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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 use {
80         crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
81         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
82         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
83         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
84         crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 };
86 #[cfg(c_bindings)]
87 use {
88         crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
89         crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 };
91
92 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
93
94 use crate::io;
95 use crate::prelude::*;
96 use core::{cmp, mem};
97 use core::cell::RefCell;
98 use crate::io::Read;
99 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
100 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
101 use core::time::Duration;
102 use core::ops::Deref;
103
104 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
105 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
106 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
107
108 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
109 //
110 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
111 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
112 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
113 //
114 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
115 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
116 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
117 // before we forward it.
118 //
119 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
120 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
121 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
122 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
123 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
124
125 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
128 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
129         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
130         Forward {
131                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
132                 /// do with the HTLC.
133                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
134                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
135                 ///
136                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
137                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
138                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
139                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
140                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
141                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
142         },
143         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
144         ///
145         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
146         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
147         Receive {
148                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
149                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
150                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
151                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
152                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
153                 ///
154                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
157                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
158                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
159                 /// blinded path was not used.
160                 ///
161                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
162                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
163                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
164                 ///
165                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
166                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
167                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
168                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
169                 /// instructions.
170                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
171                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
172                 ///
173                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
174                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
175                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
176                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
177                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
178                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
179         },
180         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
181         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
182         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
183         ReceiveKeysend {
184                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
185                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
186                 ///
187                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
188                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
189                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
191                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
192                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
193                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
194                 ///
195                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
196                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
197                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
198                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
199                 ///
200                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
201                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
202                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
203                 ///
204                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
205                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
206                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
207                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
208                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
209         },
210 }
211
212 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
213 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
214 pub struct BlindedForward {
215         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
216         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
217         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
218         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
219         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
220         /// the introduction node.
221         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
222 }
223
224 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
225         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
226         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
227                 match self {
228                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
229                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
230                         Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
231                         _ => None,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
237 /// should go next.
238 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
239 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
240 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
241         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
242         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
243         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
244         ///
245         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
246         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
247         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
248         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
250         ///
251         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
252         /// versions.
253         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
254         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
255         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
256         ///
257         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
258         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
259         /// it along another path).
260         ///
261         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
262         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
263         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
264         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
265         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
266         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
267         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
268         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
269         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
270         ///
271         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
272         /// HTLC.
273         ///
274         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
275         ///
276         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
277         /// shoulder them.
278         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
279 }
280
281 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
282 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
283         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
284         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
285 }
286
287 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
288 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
289 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
290         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
291         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
292 }
293
294 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
295 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
296         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
297
298         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
299         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
300         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
301         // HTLCs.
302         //
303         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
304         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
305         prev_htlc_id: u64,
306         prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
307         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
308         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
309 }
310
311 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
312 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
313         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
314         FailHTLC {
315                 htlc_id: u64,
316                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317         },
318         FailMalformedHTLC {
319                 htlc_id: u64,
320                 failure_code: u16,
321                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
322         },
323 }
324
325 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
326 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
328 pub enum BlindedFailure {
329         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
330         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
331         FromIntroductionNode,
332         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
333         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334         FromBlindedNode,
335 }
336
337 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
340         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
341         short_channel_id: u64,
342         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
343         htlc_id: u64,
344         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
345         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
346         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
347         channel_id: ChannelId,
348
349         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
350         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351         outpoint: OutPoint,
352 }
353
354 enum OnionPayload {
355         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
356         Invoice {
357                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
358                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
359                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
360                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
361                 /// blinded path was not used.
362                 ///
363                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
364                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
365         },
366         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
367         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 }
369
370 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
371 struct ClaimableHTLC {
372         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
373         cltv_expiry: u32,
374         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
375         value: u64,
376         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
377         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
378         sender_intended_value: u64,
379         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
380         timer_ticks: u8,
381         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
382         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
383         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
384         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
385         total_msat: u64,
386         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
387         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 }
389
390 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
391         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
392                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
393                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
394                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
395                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
396                         value_msat: val.value,
397                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
398                 }
399         }
400 }
401
402 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
403 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
404 ///
405 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
406 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
407 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408
409 impl PaymentId {
410         /// Number of bytes in the id.
411         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 }
413
414 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
415         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
416                 self.0.write(w)
417         }
418 }
419
420 impl Readable for PaymentId {
421         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
422                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
423                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
424         }
425 }
426
427 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
428         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
429                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
430         }
431 }
432
433 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
434 ///
435 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
436 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
437 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
438
439 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
440         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
441                 self.0.write(w)
442         }
443 }
444
445 impl Readable for InterceptId {
446         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
447                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
448                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
449         }
450 }
451
452 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
453 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
454 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
455         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
456         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 }
458 impl SentHTLCId {
459         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
460                 match source {
461                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
462                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
463                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
464                         },
465                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
466                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
467                 }
468         }
469 }
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
471         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
472                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
473                 (2, htlc_id, required),
474         },
475         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
476                 (0, session_priv, required),
477         };
478 );
479
480
481 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
482 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
483 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
484 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
485         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486         OutboundRoute {
487                 path: Path,
488                 session_priv: SecretKey,
489                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
490                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
491                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
492                 payment_id: PaymentId,
493         },
494 }
495 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
496 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
497         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
498                 match self {
499                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
500                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
501                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
502                         },
503                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
505                                 path.hash(hasher);
506                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
507                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
508                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
509                         },
510                 }
511         }
512 }
513 impl HTLCSource {
514         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
515         #[cfg(test)]
516         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
517                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
518                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
519                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
520                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
521                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
522                 }
523         }
524
525         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
526         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
527         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
528         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
529                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
530                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
531                 } else {
532                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
533                         true
534                 }
535         }
536 }
537
538 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
539 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
540 ///
541 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
542 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
543 pub enum FailureCode {
544         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
545         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
546         TemporaryNodeFailure,
547         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
548         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
549         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
550         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
551         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
552         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
553         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
554         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
555         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
556         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
557         ///
558         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
559         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
560         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 }
562
563 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
564     fn into(self) -> u16 {
565                 match self {
566                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
567                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
568                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
569                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
570                 }
571         }
572 }
573
574 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
575 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
576 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
577 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
578 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
579
580 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
581         err: msgs::LightningError,
582         closes_channel: bool,
583         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
584 }
585 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
586         #[inline]
587         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
588                 Self {
589                         err: LightningError {
590                                 err: err.clone(),
591                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
592                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
593                                                 channel_id,
594                                                 data: err
595                                         },
596                                 },
597                         },
598                         closes_channel: false,
599                         shutdown_finish: None,
600                 }
601         }
602         #[inline]
603         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
604                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605         }
606         #[inline]
607         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
608                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
609                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
610                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
611                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
612                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
613                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
614                 } else {
615                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616                 };
617                 Self {
618                         err: LightningError { err, action },
619                         closes_channel: true,
620                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
621                 }
622         }
623         #[inline]
624         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625                 Self {
626                         err: match err {
627                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
628                                         err: msg.clone(),
629                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
630                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
631                                                         channel_id,
632                                                         data: msg
633                                                 },
634                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
635                                         },
636                                 },
637                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
638                                         err: msg,
639                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
640                                 },
641                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
642                                         err: msg.clone(),
643                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
644                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
645                                                         channel_id,
646                                                         data: msg
647                                                 },
648                                         },
649                                 },
650                         },
651                         closes_channel: false,
652                         shutdown_finish: None,
653                 }
654         }
655
656         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
657                 self.closes_channel
658         }
659 }
660
661 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
662 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
663 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
664 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
665 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
666
667 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
668 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
669 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
670 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
671 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
672 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
673         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
674         CommitmentFirst,
675         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
676         RevokeAndACKFirst,
677 }
678
679 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
680 struct ClaimingPayment {
681         amount_msat: u64,
682         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
683         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
684         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
685         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
686 }
687 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
688         (0, amount_msat, required),
689         (2, payment_purpose, required),
690         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
691         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
692         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
693 });
694
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
699 }
700
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704         /// failed/claimed by the user.
705         ///
706         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
708         ///
709         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
712
713         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
717 }
718
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
723 #[derive(Debug)]
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
729         ///
730         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731         /// are regenerated on startup.
732         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734         /// channel to continue normal operation.
735         ///
736         /// In general this should be used rather than
737         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
740         ///
741         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742         /// are regenerated on startup.
743         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746                 channel_id: ChannelId,
747                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
748         },
749         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
751         /// on a channel.
752         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754                 channel_id: ChannelId,
755         },
756 }
757
758 #[derive(Debug)]
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763         /// event can be generated.
764         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766         /// operation of another channel.
767         ///
768         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
772         /// outbound edge.
773         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774                 event: events::Event,
775                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
776         },
777         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
780         ///
781         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
786         ///
787         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788         /// stored for later processing.
789         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793                 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
794         },
795 }
796
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804                 (4, blocking_action, required),
805                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807                 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
808         },
809         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815                 // downgrades to prior versions.
816                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
817         },
818 );
819
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825                 channel_id: ChannelId,
826         },
827 }
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834                 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
835         };
836 );
837
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
844         /// durably to disk.
845         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847                 channel_id: ChannelId,
848                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
849                 htlc_id: u64,
850         },
851 }
852
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
858                 }
859         }
860 }
861
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
864 ;);
865
866
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
870         ///
871         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
874         ///
875         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881         latest_features: InitFeatures,
882         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886         /// user but which have not yet completed.
887         ///
888         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890         /// for a missing channel.
891         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
894         ///
895         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
899         ///
900         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915         pub is_connected: bool,
916 }
917
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
924                         return false
925                 }
926                 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
927                         match phase {
928                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
931                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
933                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
934                         }
935                 )
936                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
938         }
939
940         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
943         }
944
945         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
949         }
950 }
951
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955         /// The original OpenChannel message.
956         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
959 }
960
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
964
965 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
966 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
967 ///
968 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
969 /// here.
970 ///
971 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
972 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
973 struct PendingInboundPayment {
974         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
975         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
976         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
977         /// this payment being removed.
978         expiry_time: u64,
979         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
980         user_payment_id: u64,
981         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
982         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
983         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
984 }
985
986 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
987 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
988 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
989 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
990 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
991 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
992 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
993 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
994 ///
995 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
996 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
997 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
998         Arc<M>,
999         Arc<T>,
1000         Arc<KeysManager>,
1001         Arc<KeysManager>,
1002         Arc<KeysManager>,
1003         Arc<F>,
1004         Arc<DefaultRouter<
1005                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1006                 Arc<L>,
1007                 Arc<KeysManager>,
1008                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1009                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1010                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1011         >>,
1012         Arc<L>
1013 >;
1014
1015 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1016 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1017 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1018 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1019 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1020 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1021 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1022 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1023 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1024 ///
1025 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1026 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1027 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1028         ChannelManager<
1029                 &'a M,
1030                 &'b T,
1031                 &'c KeysManager,
1032                 &'c KeysManager,
1033                 &'c KeysManager,
1034                 &'d F,
1035                 &'e DefaultRouter<
1036                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1037                         &'g L,
1038                         &'c KeysManager,
1039                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1040                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1041                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1042                 >,
1043                 &'g L
1044         >;
1045
1046 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1047 ///
1048 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1049 /// languages.
1050 pub trait AChannelManager {
1051         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1052         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1053         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1054         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1055         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1056         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1057         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1058         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1059         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1060         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1061         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1062         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1063         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1064         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1065         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1066         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1067         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1068         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1069         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1070         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1071         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1072         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1073         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1074         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1075         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1076         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1077         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1078         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1079         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1080         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1081         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1082         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1083         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1084         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1085         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1086         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1087 }
1088
1089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1090 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1091 where
1092         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1093         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1094         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1095         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1096         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1097         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1098         R::Target: Router,
1099         L::Target: Logger,
1100 {
1101         type Watch = M::Target;
1102         type M = M;
1103         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1104         type T = T;
1105         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1106         type ES = ES;
1107         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1108         type NS = NS;
1109         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1110         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1111         type SP = SP;
1112         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1113         type F = F;
1114         type Router = R::Target;
1115         type R = R;
1116         type Logger = L::Target;
1117         type L = L;
1118         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1119 }
1120
1121 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1122 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1123 ///
1124 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1125 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1126 ///   channel
1127 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1128 ///   closing channels
1129 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1130 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1131 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1132 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1133 ///   timely manner
1134 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1135 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1136 ///
1137 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1138 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1139 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1140 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1141 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1142 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1143 ///
1144 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1145 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1146 ///
1147 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1148 ///
1149 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1150 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1151 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1152 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1153 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1154 ///
1155 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1156 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1157 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1158 ///
1159 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1160 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1161 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1162 ///
1163 /// # Initialization
1164 ///
1165 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1166 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1167 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1168 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1169 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1170 ///
1171 /// ```
1172 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1173 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1174 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1175 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1176 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1177 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1178 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1179 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1180 ///
1181 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1182 /// # fn example<
1183 /// #     'a,
1184 /// #     L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1185 /// #     ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1186 /// #     S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1187 /// #     SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1188 /// #     SP: Sized,
1189 /// #     R: lightning::io::Read,
1190 /// # >(
1191 /// #     fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1192 /// #     chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1193 /// #     tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1194 /// #     router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1195 /// #     logger: &L,
1196 /// #     entropy_source: &ES,
1197 /// #     node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1198 /// #     signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1199 /// #     best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1200 /// #     current_timestamp: u32,
1201 /// #     mut reader: R,
1202 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1203 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1204 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1205 ///     network: Network::Bitcoin,
1206 ///     best_block,
1207 /// };
1208 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1209 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1210 ///     fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1211 ///     signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1212 /// );
1213 ///
1214 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1215 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1216 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1217 ///     entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1218 ///     router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1219 /// );
1220 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1221 ///     <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1222 ///
1223 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1224 /// // ...
1225 ///
1226 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1227 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1228 ///     chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1229 /// }
1230 /// # Ok(())
1231 /// # }
1232 /// ```
1233 ///
1234 /// # Operation
1235 ///
1236 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1237 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1238 ///   called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1239 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1240 ///   (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1241 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1242 ///   as documented by those traits
1243 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1244 ///   every minute
1245 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1246 ///   [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1247 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1248 ///
1249 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1250 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1251 ///
1252 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1253 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1254 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1255 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1256 ///
1257 /// # Channels
1258 ///
1259 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1260 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1261 /// currently open channels.
1262 ///
1263 /// ```
1264 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1265 /// #
1266 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1267 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1268 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1269 /// for details in channels {
1270 ///     println!("{:?}", details);
1271 /// }
1272 /// # }
1273 /// ```
1274 ///
1275 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1276 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1277 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1278 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1279 ///
1280 /// ## Opening Channels
1281 ///
1282 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1283 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1284 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1285 ///
1286 /// ```
1287 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1288 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1289 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1290 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1291 /// #
1292 /// # trait Wallet {
1293 /// #     fn create_funding_transaction(
1294 /// #         &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1295 /// #     ) -> Transaction;
1296 /// # }
1297 /// #
1298 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1299 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1300 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1301 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1302 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1303 ///     Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1304 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1305 /// }
1306 ///
1307 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1308 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1309 ///     Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1310 ///         temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1311 ///         user_channel_id, ..
1312 ///     } => {
1313 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1314 ///         let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1315 ///             channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1316 ///         );
1317 ///         match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1318 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1319 ///         ) {
1320 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1321 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1322 ///         }
1323 ///     },
1324 ///     Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1325 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1326 ///         println!(
1327 ///             "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1328 ///             former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1329 ///         );
1330 ///     },
1331 ///     Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1332 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1333 ///         println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1334 ///     },
1335 ///     // ...
1336 /// #     _ => {},
1337 /// });
1338 /// # }
1339 /// ```
1340 ///
1341 /// ## Accepting Channels
1342 ///
1343 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1344 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1345 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1346 ///
1347 /// ```
1348 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1349 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1350 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1351 /// #
1352 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1353 /// #     // ...
1354 /// #     unimplemented!()
1355 /// # }
1356 /// #
1357 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1358 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1359 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1360 ///     Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, ..  } => {
1361 ///         if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1362 ///             match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1363 ///                 &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1364 ///             ) {
1365 ///                 Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1366 ///                 Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1367 ///             }
1368 ///             return;
1369 ///         }
1370 ///
1371 ///         let user_channel_id = 43;
1372 ///         match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1373 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1374 ///         ) {
1375 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1376 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1377 ///         }
1378 ///     },
1379 ///     // ...
1380 /// #     _ => {},
1381 /// });
1382 /// # }
1383 /// ```
1384 ///
1385 /// ## Closing Channels
1386 ///
1387 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1388 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1389 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1390 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1391 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1392 ///
1393 /// ```
1394 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1395 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1396 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1397 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1398 /// #
1399 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1400 /// #     channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1401 /// # ) {
1402 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1403 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1404 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1405 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1406 /// }
1407 ///
1408 /// // On the event processing thread
1409 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1410 ///     Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, ..  } => {
1411 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1412 ///         println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1413 ///     },
1414 ///     // ...
1415 /// #     _ => {},
1416 /// });
1417 /// # }
1418 /// ```
1419 ///
1420 /// # Payments
1421 ///
1422 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1423 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1424 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1425 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1426 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1427 /// HTLCs.
1428 ///
1429 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1430 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1431 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1432 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1433 ///
1434 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1435 ///
1436 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1437 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1438 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1439 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1440 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1441 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1442 ///
1443 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1444 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1445 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1446 ///
1447 /// ```
1448 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1449 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1450 /// #
1451 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1452 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1453 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1454 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1455 ///     Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1456 /// ) {
1457 ///     Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1458 ///         println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1459 ///         payment_hash
1460 ///     },
1461 ///     Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1462 /// };
1463 ///
1464 /// // On the event processing thread
1465 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1466 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1467 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1468 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1469 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1470 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1471 ///         },
1472 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1473 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1474 ///         },
1475 ///         PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1476 ///             assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1477 ///             println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1478 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1479 ///         },
1480 ///         // ...
1481 /// #         _ => {},
1482 ///     },
1483 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1484 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1485 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1486 ///     },
1487 ///     // ...
1488 /// #     _ => {},
1489 /// });
1490 /// # }
1491 /// ```
1492 ///
1493 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1494 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1495 ///
1496 /// ```
1497 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1498 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1499 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1500 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1501 /// #
1502 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1503 /// #     channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1504 /// #     route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1505 /// # ) {
1506 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1507 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1508 /// //     payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1509 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1510 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1511 ///     payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1512 /// ) {
1513 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1514 ///     Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1515 /// }
1516 ///
1517 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1518 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1519 /// assert!(
1520 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1521 ///         details,
1522 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1523 ///             payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1524 ///             payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1525 ///             ..
1526 ///         }
1527 ///     )).is_some()
1528 /// );
1529 ///
1530 /// // On the event processing thread
1531 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1532 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1533 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1534 ///     // ...
1535 /// #     _ => {},
1536 /// });
1537 /// # }
1538 /// ```
1539 ///
1540 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1541 ///
1542 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1543 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1544 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1545 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1546 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1547 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1548 ///
1549 /// ```
1550 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1551 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1552 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1553 /// #
1554 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1555 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1556 /// let offer = channel_manager
1557 ///     .create_offer_builder()?
1558 /// # ;
1559 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1560 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1561 /// # let offer = builder
1562 ///     .description("coffee".to_string())
1563 ///     .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1564 ///     .build()?;
1565 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1566 ///
1567 /// // On the event processing thread
1568 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1569 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1570 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1571 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1572 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1573 ///         },
1574 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1575 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1576 ///         },
1577 ///         // ...
1578 /// #         _ => {},
1579 ///     },
1580 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1581 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1582 ///     },
1583 ///     // ...
1584 /// #     _ => {},
1585 /// });
1586 /// # Ok(())
1587 /// # }
1588 /// ```
1589 ///
1590 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1591 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1592 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1593 ///
1594 /// ```
1595 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1596 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1597 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1598 /// #
1599 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1600 /// #     channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1601 /// #     payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1602 /// # ) {
1603 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1604 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1605 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1606 ///     offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1607 /// ) {
1608 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1609 ///     Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1610 /// }
1611 ///
1612 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1613 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1614 /// assert!(
1615 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1616 ///         details,
1617 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1618 ///     )).is_some()
1619 /// );
1620 ///
1621 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1622 /// assert!(
1623 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1624 ///         details,
1625 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1626 ///     )).is_some()
1627 /// );
1628 ///
1629 /// // On the event processing thread
1630 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1631 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1632 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1633 ///     Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1634 ///     // ...
1635 /// #     _ => {},
1636 /// });
1637 /// # }
1638 /// ```
1639 ///
1640 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1641 ///
1642 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1643 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1644 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1645 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1646 ///
1647 /// ```
1648 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1649 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1650 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1651 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1652 /// #
1653 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1654 /// #     channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1655 /// #     max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1656 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1657 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1658 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1659 /// let refund = channel_manager
1660 ///     .create_refund_builder(
1661 ///         amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1662 ///     )?
