]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
Fix potential peer_state deadlocks in `finish_force_close_channel`
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
82
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 //
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 //
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
93 //
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102         Forward {
103                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107         },
108         Receive {
109                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
115         },
116         ReceiveKeysend {
117                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125 }
126
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
132         /// Amount received
133         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135         /// may overshoot this in either case)
136         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
141 }
142
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
147 }
148
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
154 }
155
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
158
159         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
162         // HTLCs.
163         //
164         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
166         prev_htlc_id: u64,
167         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
169 }
170
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
173         FailHTLC {
174                 htlc_id: u64,
175                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
176         },
177 }
178
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183         short_channel_id: u64,
184         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
185         htlc_id: u64,
186         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188
189         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
191         outpoint: OutPoint,
192 }
193
194 enum OnionPayload {
195         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196         Invoice {
197                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200         },
201         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
203 }
204
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208         cltv_expiry: u32,
209         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210         value: u64,
211         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213         sender_intended_value: u64,
214         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215         timer_ticks: u8,
216         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220         total_msat: u64,
221         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
223 }
224
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231                         value_msat: val.value,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
238 ///
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
242
243 impl PaymentId {
244         /// Number of bytes in the id.
245         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
246 }
247
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
250                 self.0.write(w)
251         }
252 }
253
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
257                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
258         }
259 }
260
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
264         }
265 }
266
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 ///
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
275                 self.0.write(w)
276         }
277 }
278
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
282                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
283         }
284 }
285
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
291 }
292 impl SentHTLCId {
293         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294                 match source {
295                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298                         },
299                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
301                 }
302         }
303 }
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307                 (2, htlc_id, required),
308         },
309         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310                 (0, session_priv, required),
311         };
312 );
313
314
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
320         OutboundRoute {
321                 path: Path,
322                 session_priv: SecretKey,
323                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326                 payment_id: PaymentId,
327         },
328 }
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332                 match self {
333                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
335                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336                         },
337                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
338                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
339                                 path.hash(hasher);
340                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
343                         },
344                 }
345         }
346 }
347 impl HTLCSource {
348         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349         #[cfg(test)]
350         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
356                 }
357         }
358
359         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365                 } else {
366                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
367                         true
368                 }
369         }
370 }
371
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
373         err_code: u16,
374         err_data: Vec<u8>,
375         msg: &'static str,
376 }
377
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 ///
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386         TemporaryNodeFailure,
387         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397         ///
398         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
401 }
402
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404     fn into(self) -> u16 {
405                 match self {
406                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
410                 }
411         }
412 }
413
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421         err: msgs::LightningError,
422         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 }
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427         #[inline]
428         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429                 Self {
430                         err: LightningError {
431                                 err: err.clone(),
432                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
434                                                 channel_id,
435                                                 data: err
436                                         },
437                                 },
438                         },
439                         chan_id: None,
440                         shutdown_finish: None,
441                         channel_capacity: None,
442                 }
443         }
444         #[inline]
445         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
447         }
448         #[inline]
449         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450                 Self {
451                         err: LightningError {
452                                 err: err.clone(),
453                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
455                                                 channel_id,
456                                                 data: err
457                                         },
458                                 },
459                         },
460                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
463                 }
464         }
465         #[inline]
466         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
467                 Self {
468                         err: match err {
469                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
470                                         err: msg.clone(),
471                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
473                                                         channel_id,
474                                                         data: msg
475                                                 },
476                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
477                                         },
478                                 },
479                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480                                         err: msg,
481                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482                                 },
483                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484                                         err: msg.clone(),
485                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
487                                                         channel_id,
488                                                         data: msg
489                                                 },
490                                         },
491                                 },
492                         },
493                         chan_id: None,
494                         shutdown_finish: None,
495                         channel_capacity: None,
496                 }
497         }
498
499         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500                 self.chan_id.is_some()
501         }
502 }
503
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
509
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
517         CommitmentFirst,
518         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
519         RevokeAndACKFirst,
520 }
521
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
524         amount_msat: u64,
525         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
529 }
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531         (0, amount_msat, required),
532         (2, payment_purpose, required),
533         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
536 });
537
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
542 }
543
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547         /// failed/claimed by the user.
548         ///
549         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
551         ///
552         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
555
556         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
560 }
561
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
571         ///
572         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573         /// are regenerated on startup.
574         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576         /// channel to continue normal operation.
577         ///
578         /// In general this should be used rather than
579         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
582         ///
583         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584         /// are regenerated on startup.
585         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
589         },
590         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
592         /// on a channel.
593         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595                 channel_id: ChannelId,
596         },
597 }
598
599 #[derive(Debug)]
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604         /// event can be generated.
605         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607         /// operation of another channel.
608         ///
609         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
613         /// outbound edge.
614         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615                 event: events::Event,
616                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
617         },
618 }
619
620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
621         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
622         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
623                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
624                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
625                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
626                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
627                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
628                 // downgrades to prior versions.
629                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
630         },
631 );
632
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
634 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
635         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
636                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
637                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
638         },
639 }
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
641         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
642                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
643                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
644         };
645 );
646
647 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
648 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
649 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
650 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
651         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
652         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
653         /// durably to disk.
654         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
655                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
656                 channel_id: ChannelId,
657                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
658                 htlc_id: u64,
659         },
660 }
661
662 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667                 }
668         }
669 }
670
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
673 ;);
674
675
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
679         ///
680         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
683         ///
684         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690         latest_features: InitFeatures,
691         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695         /// user but which have not yet completed.
696         ///
697         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699         /// for a missing channel.
700         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
703         ///
704         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
708         ///
709         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
724         is_connected: bool,
725 }
726
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
733                         return false
734                 }
735                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
738         }
739
740         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
743         }
744
745         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
749         }
750 }
751
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755         /// The original OpenChannel message.
756         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
759 }
760
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
764
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
767 ///
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
769 /// here.
770 ///
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777         /// this payment being removed.
778         expiry_time: u64,
779         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780         user_payment_id: u64,
781         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
784 }
785
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
794 ///
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
797         Arc<M>,
798         Arc<T>,
799         Arc<KeysManager>,
800         Arc<KeysManager>,
801         Arc<KeysManager>,
802         Arc<F>,
803         Arc<DefaultRouter<
804                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
805                 Arc<L>,
806                 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
809         >>,
810         Arc<L>
811 >;
812
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
822 ///
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
825         ChannelManager<
826                 &'a M,
827                 &'b T,
828                 &'c KeysManager,
829                 &'c KeysManager,
830                 &'c KeysManager,
831                 &'d F,
832                 &'e DefaultRouter<
833                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
834                         &'g L,
835                         &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
838                 >,
839                 &'g L
840         >;
841
842 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
843 pub trait AChannelManager {
844         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
845         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
846         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
847         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
848         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
849         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
850         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
851         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
852         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
853         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
854         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
855         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
856         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
857         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
858         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
859         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
860         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
861         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
862         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
863         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
864         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
865         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
866         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
867         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
868         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
869         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
870         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
871         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
872         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
873         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
874         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
875         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
876         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
877         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
878         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
879         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
880 }
881
882 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
883 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
884 where
885         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
886         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
887         ES::Target: EntropySource,
888         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
889         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
890         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
891         R::Target: Router,
892         L::Target: Logger,
893 {
894         type Watch = M::Target;
895         type M = M;
896         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
897         type T = T;
898         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
899         type ES = ES;
900         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
901         type NS = NS;
902         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
903         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
904         type SP = SP;
905         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
906         type F = F;
907         type Router = R::Target;
908         type R = R;
909         type Logger = L::Target;
910         type L = L;
911         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
912 }
913
914 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
915 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
916 ///
917 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
918 /// to individual Channels.
919 ///
920 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
921 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
922 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
923 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
924 ///
925 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
926 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
927 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
928 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
929 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
930 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
931 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
932 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
933 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
934 ///
935 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
936 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
937 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
938 ///
939 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
940 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
941 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
942 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
943 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
944 ///
945 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
946 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
947 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
948 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
949 ///
950 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
951 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
952 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
953 ///
954 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
955 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
956 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
957 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
958 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
959 ///
960 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
961 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
962 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
963 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
964 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
965 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
966 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
967 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
968 //
969 // Lock order:
970 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
971 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
972 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
973 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
974 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
975 //
976 // Lock order tree:
977 //
978 // `total_consistency_lock`
979 //  |
980 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
981 //  |   |
982 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
983 //  |
984 //  |__`per_peer_state`
985 //  |   |
986 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
987 //  |       |
988 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
989 //  |       |
990 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
991 //  |           |
992 //  |           |__`peer_state`
993 //  |               |
994 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
995 //  |               |
996 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
997 //  |               |
998 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
999 //  |               |
1000 //  |               |__`best_block`
1001 //  |               |
1002 //  |               |__`pending_events`
1003 //  |                   |
1004 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
1005 //
1006 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1007 where
1008         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1009         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1010         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1011         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1012         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1013         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1014         R::Target: Router,
1015         L::Target: Logger,
1016 {
1017         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1018         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1019         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1020         chain_monitor: M,
1021         tx_broadcaster: T,
1022         #[allow(unused)]
1023         router: R,
1024
1025         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1026         #[cfg(test)]
1027         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1028         #[cfg(not(test))]
1029         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1030         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1031
1032         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1033         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1034         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1035         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1036         ///
1037         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1038         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1039
1040         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1041         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1042         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1043         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1044         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1045         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1046         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1047         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1048         ///
1049         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1050         ///
1051         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1052         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1053
1054         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1055         ///
1056         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1057         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1058         /// and via the classic SCID.
1059         ///
1060         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1061         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1062         ///
1063         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064         #[cfg(test)]
1065         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1066         #[cfg(not(test))]
1067         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1068         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1069         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1070         ///
1071         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1073
1074         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1075         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1076         ///
1077         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1079
1080         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1081         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1082         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1083         /// active channel list on load.
1084         ///
1085         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1086         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1087
1088         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1089         ///
1090         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1091         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1092         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1093         ///
1094         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1095         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1096         /// the handling of the events.
1097         ///
1098         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1099         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1100         ///
1101         /// TODO:
1102         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1103         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1104         /// would break backwards compatability.
1105         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1106         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1107         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1108         ///
1109         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1111
1112         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1113         ///
1114         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1115         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1116         /// confirmation depth.
1117         ///
1118         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1119         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1120         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1121         ///
1122         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1123         #[cfg(test)]
1124         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1125         #[cfg(not(test))]
1126         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1127
1128         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1129
1130         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1131
1132         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1133         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1134         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1135         ///
1136         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1137         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1138
1139         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1140         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1141         /// keeping additional state.
1142         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1143
1144         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1145         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1146         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1147         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1148
1149         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1150         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1151         ///
1152         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1153         /// are currently open with that peer.
1154         ///
1155         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1156         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1157         /// channels.
1158         ///
1159         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1160         ///
1161         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1163         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1164         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1165         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1166
1167         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1168         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1169         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1170         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1171         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1172         ///
1173         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1174         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1175         ///
1176         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1177         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1178         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1179         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1180         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1181
1182         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1183         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1184
1185         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1186         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1187         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1188         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1189         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1190         ///
1191         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1192         ///
1193         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1194         ///
1195         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1196         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1197         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1198         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1199         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1200         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1201         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1202         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1203         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1204
1205         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1206
1207         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1208         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1209
1210         entropy_source: ES,
1211         node_signer: NS,
1212         signer_provider: SP,
1213
1214         logger: L,
1215 }
1216
1217 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1218 ///
1219 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1220 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1221 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1222 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1223 pub struct ChainParameters {
1224         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1225         pub network: Network,
1226
1227         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1228         ///
1229         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1230         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1231 }
1232
1233 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1234 #[must_use]
1235 enum NotifyOption {
1236         DoPersist,
1237         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1238         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1239 }
1240
1241 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1242 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1243 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1244 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1245 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1246 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1247 ///
1248 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1249 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1250 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1251 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1252         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1253         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1254         should_persist: F,
1255         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1256         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1257 }
1258
1259 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1260         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1261         /// events to handle.
1262         ///
1263         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1264         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1265         /// isn't ideal.
1266         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1267                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1268         }
1269
1270         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1271         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1272                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1273                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1274
1275                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1276                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1277                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1278                         should_persist: move || {
1279                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1280                                 // processing and return that.
1281                                 let notify = persist_check();
1282                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1283                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1284                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1285                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1286                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1287                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1288                                 }
1289                         },
1290                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1291                 }
1292         }
1293
1294         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1295         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1296         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1297         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1298         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1299                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1300
1301                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1302                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1303                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1304                         should_persist: persist_check,
1305                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1306                 }
1307         }
1308 }
1309
1310 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1311         fn drop(&mut self) {
1312                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1313                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1314                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1315                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1316                         },
1317                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1318                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1319                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1320                 }
1321         }
1322 }
1323
1324 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1325 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1326 ///
1327 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1328 ///
1329 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1330 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1331 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1332 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1333 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1334
1335 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1336 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1337 ///
1338 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1339 ///
1340 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1341 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1342 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1343 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1344 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1345 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1346 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1347 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1348 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1349 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1350 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1351 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1352 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1353
1354 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1355 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1356 /// this value.
1357 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1358 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1359 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1360 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1361
1362 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1363 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1364 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1365 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1366 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1367 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1368 #[deny(const_err)]
1369 #[allow(dead_code)]
1370 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1371
1372 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1373 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1374 #[deny(const_err)]
1375 #[allow(dead_code)]
1376 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1377
1378 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1379 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1380
1381 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1382 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1383 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1384
1385 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1386 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1387 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1388
1389 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1390 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1391 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1392 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1393
1394 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1395 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1396 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1397
1398 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1399 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1400 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1401
1402 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1403 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1404 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1405         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1406         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1407         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1408         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1409         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1410         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1411         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1412         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1413 }
1414
1415 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1416 /// to better separate parameters.
1417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1418 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1419         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1420         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1421         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1422         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1423         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1424         pub features: InitFeatures,
1425         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1426         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1427         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1428         ///
1429         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1430         ///
1431         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1432         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1433         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1434         /// payments to us through this channel.
1435         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1436         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1437         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1438         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1439         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1440         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1441         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1442 }
1443
1444 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1445 ///
1446 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1447 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1448 /// transactions.
1449 ///
1450 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1451 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1452 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1453         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1454         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1455         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1456         /// lifetime of the channel.
1457         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1458         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1459         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1460         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1461         /// our counterparty already.
1462         ///
1463         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1464         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1465         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1466         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1467         ///
1468         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1469         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1470         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1471         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1472         ///
1473         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1474         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1475         ///
1476         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1477         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1478         ///
1479         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1480         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1481         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1482         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1483         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1484         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1485         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1486         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1487         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1488         /// `Some(0)`).
1489         ///
1490         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1491         ///
1492         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1493         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1494         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1495         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1496         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1497         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1498         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1499         ///
1500         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1501         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1502         ///
1503         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1504         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1505         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1506         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1507         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1508         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1509         /// this value on chain.
1510         ///
1511         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1512         ///
1513         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1514         ///
1515         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1516         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1517         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1518         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1519         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1520         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1521         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1522         ///
1523         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1524         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1525         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1526         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1527         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1528         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1529         ///
1530         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1531         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1532         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1533         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1534         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1535         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1536         ///
1537         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1538         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1539         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1540         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1541         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1542         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1543         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1544         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1545         ///
1546         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1547         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1548         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1549         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1550         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1551         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1552         /// route which is valid.
1553         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1554         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1555         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1556         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1557         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1558         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1559         ///
1560         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1561         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1562         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1563         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1564         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1565         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1566         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1567         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1568         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1569         ///
1570         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1571         ///
1572         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1573         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1574         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1575         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1576         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1577         ///
1578         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1579         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1580         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1581         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1582         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1583         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1584         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1585         ///
1586         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1587         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1588         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1589         pub is_outbound: bool,
1590         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1591         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1592         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1593         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1594         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1595         ///
1596         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1597         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1598         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1599         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1600         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1601         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1602         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1603         ///
1604         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1605         pub is_usable: bool,
1606         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1607         pub is_public: bool,
1608         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1609         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1610         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1611         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1612         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1613         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1614         ///
1615         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1616         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1617 }
1618
1619 impl ChannelDetails {
1620         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1621         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1622         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1623         ///
1624         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1625         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1626         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1627                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1628         }
1629
1630         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1631         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1632         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1633         ///
1634         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1635         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1636         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1637                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1638         }
1639
1640         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1641                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1642                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1643         ) -> Self
1644         where
1645                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1646                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1647         {
1648                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1649                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1650                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1651                 ChannelDetails {
1652                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1653                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1654                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1655                                 features: latest_features,
1656                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1657                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1658                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1659                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1660                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1661                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1662                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1663                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1664                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1665                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1666                         },
1667                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1668                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1669                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1670                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1671                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1672                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1673                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1674                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1675                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1676                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1677                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1678                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1679                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1680                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1681                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1682                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1683                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1684                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1685                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1686                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1687                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1688                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1689                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1690                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1691                         config: Some(context.config()),
1692                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1693                 }
1694         }
1695 }
1696
1697 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1698 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1699 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1700 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1701 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1702 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1703 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1704 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1705         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1706         NotShuttingDown,
1707         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1708         ShutdownInitiated,
1709         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1710         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1711         ResolvingHTLCs,
1712         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1713         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1714         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1715         /// to drop the channel.
