1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
64 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
80 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
81 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
82 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
83 crate::sign::KeysManager,
86 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
89 use crate::prelude::*;
91 use core::cell::RefCell;
93 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
94 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
95 use core::time::Duration;
98 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
99 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
100 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
102 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
104 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
105 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
106 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
108 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
109 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
110 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
111 // before we forward it.
113 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
114 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
115 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
116 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
117 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
119 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
122 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
123 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
125 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
126 /// do with the HTLC.
127 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
128 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
130 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
131 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
132 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
133 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
134 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
135 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
137 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
139 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
140 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
142 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
143 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
144 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
145 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
146 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
148 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
149 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
150 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
151 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
152 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
154 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
155 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
156 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
157 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
160 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
162 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
163 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
164 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
165 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
166 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
167 requires_blinded_error: bool,
169 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
170 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
171 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
173 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
174 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
176 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
177 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
178 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
179 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
180 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
181 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
182 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
184 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
185 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
186 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
187 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
189 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
190 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
191 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
193 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
194 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
195 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
199 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
200 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
201 pub struct BlindedForward {
202 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
203 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
204 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
205 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
206 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
207 /// the introduction node.
208 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
211 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
212 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
213 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
215 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
216 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
222 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
224 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
225 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
226 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
227 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
228 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
229 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
231 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
232 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
233 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
234 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
237 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
239 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
241 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
243 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
244 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
245 /// it along another path).
247 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
248 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
249 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
250 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
251 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
252 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
253 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
254 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
255 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
257 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
260 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
262 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
264 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
267 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
268 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
269 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
270 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
273 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
274 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
275 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
276 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
277 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
280 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
281 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
282 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
284 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
285 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
286 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
289 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
290 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
292 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
293 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
294 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
297 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
298 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
299 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
302 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
307 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
311 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
312 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
313 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
314 pub enum BlindedFailure {
315 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
316 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
317 FromIntroductionNode,
318 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
319 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
323 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
324 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
325 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
326 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
327 short_channel_id: u64,
328 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
330 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
331 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
332 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
333 channel_id: ChannelId,
335 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
336 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
341 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
343 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
344 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
345 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
347 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
348 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
351 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
352 struct ClaimableHTLC {
353 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
355 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
357 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
358 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
359 sender_intended_value: u64,
360 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
362 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
363 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
364 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
365 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
367 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
368 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
371 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
372 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
373 events::ClaimedHTLC {
374 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
375 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
376 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
377 value_msat: val.value,
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
383 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
384 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
386 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
387 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
388 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
391 /// Number of bytes in the id.
392 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
395 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
396 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
401 impl Readable for PaymentId {
402 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
403 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
408 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
409 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
410 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
414 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
416 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
417 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
418 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
420 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
421 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
426 impl Readable for InterceptId {
427 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
428 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
433 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
434 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
435 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
436 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
437 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
440 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
442 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
443 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
444 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
446 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
447 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
451 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
452 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
453 (0, short_channel_id, required),
454 (2, htlc_id, required),
456 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
457 (0, session_priv, required),
462 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
463 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
464 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
465 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
466 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
469 session_priv: SecretKey,
470 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
471 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
472 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
473 payment_id: PaymentId,
476 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
477 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
478 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
480 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
482 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
484 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
487 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
488 payment_id.hash(hasher);
489 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
495 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
497 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
498 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
499 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
500 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
501 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
502 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
506 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
507 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
508 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
509 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
510 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
511 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
513 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
519 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
520 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
522 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
523 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
524 pub enum FailureCode {
525 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
526 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
527 TemporaryNodeFailure,
528 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
529 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
530 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
531 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
532 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
533 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
534 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
535 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
536 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
537 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
539 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
540 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
541 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
544 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
545 fn into(self) -> u16 {
547 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
548 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
549 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
550 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
555 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
556 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
557 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
558 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
559 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
561 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
562 err: msgs::LightningError,
563 closes_channel: bool,
564 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
566 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
568 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
570 err: LightningError {
572 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
573 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
579 closes_channel: false,
580 shutdown_finish: None,
584 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
585 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
588 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
589 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
590 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
591 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
592 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
593 // commitment upon reconnecting.
594 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
596 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
599 err: LightningError { err, action },
600 closes_channel: true,
601 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
605 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
608 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
610 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
611 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
615 log_level: Level::Warn,
618 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
622 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
624 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
625 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
632 closes_channel: false,
633 shutdown_finish: None,
637 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
642 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
643 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
644 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
645 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
646 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
648 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
649 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
650 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
651 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
652 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
653 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
654 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
656 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
660 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
661 struct ClaimingPayment {
663 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
664 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
665 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
666 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
668 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
669 (0, amount_msat, required),
670 (2, payment_purpose, required),
671 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
672 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
673 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
676 struct ClaimablePayment {
677 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
678 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
679 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
682 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
683 struct ClaimablePayments {
684 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
685 /// failed/claimed by the user.
687 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
688 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
690 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
691 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
692 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
695 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
696 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
697 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
700 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
701 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
702 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
703 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
705 enum BackgroundEvent {
706 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
707 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
708 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
709 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
711 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
712 /// are regenerated on startup.
713 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
714 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
715 /// channel to continue normal operation.
717 /// In general this should be used rather than
718 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
719 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
720 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
722 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
723 /// are regenerated on startup.
724 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
725 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
726 funding_txo: OutPoint,
727 channel_id: ChannelId,
728 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
730 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
731 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
733 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
734 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
735 channel_id: ChannelId,
740 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
741 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
742 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
743 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
744 /// event can be generated.
745 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
746 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
747 /// operation of another channel.
749 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
750 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
751 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
752 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
754 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
755 event: events::Event,
756 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
758 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
759 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
760 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
762 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
763 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
764 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
765 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
766 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
768 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
769 /// stored for later processing.
770 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
771 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
772 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
773 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
774 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
778 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
779 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
780 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
781 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
782 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
783 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
784 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
785 (4, blocking_action, required),
786 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
787 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
788 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
790 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
791 (0, event, upgradable_required),
792 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
793 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
794 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
795 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
796 // downgrades to prior versions.
797 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
801 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
802 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
803 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
804 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
805 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
806 channel_id: ChannelId,
809 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
810 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
811 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
812 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
813 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
814 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
815 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
819 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
820 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
821 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
822 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
823 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
824 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
826 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
827 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
828 channel_id: ChannelId,
829 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
834 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
835 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
836 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
838 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
843 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
844 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
848 /// State we hold per-peer.
849 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
850 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
852 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
853 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
854 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
856 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
857 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
858 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
859 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
860 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
861 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
862 latest_features: InitFeatures,
863 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
864 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
865 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
866 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
867 /// user but which have not yet completed.
869 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
870 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
871 /// for a missing channel.
872 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
873 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
874 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
876 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
877 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
878 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
879 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
881 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
882 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
883 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
884 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
885 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
886 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
887 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
888 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
889 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
890 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
891 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
892 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
893 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
894 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
895 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
899 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
900 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
901 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
902 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
903 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
904 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
907 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
908 matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_))
910 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
911 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
914 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
915 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
916 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
919 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
920 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
921 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
922 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
926 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
927 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
928 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
929 /// The original OpenChannel message.
930 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
931 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
932 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
935 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
936 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
937 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
939 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
940 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
942 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
945 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
946 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
947 struct PendingInboundPayment {
948 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
949 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
950 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
951 /// this payment being removed.
953 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
954 user_payment_id: u64,
955 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
956 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
957 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
960 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
961 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
962 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
963 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
964 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
965 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
966 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
967 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
969 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
970 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
971 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
979 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
982 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
983 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
984 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
989 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
990 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
991 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
992 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
993 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
994 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
995 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
996 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
997 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
999 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1000 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1001 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1010 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1013 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1014 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1015 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1020 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1022 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1024 pub trait AChannelManager {
1025 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1026 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1027 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1028 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1029 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1030 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1031 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1032 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1033 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1034 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1035 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1036 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1037 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1038 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1039 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1040 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1041 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1042 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1043 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1044 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1045 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1046 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1047 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1048 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1049 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1050 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1051 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1052 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1053 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1054 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1055 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1056 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1057 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1058 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1059 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1060 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1063 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1064 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1066 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1067 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1068 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1069 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1070 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1071 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1075 type Watch = M::Target;
1077 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1079 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1081 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1083 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1084 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1086 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1088 type Router = R::Target;
1090 type Logger = L::Target;
1092 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1095 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1096 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1098 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1099 /// to individual Channels.
1101 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1102 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1103 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1104 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1106 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1107 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1108 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1109 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1110 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1111 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1112 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1113 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1114 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1116 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1117 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1118 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1120 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1121 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1122 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1123 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1124 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1126 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1127 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1128 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1129 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1131 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1132 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1133 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1135 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1136 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1137 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1138 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1139 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1141 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1142 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1143 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1144 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1145 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1146 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1147 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1148 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1151 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1152 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1153 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1154 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1155 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1159 // `pending_offers_messages`
1161 // `total_consistency_lock`
1163 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1165 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1167 // |__`per_peer_state`
1169 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1171 // |__`claimable_payments`
1173 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1177 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1179 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1181 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1185 // |__`pending_events`
1187 // |__`pending_background_events`
1189 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1191 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1192 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1193 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1194 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1195 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1196 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1200 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1201 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1202 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1208 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1210 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1212 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1213 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1215 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1216 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1217 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1218 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1220 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1221 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1223 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1224 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1225 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1226 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1227 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1228 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1229 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1230 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1232 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1234 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1235 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1237 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1239 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1240 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1241 /// and via the classic SCID.
1243 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1244 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1246 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1248 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1250 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1251 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1252 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1254 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1255 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1257 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1258 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1260 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1261 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1263 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1264 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1265 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1266 /// active channel list on load.
1268 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1269 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1271 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1273 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1274 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1275 /// the handling of the events.
1277 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1278 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1281 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1282 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1283 /// would break backwards compatability.
1284 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1285 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1286 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1288 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1290 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1292 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1294 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1296 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1297 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1298 /// confirmation depth.
1300 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1301 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1302 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1304 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1306 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1308 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1310 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1312 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1314 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1315 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1316 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1318 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1319 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1321 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1322 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1323 /// keeping additional state.
1324 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1326 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1327 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1328 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1329 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1331 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1332 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1334 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1335 /// are currently open with that peer.
1337 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1338 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1341 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1343 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1344 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1345 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1346 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1347 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1349 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1350 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1351 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1352 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1353 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1355 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1356 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1358 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1359 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1360 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1361 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1362 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1364 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1365 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1367 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1368 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1369 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1370 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1371 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1373 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1375 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1377 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1378 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1379 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1380 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1381 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1382 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1383 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1384 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1385 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1386 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1387 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1389 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1390 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1391 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1393 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1395 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1396 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1398 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1402 signer_provider: SP,
1407 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1409 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1410 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1411 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1412 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1413 pub struct ChainParameters {
1414 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1415 pub network: Network,
1417 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1419 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1420 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1423 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1427 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1428 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1431 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1432 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1433 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1434 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1435 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1436 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1438 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1439 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1440 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1441 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1442 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1443 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1445 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1446 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1449 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1450 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1451 /// events to handle.
1453 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1454 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1456 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1457 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1460 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1461 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1462 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1463 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1465 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1466 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1467 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1468 should_persist: move || {
1469 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1470 // processing and return that.