1663 /// # ;
1664 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1665 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1666 /// # let refund = builder
1667 ///     .description("coffee".to_string())
1668 ///     .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1669 ///     .build()?;
1670 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1671 ///
1672 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1673 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1674 /// assert!(
1675 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1676 ///         details,
1677 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1678 ///     )).is_some()
1679 /// );
1680 ///
1681 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1682 /// assert!(
1683 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1684 ///         details,
1685 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1686 ///     )).is_some()
1687 /// );
1688 ///
1689 /// // On the event processing thread
1690 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1691 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1692 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1693 ///     // ...
1694 /// #     _ => {},
1695 /// });
1696 /// # Ok(())
1697 /// # }
1698 /// ```
1699 ///
1700 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1701 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1702 ///
1703 /// ```
1704 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1705 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1706 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1707 /// #
1708 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1709 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1710 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1711 ///     Ok(invoice) => {
1712 ///         let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1713 ///         println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1714 ///         payment_hash
1715 ///     },
1716 ///     Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1717 /// };
1718 ///
1719 /// // On the event processing thread
1720 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1721 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1722 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1723 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1724 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1725 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1726 ///         },
1727 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1728 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1729 ///             },
1730 ///         // ...
1731 /// #         _ => {},
1732 ///     },
1733 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1734 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1735 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1736 ///     },
1737 ///     // ...
1738 /// #     _ => {},
1739 /// });
1740 /// # }
1741 /// ```
1742 ///
1743 /// # Persistence
1744 ///
1745 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1746 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1747 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1748 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1749 ///
1750 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1751 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1752 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1753 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1754 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1755 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1756 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1757 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1758 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1759 ///
1760 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1761 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1762 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1763 ///
1764 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1765 ///
1766 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1767 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1768 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1769 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1770 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1771 ///
1772 /// # DoS Mitigation
1773 ///
1774 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1775 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1776 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1777 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1778 ///
1779 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1780 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1781 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1782 ///
1783 /// # Type Aliases
1784 ///
1785 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1786 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1787 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1788 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1789 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1790 ///
1791 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1792 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1793 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1794 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1795 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1796 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1797 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1798 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1799 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1800 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1801 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1802 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1803 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1804 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1805 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1806 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1807 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1808 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1809 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1810 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1811 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1812 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1813 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1814 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1815 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1816 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1817 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1818 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1819 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1820 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1821 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1822 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1823 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1824 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1825 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1826 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1827 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1828 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1829 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1830 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1831 //
1832 // Lock order:
1833 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1834 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1835 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1836 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1837 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1838 //
1839 // Lock order tree:
1840 //
1841 // `pending_offers_messages`
1842 //
1843 // `total_consistency_lock`
1844 //  |
1845 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1846 //  |   |
1847 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1848 //  |
1849 //  |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1850 //  |
1851 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1852 //      |
1853 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1854 //          |
1855 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1856 //          |
1857 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1858 //              |
1859 //              |__`peer_state`
1860 //                  |
1861 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1862 //                  |
1863 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1864 //                  |
1865 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1866 //                  |
1867 //                  |__`best_block`
1868 //                  |
1869 //                  |__`pending_events`
1870 //                      |
1871 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1872 //
1873 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1874 where
1875         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1876         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1877         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1878         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1879         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1880         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1881         R::Target: Router,
1882         L::Target: Logger,
1883 {
1884         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1885         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1886         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1887         chain_monitor: M,
1888         tx_broadcaster: T,
1889         #[allow(unused)]
1890         router: R,
1891
1892         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1893         #[cfg(test)]
1894         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1895         #[cfg(not(test))]
1896         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1897         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1898
1899         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1900         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1901         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1902         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1903         ///
1904         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1905         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1906
1907         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1908         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1909         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1910         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1911         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1912         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1913         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1914         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1915         ///
1916         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1917         ///
1918         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1919         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1920
1921         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1922         ///
1923         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1924         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1925         /// and via the classic SCID.
1926         ///
1927         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1928         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1929         ///
1930         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1931         #[cfg(test)]
1932         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1933         #[cfg(not(test))]
1934         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1935         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1936         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1937         ///
1938         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1939         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1940
1941         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1942         ///
1943         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1944         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1945         /// and via the classic SCID.
1946         ///
1947         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1948         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1949         ///
1950         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1951         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1952
1953         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1954         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1955         ///
1956         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1957         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1958
1959         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1960         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1961         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1962         /// active channel list on load.
1963         ///
1964         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1965         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1966
1967         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1968         ///
1969         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1970         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1971         /// the handling of the events.
1972         ///
1973         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1974         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1975         ///
1976         /// TODO:
1977         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1978         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1979         /// would break backwards compatability.
1980         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1981         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1982         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1983         ///
1984         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1985         #[cfg(not(test))]
1986         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1987         #[cfg(test)]
1988         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1989
1990         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1991         ///
1992         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1993         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1994         /// confirmation depth.
1995         ///
1996         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1997         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1998         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1999         ///
2000         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2001         #[cfg(test)]
2002         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2003         #[cfg(not(test))]
2004         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2005
2006         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2007
2008         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2009
2010         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2011         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2012         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2013         ///
2014         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2015         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2016
2017         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2018         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2019         /// keeping additional state.
2020         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2021
2022         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2023         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2024         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2025         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2026
2027         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2028         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2029         ///
2030         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2031         /// are currently open with that peer.
2032         ///
2033         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2034         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2035         /// channels.
2036         ///
2037         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2038         ///
2039         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2040         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2041         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2042         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2043         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2044
2045         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2046         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2047         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2048         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2049         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2050         ///
2051         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2052         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2053         ///
2054         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2055         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2056         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2057         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2058         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2059
2060         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2061         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2062
2063         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2064         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2065         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2066         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2067         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2068         ///
2069         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2070         ///
2071         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2072         ///
2073         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2074         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2075         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2076         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2077         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2078         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2079         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2080         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2081         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2082         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2083         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2084         ///
2085         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2086         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2087         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2088
2089         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2090
2091         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2092         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2093
2094         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2095
2096         /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2097         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2098
2099         entropy_source: ES,
2100         node_signer: NS,
2101         signer_provider: SP,
2102
2103         logger: L,
2104 }
2105
2106 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2107 ///
2108 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2109 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2110 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2111 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2112 pub struct ChainParameters {
2113         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2114         pub network: Network,
2115
2116         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2117         ///
2118         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2119         pub best_block: BestBlock,
2120 }
2121
2122 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2123 #[must_use]
2124 enum NotifyOption {
2125         DoPersist,
2126         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2127         SkipPersistNoEvents,
2128 }
2129
2130 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2131 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2132 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2133 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2134 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2135 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2136 ///
2137 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2138 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2139 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2140 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2141         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2142         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2143         should_persist: F,
2144         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2145         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2146 }
2147
2148 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2149         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2150         /// events to handle.
2151         ///
2152         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2153         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2154         /// isn't ideal.
2155         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2156                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2157         }
2158
2159         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2160         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2161                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2162                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2163
2164                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2165                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2166                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2167                         should_persist: move || {
2168                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2169                                 // processing and return that.
2170                                 let notify = persist_check();
2171                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
2172                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2173                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2174                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2175                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2176                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2177                                 }
2178                         },
2179                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2180                 }
2181         }
2182
2183         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2184         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2185         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2186         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2187         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2188                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2189
2190                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2191                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2192                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2193                         should_persist: persist_check,
2194                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2195                 }
2196         }
2197 }
2198
2199 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2200         fn drop(&mut self) {
2201                 match (self.should_persist)() {
2202                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2203                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2204                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2205                         },
2206                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2207                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2208                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2209                 }
2210         }
2211 }
2212
2213 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2214 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2215 ///
2216 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2217 ///
2218 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2219 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2220 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2221 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2222 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2223
2224 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2225 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2226 ///
2227 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2228 ///
2229 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2230 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2231 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2232 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2233 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2234 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2235 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2236 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2237 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2238 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2239 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2240 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2241 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2242
2243 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2244 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2245 /// this value.
2246 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2247 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2248 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2249 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2250
2251 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2252 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2253 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2254 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2255 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2256 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2257 #[allow(dead_code)]
2258 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2259
2260 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2261 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2262 #[allow(dead_code)]
2263 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2264
2265 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2266 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2267
2268 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2269 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2270 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2271
2272 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2273 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2274 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2275
2276 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2277 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2278 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2279 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2280
2281 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2282 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2283 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2284
2285 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2286 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2287 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2288
2289 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2290 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2291 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2292         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2293         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2294         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2295         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2296         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2297         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2298         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2299         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2300 }
2301
2302 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2303 /// to better separate parameters.
2304 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2305 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2306         /// The node_id of our counterparty
2307         pub node_id: PublicKey,
2308         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2309         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2310         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2311         pub features: InitFeatures,
2312         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2313         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2314         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2315         ///
2316         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2317         ///
2318         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2319         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2320         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2321         /// payments to us through this channel.
2322         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2323         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2324         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2325         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2326         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2327         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2328         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2329 }
2330
2331 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2332 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2333 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2334         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2335         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2336         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2337         /// lifetime of the channel.
2338         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2339         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2340         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2341         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2342         /// our counterparty already.
2343         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2344         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2345         ///
2346         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2347         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2348         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2349         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2350         ///
2351         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2352         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2353         ///
2354         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2355         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2356         ///
2357         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2358         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2359         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2360         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2361         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2362         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2363         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2364         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2365         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2366         /// `Some(0)`).
2367         ///
2368         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2369         ///
2370         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2371         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2372         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2373         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2374         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2375         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2376         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2377         ///
2378         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2379         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2380         ///
2381         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2382         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2383         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2384         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2385         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2386         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2387         /// this value on chain.
2388         ///
2389         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2390         ///
2391         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2392         ///
2393         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2394         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2395         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2396         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2397         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2398         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
2399         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2400         ///
2401         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2402         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2403         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2404         pub user_channel_id: u128,
2405         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2406         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2407         ///
2408         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2409         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2410         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2411         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2412         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2413         ///
2414         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2415         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2416         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2417         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2418         ///
2419         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2420         pub balance_msat: u64,
2421         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2422         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2423         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2424         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2425         ///
2426         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2427         ///
2428         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2429         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2430         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2431         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2432         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2433         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2434         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2435         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2436         ///
2437         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2438         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2439         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2440         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2441         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2442         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2443         /// route which is valid.
2444         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2445         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2446         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2447         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2448         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2449         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2450         ///
2451         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2452         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2453         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2454         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2455         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2456         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2457         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2458         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2459         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2460         ///
2461         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2462         ///
2463         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2464         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2465         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2466         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2467         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2468         ///
2469         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2470         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2471         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2472         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2473         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2474         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2475         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2476         ///
2477         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2478         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2479         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2480         pub is_outbound: bool,
2481         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2482         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2483         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2484         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2485         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2486         ///
2487         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2488         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2489         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2490         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2491         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2492         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2493         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2494         ///
2495         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2496         pub is_usable: bool,
2497         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2498         pub is_public: bool,
2499         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2500         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2501         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2502         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2503         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2504         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2505         ///
2506         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2507         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2508         /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2509         ///
2510         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2511         pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2512         /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2513         ///
2514         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2515         pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2516 }
2517
2518 impl ChannelDetails {
2519         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2520         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2521         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2522         ///
2523         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2524         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2525         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2526                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2527         }
2528
2529         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2530         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2531         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2532         ///
2533         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2534         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2535         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2536                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2537         }
2538
2539         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2540                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2541                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2542         ) -> Self
2543         where
2544                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2545                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2546         {
2547                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2548                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2549                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2550                 ChannelDetails {
2551                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2552                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2553                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2554                                 features: latest_features,
2555                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2556                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2557                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2558                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2559                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2560                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2561                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2562                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2563                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2564                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2565                         },
2566                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2567                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2568                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2569                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2570                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2571                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2572                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2573                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2574                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2575                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2576                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2577                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2578                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2579                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2580                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2581                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2582                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2583                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2584                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2585                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2586                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2587                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
2588                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
2589                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2590                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2591                         config: Some(context.config()),
2592                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2593                         pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2594                         pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2595                 }
2596         }
2597 }
2598
2599 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2600 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2601 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2602 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2603 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2604 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2605 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2606 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2607         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2608         NotShuttingDown,
2609         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2610         ShutdownInitiated,
2611         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2612         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2613         ResolvingHTLCs,
2614         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2615         NegotiatingClosingFee,
2616         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2617         /// to drop the channel.
2618         ShutdownComplete,
2619 }
2620
2621 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2622 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2623 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2624 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2625         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2626         AwaitingInvoice {
2627                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2628                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2629                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2630         },
2631         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2632         Pending {
2633                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2634                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2635                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2636                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2637                 /// abandoned.
2638                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2639                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2640                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2641                 total_msat: u64,
2642         },
2643         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2644         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2645         /// payment is removed from tracking.
2646         Fulfilled {
2647                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2648                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2649                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2650                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2651                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2652                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2653         },
2654         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2655         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2656         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2657         Abandoned {
2658                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2659                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2660                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2661                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2662                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2663         },
2664 }
2665
2666 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2667 ///
2668 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2669 #[derive(Clone)]
2670 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2671         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2672         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2673         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2674         /// route hints.
2675         pub phantom_scid: u64,
2676         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2677         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2678 }
2679
2680 macro_rules! handle_error {
2681         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2682                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2683                 // entering the macro.
2684                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2685                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2686
2687                 match $internal {
2688                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2689                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2690                                 let mut msg_event = None;
2691
2692                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2693                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2694                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2695                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
2696                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2697                                         );
2698                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2699
2700                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2701                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
2702                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2703                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2704                                                         msg: update
2705                                                 });
2706                                         }
2707                                 } else {
2708                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2709                                 }
2710
2711                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2712                                 } else {
2713                                         msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2714                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2715                                                 action: err.action.clone()
2716                                         });
2717                                 }
2718
2719                                 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2720                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2721                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2722                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2723                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2724                                         }
2725                                 }
2726
2727                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2728                                 Err(err)
2729                         },
2730                 }
2731         } };
2732 }
2733
2734 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2735         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2736                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2737                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2738                 }
2739                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2740                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2741                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2742                 } else {
2743                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2744                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2745                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2746                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2747                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2748                         // stage.
2749                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2750                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2751                 }
2752                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2753         }}
2754 }
2755
2756 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2757 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2758         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2759                 match $err {
2760                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2761                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2762                         },
2763                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2764                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2765                         },
2766                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2767                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2768                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2769                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2770                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2771                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2772                                 let err =
2773                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2774                                 (true, err)
2775                         },
2776                 }
2777         };
2778         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2779                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2780         };
2781         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2782                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2783         };
2784         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2785                 match $channel_phase {
2786                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2787                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2788                         },
2789                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2790                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2791                         },
2792                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2793                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2794                         },
2795                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2796                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2797                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2798                         },
2799                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2800                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2801                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2802                         },
2803                 }
2804         };
2805 }
2806
2807 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2808         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2809                 match $res {
2810                         Ok(res) => res,
2811                         Err(e) => {
2812                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2813                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2814                                 if drop {
2815                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2816                                 }
2817                                 break Err(res);
2818                         }
2819                 }
2820         }
2821 }
2822
2823 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2824         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2825                 match $res {
2826                         Ok(res) => res,
2827                         Err(e) => {
2828                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2829                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2830                                 if drop {
2831                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2832                                 }
2833                                 return Err(res);
2834                         }
2835                 }
2836         }
2837 }
2838
2839 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2840         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2841                 {
2842                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2843                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2844                         channel
2845                 }
2846         }
2847 }
2848
2849 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2850         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2851                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2852                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2853                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2854                 });
2855                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2856                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2857                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2858                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2859                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2860                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2861                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2862                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2863                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2864                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2865                 }
2866         }}
2867 }
2868
2869 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2870         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2871                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2872                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2873                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2874                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2875                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2876                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2877                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2878                                 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2879                         }, None));
2880                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2881                 }
2882         }
2883 }
2884
2885 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2886         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2887                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2888                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2889                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2890                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2891                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2892                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2893                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2894                         }, None));
2895                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2896                 }
2897         }
2898 }
2899
2900 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2901         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2902                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2903                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2904                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2905                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2906                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2907                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2908                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2909                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2910                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2911                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2912                         // now.
2913                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2914                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2915                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2916                                         msg,
2917                                 })
2918                         } else { None }
2919                 } else { None };
2920
2921                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2922                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2923
2924                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2925                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2926                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2927                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2928                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2929                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2930                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2931                 }
2932
2933                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2934                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2935                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2936                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2937
2938                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2939                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2940                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2941                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2942                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2943                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2944                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2945                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2946                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2947                                 ));
2948                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2949                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2950                                 } else {
2951                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2952                                 }
2953                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2954                         } else {
2955                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2956                         }
2957
2958                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2959                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2960                         if batch_completed {
2961                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2962                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2963                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2964                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2965                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2966                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2967                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2968                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2969                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2970                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2971                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2972                                                 }
2973                                         }
2974                                 }
2975                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2976                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2977                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2978                                 }
2979                         }
2980                 }
2981
2982                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2983
2984                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2985                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2986                 }
2987                 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2988                         $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2989                 }
2990                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2991                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2992                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2993                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2994                 }
2995         } }
2996 }
2997
2998 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2999         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
3000                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
3001                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
3002                 match $update_res {
3003                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
3004                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
3005                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3006                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
3007                         },
3008                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3009                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3010                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
3011                                 false
3012                         },
3013                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3014                                 $completed;
3015                                 true
3016                         },
3017                 }
3018         } };
3019         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3020                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3021                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3022         };
3023         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3024                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3025                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3026                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3027                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3028                 // filter for uniqueness here.
3029                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3030                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3031                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3032                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3033                         });
3034                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3035                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3036                         {
3037                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3038                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3039                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3040                                 }
3041                         })
3042         } };
3043 }
3044
3045 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3046         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3047                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3048                 while !processed_all_events {
3049                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3050                                 return;
3051                         }
3052
3053                         let mut result;
3054
3055                         {
3056                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3057                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3058                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3059
3060                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3061                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3062                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
3063
3064                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3065                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3066                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3067                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3068                                 }
3069                         }
3070
3071                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3072                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
3073                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3074                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3075                         }
3076
3077                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3078
3079                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3080                                 $event_to_handle = event;
3081                                 $handle_event;
3082                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3083                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
3084                                 }
3085                         }
3086
3087                         {
3088                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3089                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3090                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3091                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3092                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3093                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3094                         }
3095
3096                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3097                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3098                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3099                                 processed_all_events = false;
3100                         }
3101
3102                         match result {
3103                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3104                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3105                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3106                                 },
3107                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3108                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3109                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3110                         }
3111                 }
3112         }
3113 }
3114
3115 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3116 where
3117         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3118         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3119         ES::Target: EntropySource,
3120         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3121         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3122         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3123         R::Target: Router,
3124         L::Target: Logger,
3125 {
3126         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3127         ///
3128         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3129         ///
3130         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3131         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3132         ///
3133         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3134         ///
3135         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3136         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3137         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3138         /// more details.
3139         ///
3140         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3141         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3142         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3143         pub fn new(
3144                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3145                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3146                 current_timestamp: u32,
3147         ) -> Self {
3148                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3149                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3150                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3151                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3152                 ChannelManager {
3153                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
3154                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3155                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3156                         chain_monitor,
3157                         tx_broadcaster,
3158                         router,
3159
3160                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3161
3162                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3163                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3164                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3165                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3166                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3167                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3168                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3169                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3170                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3171
3172                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3173                         secp_ctx,
3174
3175                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3176                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3177
3178                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3179
3180                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3181
3182                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3183
3184                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3185                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3186                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3187                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3188                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3189                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3190                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3191                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3192
3193                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3194                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3195
3196                         entropy_source,
3197                         node_signer,
3198                         signer_provider,
3199
3200                         logger,
3201                 }
3202         }
3203
3204         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3205         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3206                 &self.default_configuration
3207         }
3208
3209         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3210                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3211                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3212                 let mut i = 0;
3213                 loop {
3214                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3215                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3216                         } else {
3217                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3218                         }
3219                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3220                                 break;
3221                         }
3222                         i += 1;
3223                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3224                 }
3225                 outbound_scid_alias
3226         }
3227
3228         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3229         ///
3230         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3231         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3232         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3233         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3234         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3235         ///
3236         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3237         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3238         ///
3239         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3240         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3241         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3242         ///
3243         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3244         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3245         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3246         ///
3247         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3248         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3249         ///
3250         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3251         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3252         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3253         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3254         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3255         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3256         ///
3257         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3258         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3259         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3260         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3261                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3262                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3263                 }
3264
3265                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3266                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3267                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3268
3269                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3270
3271                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3272                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3273
3274                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3275
3276                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3277                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3278                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3279                         }
3280                 }
3281
3282                 let channel = {
3283                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3284                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3285                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3286                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3287                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3288                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3289                         {
3290                                 Ok(res) => res,
3291                                 Err(e) => {
3292                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3293                                         return Err(e);
3294                                 },
3295                         }
3296                 };
3297                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3298
3299                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3300                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3301                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3302                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
3303                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3304                                 } else {
3305                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
3306                                 }
3307                         },
3308                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3309                 }
3310
3311                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3312                         node_id: their_network_key,
3313                         msg: res,
3314                 });
3315                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3316         }
3317
3318         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3319                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3320                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3321                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3322                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3323                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3324                 // the same channel.