1716         ShutdownComplete,
1717 }
1718
1719 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1720 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1721 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1722 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1723         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1724         AwaitingInvoice {
1725                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1726                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1727                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1728         },
1729         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1730         Pending {
1731                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1732                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1733                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1734                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1735                 /// abandoned.
1736                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1737                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1738                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1739                 total_msat: u64,
1740         },
1741         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1742         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1743         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1744         Fulfilled {
1745                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1746                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1747                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1748                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1749                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1750                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1751         },
1752         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1753         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1754         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1755         Abandoned {
1756                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1757                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1758                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1759                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1760                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1761         },
1762 }
1763
1764 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1765 ///
1766 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1767 #[derive(Clone)]
1768 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1769         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1770         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1771         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1772         /// route hints.
1773         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1774         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1775         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1776 }
1777
1778 macro_rules! handle_error {
1779         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1780                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1781                 // entering the macro.
1782                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1783                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1784
1785                 match $internal {
1786                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1787                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1788                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1789
1790                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1791                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1792                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1793                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1794                                                         msg: update
1795                                                 });
1796                                         }
1797                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1798                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1799                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1800                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1801                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1802                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1803                                                 }, None));
1804                                         }
1805                                 }
1806
1807                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1808                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1809                                 } else {
1810                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1811                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1812                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1813                                         });
1814                                 }
1815
1816                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1817                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1818                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1819                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1820                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1821                                         }
1822                                 }
1823
1824                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1825                                 Err(err)
1826                         },
1827                 }
1828         } };
1829         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1830                 match $internal {
1831                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1832                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1833                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1834                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1835                         },
1836                 }
1837         };
1838 }
1839
1840 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1841         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1842                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1843                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1844                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1845                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1846                 } else {
1847                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1848                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1849                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1850                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1851                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1852                         // stage.
1853                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1854                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1855                 }
1856                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1857         }}
1858 }
1859
1860 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1861 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1862         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1863                 match $err {
1864                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1865                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1866                         },
1867                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1868                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1869                         },
1870                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1871                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1872                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1873                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1874                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1875                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1876
1877                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1878                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1879                         },
1880                 }
1881         };
1882         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1883                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1884         };
1885         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1886                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1887         };
1888         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1889                 match $channel_phase {
1890                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1891                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1892                         },
1893                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1894                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1895                         },
1896                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1897                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1898                         },
1899                 }
1900         };
1901 }
1902
1903 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1904         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1905                 match $res {
1906                         Ok(res) => res,
1907                         Err(e) => {
1908                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1909                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1910                                 if drop {
1911                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1912                                 }
1913                                 break Err(res);
1914                         }
1915                 }
1916         }
1917 }
1918
1919 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1920         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1921                 match $res {
1922                         Ok(res) => res,
1923                         Err(e) => {
1924                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1925                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1926                                 if drop {
1927                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1928                                 }
1929                                 return Err(res);
1930                         }
1931                 }
1932         }
1933 }
1934
1935 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1936         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1937                 {
1938                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1939                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1940                         channel
1941                 }
1942         }
1943 }
1944
1945 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1946         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1947                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1948                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1949                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1950                 });
1951                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1952                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1953                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1954                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1955                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1956                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1957                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1958                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1959                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1960                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1961                 }
1962         }}
1963 }
1964
1965 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1966         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1967                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1968                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1969                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1970                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1971                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1972                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1973                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1974                         }, None));
1975                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1976                 }
1977         }
1978 }
1979
1980 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1981         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1982                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1983                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1984                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1985                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1986                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1987                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1988                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1989                         }, None));
1990                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1991                 }
1992         }
1993 }
1994
1995 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1996         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1997                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1998                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1999                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2000                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2001                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2002                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2003                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2004                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2005                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2006                         // now.
2007                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2008                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2009                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2010                                         msg,
2011                                 })
2012                         } else { None }
2013                 } else { None };
2014
2015                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2016                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2017
2018                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2019                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2020                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2021                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2022                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2023                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2024                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2025                 }
2026
2027                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2028                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2029                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2030
2031                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2032
2033                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2034                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2035                 }
2036                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2037                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2038                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2039                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2040                 }
2041         } }
2042 }
2043
2044 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2045         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2046                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2047                 match $update_res {
2048                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2049                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2050                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2051                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2052                         },
2053                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2054                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2055                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2056                                 false
2057                         },
2058                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2059                                 $completed;
2060                                 true
2061                         },
2062                 }
2063         } };
2064         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2065                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2066                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2067         };
2068         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2069                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2070                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2071                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2072                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2073                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2074                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2075                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2076                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2077                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2078                         });
2079                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2080                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2081                         {
2082                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2083                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2084                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2085                                 }
2086                         })
2087         } };
2088 }
2089
2090 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2091         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2092                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2093                 while !processed_all_events {
2094                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2095                                 return;
2096                         }
2097
2098                         let mut result;
2099
2100                         {
2101                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2102                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2103                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2104
2105                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2106                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2107                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2108
2109                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2110                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2111                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2112                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2113                                 }
2114                         }
2115
2116                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2117                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2118                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2119                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2120                         }
2121
2122                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2123
2124                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2125                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2126                                 $handle_event;
2127                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2128                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2129                                 }
2130                         }
2131
2132                         {
2133                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2134                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2135                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2136                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2137                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2138                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2139                         }
2140
2141                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2142                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2143                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2144                                 processed_all_events = false;
2145                         }
2146
2147                         match result {
2148                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2149                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2150                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2151                                 },
2152                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2153                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2154                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2155                         }
2156                 }
2157         }
2158 }
2159
2160 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2161 where
2162         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2163         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2164         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2165         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2166         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2167         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2168         R::Target: Router,
2169         L::Target: Logger,
2170 {
2171         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2172         ///
2173         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2174         ///
2175         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2176         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2177         ///
2178         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2179         ///
2180         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2181         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2182         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2183         /// more details.
2184         ///
2185         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2186         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2187         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2188         pub fn new(
2189                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2190                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2191                 current_timestamp: u32,
2192         ) -> Self {
2193                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2194                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2195                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2196                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2197                 ChannelManager {
2198                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2199                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2200                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2201                         chain_monitor,
2202                         tx_broadcaster,
2203                         router,
2204
2205                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2206
2207                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2208                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2209                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2210                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2211                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2212                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2213                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2214                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2215
2216                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2217                         secp_ctx,
2218
2219                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2220                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2221
2222                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2223
2224                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2225
2226                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2227
2228                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2229                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2230                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2231                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2232                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2233
2234                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2235                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2236
2237                         entropy_source,
2238                         node_signer,
2239                         signer_provider,
2240
2241                         logger,
2242                 }
2243         }
2244
2245         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2246         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2247                 &self.default_configuration
2248         }
2249
2250         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2251                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2252                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2253                 let mut i = 0;
2254                 loop {
2255                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2256                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2257                         } else {
2258                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2259                         }
2260                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2261                                 break;
2262                         }
2263                         i += 1;
2264                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2265                 }
2266                 outbound_scid_alias
2267         }
2268
2269         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2270         ///
2271         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2272         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2273         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2274         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2275         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2276         ///
2277         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2278         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2279         ///
2280         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2281         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2282         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2283         ///
2284         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2285         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2286         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2287         ///
2288         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2289         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2290         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2291         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2292         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2293         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2294         ///
2295         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2296         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2297         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2298         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2299                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2300                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2301                 }
2302
2303                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2304                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2305                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2306
2307                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2308
2309                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2310                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2311
2312                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2313                 let channel = {
2314                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2315                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2316                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2317                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2318                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2319                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2320                         {
2321                                 Ok(res) => res,
2322                                 Err(e) => {
2323                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2324                                         return Err(e);
2325                                 },
2326                         }
2327                 };
2328                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2329
2330                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2331                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2332                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2333                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2334                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2335                                 } else {
2336                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2337                                 }
2338                         },
2339                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2340                 }
2341
2342                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2343                         node_id: their_network_key,
2344                         msg: res,
2345                 });
2346                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2347         }
2348
2349         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2350                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2351                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2352                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2353                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2354                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2355                 // the same channel.
2356                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2357                 {
2358                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2359                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2360                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2361                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2362                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2363                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2364                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2365                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2366                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2367                                                 _ => None,
2368                                         })
2369                                         .filter(f)
2370                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2371                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2372                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2373                                         })
2374                                 );
2375                         }
2376                 }
2377                 res
2378         }
2379
2380         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2381         /// more information.
2382         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2383                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2384                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2385                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2386                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2387                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2388                 // the same channel.
2389                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2390                 {
2391                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2392                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2393                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2394                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2395                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2396                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2397                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2398                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2399                                         res.push(details);
2400                                 }
2401                         }
2402                 }
2403                 res
2404         }
2405
2406         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2407         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2408         ///
2409         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2410         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2411         /// are.
2412         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2413                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2414                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2415                 // really wanted anyway.
2416                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2417         }
2418
2419         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2420         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2421                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2422                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2423
2424                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2425                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2426                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2427                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2428                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2429                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2430                         };
2431                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2432                                 .iter()
2433                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2434                                 .map(context_to_details)
2435                                 .collect();
2436                 }
2437                 vec![]
2438         }
2439
2440         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2441         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2442         ///
2443         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2444         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2445         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2446         ///
2447         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2448         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2449                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2450                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2451                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2452                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2453                                 },
2454                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2455                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2456                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2457                                 },
2458                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2459                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2460                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2461                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2462                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2463                                         })
2464                                 },
2465                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2466                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2467                                 },
2468                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2469                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2470                                 },
2471                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2472                         })
2473                         .collect()
2474         }
2475
2476         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2477         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2478                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2479                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2480                         Some(transaction) => {
2481                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2482                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2483                                 }, None));
2484                         },
2485                         None => {},
2486                 }
2487                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2488                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2489                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2490                         reason: closure_reason,
2491                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2492                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2493                 }, None));
2494         }
2495
2496         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2497                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2498
2499                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2500                 loop {
2501                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2502
2503                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2504                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2505
2506                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2507                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2508
2509                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2510                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2511                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2512                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2513                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2514                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2515                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2516                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2517
2518                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2519                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2520                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2521                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2522                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2523                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2524                                                 });
2525
2526                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2527                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2528
2529                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2530                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2531                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2532                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2533                                                         break;
2534                                                 }
2535
2536                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2537                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2538                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2539                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2540                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2541                                                                         });
2542                                                                 }
2543                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2544                                                         }
2545                                                 }
2546                                                 break;
2547                                         }
2548                                 },
2549                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2550                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2551                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2552                                         //
2553                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2554                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2555                                 },
2556                         }
2557                 }
2558
2559                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2560                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2561                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2562                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2563                 }
2564
2565                 Ok(())
2566         }
2567
2568         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2569         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2570         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2571         ///
2572         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2573         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2574         ///    estimate.
2575         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2576         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2577         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2578         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2579         ///
2580         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2581         ///
2582         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2583         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2584         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2585         /// channel.
2586         ///
2587         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2588         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2589         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2590         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2591         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2592                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2593         }
2594
2595         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2596         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2597         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2598         ///
2599         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2600         /// the channel being closed or not:
2601         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2602         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2603         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2604         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2605         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2606         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2607         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2608         ///
2609         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2610         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2611         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2612         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2613         ///
2614         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2615         ///
2616         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2617         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2618         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2619         /// channel.
2620         ///
2621         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2622         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2623         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2624         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2625         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2626                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2627         }
2628
2629         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2630                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2631                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2632                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2633                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2634                 }
2635
2636                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2637                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2638                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2639                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2640                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2641                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2642                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2643                 }
2644                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2645                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2646                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2647                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2648                         // ignore the result here.
2649                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2650                 }
2651         }
2652
2653         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2654         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2655         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2656         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2657                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2658                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2659                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2660                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2661                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2662                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2663                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2664                         } else {
2665                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2666                         };
2667                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2668                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2669                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2670                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2671                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2672                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2673                                 match chan_phase {
2674                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2675                                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2676                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2677                                         },
2678                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2679                                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2680                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2681                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2682                                         },
2683                                 }
2684                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2685                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2686                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2687                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2688                                 // events anyway.
2689                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2690                         } else {
2691                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2692                         }
2693                 };
2694                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2695                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2696                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2697                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2698                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2699                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2700                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2701                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2702                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2703                                         msg: update
2704                                 });
2705                         }
2706                 }
2707
2708                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2709         }
2710
2711         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2712                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2713                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2714                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2715                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2716                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2717                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2718                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2719                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2720                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2721                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2722                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2723                                                         },
2724                                                 }
2725                                         );
2726                                 }
2727                                 Ok(())
2728                         },
2729                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2730                 }
2731         }
2732
2733         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2734         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2735         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2736         /// channel.
2737         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2738         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2739                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2740         }
2741
2742         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2743         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2744         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2745         ///
2746         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2747         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2748         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2749         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2750                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2751         }
2752
2753         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2754         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2755         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2756                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2757                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2758                 }
2759         }
2760
2761         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2762         /// local transaction(s).
2763         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2764                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2765                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2766                 }
2767         }
2768
2769         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2770                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2771                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2772                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2773         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2774                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2775                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2776                         version: 0,
2777                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2778                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2779                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2780                 };
2781
2782                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2783                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2784                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2785                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2786                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2787                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2788                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2789                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2790                                 }),
2791                 };
2792
2793                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2794                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2795                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2796                                 short_channel_id,
2797                         },
2798                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2799                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2800                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2801                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2802                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2803                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2804                 })
2805         }
2806
2807         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2808                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2809                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2810                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2811         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2812                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2813                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2814                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2815                         } =>
2816                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2817                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2818                                 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2819                         } => {
2820                                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2821                                 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2822                         }
2823                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2824                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2825                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2826                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2827                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2828                                 })
2829                         },
2830                 };
2831                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2832                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2833                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2834                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2835                                 err_code: 18,
2836                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2837                         })
2838                 }
2839                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2840                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2841                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2842                 //
2843                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2844                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2845                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2846                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2847                 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2848                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2849                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2850                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2851                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2852                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2853                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2854                         });
2855                 }
2856                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2857                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2858                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2859                 {
2860                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2861                                 err_code: 19,
2862                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2863                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2864                         });
2865                 }
2866
2867                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2868                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2869                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2870                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2871                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2872                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2873                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2874                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2875                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2876                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2877                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2878                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2879                                 });
2880                         }
2881                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2882                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2883                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2884                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2885                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2886                                 });
2887                         }
2888                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2889                                 payment_data,
2890                                 payment_preimage,
2891                                 payment_metadata,
2892                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2893                                 custom_tlvs,
2894                         }
2895                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2896                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2897                                 payment_data: data,
2898                                 payment_metadata,
2899                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2900                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2901                                 custom_tlvs,
2902                         }
2903                 } else {
2904                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2905                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2906                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2907                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2908                         });
2909                 };
2910                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2911                         routing,
2912                         payment_hash,
2913                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2914                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2915                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2916                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2917                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2918                 })
2919         }
2920
2921         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2922                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2923         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2924                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2925                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2926                                 {
2927                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2928                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2929                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2930                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2931                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2932                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2933                                         }));
2934                                 }
2935                         }
2936                 }
2937
2938                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2939                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2940                 }
2941
2942                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2943                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2944                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2945
2946                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2947                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2948                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2949                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2950                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2951                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2952                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2953                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2954                 }
2955                 macro_rules! return_err {
2956                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2957                                 {
2958                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2959                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2960                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2961                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2962                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2963                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2964                                         }));
2965                                 }
2966                         }
2967                 }
2968
2969                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
2970                         shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
2971                         msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
2972                 ) {
2973                         Ok(res) => res,
2974                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2975                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2976                         },
2977                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2978                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2979                         },
2980                 };
2981                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2982                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2983                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2984                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2985                                 }, ..
2986                         } => {
2987                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2988                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2989                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2990                         },
2991                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2992                         // inbound channel's state.
2993                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2994                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
2995                                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
2996                         {
2997                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2998                         }
2999                 };
3000
3001                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3002                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3003                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3004                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3005                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3006                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3007                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3008                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3009                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3010                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3011                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3012                                         {
3013                                                 None
3014                                         } else {
3015                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3016                                         }
3017                                 },
3018                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3019                         };
3020                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3021                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3022                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3023                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3024                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3025                                 }
3026                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3027                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3028                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3029                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3030                                 ).flatten() {
3031                                         None => {
3032                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3033                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3034                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3035                                         },
3036                                         Some(chan) => chan
3037                                 };
3038                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3039                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3040                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3041                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3042                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3043                                 }
3044                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3045                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3046                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3047                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3048                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3049                                 }
3050                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3051
3052                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3053                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3054                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3055                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3056                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3057                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3058                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3059                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3060                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3061                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3062                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3063                                         } else {
3064                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3065                                         }
3066                                 }
3067                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3068                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3069                                 }
3070                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3071                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3072                                 }
3073                                 chan_update_opt
3074                         } else {
3075                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3076                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3077                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3078                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3079                                         break Some((
3080                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3081                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3082                                         ));
3083                                 }
3084                                 None
3085                         };
3086
3087                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3088                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3089                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3090                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3091                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3092                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3093                         }
3094                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3095                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3096                         }
3097                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3098                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3099                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3100                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3101                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3102                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3103                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3104                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3105                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3106                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3107                         }
3108
3109                         break None;
3110                 }
3111                 {
3112                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3113                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3114                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3115                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3116                                 }
3117                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3118                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3119                                 }
3120                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3121                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3122                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3123                                 }
3124                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3125                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3126                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3127                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3128                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3129                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3130                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3131                                 // instead.