1471 let notify = persist_check();
1472 match (notify, force_notify) {
1473 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1474 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1475 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1476 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1477 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1480 _read_guard: read_guard,
1484 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1485 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1486 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1487 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1488 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1489 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1491 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1492 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1493 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1494 should_persist: persist_check,
1495 _read_guard: read_guard,
1500 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1501 fn drop(&mut self) {
1502 match (self.should_persist)() {
1503 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1504 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1505 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1507 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1508 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1509 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1514 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1515 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1517 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1519 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1520 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1521 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1522 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1523 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1525 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1526 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1528 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1530 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1531 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1532 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1533 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1534 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1535 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1536 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1537 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1538 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1539 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1540 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1541 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1542 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1544 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1545 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1547 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1548 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1549 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1550 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1552 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1553 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1554 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1555 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1556 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1557 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1559 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1561 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1562 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1564 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1566 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1567 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1569 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1570 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1571 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1573 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1574 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1575 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1577 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1578 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1579 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1580 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1582 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1583 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1584 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1586 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1587 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1588 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1590 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1591 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1592 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1593 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1594 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1595 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1596 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1597 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1598 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1599 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1600 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1603 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1604 /// to better separate parameters.
1605 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1606 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1607 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1608 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1609 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1610 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1611 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1612 pub features: InitFeatures,
1613 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1614 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1615 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1617 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1619 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1620 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1621 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1622 /// payments to us through this channel.
1623 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1624 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1625 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1626 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1627 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1628 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1629 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1632 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1634 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1635 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1636 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1637 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1638 /// lifetime of the channel.
1639 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1640 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1641 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1642 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1643 /// our counterparty already.
1644 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1645 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1647 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1648 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1649 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1650 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1652 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1653 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1655 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1656 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1658 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1659 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1660 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1661 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1662 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1663 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1664 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1665 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1666 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1669 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1671 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1672 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1673 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1674 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1675 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1676 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1677 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1679 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1680 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1682 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1683 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1684 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1685 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1686 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1687 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1688 /// this value on chain.
1690 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1692 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1694 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1695 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1696 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1697 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1698 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1699 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1700 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1702 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1703 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1704 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1705 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1706 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1707 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1709 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1710 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1711 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1712 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1713 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1715 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1716 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1717 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1718 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1720 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1721 pub balance_msat: u64,
1722 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1723 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1724 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1725 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1727 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1729 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1730 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1731 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1732 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1733 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1734 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1735 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1736 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1738 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1739 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1740 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1741 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1742 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1743 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1744 /// route which is valid.
1745 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1746 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1747 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1748 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1749 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1750 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1752 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1753 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1754 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1755 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1756 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1757 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1758 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1759 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1760 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1762 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1764 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1765 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1766 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1767 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1768 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1770 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1771 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1772 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1773 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1774 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1775 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1776 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1778 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1779 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1780 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1781 pub is_outbound: bool,
1782 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1783 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1784 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1785 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1786 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1788 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1789 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1790 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1791 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1792 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1793 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1794 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1796 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1797 pub is_usable: bool,
1798 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1799 pub is_public: bool,
1800 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1801 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1802 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1803 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1804 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1805 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1807 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1808 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1809 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1811 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1812 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1813 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1815 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1816 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1819 impl ChannelDetails {
1820 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1821 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1822 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1824 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1825 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1826 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1827 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1830 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1831 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1832 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1834 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1835 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1836 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1837 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1840 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1841 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1842 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1845 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1846 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1848 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1849 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1850 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1852 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1853 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1854 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1855 features: latest_features,
1856 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1857 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1858 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1859 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1860 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1861 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1862 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1863 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1864 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1865 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1867 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1868 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1869 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1870 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1871 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1872 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1873 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1874 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1875 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1876 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1877 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1878 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1879 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1880 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1881 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1882 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1883 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1884 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1885 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1886 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1887 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1888 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1889 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1890 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1891 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1892 config: Some(context.config()),
1893 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1894 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1895 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1900 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1901 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1902 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1903 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1904 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1905 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1906 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1907 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1908 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1910 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1912 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1913 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1915 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1916 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1917 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1918 /// to drop the channel.
1922 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1923 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1924 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1925 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1926 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1928 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1929 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1930 payment_id: PaymentId,
1932 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1934 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1935 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1936 payment_id: PaymentId,
1937 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1939 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1940 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1941 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1944 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1945 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1946 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1948 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1949 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1950 payment_id: PaymentId,
1951 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1952 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1953 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1955 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1956 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1957 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1959 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1960 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1961 payment_id: PaymentId,
1962 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1963 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1967 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1969 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1971 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1972 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1973 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1974 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1976 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1977 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1978 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1981 macro_rules! handle_error {
1982 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1983 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1984 // entering the macro.
1985 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1986 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1990 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1991 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1993 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1994 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1995 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1996 let logger = WithContext::from(
1997 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1999 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2001 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2002 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2003 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2008 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2011 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2013 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2014 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2015 action: err.action.clone()
2019 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2020 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2021 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2022 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2027 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2034 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2035 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2036 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2037 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2039 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2040 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2041 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2043 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2044 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2045 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2046 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2047 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2049 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2050 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2052 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2056 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2057 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2058 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2060 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2061 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2063 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2064 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2066 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2067 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2068 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2069 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2070 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2071 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2073 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2078 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2079 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2081 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2082 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2084 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2085 match $channel_phase {
2086 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2087 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2089 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2090 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2092 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2093 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2099 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2100 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2104 let key = *$entry.key();
2105 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2107 $entry.remove_entry();
2115 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2116 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2120 let key = *$entry.key();
2121 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2123 $entry.remove_entry();
2131 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2132 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2134 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2135 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2141 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2142 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2143 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2144 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2145 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2147 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2148 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2149 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2150 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2151 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2152 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2153 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2154 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2155 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2156 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2161 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2162 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2163 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2164 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2165 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2166 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2167 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2168 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2169 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2170 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2172 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2177 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2178 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2179 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2180 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2181 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2182 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2183 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2184 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2185 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2187 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2192 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2193 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2194 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2195 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2196 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2197 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2198 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2199 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2200 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2201 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2202 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2203 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2205 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2206 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2207 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2213 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2214 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2216 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2217 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2218 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2219 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2220 updates.announcement_sigs);
2221 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2222 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2225 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2226 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2227 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2228 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2230 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2231 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2232 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2233 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2234 let mut batch_completed = false;
2235 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2236 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2237 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2238 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2240 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2241 channel_state.2 = true;
2243 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2245 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2247 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2250 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2251 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2252 if batch_completed {
2253 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2254 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2255 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2256 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2257 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2258 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2259 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2260 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2261 chan.set_batch_ready();
2262 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2263 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2267 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2268 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2269 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2274 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2276 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2277 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2279 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2280 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2281 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2282 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2287 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2288 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2289 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2290 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2292 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2293 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2294 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2295 panic!("{}", err_str);
2297 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2298 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2299 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2302 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2308 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2309 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2310 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2312 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2313 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2314 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2315 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2316 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2317 // filter for uniqueness here.
2318 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2319 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2320 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2321 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2323 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2324 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2326 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2327 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2328 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2334 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2335 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2336 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2337 while !processed_all_events {
2338 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2345 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2346 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2347 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2349 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2350 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2351 result = $self.process_background_events();
2353 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2354 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2355 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2356 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2360 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2361 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2362 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2363 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2366 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2368 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2369 $event_to_handle = event;
2371 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2372 post_event_actions.push(action);
2377 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2378 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2379 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2380 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2381 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2382 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2385 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2386 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2387 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2388 processed_all_events = false;
2392 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2393 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2394 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2396 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2397 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2398 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2404 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2406 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2407 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2408 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2409 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2410 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2411 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2415 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2417 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2419 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2420 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2422 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2424 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2425 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2426 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2429 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2430 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2431 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2433 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2434 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2435 current_timestamp: u32,
2437 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2438 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2439 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2440 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2442 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2443 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2444 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2449 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2451 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2452 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2453 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2454 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2455 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2456 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2457 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2458 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2460 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2463 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2464 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2466 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2468 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2470 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2472 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2473 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2474 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2475 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2476 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2477 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2478 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2479 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2481 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2491 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2492 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2493 &self.default_configuration
2496 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2497 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2498 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2501 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2502 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2504 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2506 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2510 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2515 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2517 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2518 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2519 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2520 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2521 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2523 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2524 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2526 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2527 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2528 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2530 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2531 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2532 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2534 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2535 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2537 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2538 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2539 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2540 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2541 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2542 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2544 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2545 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2546 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2547 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2548 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2549 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2553 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2554 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2558 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2559 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2561 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2563 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2564 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2570 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2571 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2572 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2573 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2574 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2575 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2579 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2584 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2586 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2587 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2592 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2598 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2599 node_id: their_network_key,
2602 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2605 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2606 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2607 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2608 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2609 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2610 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2611 // the same channel.
2612 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2614 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2615 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2616 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2619 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2620 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2621 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2622 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2626 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2627 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2628 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2636 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2637 /// more information.
2638 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2639 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2640 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2641 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2642 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2643 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2644 // the same channel.
2645 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2648 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2649 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2652 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2653 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2654 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2662 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2663 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2665 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2666 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2668 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2669 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2670 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2671 // really wanted anyway.
2672 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2675 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2676 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2677 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2680 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2683 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2684 let context_to_details = |context| {
2685 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2687 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2689 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2690 .map(context_to_details)
2696 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2697 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2699 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2700 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2701 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2703 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2704 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2705 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2706 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2707 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2708 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2710 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2711 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2712 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2714 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2715 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2716 payment_id: *payment_id,
2717 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2718 total_msat: *total_msat,
2721 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2722 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2724 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2725 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2727 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2732 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2735 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2736 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2741 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2742 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2747 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2749 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2750 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2751 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2752 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2753 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2754 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2756 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2757 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2758 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2759 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2760 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2764 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2765 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2767 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2768 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2769 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2770 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2773 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2774 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2778 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2780 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2781 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2788 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2789 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2790 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2791 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2794 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2795 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2801 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2802 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2803 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2805 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2806 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2808 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2809 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2810 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2811 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2813 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2815 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2816 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2817 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2820 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2821 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2822 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2823 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2824 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2825 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2828 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2829 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2830 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2832 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2833 /// the channel being closed or not:
2834 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2835 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2836 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2837 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2838 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2839 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2840 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2842 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2843 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2844 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2845 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2847 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2849 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2850 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2851 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2854 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2855 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2856 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2857 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2858 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2861 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2862 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2863 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2864 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2865 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2868 let logger = WithContext::from(
2869 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2872 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2873 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2874 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2875 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2876 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2877 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2878 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2880 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2881 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2882 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2883 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2884 // ignore the result here.
2885 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2887 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2888 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2889 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2890 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2891 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2892 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2893 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2894 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2895 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2896 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2897 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2898 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2901 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2904 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2905 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2910 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2911 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2912 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2913 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2914 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2915 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2916 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2917 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2920 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2921 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2922 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2926 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2927 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2931 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2932 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2933 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2934 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2936 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2937 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2938 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2939 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2940 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2941 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2943 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2945 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2946 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2947 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2948 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2949 mem::drop(peer_state);
2950 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2952 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2953 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2954 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2956 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2957 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2958 // Unfunded channel has no update
2959 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2962 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2963 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2964 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2965 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2967 (None, *peer_node_id)
2969 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2972 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2973 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2974 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2976 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2977 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2978 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2979 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2980 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2986 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2989 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2991 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2992 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2994 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2995 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2997 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2998 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2999 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3000 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3011 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3012 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3013 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3015 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3016 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3017 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3020 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3021 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3022 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3024 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3025 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3026 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3027 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3028 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3031 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3032 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3033 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3034 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3035 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3039 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3040 /// local transaction(s).
3041 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3042 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3043 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3047 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3048 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3050 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3052 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3053 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3056 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3057 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3058 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3059 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3065 macro_rules! return_err {
3066 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3069 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3070 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3072 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3073 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3074 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3075 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3076 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3077 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3078 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3082 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3083 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3084 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3085 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3086 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3087 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3088 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3089 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3095 let NextPacketDetails {
3096 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3097 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3098 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3099 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3100 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3103 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3104 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3105 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3106 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3107 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3108 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3109 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3110 // phantom or an intercept.