3325                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3326                 {
3327                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3328                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3329                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3330                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3331                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3332                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3333                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3334                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3335                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3336                                                 _ => None,
3337                                         })
3338                                         .filter(f)
3339                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3340                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3341                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3342                                         })
3343                                 );
3344                         }
3345                 }
3346                 res
3347         }
3348
3349         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3350         /// more information.
3351         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3352                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3353                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3354                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3355                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3356                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3357                 // the same channel.
3358                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3359                 {
3360                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3361                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3362                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3363                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3364                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3365                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3366                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3367                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3368                                         res.push(details);
3369                                 }
3370                         }
3371                 }
3372                 res
3373         }
3374
3375         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3376         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3377         ///
3378         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3379         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3380         /// are.
3381         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3382                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3383                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3384                 // really wanted anyway.
3385                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3386         }
3387
3388         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3389         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3390                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3391                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3392
3393                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3394                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3395                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3396                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3397                         let context_to_details = |context| {
3398                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3399                         };
3400                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
3401                                 .iter()
3402                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3403                                 .map(context_to_details)
3404                                 .collect();
3405                 }
3406                 vec![]
3407         }
3408
3409         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3410         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3411         ///
3412         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3413         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3414         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3415         ///
3416         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3417         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3418                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3419                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3420                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3421                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3422                                 },
3423                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3424                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3425                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3426                                 },
3427                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3428                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3429                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
3430                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3431                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
3432                                         })
3433                                 },
3434                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3435                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3436                                 },
3437                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3438                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3439                                 },
3440                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3441                         })
3442                         .collect()
3443         }
3444
3445         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3446                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3447
3448                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3449                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3450
3451                 {
3452                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3453
3454                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3455                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3456
3457                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3458                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3459
3460                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3461                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3462                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3463                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3464                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3465                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3466                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3467                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3468
3469                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3470                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3471                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3472                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3473                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3474                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
3475                                                 });
3476
3477                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3478                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3479
3480                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3481                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3482                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3483                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3484                                                 }
3485                                         } else {
3486                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3487                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3488                                         }
3489                                 },
3490                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3491                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3492                                                 err: format!(
3493                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3494                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3495                                                 )
3496                                         });
3497                                 },
3498                         }
3499                 }
3500
3501                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3502                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3503                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3504                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3505                 }
3506
3507                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3508                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3509                 }
3510
3511                 Ok(())
3512         }
3513
3514         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3515         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3516         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3517         ///
3518         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3519         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3520         ///    fee estimate.
3521         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3522         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3523         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3524         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3525         ///
3526         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3527         ///
3528         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3529         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3530         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3531         /// channel.
3532         ///
3533         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3534         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3535         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3536         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3537         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3538                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3539         }
3540
3541         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3542         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3543         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3544         ///
3545         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3546         /// the channel being closed or not:
3547         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3548         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3549         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3550         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3551         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3552         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3553         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3554         ///
3555         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3556         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3557         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3558         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3559         ///
3560         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3561         ///
3562         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3563         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3564         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3565         /// channel.
3566         ///
3567         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3568         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3569         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3570         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3571                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3572         }
3573
3574         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3575                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3576                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3577                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3578                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3579                 }
3580
3581                 let logger = WithContext::from(
3582                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3583                 );
3584
3585                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3586                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3587                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3588                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3589                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3590                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3591                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3592                 }
3593                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3594                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3595                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3596                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3597                         // ignore the result here.
3598                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3599                 }
3600                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3601                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3602                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3603                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3604                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3605                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3606                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3607                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3608                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3609                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3610                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3611                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3612                                         }
3613                                 }
3614                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3615                         }
3616                         debug_assert!(
3617                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3618                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3619                         );
3620                 }
3621
3622                 {
3623                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3624                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3625                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3626                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3627                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3628                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3629                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3630                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3631                         }, None));
3632
3633                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3634                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3635                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3636                                 }, None));
3637                         }
3638                 }
3639                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3640                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3641                 }
3642         }
3643
3644         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3645         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3646         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3647         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3648                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3649                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3650                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3651                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3652                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3653                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3654                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3655                         } else {
3656                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3657                         };
3658                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3659                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3660                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3661                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3662                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
3663                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3664                                 match chan_phase {
3665                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3666                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3667                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3668                                         },
3669                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3670                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3671                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3672                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3673                                         },
3674                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3675                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3676                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3677                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3678                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3679                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3680                                         },
3681                                 }
3682                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3683                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3684                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3685                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3686                                 // events anyway.
3687                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
3688                         } else {
3689                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3690                         }
3691                 };
3692                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3693                         // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3694                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3695                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3696                                 msg: update
3697                         });
3698                 }
3699
3700                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3701         }
3702
3703         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3704                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3705                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3706                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3707                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3708                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3709                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3710                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3711                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3712                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3713                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3714                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3715                                                         },
3716                                                 }
3717                                         );
3718                                 }
3719                                 Ok(())
3720                         },
3721                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3722                 }
3723         }
3724
3725         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3726         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3727         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3728         /// channel.
3729         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3730         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3731                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3732         }
3733
3734         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3735         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3736         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3737         ///
3738         /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3739         /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3740         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3741         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3742                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3743         }
3744
3745         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3746         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3747         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3748                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3749                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3750                 }
3751         }
3752
3753         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3754         /// local transaction(s).
3755         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3756                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3757                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3758                 }
3759         }
3760
3761         fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3762                 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3763         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3764                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3765                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3766                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3767                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3768                         return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3769                 }
3770                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3771                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3772                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3773                         // we don't have the channel here.
3774                         return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3775                 }
3776
3777                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3778                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3779                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3780                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3781                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3782                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3783                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3784                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3785                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3786                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3787                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3788                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3789                         } else {
3790                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3791                         }
3792                 }
3793                 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3794                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3795                         return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3796                 }
3797                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3798                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3799                         return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3800                 }
3801
3802                 Ok(())
3803         }
3804
3805         /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3806         /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3807         fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3808                 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3809         ) -> Option<X> {
3810                 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3811                         None => return None,
3812                         Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3813                 };
3814                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3815                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3816                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3817                         return None;
3818                 }
3819                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3820                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3821                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3822                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3823                 ) {
3824                         None => None,
3825                         Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3826                 }
3827         }
3828
3829         fn can_forward_htlc(
3830                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3831         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3832                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3833                         self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3834                 }) {
3835                         Some(Ok(())) => {},
3836                         Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3837                         None => {
3838                                 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3839                                 // intercept forward.
3840                                 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3841                                         fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3842                                         fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3843                                 {} else {
3844                                         return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3845                                 }
3846                         }
3847                 }
3848
3849                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3850                 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3851                         cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3852                 ) {
3853                         let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3854                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3855                         }).flatten();
3856                         return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3857                 }
3858
3859                 Ok(())
3860         }
3861
3862         fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3863                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3864                 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3865                 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3866         ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3867                 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3868                 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3869                         let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3870                         if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3871                                 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3872                         }
3873                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3874                                 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3875                         }
3876                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3877                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3878                                 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3879                         }
3880                         (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3881                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3882                         chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3883                 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3884                         // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3885                         // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3886                         // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3887                         // instead.
3888                         err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3889                 }
3890
3891                 log_info!(
3892                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3893                         "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3894                 );
3895                 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3896                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3897                         return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3898                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3899                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3900                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3901                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3902                         });
3903                 }
3904
3905                 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3906                         (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3907                 } else {
3908                         (err_code, &res.0[..])
3909                 };
3910                 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3911                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3912                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3913                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3914                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3915                 })
3916         }
3917
3918         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3919                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3920         ) -> Result<
3921                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3922         > {
3923                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3924                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3925                 )?;
3926
3927                 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3928                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3929                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3930                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3931                 };
3932
3933                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3934                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3935                 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3936                         let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3937                         self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3938                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3939                                 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3940                         )
3941                 })?;
3942
3943                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3944         }
3945
3946         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3947                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3948                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3949                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3950         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3951                 macro_rules! return_err {
3952                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3953                                 {
3954                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3955                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3956                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3957                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3958                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3959                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3960                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3961                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3962                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3963                                                         }
3964                                                 ))
3965                                         }
3966                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3967                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3968                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3969                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3970                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3971                                         }));
3972                                 }
3973                         }
3974                 }
3975                 match decoded_hop {
3976                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3977                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3978                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3979                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3980                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3981                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3982                                 {
3983                                         Ok(info) => {
3984                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3985                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3986                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3987                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3988                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3989                                         },
3990                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3991                                 }
3992                         },
3993                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3994                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3995                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3996                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3997                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3998                                 }
3999                         }
4000                 }
4001         }
4002
4003         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
4004         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
4005         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4006         ///
4007         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4008         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4009         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4010         ///
4011         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4012         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4013         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4014                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4015                         return Err(LightningError {
4016                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4017                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4018                         });
4019                 }
4020                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4021                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4022                 }
4023                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4024                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4025                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4026         }
4027
4028         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4029         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4030         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4031         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4032         ///
4033         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4034         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4035         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4036         ///
4037         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4038         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4039         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4040                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4041                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4042                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4043                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4044                         Some(id) => id,
4045                 };
4046
4047                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4048         }
4049
4050         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4051                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4052                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4053                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4054
4055                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4056                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4057                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4058                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4059                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4060                 };
4061
4062                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4063                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4064                         short_channel_id,
4065                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4066                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4067                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4068                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4069                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4070                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4071                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4072                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4073                 };
4074                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4075                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4076                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4077                 // channel.
4078                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4079
4080                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4081                         signature: sig,
4082                         contents: unsigned
4083                 })
4084         }
4085
4086         #[cfg(test)]
4087         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4088                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4089                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4090                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4091                         session_priv_bytes
4092                 })
4093         }
4094
4095         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4096                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4097                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4098                         session_priv_bytes
4099                 } = args;
4100                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4101                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4102                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4103                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4104
4105                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4106                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4107                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4108                 ).map_err(|e| {
4109                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4110                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4111                         e
4112                 })?;
4113
4114                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4115                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4116                                 None => {
4117                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4118                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4119                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4120                                 },
4121                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4122                         };
4123
4124                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4125                         log_trace!(logger,
4126                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4127                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4128
4129                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4130                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4131                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4132                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4133                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4134                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4135                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4136                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4137                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4138                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4139                                                 }
4140                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4141                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4142                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4143                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4144                                                                 path: path.clone(),
4145                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4146                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4147                                                                 payment_id,
4148                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4149                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4150                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
4151                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4152                                                                         false => {
4153                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4154                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4155                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4156                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4157                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4158                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4159                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4160                                                                         },
4161                                                                         true => {},
4162                                                                 }
4163                                                         },
4164                                                         None => {},
4165                                                 }
4166                                         },
4167                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4168                                 };
4169                         } else {
4170                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4171                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4172                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
4173                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4174                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4175                         }
4176                         return Ok(());
4177                 };
4178                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4179                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4180                         Err(e) => {
4181                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4182                         },
4183                 }
4184         }
4185
4186         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4187         ///
4188         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4189         /// fields for more info.
4190         ///
4191         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4192         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4193         ///
4194         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4195         ///
4196         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4197         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4198         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4199         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4200         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4201         ///
4202         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4203         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4204         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4205         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4206         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4207         ///
4208         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4209         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4210         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4211         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4212         ///
4213         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4214         ///
4215         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4216         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4217         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4218         ///
4219         /// In general, a path may raise:
4220         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4221         ///    node public key) is specified.
4222         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4223         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4224         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4225         ///    relevant updates.
4226         ///
4227         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4228         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4229         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4230         ///
4231         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4232         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4233         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4234         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4235         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4236         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4237         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4238                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4239                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4240                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4241                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4242                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4243                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4244         }
4245
4246         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4247         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4248         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4249                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4250                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4251                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4252                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4253                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4254                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4255                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4256         }
4257
4258         #[cfg(test)]
4259         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4260                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4261                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4262                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4263                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4264                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4265         }
4266
4267         #[cfg(test)]
4268         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4269                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4270                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4271         }
4272
4273         #[cfg(test)]
4274         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4275                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4276         }
4277
4278         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4279                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4280                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4281                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4282                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4283                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4284                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4285                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4286                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4287                         )
4288         }
4289
4290         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4291         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4292         /// retries are exhausted.
4293         ///
4294         /// # Event Generation
4295         ///
4296         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4297         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4298         ///
4299         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4300         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4301         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4302         ///
4303         /// # Requested Invoices
4304         ///
4305         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4306         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4307         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4308         /// once the invoice has been received.
4309         ///
4310         /// # Restart Behavior
4311         ///
4312         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4313         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4314         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4315         ///
4316         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4317         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4318                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4319                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4320         }
4321
4322         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4323         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4324         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4325         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4326         /// never reach the recipient.
4327         ///
4328         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4329         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4330         ///
4331         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4332         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4333         ///
4334         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4335         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4336                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4337                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4338                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4339                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4340                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4341         }
4342
4343         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4344         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4345         ///
4346         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4347         /// payments.
4348         ///
4349         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4350         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4351                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4352                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4353                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4354                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4355                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4356                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4357         }
4358
4359         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4360         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4361         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4362         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4363                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4364                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4365                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4366                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4367                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4368         }
4369
4370         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4371         /// payment probe.
4372         #[cfg(test)]
4373         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4374                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4375         }
4376
4377         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4378         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4379         ///
4380         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4381         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4382                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4383                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4384         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4385                 let payment_params =
4386                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4387
4388                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4389
4390                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4391         }
4392
4393         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4394         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4395         ///
4396         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4397         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4398         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4399         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4400         ///
4401         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4402         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4403         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4404         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4405         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4406         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4407         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4408                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4409         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4410                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4411
4412                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4413                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4414                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4415                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4416
4417                 let route = self
4418                         .router
4419                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4420                         .map_err(|e| {
4421                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4422                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4423                         })?;
4424
4425                 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4426
4427                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4428
4429                 for mut path in route.paths {
4430                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4431                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4432                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4433                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4434                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4435                                         break;
4436                                 } else {
4437                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4438                                         log_debug!(
4439                                                 self.logger,
4440                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4441                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4442                                         );
4443                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4444                                         path.hops.pop();
4445                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4446                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4447                                         }
4448                                 }
4449                         }
4450
4451                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4452                                 log_debug!(
4453                                         self.logger,
4454                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4455                                 );
4456                                 continue;
4457                         }
4458
4459                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4460                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4461                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4462                                 }) {
4463                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4464                                         let used_liquidity =
4465                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4466
4467                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4468                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4469                                         {
4470                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4471                                                 continue;
4472                                         } else {
4473                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4474                                         }
4475                                 }
4476                         }
4477
4478                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4479                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4480                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4481                         })?);
4482                 }
4483
4484                 Ok(res)
4485         }
4486
4487         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4488         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4489         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4490                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4491                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4492         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4493                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4494                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4495                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4496
4497                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4498                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4499                 let funding_txo;
4500                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4501                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4502                                 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4503
4504                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4505                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4506                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4507                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4508                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4509                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4510                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4511                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
4512                                 match funding_res {
4513                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4514                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
4515                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4516                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4517                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4518                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4519                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4520                                                 });
4521                                         },
4522                                 }
4523                         },
4524                         Some(phase) => {
4525                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4526                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4527                                         err: format!(
4528                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4529                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4530                                 })
4531                         },
4532                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4533                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4534                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4535                                 }),
4536                 };
4537
4538                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4539                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4540                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4541                                 msg,
4542                         });
4543                 }
4544                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4545                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4546                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4547                         },
4548                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4549                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4550                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4551                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4552                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4553                                                 let err = format!(
4554                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4555                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
4556                                                 );
4557                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4558                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4559                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4560                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4561                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4562                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4563                                         }
4564                                 }
4565                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4566                         }
4567                 }
4568                 Ok(())
4569         }
4570
4571         #[cfg(test)]
4572         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4573                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4574                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4575                 })
4576         }
4577
4578         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4579         ///
4580         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4581         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4582         ///
4583         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4584         /// across the p2p network.
4585         ///
4586         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4587         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4588         ///
4589         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4590         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4591         /// keys per-channel).
4592         ///
4593         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4594         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4595         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4596         ///
4597         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4598         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4599         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4600         ///
4601         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4602         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4603         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4604         /// for more details.
4605         ///
4606         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4607         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4608         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4609                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4610         }
4611
4612         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4613         ///
4614         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4615         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4616         ///
4617         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4618         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4619         /// signature for each channel.
4620         ///
4621         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4622         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4623                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4624                 let mut result = Ok(());
4625
4626                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4627                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4628                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4629                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4630                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4631                                         }));
4632                                 }
4633                         }
4634                 }
4635                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4636                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4637                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4638                         }));
4639                 }
4640                 {
4641                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4642                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4643                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4644                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4645                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4646                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4647                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4648                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4649                         {
4650                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4651                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4652                                 }));
4653                         }
4654                 }
4655
4656                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4657                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4658                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4659                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4660                 } else {
4661                         None
4662                 };
4663                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4664                         match states.entry(txid) {
4665                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4666                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4667                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4668                                         }));
4669                                         None
4670                                 },
4671                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4672                         }
4673                 });
4674                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4675                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4676                                 temporary_channel_id,
4677                                 counterparty_node_id,
4678                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
4679                                 is_batch_funding,
4680                                 |chan, tx| {
4681                                         let mut output_index = None;
4682                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4683                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4684                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4685                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
4686                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4687                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4688                                                                 });
4689                                                         }
4690                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4691                                                 }
4692                                         }
4693                                         if output_index.is_none() {
4694                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4695                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4696                                                 });
4697                                         }
4698                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4699                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4700                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4701                                                 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4702                                                 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4703                                                 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4704                                         }
4705                                         Ok(outpoint)
4706                                 })
4707                         );
4708                 }
4709                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4710                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4711                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4712                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4713                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4714                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4715                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4716                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4717                         );
4718                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4719                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4720                         );
4721                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4722                         {
4723                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4724                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4725                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4726                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4727                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4728                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
4729                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4730                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4731                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4732                                                 });
4733                                 }
4734                         }
4735                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4736                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4737                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4738                         }
4739                 }
4740                 result
4741         }
4742
4743         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4744         ///
4745         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4746         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4747         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4748         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4749         ///
4750         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4751         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4752         ///
4753         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4754         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4755         ///
4756         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4757         ///
4758         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4759         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4760         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4761         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4762         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4763         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4764         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4765         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4766                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4767         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4768                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4769                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4770                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4771                         });
4772                 }
4773
4774                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4775                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4776                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4777                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4778                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4779                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4780
4781                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4782                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4783                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4784                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4785                                 });
4786                         };
4787                 }
4788                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4789                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4790                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4791                                 config.apply(config_update);
4792                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4793                                         continue;
4794                                 }
4795                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4796                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4797                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4798                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4799                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4800                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4801                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4802                                                         msg,
4803                                                 });
4804                                         }
4805                                 }
4806                                 continue;
4807                         } else {
4808                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4809                                 debug_assert!(false);
4810                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4811                                         err: format!(
4812                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4813                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4814                                 });
4815                         };
4816                 }
4817                 Ok(())
4818         }
4819
4820         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4821         ///
4822         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4823         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4824         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4825         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4826         ///
4827         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4828         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4829         ///
4830         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4831         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4832         ///
4833         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4834         ///
4835         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4836         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4837         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4838         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4839         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4840         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4841         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4842         pub fn update_channel_config(
4843                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4844         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4845                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4846         }
4847
4848         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4849         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4850         ///
4851         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4852         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4853         ///
4854         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4855         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4856         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4857         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4858         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4859         ///
4860         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4861         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4862         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4863         /// than expected.
4864         ///
4865         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4866         /// backwards.