3132                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3133                         }
3134                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3135                 }
3136                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3137         }
3138
3139         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3140                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3141                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3142         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3143                 macro_rules! return_err {
3144                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3145                                 {
3146                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3147                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3148                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3149                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3150                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3151                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3152                                         }));
3153                                 }
3154                         }
3155                 }
3156                 match decoded_hop {
3157                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3158                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3159                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3160                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3161                                 {
3162                                         Ok(info) => {
3163                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3164                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3165                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3166                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3167                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3168                                         },
3169                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3170                                 }
3171                         },
3172                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3173                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3174                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3175                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3176                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3177                                 }
3178                         }
3179                 }
3180         }
3181
3182         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3183         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3184         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3185         ///
3186         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3187         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3188         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3189         ///
3190         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3191         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3192         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3193                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3194                         return Err(LightningError {
3195                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3196                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3197                         });
3198                 }
3199                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3200                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3201                 }
3202                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3203                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3204         }
3205
3206         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3207         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3208         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3209         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3210         ///
3211         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3212         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3213         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3214         ///
3215         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3216         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3217         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3218                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3219                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3220                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3221                         Some(id) => id,
3222                 };
3223
3224                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3225         }
3226
3227         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3228                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3229                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3230
3231                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3232                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3233                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3234                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3235                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3236                 };
3237
3238                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3239                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3240                         short_channel_id,
3241                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3242                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3243                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3244                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3245                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3246                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3247                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3248                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3249                 };
3250                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3251                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3252                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3253                 // channel.
3254                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3255
3256                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3257                         signature: sig,
3258                         contents: unsigned
3259                 })
3260         }
3261
3262         #[cfg(test)]
3263         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3264                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3265                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3266                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3267                         session_priv_bytes
3268                 })
3269         }
3270
3271         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3272                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3273                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3274                         session_priv_bytes
3275                 } = args;
3276                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3277                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3278
3279                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3280                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3281                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3282                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3283                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3284
3285                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3286                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3287                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3288
3289                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3290                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3291
3292                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3293                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3294                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3295                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3296                         };
3297
3298                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3299                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3300                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3301                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3302                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3303                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3304                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3305                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3306                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3307                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3308                                                 }
3309                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3310                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3311                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3312                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3313                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3314                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3315                                                                 payment_id,
3316                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3317                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3318                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3319                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3320                                                                         false => {
3321                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3322                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3323                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3324                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3325                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3326                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3327                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3328                                                                         },
3329                                                                         true => {},
3330                                                                 }
3331                                                         },
3332                                                         None => {},
3333                                                 }
3334                                         },
3335                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3336                                 };
3337                         } else {
3338                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3339                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3340                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3341                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3342                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3343                         }
3344                         return Ok(());
3345                 };
3346
3347                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3348                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3349                         Err(e) => {
3350                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3351                         },
3352                 }
3353         }
3354
3355         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3356         ///
3357         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3358         /// fields for more info.
3359         ///
3360         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3361         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3362         ///
3363         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3364         ///
3365         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3366         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3367         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3368         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3369         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3370         ///
3371         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3372         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3373         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3374         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3375         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3376         ///
3377         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3378         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3379         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3380         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3381         ///
3382         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3383         ///
3384         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3385         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3386         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3387         ///
3388         /// In general, a path may raise:
3389         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3390         ///    node public key) is specified.
3391         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3392         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3393         ///    failure).
3394         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3395         ///    relevant updates.
3396         ///
3397         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3398         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3399         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3400         ///
3401         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3402         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3403         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3404         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3405         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3406         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3407         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3408                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3409                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3410                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3411                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3412                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3413                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3414         }
3415
3416         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3417         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3418         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3419                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3420                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3421                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3422                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3423                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3424                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3425                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3426         }
3427
3428         #[cfg(test)]
3429         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3430                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3431                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3432                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3433                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3434                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3435         }
3436
3437         #[cfg(test)]
3438         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3439                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3440                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3441         }
3442
3443         #[cfg(test)]
3444         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3445                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3446         }
3447
3448
3449         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3450         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3451         /// retries are exhausted.
3452         ///
3453         /// # Event Generation
3454         ///
3455         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3456         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3457         ///
3458         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3459         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3460         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3461         ///
3462         /// # Requested Invoices
3463         ///
3464         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3465         /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3466         /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3467         ///
3468         /// # Restart Behavior
3469         ///
3470         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3471         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3472         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3473         ///
3474         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3475         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3476                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3477                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3478         }
3479
3480         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3481         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3482         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3483         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3484         /// never reach the recipient.
3485         ///
3486         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3487         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3488         ///
3489         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3490         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3491         ///
3492         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3493         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3494                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3495                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3496                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3497                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3498                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3499         }
3500
3501         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3502         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3503         ///
3504         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3505         /// payments.
3506         ///
3507         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3508         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3509                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3510                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3511                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3512                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3513                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3514                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3515         }
3516
3517         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3518         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3519         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3520         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3521                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3522                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3523                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3524                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3525                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3526         }
3527
3528         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3529         /// payment probe.
3530         #[cfg(test)]
3531         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3532                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3533         }
3534
3535         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3536         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3537         ///
3538         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3539         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3540                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32, 
3541                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3542         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3543                 let payment_params =
3544                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3545
3546                 let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params, final_value_msat: amount_msat };
3547
3548                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3549         }
3550
3551         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3552         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3553         ///
3554         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3555         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3556         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3557         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3558         ///
3559         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3560         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3561         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3562         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3563         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3564         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3565         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3566                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3567         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3568                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3569
3570                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3571                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3572                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3573                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3574
3575                 let route = self
3576                         .router
3577                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3578                         .map_err(|e| {
3579                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3580                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3581                         })?;
3582
3583                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3584
3585                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3586
3587                 for mut path in route.paths {
3588                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3589                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3590                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3591                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3592                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3593                                         break;
3594                                 } else {
3595                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3596                                         log_debug!(
3597                                                 self.logger,
3598                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3599                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3600                                         );
3601                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3602                                         path.hops.pop();
3603                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3604                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3605                                         }
3606                                 }
3607                         }
3608
3609                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3610                                 log_debug!(
3611                                         self.logger,
3612                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3613                                 );
3614                                 continue;
3615                         }
3616
3617                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3618                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3619                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3620                                 }) {
3621                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3622                                         let used_liquidity =
3623                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3624
3625                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3626                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3627                                         {
3628                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3629                                                 continue;
3630                                         } else {
3631                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3632                                         }
3633                                 }
3634                         }
3635
3636                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3637                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3638                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3639                         })?);
3640                 }
3641
3642                 Ok(res)
3643         }
3644
3645         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3646         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3647         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3648                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3649         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3650                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3651                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3652                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3653
3654                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3655                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3656                 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3657                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3658                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3659
3660                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3661                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3662                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3663                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3664                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3665                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3666                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3667                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3668                                 match funding_res {
3669                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3670                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3671                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3672                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3673
3674                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3675                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3676                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3677                                                 });
3678                                         },
3679                                 }
3680                         },
3681                         Some(phase) => {
3682                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3683                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3684                                         err: format!(
3685                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3686                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3687                                 })
3688                         },
3689                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3690                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3691                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3692                                 }),
3693                 };
3694
3695                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3696                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3697                         msg,
3698                 });
3699                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3700                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3701                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3702                         },
3703                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3704                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3705                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3706                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3707                                 }
3708                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3709                         }
3710                 }
3711                 Ok(())
3712         }
3713
3714         #[cfg(test)]
3715         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3716                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3717                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3718                 })
3719         }
3720
3721         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3722         ///
3723         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3724         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3725         ///
3726         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3727         /// across the p2p network.
3728         ///
3729         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3730         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3731         ///
3732         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3733         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3734         /// keys per-channel).
3735         ///
3736         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3737         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3738         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3739         ///
3740         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3741         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3742         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3743         ///
3744         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3745         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3746         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3747         /// for more details.
3748         ///
3749         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3750         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3751         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3752                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3753
3754                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3755                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3756                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3757                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3758                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3759                                         });
3760                                 }
3761                         }
3762                 }
3763                 {
3764                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3765                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3766                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3767                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3768                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3769                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3770                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3771                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3772                                 });
3773                         }
3774                 }
3775                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3776                         if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3777                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3778                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3779                                 });
3780                         }
3781
3782                         let mut output_index = None;
3783                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3784                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3785                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3786                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3787                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3788                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3789                                                 });
3790                                         }
3791                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3792                                 }
3793                         }
3794                         if output_index.is_none() {
3795                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3796                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3797                                 });
3798                         }
3799                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3800                 })
3801         }
3802
3803         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3804         ///
3805         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3806         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3807         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3808         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3809         ///
3810         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3811         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3812         ///
3813         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3814         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3815         ///
3816         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3817         ///
3818         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3819         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3820         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3821         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3822         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3823         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3824         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3825         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3826                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3827         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3828                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3829                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3830                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3831                         });
3832                 }
3833
3834                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3835                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3836                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3837                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3838                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3839                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3840                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3841                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3842                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3843                                         err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3844                                 });
3845                         };
3846                 }
3847                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3848                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3849                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3850                                 config.apply(config_update);
3851                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3852                                         continue;
3853                                 }
3854                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3855                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3856                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3857                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3858                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3859                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3860                                                         msg,
3861                                                 });
3862                                         }
3863                                 }
3864                                 continue;
3865                         } else {
3866                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3867                                 debug_assert!(false);
3868                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3869                                         err: format!(
3870                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3871                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3872                                 });
3873                         };
3874                 }
3875                 Ok(())
3876         }
3877
3878         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3879         ///
3880         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3881         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3882         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3883         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3884         ///
3885         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3886         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3887         ///
3888         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3889         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3890         ///
3891         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3892         ///
3893         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3894         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3895         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3896         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3897         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3898         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3899         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3900         pub fn update_channel_config(
3901                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3902         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3903                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3904         }
3905
3906         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3907         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3908         ///
3909         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3910         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3911         ///
3912         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3913         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3914         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3915         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3916         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3917         ///
3918         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3919         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3920         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3921         /// than expected.
3922         ///
3923         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3924         /// backwards.
3925         ///
3926         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3927         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3928         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3929         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3930         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3931         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3932                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3933
3934                 let next_hop_scid = {
3935                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3936                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3937                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3938                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3939                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3940                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3941                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3942                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3943                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3944                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3945                                                 })
3946                                         }
3947                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3948                                 },
3949                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3950                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3951                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3952                                 }),
3953                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3954                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3955                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3956                                 })
3957                         }
3958                 };
3959
3960                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3961                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3962                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3963                         })?;
3964
3965                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3966                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3967                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3968                         },
3969                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3970                 };
3971                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3972                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3973                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3974                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3975                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3976                 };
3977
3978                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3979                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3980                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3981                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3982                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3983                 )];
3984                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3985                 Ok(())
3986         }
3987
3988         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3989         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3990         ///
3991         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3992         /// backwards.
3993         ///
3994         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3995         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3996                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3997
3998                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3999                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4000                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4001                         })?;
4002
4003                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4004                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4005                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4006                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4007                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4008                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4009                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4010                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4011                         });
4012
4013                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4014                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4015                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4016                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4017
4018                 Ok(())
4019         }
4020
4021         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4022         ///
4023         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4024         /// Will likely generate further events.
4025         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4026                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4027
4028                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4029                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4030                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4031                 {
4032                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4033                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4034
4035                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4036                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4037                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4038                                                 () => {
4039                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4040                                                                 match forward_info {
4041                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4042                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4043                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4044                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4045                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4046                                                                                 }
4047                                                                         }) => {
4048                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4049                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4050                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4051
4052                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4053                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4054                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4055                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4056                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4057                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4058                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4059                                                                                                 });
4060
4061                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4062                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4063                                                                                                 } else {
4064                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4065                                                                                                 };
4066
4067                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4068                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4069                                                                                                         reason
4070                                                                                                 ));
4071                                                                                                 continue;
4072                                                                                         }
4073                                                                                 }
4074                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4075                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4076                                                                                                 {
4077                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4078                                                                                                 }
4079                                                                                         }
4080                                                                                 }
4081                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4082                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4083                                                                                                 {
4084                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4085                                                                                                 }
4086                                                                                         }
4087                                                                                 }
4088                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4089                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4090                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4091                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4092                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4093                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4094                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4095                                                                                                 ) {
4096                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4097                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4098                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4099                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4100                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4101                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4102                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4103                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4104                                                                                                         },
4105                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4106                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4107                                                                                                         },
4108                                                                                                 };
4109                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4110                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4111                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4112                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4113                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4114                                                                                                                 {
4115                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4116                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4117                                                                                                                 }
4118                                                                                                         },
4119                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4120                                                                                                 }
4121                                                                                         } else {
4122                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4123                                                                                         }
4124                                                                                 } else {
4125                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4126                                                                                 }
4127                                                                         },
4128                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4129                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4130                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4131                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4132                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4133                                                                         }
4134                                                                 }
4135                                                         }
4136                                                 }
4137                                         }
4138                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4139                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4140                                                 None => {
4141                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4142                                                         continue;
4143                                                 }
4144                                         };
4145                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4146                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4147                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4148                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4149                                                 continue;
4150                                         }
4151                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4152                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4153                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4154                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4155                                                         match forward_info {
4156                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4157                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4158                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4159                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4160                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4161                                                                         },
4162                                                                 }) => {
4163                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4164                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4165                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4166                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4167                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4168                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4169                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4170                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4171                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4172                                                                         });
4173                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4174                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4175                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4176                                                                                 &self.logger)
4177                                                                         {
4178                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4179                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4180                                                                                 } else {
4181                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4182                                                                                 }
4183                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4184                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4185                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4186                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4187                                                                                 ));
4188                                                                                 continue;
4189                                                                         }
4190                                                                 },
4191                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4192                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4193                                                                 },
4194                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4195                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4196                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4197                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4198                                                                         ) {
4199                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4200                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4201                                                                                 } else {
4202                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4203                                                                                 }
4204                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4205                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4206                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4207                                                                                 continue;
4208                                                                         }
4209                                                                 },
4210                                                         }
4211                                                 }
4212                                         } else {
4213                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4214                                                 continue;
4215                                         }
4216                                 } else {
4217                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4218                                                 match forward_info {
4219                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4220                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4221                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4222                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4223                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4224                                                                 }
4225                                                         }) => {
4226                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4227                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4228                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4229                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4230                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4231                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4232                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4233                                                                         },
4234                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4235                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4236                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4237                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4238                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4239                                                                                 };
4240                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4241                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4242                                                                         },
4243                                                                         _ => {
4244                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4245                                                                         }
4246                                                                 };
4247                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4248                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4249                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4250                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4251                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4252                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4253                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4254                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4255                                                                         },
4256                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4257                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4258                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4259                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4260                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4261                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4262                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4263                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4264                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4265                                                                         onion_payload,
4266                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4267                                                                 };
4268
4269                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4270
4271                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4272                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4273                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4274                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4275                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4276                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4277                                                                                 );
4278                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4279                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4280                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4281                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4282                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4283                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4284                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4285                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4286                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4287                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4288                                                                                 ));
4289                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4290                                                                         }
4291                                                                 }
4292                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4293                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4294                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4295                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4296                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4297                                                                 }
4298
4299                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4300                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4301                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4302                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4303                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4304                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4305                                                                                 };
4306                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4307                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4308                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4309                                                                                 }
4310                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4311                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4312                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4313                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4314                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4315                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4316                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4317                                                                                                 }
4318                                                                                         });
4319                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4320                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4321                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4322                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4323                                                                                 }
4324                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4325                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4326                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4327                                                                                 }
4328                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4329                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4330                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4331                                                                                         }
4332                                                                                 } else {
4333                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4334                                                                                 }
4335                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4336                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4337                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4338                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4339                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4340                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4341                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4342                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4343                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4344                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4345                                                                                         }
4346                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4347                                                                                 }
4348                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4349                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4350                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4351                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4352                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4353                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4354                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4355                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4356                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4357                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4358                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4359                                                                                         }
4360                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4361                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4362                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4363                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4364                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4365                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4366                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4367                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4368                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4369                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4370                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4371                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4372                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4373                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4374                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4375                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4376                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4377                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4378                                                                                         }, None));
4379                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4380                                                                                 } else {
4381                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4382                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4383                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4384                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4385                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4386                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4387                                                                                         }
4388                                                                                 }
4389                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4390                                                                         }}
4391                                                                 }
4392
4393                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4394                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4395                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4396                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4397                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4398                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4399                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4400                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4401                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4402                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4403                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4404                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4405                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4406                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4407                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4408                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4409                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4410                                                                                                         }
4411                                                                                                 };
4412                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4413                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4414                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4415                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4416                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4417                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4418                                                                                                         }
4419                                                                                                 }
4420                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4421                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4422                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4423                                                                                                 };
4424                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4425                                                                                         },
4426                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4427                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4428                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4429                                                                                         }
4430                                                                                 }
4431                                                                         },
4432                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4433                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4434                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4435                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4436                                                                                 }
4437                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4438                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4439                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4440                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4441                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4442                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4443                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4444                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4445                                                                                 } else {
4446                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4447                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4448                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4449                                                                                         };
4450                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4451                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4452                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4453                                                                                         }
4454                                                                                 }
4455                                                                         },
4456                                                                 };
4457                                                         },
4458                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4459                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4460                                                         }
4461                                                 }
4462                                         }
4463                                 }
4464                         }
4465                 }
4466
4467                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4468                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4469                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4470                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4471
4472                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4473                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4474                 }
4475                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4476
4477                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4478                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4479                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4480                 // network stack.