3111 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3112 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3113 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3117 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3120 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3122 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3124 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3125 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3126 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3128 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3129 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3130 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3131 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3134 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3135 // have no consistency guarantees.
3136 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3140 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3141 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3142 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3143 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3144 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3146 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3147 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3148 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3149 // we don't have the channel here.
3150 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3152 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3154 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3155 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3156 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3157 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3158 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3159 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3160 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3161 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3162 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3163 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3164 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3166 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3169 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3170 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3172 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3173 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3180 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3182 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3183 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3185 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3186 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3187 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3188 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3189 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3191 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3192 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3198 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3199 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3200 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3201 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3203 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3204 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3206 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3207 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3208 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3210 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3211 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3212 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3213 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3214 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3215 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3216 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3220 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3222 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3225 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3226 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3227 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3228 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3229 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3230 macro_rules! return_err {
3231 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3233 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3234 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3235 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3236 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3237 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3238 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3239 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3240 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3241 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3245 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3246 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3247 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3248 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3249 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3255 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3257 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3258 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3259 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3260 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3263 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3264 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3265 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3266 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3267 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3269 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3272 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3273 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3274 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3275 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3276 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3282 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3283 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3284 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3286 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3287 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3288 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3290 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3291 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3292 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3293 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3294 return Err(LightningError {
3295 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3299 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3300 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3302 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3303 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3304 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3307 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3308 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3309 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3310 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3312 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3313 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3314 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3316 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3317 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3318 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3319 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3320 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3321 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3322 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3326 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3329 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3330 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3331 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3332 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3334 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3335 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3336 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3337 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3338 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3341 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3342 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3344 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3345 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3346 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3347 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3348 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3349 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3350 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3351 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3353 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3354 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3355 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3357 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3359 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3366 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3367 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3368 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3369 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3374 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3375 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3376 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3379 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3380 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3381 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3382 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3384 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3385 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3386 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3388 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3389 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3393 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3394 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3396 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3397 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3398 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3400 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3403 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3405 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3406 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3409 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3410 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3411 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3412 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3413 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3414 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3415 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3416 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3417 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3419 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3420 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3421 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3422 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3424 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3425 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3427 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3428 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3429 Some(monitor_update) => {
3430 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3432 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3433 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3434 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3435 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3436 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3437 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3438 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3446 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3449 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3450 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3451 // `channel_by_id` map.
3452 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3453 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3457 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3458 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3460 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3465 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3467 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3468 /// fields for more info.
3470 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3471 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3473 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3475 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3476 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3477 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3478 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3479 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3481 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3482 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3483 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3484 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3485 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3487 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3488 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3489 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3490 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3492 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3494 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3495 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3496 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3498 /// In general, a path may raise:
3499 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3500 /// node public key) is specified.
3501 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3502 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3503 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3504 /// relevant updates.
3506 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3507 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3508 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3510 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3511 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3512 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3513 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3514 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3515 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3516 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3517 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3519 self.pending_outbound_payments
3520 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3521 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3522 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3525 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3526 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3527 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3530 self.pending_outbound_payments
3531 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3532 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3533 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3534 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3538 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3539 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3541 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3542 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3543 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3547 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3548 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3549 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3553 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3554 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3557 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3558 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3560 self.pending_outbound_payments
3561 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3562 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3563 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3564 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3565 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3569 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3570 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3571 /// retries are exhausted.
3573 /// # Event Generation
3575 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3576 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3578 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3579 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3580 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3582 /// # Requested Invoices
3584 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3585 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3586 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3587 /// once the invoice has been received.
3589 /// # Restart Behavior
3591 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3592 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3593 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3595 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3596 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3598 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3601 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3602 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3603 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3604 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3605 /// never reach the recipient.
3607 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3608 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3610 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3611 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3613 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3614 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3617 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3618 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3619 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3622 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3623 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3625 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3628 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3629 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3630 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3631 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3632 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3633 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3634 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3635 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3638 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3639 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3640 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3641 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3642 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3644 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3645 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3646 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3649 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3652 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3653 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3656 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3657 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3659 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3660 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3661 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3662 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3663 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3664 let payment_params =
3665 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3667 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3669 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3672 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3673 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3675 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3676 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3677 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3678 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3680 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3681 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3682 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3683 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3684 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3685 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3686 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3687 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3688 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3689 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3691 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3692 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3693 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3694 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3698 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3700 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3701 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3704 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3706 let mut res = Vec::new();
3708 for mut path in route.paths {
3709 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3710 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3711 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3712 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3713 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3716 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3719 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3720 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3722 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3724 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3725 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3730 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3733 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3738 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3739 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3740 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3742 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3743 let used_liquidity =
3744 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3746 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3747 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3749 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3752 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3757 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3758 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3759 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3766 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3767 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3768 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3769 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3770 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3771 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3773 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3774 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3776 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3777 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3779 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3780 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3781 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3783 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3784 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3785 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3786 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3787 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3788 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3789 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3790 } else { unreachable!(); });
3792 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3793 Err((chan, err)) => {
3794 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3795 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3796 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3797 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3798 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3804 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3805 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3807 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3808 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3811 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3812 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3813 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3817 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3818 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3819 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3823 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3825 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3828 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3829 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3833 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3834 funding_txo, o.get()
3836 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3837 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3838 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3839 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3840 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3841 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3844 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3851 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3852 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3853 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3857 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3859 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3860 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3862 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3863 /// across the p2p network.
3865 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3866 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3868 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3869 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3870 /// keys per-channel).
3872 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3873 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3874 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3876 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3877 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3878 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3880 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3881 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3882 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3883 /// for more details.
3885 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3886 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3887 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3888 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3891 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3893 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3894 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3896 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3897 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3898 /// signature for each channel.
3900 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3901 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3903 let mut result = Ok(());
3905 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3906 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3907 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3908 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3909 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3914 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3915 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3916 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3920 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3921 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3922 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3923 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3924 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3925 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3926 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3927 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3929 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3930 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3935 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3936 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3937 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3938 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3942 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3943 match states.entry(txid) {
3944 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3945 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3946 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3950 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3953 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3954 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3955 temporary_channel_id,
3956 counterparty_node_id,
3957 funding_transaction.clone(),
3960 let mut output_index = None;
3961 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3962 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3963 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3964 if output_index.is_some() {
3965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3966 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3969 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3972 if output_index.is_none() {
3973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3974 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3977 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3978 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3979 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
3980 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
3981 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
3982 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3988 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3989 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3990 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3991 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3992 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3993 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3994 .into_iter().flatten()
3995 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3997 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3998 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4000 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4003 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4004 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4005 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4006 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4008 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4009 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4010 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4014 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4015 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4016 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4022 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4024 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4025 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4026 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4027 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4029 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4030 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4032 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4033 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4035 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4037 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4038 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4039 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4040 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4041 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4042 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4043 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4044 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4045 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4046 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4047 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4048 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4049 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4055 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4056 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4057 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4058 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4059 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4060 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4061 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4062 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4066 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4067 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4068 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4069 config.apply(config_update);
4070 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4073 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4074 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4075 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4076 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4077 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4078 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4085 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4086 debug_assert!(false);
4087 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4089 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4090 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4097 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4099 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4100 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4101 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4102 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4104 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4105 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4107 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4108 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4110 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4112 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4113 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4114 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4115 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4116 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4117 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4118 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4119 pub fn update_channel_config(
4120 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4121 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4122 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4125 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4126 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4128 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4129 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4131 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4132 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4133 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4134 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4135 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4137 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4138 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4139 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4142 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4145 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4146 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4147 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4148 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4149 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4150 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4153 let next_hop_scid = {
4154 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4155 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4156 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4159 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4160 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4161 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4162 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4163 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4166 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4168 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4169 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4170 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4173 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4174 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4175 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4176 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4177 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4184 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4185 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4186 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4189 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4190 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4191 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4192 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4195 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4197 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4198 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4199 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4200 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4201 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4204 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4205 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4206 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4207 payment.prev_channel_id,
4208 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4209 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4211 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4215 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4216 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4218 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4221 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4222 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4225 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4226 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4227 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4230 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4231 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4232 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4233 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4234 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4235 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4236 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4237 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4238 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4239 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4242 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4243 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4244 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4245 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4250 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4252 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4253 /// Will likely generate further events.
4254 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4257 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4258 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4259 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4261 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4262 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4264 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4265 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4266 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4267 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4269 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4270 match forward_info {
4271 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4272 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4273 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4274 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4275 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4278 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4279 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4280 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4281 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4283 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4284 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4285 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4286 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4287 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4288 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4289 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4290 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4291 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4294 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4295 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4297 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4300 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4301 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4307 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4308 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4310 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4314 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4315 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4317 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4321 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4322 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4323 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4324 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4325 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4326 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4327 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4330 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4331 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4332 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4333 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4334 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4336 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4338 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4339 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4343 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4344 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4345 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4346 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4347 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4348 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4350 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4351 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4357 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4360 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4363 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4364 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4365 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4366 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4367 // problem, not ours.
4373 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4374 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4375 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4377 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4381 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4383 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4384 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4385 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4390 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4391 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4392 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4393 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4394 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4395 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4396 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4397 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4399 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4400 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4403 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4404 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4405 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4406 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4407 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4408 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4409 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4410 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4411 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4412 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4413 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4415 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4416 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4417 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4418 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4419 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4420 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4423 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4424 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4425 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4428 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4429 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4431 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4433 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4434 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4435 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4436 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4442 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4443 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4445 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4446 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4447 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4449 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4450 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4451 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4452 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4454 Some((res, htlc_id))
4457 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4458 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4459 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4460 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4462 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4464 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4465 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4466 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4472 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4476 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4477 match forward_info {
4478 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4479 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4480 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4481 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4482 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4485 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4486 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4487 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4488 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4489 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4491 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4492 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4493 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4494 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4495 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4497 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4498 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4499 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4503 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4504 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4507 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4510 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4511 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4512 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4513 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4514 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4515 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4516 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4517 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4518 phantom_shared_secret,
4521 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4522 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4523 // if routing nodes overpay
4524 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4525 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4527 total_value_received: None,
4528 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4531 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4534 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4536 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4537 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4538 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4539 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4540 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4541 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4543 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4544 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4545 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4546 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4547 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4548 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4549 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4550 phantom_shared_secret,
4553 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4554 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4556 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4559 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4560 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4561 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4562 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4563 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4566 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4567 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4568 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4569 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4570 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4571 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4573 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4574 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4575 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4577 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4578 .entry(payment_hash)
4579 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4580 .or_insert_with(|| {
4581 committed_to_claimable = true;
4583 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4586 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4587 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4589 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4591 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4593 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4595 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4596 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4597 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4600 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4602 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4603 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4604 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4605 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4606 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4607 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4608 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4610 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4611 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4613 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4615 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4616 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4617 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4618 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4619 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4622 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4623 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4624 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4625 committed_to_claimable = true;
4627 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4628 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4629 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4630 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4631 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4632 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4633 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4634 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4635 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4639 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4640 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4641 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4642 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4643 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4645 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4647 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4648 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4650 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4651 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4652 committed_to_claimable = true;
4655 payment_claimable_generated
4659 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4660 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4661 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4662 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4663 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4664 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4665 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4666 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4667 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4668 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4669 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4670 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4671 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4672 Ok(result) => result,
4674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4675 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4678 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4679 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4680 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4681 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4682 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4683 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4686 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4687 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4688 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4690 check_total_value!(purpose);
4692 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4693 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4694 check_total_value!(purpose);
4698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4699 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4700 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4701 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4703 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4704 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4705 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4706 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4707 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4709 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4710 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4712 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4713 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4714 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4716 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4717 if payment_claimable_generated {
4718 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4724 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4725 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4733 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4734 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4735 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4736 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4738 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4739 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4741 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4743 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4744 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4745 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4747 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4749 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4750 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4751 events.append(&mut new_events);
4754 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4756 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4757 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4758 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4760 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4762 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4763 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4764 if background_events.is_empty() {
4765 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4768 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4770 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4771 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4772 // monitor updating completing.