4867         ///
4868         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4869         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4870         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4871         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4872         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4873         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4874                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4875
4876                 let next_hop_scid = {
4877                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4878                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4879                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4880                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4881                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4882                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4883                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4884                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4885                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4886                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4887                                                 })
4888                                         }
4889                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4890                                 },
4891                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4892                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4893                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4894                                 }),
4895                                 None => {
4896                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4897                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4898                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4899                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4900                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4901                                                 err: error
4902                                         })
4903                                 }
4904                         }
4905                 };
4906
4907                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4908                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4909                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4910                         })?;
4911
4912                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4913                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4914                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4915                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4916                                 }
4917                         },
4918                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4919                 };
4920                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4921                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4922                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4923                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4924                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4925                 };
4926
4927                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4928                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4929                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4930                         payment.prev_channel_id,
4931                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4932                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4933                 )];
4934                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4935                 Ok(())
4936         }
4937
4938         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4939         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4940         ///
4941         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4942         /// backwards.
4943         ///
4944         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4945         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4946                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4947
4948                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4949                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4950                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4951                         })?;
4952
4953                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4954                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4955                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4956                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4957                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4958                                 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4959                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4960                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4961                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4962                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4963                         });
4964
4965                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4966                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4967                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4968                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4969
4970                 Ok(())
4971         }
4972
4973         fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4974                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4975                 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4976
4977                 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4978                         if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4979                                 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4980                                         Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4981                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4982                                                         node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4983                                                         channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4984                                                 },
4985                                         None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4986                                                 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4987                                         },
4988                                 }
4989                         } else {
4990                                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4991                         }
4992                 };
4993
4994                 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4995                         let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4996                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4997                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4998                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4999                                 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
5000                                 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
5001                                 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
5002                         });
5003                         let (
5004                                 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5005                                 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5006                          ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5007                                 incoming_channel_details
5008                         } else {
5009                                 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5010                                 continue;
5011                         };
5012
5013                         let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5014                         let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5015                         for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5016                                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5017                                         &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5018                                 ) {
5019                                         Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5020                                         Err(htlc_fail) => {
5021                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5022                                                 continue;
5023                                         },
5024                                 };
5025
5026                                 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5027                                 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5028
5029                                 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5030                                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5031                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5032                                         chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5033                                                 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5034                                         )
5035                                 }) {
5036                                         Some(Ok(_)) => {},
5037                                         Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5038                                                 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5039                                                         self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5040                                                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5041                                                         }).flatten()
5042                                                 } else {
5043                                                         None
5044                                                 };
5045                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5046                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5047                                                         outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5048                                                 );
5049                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5050                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5051                                                 continue;
5052                                         },
5053                                         // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5054                                         None => continue 'outer_loop,
5055                                 }
5056
5057                                 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5058                                 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5059                                         if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5060                                                 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5061                                         ) {
5062                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5063                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5064                                                         chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5065                                                 );
5066                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5067                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5068                                                 continue;
5069                                         }
5070                                 }
5071
5072                                 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5073                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5074                                         incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5075                                 ) {
5076                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5077                                                 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5078                                         },
5079                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5080                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5081                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5082                                         },
5083                                 }
5084                         }
5085
5086                         // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5087                         // proposed to as a batch.
5088                         let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5089                                 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5090                         self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5091                         for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5092                                 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5093                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5094                                                 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5095                                                 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5096                                         },
5097                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5098                                                 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5099                                                 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5100                                                 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5101                                         },
5102                                 };
5103                                 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5104                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5105                                         prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5106                                         failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5107                                 }, None));
5108                         }
5109                 }
5110         }
5111
5112         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5113         ///
5114         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5115         /// Will likely generate further events.
5116         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5117                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5118
5119                 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5120
5121                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5122                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5123                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5124                 {
5125                         let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5126                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5127
5128                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5129                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5130                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5131                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5132                                                 () => {
5133                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5134                                                                 match forward_info {
5135                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5136                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5137                                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5138                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5139                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5140                                                                                 }
5141                                                                         }) => {
5142                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5143                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5144                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5145                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5146
5147                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5148                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5149                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5150                                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5151                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5152                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5153                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5154                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5155                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5156                                                                                                 });
5157
5158                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5159                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5160                                                                                                 } else {
5161                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5162                                                                                                 };
5163
5164                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5165                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5166                                                                                                         reason
5167                                                                                                 ));
5168                                                                                                 continue;
5169                                                                                         }
5170                                                                                 }
5171                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5172                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5173                                                                                                 {
5174                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5175                                                                                                 }
5176                                                                                         }
5177                                                                                 }
5178                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5179                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5180                                                                                                 {
5181                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5182                                                                                                 }
5183                                                                                         }
5184                                                                                 }
5185                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5186                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5187                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5188                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5189                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5190                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5191                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5192                                                                                                 ) {
5193                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
5194                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5195                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5196                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5197                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5198                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5199                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
5200                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5201                                                                                                         },
5202                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5203                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5204                                                                                                         },
5205                                                                                                 };
5206                                                                                                 match next_hop {
5207                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5208                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5209                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5210                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5211                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5212                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5213                                                                                                                 {
5214                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5215                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5216                                                                                                                 }
5217                                                                                                         },
5218                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
5219                                                                                                 }
5220                                                                                         } else {
5221                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5222                                                                                         }
5223                                                                                 } else {
5224                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5225                                                                                 }
5226                                                                         },
5227                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5228                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5229                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5230                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5231                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
5232                                                                         }
5233                                                                 }
5234                                                         }
5235                                                 }
5236                                         }
5237                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5238                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5239                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5240                                                 None => {
5241                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5242                                                         continue;
5243                                                 }
5244                                         };
5245                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5246                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5247                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5248                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5249                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5250                                                 continue;
5251                                         }
5252                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5253                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5254                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5255                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5256                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5257                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5258                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5259                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5260                                                                         prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5261                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5262                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5263                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
5264                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5265                                                                         },
5266                                                                 }) => {
5267                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5268                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5269                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5270                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5271                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5272                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5273                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5274                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5275                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5276                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5277                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5278                                                                         });
5279                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5280                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5281                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5282                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5283                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5284                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5285                                                                                 ).ok()
5286                                                                         });
5287                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5288                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5289                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5290                                                                                 &&logger)
5291                                                                         {
5292                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5293                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5294                                                                                 } else {
5295                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5296                                                                                 }
5297                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5298                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5299                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5300                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5301                                                                                 ));
5302                                                                                 continue;
5303                                                                         }
5304                                                                         None
5305                                                                 },
5306                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5307                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5308                                                                 },
5309                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5310                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5311                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5312                                                                 },
5313                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5314                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5315                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5316                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5317                                                                         );
5318                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
5319                                                                 },
5320                                                         };
5321                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5322                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5323                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5324                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5325                                                                         } else {
5326                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5327                                                                         }
5328                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5329                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5330                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5331                                                                         continue;
5332                                                                 }
5333                                                         }
5334                                                 }
5335                                         } else {
5336                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5337                                                 continue;
5338                                         }
5339                                 } else {
5340                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5341                                                 match forward_info {
5342                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5343                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5344                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5345                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5346                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5347                                                                 }
5348                                                         }) => {
5349                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5350                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5351                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5352                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5353                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5354                                                                                 requires_blinded_error: _
5355                                                                         } => {
5356                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5357                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5358                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5359                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data, payment_context },
5360                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5361                                                                         },
5362                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5363                                                                                 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5364                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5365                                                                         } => {
5366                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5367                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5368                                                                                         payment_metadata,
5369                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
5370                                                                                 };
5371                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5372                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
5373                                                                         },
5374                                                                         _ => {
5375                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5376                                                                         }
5377                                                                 };
5378                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5379                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5380                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5381                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5382                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5383                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5384                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5385                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5386                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5387                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5388                                                                         },
5389                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5390                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5391                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
5392                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5393                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5394                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
5395                                                                         total_value_received: None,
5396                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5397                                                                         cltv_expiry,
5398                                                                         onion_payload,
5399                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5400                                                                 };
5401
5402                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5403
5404                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5405                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5406                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5407                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5408                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5409                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5410                                                                                 );
5411                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5412                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5413                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5414                                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5415                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5416                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5417                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5418                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5419                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5420                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
5421                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5422                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5423                                                                                 ));
5424                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5425                                                                         }
5426                                                                 }
5427                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5428                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5429                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5430                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5431                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5432                                                                 }
5433
5434                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5435                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
5436                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5437                                                                                 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5438                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5439                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5440                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5441                                                                                 }
5442                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5443                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
5444                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5445                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
5446                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5447                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
5448                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5449                                                                                                 }
5450                                                                                         });
5451                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5452                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5453                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5454                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5455                                                                                 }
5456                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5457                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5458                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5459                                                                                 }
5460                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5461                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5462                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5463                                                                                         }
5464                                                                                 } else {
5465                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5466                                                                                 }
5467                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5468                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5469                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5470                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5471                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5472                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5473                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5474                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5475                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5476                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5477                                                                                         }
5478                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5479                                                                                 }
5480                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5481                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5482                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5483                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5484                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5485                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5486                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
5487                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5488                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5489                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5490                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5491                                                                                         }
5492                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5493                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5494                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5495                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5496                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5497                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5498                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5499                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5500                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5501                                                                                                 payment_hash,
5502                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
5503                                                                                                 amount_msat,
5504                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5505                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5506                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5507                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5508                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5509                                                                                         }, None));
5510                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
5511                                                                                 } else {
5512                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5513                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5514                                                                                         // MPP parts.
5515                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5516                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5517                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5518                                                                                         }
5519                                                                                 }
5520                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
5521                                                                         }}
5522                                                                 }
5523
5524                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5525                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5526                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5527                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5528                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5529                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5530                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5531                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5532                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5533                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5534                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { ref payment_context, .. } => {
5535                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5536                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5537                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
5538                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
5539                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5540                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5541                                                                                                         }
5542                                                                                                 };
5543                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5544                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5545                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5546                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5547                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5548                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5549                                                                                                         }
5550                                                                                                 }
5551                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5552                                                                                                         payment_preimage.clone(),
5553                                                                                                         payment_data.payment_secret,
5554                                                                                                         payment_context.clone(),
5555                                                                                                 );
5556                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5557                                                                                         },
5558                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5559                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5560                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5561                                                                                         }
5562                                                                                 }
5563                                                                         },
5564                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5565                                                                                 let payment_context = match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5566                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) => {
5567                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5568                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5569                                                                                         },
5570                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { ref payment_context, .. } => payment_context,
5571                                                                                 };
5572                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5573                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5574                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5575                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5576                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5577                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5578                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5579                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5580                                                                                 } else {
5581                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5582                                                                                                 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5583                                                                                                 payment_data.payment_secret,
5584                                                                                                 payment_context.clone(),
5585                                                                                         );
5586                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5587                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
5588                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5589                                                                                         }
5590                                                                                 }
5591                                                                         },
5592                                                                 };
5593                                                         },
5594                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5595                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5596                                                         }
5597                                                 }
5598                                         }
5599                                 }
5600                         }
5601                 }
5602
5603                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5604                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5605                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5606                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5607
5608                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5609                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5610                 }
5611                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5612
5613                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5614                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5615                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5616                 // network stack.
5617                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5618
5619                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5620                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5621                 events.append(&mut new_events);
5622         }
5623
5624         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5625         ///
5626         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5627         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5628                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5629
5630                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5631
5632                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5633                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5634                 if background_events.is_empty() {
5635                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5636                 }
5637
5638                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5639                         match event {
5640                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5641                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5642                                         // monitor updating completing.
5643                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5644                                 },
5645                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5646                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
5647                                         {
5648                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5649                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5650                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5651                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5652                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5653                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5654                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5655                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
5656                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5657                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5658                                                                         } else {
5659                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5660                                                                         }
5661                                                                 },
5662                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5663                                                         }
5664                                                 }
5665                                         }
5666                                         if !updated_chan {
5667                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5668                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5669                                         }
5670                                 },
5671                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5672                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5673                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5674                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5675                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5676                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5677                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5678                                                 } else {
5679                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5680                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5681                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5682                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5683                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5684                                                 }
5685                                         }
5686                                 },
5687                         }
5688                 }
5689                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5690         }
5691
5692         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5693         /// Process background events, for functional testing
5694         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5695                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5696                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5697         }
5698
5699         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5700                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5701
5702                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5703
5704                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5705                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5706                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5707                 }
5708                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5709                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5710                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5711                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5712                 }
5713                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5714                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5715
5716                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5717                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5718         }
5719
5720         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5721         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5722         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5723         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5724         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5725         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5726                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5727                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5728
5729                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5730                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5731
5732                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5733                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5734                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5735                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5736                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5737                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5738                                 ) {
5739                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5740                                                 anchor_feerate
5741                                         } else {
5742                                                 non_anchor_feerate
5743                                         };
5744                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5745                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5746                                 }
5747                         }
5748
5749                         should_persist
5750                 });
5751         }
5752
5753         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5754         ///
5755         /// This currently includes:
5756         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5757         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5758         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5759         ///    the channel.
5760         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5761         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5762         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5763         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5764         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5765         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5766         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5767         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
5768         ///
5769         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5770         /// estimate fetches.
5771         ///
5772         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5773         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5774         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5775                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5776                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5777
5778                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5779                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5780
5781                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5782                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5783                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5784                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5785
5786                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5787                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5788                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5789                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5790                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5791                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5792                         | {
5793                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5794                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5795                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5796                                         log_error!(logger,
5797                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5798                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5799                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5800                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5801                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5802                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5803                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5804                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5805                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5806                                                         },
5807                                                 },
5808                                         });
5809                                         false
5810                                 } else {
5811                                         true
5812                                 }
5813                         };
5814
5815                         {
5816                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5817                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5818                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5819                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5820                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5821                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5822                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5823                                                 match phase {
5824                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5825                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5826                                                                         anchor_feerate
5827                                                                 } else {
5828                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
5829                                                                 };
5830                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5831                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5832
5833                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5834                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5835                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5836                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
5837                                                                 }
5838
5839                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5840                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5841                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5842                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5843                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5844                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5845                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5846                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5847                                                                                 n += 1;
5848                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5849                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5850                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5851                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5852                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5853                                                                                                         msg: update
5854                                                                                                 });
5855                                                                                         }
5856                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5857                                                                                 } else {
5858                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5859                                                                                 }
5860                                                                         },
5861                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5862                                                                                 n += 1;
5863                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5864                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5865                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5866                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5867                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5868                                                                                                         msg: update
5869                                                                                                 });
5870                                                                                         }
5871                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5872                                                                                 } else {
5873                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5874                                                                                 }
5875                                                                         },
5876                                                                         _ => {},
5877                                                                 }
5878
5879                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5880
5881                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5882                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5883                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5884                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5885                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5886                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5887                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5888                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5889                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5890                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5891                                                                                         },
5892                                                                                 },
5893                                                                         });
5894                                                                 }
5895
5896                                                                 true
5897                                                         },
5898                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5899                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5900                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5901                                                         },
5902                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5903                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5904                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5905                                                         },
5906                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5907                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5908                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5909                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5910                                                         },
5911                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5912                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5913                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5914                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5915                                                         },
5916                                                 }
5917                                         });
5918
5919                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5920                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5921                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5922                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5923                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5924                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5925                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5926                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5927                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5928                                                                         },
5929                                                                 }
5930                                                         );
5931                                                 }
5932                                         }
5933                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5934
5935                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5936                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5937                                         }
5938                                 }
5939                         }
5940
5941                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5942                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5943                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5944                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5945                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5946                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5947                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5948                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5949                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5950                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5951                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5952                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5953                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5954                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5955                                                         let remove_entry = {
5956                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5957                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5958                                                         };
5959                                                         if remove_entry {
5960                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5961                                                         }
5962                                                 },
5963                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5964                                         }
5965                                 }
5966                         }
5967
5968                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5969                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5970                                         // This should be unreachable
5971                                         debug_assert!(false);
5972                                         return false;
5973                                 }
5974                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5975                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5976                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5977                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5978                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5979                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5980                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5981                                         {
5982                                                 return true;
5983                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5984                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5985                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5986                                         }) {
5987                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5988                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5989                                                 return false;
5990                                         }
5991                                 }
5992                                 true
5993                         });
5994
5995                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5996                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5997                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5998                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5999                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6000                         }
6001
6002                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6003                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6004                         }
6005
6006                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
6007                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6008                         }
6009
6010                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6011                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6012                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6013                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6014                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6015                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6016                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6017                         );
6018
6019                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6020                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6021                         );
6022
6023                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6024                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6025                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6026                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6027                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6028                         }
6029
6030                         should_persist
6031                 });
6032         }
6033
6034         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6035         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6036         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6037         ///
6038         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6039         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6040         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6041         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6042         ///
6043         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6044         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6045         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6046         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6047         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6048                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6049         }
6050
6051         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6052         /// reason for the failure.
6053         ///
6054         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6055         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6056                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6057
6058                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6059                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6060                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6061                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6062                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6063                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6064                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6065                         }
6066                 }
6067         }
6068
6069         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6070         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6071                 match failure_code {
6072                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6073                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6074                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6075                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6076                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6077                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6078                         },
6079                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6080                                 let fail_data = match data {
6081                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6082                                         None => Vec::new(),
6083                                 };
6084                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6085                         }
6086                 }
6087         }
6088
6089         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6090         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6091         ///
6092         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6093         /// forwarding
6094         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6095                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6096                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6097                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6098                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6099                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6100                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6101                 } else {
6102                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6103                 };
6104                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6105                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6106                 } else {
6107                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6108                 }
6109         }
6110
6111
6112         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6113         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6114         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6115                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6116                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6117                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6118                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6119                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6120                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6121                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6122                         }
6123                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6124                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6125                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6126                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6127                 } else {
6128                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6129                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6130                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6131                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6132                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6133                 }
6134         }
6135
6136         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6137         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6138         // be surfaced to the user.
6139         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6140                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6141                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6142         ) {
6143                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6144                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6145                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6146                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6147                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6148                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6149                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6150                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6151                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6152                                                 } else {
6153                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6154                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6155                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6156                                                 }
6157                                         },
6158                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6159                                 }
6160                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6161                 };
6162
6163                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6164                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6165                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6166                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6167                 }
6168         }
6169
6170         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6171                 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6172                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6173         }
6174
6175         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6176         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6177         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6178                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6179                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6180                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6181                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6182                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6183                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6184                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6185                 }
6186
6187                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6188                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6189                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6190                 //timer handling.
6191
6192                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6193                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6194                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6195                 let mut push_forward_event;
6196                 match source {
6197                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6198                                 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6199                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6200                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6201                         },
6202                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6203                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6204                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6205                         }) => {
6206                                 log_trace!(
6207                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6208                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6209                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6210                                 );
6211                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6212                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6213                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6214                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6215                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6216                                                 );
6217                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6218                                         },
6219                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6220                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6221                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
6222                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6223                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6224                                                 }
6225                                         },
6226                                         None => {
6227                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6228                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6229                                                 );
6230                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6231                                         }
6232                                 };
6233
6234                                 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6235                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6236                                 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6237                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6238                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6239                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6240                                         },
6241                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6242                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6243                                         }
6244                                 }
6245                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6246                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6247                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6248                                         prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6249                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
6250                                 }, None));
6251                         },
6252                 }
6253                 push_forward_event
6254         }
6255
6256         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6257         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6258         ///
6259         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6260         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6261         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6262         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6263         ///
6264         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6265         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6266         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6267         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6268         ///
6269         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6270         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6271         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6272         ///
6273         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6274         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6275         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6276         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6277         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6278         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6279         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6280         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6281                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6282         }
6283
6284         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6285         /// even type numbers.