4481                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4482
4483                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4484                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4485                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4486         }
4487
4488         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4489         ///
4490         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4491         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4492                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4493
4494                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4495
4496                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4497                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4498                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4499                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4500                 }
4501
4502                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4503                         match event {
4504                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4505                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4506                                         // monitor updating completing.
4507                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4508                                 },
4509                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4510                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4511                                         {
4512                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4513                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4514                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4515                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4516                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4517                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4518                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4519                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4520                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4521                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4522                                                                         } else {
4523                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4524                                                                         }
4525                                                                 },
4526                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4527                                                         }
4528                                                 }
4529                                         }
4530                                         if !updated_chan {
4531                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4532                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4533                                         }
4534                                 },
4535                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4536                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4537                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4538                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4539                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4540                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4541                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4542                                                 } else {
4543                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4544                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4545                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4546                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4547                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4548                                                 }
4549                                         }
4550                                 },
4551                         }
4552                 }
4553                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4554         }
4555
4556         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4557         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4558         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4559                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4560                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4561         }
4562
4563         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4564                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4565                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4566                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4567                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4568                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4569                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4570                 }
4571                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4572                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4573                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4574                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4575                 }
4576                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4577                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4578
4579                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4580                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4581         }
4582
4583         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4584         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4585         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4586         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4587         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4588         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4589                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4590                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4591
4592                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4593                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4594
4595                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4596                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4597                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4598                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4599                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4600                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4601                                 ) {
4602                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4603                                                 min_mempool_feerate
4604                                         } else {
4605                                                 normal_feerate
4606                                         };
4607                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4608                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4609                                 }
4610                         }
4611
4612                         should_persist
4613                 });
4614         }
4615
4616         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4617         ///
4618         /// This currently includes:
4619         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4620         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4621         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4622         ///    the channel.
4623         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4624         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4625         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4626         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4627         ///
4628         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4629         /// estimate fetches.
4630         ///
4631         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4632         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4633         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4634                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4635                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4636
4637                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4638                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4639
4640                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4641                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4642                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4643                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4644
4645                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4646                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4647                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4648                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4649                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4650                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4651                         | {
4652                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4653                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4654                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4655                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4656                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4657                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4658                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4659                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4660                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4661                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4662                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4663                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4664                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4665                                                         },
4666                                                 },
4667                                         });
4668                                         false
4669                                 } else {
4670                                         true
4671                                 }
4672                         };
4673
4674                         {
4675                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4676                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4677                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4678                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4679                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4680                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4681                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4682                                                 match phase {
4683                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4684                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4685                                                                         min_mempool_feerate
4686                                                                 } else {
4687                                                                         normal_feerate
4688                                                                 };
4689                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4690                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4691
4692                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4693                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4694                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4695                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4696                                                                 }
4697
4698                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4699                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4700                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4701                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4702                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4703                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4704                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4705                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4706                                                                                 n += 1;
4707                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4708                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4709                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4710                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4711                                                                                                         msg: update
4712                                                                                                 });
4713                                                                                         }
4714                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4715                                                                                 } else {
4716                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4717                                                                                 }
4718                                                                         },
4719                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4720                                                                                 n += 1;
4721                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4722                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4723                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4724                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4725                                                                                                         msg: update
4726                                                                                                 });
4727                                                                                         }
4728                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4729                                                                                 } else {
4730                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4731                                                                                 }
4732                                                                         },
4733                                                                         _ => {},
4734                                                                 }
4735
4736                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4737
4738                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4739                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4740                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4741                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4742                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4743                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4744                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4745                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4746                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4747                                                                                         },
4748                                                                                 },
4749                                                                         });
4750                                                                 }
4751
4752                                                                 true
4753                                                         },
4754                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4755                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4756                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4757                                                         },
4758                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4759                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4760                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4761                                                         },
4762                                                 }
4763                                         });
4764
4765                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4766                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4767                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4768                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4769                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4770                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4771                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4772                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4773                                                                         },
4774                                                                 }
4775                                                         );
4776                                                 }
4777                                         }
4778                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4779
4780                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4781                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4782                                         }
4783                                 }
4784                         }
4785
4786                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4787                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4788                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4789                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4790                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4791                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4792                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4793                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4794                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4795                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4796                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4797                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4798                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4799                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4800                                                         let remove_entry = {
4801                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4802                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4803                                                         };
4804                                                         if remove_entry {
4805                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4806                                                         }
4807                                                 },
4808                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4809                                         }
4810                                 }
4811                         }
4812
4813                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4814                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4815                                         // This should be unreachable
4816                                         debug_assert!(false);
4817                                         return false;
4818                                 }
4819                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4820                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4821                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4822                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4823                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4824                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4825                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4826                                         {
4827                                                 return true;
4828                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4829                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4830                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4831                                         }) {
4832                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4833                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4834                                                 return false;
4835                                         }
4836                                 }
4837                                 true
4838                         });
4839
4840                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4841                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4842                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4843                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4844                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4845                         }
4846
4847                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4848                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4849                         }
4850
4851                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4852                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4853                         }
4854
4855                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4856
4857                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4858                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4859                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4860                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4861                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4862                         }
4863
4864                         should_persist
4865                 });
4866         }
4867
4868         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4869         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4870         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4871         ///
4872         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4873         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4874         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4875         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4876         ///
4877         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4878         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4879         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4880         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4881         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4882                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4883         }
4884
4885         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4886         /// reason for the failure.
4887         ///
4888         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4889         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4890                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4891
4892                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4893                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4894                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4895                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4896                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4897                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4898                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4899                         }
4900                 }
4901         }
4902
4903         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4904         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4905                 match failure_code {
4906                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4907                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4908                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4909                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4910                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4911                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4912                         },
4913                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4914                                 let fail_data = match data {
4915                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4916                                         None => Vec::new(),
4917                                 };
4918                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4919                         }
4920                 }
4921         }
4922
4923         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4924         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4925         ///
4926         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4927         /// forwarding
4928         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4929                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4930                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4931                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4932                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4933                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4934                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4935                 } else {
4936                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4937                 };
4938                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4939                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4940                 } else {
4941                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4942                 }
4943         }
4944
4945
4946         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4947         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4948         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4949                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4950                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4951                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4952                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4953                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4954                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4955                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4956                         }
4957                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4958                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4959                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4960                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4961                 } else {
4962                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4963                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4964                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4965                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4966                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4967                 }
4968         }
4969
4970         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4971         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4972         // be surfaced to the user.
4973         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4974                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4975                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4976         ) {
4977                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4978                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4979                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4980                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4981                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4982                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4983                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4984                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4985                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4986                                                 } else {
4987                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4988                                                         debug_assert!(false);
4989                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4990                                                 }
4991                                         },
4992                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4993                                 }
4994                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4995                 };
4996
4997                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4998                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4999                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5000                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5001                 }
5002         }
5003
5004         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5005         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5006         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5007                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5008                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5009                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5010                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5011                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5012                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5013                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5014                 }
5015
5016                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5017                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5018                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5019                 //timer handling.
5020
5021                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5022                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5023                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5024                 match source {
5025                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5026                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5027                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5028                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5029                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5030                         },
5031                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5032                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5033                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5034
5035                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5036                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5037                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5038                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5039                                 }
5040                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5041                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5042                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5043                                         },
5044                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5045                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5046                                         }
5047                                 }
5048                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5049                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5050                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5051                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5052                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5053                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5054                                 }, None));
5055                         },
5056                 }
5057         }
5058
5059         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5060         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5061         ///
5062         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5063         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5064         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5065         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5066         ///
5067         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5068         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5069         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5070         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5071         ///
5072         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5073         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5074         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5075         ///
5076         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5077         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5078         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5079         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5080         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5081         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5082         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5083         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5084                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5085         }
5086
5087         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5088         /// even type numbers.
5089         ///
5090         /// # Note
5091         ///
5092         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5093         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5094         ///
5095         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5096         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5097                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5098         }
5099
5100         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5101                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5102
5103                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5104
5105                 let mut sources = {
5106                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5107                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5108                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5109                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5110                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5111                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5112                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5113                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5114                                                 break;
5115                                         }
5116                                 }
5117
5118                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5119                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5120                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5121                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5122                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5123                                 });
5124                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5125                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5126                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5127                                                 &payment_hash);
5128                                 }
5129
5130                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5131                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5132                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5133                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5134                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5135                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5136                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5137                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5138                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5139                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5140                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5141                                                 }
5142                                                 return;
5143                                         }
5144                                 }
5145
5146                                 payment.htlcs
5147                         } else { return; }
5148                 };
5149                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5150
5151                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5152                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5153                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5154                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5155                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5156                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5157                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5158                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5159                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5160                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5161                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5162                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5163                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5164                                 debug_assert!(false);
5165                                 valid_mpp = false;
5166                                 break;
5167                         }
5168                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5169
5170                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5171                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5172                                 debug_assert!(false);
5173                                 valid_mpp = false;
5174                                 break;
5175                         }
5176                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5177                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5178                 }
5179                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5180                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5181                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5182                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5183                         return;
5184                 }
5185                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5186                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5187                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5188                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5189                         return;
5190                 }
5191                 if valid_mpp {
5192                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5193                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5194                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5195                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5196                                 {
5197                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5198                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5199                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5200                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5201                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5202                                 }
5203                         }
5204                 }
5205                 if !valid_mpp {
5206                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5207                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5208                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5209                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5210                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5211                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5212                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5213                         }
5214                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5215                 }
5216
5217                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5218                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5219                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5220                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5221                 }
5222         }
5223
5224         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5225                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5226         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5227                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5228
5229                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5230                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5231                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5232                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5233
5234                 {
5235                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5236                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5237                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5238                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5239                                 None => None
5240                         };
5241
5242                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5243                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5244                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5245                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5246
5247                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5248                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5249                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5250                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5251                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5252                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5253                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5254
5255                                                 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5256                                                         if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5257                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5258                                                                         chan_id, action);
5259                                                                 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5260                                                         }
5261                                                         if !during_init {
5262                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5263                                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5264                                                         } else {
5265                                                                 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5266                                                                 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5267                                                                 // monitor update as a background event.
5268                                                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5269                                                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5270                                                                                 counterparty_node_id,
5271                                                                                 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5272                                                                                 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5273                                                                         });
5274                                                         }
5275                                                 }
5276                                         }
5277                                         return Ok(());
5278                                 }
5279                         }
5280                 }
5281                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5282                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5283                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5284                                 payment_preimage,
5285                         }],
5286                 };
5287
5288                 if !during_init {
5289                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5290                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5291                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5292                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5293                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5294                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5295                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5296                                 // again on restart.
5297                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5298                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5299                         }
5300                 } else {
5301                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5302                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5303                         // event.
5304                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5305                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5306                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5307                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5308                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5309                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5310                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5311                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5312                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5313                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5314                                 )));
5315                 }
5316                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5317                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5318                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5319                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5320                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5321                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5322                 Ok(())
5323         }
5324
5325         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5326                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5327         }
5328
5329         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5330                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5331                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5332         ) {
5333                 match source {
5334                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5335                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5336                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5337                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5338                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5339                                 }
5340                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5341                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5342                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5343                                 };
5344                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5345                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5346                                         &self.logger);
5347                         },
5348                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5349                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5350                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5351                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5352                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5353                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5354                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5355                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5356                                                         } else { None };
5357
5358                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5359                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5360                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5361                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5362                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5363                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5364                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5365                                                                 },
5366                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5367                                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5368                                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5369                                                                         } else {
5370                                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5371                                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5372                                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5373                                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5374                                                                                 // closed.
5375                                                                                 None
5376                                                                         },
5377                                                         })
5378                                                 } else { None }
5379                                         });
5380                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5381                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5382                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5383                                 }
5384                         },
5385                 }
5386         }
5387
5388         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5389         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5390                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5391         }
5392
5393         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5394                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5395                         match action {
5396                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5397                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5398                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5399                                                 amount_msat,
5400                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5401                                                 receiver_node_id,
5402                                                 htlcs,
5403                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5404                                         }) = payment {
5405                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5406                                                         payment_hash,
5407                                                         purpose,
5408                                                         amount_msat,
5409                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5410                                                         htlcs,
5411                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5412                                                 }, None));
5413                                         }
5414                                 },
5415                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5416                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5417                                 } => {
5418                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5419                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5420                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5421                                         }
5422                                 },
5423                         }
5424                 }
5425         }
5426
5427         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5428         /// update completion.
5429         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5430                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5431                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5432                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5433                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5434         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5435                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5436                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5437                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5438                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5439                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5440                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5441                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5442
5443                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5444
5445                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5446                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5447                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5448                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5449                 }
5450
5451                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5452                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5453                 }
5454                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5455                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5456                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5457                                 msg,
5458                         });
5459                 }
5460
5461                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5462                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5463                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5464                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5465                                         updates: update,
5466                                 });
5467                         }
5468                 } }
5469                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5470                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5471                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5472                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5473                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5474                                 });
5475                         }
5476                 } }
5477                 match order {
5478                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5479                                 handle_cs!();
5480                                 handle_raa!();
5481                         },
5482                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5483                                 handle_raa!();
5484                                 handle_cs!();
5485                         },
5486                 }
5487
5488                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5489                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5490                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5491                 }
5492
5493                 {
5494                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5495                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5496                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5497                 }
5498
5499                 htlc_forwards
5500         }
5501
5502         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5503                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5504
5505                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5506                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5507                         None => {
5508                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5509                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5510                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5511                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5512                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5513                                         None => return,
5514                                 }
5515                         }
5516                 };
5517                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5518                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5519                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5520                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5521                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5522                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5523                 let channel =
5524                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5525                                 chan
5526                         } else {
5527                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5528                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5529                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5530                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5531                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5532                                 return;
5533                         };
5534                 let remaining_in_flight =
5535                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5536                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5537                                 pending.len()
5538                         } else { 0 };
5539                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5540                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5541                         remaining_in_flight);
5542                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5543                         return;
5544                 }
5545                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5546         }
5547
5548         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5549         ///
5550         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5551         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5552         /// the channel.
5553         ///
5554         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5555         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5556         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5557         ///
5558         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5559         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5560         /// used to accept such channels.
5561         ///
5562         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5563         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5564         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5565                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5566         }
5567
5568         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5569         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5570         ///
5571         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5572         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5573         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5574         ///
5575         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5576         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5577         ///
5578         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5579         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5580         ///
5581         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5582         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5583         ///
5584         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5585         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5586         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5587                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5588         }
5589
5590         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5591                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5592
5593                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5594                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5595                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5596                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5597                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5598                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5599                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5600                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5601
5602                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5603                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5604                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5605                 // succeed.
5606                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5607                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5608                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5609                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5610                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5611                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5612                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5613                         }
5614                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5615                 }?;
5616
5617                 if accept_0conf {
5618                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5619                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5620                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5621                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5622                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5623                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5624                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5625                                 }
5626                         };
5627                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5628                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5629                 } else {
5630                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5631                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5632                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5633                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5634                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5635                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5636                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5637                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5638                                         }
5639                                 };
5640                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5641                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5642                         }
5643                 }
5644
5645                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5646                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5647                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5648
5649                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5650                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5651                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5652                 });
5653
5654                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5655
5656                 Ok(())
5657         }
5658
5659         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5660         /// or 0-conf channels.