4773 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4775 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4776 let mut updated_chan = false;
4778 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4779 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4782 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4784 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4785 updated_chan = true;
4786 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4787 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4789 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4797 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4798 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4801 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4803 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4806 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4807 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4809 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4810 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4811 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4812 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4813 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4819 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4822 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4823 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4824 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4825 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4826 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4829 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4830 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4832 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4834 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4835 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4836 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4837 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4838 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4840 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4842 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4843 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4844 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4845 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4847 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4848 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4850 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4851 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4855 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4856 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4857 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4858 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4859 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4860 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4861 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4863 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4864 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4867 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4870 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4871 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4873 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4878 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4879 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4887 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4889 /// This currently includes:
4890 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4891 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4892 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4894 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4895 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4896 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4897 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4898 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4899 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4900 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4901 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4903 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4904 /// estimate fetches.
4906 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4907 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4908 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4909 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4910 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4912 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4913 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4915 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4916 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4917 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4918 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4920 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4921 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4922 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4923 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4924 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4925 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4927 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4928 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4929 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4931 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4932 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4933 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4934 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4935 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4936 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4937 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4938 channel_id: *chan_id,
4939 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4951 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4954 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4955 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4956 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4958 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4959 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4964 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4965 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4967 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4968 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4969 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4970 if needs_close { return false; }
4973 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4974 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4975 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4976 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4977 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4978 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4979 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4980 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4982 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4983 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4984 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4985 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4989 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4991 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4994 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4996 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4997 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4998 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4999 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5003 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5005 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5011 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5013 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5014 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5015 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5016 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5017 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5018 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5019 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5020 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5021 channel_id: *chan_id,
5022 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5030 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5031 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5032 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5034 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5035 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5036 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5041 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5042 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5043 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5044 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5046 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5047 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5048 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5049 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5055 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5057 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5058 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5063 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5064 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5065 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5066 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5067 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5068 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5069 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5070 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5071 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5072 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5073 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5075 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5076 // have no channels to the peer.
5077 let remove_entry = {
5078 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5079 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5082 entry.remove_entry();
5085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5090 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5091 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5092 // This should be unreachable
5093 debug_assert!(false);
5096 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5097 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5098 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5099 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5100 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5101 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5102 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5105 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5106 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5107 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5109 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5110 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5117 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5118 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5119 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5120 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5121 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5124 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5125 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5128 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5129 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5132 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5133 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5134 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5135 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5136 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5137 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5138 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5141 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5142 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5145 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5146 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5147 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5148 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5149 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5156 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5157 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5158 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5160 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5161 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5162 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5163 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5165 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5166 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5167 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5168 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5169 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5170 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5173 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5174 /// reason for the failure.
5176 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5177 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5180 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5181 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5182 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5183 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5184 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5185 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5186 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5191 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5192 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5193 match failure_code {
5194 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5195 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5196 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5197 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5198 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5199 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5201 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5202 let fail_data = match data {
5203 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5206 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5211 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5212 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5214 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5216 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5217 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5218 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5219 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5220 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5221 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5222 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5224 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5226 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5227 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5229 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5234 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5235 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5236 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5237 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5238 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5239 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5240 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5241 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5242 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5243 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5245 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5246 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5247 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5248 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5250 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5251 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5252 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5253 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5254 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5258 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5259 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5260 // be surfaced to the user.
5261 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5262 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5263 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5265 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5266 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5267 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5268 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5269 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5270 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5271 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5272 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5273 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5275 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5276 debug_assert!(false);
5277 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5282 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5285 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5286 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5287 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5288 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5292 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5293 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5294 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5295 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5296 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5297 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5298 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5299 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5300 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5301 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5304 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5305 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5306 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5309 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5310 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5311 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5314 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5315 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5316 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5317 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5319 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5320 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5321 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5324 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5325 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5326 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5328 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5329 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5330 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5331 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5332 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5334 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5336 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5337 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5339 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5340 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5344 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5345 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5347 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5351 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5352 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5353 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5354 push_forward_ev = true;
5356 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5358 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5361 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5364 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5365 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5366 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5367 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5368 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5369 failed_next_destination: destination,
5375 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5376 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5378 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5379 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5380 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5381 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5383 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5384 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5385 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5386 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5388 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5389 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5390 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5392 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5393 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5394 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5395 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5396 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5397 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5398 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5399 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5400 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5403 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5404 /// even type numbers.
5408 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5409 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5411 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5412 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5413 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5416 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5417 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5419 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5422 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5423 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5424 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5425 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5426 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5427 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5428 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5429 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5434 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5435 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5436 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5437 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5438 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5440 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5441 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5442 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5446 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5447 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5448 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5449 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5450 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5451 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5452 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5453 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5454 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5455 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5456 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5465 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5467 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5468 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5469 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5470 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5471 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5472 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5473 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5474 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5475 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5477 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5478 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5479 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5480 debug_assert!(false);
5484 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5486 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5487 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5488 debug_assert!(false);
5492 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5493 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5495 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5496 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5497 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5498 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5501 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5502 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5503 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5504 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5508 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5509 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5510 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5511 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5512 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5513 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5514 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5517 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5518 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5519 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5520 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5521 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5522 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5527 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5528 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5529 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5530 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5531 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5532 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5533 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5535 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5538 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5539 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5540 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5541 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5545 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5546 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5547 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5548 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5550 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5551 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5552 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5553 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5555 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5556 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5557 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5558 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5561 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5562 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5563 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5564 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5568 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5569 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5570 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5573 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5576 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5577 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5578 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5579 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5580 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5583 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5584 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5585 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5587 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5590 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5591 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5593 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5594 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5595 // monitor update as a background event.
5596 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5597 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5598 counterparty_node_id,
5599 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5600 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5601 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5605 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5606 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5611 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5613 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5615 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5616 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5617 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5618 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5619 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5621 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5623 debug_assert!(false,
5624 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5627 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5628 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5629 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5630 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5631 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5633 let mut found_blocker = false;
5634 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5635 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5636 // which case we need to only remove the one
5637 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5638 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5639 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5640 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5642 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5645 debug_assert!(false);
5654 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5655 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5656 counterparty_node_id: None,
5657 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5660 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5664 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5665 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5666 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5667 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5668 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5669 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5670 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5671 // again on restart.
5672 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5673 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5674 payment_preimage, update_res);
5677 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5678 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5680 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5681 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5682 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5683 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5684 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5685 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5686 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5687 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5688 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5689 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5692 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5693 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5694 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5695 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5696 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5697 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5701 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5702 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5705 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5706 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5707 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5708 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId,
5711 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5712 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5713 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5714 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5715 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5717 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5718 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5719 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5721 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5722 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5725 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5726 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5727 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5728 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5729 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5730 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5731 let claiming_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5732 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5733 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5734 let chan_to_release =
5735 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5736 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5738 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5739 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5740 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5741 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5746 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5747 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5748 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5749 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5750 // in the background.
5751 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5752 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5753 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5754 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5756 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5757 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5758 funding_txo, update, ..
5760 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5761 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5762 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5763 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5765 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5771 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5772 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5773 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5775 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5776 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5778 monitor_update.updates[0],
5779 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5784 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5785 // immediately once we get going.
5786 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5789 *channel_id == claiming_channel_id,
5791 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5794 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5795 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5796 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5797 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5798 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5799 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5800 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5804 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5805 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5806 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5809 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5810 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5811 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5812 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5813 total_fee_earned_msat,
5814 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5815 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5816 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5817 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5820 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5824 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5825 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5826 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5832 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5833 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5834 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5837 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5838 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5839 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5840 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5842 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5844 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5845 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5846 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5848 payment_purpose: purpose,
5851 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5853 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5857 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5859 sender_intended_total_msat,
5863 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5864 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5866 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5867 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5868 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5871 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5872 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5874 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5875 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5876 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5877 downstream_channel_id,
5878 Some(blocking_action),
5885 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5886 /// update completion.
5887 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5888 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5889 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5890 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5891 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5892 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5893 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5894 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5895 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5896 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5897 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5898 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5899 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5900 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5902 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5904 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5905 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5906 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5907 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5910 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5911 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5913 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5915 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5920 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5921 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5922 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5923 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5928 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5929 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5930 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5931 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5932 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5937 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5941 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5947 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5948 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5949 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5954 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5955 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5961 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5962 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5964 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5965 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5967 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5968 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5969 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5970 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
5971 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5977 let mut peer_state_lock;
5978 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5979 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5980 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5983 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
5986 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5987 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5988 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5989 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5990 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5993 let remaining_in_flight =
5994 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5995 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5998 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5999 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6000 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6001 remaining_in_flight);
6002 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6005 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6008 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6010 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6011 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6014 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6015 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6016 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6018 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6019 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6020 /// used to accept such channels.
6022 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6023 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6024 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6025 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6028 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6029 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6031 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6032 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6033 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6035 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6036 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6038 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6039 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6041 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6042 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6044 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6045 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6046 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6047 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6050 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6052 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6055 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6056 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6057 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6058 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6060 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6061 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6063 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6067 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6069 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6070 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6071 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6073 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6074 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6075 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6076 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6077 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6078 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6079 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6080 let err_str = e.to_string();
6081 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6083 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6087 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6088 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6090 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6095 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6096 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6097 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6098 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6099 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6100 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6101 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6104 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6105 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6106 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6108 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6110 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6111 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6112 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6113 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6114 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6115 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6116 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6117 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6120 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6121 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6122 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6124 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6128 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6129 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6130 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6132 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6133 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6134 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6137 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6142 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6143 /// or 0-conf channels.
6145 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6146 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6147 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6148 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6149 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6150 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6152 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6153 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6154 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6155 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6156 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6157 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6158 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6162 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6165 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6166 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6168 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6169 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6171 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6172 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6173 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6174 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6175 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6177 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6180 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6181 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6182 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6185 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6186 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6191 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6194 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6195 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6196 // likely to be lost on restart!
6197 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6199 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6202 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6204 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6207 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6208 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6209 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6210 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6211 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6213 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6214 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6216 debug_assert!(false);
6217 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6218 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6219 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6224 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6225 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6226 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6227 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6228 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6229 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6232 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6233 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6236 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6237 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6239 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6240 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6243 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6244 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6247 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6248 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6251 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6252 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6253 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6254 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6256 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6258 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6259 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6260 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6261 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6262 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6263 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6266 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6267 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6268 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6273 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6274 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6275 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6276 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6277 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6278 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6279 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6287 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6288 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6289 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6290 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6291 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6293 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6295 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6296 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6299 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6300 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6302 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6303 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6304 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6306 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6310 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6311 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6312 // likely to be lost on restart!