6286         ///
6287         /// # Note
6288         ///
6289         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6290         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6291         ///
6292         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6293         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6294                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6295         }
6296
6297         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6298                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6299
6300                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6301
6302                 let mut sources = {
6303                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6304                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6305                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6306                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6307                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6308                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6309                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6310                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6311                                                 break;
6312                                         }
6313                                 }
6314
6315                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6316                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6317                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6318                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6319                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6320                                 });
6321                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6322                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6323                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6324                                                 &payment_hash);
6325                                 }
6326
6327                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6328                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6329                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6330                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6331                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6332                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6333                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6334                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6335                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6336                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6337                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6338                                                 }
6339                                                 return;
6340                                         }
6341                                 }
6342
6343                                 payment.htlcs
6344                         } else { return; }
6345                 };
6346                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6347
6348                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6349                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6350                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6351                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6352                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6353                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6354                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6355                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6356                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6357                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6358                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6359                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6360                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6361                                 debug_assert!(false);
6362                                 valid_mpp = false;
6363                                 break;
6364                         }
6365                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6366
6367                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6368                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6369                                 debug_assert!(false);
6370                                 valid_mpp = false;
6371                                 break;
6372                         }
6373                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6374                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6375                 }
6376                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6377                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6378                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6379                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6380                         return;
6381                 }
6382                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6383                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6384                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6385                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6386                         return;
6387                 }
6388                 if valid_mpp {
6389                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6390                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6391                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6392                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6393                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6394                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6395                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6396                                         }
6397                                 ) {
6398                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6399                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6400                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6401                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6402                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6403                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6404                                 }
6405                         }
6406                 }
6407                 if !valid_mpp {
6408                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6409                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6410                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6411                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6412                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6413                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6414                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6415                         }
6416                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6417                 }
6418
6419                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6420                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6421                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6422                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6423                 }
6424         }
6425
6426         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6427                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6428         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6429                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6430
6431                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6432                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6433                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6434                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6435
6436                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6437                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6438                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6439                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6440
6441                 {
6442                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6443                         let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6444                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6445                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6446                                 None => None
6447                         };
6448
6449                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6450                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6451                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6452                         ).unwrap_or(None);
6453
6454                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6455                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6456                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6457                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6458                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6459                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6460                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6461                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6462
6463                                                 match fulfill_res {
6464                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6465                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6466                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6467                                                                                 chan_id, action);
6468                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6469                                                                 }
6470                                                                 if !during_init {
6471                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6472                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6473                                                                 } else {
6474                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6475                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6476                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
6477                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6478                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6479                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
6480                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6481                                                                                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6482                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
6483                                                                                 });
6484                                                                 }
6485                                                         }
6486                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6487                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6488                                                                         action
6489                                                                 } else {
6490                                                                         return Ok(());
6491                                                                 };
6492                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6493
6494                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6495                                                                         chan_id, action);
6496                                                                 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6497                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6498                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6499                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6500                                                                         blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6501                                                                 } = action {
6502                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6503                                                                 } else {
6504                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
6505                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6506                                                                         return Ok(());
6507                                                                 };
6508                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6509                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6510                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6511                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6512                                                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6513                                                                         {
6514                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
6515                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6516                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6517                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
6518                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6519                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6520                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6521                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6522                                                                                 });
6523                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6524                                                                         }
6525                                                                 } else {
6526                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6527                                                                 }
6528                                                         }
6529                                                 }
6530                                         }
6531                                         return Ok(());
6532                                 }
6533                         }
6534                 }
6535                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6536                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6537                         counterparty_node_id: None,
6538                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6539                                 payment_preimage,
6540                         }],
6541                         channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6542                 };
6543
6544                 if !during_init {
6545                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6546                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6547                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6548                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6549                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6550                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6551                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6552                                 // again on restart.
6553                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6554                                         "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6555                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
6556                         }
6557                 } else {
6558                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6559                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6560                         // event.
6561                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6562                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6563                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6564                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6565                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6566                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6567                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6568                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6569                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6570                                         prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6571                                 )));
6572                 }
6573                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6574                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6575                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6576                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6577                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6578                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6579                 Ok(())
6580         }
6581
6582         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6583                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6584         }
6585
6586         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6587                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6588                 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6589                 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6590         ) {
6591                 match source {
6592                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6593                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6594                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6595                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6596                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6597                                 }
6598                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6599                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6600                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6601                                 };
6602                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6603                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6604                                         &self.logger);
6605                         },
6606                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6607                                 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6608                                 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6609                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6610                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6611                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6612                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6613                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6614                                                 let chan_to_release =
6615                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6616                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6617                                                         } else {
6618                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6619                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6620                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6621                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6622                                                                 // closed.
6623                                                                 None
6624                                                         };
6625
6626                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6627                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6628                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6629                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6630                                                         // in the background.
6631                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6632                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6633                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6634                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6635                                                                         match ev {
6636                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6637                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6638                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
6639                                                                                 } => {
6640                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6641                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6642                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6643                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6644                                                                                                         } = upd {
6645                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6646                                                                                                         } else { false }
6647                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
6648                                                                                                 true
6649                                                                                         } else { false }
6650                                                                                 },
6651                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6652                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6653                                                                                         (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6654                                                                                 ) => {
6655                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6656                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6657                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
6658                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
6659                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6660                                                                                                 ));
6661                                                                                                 true
6662                                                                                         } else { false }
6663                                                                                 },
6664                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6665                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
6666                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6667                                                                                         channel_id, ..
6668                                                                                 } =>
6669                                                                                         *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6670                                                                         }
6671                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6672                                                         }
6673                                                         None
6674                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6675                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6676                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6677                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6678                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6679                                                                         downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6680                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6681                                                                 })
6682                                                         } else { None }
6683                                                 } else {
6684                                                         let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6685                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6686                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6687                                                                 } else { None }
6688                                                         } else { None };
6689                                                         debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6690                                                                 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6691                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6692                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6693                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6694                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6695                                                                         prev_user_channel_id,
6696                                                                         next_user_channel_id,
6697                                                                         total_fee_earned_msat,
6698                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6699                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6700                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6701                                                                 },
6702                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6703                                                         })
6704                                                 }
6705                                         });
6706                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6707                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6708                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6709                                 }
6710                         },
6711                 }
6712         }
6713
6714         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6715         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6716                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6717         }
6718
6719         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6720                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6721                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6722                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6723
6724                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6725                         match action {
6726                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6727                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6728                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6729                                                 amount_msat,
6730                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
6731                                                 receiver_node_id,
6732                                                 htlcs,
6733                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6734                                         }) = payment {
6735                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6736                                                         payment_hash,
6737                                                         purpose,
6738                                                         amount_msat,
6739                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6740                                                         htlcs,
6741                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
6742                                                 }, None));
6743                                         }
6744                                 },
6745                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6746                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6747                                 } => {
6748                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6749                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6750                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6751                                         }
6752                                 },
6753                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6754                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6755                                 } => {
6756                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6757                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6758                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6759                                                 downstream_channel_id,
6760                                                 Some(blocking_action),
6761                                         );
6762                                 },
6763                         }
6764                 }
6765         }
6766
6767         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6768         /// update completion.
6769         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6770                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6771                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6772                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6773                 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6774                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6775         -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6776                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6777                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6778                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
6779                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6780                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6781                         pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6782                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6783                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6784                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6785
6786                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6787                 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6788
6789                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6790                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6791                         htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6792                                 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6793                 }
6794                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6795                 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6796                         decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6797                 }
6798
6799                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6800                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6801                 }
6802                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6803                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6804                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6805                                 msg,
6806                         });
6807                 }
6808
6809                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6810                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6811                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6812                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6813                                         updates: update,
6814                                 });
6815                         }
6816                 } }
6817                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6818                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6819                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6820                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6821                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
6822                                 });
6823                         }
6824                 } }
6825                 match order {
6826                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6827                                 handle_cs!();
6828                                 handle_raa!();
6829                         },
6830                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6831                                 handle_raa!();
6832                                 handle_cs!();
6833                         },
6834                 }
6835
6836                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6837                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6838                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6839                 }
6840
6841                 {
6842                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6843                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6844                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6845                 }
6846
6847                 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6848         }
6849
6850         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6851                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6852
6853                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6854                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6855                         None => {
6856                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6857                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6858                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6859                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6860                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6861                                         None => return,
6862                                 }
6863                         }
6864                 };
6865                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6866                 let mut peer_state_lock;
6867                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6868                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6869                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6870                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6871                 let channel =
6872                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6873                                 chan
6874                         } else {
6875                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6876                                         .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6877                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6878                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6879                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6880                                 return;
6881                         };
6882                 let remaining_in_flight =
6883                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6884                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6885                                 pending.len()
6886                         } else { 0 };
6887                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6888                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6889                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6890                         remaining_in_flight);
6891                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6892                         return;
6893                 }
6894                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6895         }
6896
6897         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6898         ///
6899         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6900         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6901         /// the channel.
6902         ///
6903         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6904         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6905         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6906         ///
6907         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6908         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6909         /// used to accept such channels.
6910         ///
6911         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6912         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6913         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6914                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6915         }
6916
6917         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6918         /// it as confirmed immediately.
6919         ///
6920         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6921         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6922         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6923         ///
6924         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6925         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6926         ///
6927         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6928         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6929         ///
6930         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6931         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6932         ///
6933         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6934         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6935         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6936                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6937         }
6938
6939         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6940
6941                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6942                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6943
6944                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6945                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6946                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6947                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6948                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6949                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6950                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6951
6952                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6953                 })?;
6954                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6955                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6956                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6957
6958                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6959                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6960                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6961                 // succeed.
6962                 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6963                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6964                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6965                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6966                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6967                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6968                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6969                         },
6970                         _ => {
6971                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6972                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6973
6974                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6975                         }
6976                 };
6977
6978                 match res {
6979                         Err(err) => {
6980                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6981                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6982                                 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6983                                         Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6984                                         Err(e) => {
6985                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6986                                         },
6987                                 }
6988                         }
6989                         Ok(mut channel) => {
6990                                 if accept_0conf {
6991                                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6992                                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6993                                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6994                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6995                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6996                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6997                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6998                                                 }
6999                                         };
7000                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7001                                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
7002                                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7003
7004                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7005                                 } else {
7006                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7007                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7008                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7009                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7010                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7011                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7012                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7013                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7014                                                         }
7015                                                 };
7016                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7017                                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7018                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7019
7020                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7021                                         }
7022                                 }
7023
7024                                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7025                                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7026                                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7027
7028                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7029                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7030                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7031                                 });
7032
7033                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7034
7035                                 Ok(())
7036                         },
7037                 }
7038         }
7039
7040         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7041         /// or 0-conf channels.
7042         ///
7043         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7044         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7045         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7046         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7047                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7048                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7049                 {
7050                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7051                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7052                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7053                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7054                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7055                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7056                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7057                                 }
7058                         }
7059                 }
7060                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7061         }
7062
7063         fn unfunded_channel_count(
7064                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7065         ) -> usize {
7066                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7067                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7068                         match phase {
7069                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7070                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7071                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7072                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7073                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7074                                         {
7075                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7076                                         }
7077                                 },
7078                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7079                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7080                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7081                                         }
7082                                 },
7083                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7084                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7085                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7086                                         // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7087                                         // included in the unfunded count.
7088                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7089                                                 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7090                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7091                                         }
7092                                 },
7093                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7094                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7095                                         continue;
7096                                 },
7097                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7098                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7099                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7100                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7101                                         continue;
7102                                 }
7103                         }
7104                 }
7105                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7106         }
7107
7108         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7109                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7110                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7111                 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7112                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7113                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7114                 }
7115
7116                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7117                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7118                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7119                 }
7120
7121                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7122                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7123                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7124                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7125                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7126
7127                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7128                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7129                     .ok_or_else(|| {
7130                                 debug_assert!(false);
7131                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7132                                         format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7133                                         msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7134                         })?;
7135                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7136                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7137
7138                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7139                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7140                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7141                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7142                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7143                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7144                 {
7145                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7146                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7147                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7148                 }
7149
7150                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7151                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7152                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7153                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7154                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7155                 }
7156
7157                 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7158                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7159                 if channel_exists {
7160                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7161                                 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7162                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7163                 }
7164
7165                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7166                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7167                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7168                                         &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7169                                 ).map_err(|e|
7170                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7171                                 )?;
7172                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7173                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7174                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7175                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7176                                 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7177                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7178                                 channel_type,
7179                         }, None));
7180                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7181                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7182                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7183                         });
7184                         return Ok(());
7185                 }
7186
7187                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7188                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7189                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7190                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7191                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7192                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7193                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7194                 {
7195                         Err(e) => {
7196                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7197                         },
7198                         Ok(res) => res
7199                 };
7200
7201                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7202                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7203                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7204                                 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7205                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7206                 }
7207                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7208                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7209                                 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7210                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7211                 }
7212
7213                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7214                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7215
7216                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7217                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7218                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7219                 });
7220                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7221                 Ok(())
7222         }
7223
7224         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7225                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7226                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7227                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7228                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7229                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7230                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7231                                         debug_assert!(false);
7232                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7233                                 })?;
7234                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7235                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7236                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7237                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7238                                         match phase.get_mut() {
7239                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7240                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7241                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7242                                                 },
7243                                                 _ => {
7244                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7245                                                 }
7246                                         }
7247                                 },
7248                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7249                         }
7250                 };
7251                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7252                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7253                         temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7254                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7255                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
7256                         output_script,
7257                         user_channel_id: user_id,
7258                 }, None));
7259                 Ok(())
7260         }
7261
7262         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7263                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7264
7265                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7266                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7267                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7268                                 debug_assert!(false);
7269                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7270                         })?;
7271
7272                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7273                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7274                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7275                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7276                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7277                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7278                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7279                                                 Ok(res) => res,
7280                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7281                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7282                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7283                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7284                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7285                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7286                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7287                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7288                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7289                                                 },
7290                                         }
7291                                 },
7292                                 Some(mut phase) => {
7293                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7294                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7295                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7296                                 },
7297                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7298                         };
7299
7300                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7301
7302                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7303                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7304                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7305                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7306                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7307                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7308                         // on the channel.
7309                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7310                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7311                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7312                 } } }
7313
7314                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7315                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7316                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7317                         },
7318                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7319                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7320                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7321                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7322                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7323                                         },
7324                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7325                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7326                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7327                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7328                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7329
7330                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7331                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7332                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7333                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
7334                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7335                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7336                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7337                                                                         msg,
7338                                                                 });
7339                                                         }
7340
7341                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7342                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7343                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7344                                                         } else {
7345                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7346                                                         }
7347                                                         Ok(())
7348                                                 } else {
7349                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7350                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7351                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7352                                                 }
7353                                         }
7354                                 }
7355                         }
7356                 }
7357         }
7358
7359         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7360                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7361                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7362                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7363                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7364                                 debug_assert!(false);
7365                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7366                         })?;
7367
7368                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7369                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7370                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7371                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7372                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7373                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7374                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
7375                                                 &self.logger,
7376                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7377                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7378                                         );
7379                                         let res =
7380                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7381                                         match res {
7382                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7383                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7384                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7385                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7386                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7387                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7388                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7389                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7390                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7391                                                                 Ok(())
7392                                                         } else {
7393                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7394                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7395                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7396                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7397                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7398                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7399                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7400                                                         }
7401                                                 },
7402                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
7403                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7404                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7405                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7406                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7407                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7408                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7409                                                 }
7410                                         }
7411                                 } else {
7412                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7413                                 }
7414                         },
7415                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7416                 }
7417         }
7418
7419         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7420                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7421                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7422                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7423                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7424                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7425                                 debug_assert!(false);
7426                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7427                         })?;
7428                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7429                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7430                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7431                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7432                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7433                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7434                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7435                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7436                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7437                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7438                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7439                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7440                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
7441                                                 });
7442                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7443                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7444                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7445                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7446                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7447                                                 // announcement_signatures.
7448                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7449                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7450                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7451                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7452                                                                 msg,
7453                                                         });
7454                                                 }
7455                                         }
7456
7457                                         {
7458                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7459                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7460                                         }
7461
7462                                         Ok(())
7463                                 } else {
7464                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7465                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7466                                 }
7467                         },
7468                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7469                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7470                         }
7471                 }
7472         }
7473
7474         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7475                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7476                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7477                 {
7478                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7479                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7480                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7481                                         debug_assert!(false);
7482                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7483                                 })?;
7484                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7485                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7486                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7487                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7488                                 match phase {
7489                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7490                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7491                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7492                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7493                                                                 msg.channel_id,
7494                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7495                                                 }
7496
7497                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7498                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7499                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7500                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7501
7502                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7503                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7504                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7505                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7506                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7507                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7508                                                                 msg,
7509                                                         });
7510                                                 }
7511                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7512                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7513                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7514                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7515                                                 }
7516                                         },
7517                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7518                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7519                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7520                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7521                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7522                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7523                                         },
7524                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7525                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7526                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7527                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7528                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7529                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7530                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7531                                         },
7532                                 }
7533                         } else {
7534                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7535                         }
7536                 }
7537                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7538                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7539                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7540                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7541                 }
7542                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7543                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7544                 }
7545
7546                 Ok(())
7547         }
7548
7549         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7550                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7551                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7552                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7553                                 debug_assert!(false);
7554                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7555                         })?;
7556                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7557                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7558                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7559                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7560                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7561                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7562                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7563                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7564                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7565                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7566                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7567                                                                 msg,
7568                                                         });
7569                                                 }
7570                                                 if tx.is_some() {
7571                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7572                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7573                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7574                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7575                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7576                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7577                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7578                                         } else {
7579                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7580                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7581                                         }
7582                                 },
7583                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7584                         }
7585                 };
7586                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7587                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7588                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7589                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7590                 }
7591                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7592                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7593                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7594                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7595                                         msg: update
7596                                 });
7597                         }
7598                 }
7599                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7600                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7601                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7602                 }
7603                 Ok(())
7604         }
7605
7606         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7607                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7608                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7609                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7610                 //
7611                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7612                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7613                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7614                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7615
7616                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7617                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7618
7619                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7620                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7621                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7622                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7623                                 debug_assert!(false);
7624                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7625                         })?;
7626                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7627                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7628                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7629                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7630                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7631                                         let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7632                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7633                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7634                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7635                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7636                                                         ),
7637                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7638                                         };
7639                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7640                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7641                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7642                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7643                                         if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7644                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7645                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7646                                                                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7647                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7648                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7649                                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7650                                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7651                                                                 }
7652                                                         ))
7653                                                 } else {
7654                                                         match pending_forward_info {
7655                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7656                                                                         ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7657                                                                 }) => {
7658                                                                         let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7659                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7660                                                                         } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7661                                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7662                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7663                                                                         } else {
7664                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7665                                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7666                                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7667                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7668                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7669                                                                                 reason
7670                                                                         };
7671                                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7672                                                                 },
7673                                                                 _ => {},
7674                                                         }
7675                                                 }
7676                                         }
7677                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7678                                 } else {
7679                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7680                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7681                                 }
7682                         },
7683                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7684                 }
7685                 Ok(())
7686         }
7687
7688         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7689                 let funding_txo;
7690                 let next_user_channel_id;
7691                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7692                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7693                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7694                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7695                                         debug_assert!(false);
7696                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7697                                 })?;
7698                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7699                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7700                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7701                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7702                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7703                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7704                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7705                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7706                                                         log_trace!(logger,
7707                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7708                                                                 msg.channel_id);
7709                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7710                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7711                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7712                                                 }
7713                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7714                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7715                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7716                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7717                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7718                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7719                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7720                                                 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7721                                                 res
7722                                         } else {
7723                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7724                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7725                                         }
7726                                 },
7727                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7728                         }
7729                 };
7730                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7731                         Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7732                         funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7733                 );
7734
7735                 Ok(())
7736         }
7737
7738         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7739                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7740                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7741                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7742                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7743                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7744                                 debug_assert!(false);
7745                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7746                         })?;
7747                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7748                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7749                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7750                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7751                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7752                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7753                                 } else {
7754                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7755                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7756                                 }
7757                         },
7758                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7759                 }
7760                 Ok(())
7761         }
7762
7763         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7764                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7765                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7766                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7767                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7768                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7769                                 debug_assert!(false);
7770                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7771                         })?;
7772                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7773                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7774                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7775                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7776                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7777                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7778                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7779                                 }
7780                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7781                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7782                                 } else {
7783                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7784                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7785                                 }
7786                                 Ok(())
7787                         },
7788                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7789                 }
7790         }
7791
7792         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7793                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7794                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7795                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7796                                 debug_assert!(false);
7797                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7798                         })?;
7799                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7800                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7801                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7802                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7803                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7804                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7805                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7806                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7807                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7808                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7809                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7810                                         }
7811                                         Ok(())
7812                                 } else {
7813                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7814                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7815                                 }
7816                         },
7817                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7818                 }
7819         }
7820
7821         fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7822                 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7823                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7824                 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7825                 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7826                 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7827                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7828                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7829                 }
7830                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7831         }
7832
7833         #[inline]
7834         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7835                 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7836                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7837         }
7838
7839         #[inline]
7840         fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7841                 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7842                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7843                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7844                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7845                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7846                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7847                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7848                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7849                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7850                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7851                                         };
7852                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7853                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7854
7855                                         let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7856                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7857                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7858                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7859                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7860                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7861                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7862                                                 },
7863                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7864                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7865                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7866                                                         {
7867                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7868                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7869                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7870                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7871                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7872                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7873                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7874                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7875                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7876                                                                                         intercept_id
7877                                                                                 }, None));
7878                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7879                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7880                                                                         },
7881                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7882                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7883                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7884                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7885                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7886                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7887                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7888                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7889                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7890                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7891                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
7892                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7893                                                                                 });
7894
7895                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7896                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7897                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7898                                                                                 ));
7899                                                                         }
7900                                                                 }
7901                                                         } else {
7902                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7903                                                                 // payments are being processed.
7904                                                                 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7905                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7906                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7907                                                         }
7908                                                 }
7909                                         }
7910                                 }
7911                         }
7912
7913                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7914                                 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7915                         }
7916
7917                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7918                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7919                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7920                         }
7921                 }
7922                 push_forward_event
7923         }
7924
7925         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7926                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7927                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7928                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7929                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7930                 ).count();
7931                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7932                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7933                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7934                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7935                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7936                 // real by taking more time.