5661         ///
5662         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5663         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5664         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5665         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5666                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5667                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5668                 {
5669                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5670                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5671                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5672                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5673                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5674                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5675                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5676                                 }
5677                         }
5678                 }
5679                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5680         }
5681
5682         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5683                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5684         ) -> usize {
5685                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5686                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5687                         match phase {
5688                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5689                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5690                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5691                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5692                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5693                                         {
5694                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5695                                         }
5696                                 },
5697                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5698                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5699                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5700                                         }
5701                                 },
5702                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5703                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5704                                         continue;
5705                                 }
5706                         }
5707                 }
5708                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5709         }
5710
5711         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5712                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5713                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5714                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5715                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5716                 }
5717
5718                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5719                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5720                 }
5721
5722                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5723                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5724                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5725                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5726                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5727
5728                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5729                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5730                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5731                                 debug_assert!(false);
5732                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5733                         })?;
5734                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5735                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5736
5737                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5738                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5739                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5740                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5741                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5742                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5743                 {
5744                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5745                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5746                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5747                 }
5748
5749                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5750                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5751                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5752                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5753                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5754                 }
5755
5756                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5757                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5758                 if channel_exists {
5759                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5760                 }
5761
5762                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5763                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5764                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5765                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5766                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5767                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5768                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5769                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5770                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5771                         }, None));
5772                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5773                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5774                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5775                         });
5776                         return Ok(());
5777                 }
5778
5779                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5780                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5781                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5782                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5783                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5784                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5785                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5786                 {
5787                         Err(e) => {
5788                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5789                         },
5790                         Ok(res) => res
5791                 };
5792
5793                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5794                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5795                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5796                 }
5797                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5798                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5799                 }
5800
5801                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5802                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5803
5804                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5805                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5806                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5807                 });
5808                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5809                 Ok(())
5810         }
5811
5812         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5813                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5814                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5815                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5816                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5817                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5818                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5819                                         debug_assert!(false);
5820                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5821                                 })?;
5822                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5823                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5824                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5825                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5826                                         match phase.get_mut() {
5827                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5828                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5829                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5830                                                 },
5831                                                 _ => {
5832                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5833                                                 }
5834                                         }
5835                                 },
5836                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5837                         }
5838                 };
5839                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5840                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5841                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5842                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5843                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
5844                         output_script,
5845                         user_channel_id: user_id,
5846                 }, None));
5847                 Ok(())
5848         }
5849
5850         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5851                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5852
5853                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5854                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5855                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5856                                 debug_assert!(false);
5857                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5858                         })?;
5859
5860                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5861                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5862                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5863                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5864                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5865                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5866                                                 Ok(res) => res,
5867                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5868                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5869                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5870                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5871                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5872                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5873                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5874                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5875                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5876                                                 },
5877                                         }
5878                                 },
5879                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5880                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5881                                 },
5882                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5883                         };
5884
5885                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5886                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5887                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5888                         },
5889                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5890                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5891                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5892                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5893                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5894                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5895                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
5896                                         },
5897                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5898                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5899                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
5900                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5901                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
5902
5903                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5904                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5905                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5906                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
5907                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5908                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5909                                                                 msg: funding_msg,
5910                                                         });
5911
5912                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5913                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5914                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5915                                                         } else {
5916                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5917                                                         }
5918                                                         Ok(())
5919                                                 } else {
5920                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
5921                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5922                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5923                                                                 funding_msg.channel_id));
5924                                                 }
5925                                         }
5926                                 }
5927                         }
5928                 }
5929         }
5930
5931         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5932                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5933                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5934                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5935                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5936                                 debug_assert!(false);
5937                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5938                         })?;
5939
5940                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5941                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5942                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5943                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5944                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5945                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5946                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5947                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5948                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
5949                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5950                                                         Ok(())
5951                                                 } else {
5952                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
5953                                                 }
5954                                         },
5955                                         _ => {
5956                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5957                                         },
5958                                 }
5959                         },
5960                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5961                 }
5962         }
5963
5964         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5965                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
5966                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
5967                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5968                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5969                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5970                                 debug_assert!(false);
5971                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5972                         })?;
5973                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5974                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5975                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5976                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5977                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5978                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5979                                                 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5980                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5981                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5982                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5983                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5984                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
5985                                                 });
5986                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5987                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5988                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5989                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5990                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5991                                                 // announcement_signatures.
5992                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5993                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5994                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5995                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5996                                                                 msg,
5997                                                         });
5998                                                 }
5999                                         }
6000
6001                                         {
6002                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6003                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6004                                         }
6005
6006                                         Ok(())
6007                                 } else {
6008                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6009                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6010                                 }
6011                         },
6012                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6013                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6014                         }
6015                 }
6016         }
6017
6018         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6019                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6020                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6021                 {
6022                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6023                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6024                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6025                                         debug_assert!(false);
6026                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6027                                 })?;
6028                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6029                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6030                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6031                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6032                                 match phase {
6033                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6034                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6035                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6036                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6037                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6038                                                 }
6039
6040                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6041                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6042                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6043                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6044
6045                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6046                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6047                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6048                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6049                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6050                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6051                                                                 msg,
6052                                                         });
6053                                                 }
6054                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6055                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6056                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6057                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6058                                                 }
6059                                         },
6060                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6061                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6062                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6063                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6064                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6065                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6066                                         },
6067                                 }
6068                         } else {
6069                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6070                         }
6071                 }
6072                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6073                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6074                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6075                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6076                 }
6077                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6078                         self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6079                 }
6080
6081                 Ok(())
6082         }
6083
6084         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6085                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6086                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6087                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6088                                 debug_assert!(false);
6089                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6090                         })?;
6091                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6092                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6093                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6094                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6095                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6096                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6097                                                 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6098                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6099                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6100                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6101                                                                 msg,
6102                                                         });
6103                                                 }
6104                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6105                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6106                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6107                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6108                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6109                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6110                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6111                                                 } else { (tx, None) }
6112                                         } else {
6113                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6114                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6115                                         }
6116                                 },
6117                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6118                         }
6119                 };
6120                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6121                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6122                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6123                 }
6124                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6125                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6126                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6127                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6128                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6129                                         msg: update
6130                                 });
6131                         }
6132                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6133                 }
6134                 Ok(())
6135         }
6136
6137         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6138                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6139                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6140                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6141                 //
6142                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6143                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6144                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6145                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6146
6147                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6148                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6149
6150                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6151                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6152                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6153                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6154                                 debug_assert!(false);
6155                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6156                         })?;
6157                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6158                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6159                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6160                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6161                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6162                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6163                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6164                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6165                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6166                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6167                                         };
6168                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6169                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6170                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6171                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6172                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6173                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6174                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6175                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6176                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6177                                                                 } else {
6178                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6179                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6180                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6181                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6182                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6183                                                                         reason
6184                                                                 };
6185                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6186                                                         },
6187                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6188                                                 }
6189                                         };
6190                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6191                                 } else {
6192                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6193                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6194                                 }
6195                         },
6196                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6197                 }
6198                 Ok(())
6199         }
6200
6201         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6202                 let funding_txo;
6203                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6204                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6205                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6206                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6207                                         debug_assert!(false);
6208                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6209                                 })?;
6210                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6211                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6212                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6213                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6214                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6215                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6216                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6217                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6218                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6219                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6220                                                 }
6221                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6222                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6223                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6224                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6225                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6226                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6227                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6228                                                 res
6229                                         } else {
6230                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6231                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6232                                         }
6233                                 },
6234                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6235                         }
6236                 };
6237                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6238                 Ok(())
6239         }
6240
6241         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6242                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6243                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6244                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6245                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6246                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6247                                 debug_assert!(false);
6248                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6249                         })?;
6250                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6251                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6252                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6253                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6254                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6255                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6256                                 } else {
6257                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6258                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6259                                 }
6260                         },
6261                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6262                 }
6263                 Ok(())
6264         }
6265
6266         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6267                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6268                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6269                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6270                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6271                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6272                                 debug_assert!(false);
6273                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6274                         })?;
6275                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6276                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6277                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6278                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6279                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6280                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6281                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6282                                 }
6283                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6284                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6285                                 } else {
6286                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6287                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6288                                 }
6289                                 Ok(())
6290                         },
6291                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6292                 }
6293         }
6294
6295         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6296                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6297                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6298                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6299                                 debug_assert!(false);
6300                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6301                         })?;
6302                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6303                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6304                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6305                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6306                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6307                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6308                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6309                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6310                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6311                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6312                                         }
6313                                         Ok(())
6314                                 } else {
6315                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6316                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6317                                 }
6318                         },
6319                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6320                 }
6321         }
6322
6323         #[inline]
6324         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6325                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6326                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6327                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6328                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6329                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6330                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6331                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6332                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6333                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6334                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6335                                         };
6336                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6337                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6338
6339                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6340                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6341                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6342                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6343                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6344                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6345                                                 },
6346                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6347                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6348                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6349                                                         {
6350                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6351                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6352                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6353                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6354                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6355                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6356                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6357                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6358                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6359                                                                                         intercept_id
6360                                                                                 }, None));
6361                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6362                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6363                                                                         },
6364                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6365                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6366                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6367                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6368                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6369                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6370                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6371                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6372                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6373                                                                                 });
6374
6375                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6376                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6377                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6378                                                                                 ));
6379                                                                         }
6380                                                                 }
6381                                                         } else {
6382                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6383                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6384                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6385                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6386                                                                 }
6387                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6388                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6389                                                         }
6390                                                 }
6391                                         }
6392                                 }
6393                         }
6394
6395                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6396                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6397                         }
6398
6399                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6400                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6401                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6402                         }
6403                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6404                 }
6405         }
6406
6407         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6408                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6409                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6410                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6411                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6412                 ).count();
6413                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6414                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6415                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6416                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6417                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6418                 // real by taking more time.
6419                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6420                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6421                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6422                         }, None));
6423                 }
6424         }
6425
6426         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6427         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6428         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6429         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6430         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6431                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6432                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6433         ) -> bool {
6434                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6435                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6436                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6437                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6438                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6439                                 counterparty_node_id,
6440                         })
6441                 })
6442         }
6443
6444         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6445         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6446                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6447         ) -> bool {
6448                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6449                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6450                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6451                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6452
6453                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6454                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6455                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6456                         }
6457                 }
6458                 false
6459         }
6460
6461         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6462                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6463                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6464                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6465                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6466                                         debug_assert!(false);
6467                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6468                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6469                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6470                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6471                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6472                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6473                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6474                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6475                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6476                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6477                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6478                                                 } else { false };
6479                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6480                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6481                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6482                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6483                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6484                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6485                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6486                                                 }
6487                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6488                                         } else {
6489                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6490                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6491                                         }
6492                                 },
6493                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6494                         }
6495                 };
6496                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6497                 Ok(())
6498         }
6499
6500         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6501                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6502                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6503                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6504                                 debug_assert!(false);
6505                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6506                         })?;
6507                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6508                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6509                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6510                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6511                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6512                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6513                                 } else {
6514                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6515                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6516                                 }
6517                         },
6518                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6519                 }
6520                 Ok(())
6521         }
6522
6523         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6524                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6525                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6526                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6527                                 debug_assert!(false);
6528                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6529                         })?;
6530                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6531                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6532                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6533                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6534                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6535                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6536                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6537                                         }
6538
6539                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6540                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6541                                                         &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6542                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6543                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6544                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6545                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6546                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6547                                         });
6548                                 } else {
6549                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6550                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6551                                 }
6552                         },
6553                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6554                 }
6555                 Ok(())
6556         }
6557
6558         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6559         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6560                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6561                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6562                         None => {
6563                                 // It's not a local channel
6564                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6565                         }
6566                 };
6567                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6568                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6569                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6570                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6571                 }
6572                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6573                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6574                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6575                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6576                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6577                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6578                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6579                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6580                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6581                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6582                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6583                                                 }
6584                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6585                                         }
6586                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6587                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6588                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6589                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6590                                         } else {
6591                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6592                                                 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6593                                         }
6594                                 } else {
6595                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6596                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6597                                 }
6598                         },
6599                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6600                 }
6601                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6602         }
6603
6604         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6605                 let htlc_forwards;
6606                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6607                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6608
6609                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6610                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6611                                         debug_assert!(false);
6612                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6613                                 })?;
6614                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6615                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6616                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6617                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6618                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6619                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6620                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6621                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6622                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6623                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6624                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6625                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6626                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
6627                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6628                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6629                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6630                                                                 msg,
6631                                                         });
6632                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6633                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6634                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6635                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
6636                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6637                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6638                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6639                                                                         msg,
6640                                                                 });
6641                                                         }
6642                                                 }
6643                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6644                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6645                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6646                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6647                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6648                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6649                                                 }
6650                                                 need_lnd_workaround
6651                                         } else {
6652                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6653                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6654                                         }
6655                                 },
6656                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6657                         }
6658                 };
6659
6660                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6661                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6662                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6663                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6664                 }
6665
6666                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6667                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6668                 }
6669                 Ok(persist)
6670         }
6671
6672         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6673         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6674                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6675
6676                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6677                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6678                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6679                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6680                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6681                                 match monitor_event {
6682                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6683                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6684                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6685                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6686                                                 } else {
6687                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6688                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6689                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6690                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6691                                                 }
6692                                         },
6693                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6694                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6695                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6696                                                         None => {
6697                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6698                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6699                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6700                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6701                                                         }
6702                                                 };
6703                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6704                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6705                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6706                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6707                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6708                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6709                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6710                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6711                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6712                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6713                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6714                                                                                                 msg: update
6715                                                                                         });
6716                                                                                 }
6717                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6718                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6719                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6720                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6721                                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6722                                                                                         },
6723                                                                                 });
6724                                                                         }
6725                                                                 }
6726                                                         }
6727                                                 }
6728                                         },
6729                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6730                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6731                                         },
6732                                 }
6733                         }
6734                 }
6735
6736                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6737                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6738                 }
6739
6740                 has_pending_monitor_events
6741         }
6742
6743         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6744         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6745         /// update events as a separate process method here.
6746         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
6747         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6748                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6749                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6750         }
6751
6752         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6753         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6754         /// update was applied.
6755         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6756                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6757                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6758
6759                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6760                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6761                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6762                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6763                 'peer_loop: loop {
6764                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6765                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6766                                 'chan_loop: loop {
6767                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6768                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6769                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6770                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6771                                         ) {
6772                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6773                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6774                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6775                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6776                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6777                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6778                                                 }
6779                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6780                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
6781
6782                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6783                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6784                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
6785                                                 }
6786                                         }
6787                                         break 'chan_loop;
6788                                 }
6789                         }
6790                         break 'peer_loop;
6791                 }
6792
6793                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
6794                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6795                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6796                 }
6797
6798                 has_update
6799         }
6800
6801         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6802         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6803         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6804         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6805                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6806                 let mut has_update = false;
6807                 {
6808                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6809
6810                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6811                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6812                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6813                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6814                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6815                                         match phase {
6816                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6817                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6818                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6819                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6820                                                                                 has_update = true;
6821                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6822                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6823                                                                                 });
6824                                                                         }
6825                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6826                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6827                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6828                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6829                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6830                                                                                                 msg: update
6831                                                                                         });
6832                                                                                 }
6833
6834                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6835
6836                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6837                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6838                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6839                                                                                 false
6840                                                                         } else { true }
6841                                                                 },
6842                                                                 Err(e) => {
6843                                                                         has_update = true;
6844                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6845                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6846                                                                         !close_channel
6847                                                                 }
6848                                                         }
6849                                                 },
6850                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6851                                         }
6852                                 });
6853                         }
6854                 }
6855
6856                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6857                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6858                 }
6859
6860                 has_update
6861         }
6862
6863         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6864         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6865         /// Channel object.
6866         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6867                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6868                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6869                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6870                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
6871                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6872                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6873                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6874                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6875                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6876                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6877                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6878                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
6879                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
6880                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6881                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6882                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6883                                         });
6884                         }
6885                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6886                 }
6887         }
6888
6889         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6890         /// to pay us.
6891         ///
6892         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6893         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6894         ///
6895         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6896         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6897         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6898         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6899         ///
6900         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6901         ///
6902         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6903         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6904         ///
6905         /// # Note
6906         ///
6907         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6908         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6909         ///
6910         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6911         ///
6912         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6913         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6914         ///
6915         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6916         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6917         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6918         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6919         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6920         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6921         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6922                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6923                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6924                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6925                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6926         }
6927
6928         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6929         /// stored external to LDK.
6930         ///
6931         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6932         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6933         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6934         ///
6935         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6936         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6937         /// payments.
6938         ///
6939         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6940         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6941         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6942         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6943         ///
6944         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6945         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6946         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6947         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6948         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6949         ///
6950         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6951         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6952         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6953         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6954         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6955         ///
6956         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6957         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6958         ///
6959         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6960         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6961         ///
6962         /// # Note
6963         ///
6964         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6965         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6966         ///
6967         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6968         ///
6969         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6970         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6971         ///
6972         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6973         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6974         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6975                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6976                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6977                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6978                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
6979         }
6980
6981         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6982         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6983         ///
6984         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6985         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6986                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6987         }
6988
6989         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6990         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6991         ///
6992         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6993         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6994                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6995                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6996                 loop {
6997                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6998                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6999                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7000                                 Some(_) => continue,
7001                                 None => return scid_candidate
7002                         }
7003                 }
7004         }
7005
7006         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7007         ///
7008         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7009         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7010                 PhantomRouteHints {
7011                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7012                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7013                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7014                 }
7015         }
7016
7017         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7018         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7019         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7020         ///
7021         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7022         /// times to get a unique scid.
7023         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7024                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7025                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7026                 loop {
7027                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7028                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7029                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7030                         return scid_candidate
7031                 }
7032         }
7033
7034         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7035         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7036         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7037                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7038
7039                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7040                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7041                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7042                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7043                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7044                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7045                         ) {
7046                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7047                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7048                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7049                                         }
7050                                 }
7051                         }
7052                 }
7053
7054                 inflight_htlcs
7055         }
7056
7057         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7058         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7059                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7060                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7061                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7062                 events.into_inner()
7063         }
7064
7065         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7066         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7067                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7068                 events.push_back((event, None));
7069         }
7070
7071         #[cfg(test)]
7072         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7073                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7074                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7075         }
7076
7077         #[cfg(test)]
7078         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7079                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7080         }
7081
7082         #[cfg(test)]
7083         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7084                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7085         }
7086
7087         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7088         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7089         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7090         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7091         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7092                 loop {
7093                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7094                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7095                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7096                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7097
7098                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7099                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7100                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7101                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7102                                         {
7103                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7104                                         }
7105                                 }
7106
7107                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7108                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7109                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7110                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7111                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7112                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7113                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7114                                         break;
7115                                 }
7116
7117                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7118                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7119                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7120                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7121                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7122                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7123                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7124                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7125                                                         if further_update_exists {
7126                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7127                                                                 // top of the loop.
