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6695 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6696 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6697 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6699 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6700 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6701 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6702 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6703 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6704 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6706 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6707 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6708 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6709 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6710 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6711 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6712 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6713 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6715 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6716 // the channel info has updated.
6717 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6718 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6719 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6720 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6721 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6722 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6726 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6727 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6729 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6730 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6731 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6732 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6733 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6735 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6736 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6737 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6738 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6739 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6740 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6741 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6743 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6744 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6745 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6747 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6748 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6750 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6751 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6752 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6753 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6754 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6756 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6757 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6758 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6760 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6761 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6762 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6763 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6764 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6765 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6766 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6767 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6768 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6770 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6771 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6773 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6774 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6775 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6777 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6778 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6779 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6780 // lightning messages manually.
6781 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6783 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6784 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6785 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6787 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6788 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6790 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6791 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6793 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6794 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6795 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6798 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6799 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6801 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6803 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6805 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6809 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6810 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6811 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6812 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6814 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6815 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6816 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6817 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6819 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6822 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6823 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6824 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6825 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6830 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6831 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6832 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6833 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6840 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6841 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6842 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6843 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6844 // fails as expected.
6845 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6849 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6850 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6852 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6853 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6854 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6856 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6857 let params = RouteParameters {
6858 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6859 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6860 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6862 let route = find_route(
6863 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6864 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6866 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6868 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6869 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6870 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6871 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6872 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6874 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6875 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6876 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6878 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6879 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6880 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6881 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6882 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6883 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6884 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6885 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6886 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6888 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6889 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6891 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6892 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6893 let route = find_route(
6894 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6895 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6897 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6899 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6900 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6901 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6902 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6903 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6905 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6906 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6907 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6909 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6911 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6912 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6913 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6915 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6916 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6917 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6919 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6920 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6921 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6922 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6923 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6924 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6925 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6926 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6927 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6929 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6930 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6934 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6935 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6936 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6942 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6943 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6944 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6945 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6947 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6948 let params = RouteParameters {
6949 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6950 final_value_msat: 10000,
6951 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6953 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6954 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6955 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6956 let route = find_route(
6957 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6958 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6961 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6962 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6963 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6966 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6967 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6968 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6969 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6970 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6971 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6972 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6974 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6978 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6979 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6980 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6981 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6982 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6983 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6985 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6986 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6987 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6988 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6990 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6991 let params = RouteParameters {
6992 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6993 final_value_msat: 10000,
6994 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6996 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6997 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6998 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6999 let route = find_route(
7000 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7001 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7004 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7005 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7006 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7007 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7011 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7012 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7013 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7014 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7016 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7018 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7022 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7026 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7028 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7029 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7030 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7031 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7033 // Marshall an MPP route.
7034 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7035 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7036 route.paths.push(path);
7037 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7038 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7039 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7040 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7041 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7042 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7044 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7045 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7046 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7047 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7052 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7053 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7054 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7059 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7060 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7062 total_msat: 100_000,
7065 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7066 // payment verification fails as expected.
7067 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7068 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7069 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7070 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7072 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7076 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7077 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7081 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7084 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7085 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7086 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7087 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7088 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7089 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7090 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7091 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
7092 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7093 use util::test_utils;
7094 use util::config::UserConfig;
7095 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7097 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7098 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7099 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7101 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7105 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7106 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7107 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7108 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7109 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7110 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7111 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7116 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7117 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7120 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7121 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7122 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7124 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7125 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7127 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7128 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7130 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7131 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7133 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7134 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7135 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7136 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7137 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7139 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7141 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7143 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7144 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7145 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7146 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7147 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7149 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7151 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7153 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7154 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7155 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7156 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7157 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7160 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7161 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7162 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7164 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7165 } else { panic!(); }
7167 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7168 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7170 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7173 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7176 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7177 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7179 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7180 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7181 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7182 match msg_events[0] {
7183 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7184 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7185 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7189 match msg_events[1] {
7190 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7194 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7196 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7197 macro_rules! send_payment {
7198 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7199 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7200 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7201 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7202 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7203 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
7204 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7206 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7207 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7209 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7210 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7212 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7213 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7214 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7215 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7216 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7217 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7218 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7219 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7222 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7223 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7225 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7226 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7227 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7228 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7229 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7231 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7234 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7235 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7236 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7237 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7239 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7244 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7245 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);