7937                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7938                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7939                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7940                         }, None));
7941                 }
7942         }
7943
7944         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7945         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7946         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7947         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7948         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7949                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7950                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7951         ) -> bool {
7952                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7953                         .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7954                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7955                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7956                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
7957                                 channel_id,
7958                                 counterparty_node_id,
7959                         })
7960                 })
7961         }
7962
7963         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7964         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7965                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7966         ) -> bool {
7967                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7968                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7969                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7970                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7971
7972                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7973                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7974                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7975                         }
7976                 }
7977                 false
7978         }
7979
7980         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7981                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7982                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7983                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7984                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7985                                         debug_assert!(false);
7986                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7987                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7988                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7989                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7990                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7991                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7992                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7993                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7994                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7995                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7996                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7997                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
7998                                                 } else { false };
7999                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
8000                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
8001                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
8002                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
8003                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
8004                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
8005                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8006                                                 }
8007                                                 htlcs_to_fail
8008                                         } else {
8009                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8010                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8011                                         }
8012                                 },
8013                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8014                         }
8015                 };
8016                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8017                 Ok(())
8018         }
8019
8020         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8021                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8022                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8023                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8024                                 debug_assert!(false);
8025                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8026                         })?;
8027                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8028                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8029                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8030                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8031                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8032                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8033                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8034                                 } else {
8035                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8036                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8037                                 }
8038                         },
8039                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8040                 }
8041                 Ok(())
8042         }
8043
8044         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8045                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8046                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8047                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8048                                 debug_assert!(false);
8049                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8050                         })?;
8051                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8052                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8053                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8054                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8055                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8056                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8057                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8058                                         }
8059
8060                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8061                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8062                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8063                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
8064                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
8065                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8066                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8067                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8068                                         });
8069                                 } else {
8070                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8071                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8072                                 }
8073                         },
8074                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8075                 }
8076                 Ok(())
8077         }
8078
8079         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8080         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8081                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8082                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8083                         None => {
8084                                 // It's not a local channel
8085                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8086                         }
8087                 };
8088                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8089                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8090                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8091                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8092                 }
8093                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8094                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8095                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8096                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8097                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8098                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8099                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8100                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8101                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8102                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8103                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8104                                                 }
8105                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8106                                         }
8107                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8108                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8109                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8110                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8111                                         } else {
8112                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8113                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8114                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8115                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8116                                                 // persisting.
8117                                                 if !did_change {
8118                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8119                                                 }
8120                                         }
8121                                 } else {
8122                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8123                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8124                                 }
8125                         },
8126                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8127                 }
8128                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8129         }
8130
8131         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8132                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8133                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8134
8135                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8136                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
8137                                         debug_assert!(false);
8138                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8139                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8140                                                 msg.channel_id
8141                                         )
8142                                 })?;
8143                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8144                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8145                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8146                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8147                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8148                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8149                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8150                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8151                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8152                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8153                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8154                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8155                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8156                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
8157                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8158                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8159                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8160                                                                 msg,
8161                                                         });
8162                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8163                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8164                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8165                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
8166                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8167                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8168                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8169                                                                         msg,
8170                                                                 });
8171                                                         }
8172                                                 }
8173                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8174                                                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8175                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8176                                                         Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8177                                                 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8178                                                 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8179                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8180                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8181                                                 }
8182                                                 need_lnd_workaround
8183                                         } else {
8184                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8185                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8186                                         }
8187                                 },
8188                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8189                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8190                                                 msg.channel_id);
8191                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8192                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8193                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8194                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8195                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8196                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8197                                         //
8198                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8199                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8200                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8201                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8202                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8203                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8204                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8205                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8206                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8207                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8208                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8209                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8210                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8211                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8212                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8213                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
8214                                                 },
8215                                         });
8216                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8217                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8218                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8219                                         )
8220                                 }
8221                         }
8222                 };
8223
8224                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8225                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8226                 }
8227                 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8228         }
8229
8230         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8231         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8232                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8233
8234                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8235                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8236                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8237                 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8238                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8239                                 match monitor_event {
8240                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8241                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8242                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8243                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8244                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8245                                                                 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8246                                                                 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8247                                                 } else {
8248                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8249                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8250                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8251                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8252                                                 }
8253                                         },
8254                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8255                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8256                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8257                                                         None => {
8258                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8259                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8260                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8261                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8262                                                         }
8263                                                 };
8264                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8265                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8266                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8267                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8268                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8269                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8270                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8271                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8272                                                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8273                                                                                         reason
8274                                                                                 } else {
8275                                                                                         ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8276                                                                                 };
8277                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8278                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8279                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8280                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8281                                                                                                 msg: update
8282                                                                                         });
8283                                                                                 }
8284                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8285                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8286                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8287                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8288                                                                                         },
8289                                                                                 });
8290                                                                         }
8291                                                                 }
8292                                                         }
8293                                                 }
8294                                         },
8295                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8296                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8297                                         },
8298                                 }
8299                         }
8300                 }
8301
8302                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8303                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8304                 }
8305
8306                 has_pending_monitor_events
8307         }
8308
8309         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8310         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8311         /// update events as a separate process method here.
8312         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
8313         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8314                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8315                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8316         }
8317
8318         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8319         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8320         /// update was applied.
8321         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8322                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8323                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8324
8325                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8326                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8327                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8328                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8329                 'peer_loop: loop {
8330                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8331                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8332                                 'chan_loop: loop {
8333                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8334                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8335                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8336                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8337                                         ) {
8338                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8339                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8340                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8341                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8342                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8343                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8344                                                 }
8345                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8346                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
8347
8348                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8349                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8350                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
8351                                                 }
8352                                         }
8353                                         break 'chan_loop;
8354                                 }
8355                         }
8356                         break 'peer_loop;
8357                 }
8358
8359                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8360                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8361                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8362                 }
8363
8364                 has_update
8365         }
8366
8367         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8368         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8369         ///
8370         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8371         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8372         ///
8373         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8374         #[cfg(async_signing)]
8375         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8376                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8377
8378                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8379                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8380                         match phase {
8381                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8382                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8383                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8384                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8385                                                         node_id,
8386                                                         updates,
8387                                                 });
8388                                         }
8389                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8390                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8391                                                         node_id,
8392                                                         msg,
8393                                                 });
8394                                         }
8395                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8396                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8397                                         }
8398                                 }
8399                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8400                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8401                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8402                                                         node_id,
8403                                                         msg,
8404                                                 });
8405                                         }
8406                                 }
8407                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8408                         }
8409                 };
8410
8411                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8412                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8413                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8414                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8415                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8416                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8417                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8418                                 }
8419                         }
8420                 } else {
8421                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8422                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8423                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8424                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8425                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8426                                 }
8427                         }
8428                 }
8429         }
8430
8431         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8432         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8433         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8434         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8435                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8436                 let mut has_update = false;
8437                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8438                 {
8439                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8440
8441                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8442                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8443                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8444                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8445                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8446                                         match phase {
8447                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8448                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8449                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8450                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8451                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8452                                                                                 has_update = true;
8453                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8454                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8455                                                                                 });
8456                                                                         }
8457                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8458                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8459                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8460                                                                         }
8461                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8462                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8463                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8464                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8465                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8466                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8467                                                                                                 msg: update
8468                                                                                         });
8469                                                                                 }
8470
8471                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8472                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8473                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8474                                                                                 false
8475                                                                         } else { true }
8476                                                                 },
8477                                                                 Err(e) => {
8478                                                                         has_update = true;
8479                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8480                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8481                                                                         !close_channel
8482                                                                 }
8483                                                         }
8484                                                 },
8485                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8486                                         }
8487                                 });
8488                         }
8489                 }
8490
8491                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8492                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8493                 }
8494
8495                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8496                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8497                 }
8498
8499                 has_update
8500         }
8501
8502         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8503         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8504         /// Channel object.
8505         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8506                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8507                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8508                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8509                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
8510                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8511                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8512                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8513                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8514                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8515                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8516                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8517                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
8518                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
8519                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8520                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8521                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8522                                         });
8523                         }
8524                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8525                 }
8526         }
8527 }
8528
8529 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8530         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8531         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8532         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8533         ///
8534         /// # Privacy
8535         ///
8536         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8537         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8538         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8539         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8540         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8541         ///
8542         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8543         ///
8544         /// # Limitations
8545         ///
8546         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8547         /// reply path.
8548         ///
8549         /// # Errors
8550         ///
8551         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8552         ///
8553         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8554         ///
8555         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8556         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8557         pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8558                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8559                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8560                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8561                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8562
8563                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8564                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8565                         node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8566                 )
8567                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8568                         .path(path);
8569
8570                 Ok(builder.into())
8571         }
8572 } }
8573
8574 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8575         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8576         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8577         ///
8578         /// # Payment
8579         ///
8580         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8581         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8582         ///
8583         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8584         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8585         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8586         /// expired.
8587         ///
8588         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8589         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8590         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8591         ///
8592         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8593         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8594         ///
8595         /// # Privacy
8596         ///
8597         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8598         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8599         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8600         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8601         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8602         ///
8603         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8604         ///
8605         /// # Limitations
8606         ///
8607         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8608         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8609         ///
8610         /// # Errors
8611         ///
8612         /// Errors if:
8613         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8614         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8615         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8616         ///
8617         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8618         ///
8619         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8620         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8621         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8622         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8623         pub fn create_refund_builder(
8624                 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8625                 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8626         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8627                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8628                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8629                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8630                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8631
8632                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8633                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8634                         node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8635                 )?
8636                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8637                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8638                         .path(path);
8639
8640                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8641
8642                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8643                 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8644                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8645                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8646                         )
8647                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8648
8649                 Ok(builder.into())
8650         }
8651 } }
8652
8653 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8654 where
8655         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8656         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8657         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8658         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8659         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8660         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8661         R::Target: Router,
8662         L::Target: Logger,
8663 {
8664         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8665         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8666         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8667         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8668
8669         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8670         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8671         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8672         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8673
8674         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8675         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8676         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8677         ///
8678         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8679         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8680         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8681         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8682         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8683         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8684         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8685         ///
8686         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8687         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8688         ///
8689         /// # Payment
8690         ///
8691         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8692         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8693         /// been sent.
8694         ///
8695         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8696         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8697         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8698         ///
8699         /// # Privacy
8700         ///
8701         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8702         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8703         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8704         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8705         ///
8706         /// # Limitations
8707         ///
8708         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8709         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8710         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8711         ///
8712         /// # Errors
8713         ///
8714         /// Errors if:
8715         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8716         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8717         /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8718         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8719         ///   request.
8720         ///
8721         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8722         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8723         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8724         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8725         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8726         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8727         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8728         pub fn pay_for_offer(
8729                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8730                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8731                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8732         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8733                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8734                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8735                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8736
8737                 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8738                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8739                         .into();
8740                 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8741
8742                 let builder = match quantity {
8743                         None => builder,
8744                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8745                 };
8746                 let builder = match amount_msats {
8747                         None => builder,
8748                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8749                 };
8750                 let builder = match payer_note {
8751                         None => builder,
8752                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8753                 };
8754                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8755                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8756
8757                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8758
8759                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8760                 self.pending_outbound_payments
8761                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8762                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8763                         )
8764                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8765
8766                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8767                 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8768                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8769                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8770                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8771                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8772                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8773                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8774                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8775                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8776                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8777                                 );
8778                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8779                         }
8780                 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8781                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8782                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8783                                 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8784                                 Some(reply_path),
8785                         );
8786                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8787                 } else {
8788                         debug_assert!(false);
8789                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8790                 }
8791
8792                 Ok(())
8793         }
8794
8795         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8796         /// message.
8797         ///
8798         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8799         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8800         /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8801         ///
8802         /// # Limitations
8803         ///
8804         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8805         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8806         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8807         /// received and no retries will be made.
8808         ///
8809         /// # Errors
8810         ///
8811         /// Errors if:
8812         /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8813         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8814         ///   the invoice.
8815         ///
8816         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8817         pub fn request_refund_payment(
8818                 &self, refund: &Refund
8819         ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8820                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8821                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8822                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8823
8824                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8825                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8826
8827                 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8828                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8829                 }
8830
8831                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8832
8833                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8834                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8835                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8836                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8837                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8838                                 )
8839                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8840
8841                                 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8842                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8843                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8844                                 )?;
8845                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8846                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8847                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8848                                 );
8849                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8850                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8851                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8852                                 )?;
8853                                 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8854                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8855                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8856                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8857
8858                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8859                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8860                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8861                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8862                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8863                                                 Some(reply_path),
8864                                         );
8865                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8866                                 } else {
8867                                         for path in refund.paths() {
8868                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8869                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8870                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8871                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8872                                                 );
8873                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8874                                         }
8875                                 }
8876
8877                                 Ok(invoice)
8878                         },
8879                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8880                 }
8881         }
8882
8883         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8884         /// to pay us.
8885         ///
8886         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8887         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8888         ///
8889         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8890         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8891         /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8892         ///
8893         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8894         ///
8895         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8896         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8897         ///
8898         /// # Note
8899         ///
8900         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8901         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8902         ///
8903         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8904         ///
8905         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8906         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8907         ///
8908         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8909         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8910         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8911         /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8912         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8913         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8914                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8915                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8916                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8917                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8918         }
8919
8920         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8921         /// stored external to LDK.
8922         ///
8923         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8924         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8925         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8926         ///
8927         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8928         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8929         /// payments.
8930         ///
8931         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8932         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8933         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8934         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8935         ///
8936         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8937         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8938         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8939         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8940         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8941         ///
8942         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8943         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8944         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8945         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8946         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8947         ///
8948         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8949         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8950         ///
8951         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8952         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8953         ///
8954         /// # Note
8955         ///
8956         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8957         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8958         ///
8959         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8960         ///
8961         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8962         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8963         ///
8964         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8965         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8966         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8967                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8968                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8969                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8970                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
8971         }
8972
8973         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8974         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8975         ///
8976         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8977         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8978                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8979         }
8980
8981         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8982         ///
8983         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8984         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8985                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8986                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8987
8988                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8989                         .iter()
8990                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8991                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8992                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8993
8994                 self.router
8995                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8996                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8997         }
8998
8999         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
9000         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
9001         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
9002                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
9003         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
9004                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9005
9006                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9007                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9008                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9009                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9010                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9011                         payment_secret,
9012                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9013                                 max_cltv_expiry,
9014                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9015                         },
9016                         payment_context,
9017                 };
9018                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9019                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9020                 )
9021         }
9022
9023         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9024         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9025         ///
9026         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9027         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9028                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9029                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9030                 loop {
9031                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9032                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9033                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9034                                 Some(_) => continue,
9035                                 None => return scid_candidate
9036                         }
9037                 }
9038         }
9039
9040         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9041         ///
9042         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9043         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9044                 PhantomRouteHints {
9045                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9046                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9047                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9048                 }
9049         }
9050
9051         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9052         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9053         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9054         ///
9055         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9056         /// times to get a unique scid.
9057         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9058                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9059                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9060                 loop {
9061                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9062                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9063                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9064                         return scid_candidate
9065                 }
9066         }
9067
9068         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9069         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9070         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9071                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9072
9073                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9074                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9075                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9076                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9077                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9078                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9079                         ) {
9080                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9081                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9082                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9083                                         }
9084                                 }
9085                         }
9086                 }
9087
9088                 inflight_htlcs
9089         }
9090
9091         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9092         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9093                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9094                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9095                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9096                 events.into_inner()
9097         }
9098
9099         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9100         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9101                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9102                 events.push_back((event, None));
9103         }
9104
9105         #[cfg(test)]
9106         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9107                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9108                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9109         }
9110
9111         #[cfg(test)]
9112         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9113                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9114         }
9115
9116         #[cfg(test)]
9117         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9118                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9119         }
9120
9121         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9122         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9123         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9124         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9125         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9126                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9127                 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9128
9129                 let logger = WithContext::from(
9130                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9131                 );
9132                 loop {
9133                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9134                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9135                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9136                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9137                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9138                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9139                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9140                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9141                                         {
9142                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9143                                         }
9144                                 }
9145
9146                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9147                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9148                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9149                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9150                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9151                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9152                                                 &channel_id);
9153                                         break;
9154                                 }
9155
9156                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9157                                         channel_id) {
9158                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9159                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9160                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9161                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9162                                                                 channel_id);
9163                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9164                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9165                                                         if further_update_exists {
9166                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9167                                                                 // top of the loop.
9168                                                                 continue;
9169                                                         }
9170                                                 } else {
9171                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9172                                                                 channel_id);
9173                                                 }
9174                                         }
9175                                 }
9176                         } else {
9177                                 log_debug!(logger,
9178                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9179                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9180                         }
9181                         break;
9182                 }
9183         }
9184
9185         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9186                 for action in actions {
9187                         match action {
9188                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9189                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9190                                 } => {
9191                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9192                                 }
9193                         }
9194                 }
9195         }
9196
9197         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9198         /// using the given event handler.
9199         ///
9200         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9201         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9202                 &self, handler: H
9203         ) {
9204                 let mut ev;
9205                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9206         }
9207 }
9208
9209 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9210 where
9211         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9212         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9213         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9214         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9215         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9216         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9217         R::Target: Router,
9218         L::Target: Logger,
9219 {
9220         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9221         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9222         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9223         /// is always placed next to each other.
9224         ///
9225         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9226         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9227         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9228         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9229         ///
9230         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9231         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9232         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9233         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9234                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9235                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9236                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9237
9238                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9239                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9240                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9241                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9242                         }
9243
9244                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9245                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9246                         }
9247                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9248                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9249                         }
9250
9251                         let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9252                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9253                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9254                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9255                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9256                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9257                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9258                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9259                                 }
9260                                 if peer_state.is_connected {
9261                                         is_any_peer_connected = true
9262                                 }
9263                         }
9264
9265                         // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9266                         if is_any_peer_connected {
9267                                 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9268                                 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9269                         }
9270
9271                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9272                                 events.replace(pending_events);
9273                         }
9274
9275                         result
9276                 });
9277                 events.into_inner()
9278         }
9279 }
9280
9281 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9282 where
9283         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9284         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9285         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9286         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9287         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9288         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9289         R::Target: Router,
9290         L::Target: Logger,
9291 {
9292         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9293         ///
9294         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9295         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9296         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9297                 let mut ev;
9298                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9299         }
9300 }
9301
9302 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9303 where
9304         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9305         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9306         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9307         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9308         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9309         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9310         R::Target: Router,
9311         L::Target: Logger,
9312 {
9313         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9314                 {
9315                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9316                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9317                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9318                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9319                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9320                 }
9321
9322                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9323                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9324         }
9325
9326         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9327                 let _persistence_guard =
9328                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9329                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9330                 let new_height = height - 1;
9331                 {
9332                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9333                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9334                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9335                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9336                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9337                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9338                 }
9339
9340                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9341         }
9342 }
9343
9344 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9345 where
9346         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9347         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9348         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9349         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9350         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9351         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9352         R::Target: Router,
9353         L::Target: Logger,
9354 {
9355         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9356                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9357                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9358                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9359
9360                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9361                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9362
9363                 let _persistence_guard =
9364                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9365                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9366                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9367                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9368
9369                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9370                 if height < last_best_block_height {
9371                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9372                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9373                 }
9374         }
9375
9376         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9377                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9378                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9379                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9380
9381                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9382                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9383
9384                 let _persistence_guard =
9385                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9386                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9387                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9388
9389                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9390
9391                 macro_rules! max_time {
9392                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
9393                                 loop {
9394                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9395                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9396                                         // having an explicit local time source.
9397                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9398                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9399                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9400                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9401                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9402                                                 break;
9403                                         }
9404                                 }
9405                         }
9406                 }
9407                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9408                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9409                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9410                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9411                 });
9412         }
9413
9414         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9415                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9416                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9417                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9418                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9419                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9420                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9421                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9422                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9423                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9424                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9425                                 }
9426                         }
9427                 }
9428                 res
9429         }
9430
9431         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9432                 let _persistence_guard =
9433                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9434                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9435                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9436                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9437                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9438                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9439                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9440                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9441                 });
9442         }
9443 }
9444
9445 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9446 where
9447         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9448         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9449         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9450         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9451         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9452         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9453         R::Target: Router,
9454         L::Target: Logger,
9455 {
9456         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9457         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9458         /// the function.