6313 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6317 debug_assert!(false);
6318 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6322 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6324 match phase.get_mut() {
6325 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6326 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6327 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6330 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6337 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6338 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6339 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6340 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6341 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6343 user_channel_id: user_id,
6348 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6349 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6352 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6354 debug_assert!(false);
6355 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6360 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6361 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6362 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6363 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6364 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6366 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6367 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6368 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6369 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6370 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6371 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6372 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6373 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6374 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6378 Some(mut phase) => {
6379 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6380 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6381 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6383 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6386 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6388 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6389 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6390 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6391 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6392 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6393 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6395 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6396 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6397 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6400 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6402 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6405 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6406 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6408 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6411 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6412 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6413 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6414 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6416 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6417 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6418 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6419 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6420 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6421 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6422 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6427 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6428 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6429 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6431 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6435 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6436 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6437 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6445 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6446 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6450 debug_assert!(false);
6451 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6456 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6458 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6459 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6460 let logger = WithContext::from(
6462 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6463 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6466 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6468 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6469 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6470 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6471 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6472 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6473 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6474 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6475 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6476 } else { unreachable!(); }
6479 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6480 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6481 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6482 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6483 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6484 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6485 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6489 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6490 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6491 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6492 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6493 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6494 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6498 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6505 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6506 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6507 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6508 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6509 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6511 debug_assert!(false);
6512 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6514 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6515 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6516 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6517 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6518 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6519 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6520 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6521 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6522 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6523 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6524 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6525 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6526 msg: announcement_sigs,
6528 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6529 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6530 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6531 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6532 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6533 // announcement_signatures.
6534 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6535 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6536 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6537 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6544 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6545 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6550 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6551 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6554 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6555 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6560 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6561 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6562 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6564 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6565 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6567 debug_assert!(false);
6568 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6572 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6573 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6575 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6576 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6577 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6578 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6580 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6583 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6584 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6585 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6586 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6588 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6589 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6590 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6591 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6592 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6593 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6597 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6598 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6599 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6600 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6603 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6604 let context = phase.context_mut();
6605 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6606 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6607 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6608 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6612 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6615 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6616 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6617 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6620 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6621 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6627 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6629 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6631 debug_assert!(false);
6632 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6634 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6635 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6637 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6639 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6640 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6641 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6642 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6643 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6644 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6649 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6650 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6651 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6652 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6653 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6654 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6655 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6657 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6658 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6664 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6665 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6666 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6667 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6669 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6670 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6673 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6678 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6679 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6680 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6685 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6686 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6687 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6688 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6690 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6691 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6692 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6693 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6695 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6696 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6698 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6700 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6702 debug_assert!(false);
6703 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6705 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6706 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6707 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6709 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6710 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6711 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6712 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6713 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6714 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6716 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6718 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6719 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6720 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6721 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6722 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6723 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6724 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6725 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6729 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6730 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6731 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6732 match pending_forward_info {
6733 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6734 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6736 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6737 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6738 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6739 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6740 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6742 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6743 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6744 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6745 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6746 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6749 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6751 _ => pending_forward_info
6754 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6755 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6757 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6758 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6766 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6768 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6770 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6772 debug_assert!(false);
6773 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6777 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6779 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6780 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6781 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6782 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6784 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6786 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6787 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6788 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6790 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6791 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6792 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6793 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6794 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6795 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6796 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6799 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6800 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6806 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6807 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6808 funding_txo, msg.channel_id
6814 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6815 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6816 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6817 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6818 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6820 debug_assert!(false);
6821 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6825 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6827 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6828 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6830 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6831 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6839 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6840 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6841 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6843 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6845 debug_assert!(false);
6846 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6848 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6850 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6852 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6853 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6854 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6856 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6857 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6859 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6860 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6868 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6870 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6872 debug_assert!(false);
6873 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6877 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6879 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6880 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6881 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6882 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6883 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6884 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6885 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6889 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6890 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6898 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6899 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6900 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6901 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6902 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6903 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6904 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6905 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6906 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6907 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6908 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6910 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6911 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6913 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6914 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6915 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6917 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6918 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6921 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6922 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6924 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6925 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6926 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6928 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6929 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6930 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6931 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6932 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6935 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6936 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6939 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
6940 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6941 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6942 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6943 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6944 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6945 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
6946 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6947 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6948 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6949 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6952 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6953 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6954 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6959 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6960 // payments are being processed.
6961 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6962 push_forward_event = true;
6964 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6965 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6972 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6973 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6976 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6977 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6978 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6980 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6984 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6985 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6986 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6987 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6988 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6990 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6991 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6992 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6993 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6994 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6995 // real by taking more time.
6996 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6997 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6998 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7003 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7004 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7005 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7006 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7007 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7008 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7009 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7011 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7012 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7013 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7014 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7015 channel_funding_outpoint,
7017 counterparty_node_id,
7022 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7023 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7024 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7027 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7028 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7031 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7032 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7033 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7039 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7040 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7041 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7042 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7044 debug_assert!(false);
7045 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7046 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7050 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7051 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7052 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7053 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7054 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7055 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7056 *counterparty_node_id)
7058 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7059 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7060 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7061 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7062 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7063 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7064 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7068 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7069 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7072 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7075 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7079 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7081 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7083 debug_assert!(false);
7084 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7086 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7087 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7088 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7090 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7091 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7092 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7094 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7095 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7103 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7104 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7105 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7107 debug_assert!(false);
7108 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7110 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7112 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7114 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7115 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7119 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7120 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7121 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7122 msg, &self.default_configuration
7123 ), chan_phase_entry),
7124 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7125 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7126 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7129 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7130 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7138 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7139 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7140 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7141 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7143 // It's not a local channel
7144 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7147 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7148 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7149 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7150 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7152 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7154 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7155 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7156 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7157 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7158 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7159 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7160 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7161 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7162 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7166 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7167 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7168 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7169 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7171 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7172 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7173 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7174 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7177 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7181 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7182 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7187 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7190 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7192 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7195 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7197 debug_assert!(false);
7198 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7199 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7203 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7206 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7208 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7209 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7210 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7211 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7212 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7213 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7214 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7215 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7216 let mut channel_update = None;
7217 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7218 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7219 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7222 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7223 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7224 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7225 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7226 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7227 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7228 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7233 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7234 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7235 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7236 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7237 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7238 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7242 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7243 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7247 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7249 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7250 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7251 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7252 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7253 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7254 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7256 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7257 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7258 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7259 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7260 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7261 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7262 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7263 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7264 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7265 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7266 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7267 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7268 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7269 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7270 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7271 next_funding_txid: None,
7274 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7275 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7276 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7282 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7283 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7284 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7285 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7288 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7289 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7294 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7295 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7296 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7298 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7299 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7300 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7301 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7302 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7303 match monitor_event {
7304 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7305 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7306 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7307 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7308 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7309 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7310 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id);
7312 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7313 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7314 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7315 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7318 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_funding_outpoint) => {
7319 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7320 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7322 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7323 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7324 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7325 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7328 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7329 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7330 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7331 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7332 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7333 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7334 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7335 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7336 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7337 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7343 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7345 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7353 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7354 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7360 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7361 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7364 has_pending_monitor_events
7367 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7368 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7369 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7371 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7373 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7376 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7377 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7378 /// update was applied.
7379 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7380 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7381 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7383 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7384 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7385 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7386 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7388 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7389 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7391 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7392 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7393 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7394 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7396 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7397 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7398 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7399 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7400 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7401 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7403 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7404 has_monitor_update = true;
7406 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7407 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7408 continue 'peer_loop;
7417 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7418 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7419 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7425 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7426 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7428 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7429 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7431 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7432 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7433 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7434 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7436 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7437 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7439 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7440 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7441 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7442 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7447 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7453 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7454 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7457 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7458 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7459 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7465 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7469 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7470 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7471 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7474 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7475 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7479 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7482 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7483 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7489 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7490 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7491 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7492 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7493 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7494 let mut has_update = false;
7495 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7499 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7502 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7503 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7505 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7506 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7507 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7508 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7509 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7511 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7512 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7515 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7516 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7517 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7519 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7520 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7521 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7522 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7523 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7528 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7529 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7530 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7536 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7537 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7542 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7548 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7549 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7552 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7553 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7559 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7560 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7562 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7563 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7564 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7565 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7566 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7567 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7568 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7569 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7570 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7571 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7572 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7573 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7574 assert!(should_broadcast);
7575 } else { unreachable!(); }
7576 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7577 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7578 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7581 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7585 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7586 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7587 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7591 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7592 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7593 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7594 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7595 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7597 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7601 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7606 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7608 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7610 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7611 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7612 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7613 &self, description: String
7614 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7615 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7616 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7617 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7618 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7620 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7621 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7622 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7624 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7630 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7631 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7635 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7636 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7638 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7639 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7640 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7643 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7644 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7645 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7647 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7648 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7652 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7653 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7654 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7655 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7656 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7658 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7662 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7663 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7668 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7669 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7670 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7672 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7674 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7675 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7676 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7677 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7678 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7679 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7680 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7681 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7682 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7683 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7684 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7685 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7687 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7688 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7689 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7691 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7692 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7695 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7696 self.pending_outbound_payments
7697 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7698 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7700 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7705 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7706 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7707 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7709 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7710 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7711 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7712 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7713 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7714 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7715 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7717 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7718 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7722 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7723 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7726 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7727 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7728 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7732 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7733 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7734 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7735 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7739 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7740 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7741 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7746 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7747 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7748 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7751 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7752 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7753 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7754 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7755 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7756 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7757 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7758 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7759 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7760 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7761 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7762 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7763 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7764 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7765 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7768 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7769 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7770 let builder = match quantity {
7772 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7774 let builder = match amount_msats {
7776 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7778 let builder = match payer_note {
7780 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7782 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7783 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7785 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7786 self.pending_outbound_payments
7787 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7788 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7790 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7792 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7793 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7794 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7795 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7796 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7799 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7801 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7802 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7803 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7804 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7805 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7806 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7807 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7808 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7809 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7811 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7818 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7821 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7822 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7823 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7827 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7828 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7829 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7830 /// received and no retries will be made.
7834 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7835 /// path for the invoice.
7837 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7838 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7839 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7840 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7841 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7843 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7844 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7846 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7847 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7848 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7849 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7851 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7852 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7853 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7855 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7856 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7857 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7859 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7860 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7861 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7863 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7864 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7865 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7867 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7868 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7869 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7870 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7871 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7874 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7876 for path in refund.paths() {
7877 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7878 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7879 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7880 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7882 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7888 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7892 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7895 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7896 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7898 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7899 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7900 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7901 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7903 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7905 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7906 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7910 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7911 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7913 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7915 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7916 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7918 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7919 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7920 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7921 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7922 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7923 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7924 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7925 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7926 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7927 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7928 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7931 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7932 /// stored external to LDK.
7934 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7935 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7936 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7938 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7939 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7942 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7943 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7944 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7945 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7947 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7948 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7949 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7950 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7951 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7953 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7954 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7955 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7956 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7957 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7959 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7960 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7962 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7963 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7967 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7968 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7970 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7972 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7973 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7975 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7976 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7977 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7978 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7979 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7980 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7981 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7984 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7985 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7987 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7988 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7989 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7992 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7994 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7995 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7996 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7997 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7999 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8001 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8002 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8003 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8006 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8007 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8010 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8011 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8012 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8013 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8014 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8015 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8017 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8018 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8019 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8020 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8021 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8023 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8025 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8028 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8029 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8033 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8034 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8036 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8037 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8038 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8039 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8041 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8042 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8043 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8044 Some(_) => continue,
8045 None => return scid_candidate
8050 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8052 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8053 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8055 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8056 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8057 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8061 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8062 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8063 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8065 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8066 /// times to get a unique scid.
8067 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8068 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8069 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8071 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8072 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8073 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8074 return scid_candidate
8078 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8079 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8080 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8081 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8084 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8085 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8086 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8087 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8088 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8090 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8091 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8092 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8101 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8102 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8103 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8104 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8105 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8109 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8110 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8111 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8112 events.push_back((event, None));
8116 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8117 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8118 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8122 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8123 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8127 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8128 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8131 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8132 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8133 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8134 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8135 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8136 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8137 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8139 let logger = WithContext::from(
8140 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8144 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8145 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8147 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8148 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8149 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8150 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8152 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8156 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8157 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8158 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8159 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8160 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8161 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8166 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8168 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8169 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8170 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8171 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8173 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8174 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8175 if further_update_exists {
8176 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8181 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8188 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8189 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8195 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8196 for action in actions {
8198 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8199 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8201 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8207 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8208 /// using the given event handler.