7128                                                                 continue;
7129                                                         }
7130                                                 } else {
7131                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7132                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7133                                                 }
7134                                         }
7135                                 }
7136                         } else {
7137                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7138                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7139                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7140                         }
7141                         break;
7142                 }
7143         }
7144
7145         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7146                 for action in actions {
7147                         match action {
7148                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7149                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7150                                 } => {
7151                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7152                                 }
7153                         }
7154                 }
7155         }
7156
7157         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7158         /// using the given event handler.
7159         ///
7160         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7161         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7162                 &self, handler: H
7163         ) {
7164                 let mut ev;
7165                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7166         }
7167 }
7168
7169 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7170 where
7171         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7172         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7173         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7174         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7175         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7176         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7177         R::Target: Router,
7178         L::Target: Logger,
7179 {
7180         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7181         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7182         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7183         /// is always placed next to each other.
7184         ///
7185         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7186         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7187         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7188         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7189         ///
7190         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7191         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7192         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7193         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7194                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7195                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7196                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7197
7198                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7199                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7200                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7201                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7202                         }
7203
7204                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7205                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7206                         }
7207                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7208                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7209                         }
7210
7211                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7212                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7213                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7214                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7215                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7216                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7217                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7218                                 }
7219                         }
7220
7221                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7222                                 events.replace(pending_events);
7223                         }
7224
7225                         result
7226                 });
7227                 events.into_inner()
7228         }
7229 }
7230
7231 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7232 where
7233         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7234         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7235         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7236         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7237         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7238         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7239         R::Target: Router,
7240         L::Target: Logger,
7241 {
7242         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7243         ///
7244         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7245         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7246         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7247                 let mut ev;
7248                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7249         }
7250 }
7251
7252 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7253 where
7254         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7255         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7256         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7257         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7258         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7259         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7260         R::Target: Router,
7261         L::Target: Logger,
7262 {
7263         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7264                 {
7265                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7266                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7267                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7268                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7269                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7270                 }
7271
7272                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7273                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7274         }
7275
7276         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7277                 let _persistence_guard =
7278                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7279                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7280                 let new_height = height - 1;
7281                 {
7282                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7283                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7284                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7285                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7286                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7287                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7288                 }
7289
7290                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7291         }
7292 }
7293
7294 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7295 where
7296         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7297         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7298         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7299         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7300         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7301         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7302         R::Target: Router,
7303         L::Target: Logger,
7304 {
7305         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7306                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7307                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7308                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7309
7310                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7311                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7312
7313                 let _persistence_guard =
7314                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7315                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7316                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7317                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7318
7319                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7320                 if height < last_best_block_height {
7321                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7322                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7323                 }
7324         }
7325
7326         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7327                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7328                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7329                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7330
7331                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7332                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7333
7334                 let _persistence_guard =
7335                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7336                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7337                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7338
7339                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7340
7341                 macro_rules! max_time {
7342                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
7343                                 loop {
7344                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7345                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7346                                         // having an explicit local time source.
7347                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7348                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7349                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7350                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7351                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7352                                                 break;
7353                                         }
7354                                 }
7355                         }
7356                 }
7357                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7358                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7359                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7360                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7361                 });
7362         }
7363
7364         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7365                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7366                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7367                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7368                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7369                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7370                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7371                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7372                                 }
7373                         }
7374                 }
7375                 res
7376         }
7377
7378         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7379                 let _persistence_guard =
7380                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7381                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7382                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7383                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7384                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7385                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7386                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7387                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7388                 });
7389         }
7390 }
7391
7392 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7393 where
7394         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7395         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7396         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7397         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7398         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7399         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7400         R::Target: Router,
7401         L::Target: Logger,
7402 {
7403         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7404         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7405         /// the function.
7406         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7407                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7408                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7409                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7410                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7411
7412                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7413                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7414                 {
7415                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7416                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7417                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7418                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7419                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7420                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7421                                         match phase {
7422                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
7423                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7424                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7425                                                         let res = f(channel);
7426                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7427                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7428                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7429                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7430                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7431                                                                 }
7432                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7433                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7434                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
7435                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7436                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7437                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7438                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7439                                                                                                 msg,
7440                                                                                         });
7441                                                                                 }
7442                                                                         } else {
7443                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7444                                                                         }
7445                                                                 }
7446
7447                                                                 {
7448                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7449                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7450                                                                 }
7451
7452                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7453                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7454                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7455                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7456                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
7457                                                                         });
7458                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7459                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7460                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7461                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
7462                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7463                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7464                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7465                                                                                         });
7466                                                                                 }
7467                                                                         }
7468                                                                 }
7469                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7470                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7471                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7472                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7473                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7474                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7475                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7476                                                                                 // is always consistent.
7477                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7478                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7479                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7480                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7481                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7482                                                                         }
7483                                                                 }
7484                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7485                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7486                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7487                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7488                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7489                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7490                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7491                                                                                 msg: update
7492                                                                         });
7493                                                                 }
7494                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7495                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7496                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7497                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7498                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7499                                                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7500                                                                                 data: reason_message,
7501                                                                         } },
7502                                                                 });
7503                                                                 return false;
7504                                                         }
7505                                                         true
7506                                                 }
7507                                         }
7508                                 });
7509                         }
7510                 }
7511
7512                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7513                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7514                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7515                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7516                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7517                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7518                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7519                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7520                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7521                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7522
7523                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7524                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7525                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7526                                                 false
7527                                         } else { true }
7528                                 });
7529                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7530                         });
7531
7532                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7533                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7534                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7535                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7536                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7537                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7538                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7539                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7540                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7541                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7542                                         });
7543
7544                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7545                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7546                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
7547                                         };
7548                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7549                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7550                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7551                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7552                                         false
7553                                 } else { true }
7554                         });
7555                 }
7556
7557                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7558
7559                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7560                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7561                 }
7562         }
7563
7564         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7565         /// may have events that need processing.
7566         ///
7567         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7568         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7569         ///
7570         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7571         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7572         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7573                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7574         }
7575
7576         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7577         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7578                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7579         }
7580
7581         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7582         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7583                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7584         }
7585
7586         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7587         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7588         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7589                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7590         }
7591
7592         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7593         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7594         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7595                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7596         }
7597
7598         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7599         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7600         ///
7601         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7602         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7603         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7604         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7605                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7606         }
7607
7608         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7609         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7610         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7611                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7612         }
7613
7614         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7615         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7616         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7617                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7618         }
7619
7620         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7621         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7622         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7623                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7624         }
7625 }
7626
7627 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7628         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7629 where
7630         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7631         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7632         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7633         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7634         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7635         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7636         R::Target: Router,
7637         L::Target: Logger,
7638 {
7639         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7640                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7641                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7642                 // change to the contents.
7643                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7644                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7645                         let persist = match &res {
7646                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7647                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7648                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
7649                                 },
7650                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7651                         };
7652                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7653                         persist
7654                 });
7655         }
7656
7657         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7658                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7659                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7660                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7661         }
7662
7663         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7664                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7665                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7666                 // change to the contents.
7667                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7668                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7669                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7670                 });
7671         }
7672
7673         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7674                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7675                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7676                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7677         }
7678
7679         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7680                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7681                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7682         }
7683
7684         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7685                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7686                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7687         }
7688
7689         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7690                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7691                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7692                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7693                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7694                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7695                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7696                         let persist = match &res {
7697                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7698                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7699                         };
7700                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7701                         persist
7702                 });
7703         }
7704
7705         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7706                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7707                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7708         }
7709
7710         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7711                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7712                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7713         }
7714
7715         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7716                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7717                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7718                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7719                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7720                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7721                         let persist = match &res {
7722                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7723                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7724                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7725                         };
7726                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7727                         persist
7728                 });
7729         }
7730
7731         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7732                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7733                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7734         }
7735
7736         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7737                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7738                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7739                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7740                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7741                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7742                         let persist = match &res {
7743                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7744                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7745                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7746                         };
7747                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7748                         persist
7749                 });
7750         }
7751
7752         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7753                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7754                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7755                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7756                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7757                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7758                         let persist = match &res {
7759                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7760                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7761                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7762                         };
7763                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7764                         persist
7765                 });
7766         }
7767
7768         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7769                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7770                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7771         }
7772
7773         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7774                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7775                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7776         }
7777
7778         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7779                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7780                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7781                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7782                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7783                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7784                         let persist = match &res {
7785                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7786                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7787                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7788                         };
7789                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7790                         persist
7791                 });
7792         }
7793
7794         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7795                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7796                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7797         }
7798
7799         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7800                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7801                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7802                                 persist
7803                         } else {
7804                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7805                         }
7806                 });
7807         }
7808
7809         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7810                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7811                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7812                         let persist = match &res {
7813                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7814                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7815                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
7816                         };
7817                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7818                         persist
7819                 });
7820         }
7821
7822         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7823                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
7824                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
7825
7826                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7827                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7828                 let remove_peer = {
7829                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7830                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7831                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7832                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7833                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7834                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7835                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7836                                         let context = match phase {
7837                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7838                                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7839                                                         // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7840                                                         if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7841                                                                 return true;
7842                                                         }
7843                                                         &chan.context
7844                                                 },
7845                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7846                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7847                                                         &chan.context
7848                                                 },
7849                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7850                                                         &chan.context
7851                                                 },
7852                                         };
7853                                         // Clean up for removal.
7854                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7855                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7856                                         false
7857                                 });
7858                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7859                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7860                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7861                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7862                                         match msg {
7863                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
7864                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7865                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7866                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7867                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7868                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
7869                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7870                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7871                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
7872                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7873                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7874                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7875                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7876                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7877                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7878                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7879                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7880                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7881                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7882                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7883                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7884                                                 // Channel Operations
7885                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7886                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7887                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7888                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7889                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7890                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7891                                                 // Gossip
7892                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7893                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7894                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7895                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7896                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7897                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7898                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7899                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7900                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7901                                         }
7902                                 });
7903                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7904                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7905                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7906                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7907                 };
7908                 if remove_peer {
7909                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7910                 }
7911                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7912
7913                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7914                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7915                 }
7916         }
7917
7918         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7919                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7920                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7921                         return Err(());
7922                 }
7923
7924                 let mut res = Ok(());
7925
7926                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7927                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7928                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7929                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7930                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7931                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7932                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7933
7934                         {
7935                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7936                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7937                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7938                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
7939                                                         res = Err(());
7940                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7941                                                 }
7942                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7943                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7944                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7945                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7946                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7947                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7948                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7949                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7950                                                         is_connected: true,
7951                                                 }));
7952                                         },
7953                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7954                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7955                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7956
7957                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7958                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7959                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7960                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7961                                                 {
7962                                                         res = Err(());
7963                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7964                                                 }
7965
7966                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7967                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7968                                         },
7969                                 }
7970                         }
7971
7972                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7973
7974                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7975                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7976                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7977                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7978                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7979
7980                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7981                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7982                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7983                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7984                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
7985                                                 debug_assert!(false);
7986                                                 None
7987                                         }
7988                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
7989                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7990                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7991                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7992                                         });
7993                                 });
7994                         }
7995
7996                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7997                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7998                 });
7999                 res
8000         }
8001
8002         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8003                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8004
8005                 match &msg.data as &str {
8006                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8007                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8008                         {
8009                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8010                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8011                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8012                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8013                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8014                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8015                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8016                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8017                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8018                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8019                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8020                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8021                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8022                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8023                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8024                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8025                                                                 msg,
8026                                                         });
8027                                                 }
8028                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8029                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8030                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8031                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8032                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8033                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8034                                                                 },
8035                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8036                                                         }
8037                                                 });
8038                                         }
8039                                 }
8040                                 return;
8041                         }
8042                         _ => {}
8043                 }
8044
8045                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8046                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8047                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8048                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8049                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8050                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8051                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8052                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8053                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8054                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8055                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8056                         };
8057                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8058                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8059                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8060                         }
8061                 } else {
8062                         {
8063                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8064                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8065                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8066                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8067                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8068                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8069                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8070                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8071                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8072                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8073                                                         msg,
8074                                                 });
8075                                                 return;
8076                                         }
8077                                 }
8078                         }
8079
8080                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8081                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8082                 }
8083         }
8084
8085         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8086                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8087         }
8088
8089         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8090                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8091         }
8092
8093         fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8094                 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8095         }
8096
8097         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8098                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8099                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8100                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8101         }
8102
8103         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8104                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8105                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8106                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8107         }
8108
8109         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8110                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8111                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8112                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8113         }
8114
8115         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8116                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8117                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8118                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8119         }
8120
8121         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8122                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8123                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8124                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8125         }
8126
8127         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8128                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8129                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8130                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8131         }
8132
8133         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8134                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8135                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8136                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8137         }
8138
8139         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8140                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8141                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8142                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8143         }
8144
8145         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8146                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8147                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8148                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8149         }
8150 }
8151
8152 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8153 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8154 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8155         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8156         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8157         node_features
8158 }
8159
8160 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8161 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8162 ///
8163 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8164 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8165 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8166 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8167         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8168 }
8169
8170 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8171 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8172 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8173         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8174 }
8175
8176 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8177 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8178 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8179         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8180 }
8181
8182 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8183 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8184 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8185         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8186         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8187         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8188         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8189         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8190         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8191         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8192         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8193         features.set_payment_secret_required();
8194         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8195         features.set_wumbo_optional();
8196         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8197         features.set_channel_type_optional();
8198         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8199         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8200         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8201                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8202         }
8203         features
8204 }
8205
8206 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8207 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8208
8209 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8210         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8211         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8212         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8213 });
8214
8215 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8216         (2, node_id, required),
8217         (4, features, required),
8218         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8219         (8, forwarding_info, option),
8220         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8221         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8222 });
8223
8224 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8225         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8226                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8227                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8228                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8229                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8230                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8231                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8232                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
8233                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
8234                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
8235                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8236                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8237                         (7, self.config, option),
8238                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8239                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
8240                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8241                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8242                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8243                         (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),  // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8244                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8245                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8246                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8247                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8248                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8249                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8250                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8251                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8252                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
8253                         (32, self.is_public, required),
8254                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8255                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8256                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8257                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8258                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8259                 });
8260                 Ok(())
8261         }
8262 }
8263
8264 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8265         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8266                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8267                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8268                         (2, channel_id, required),
8269                         (3, channel_type, option),
8270                         (4, counterparty, required),
8271                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8272                         (6, funding_txo, option),
8273                         (7, config, option),
8274                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
8275                         (9, confirmations, option),
8276                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8277                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8278                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8279                         (16, _balance_msat, option),  // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8280                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8281                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8282                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8283                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8284                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8285                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8286                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
8287                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8288                         (26, is_outbound, required),
8289                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8290                         (30, is_usable, required),
8291                         (32, is_public, required),
8292                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8293                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8294                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8295                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8296                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8297                 });
8298
8299                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8300                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8301                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8302                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8303                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8304
8305                 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8306
8307                 Ok(Self {
8308                         inbound_scid_alias,
8309                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8310                         channel_type,
8311                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8312                         outbound_scid_alias,
8313                         funding_txo,
8314                         config,
8315                         short_channel_id,
8316                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8317                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8318                         user_channel_id,
8319                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8320                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8321                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8322                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8323                         confirmations_required,
8324                         confirmations,
8325                         force_close_spend_delay,
8326                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8327                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8328                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8329                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8330                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8331                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8332                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8333                         channel_shutdown_state,
8334                 })
8335         }
8336 }
8337
8338 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8339         (2, channels, required_vec),
8340         (4, phantom_scid, required),
8341         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8342 });
8343
8344 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8345         (0, Forward) => {
8346                 (0, onion_packet, required),
8347                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8348         },
8349         (1, Receive) => {
8350                 (0, payment_data, required),
8351                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8352                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8353                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8354                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8355         },
8356         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8357                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8358                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8359                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8360                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8361                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8362         },
8363 ;);
8364
8365 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8366         (0, routing, required),
8367         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8368         (4, payment_hash, required),
8369         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8370         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8371         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8372         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8373 });
8374
8375
8376 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8377         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8378                 match self {
8379                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8380                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8381                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8382                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8383                                 reason.write(writer)?;
8384                         },
8385                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8386                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8387                         }) => {
8388                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8389                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8390                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8391                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8392                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8393                         },
8394                 }
8395                 Ok(())
8396         }
8397 }
8398
8399 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8400         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8401                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8402                 match id {
8403                         0 => {
8404                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8405                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8406                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8407                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8408                                 }))
8409                         },
8410                         1 => {
8411                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8412                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8413                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8414                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8415                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8416                                 }))
8417                         },
8418                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8419                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8420                         // messages contained in the variants.