9459         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9460                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9461                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9462                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9463                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9464
9465                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9466                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9467                 {
9468                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9469                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9470                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9471                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9472                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9473
9474                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9475                                         match phase {
9476                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
9477                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9478                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9479                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9480                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9481                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9482                                                         let res = f(channel);
9483                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9484                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9485                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9486                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9487                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9488                                                                 }
9489                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9490                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9491                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9492                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
9493                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9494                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9495                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9496                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9497                                                                                                 msg,
9498                                                                                         });
9499                                                                                 }
9500                                                                         } else {
9501                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9502                                                                         }
9503                                                                 }
9504
9505                                                                 {
9506                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9507                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9508                                                                 }
9509
9510                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9511                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9512                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9513                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9514                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
9515                                                                         });
9516                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9517                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9518                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9519                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
9520                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9521                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9522                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9523                                                                                         });
9524                                                                                 }
9525                                                                         }
9526                                                                 }
9527                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9528                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9529                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9530                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9531                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9532                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9533                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9534                                                                                 // is always consistent.
9535                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9536                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9537                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9538                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9539                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9540                                                                         }
9541                                                                 }
9542                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9543                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9544                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9545                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9546                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9547                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9548                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9549                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9550                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9551                                                                                 msg: update
9552                                                                         });
9553                                                                 }
9554                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9555                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9556                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9557                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9558                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9559                                                                                         data: reason_message,
9560                                                                                 })
9561                                                                         },
9562                                                                 });
9563                                                                 return false;
9564                                                         }
9565                                                         true
9566                                                 }
9567                                         }
9568                                 });
9569                         }
9570                 }
9571
9572                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9573                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9574                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9575                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9576                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9577                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9578                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9579                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9580                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9581                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9582
9583                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9584                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9585                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9586                                                 false
9587                                         } else { true }
9588                                 });
9589                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9590                         });
9591
9592                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9593                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9594                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9595                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9596                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9597                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9598                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9599                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9600                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9601                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9602                                                 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9603                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9604                                         });
9605
9606                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9607                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9608                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
9609                                         };
9610                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9611                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9612                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9613                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
9614                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9615                                         );
9616                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9617                                         false
9618                                 } else { true }
9619                         });
9620                 }
9621
9622                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9623
9624                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9625                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9626                 }
9627         }
9628
9629         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9630         /// may have events that need processing.
9631         ///
9632         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9633         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9634         ///
9635         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9636         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9637         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9638                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9639         }
9640
9641         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9642         ///
9643         /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9644         /// indicates this should be checked.
9645         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9646                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9647         }
9648
9649         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9650         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9651                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9652         }
9653
9654         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9655         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9656         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9657                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9658         }
9659
9660         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9661         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9662         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9663                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9664         }
9665
9666         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9667         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9668         ///
9669         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9670         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9671         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9672         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9673                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9674         }
9675
9676         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9677         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9678         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9679                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9680         }
9681
9682         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9683         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9684         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9685                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9686         }
9687
9688         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9689         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9690         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9691                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9692         }
9693
9694         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9695         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9696         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9697                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9698         }
9699 }
9700
9701 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9702         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9703 where
9704         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9705         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9706         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9707         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9708         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9709         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9710         R::Target: Router,
9711         L::Target: Logger,
9712 {
9713         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9714                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9715                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9716                 // change to the contents.
9717                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9718                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9719                         let persist = match &res {
9720                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9721                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9722                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
9723                                 },
9724                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9725                         };
9726                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9727                         persist
9728                 });
9729         }
9730
9731         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9732                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9733                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9734                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9735         }
9736
9737         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9738                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9739                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9740                 // change to the contents.
9741                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9742                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9743                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9744                 });
9745         }
9746
9747         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9748                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9749                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9750                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9751         }
9752
9753         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9754                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9755                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9756         }
9757
9758         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9759                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9760                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9761         }
9762
9763         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9764                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9765                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9766                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9767                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9768                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9769                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9770                         let persist = match &res {
9771                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9772                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9773                         };
9774                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9775                         persist
9776                 });
9777         }
9778
9779         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9780                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9781                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9782                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9783         }
9784
9785         #[cfg(splicing)]
9786         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9787                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9788                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9789                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9790         }
9791
9792         #[cfg(splicing)]
9793         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9794                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9795                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9796                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9797         }
9798
9799         #[cfg(splicing)]
9800         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9801                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9802                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9803                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9804         }
9805
9806         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9807                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9808                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9809         }
9810
9811         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9812                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9813                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9814         }
9815
9816         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9817                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9818                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9819                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9820                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9821                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9822                         let persist = match &res {
9823                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9824                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9825                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9826                         };
9827                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9828                         persist
9829                 });
9830         }
9831
9832         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9833                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9834                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9835         }
9836
9837         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9838                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9839                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9840                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9841                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9842                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9843                         let persist = match &res {
9844                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9845                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9846                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9847                         };
9848                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9849                         persist
9850                 });
9851         }
9852
9853         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9854                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9855                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9856                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9857                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9858                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9859                         let persist = match &res {
9860                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9861                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9862                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9863                         };
9864                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9865                         persist
9866                 });
9867         }
9868
9869         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9870                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9871                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9872         }
9873
9874         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9875                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9876                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9877         }
9878
9879         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9880                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9881                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9882                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9883                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9884                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9885                         let persist = match &res {
9886                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9887                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9888                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9889                         };
9890                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9891                         persist
9892                 });
9893         }
9894
9895         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9896                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9897                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9898         }
9899
9900         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9901                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9902                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9903                                 persist
9904                         } else {
9905                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9906                         }
9907                 });
9908         }
9909
9910         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9911                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9912                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9913                         let persist = match &res {
9914                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9915                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9916                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9917                         };
9918                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9919                         persist
9920                 });
9921         }
9922
9923         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9924                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9925                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9926                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9927                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9928                 let remove_peer = {
9929                         log_debug!(
9930                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9931                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9932                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9933                         );
9934                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9935                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9936                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9937                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9938                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9939                                         let context = match phase {
9940                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9941                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9942                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9943                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9944                                                                 return true;
9945                                                         }
9946                                                         &mut chan.context
9947                                                 },
9948                                                 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9949                                                 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9950                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9951                                                         return true;
9952                                                 },
9953                                                 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9954                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9955                                                         &mut chan.context
9956                                                 },
9957                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9958                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9959                                                         &mut chan.context
9960                                                 },
9961                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9962                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9963                                                         &mut chan.context
9964                                                 },
9965                                         };
9966                                         // Clean up for removal.
9967                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9968                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9969                                         false
9970                                 });
9971                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9972                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9973                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9974                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9975                                         match msg {
9976                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
9977                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9978                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9979                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9980                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9981                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
9982                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9983                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9984                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
9985                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9986                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9987                                                 // Quiescence
9988                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9989                                                 // Splicing
9990                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9991                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9992                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9993                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9994                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9995                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9996                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9997                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9998                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9999                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
10000                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
10001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
10002                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
10003                                                 // Channel Operations
10004                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
10005                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
10006                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
10007                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
10008                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
10009                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10010                                                 // Gossip
10011                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10012                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10013                                                 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10014                                                 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10015                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10016                                                         debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10017                                                         false
10018                                                 },
10019                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10020                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10021                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10022                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10023                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10024                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10025                                         }
10026                                 });
10027                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10028                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10029                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10030                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10031                 };
10032                 if remove_peer {
10033                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10034                 }
10035                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10036
10037                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10038                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10039                 }
10040         }
10041
10042         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10043                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10044                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10045                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10046                         return Err(());
10047                 }
10048
10049                 let mut res = Ok(());
10050
10051                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10052                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10053                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10054                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10055                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10056                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10057                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10058
10059                         {
10060                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10061                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10062                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10063                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
10064                                                         res = Err(());
10065                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10066                                                 }
10067                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10068                                                         channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10069                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10070                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10071                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10072                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10073                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10074                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10075                                                         is_connected: true,
10076                                                 }));
10077                                         },
10078                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10079                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10080                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10081
10082                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10083                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10084                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10085                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10086                                                 {
10087                                                         res = Err(());
10088                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10089                                                 }
10090
10091                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10092                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10093                                         },
10094                                 }
10095                         }
10096
10097                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10098
10099                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10100                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10101                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10102                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10103                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10104
10105                                 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10106                                         match phase {
10107                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10108                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10109                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10110                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10111                                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10112                                                         });
10113                                                 }
10114
10115                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10116                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10117                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10118                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10119                                                         });
10120                                                 }
10121
10122                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10123                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10124                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10125                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10126                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10127                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10128                                                         });
10129                                                 },
10130
10131                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10132                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10133                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10134                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10135                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10136                                                 }
10137
10138                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10139                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10140                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10141                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10142                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10143                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10144                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10145                                                 },
10146                                         }
10147                                 }
10148                         }
10149
10150                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10151                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10152                 });
10153                 res
10154         }
10155
10156         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10157                 match &msg.data as &str {
10158                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10159                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
10160                         {
10161                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10162                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10163                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10164                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10165                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10166                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10167                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10168                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10169                                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10170                                                 self,
10171                                                 || -> NotifyOption {
10172                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10173                                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10174                                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10175                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10176                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10177                                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10178                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10179                                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10180                                                                                 msg,
10181                                                                         });
10182                                                                 }
10183                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10184                                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10185                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10186                                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10187                                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10188                                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10189                                                                                 },
10190                                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
10191                                                                         }
10192                                                                 });
10193                                                                 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10194                                                                 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10195                                                                 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10196                                                         }
10197                                                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10198                                                 }
10199                                         );
10200                                 }
10201                                 return;
10202                         }
10203                         _ => {}
10204                 }
10205
10206                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10207
10208                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10209                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10210                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10211                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10212                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10213                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10214                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10215                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10216                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10217                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10218                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10219                         };
10220                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
10221                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10222                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10223                         }
10224                 } else {
10225                         {
10226                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10227                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10228                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10229                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10230                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10231                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10232                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10233                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10234                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10235                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10236                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10237                                                                 msg,
10238                                                         });
10239                                                         return;
10240                                                 }
10241                                         },
10242                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10243                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10244                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10245                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10246                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10247                                                                 msg,
10248                                                         });
10249                                                         return;
10250                                                 }
10251                                         },
10252                                         None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10253                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10254                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10255                                 }
10256                         }
10257
10258                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10259                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10260                 }
10261         }
10262
10263         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10264                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10265         }
10266
10267         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10268                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10269         }
10270
10271         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10272                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10273         }
10274
10275         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10276                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10277                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10278                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10279         }
10280
10281         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10282                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10283                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10284                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10285         }
10286
10287         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10288                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10289                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10290                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10291         }
10292
10293         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10294                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10295                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10296                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10297         }
10298
10299         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10300                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10301                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10302                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10303         }
10304
10305         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10306                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10307                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10308                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10309         }
10310
10311         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10312                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10313                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10314                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10315         }
10316
10317         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10318                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10319                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10320                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10321         }
10322
10323         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10324                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10325                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10326                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10327         }
10328 }
10329
10330 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10331 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10332 where
10333         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10334         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10335         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10336         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10337         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10338         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10339         R::Target: Router,
10340         L::Target: Logger,
10341 {
10342         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10343                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10344                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10345
10346                 match message {
10347                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10348                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10349                                         &invoice_request
10350                                 ) {
10351                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10352                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10353                                 };
10354                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10355                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10356                                         Err(()) => {
10357                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10358                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10359                                         },
10360                                 };
10361
10362                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10363                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10364                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10365                                 ) {
10366                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10367                                         Err(()) => {
10368                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10369                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10370                                         },
10371                                 };
10372
10373                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10374                                         offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10375                                         invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10376                                 });
10377                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10378                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10379                                 ) {
10380                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10381                                         Err(()) => {
10382                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10383                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10384                                         },
10385                                 };
10386
10387                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10388                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10389                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10390                                 );
10391
10392                                 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10393                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10394                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10395                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
10396                                         );
10397                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10398                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10399                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10400                                         );
10401                                         builder
10402                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10403                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10404                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10405                                 } else {
10406                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10407                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10408                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10409                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10410                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10411                                         );
10412                                         builder
10413                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10414                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10415                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10416                                                 .and_then(|invoice| {
10417                                                         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
10418                                                         let mut invoice = invoice;
10419                                                         invoice
10420                                                                 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10421                                                                         self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10422                                                                 )
10423                                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10424                                                 })
10425                                 };
10426
10427                                 match response {
10428                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10429                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10430                                 }
10431                         },
10432                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10433                                 let response = invoice
10434                                         .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10435                                         .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10436                                         .and_then(|payment_id| {
10437                                                 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10438                                                 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10439                                                         Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10440                                                 } else {
10441                                                         self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10442                                                                 .map_err(|e| {
10443                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10444                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10445                                                                 })
10446                                                 }
10447                                         });
10448
10449                                 match response {
10450                                         Ok(()) => None,
10451                                         Err(e) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10452                                 }
10453                         },
10454                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10455                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10456                                 None
10457                         },
10458                 }
10459         }
10460
10461         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10462                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10463         }
10464 }
10465
10466 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10467 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10468 where
10469         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10470         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10471         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10472         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10473         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10474         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10475         R::Target: Router,
10476         L::Target: Logger,
10477 {
10478         fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10479                 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10480         }
10481 }
10482
10483 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10484 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10485 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10486         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10487         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10488         node_features
10489 }
10490
10491 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10492 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10493 ///
10494 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10495 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10496 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10497 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10498         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10499 }
10500
10501 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10502 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10503 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10504         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10505 }
10506
10507 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10508 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10509 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10510         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10511 }
10512
10513 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10514 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10515 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10516         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10517 }
10518
10519 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10520 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10521 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10522         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10523         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10524         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10525         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10526         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10527         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10528         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10529         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10530         features.set_payment_secret_required();
10531         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10532         features.set_wumbo_optional();
10533         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10534         features.set_channel_type_optional();
10535         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10536         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10537         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10538         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10539                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10540         }
10541         features
10542 }
10543
10544 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10545 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10546
10547 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10548         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10549         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10550         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10551 });
10552
10553 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10554         (2, node_id, required),
10555         (4, features, required),
10556         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10557         (8, forwarding_info, option),
10558         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10559         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10560 });
10561
10562 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10563         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10564                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10565                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10566                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10567                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10568                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10569                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10570                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
10571                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
10572                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
10573                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10574                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10575                         (7, self.config, option),
10576                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10577                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
10578                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10579                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10580                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10581                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10582                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10583                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10584                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10585                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10586                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10587                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10588                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10589                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10590                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
10591                         (32, self.is_public, required),
10592                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10593                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10594                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10595                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10596                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10597                         (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10598                         (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10599                 });
10600                 Ok(())
10601         }
10602 }
10603
10604 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10605         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10606                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10607                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10608                         (2, channel_id, required),
10609                         (3, channel_type, option),
10610                         (4, counterparty, required),
10611                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10612                         (6, funding_txo, option),
10613                         (7, config, option),
10614                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
10615                         (9, confirmations, option),
10616                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10617                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10618                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10619                         (16, balance_msat, required),
10620                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10621                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10622                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10623                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10624                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10625                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10626                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
10627                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10628                         (26, is_outbound, required),
10629                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10630                         (30, is_usable, required),
10631                         (32, is_public, required),
10632                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10633                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10634                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10635                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10636                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10637                         (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10638                         (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10639                 });
10640
10641                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10642                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10643                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10644                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10645                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10646
10647                 Ok(Self {
10648                         inbound_scid_alias,
10649                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10650                         channel_type,
10651                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10652                         outbound_scid_alias,
10653                         funding_txo,
10654                         config,
10655                         short_channel_id,
10656                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10657                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10658                         user_channel_id,
10659                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10660                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10661                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10662                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10663                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10664                         confirmations_required,
10665                         confirmations,
10666                         force_close_spend_delay,
10667                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10668                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10669                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10670                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10671                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10672                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10673                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10674                         channel_shutdown_state,
10675                         pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10676                         pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10677                 })
10678         }
10679 }
10680
10681 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10682         (2, channels, required_vec),
10683         (4, phantom_scid, required),
10684         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10685 });
10686
10687 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10688         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10689         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10690 });
10691
10692 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10693         (0, Forward) => {
10694                 (0, onion_packet, required),
10695                 (1, blinded, option),
10696                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10697         },
10698         (1, Receive) => {
10699                 (0, payment_data, required),
10700                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10701                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10702                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10703                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10704                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10705                 (9, payment_context, option),
10706         },
10707         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10708                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10709                 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10710                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10711                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10712                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10713                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10714         },
10715 ;);
10716
10717 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10718         (0, routing, required),
10719         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10720         (4, payment_hash, required),
10721         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10722         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10723         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10724         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10725 });
10726
10727
10728 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10729         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10730                 match self {
10731                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10732                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10733                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10734                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10735                                 reason.write(writer)?;
10736                         },
10737                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10738                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10739                         }) => {
10740                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10741                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10742                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10743                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10744                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10745                         },
10746                 }
10747                 Ok(())
10748         }
10749 }
10750
10751 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10752         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10753                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10754                 match id {
10755                         0 => {
10756                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10757                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10758                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10759                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10760                                 }))
10761                         },
10762                         1 => {
10763                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10764                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10765                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10766                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10767                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10768                                 }))
10769                         },
10770                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10771                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10772                         // messages contained in the variants.
10773                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10774                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10775                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10776                         2 => {
10777                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10778                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10779                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10780                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10781                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10782                         },
10783                         3 => {
10784                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10785                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10786                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10787                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10788                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10789                         },
10790                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10791                 }
10792         }
10793 }
10794
10795 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10796         (0, Forward),
10797         (1, Fail),
10798 );
10799
10800 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10801         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10802         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10803 );
10804
10805 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10806         (0, short_channel_id, required),
10807         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10808         (2, outpoint, required),
10809         (3, blinded_failure, option),
10810         (4, htlc_id, required),
10811         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10812         (7, user_channel_id, option),
10813         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10814         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10815         (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10816 });
10817
10818 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10819         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10820                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_context) = match &self.onion_payload {
10821                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data, payment_context } => {
10822                                 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None, payment_context.as_ref())
10823                         },
10824                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage), None),
10825                 };
10826                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10827                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10828                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
10829                         (2, self.value, required),
10830                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10831                         (4, payment_data, option),
10832                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10833                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10834                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10835                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10836                         (11, payment_context, option),
10837                 });
10838                 Ok(())
10839         }
10840 }
10841
10842 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10843         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10844                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10845                         (0, prev_hop, required),
10846                         (1, total_msat, option),
10847                         (2, value_ser, required),
10848                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10849                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10850                         (5, total_value_received, option),
10851                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10852                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10853                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10854                         (11, payment_context, option),
10855                 });
10856                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10857                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10858                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10859                         Some(p) => {
10860                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
10861                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10862                                 }
10863                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10864                                         total_msat = Some(value);
10865                                 }
10866                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10867                         },
10868                         None => {
10869                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10870                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
10871                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10872                                         }
10873                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10874                                 }
10875                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data, payment_context }
10876                         },
10877                 };
10878                 Ok(Self {
10879                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10880                         timer_ticks: 0,
10881                         value,
10882                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10883                         total_value_received,
10884                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10885                         onion_payload,
10886                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10887                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10888                 })
10889         }
10890 }
10891
10892 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10893         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10894                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10895                 match id {
10896                         0 => {
10897                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10898                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10899                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10900                                 let mut payment_id = None;
10901                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10902                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10903                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10904                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10905                                         (1, payment_id, option),
10906                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10907                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10908                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10909                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
10910                                 });
10911                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
10912                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10913                                         // instead.
10914                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10915                                 }
10916                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10917                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10918                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10919                                 }
10920                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10921                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10922                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10923                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10924                                                 }
10925                                         }
10926                                 }
10927                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10928                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10929                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
10930                                         path,
10931                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10932                                 })
10933                         }
10934                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10935                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10936                 }
10937         }
10938 }
10939
10940 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10941         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10942                 match self {
10943                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10944                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10945                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10946                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10947                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10948                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10949                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10950                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10951                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10952                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10953                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10954                                  });
10955                         }
10956                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10957                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10958                                 field.write(writer)?;
10959                         }
10960                 }
10961                 Ok(())
10962         }
10963 }
10964
10965 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10966         (0, forward_info, required),
10967         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10968         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10969         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10970         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10971         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10972         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10973         (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10974 });
10975
10976 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10977         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10978                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10979                 match self {
10980                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10981                                 0u8.write(w)?;
10982                                 info.write(w)?;
10983                         },
10984                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10985                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10986                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10987                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10988                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10989                                 });
10990                         },
10991                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10992                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10993                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10994                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10995                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10996                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10997                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10998                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10999                                         (1, failure_code, required),
11000                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
11001                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
11002                                 });
11003                         },
11004                 }
11005                 Ok(())
11006         }
11007 }
11008
11009 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11010         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11011                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11012                 Ok(match id {
11013                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11014                         1 => {
11015                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11016                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11017                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11018                                         (2, err_packet, required),
11019                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11020                                 });
11021                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11022                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11023                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11024                                                 failure_code,
11025                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11026                                         }
11027                                 } else {
11028                                         Self::FailHTLC {
11029                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11030                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11031                                         }
11032                                 }
11033                         },
11034                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11035                 })
11036         }
11037 }
11038
11039 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11040         (0, payment_secret, required),
11041         (2, expiry_time, required),
11042         (4, user_payment_id, required),
11043         (6, payment_preimage, required),
11044         (8, min_value_msat, required),
11045 });
11046
11047 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11048 where
11049         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11050         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11051         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11052         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11053         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11054         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11055         R::Target: Router,
11056         L::Target: Logger,
11057 {
11058         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11059                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11060
11061                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11062
11063                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11064                 {
11065                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11066                         best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11067                         best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11068                 }
11069
11070                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11071
11072                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11073                 {
11074                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11075                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11076                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11077                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11078                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11079                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
11080                                 }
11081
11082                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11083                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11084                                 ).count();
11085                         }
11086
11087                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11088
11089                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11090                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11091                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11092                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11093                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11094                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11095                                         } else { None }
11096                                 ) {
11097                                         channel.write(writer)?;
11098                                 }
11099                         }
11100                 }
11101
11102                 {
11103                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11104                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11105                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11106                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11107                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11108                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
11109                                         forward.write(writer)?;
11110                                 }
11111                         }
11112                 }
11113
11114                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11115                 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11116                 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11117                         decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11118                 }
11119
11120                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11121                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11122                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11123
11124                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11125                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11126                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11127                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11128                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11129                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11130                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11131                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
11132                         }
11133                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11134                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11135                 }
11136
11137                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11138                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11139                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11140                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11141                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11142                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
11143                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11144                 }
11145
11146                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11147                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11148                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11149                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11150                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11151                         // no channels.