8210 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8211 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8215 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8219 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8221 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8223 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8224 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8225 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8230 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8231 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8232 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8233 /// is always placed next to each other.
8235 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8236 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8237 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8238 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8240 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8241 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8242 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8243 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8244 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8245 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8246 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8248 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8249 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8250 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8251 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8254 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8255 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8257 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8258 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8261 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8263 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8264 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8265 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8266 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8267 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8271 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8272 events.replace(pending_events);
8281 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8283 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8285 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8286 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8287 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8292 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8294 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8295 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8296 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8298 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8302 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8304 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8305 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8306 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8307 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8308 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8309 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8313 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8315 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8316 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8317 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8318 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8319 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8322 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8323 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8326 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8327 let _persistence_guard =
8328 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8329 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8330 let new_height = height - 1;
8332 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8333 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8334 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8335 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8336 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8337 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8340 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8344 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8346 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8347 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8348 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8349 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8350 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8355 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8356 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8357 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8358 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8360 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8361 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8363 let _persistence_guard =
8364 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8365 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8366 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8367 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8369 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8370 if height < last_best_block_height {
8371 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8372 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8376 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8377 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8378 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8379 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8381 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8382 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8384 let _persistence_guard =
8385 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8386 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8387 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8389 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8391 macro_rules! max_time {
8392 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8394 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8395 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8396 // having an explicit local time source.
8397 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8398 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8399 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8400 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8401 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8407 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8408 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8409 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8410 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8414 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8415 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8416 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8419 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8420 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8421 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8422 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8423 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8424 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8431 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8432 let _persistence_guard =
8433 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8434 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8435 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8436 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8437 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8438 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8439 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8440 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8445 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8447 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8448 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8449 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8450 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8451 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8456 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8457 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8459 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8460 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8461 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8462 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8463 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8465 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8466 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8469 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8472 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8473 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8475 // Retain unfunded channels.
8476 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8477 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8478 let res = f(channel);
8479 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8480 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8481 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8482 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8483 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8485 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8486 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8487 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8488 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8489 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8490 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8491 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8492 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8497 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8502 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8503 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8506 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8507 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8508 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8509 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8510 msg: announcement_sigs,
8512 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8513 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8514 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8516 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8517 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8518 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8523 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8524 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8525 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8526 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8527 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8528 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8529 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8530 // is always consistent.
8531 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8532 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8533 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8534 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8535 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8538 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8539 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8540 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8541 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8542 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8543 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8544 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8545 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8550 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8551 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8552 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8553 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8554 data: reason_message,
8567 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8568 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8569 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8570 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8571 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8572 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8573 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8574 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8575 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8576 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8578 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8579 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8580 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8584 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8587 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8588 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8589 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8590 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8591 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8592 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8593 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8594 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8595 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8596 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8597 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8598 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8601 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8602 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8603 _ => unreachable!(),
8605 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8606 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8607 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8608 let logger = WithContext::from(
8609 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8611 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8617 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8619 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8620 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8624 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8625 /// may have events that need processing.
8627 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8628 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8630 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8631 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8632 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8633 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8636 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8637 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8638 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8641 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8642 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8643 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8646 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8647 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8648 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8649 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8652 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8653 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8654 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8655 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8658 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8659 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8661 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8662 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8663 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8664 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8665 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8668 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8669 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8670 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8671 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8674 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8675 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8676 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8677 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8680 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8681 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8682 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8683 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8686 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8687 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8688 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8689 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8693 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8694 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8696 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8697 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8698 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8699 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8700 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8701 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8705 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8706 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8707 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8708 // change to the contents.
8709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8710 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8711 let persist = match &res {
8712 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8713 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8714 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8716 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8718 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8723 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8724 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8725 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8726 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8729 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8730 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8731 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8732 // change to the contents.
8733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8734 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8735 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8739 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8740 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8741 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8742 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8745 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8747 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8750 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8752 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8755 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8756 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8757 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8758 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8759 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8761 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8762 let persist = match &res {
8763 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8764 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8766 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8771 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8772 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8773 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8774 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8777 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8778 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8779 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8780 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8783 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8784 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8785 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8786 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8789 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8790 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8791 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8792 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8795 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8796 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8797 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8800 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8801 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8802 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8805 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8806 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8807 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8808 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8810 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8811 let persist = match &res {
8812 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8813 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8814 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8816 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8821 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8823 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8826 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8827 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8828 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8829 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8831 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8832 let persist = match &res {
8833 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8834 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8835 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8837 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8842 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8843 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8844 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8845 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8846 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8847 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8848 let persist = match &res {
8849 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8850 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8851 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8853 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8858 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8860 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8863 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8865 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8868 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8869 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8870 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8871 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8873 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8874 let persist = match &res {
8875 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8876 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8877 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8879 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8884 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8886 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8889 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8890 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8891 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8894 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8899 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8901 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8902 let persist = match &res {
8903 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8904 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8905 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8907 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8912 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8914 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8915 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8916 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8919 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8920 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8921 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8923 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8926 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8927 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8928 let context = match phase {
8929 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8930 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8931 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8932 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8937 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
8938 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
8939 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
8942 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
8943 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8947 // Clean up for removal.
8948 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8949 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8952 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8953 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8954 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8955 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8957 // V1 Channel Establishment
8958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8959 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8960 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8962 // V2 Channel Establishment
8963 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8965 // Common Channel Establishment
8966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8967 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8969 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8971 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8972 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8973 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8974 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8975 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8976 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8977 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8978 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8979 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8980 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8981 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8982 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8983 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8984 // Channel Operations
8985 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8986 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8987 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8988 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8989 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8990 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8992 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8993 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8994 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8995 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8996 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8997 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8998 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8999 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9000 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9003 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9004 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9005 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9006 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9009 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9011 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9013 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9014 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9018 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9019 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9020 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9021 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9025 let mut res = Ok(());
9027 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9028 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9029 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9030 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9031 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9032 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9033 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9036 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9037 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9039 if inbound_peer_limited {
9041 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9043 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9044 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9045 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9046 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9047 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9048 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9049 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9050 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9054 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9055 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9056 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9058 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9059 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9060 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9061 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9064 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9067 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9068 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9073 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9075 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9076 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9079 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9081 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9083 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9084 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9086 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9087 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9091 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9092 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9093 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9094 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9098 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9099 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9100 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9101 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9102 debug_assert!(false);
9108 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9109 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9114 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9117 match &msg.data as &str {
9118 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9119 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9121 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9122 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9123 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9124 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9125 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9126 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9127 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9128 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9130 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9131 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9132 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9133 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9134 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9135 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9136 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9140 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9141 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9142 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9143 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9144 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9145 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9147 log_level: Level::Trace,
9157 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9158 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9160 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9161 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9162 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9163 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9164 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9165 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9166 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9167 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9169 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9170 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9171 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9175 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9177 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9178 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9181 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9182 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9183 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9184 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9192 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9193 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9197 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9198 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9201 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9202 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9205 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9206 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9209 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9210 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9211 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9212 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9215 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9216 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9217 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9218 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9221 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9222 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9223 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9224 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9227 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9228 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9229 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9230 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9233 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9234 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9235 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9236 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9239 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9240 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9241 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9242 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9245 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9246 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9247 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9248 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9251 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9252 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9253 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9254 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9257 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9258 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9259 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9260 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9264 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9265 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9267 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9268 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9269 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9270 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9271 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9272 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9276 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9277 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9278 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9281 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9282 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9285 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9286 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9288 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9289 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9291 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9292 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9296 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9297 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9298 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9300 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9302 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9303 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9307 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9308 amount_msats, payment_secret
9310 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9312 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9313 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9317 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9318 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9319 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9322 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9323 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9324 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9325 payment_paths, payment_hash
9327 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9328 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9329 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9331 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9332 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9333 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9336 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9337 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9338 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9339 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9340 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9342 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9343 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9345 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9346 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9347 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9348 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9350 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9351 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9355 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9356 Err(error) => Some(error),
9360 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9361 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9363 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9365 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9366 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9369 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9371 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9378 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9385 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9386 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9390 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9391 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9392 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9393 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9394 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9398 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9399 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9401 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9402 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9403 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9404 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9405 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9408 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9409 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9410 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9411 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9414 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9415 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9416 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9417 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9420 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9421 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9422 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9423 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9426 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9427 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9428 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9429 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9430 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9431 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9432 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9433 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9434 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9435 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9436 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9437 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9438 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9439 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9440 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9441 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9442 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9443 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9444 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9445 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9446 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9451 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9452 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9454 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9455 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9456 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9457 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9460 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9461 (2, node_id, required),
9462 (4, features, required),
9463 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9464 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9465 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9466 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9469 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9470 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9471 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9472 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9473 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9474 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9475 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9476 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9477 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9478 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9479 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9480 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9481 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9482 (7, self.config, option),
9483 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9484 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9485 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9486 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9487 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9488 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9489 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9490 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9491 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9492 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9493 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9494 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9495 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9496 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9497 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9498 (32, self.is_public, required),
9499 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9500 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9501 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9502 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9503 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9504 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9505 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9511 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9512 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9513 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9514 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9515 (2, channel_id, required),
9516 (3, channel_type, option),
9517 (4, counterparty, required),
9518 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9519 (6, funding_txo, option),
9520 (7, config, option),
9521 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9522 (9, confirmations, option),
9523 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9524 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9525 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9526 (16, balance_msat, required),
9527 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9528 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9529 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9530 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9531 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9532 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9533 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9534 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9535 (26, is_outbound, required),
9536 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9537 (30, is_usable, required),
9538 (32, is_public, required),
9539 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9540 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9541 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9542 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9543 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9544 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9545 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9548 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9549 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9550 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9551 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9552 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9556 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9558 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9559 outbound_scid_alias,
9563 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9564 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9566 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9567 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9568 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9569 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9570 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9571 confirmations_required,
9573 force_close_spend_delay,
9574 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9575 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9576 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9577 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9578 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9579 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9580 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9581 channel_shutdown_state,
9582 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9583 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9588 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9589 (2, channels, required_vec),
9590 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9591 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9594 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9595 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9596 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9599 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9601 (0, onion_packet, required),
9602 (1, blinded, option),
9603 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9606 (0, payment_data, required),
9607 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9608 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9609 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9610 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9611 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9613 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9614 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9615 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9616 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9617 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9618 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9622 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9623 (0, routing, required),
9624 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9625 (4, payment_hash, required),
9626 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9627 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9628 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9629 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9633 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9634 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9636 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9638 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9639 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9640 reason.write(writer)?;
9642 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9643 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9646 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9647 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9648 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9649 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9656 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9657 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9658 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9661 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9662 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9663 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9664 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9668 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9669 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9670 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9671 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9672 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9675 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9676 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9677 // messages contained in the variants.