8421                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8422                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8423                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8424                         2 => {
8425                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8426                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8427                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8428                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8429                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8430                         },
8431                         3 => {
8432                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8433                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8434                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8435                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8436                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8437                         },
8438                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8439                 }
8440         }
8441 }
8442
8443 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8444         (0, Forward),
8445         (1, Fail),
8446 );
8447
8448 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8449         (0, short_channel_id, required),
8450         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8451         (2, outpoint, required),
8452         (4, htlc_id, required),
8453         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8454         (7, user_channel_id, option),
8455 });
8456
8457 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8458         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8459                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8460                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8461                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8462                 };
8463                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8464                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8465                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
8466                         (2, self.value, required),
8467                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8468                         (4, payment_data, option),
8469                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8470                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8471                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8472                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8473                 });
8474                 Ok(())
8475         }
8476 }
8477
8478 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8479         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8480                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8481                         (0, prev_hop, required),
8482                         (1, total_msat, option),
8483                         (2, value_ser, required),
8484                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8485                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8486                         (5, total_value_received, option),
8487                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8488                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8489                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8490                 });
8491                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8492                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8493                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8494                         Some(p) => {
8495                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
8496                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8497                                 }
8498                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8499                                         total_msat = Some(value);
8500                                 }
8501                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8502                         },
8503                         None => {
8504                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8505                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
8506                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8507                                         }
8508                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8509                                 }
8510                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8511                         },
8512                 };
8513                 Ok(Self {
8514                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8515                         timer_ticks: 0,
8516                         value,
8517                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8518                         total_value_received,
8519                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8520                         onion_payload,
8521                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8522                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8523                 })
8524         }
8525 }
8526
8527 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8528         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8529                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8530                 match id {
8531                         0 => {
8532                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8533                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8534                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8535                                 let mut payment_id = None;
8536                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8537                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8538                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8539                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8540                                         (1, payment_id, option),
8541                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8542                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8543                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8544                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
8545                                 });
8546                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
8547                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8548                                         // instead.
8549                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8550                                 }
8551                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8552                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8553                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8554                                 }
8555                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8556                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8557                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8558                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8559                                                 }
8560                                         }
8561                                 }
8562                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8563                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8564                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
8565                                         path,
8566                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8567                                 })
8568                         }
8569                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8570                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8571                 }
8572         }
8573 }
8574
8575 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8576         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8577                 match self {
8578                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8579                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8580                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8581                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8582                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8583                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8584                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8585                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8586                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8587                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8588                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8589                                  });
8590                         }
8591                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8592                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8593                                 field.write(writer)?;
8594                         }
8595                 }
8596                 Ok(())
8597         }
8598 }
8599
8600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8601         (0, forward_info, required),
8602         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8603         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8604         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8605         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8606 });
8607
8608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8609         (1, FailHTLC) => {
8610                 (0, htlc_id, required),
8611                 (2, err_packet, required),
8612         };
8613         (0, AddHTLC)
8614 );
8615
8616 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8617         (0, payment_secret, required),
8618         (2, expiry_time, required),
8619         (4, user_payment_id, required),
8620         (6, payment_preimage, required),
8621         (8, min_value_msat, required),
8622 });
8623
8624 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8625 where
8626         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8627         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8628         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8629         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8630         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8631         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8632         R::Target: Router,
8633         L::Target: Logger,
8634 {
8635         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8636                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8637
8638                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8639
8640                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8641                 {
8642                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8643                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8644                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8645                 }
8646
8647                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8648                 {
8649                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8650                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8651                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8652                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8653                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8654                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8655                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
8656                                 }
8657
8658                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8659                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8660                                 ).count();
8661                         }
8662
8663                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8664
8665                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8666                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8667                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8668                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8669                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8670                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8671                                         } else { None }
8672                                 ) {
8673                                         channel.write(writer)?;
8674                                 }
8675                         }
8676                 }
8677
8678                 {
8679                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8680                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8681                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8682                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8683                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8684                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
8685                                         forward.write(writer)?;
8686                                 }
8687                         }
8688                 }
8689
8690                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8691
8692                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8693                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8694                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8695
8696                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8697                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8698                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8699                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8700                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8701                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8702                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8703                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
8704                         }
8705                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8706                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8707                 }
8708
8709                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8710                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8711                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8712                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8713                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8714                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
8715                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8716                 }
8717
8718                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8719                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8720                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8721                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8722                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8723                         // no channels.
8724                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8725                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8726                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8727                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8728                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8729                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8730                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8731                                 }
8732                         }
8733                 }
8734
8735                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8736                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8737                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8738                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8739                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8740                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8741                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8742                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
8743                         0u64.write(writer)?;
8744                 } else {
8745                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8746                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8747                                 event.write(writer)?;
8748                         }
8749                 }
8750
8751                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8752                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8753                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8754                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8755                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8756                 0u64.write(writer)?;
8757
8758                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8759                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8760                 // likely to be identical.
8761                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8762                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8763
8764                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8765                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8766                         hash.write(writer)?;
8767                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8768                 }
8769
8770                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8771                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8772                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8773                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8774                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8775                         }
8776                 }
8777                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8778                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8779                         match outbound {
8780                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8781                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8782                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8783                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8784                                         }
8785                                 }
8786                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8787                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8788                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8789                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8790                         }
8791                 }
8792
8793                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8794                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8795                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8796                         match outbound {
8797                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8798                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8799                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8800                                 },
8801                                 _ => {},
8802                         }
8803                 }
8804
8805                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8806                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8807                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8808                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8809                 }
8810
8811                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8812                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8813                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8814                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8815                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
8816                 }
8817
8818                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8819                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8820                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8821                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
8822                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8823                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8824                                 }
8825                         }
8826                 }
8827
8828                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8829                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8830                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8831                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8832                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8833                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8834                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8835                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8836                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8837                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8838                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8839                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8840                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8841                 });
8842
8843                 Ok(())
8844         }
8845 }
8846
8847 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8848         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8849                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8850                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8851                         event.write(w)?;
8852                         action.write(w)?;
8853                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8854                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8855                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8856                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8857                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8858                                 // check that the event is sane here.
8859                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8860                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8861                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8862                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8863                         }
8864                 }
8865                 Ok(())
8866         }
8867 }
8868 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8869         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8870                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8871                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8872                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8873                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8874                         len) as usize);
8875                 for _ in 0..len {
8876                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8877                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8878                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8879                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
8880                         } else if action.is_some() {
8881                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8882                         }
8883                 }
8884                 Ok(events)
8885         }
8886 }
8887
8888 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8889         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8890         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8891         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8892         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8893         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8894 );
8895
8896 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8897 ///
8898 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8899 /// is:
8900 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8901 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8902 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8903 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8904 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8905 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8906 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8907 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8908 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8909 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8910 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8911 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8912 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8913 ///    the next step.
8914 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8915 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8916 ///
8917 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8918 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8919 ///
8920 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8921 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8922 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8923 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8924 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8925 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8926 ///
8927 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8928 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8929 where
8930         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8931         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8932         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8933         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8934         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8935         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8936         R::Target: Router,
8937         L::Target: Logger,
8938 {
8939         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8940         pub entropy_source: ES,
8941
8942         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8943         pub node_signer: NS,
8944
8945         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8946         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8947         /// signing data.
8948         pub signer_provider: SP,
8949
8950         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8951         ///
8952         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8953         pub fee_estimator: F,
8954         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8955         ///
8956         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8957         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8958         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8959         pub chain_monitor: M,
8960
8961         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8962         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8963         /// force-closed during deserialization.
8964         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8965         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8966         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8967         ///
8968         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8969         pub router: R,
8970         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8971         /// deserialization.
8972         pub logger: L,
8973         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8974         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8975         pub default_config: UserConfig,
8976
8977         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8978         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8979         ///
8980         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8981         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8982         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8983         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8984         ///
8985         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8986         /// this struct.
8987         ///
8988         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8989         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8990 }
8991
8992 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8993                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8994 where
8995         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8996         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8997         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8998         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8999         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9000         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9001         R::Target: Router,
9002         L::Target: Logger,
9003 {
9004         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9005         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9006         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9007         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9008                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9009                 Self {
9010                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9011                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9012                 }
9013         }
9014 }
9015
9016 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9017 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9018 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9019         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9020 where
9021         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9022         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9023         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9024         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9025         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9026         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9027         R::Target: Router,
9028         L::Target: Logger,
9029 {
9030         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9031                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9032                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9033         }
9034 }
9035
9036 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9037         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9038 where
9039         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9040         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9041         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9042         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9043         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9044         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9045         R::Target: Router,
9046         L::Target: Logger,
9047 {
9048         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9049                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9050
9051                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9052                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9053                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9054
9055                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9056
9057                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9058                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9059                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9060                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9061                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9062                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9063                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9064                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9065                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9066                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9067                         ))?;
9068                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9069                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9070                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9071                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9072                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9073                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9074                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9075                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9076                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9077                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9078                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9079                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9080                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9081                                         }
9082                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9083                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9084                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9085                                         }
9086                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9087                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9088                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9089                                         }
9090                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9091                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9092                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9093                                         }
9094                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9095                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9096                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9097                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9098                                                 });
9099                                         }
9100                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9101                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9102                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9103                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9104                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9105                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9106                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9107                                         }, None));
9108                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9109                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
9110                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9111                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9112                                                 }
9113                                                 if !found_htlc {
9114                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9115                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9116                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9117                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9118                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9119                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9120                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9121                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
9122                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9123                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9124                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9125                                                 }
9126                                         }
9127                                 } else {
9128                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9129                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9130                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9131                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9132                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9133                                         }
9134                                         if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
9135                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9136                                         }
9137                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9138                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9139                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9140                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9141                                                 },
9142                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9143                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9144                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9145                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
9146                                                 }
9147                                         }
9148                                 }
9149                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9150                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9151                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9152                                 // safely discard the channel.
9153                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9154                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9155                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9156                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9157                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9158                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9159                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9160                                 }, None));
9161                         } else {
9162                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9163                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9164                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9165                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9166                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9167                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9168                         }
9169                 }
9170
9171                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9172                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9173                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9174                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9175                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9176                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9177                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9178                                 };
9179                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9180                         }
9181                 }
9182
9183                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9184                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9185                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9186                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9187                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9188                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9189                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9190                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9191                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9192                         }
9193                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9194                 }
9195
9196                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9197                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9198                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9199                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9200                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9201                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9202                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9203                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9204                         }
9205                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9206                 }
9207
9208                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9209                         PeerState {
9210                                 channel_by_id,
9211                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9212                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9213                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9214                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9215                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9216                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9217                                 is_connected: false,
9218                         }
9219                 };
9220
9221                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9222                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9223                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9224                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9225                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9226                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9227                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9228                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9229                 }
9230
9231                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9232                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9233                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9234                 for _ in 0..event_count {
9235                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9236                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9237                                 None => continue,
9238                         }
9239                 }
9240
9241                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9242                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9243                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9244                                 0 => {
9245                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9246                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9247                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
9248                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9249                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9250                                 }
9251                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9252                         }
9253                 }
9254
9255                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9256                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9257
9258                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9259                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9260                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9261                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9262                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9263                         }
9264                 }
9265
9266                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9267                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9268                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9269                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9270                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9271                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9272                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9273                         };
9274                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9275                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9276                         };
9277                 }
9278
9279                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9280                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9281                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9282                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9283                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9284                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9285                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9286                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9287                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9288                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9289                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9290                 let mut events_override = None;
9291                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9292                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9293                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9294                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9295                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9296                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9297                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9298                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9299                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9300                         (8, events_override, option),
9301                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9302                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9303                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9304                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9305                 });
9306                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9307                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9308                 }
9309
9310                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9311                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9312                 }
9313
9314                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9315                         pending_events_read = events;
9316                 }
9317
9318                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9319                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9320                 }
9321
9322                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9323                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9324                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9325                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9326                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9327                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9328                         }
9329                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9330                 }
9331                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9332                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9333                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9334                 };
9335
9336                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9337                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9338                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9339                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9340                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9341                 //
9342                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9343                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9344                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9345                 //
9346                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9347                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9348                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9349                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9350                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9351                         ) => { {
9352                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9353                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9354                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9355                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9356                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9357                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9358                                         pending_background_events.push(
9359                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9360                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9361                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9362                                                         update: update.clone(),
9363                                                 });
9364                                 }
9365                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9366                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9367                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9368                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9369                                         pending_background_events.push(
9370                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9371                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9372                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9373                                                 });
9374                                 }
9375                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9376                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9377                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9378                                 }
9379                                 max_in_flight_update_id
9380                         } }
9381                 }
9382
9383                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9384                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9385                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9386                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9387                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9388                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9389                                         // discarded.
9390                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9391                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9392                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9393                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9394                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9395                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9396                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9397                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9398                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9399                                                 }
9400                                         }
9401                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9402                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9403                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9404                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9405                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9406                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9407                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9408                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9409                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9410                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9411                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9412                                         }
9413                                 } else {
9414                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9415                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9416                                         debug_assert!(false);
9417                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9418                                 }
9419                         }
9420                 }
9421
9422                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9423                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9424                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9425                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9426                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9427                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9428                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9429                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9430                                         });
9431                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9432                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9433                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9434                                 } else {
9435                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9436                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9437                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9438                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9439                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9440                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9441                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9442                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9443                                 }
9444                         }
9445                 }
9446
9447                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9448                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9449
9450                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9451                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9452                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9453                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9454
9455                 {
9456                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9457                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9458                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9459                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9460                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9461                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9462                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9463                         // 0.0.102+
9464                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9465                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9466                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9467                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9468                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9469                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
9470                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9471                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9472                                                         }
9473
9474                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9475                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9476                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9477                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9478                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9479                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9480                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9481                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9482                                                                 },
9483                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9484                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9485                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9486                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
9487                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9488                                                                                 payment_params: None,
9489                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9490                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9491                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9492                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9493                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9494                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9495                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9496                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9497                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
9498                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9499                                                                         });
9500                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9501                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9502                                                                 }
9503                                                         }
9504                                                 }
9505                                         }
9506                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9507                                                 match htlc_source {
9508                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9509                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9510                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9511                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9512                                                                 };
9513                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9514                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9515                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9516                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9517                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9518                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9519                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
9520                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9521                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9522                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9523                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9524                                                                                                 false
9525                                                                                         } else { true }
9526                                                                                 } else { true }
9527                                                                         });
9528                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
9529                                                                 });
9530                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9531                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9532                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9533                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9534                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9535                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9536                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
9537                                                                                         } else { true }
9538                                                                                 });
9539                                                                                 false
9540                                                                         } else { true }
9541                                                                 });
9542                                                         },
9543                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9544                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9545                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9546                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9547                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9548                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9549                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9550                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9551                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9552                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9553                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9554                                                                         let compl_action =
9555                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9556                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9557                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9558                                                                                 };
9559                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9560                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9561                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9562                                                                 }
9563                                                         },
9564                                                 }
9565                                         }
9566                                 }
9567
9568                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9569                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9570                                 // payments.
9571                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9572                                         .into_iter()
9573                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9574                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9575                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9576                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9577                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9578                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9579                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9580                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9581                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9582                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9583                                                         } else { None }
9584                                                 } else {
9585                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9586                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9587                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9588                                                         // channel still live case here.
9589                                                         None
9590                                                 }
9591                                         });
9592                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9593                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9594                                 }
9595                         }
9596                 }
9597
9598                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9599                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9600                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9601                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9602                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9603                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9604                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9605                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9606                         }, None));
9607                 }
9608
9609                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9610                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9611
9612                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9613                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9614                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9615                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9616                         }
9617                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9618                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9619                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9620                                 }
9621                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9622                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9623                                 {
9624                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9625                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9626                                         });
9627                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9628                                 }
9629                         } else {
9630                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9631                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9632                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9633                                         });
9634                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9635                                 }
9636                         }
9637                 } else {
9638                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9639                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9640                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9641                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9642                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9643                                 }
9644                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9645                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9646                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9647                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9648                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9649                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9650                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9651                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9652                                                                                 Err(()) => {
9653                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9654                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9655                                                                                 }
9656                                                                         }
9657                                                                 },
9658                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9659                                                         }
9660                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9661                                         },
9662                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9663                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9664                                 };
9665                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9666                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9667                                 });
9668                         }
9669                 }
9670
9671                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9672                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9673
9674                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9675                         Ok(key) => key,
9676                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9677                 };
9678                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9679                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9680                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9681                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9682                         }
9683                 }
9684
9685                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9686                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9687                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9688                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9689                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9690                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9691                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9692                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9693                                                 loop {
9694                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9695                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9696                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9697                                                 }
9698                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9699                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9700                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9701                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9702                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9703                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9704                                         }
9705                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
9706                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9707                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9708                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9709                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9710                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9711                                                 }
9712                                         }
9713                                 } else {
9714                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9715                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9716                                         debug_assert!(false);
9717                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9718                                 }
9719                         }
9720                 }
9721
9722                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9723
9724                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9725                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9726                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9727                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9728                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9729                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9730                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9731                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9732                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9733                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9734                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9735                                         }
9736                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9737                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9738
9739                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9740                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9741                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9742                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9743                                                 //
9744                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9745                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9746                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9747                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9748                                                 // reason to.
9749                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9750                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9751                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9752                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9753                                                 // restart.
9754                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9755                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9756                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9757                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9758                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9759                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9760                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9761                                                         }
9762                                                 }
9763                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9764                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9765                                                 }
9766                                         }
9767                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9768                                                 receiver_node_id,
9769                                                 payment_hash,
9770                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
9771                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9772                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9773                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9774                                         }, None));
9775                                 }
9776                         }
9777                 }
9778
9779                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9780                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9781                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9782                                         for action in actions.iter() {
9783                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9784                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9785                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9786                                                 } = action {
9787                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9788                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9789                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9790                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9791                                                         } else {
9792                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9793                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9794                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9795                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9796                                                                 // anymore.
9797                                                         }
9798                                                 }
9799                                         }
9800                                 }
9801                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9802                         } else {
9803                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9804                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9805                         }
9806                 }
9807
9808                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9809                         genesis_hash,
9810                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9811                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9812                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9813                         router: args.router,
9814
9815                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9816
9817                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9818                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9819                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9820                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9821
9822                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9823                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9824                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9825                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9826                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9827                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9828
9829                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9830
9831                         our_network_pubkey,
9832                         secp_ctx,
9833
9834                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9835
9836                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9837
9838                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9839                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9840                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9841                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9842                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9843
9844                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9845                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
9846
9847                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9848                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
9849                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9850
9851                         logger: args.logger,
9852                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
9853                 };
9854
9855                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9856                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9857                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9858                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9859                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9860                 }
9861
9862                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9863                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9864                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9865                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9866                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9867                                 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
9868                 }
9869
9870                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9871                 //connection or two.
9872
9873                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9874         }
9875 }
9876
9877 #[cfg(test)]
9878 mod tests {
9879         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9880         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9881         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9882         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9883         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9884         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9885         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9886         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9887         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9888         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9889         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9890         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9891         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9892         use crate::util::test_utils;
9893         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9894         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9895
9896         #[test]
9897         fn test_notify_limits() {
9898                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9899                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9900                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9901                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9902                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9903                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9904
9905                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9906                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9907                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9908                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9909                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9910
9911                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9912
9913                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9914                 // to connect messages with new values
9915                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9916                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9917                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9918                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9919                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9920                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9921
9922                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9923                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9924                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9925                 // ... but the last node should not.
9926                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9927                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9928                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9929                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9930
9931                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9932                 // about the channel.
9933                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9934                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9935                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9936
9937                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9938                 // parties.
9939                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9940                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9941                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9942                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9943                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9944                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9945
9946                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9947                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9948                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9949
9950                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9951                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9952                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9953                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9954                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9955                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9956
9957                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9958                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9959                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9960                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9961                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9962                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9963                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9964                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9965
9966                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9967                 // the channel info has updated.
9968                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9969                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9970                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9971                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9972                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9973                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9974         }
9975
9976         #[test]
9977         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9978                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9979                 // expected.
9980                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9981                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9982                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9983                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9984                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9985
9986                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9987                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9988                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9989                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9990
9991                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9992                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9993                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9994                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9995                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9996                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9997                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9998                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9999                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10000                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10001                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10002                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10003
10004                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10005                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10006                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10007                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10008                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10009                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10010                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10011                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10012                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10013                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10014                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10015                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10016                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10017                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10018                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10019                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10020                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10021                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10022                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10023                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10024                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10025                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10026                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10027
10028                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10029                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10030                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10031                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10032                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10033                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10034                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10035
10036                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10037                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10038                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10039                 // lightning messages manually.
10040                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10041                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10042                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10043
10044                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10045                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10046                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10047                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10048                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10049                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10050                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10051                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10052                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10053                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10054                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10055                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10056                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10057                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10058                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10059                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10060                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10061                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10062                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10063                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10064                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10065                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10066                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10067                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10068                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10069                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10070
10071                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10072                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10073                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10074                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10075                 match events[0] {
10076                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10077                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10078                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10079                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10080                         },
10081                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10082                 }
10083                 match events[1] {
10084                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10085                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10086                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10087                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10088                         },
10089                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10090                 }
10091         }
10092
10093         #[test]
10094         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10095                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10096                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10097         }
10098
10099         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10100                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10101                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10102                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10103                 //      fails as expected.
10104                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10105                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10106                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10107                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10108                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10109                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10110                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10111                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10112                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10113                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10114                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10115                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10116                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10117                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10118                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10119
10120                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10121                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10122                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10123
10124                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10125                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10126                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10127                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10128                 let route = find_route(
10129                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10130                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10131                 ).unwrap();
10132                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10133                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10134                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10135                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10136                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10137                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10138                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10139                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10140                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10141                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10142                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10143                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10144                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10145                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10146                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10147                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10148                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10149                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10150                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10151                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10152                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10153                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10154                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10155                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10156
10157                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10158                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10159
10160                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10161                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10162                 let route = find_route(
10163                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10164                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10165                 ).unwrap();
10166                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10167                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10168                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10169                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10170                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10171                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10172                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10173                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10174
10175                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10176                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10177                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10178                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10179                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10180                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10181                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10182                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10183                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10184                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10185                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10186                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10187                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10188                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10189                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10190                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10191                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10192                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10193                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10194                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10195                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10196                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10197                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10198                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10199
10200                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10201                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10202
10203                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10204                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10205                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10206                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10207                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10208                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10209                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10210                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10211                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10212                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10213
10214                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10215                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10216                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10217                         100_000
10218                 );
10219                 let route = find_route(
10220                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10221                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10222                 ).unwrap();
10223                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10224                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10225                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10226                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10227                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10228                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10229                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10230                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10231                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10232                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10233                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10234                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10235                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10236                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10237                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10238                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10239                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10240                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10241                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10242                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10243                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10244                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10245                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10246
10247                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10248                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10249         }
10250
10251         #[test]
10252         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10253                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10254                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10255                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10256                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10257                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10258                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10259
10260                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10261                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10262
10263                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10264                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10265                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10266                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10267                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10268                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10269                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10270                 let route = find_route(
10271                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10272                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10273                 ).unwrap();
10274
10275                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10276                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10277                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10278                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10279                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10280                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10281                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10282
10283                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10284                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10285                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10286                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10287                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10288                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10289                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10290
10291                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10292         }
10293
10294         #[test]
10295         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10296                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10297                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10298                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10299                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10300                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10301                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10302                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10303                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10304
10305                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10306                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10307
10308                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10309                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10310                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10311                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10312                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10313                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10314                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10315                 let route = find_route(
10316                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10317                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10318                 ).unwrap();
10319
10320                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10321                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10322                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10323                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10324                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10325                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10326                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10327                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10328                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10329
10330                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10331                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10332                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10333                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10334                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10335                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10336                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10337
10338                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10339         }
10340
10341         #[test]
10342         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10343                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10344                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10345                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10346                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10347
10348                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10349                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10350                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10351                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10352
10353                 // Marshall an MPP route.
10354                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10355                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10356                 route.paths.push(path);
10357                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10358                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10359                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10360                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10361                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10362                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10363
10364                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10365                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10366                 .unwrap_err() {
10367                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10368                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10369                         },
10370                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10371                 }
10372         }
10373
10374         #[test]
10375         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10376                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10377                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10378                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10379                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10380
10381                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10382
10383                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10384                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10385
10386                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10387                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10388                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10389                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10390
10391                 {
10392                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10393                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10394                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10395                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10396                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10397                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10398                 }
10399
10400                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10401
10402                 {
10403                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10404                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10405                 }
10406         }
10407
10408         #[test]
10409         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10410                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10411                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10412                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10413                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10414                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10415
10416                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10417                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10418                         payment_secret,
10419                         total_msat: 100_000,
10420                 };
10421
10422                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10423                 // payment verification fails as expected.
10424                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10425                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10426                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10427                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10428                         Err(()) => {
10429                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10430                         }
10431                 }
10432
10433                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10434                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10435         }
10436
10437         #[test]
10438         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10439                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10440                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10441                 // the channel is successfully closed.
10442                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10443                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10444                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10445                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10446
10447                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10448                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10449                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10450                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10451                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10452
10453                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10454                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10455                 {
10456                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10457                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10458                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10459                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10460                 }
10461
10462                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10463                 {
10464                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10465                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10466                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10467                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10468                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10469                 }
10470
10471                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10472
10473                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10474
10475                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10476                 {
10477                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10478                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10479                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10480                 }
10481                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10482
10483                 {
10484                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10485                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10486                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10487                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10488                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10489                 }
10490                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10491                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10492                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10493                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10494                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10495                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10496                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10497                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10498
10499                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10500                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10501                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10502                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10503
10504                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10505                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10506                 {
10507                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10508                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10509                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10510                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10511                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10512                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10513                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10514                 }
10515
10516                 {
10517                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10518                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10519                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10520                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10521                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10522                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10523                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10524                 }
10525
10526                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10527                 {
10528                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10529                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10530                         // closing transaction).
10531                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10532                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10533                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10534
10535                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10536                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10537                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10538                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10539                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10540                 }
10541
10542                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10543
10544                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10545                 {
10546                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10547                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10548                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10549                 }
10550                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10551
10552                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10553                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10554         }
10555
10556         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10557                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10558                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10559         }
10560
10561         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10562                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10563                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10564         }
10565
10566         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10567                 match res_err {
10568                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10569                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10570                         },
10571                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10572                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10573                         },
10574                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10575                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10576                 }
10577         }
10578
10579         #[test]
10580         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10581                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10582                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10583                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10584                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10585                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10586                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10587                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10588
10589                 // Dummy values
10590                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10591                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10592                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10593
10594                 // Test the API functions.
10595                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10596
10597                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10598
10599                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10600
10601                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10602
10603                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10604
10605                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10606
10607                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10608         }
10609
10610         #[test]
10611         fn test_connection_limiting() {
10612                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10613                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10614                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10615                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10616                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10617
10618                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10619
10620                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10621                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10622
10623                 let mut funding_tx = None;
10624                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10625                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10626                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10627
10628                         if idx == 0 {
10629                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10630                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10631                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10632                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10633                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10634
10635                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10636                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10637                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10638
10639                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10640
10641                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10642                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10643                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10644                         }
10645                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10646                 }
10647
10648                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10649                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10650                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10651                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10652                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10653
10654                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10655                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10656                 // limit.
10657                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10658                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10659                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10660                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10661                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10662                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10663                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10664                         }, true).unwrap();
10665                 }
10666                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10667                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10668                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10669                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10670                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10671
10672                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10673                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10674                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10675                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10676                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10677                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10678                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10679                 }
10680                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10681                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10682                 }, true).unwrap();
10683                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10684                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10685                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10686
10687                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10688                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10689                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10690                 }, false).unwrap();
10691                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10692
10693                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10694                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10695                 // open channels.
10696                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10697                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10698                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10699                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10700                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10701                 }
10702                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10703                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10704                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10705
10706                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10707                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10708                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10709
10710                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10711                 // "protected" and can connect again.
10712                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10713                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10714                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10715                 }, true).unwrap();
10716                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10717
10718                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10719                 // last_random_pk.
10720                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10721                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10722         }
10723
10724         #[test]
10725         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10726                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10727                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10728                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10729                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10730                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10731
10732                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10733
10734                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10735                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10736
10737                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10738                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10739                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10740                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10741                 }
10742
10743                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10744                 // rejected.
10745                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10746                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10747                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10748
10749                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10750                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10751                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10752
10753                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10754                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10755                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10756                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10757         }
10758
10759         #[test]
10760         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10761                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10762                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10763                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10764                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10765                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10766                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10767                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10768                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10769
10770                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10771
10772                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10773                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10774
10775                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10776                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10777                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10778                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10779                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10780                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10781                         }, true).unwrap();
10782
10783                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10784                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10785                         match events[0] {
10786                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10787                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10788                                 }
10789                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10790                         }
10791                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10792                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10793                 }
10794
10795                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10796                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10797                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10798                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10799                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10800                 }, true).unwrap();
10801                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10802                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10803                 match events[0] {
10804                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10805                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10806                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10807                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10808                                         _ => panic!(),
10809                                 }
10810                         }
10811                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10812                 }
10813                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10814                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10815
10816                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10817                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10818                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10819                 match events[0] {
10820                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10821                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10822                         }
10823                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10824                 }
10825                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10826         }
10827
10828         #[test]
10829         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10830                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10831                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10832                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10833                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10834                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10835                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10836                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10837                         amt_msat: 100,
10838                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10839                         payment_metadata: None,
10840                         keysend_preimage: None,
10841                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10842                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10843                         }),
10844                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10845                 };
10846                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10847                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10848                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10849                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10850                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10851                 {
10852                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10853                 } else { panic!(); }
10854
10855                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10856                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10857                         amt_msat: 100,
10858                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10859                         payment_metadata: None,
10860                         keysend_preimage: None,
10861                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10862                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10863                         }),
10864                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10865                 };
10866                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10867                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10868         }
10869
10870         #[test]
10871         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10872                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10873                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10874                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10875                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10876
10877                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10878                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10879
10880                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10881                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10882                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10883                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10884                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10885
10886                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10887                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10888
10889                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10890                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10891                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10892                 match &msg_events[0] {
10893                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10894                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10895                                 match action {
10896                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10897                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10898                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10899                                 }
10900                         }
10901                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10902                 }
10903
10904                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10905                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10906                 match events[0] {
10907                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10908                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10909                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10910                 }
10911                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10912         }
10913
10914         #[test]
10915         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10916                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10917                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10918                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10919                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10920                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10921                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10922                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10923                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10924                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10925                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10926
10927                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10928                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10929                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10930
10931                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10932                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10933                 match events[0] {
10934                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10935                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10936                         }
10937                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10938                 }
10939
10940                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10941                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10942
10943                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10944                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10945
10946                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10947                 // not have generated any events.
10948                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10949         }
10950
10951         #[test]
10952         fn test_update_channel_config() {
10953                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10954                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10955                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10956                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10957                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10958                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10959                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10960
10961                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10962                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10963                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10964
10965                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10966                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10967                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10968                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10969                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10970                 match &events[0] {
10971                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10972                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10973                 }
10974
10975                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10976                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10977                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10978
10979                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10980                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10981                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10982                         ..Default::default()
10983                 }).unwrap();
10984                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10985                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10986                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10987                 match &events[0] {
10988                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10989                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10990                 }
10991
10992                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10993                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10994                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10995                         ..Default::default()
10996                 }).unwrap();
10997                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10998                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10999                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11000                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11001                 match &events[0] {
11002                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11003                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11004                 }
11005
11006                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11007                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11008                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11009                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11010                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11011                 assert!(
11012                         matches!(
11013                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11014                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11015                                         ..Default::default()
11016                                 }),
11017                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11018                         )
11019                 );
11020                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11021                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11022                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11023                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11024         }
11025
11026         #[test]
11027         fn test_payment_display() {
11028                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11029                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11030                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11031                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11032                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11033                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11034         }
11035 }
11036
11037 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
11038 pub mod bench {
11039         use crate::chain::Listen;
11040         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11041         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11042         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11043         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11044         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11045         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11046         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11047         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11048         use crate::util::test_utils;
11049         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11050
11051         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11052         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11053         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11054
11055         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11056
11057         use criterion::Criterion;
11058
11059         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11060                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11061                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11062                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11063                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11064                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11065                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11066
11067         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11068                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11069         }
11070         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11071                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11072                 #[inline]
11073                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11074                 #[inline]
11075                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11076         }
11077
11078         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11079                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11080         }
11081
11082         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11083                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11084                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11085                 // calls per node.
11086                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11087                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11088
11089                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11090                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11091                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11092                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11093                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11094
11095                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11096                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11097                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11098
11099                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11100                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11101                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11102                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11103                         network,
11104                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11105                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11106                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11107
11108                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11109                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11110                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11111                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11112                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11113                         network,
11114                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11115                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11116                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11117
11118                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11119                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11120                 }, true).unwrap();
11121                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11122                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11123                 }, false).unwrap();
11124                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11125                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11126                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11127
11128                 let tx;
11129                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11130                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11131                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11132                         }]};
11133                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11134                 } else { panic!(); }
11135
11136                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11137                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11138                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11139                 match events_b[0] {
11140                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11141                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11142                         },
11143                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11144                 }
11145
11146                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11147                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11148                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11149                 match events_a[0] {
11150                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11151                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11152                         },
11153                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11154                 }
11155
11156                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11157
11158                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11159                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11160                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11161
11162                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11163                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11164                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11165                 match msg_events[0] {
11166                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11167                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11168                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11169                         },
11170                         _ => panic!(),
11171                 }
11172                 match msg_events[1] {
11173                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11174                         _ => panic!(),
11175                 }
11176
11177                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11178                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11179                 match events_a[0] {
11180                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11181                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11182                         },
11183                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11184                 }
11185
11186                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11187                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11188                 match events_b[0] {
11189                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11190                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11191                         },
11192                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11193                 }
11194
11195                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11196                 macro_rules! send_payment {
11197                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11198                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11199                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11200                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11201                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11202                                 payment_count += 1;
11203                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11204                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11205
11206                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11207                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11208                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11209                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11210                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11211                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11212                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11213                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11214                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11215                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11216                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11217
11218                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11219                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11220                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11221                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11222
11223                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11224                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11225                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11226                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11227                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11228                                         },
11229                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11230                                 }
11231
11232                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11233                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11234                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11235                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11236
11237                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11238                         }
11239                 }
11240
11241                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11242                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11243                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
11244                 }));
11245         }
11246 }