9678 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9679 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9680 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9682 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9683 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9684 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9685 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9686 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9689 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9690 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9691 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9692 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9693 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9695 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9700 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9705 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9706 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9707 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9710 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9711 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9712 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9713 (2, outpoint, required),
9714 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9715 (4, htlc_id, required),
9716 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9717 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9718 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9719 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9720 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9723 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9724 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9725 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9726 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9727 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9729 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9730 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9731 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9732 (2, self.value, required),
9733 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9734 (4, payment_data, option),
9735 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9736 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9737 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9738 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9744 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9745 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9746 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9747 (0, prev_hop, required),
9748 (1, total_msat, option),
9749 (2, value_ser, required),
9750 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9751 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9752 (5, total_value_received, option),
9753 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9754 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9755 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9757 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9758 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9759 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9761 if payment_data.is_some() {
9762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9764 if total_msat.is_none() {
9765 total_msat = Some(value);
9767 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9770 if total_msat.is_none() {
9771 if payment_data.is_none() {
9772 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9774 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9776 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9780 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9783 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9784 total_value_received,
9785 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9787 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9788 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9793 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9794 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9795 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9798 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9799 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9800 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9801 let mut payment_id = None;
9802 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9803 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9804 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9805 (0, session_priv, required),
9806 (1, payment_id, option),
9807 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9808 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9809 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9810 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9812 if payment_id.is_none() {
9813 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9815 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9817 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9818 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9819 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9821 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9822 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9823 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9824 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9828 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9829 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9830 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9832 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9835 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9836 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9841 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9842 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9844 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9846 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9847 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9848 (0, session_priv, required),
9849 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9850 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9851 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9852 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9853 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9854 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9857 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9859 field.write(writer)?;
9866 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9867 (0, forward_info, required),
9868 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9869 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9870 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9871 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9872 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
9873 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9874 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9877 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9878 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9879 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9881 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9885 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9886 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9887 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9888 (0, htlc_id, required),
9889 (2, err_packet, required),
9892 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9893 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9894 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9895 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9896 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9897 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9898 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9899 (0, htlc_id, required),
9900 (1, failure_code, required),
9901 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9902 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9910 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9911 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9912 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9914 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9916 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9917 (0, htlc_id, required),
9918 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9919 (2, err_packet, required),
9920 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9922 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9923 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9924 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9926 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9930 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9931 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9935 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9940 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9941 (0, payment_secret, required),
9942 (2, expiry_time, required),
9943 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9944 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9945 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9948 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9950 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9951 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9952 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9953 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9954 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9955 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9959 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9960 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9962 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9964 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9966 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9967 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9968 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9971 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9974 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9975 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9978 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9979 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9982 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9983 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9987 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9989 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9992 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9993 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9994 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9997 channel.write(writer)?;
10003 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10004 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10005 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10006 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10007 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10008 for forward in pending_forwards {
10009 forward.write(writer)?;
10014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10016 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10017 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10018 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10020 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10021 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10022 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10023 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10024 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10025 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10026 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10027 htlc.write(writer)?;
10029 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10030 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10033 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10034 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10035 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10036 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10037 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10038 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10039 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10042 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10043 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10044 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10045 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10046 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10048 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10049 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10050 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10051 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10052 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10053 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10054 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10059 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10060 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10061 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10062 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10063 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10064 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10065 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10066 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10067 0u64.write(writer)?;
10069 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10070 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10071 event.write(writer)?;
10075 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10076 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10077 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10078 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10079 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10080 0u64.write(writer)?;
10082 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10083 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10084 // likely to be identical.
10085 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10086 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10088 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10089 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10090 hash.write(writer)?;
10091 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10094 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10095 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10096 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10097 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10098 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10101 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10102 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10104 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10105 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10106 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10107 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10110 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10111 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10112 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10113 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10117 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10118 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10119 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10121 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10122 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10123 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10129 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10130 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10131 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10132 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10135 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10136 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10137 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10138 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10139 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10142 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10143 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10144 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10145 if !updates.is_empty() {
10146 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10147 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10152 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10153 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10154 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10155 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10156 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10157 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10158 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10159 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10160 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10161 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10162 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10163 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10164 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10171 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10172 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10173 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10174 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10177 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10178 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10179 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10180 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10181 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10182 // check that the event is sane here.
10183 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10184 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10185 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10186 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10192 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10193 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10194 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10195 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10196 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10197 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10200 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10201 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10202 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10203 events.push_back((ev, action));
10204 } else if action.is_some() {
10205 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10212 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10213 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10214 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10215 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10216 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10217 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10220 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10222 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10224 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10225 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10226 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10227 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10228 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10229 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10230 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10231 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10232 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10233 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10234 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10235 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10236 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10238 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10239 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10241 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10242 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10244 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10245 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10246 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10247 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10248 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10249 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10251 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10252 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10254 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10256 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10257 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10258 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10259 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10263 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10264 pub entropy_source: ES,
10266 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10267 pub node_signer: NS,
10269 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10270 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10272 pub signer_provider: SP,
10274 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10276 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10277 pub fee_estimator: F,
10278 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10280 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10281 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10282 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10283 pub chain_monitor: M,
10285 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10286 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10287 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10288 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10289 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10290 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10292 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10294 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10295 /// deserialization.
10297 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10298 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10299 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10301 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10302 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10304 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10305 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10306 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10307 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10309 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10312 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10313 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10316 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10317 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10319 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10320 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10321 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10322 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10323 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10324 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10328 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10329 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10330 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10331 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10332 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10334 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10335 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10336 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10342 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10343 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10344 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10345 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10347 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10349 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10350 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10351 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10352 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10356 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10357 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10358 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10362 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10363 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10365 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10366 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10367 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10368 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10369 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10374 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10375 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10377 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10378 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10379 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10381 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10383 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10384 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10385 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10386 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10387 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10388 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10389 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10390 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10391 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10392 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10393 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10395 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10396 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10397 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10398 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10399 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10400 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10401 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10402 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10403 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10404 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10405 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10406 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10407 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10408 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10409 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10411 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10412 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10413 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10415 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10416 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10417 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10419 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10420 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10421 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10423 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10424 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10427 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10428 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10429 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10432 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10433 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10434 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10435 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10436 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10437 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10438 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10439 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10441 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10442 let mut found_htlc = false;
10443 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10444 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10447 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10448 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10449 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10450 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10451 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10452 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10453 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10455 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10456 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10457 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10461 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10462 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10463 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10464 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10465 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10467 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10468 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10470 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10472 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10473 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10476 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10477 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10478 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10482 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10483 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10484 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10485 // safely discard the channel.
10486 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10487 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10488 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10489 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10490 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10491 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10492 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10493 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10496 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10497 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10498 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10499 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10500 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10501 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10505 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10506 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10507 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10508 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10509 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10511 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10512 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10513 counterparty_node_id: None,
10514 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10515 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10517 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10521 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10522 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10523 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10524 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10525 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10526 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10527 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10528 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10529 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10531 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10534 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10535 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10536 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10537 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10538 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10539 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10540 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10541 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10543 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10546 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10549 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10550 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10551 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10552 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10553 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10554 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10555 is_connected: false,
10559 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10560 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10561 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10562 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10563 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10564 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10565 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10566 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10569 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10570 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10571 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10572 for _ in 0..event_count {
10573 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10574 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10579 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10580 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10581 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10583 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10584 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10585 // on-startup monitor updates.
10586 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10587 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10589 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10593 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10594 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10596 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10597 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10598 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10599 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10600 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10604 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10605 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10606 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10607 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10608 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10609 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10610 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10612 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10613 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10617 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10618 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10619 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10620 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10621 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10622 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10623 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10624 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10625 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10626 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10627 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10628 let mut events_override = None;
10629 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10630 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10631 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10632 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10633 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10634 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10635 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10636 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10637 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10638 (8, events_override, option),
10639 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10640 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10641 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10642 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10644 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10645 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10648 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10649 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10652 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10653 pending_events_read = events;
10656 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10657 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10660 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10661 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10662 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10663 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10664 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10665 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10667 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10669 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10670 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10671 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10674 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10675 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10676 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10677 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10678 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10680 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10681 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10682 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10684 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10685 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10686 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10687 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10688 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10690 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10691 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10692 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10693 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10694 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10695 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10696 pending_background_events.push(
10697 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10698 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10699 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10700 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10701 update: update.clone(),
10704 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10705 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10706 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10707 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10708 pending_background_events.push(
10709 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10710 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10711 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10714 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10715 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10718 max_in_flight_update_id
10722 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10725 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10726 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10727 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10729 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10731 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10732 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10733 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10734 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10735 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10736 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10737 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10738 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10739 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10742 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10743 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10744 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10745 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10746 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10747 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10748 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10749 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10750 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10751 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10752 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10755 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10756 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10757 debug_assert!(false);
10758 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10763 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10764 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10765 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10766 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10767 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10768 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10769 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10770 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10771 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10772 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
10774 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10775 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10776 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10778 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10779 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
10780 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
10781 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10782 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10783 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10784 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10785 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10790 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10791 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10793 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10794 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10795 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10796 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10799 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10800 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10801 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10802 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10803 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10804 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10805 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10807 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10808 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10809 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10810 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10811 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10812 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10813 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10814 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10815 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10818 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10819 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10820 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10821 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10823 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10824 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10825 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10828 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10829 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10830 retry_strategy: None,
10831 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10832 payment_params: None,
10833 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
10834 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10835 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10836 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10837 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10838 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10839 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10840 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10841 total_msat: path_amt,
10842 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10843 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10845 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10846 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10851 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10852 match htlc_source {
10853 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10854 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10855 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10856 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10858 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10859 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10860 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10861 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10862 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10863 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10864 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10865 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10866 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10867 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10868 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
10873 !forwards.is_empty()
10875 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10876 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10877 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10878 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
10879 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10880 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10881 intercepted_id != ev_id
10888 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10889 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10890 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10891 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10892 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10893 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10894 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10895 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10896 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10897 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10898 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10900 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10901 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10902 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
10903 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10905 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10906 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10907 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10914 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10915 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10917 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10919 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10920 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10921 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10922 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10923 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10924 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10925 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10926 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10927 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10928 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
10931 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10932 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10933 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10934 // channel still live case here.
10938 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10939 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10944 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10945 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10946 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10947 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10948 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10949 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10950 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10951 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10955 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10956 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10958 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10959 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10960 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10961 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10963 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10964 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10965 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10967 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10968 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10970 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10971 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10973 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10976 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10977 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10978 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10980 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10984 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10985 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10986 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10987 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10988 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10990 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10991 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10992 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10993 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10994 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10995 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10996 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10997 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10999 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11000 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11004 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11006 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11008 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11009 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11011 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11012 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11017 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11018 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11020 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11022 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11024 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11025 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11026 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11027 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11031 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11032 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11035 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11036 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11037 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11038 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11039 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11041 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11042 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11043 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11045 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11046 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11047 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11048 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11049 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11050 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11052 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11053 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11054 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11055 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11056 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11057 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11061 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11062 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11063 debug_assert!(false);
11064 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11069 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11071 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11072 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11073 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11074 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11075 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11076 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11077 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11078 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11079 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11080 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11081 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11083 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11084 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11086 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11087 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11088 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11089 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11091 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11092 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11093 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11094 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11096 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11097 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11098 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11099 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11101 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11102 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11103 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11106 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11107 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11108 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11111 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11112 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11115 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11118 purpose: payment.purpose,
11119 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11120 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11121 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11127 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11128 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11129 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11130 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11131 for action in actions.iter() {
11132 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11133 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11134 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11136 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11138 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11139 blocked_channel_id);
11140 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11141 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11142 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11144 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11145 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11146 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11147 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11151 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11152 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11156 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11158 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11159 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11163 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11165 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11166 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11167 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11168 router: args.router,
11170 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11172 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11173 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11174 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11175 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11177 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11178 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11179 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11180 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11181 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11182 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11184 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11186 our_network_pubkey,
11189 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11191 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11193 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11194 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11195 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11196 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11197 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11199 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11200 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11202 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11204 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11206 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11207 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11208 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11210 logger: args.logger,
11211 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11214 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11215 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11216 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11217 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11218 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11221 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11222 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11223 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11224 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11225 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11226 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id);
11229 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11230 //connection or two.
11232 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11238 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11239 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11240 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11241 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11242 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11243 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11244 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11245 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11246 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11247 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11248 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11249 use crate::prelude::*;
11250 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11251 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11252 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11253 use crate::util::test_utils;
11254 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11255 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11258 fn test_notify_limits() {
11259 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11260 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11264 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11266 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11267 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11268 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11269 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11270 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11272 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11274 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11275 // to connect messages with new values
11276 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11277 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11278 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11279 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11280 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11281 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11283 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11284 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11285 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11286 // ... but the last node should not.
11287 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11288 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11289 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11290 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11292 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11293 // about the channel.
11294 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11295 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11296 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11298 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11300 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11301 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11302 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11303 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11304 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11305 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11307 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11308 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11309 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11311 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11312 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11313 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11314 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11315 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11316 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11318 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11319 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11320 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11321 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11322 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11323 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11324 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11325 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11327 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11328 // the channel info has updated.
11329 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11330 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11331 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11332 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11333 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11334 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11338 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11339 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11344 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11345 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11347 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11348 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11349 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11350 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11352 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11353 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11354 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11355 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11356 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11357 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11358 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11359 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11361 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11363 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11365 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11366 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11367 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11369 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11371 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11372 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11373 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11375 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11376 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11377 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11379 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11380 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11381 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11382 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11383 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11384 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11385 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11386 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11387 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11389 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11390 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11391 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11393 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11394 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11395 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11397 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11398 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11399 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11400 // lightning messages manually.
11401 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11402 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11405 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11406 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11407 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11408 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11410 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11411 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11413 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11414 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11416 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11417 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11418 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11420 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11421 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11422 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11424 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11426 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11428 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11429 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11432 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11433 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11434 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11435 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11437 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11438 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11439 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11440 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11445 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11446 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11447 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11448 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11455 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11456 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11457 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11460 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11461 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11462 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11463 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11464 // fails as expected.
11465 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11466 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11467 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11468 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11469 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11470 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11473 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11474 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11477 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11478 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11479 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11481 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11482 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11483 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11485 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11486 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11487 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11488 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11489 let route = find_route(
11490 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11491 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11493 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11494 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11496 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11498 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11499 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11500 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11502 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11503 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11504 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11505 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11506 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11508 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11509 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11510 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11511 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11512 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11513 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11514 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11516 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11518 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11519 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11521 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11522 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11523 let route = find_route(
11524 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11525 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11527 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11528 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11530 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11532 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11533 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11534 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11536 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11537 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11538 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11539 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11541 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11542 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11543 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11544 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11545 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11547 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11548 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11549 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11551 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11552 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11553 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11554 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11555 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11556 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11557 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11558 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11559 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11561 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11562 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11564 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11565 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11566 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11567 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11569 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11571 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11572 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11573 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11575 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11576 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11577 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11580 let route = find_route(
11581 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11582 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11584 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11585 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11586 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11588 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11590 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11591 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11592 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11594 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11596 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11598 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11599 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11600 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11601 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11602 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11603 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11604 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11605 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11606 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11608 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11609 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11613 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11614 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11615 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11616 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11619 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11621 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11622 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11624 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11625 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11626 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11627 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11628 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11629 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11630 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11631 let route = find_route(
11632 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11633 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11636 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11637 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11638 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11639 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11640 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11641 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11644 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11645 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11646 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11647 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11648 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11649 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11652 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11656 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11657 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11658 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11659 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11660 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11661 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11662 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11663 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11664 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11666 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11667 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11669 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11670 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11671 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11672 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11673 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11674 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11675 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11676 let route = find_route(
11677 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11678 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11681 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11682 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11683 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11684 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11685 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11686 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11687 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11688 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11691 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11692 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11693 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11694 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11695 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11696 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11697 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11699 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11703 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11707 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11709 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11710 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11711 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11712 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11714 // Marshall an MPP route.
11715 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11716 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11717 route.paths.push(path);
11718 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11719 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11720 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11721 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11722 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11723 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11725 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11726 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11728 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11729 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11731 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11736 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11742 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11744 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11745 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11747 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11748 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11750 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11753 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11754 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11755 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11756 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11757 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11758 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11761 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11764 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11765 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11770 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11771 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11777 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11778 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11780 total_msat: 100_000,
11783 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11784 // payment verification fails as expected.
11785 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11786 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11787 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11788 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11790 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11794 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11795 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11799 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11800 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11801 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11802 // the channel is successfully closed.
11803 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11804 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11805 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11806 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11808 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11809 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11810 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11811 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11812 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11814 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11815 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11817 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11818 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11819 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11820 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11823 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11825 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11826 // as it has the funding transaction.
11827 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11828 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11829 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11832 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11834 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11836 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11838 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11839 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11840 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11842 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11845 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11846 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11847 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11848 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11849 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11852 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11853 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11855 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11856 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11857 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11858 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11860 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11861 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11862 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11863 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11865 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11866 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11868 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11869 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11870 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11871 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11872 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11873 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11874 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11878 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11879 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11880 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11881 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11882 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11883 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11884 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11887 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11889 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11890 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11891 // closing transaction).
11892 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11893 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11894 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11896 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11897 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11898 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11899 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11900 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11903 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11905 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11907 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11908 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11909 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11911 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11913 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11914 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11917 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11918 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11919 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11922 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11923 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11924 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11927 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11928 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11929 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11932 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11933 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11934 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11937 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11939 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11940 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11942 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11943 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11945 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11946 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11951 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11952 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11953 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11954 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11955 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11956 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11957 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11958 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11961 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11962 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11963 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11965 // Test the API functions.
11966 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11968 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11970 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11972 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11974 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11976 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11978 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11982 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11983 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11984 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11985 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11986 // the given `channel_id`.
11987 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11988 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11989 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11990 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11992 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11995 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11997 // Test the API functions.
11998 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12000 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12002 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12004 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12006 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12008 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12012 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12013 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12017 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12019 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12021 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12022 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12024 let mut funding_tx = None;
12025 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12026 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12027 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12030 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12031 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12032 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12033 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12034 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12036 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12038 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12040 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12042 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12044 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12046 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12049 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12050 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12051 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12052 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12053 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12054 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12056 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12057 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12059 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12060 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12061 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12062 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12063 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12064 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12065 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12068 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12069 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12070 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12071 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12072 }, true).unwrap_err();
12074 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12075 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12076 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12077 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12078 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12079 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12080 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12083 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12085 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12086 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12087 }, true).unwrap_err();
12089 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12090 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12091 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12092 }, false).unwrap();
12093 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12095 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12096 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12098 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12099 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12100 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12101 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12102 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12104 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12105 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12106 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12108 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12109 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12110 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12112 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12113 // "protected" and can connect again.
12114 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12115 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12116 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12118 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12120 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12122 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12123 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12127 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12128 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12130 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12132 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12134 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12136 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12137 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12139 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12141 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12142 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12145 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12147 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12148 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12149 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12151 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12152 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12153 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12155 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12156 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12157 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12158 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12162 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12163 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12164 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12167 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12168 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12170 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12172 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12174 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12175 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12177 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12178 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12179 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12180 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12181 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12182 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12185 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12186 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12188 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12189 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12193 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12194 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12197 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12198 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12199 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12200 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12201 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12203 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12204 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12206 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12207 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12208 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12209 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12215 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12216 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12218 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12219 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12220 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12222 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12223 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12225 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12227 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12231 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12232 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12233 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12234 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12235 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12236 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12237 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12238 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12239 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12240 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12241 payment_metadata: None,
12242 keysend_preimage: None,
12243 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12244 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12246 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12248 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12249 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12250 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12251 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12252 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12253 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12254 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12256 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12257 } else { panic!(); }
12259 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12260 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12261 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12262 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12263 payment_metadata: None,
12264 keysend_preimage: None,
12265 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12266 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12268 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12270 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12271 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12272 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12273 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12277 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12278 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12279 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12280 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12281 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12283 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12284 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12285 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12286 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12287 payment_metadata: None,
12288 keysend_preimage: None,
12289 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12290 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12292 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12293 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12294 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12296 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12297 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12298 // is not satisfied.
12299 assert!(result.is_ok());
12303 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12304 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12305 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12306 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12307 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12309 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12310 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12315 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12316 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12318 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12319 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12321 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12322 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12323 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12324 match &msg_events[0] {
12325 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12326 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12328 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12329 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12330 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12336 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12337 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12339 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12340 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12343 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12347 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12348 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12349 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12350 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12353 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12354 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12355 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12356 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12357 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12359 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12360 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12361 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12363 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12364 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12366 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12367 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12372 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12373 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12375 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12376 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12378 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12379 // not have generated any events.
12380 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12384 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12385 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12386 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12387 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12388 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12389 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12390 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12391 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12393 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12394 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12397 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12398 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12399 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12400 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12401 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12403 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12404 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12407 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12408 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12411 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12412 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12413 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12414 ..Default::default()
12416 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12417 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12420 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12421 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12424 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12425 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12426 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12427 ..Default::default()
12429 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12430 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12431 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12434 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12435 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12438 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12439 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12440 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12441 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12442 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12445 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12446 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12447 ..Default::default()
12449 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12452 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12454 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12459 fn test_payment_display() {
12460 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12461 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12462 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12463 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12464 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12465 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12469 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12470 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12471 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12472 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12473 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12476 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12477 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12478 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12479 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12480 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12481 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12482 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12483 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12485 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12486 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12487 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12490 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12491 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12493 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12494 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12496 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12497 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12498 }, false).unwrap();
12499 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12500 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12501 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12503 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12505 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12506 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12507 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12508 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12509 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12510 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12511 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12512 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12513 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12514 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12515 } else { panic!() };
12516 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12517 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12518 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12519 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12521 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12523 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12524 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12525 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12530 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12531 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12532 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12533 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12536 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12537 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12538 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12540 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12541 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12543 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12544 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12547 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12548 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12549 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12551 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12555 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12556 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12557 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12559 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12564 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12565 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12566 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12567 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12569 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12570 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12571 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12573 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12575 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12576 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12577 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12578 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12580 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12581 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12583 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12589 use crate::chain::Listen;
12590 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12591 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12592 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12593 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12594 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12595 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12596 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12597 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12598 use crate::util::test_utils;
12599 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12601 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12602 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12603 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12604 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12606 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12608 use criterion::Criterion;
12610 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12611 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12612 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12613 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12614 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12615 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12616 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12618 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12619 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12621 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12622 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12624 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12626 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12629 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12630 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12633 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12634 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12635 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12637 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12638 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12640 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12641 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12642 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12643 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12644 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12646 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12647 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12648 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12650 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12651 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12652 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12653 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12655 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12656 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12657 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12659 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12660 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12661 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12662 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12663 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12665 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12666 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12667 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12669 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12670 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12672 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12673 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12674 }, false).unwrap();
12675 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12676 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12677 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12680 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12681 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12682 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12684 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12685 } else { panic!(); }
12687 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12688 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12689 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12690 match events_b[0] {
12691 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12692 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12697 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12698 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12699 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12700 match events_a[0] {
12701 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12702 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12707 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12709 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12710 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12711 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12713 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12714 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12715 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12716 match msg_events[0] {
12717 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12718 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12719 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12723 match msg_events[1] {
12724 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12728 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12729 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12730 match events_a[0] {
12731 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12732 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12737 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12738 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12739 match events_b[0] {
12740 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12741 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12746 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12747 macro_rules! send_payment {
12748 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12749 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12750 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12751 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12752 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12753 payment_count += 1;
12754 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12755 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12757 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12758 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12759 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12760 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12761 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12762 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12763 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12764 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12765 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12766 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12767 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12769 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12770 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12771 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12772 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12774 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12775 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12776 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12777 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12778 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12780 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12783 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12784 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12785 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12786 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12788 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12792 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12793 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12794 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);