11152                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11153                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11154                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11155                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11156                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11157                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11158                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11159                                 }
11160                         }
11161                 }
11162
11163                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11164                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11165                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11166                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11167                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11168                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11169                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11170                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
11171                         0u64.write(writer)?;
11172                 } else {
11173                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11174                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11175                                 event.write(writer)?;
11176                         }
11177                 }
11178
11179                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11180                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11181                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11182                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11183                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11184                 0u64.write(writer)?;
11185
11186                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11187                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11188                 // likely to be identical.
11189                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11190                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11191
11192                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11193                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11194                         hash.write(writer)?;
11195                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11196                 }
11197
11198                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11199                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11200                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11201                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11202                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11203                         }
11204                 }
11205                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11206                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11207                         match outbound {
11208                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11209                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11210                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11211                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11212                                         }
11213                                 }
11214                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11215                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11216                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11217                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11218                         }
11219                 }
11220
11221                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11222                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11223                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11224                         match outbound {
11225                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11226                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11227                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11228                                 },
11229                                 _ => {},
11230                         }
11231                 }
11232
11233                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11234                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11235                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11236                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11237                 }
11238
11239                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11240                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11241                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11242                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11243                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
11244                 }
11245
11246                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11247                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11248                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11249                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
11250                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11251                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11252                                 }
11253                         }
11254                 }
11255
11256                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11257                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11258                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11259                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11260                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11261                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11262                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11263                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11264                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11265                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11266                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11267                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11268                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11269                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11270                 });
11271
11272                 Ok(())
11273         }
11274 }
11275
11276 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11277         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11278                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11279                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11280                         event.write(w)?;
11281                         action.write(w)?;
11282                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11283                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11284                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11285                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11286                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11287                                 // check that the event is sane here.
11288                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11289                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11290                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11291                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11292                         }
11293                 }
11294                 Ok(())
11295         }
11296 }
11297 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11298         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11299                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11300                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11301                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11302                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11303                         len) as usize);
11304                 for _ in 0..len {
11305                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11306                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11307                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11308                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
11309                         } else if action.is_some() {
11310                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11311                         }
11312                 }
11313                 Ok(events)
11314         }
11315 }
11316
11317 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11318         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11319         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11320         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11321         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11322         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11323 );
11324
11325 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11326 ///
11327 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11328 /// is:
11329 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11330 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11331 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11332 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11333 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11334 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11335 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11336 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11337 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11338 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11339 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11340 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11341 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11342 ///    the next step.
11343 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11344 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11345 ///
11346 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11347 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11348 ///
11349 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11350 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11351 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11352 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11353 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11354 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11355 ///
11356 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11357 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11358 where
11359         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11360         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11361         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11362         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11363         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11364         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11365         R::Target: Router,
11366         L::Target: Logger,
11367 {
11368         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11369         pub entropy_source: ES,
11370
11371         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11372         pub node_signer: NS,
11373
11374         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11375         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11376         /// signing data.
11377         pub signer_provider: SP,
11378
11379         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11380         ///
11381         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11382         pub fee_estimator: F,
11383         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11384         ///
11385         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11386         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11387         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11388         pub chain_monitor: M,
11389
11390         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11391         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11392         /// force-closed during deserialization.
11393         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11394         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11395         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11396         ///
11397         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11398         pub router: R,
11399         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11400         /// deserialization.
11401         pub logger: L,
11402         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11403         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11404         pub default_config: UserConfig,
11405
11406         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11407         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11408         ///
11409         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11410         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11411         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11412         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11413         ///
11414         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11415         /// this struct.
11416         ///
11417         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11418         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11419 }
11420
11421 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11422                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11423 where
11424         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11425         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11426         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11427         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11428         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11429         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11430         R::Target: Router,
11431         L::Target: Logger,
11432 {
11433         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11434         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11435         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11436         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11437                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11438                 Self {
11439                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11440                         channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11441                                 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11442                         ),
11443                 }
11444         }
11445 }
11446
11447 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11448 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11449 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11450         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11451 where
11452         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11453         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11454         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11455         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11456         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11457         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11458         R::Target: Router,
11459         L::Target: Logger,
11460 {
11461         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11462                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11463                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11464         }
11465 }
11466
11467 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11468         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11469 where
11470         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11471         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11472         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11473         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11474         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11475         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11476         R::Target: Router,
11477         L::Target: Logger,
11478 {
11479         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11480                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11481
11482                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11483                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11484                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11485
11486                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11487
11488                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11489                 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11490                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11491                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11492                 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11493                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11494                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11495                 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11496                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11497                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11498                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11499                         ))?;
11500                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11501                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11502                         funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11503                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11504                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11505                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11506                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11507                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11508                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11509                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11510                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11511                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11512                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11513                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11514                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11515                                         }
11516                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11517                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11518                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11519                                         }
11520                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11521                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11522                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11523                                         }
11524                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11525                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11526                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11527                                         }
11528                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11529                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11530                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11531                                         }
11532                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11533                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11534                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11535                                                 });
11536                                         }
11537                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11538                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11539                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11540                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11541                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11542                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11543                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11544                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11545                                         }, None));
11546                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11547                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
11548                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11549                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11550                                                 }
11551                                                 if !found_htlc {
11552                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11553                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11554                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11555                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11556                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11557                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11558                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11559                                                         log_info!(logger,
11560                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11561                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11562                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11563                                                 }
11564                                         }
11565                                 } else {
11566                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
11567                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11568                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11569                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11570                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11571                                         }
11572                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11573                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11574                                         }
11575                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11576                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11577                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11578                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11579                                                 },
11580                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11581                                                         let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11582                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11583                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
11584                                                 }
11585                                         }
11586                                 }
11587                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11588                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11589                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11590                                 // safely discard the channel.
11591                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11592                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11593                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11594                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11595                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11596                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11597                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11598                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11599                                 }, None));
11600                         } else {
11601                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11602                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11603                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11604                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11605                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11606                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11607                         }
11608                 }
11609
11610                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11611                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11612                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11613                                 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11614                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11615                                         &channel_id);
11616                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11617                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11618                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
11619                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11620                                         channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11621                                 };
11622                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11623                         }
11624                 }
11625
11626                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11627                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11628                 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11629                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11630                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11631                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11632                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11633                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11634                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11635                         }
11636                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11637                 }
11638
11639                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11640                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11641                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11642                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11643                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11644                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11645                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11646                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11647                         }
11648                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11649                 }
11650
11651                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11652                         PeerState {
11653                                 channel_by_id,
11654                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11655                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11656                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11657                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11658                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11659                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11660                                 is_connected: false,
11661                         }
11662                 };
11663
11664                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11665                 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11666                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11667                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11668                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11669                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11670                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11671                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11672                 }
11673
11674                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11675                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11676                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11677                 for _ in 0..event_count {
11678                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11679                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11680                                 None => continue,
11681                         }
11682                 }
11683
11684                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11685                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11686                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11687                                 0 => {
11688                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11689                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11690                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
11691                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11692                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11693                                 }
11694                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11695                         }
11696                 }
11697
11698                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11699                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11700
11701                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11702                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11703                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11704                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11705                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11706                         }
11707                 }
11708
11709                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11710                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11711                         hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11712                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11713                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11714                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11715                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11716                         };
11717                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11718                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11719                         };
11720                 }
11721
11722                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11723                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11724                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11725                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11726                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11727                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11728                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11729                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11730                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11731                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11732                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11733                 let mut events_override = None;
11734                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11735                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11736                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11737                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11738                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11739                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11740                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11741                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11742                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11743                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11744                         (8, events_override, option),
11745                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11746                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11747                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11748                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11749                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11750                 });
11751                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11752                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11753                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11754                 }
11755
11756                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11757                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11758                 }
11759
11760                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11761                         pending_events_read = events;
11762                 }
11763
11764                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11765                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11766                 }
11767
11768                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11769                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11770                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11771                         let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11772                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11773                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11774                         }
11775                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11776                 }
11777                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11778                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11779                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11780                 };
11781
11782                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11783                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11784                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11785                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11786                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11787                 //
11788                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11789                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11790                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11791                 //
11792                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11793                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11794                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11795                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11796                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11797                         ) => { {
11798                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11799                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11800                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11801                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11802                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11803                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11804                                         pending_background_events.push(
11805                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11806                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11807                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11808                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11809                                                         update: update.clone(),
11810                                                 });
11811                                 }
11812                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11813                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11814                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11815                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11816                                         pending_background_events.push(
11817                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11818                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11819                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11820                                                 });
11821                                 }
11822                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11823                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11824                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11825                                 }
11826                                 max_in_flight_update_id
11827                         } }
11828                 }
11829
11830                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11831                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11832                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11833                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11834                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11835                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11836
11837                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11838                                         // discarded.
11839                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11840                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11841                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11842                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11843                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11844                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11845                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11846                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11847                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11848                                                 }
11849                                         }
11850                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11851                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11852                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11853                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11854                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11855                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11856                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11857                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11858                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11859                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11860                                                 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11861                                         }
11862                                 } else {
11863                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11864                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11865                                         debug_assert!(false);
11866                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11867                                 }
11868                         }
11869                 }
11870
11871                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11872                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11873                                 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11874                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11875                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11876                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11877                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11878                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11879                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11880                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11881                                         });
11882                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11883                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11884                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11885                                 } else {
11886                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11887                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11888                                                 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11889                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11890                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11891                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11892                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11893                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11894                                 }
11895                         }
11896                 }
11897
11898                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11899                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11900
11901                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11902                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11903                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11904                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11905
11906                 {
11907                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11908                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11909                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11910                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11911                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11912                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11913                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11914                         // 0.0.102+
11915                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11916                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11917                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11918                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11919                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11920                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11921                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
11922                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11923                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11924                                                         }
11925
11926                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11927                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11928                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11929                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11930                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11931                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11932                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11933                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11934                                                                 },
11935                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11936                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11937                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11938                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
11939                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11940                                                                                 payment_params: None,
11941                                                                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11942                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11943                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11944                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11945                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11946                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11947                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11948                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11949                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
11950                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11951                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11952                                                                         });
11953                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11954                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11955                                                                 }
11956                                                         }
11957                                                 }
11958                                         }
11959                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11960                                                 match htlc_source {
11961                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11962                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11963                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11964                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11965                                                                 };
11966                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11967                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11968                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11969                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11970                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11971                                                                 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11972                                                                         update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11973                                                                                 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11974                                                                                         update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11975                                                                                 if matches {
11976                                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11977                                                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11978                                                                                 }
11979                                                                                 !matches
11980                                                                         });
11981                                                                         !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11982                                                                 });
11983                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11984                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
11985                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11986                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11987                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11988                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11989                                                                                                 false
11990                                                                                         } else { true }
11991                                                                                 } else { true }
11992                                                                         });
11993                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
11994                                                                 });
11995                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11996                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11997                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11998                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11999                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
12000                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
12001                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
12002                                                                                         } else { true }
12003                                                                                 });
12004                                                                                 false
12005                                                                         } else { true }
12006                                                                 });
12007                                                         },
12008                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
12009                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12010                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12011                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12012                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12013                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12014                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12015                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12016                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12017                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12018                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12019                                                                         let compl_action =
12020                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12021                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12022                                                                                         channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12023                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12024                                                                                 };
12025                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12026                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12027                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12028                                                                 }
12029                                                         },
12030                                                 }
12031                                         }
12032                                 }
12033
12034                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12035                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12036                                 // payments.
12037                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12038                                         .into_iter()
12039                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12040                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12041                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12042                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12043                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12044                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12045                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12046                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12047                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12048                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12049                                                         } else { None }
12050                                                 } else {
12051                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12052                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12053                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12054                                                         // channel still live case here.
12055                                                         None
12056                                                 }
12057                                         });
12058                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12059                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12060                                 }
12061                         }
12062                 }
12063
12064                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12065                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12066                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12067                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12068                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12069                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12070                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12071                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12072                         }, None));
12073                 }
12074
12075                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12076                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12077
12078                 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12079                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12080                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12081                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12082                         }
12083                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12084                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12085                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12086                                 }
12087                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12088                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12089                                 {
12090                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12091                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12092                                         });
12093                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12094                                 }
12095                         } else {
12096                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12097                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12098                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12099                                         });
12100                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12101                                 }
12102                         }
12103                 } else {
12104                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12105                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12106                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12107                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12108                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12109                                 }
12110                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12111                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data, payment_context: _ } => {
12112                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12113                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12114                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12115                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12116                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12117                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12118                                                                                 Err(()) => {
12119                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12120                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12121                                                                                 }
12122                                                                         }
12123                                                                 },
12124                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12125                                                         }
12126                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12127                                         },
12128                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12129                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12130                                 };
12131                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12132                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12133                                 });
12134                         }
12135                 }
12136
12137                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12138                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12139
12140                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12141                         Ok(key) => key,
12142                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12143                 };
12144                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12145                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12146                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12147                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12148                         }
12149                 }
12150
12151                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12152                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12153                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12154                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12155                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12156                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12157                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12158                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12159                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12160                                                 loop {
12161                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12162                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12163                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12164                                                 }
12165                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12166                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12167                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12168                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12169                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12170                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12171                                         }
12172                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
12173                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12174                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12175                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12176                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12177                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12178                                                 }
12179                                         }
12180                                 } else {
12181                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12182                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12183                                         debug_assert!(false);
12184                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12185                                 }
12186                         }
12187                 }
12188
12189                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12190
12191                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12192                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12193                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12194                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12195                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12196                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12197                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12198                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12199                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12200                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12201                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12202                                         }
12203                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12204                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12205
12206                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12207                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12208                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12209                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12210                                                 //
12211                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12212                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12213                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12214                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12215                                                 // reason to.
12216                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12217                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12218                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12219                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12220                                                 // restart.
12221                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12222                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12223                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12224                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12225                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12226                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12227                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12228                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12229                                                         }
12230                                                 }
12231                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12232                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12233                                                 }
12234                                         }
12235                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12236                                                 receiver_node_id,
12237                                                 payment_hash,
12238                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
12239                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12240                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12241                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12242                                         }, None));
12243                                 }
12244                         }
12245                 }
12246
12247                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12248                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12249                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12250                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12251                                         for action in actions.iter() {
12252                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12253                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12254                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12255                                                 } = action {
12256                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12257                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
12258                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12259                                                                         blocked_channel_id);
12260                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12261                                                                         .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12262                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12263                                                         } else {
12264                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12265                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12266                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12267                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12268                                                                 // anymore.
12269                                                         }
12270                                                 }
12271                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12272                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12273                                                 }
12274                                         }
12275                                 }
12276                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12277                         } else {
12278                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12279                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12280                         }
12281                 }
12282
12283                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12284                         chain_hash,
12285                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12286                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12287                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12288                         router: args.router,
12289
12290                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12291
12292                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12293                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12294                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12295                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12296
12297                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12298                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12299                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12300                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12301                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12302                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12303                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12304
12305                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12306
12307                         our_network_pubkey,
12308                         secp_ctx,
12309
12310                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12311
12312                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12313
12314                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12315                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12316                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12317                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12318                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12319
12320                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12321                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12322
12323                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12324
12325                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12326
12327                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12328
12329                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12330                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
12331                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12332
12333                         logger: args.logger,
12334                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
12335                 };
12336
12337                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12338                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12339                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12340                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12341                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12342                 }
12343
12344                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12345                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12346                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12347                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12348                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12349                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12350                                 downstream_channel_id, None
12351                         );
12352                 }
12353
12354                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12355                 //connection or two.
12356
12357                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12358         }
12359 }
12360
12361 #[cfg(test)]
12362 mod tests {
12363         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12364         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12365         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12366         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12367         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12368         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12369         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12370         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12371         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12372         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12373         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12374         use crate::prelude::*;
12375         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12376         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12377         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12378         use crate::util::test_utils;
12379         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12380         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12381
12382         #[test]
12383         fn test_notify_limits() {
12384                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12385                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12386                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12387                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12388                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12389                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12390
12391                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12392                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12393                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12394                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12395                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12396
12397                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12398
12399                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12400                 // to connect messages with new values
12401                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12402                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12403                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12404                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12405                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12406                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12407
12408                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12409                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12410                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12411                 // ... but the last node should not.
12412                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12413                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12414                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12415                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12416
12417                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12418                 // about the channel.
12419                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12420                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12421                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12422
12423                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12424                 // parties.
12425                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12426                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12427                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12428                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12429                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12430                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12431
12432                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12433                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12434                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12435
12436                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12437                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12438                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12439                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12440                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12441                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12442
12443                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12444                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12445                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12446                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12447                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12448                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12449                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12450                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12451
12452                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12453                 // the channel info has updated.
12454                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12455                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12456                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12457                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12458                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12459                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12460         }
12461
12462         #[test]
12463         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12464                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12465                 // expected.
12466                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12467                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12468                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12469                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12470                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12471
12472                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12473                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12474                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12475                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12476
12477                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12478                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12479                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12480                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12481                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12482                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12483                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12484                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12485                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12486                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12487                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12488                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12489
12490                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12491                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12492                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12493                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12494                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12495                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12496                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12497                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12498                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12499                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12500                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12501                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12502                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12503                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12504                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12505                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12506                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12507                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12508                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12509                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12510                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12511                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12512                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12513
12514                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12515                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12516                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12517                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12518                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12519                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12520                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12521
12522                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12523                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12524                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12525                 // lightning messages manually.
12526                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12527                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12528                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12529
12530                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12531                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12532                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12533                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12534                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12535                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12536                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12537                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12538                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12539                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12541                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12542                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12543                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12544                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12545                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12546                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12547                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12548                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12549                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12550                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12551                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12552                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12553                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12554                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12555                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12556
12557                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12558                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12559                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12560                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12561                 match events[0] {
12562                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12563                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12564                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12565                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12566                         },
12567                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12568                 }
12569                 match events[1] {
12570                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12571                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12572                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12573                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12574                         },
12575                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12576                 }
12577         }
12578
12579         #[test]
12580         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12581                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12582                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12583         }
12584
12585         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12586                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12587                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12588                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12589                 //      fails as expected.
12590                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12591                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12592                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12593                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12594                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12595                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12596                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12597                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12598                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12599                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12600                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12601                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12602                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12603                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12604                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12605
12606                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12607                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12608                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12609
12610                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12611                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12612                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12613                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12614                 let route = find_route(
12615                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12616                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12617                 ).unwrap();
12618                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12619                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12620                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12621                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12622                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12623                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12624                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12625                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12626                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12627                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12628                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12629                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12630                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12631                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12632                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12633                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12634                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12635                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12636                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12637                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12638                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12639                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12640                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12641                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12642
12643                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12644                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12645
12646                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12647                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12648                 let route = find_route(
12649                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12650                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12651                 ).unwrap();
12652                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12653                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12654                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12655                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12656                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12657                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12658                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12659                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12660
12661                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12662                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12663                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12664                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12665                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12666                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12667                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12668                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12669                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12670                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12671                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12672                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12673                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12674                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12675                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12676                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12677                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12678                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12679                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12680                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12681                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12682                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12683                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12684                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12685
12686                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12687                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12688
12689                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12690                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12691                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12692                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12693                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12694                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12695                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12696                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12697                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12698                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12699
12700                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12701                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12702                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12703                         100_000
12704                 );
12705                 let route = find_route(
12706                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12707                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12708                 ).unwrap();
12709                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12710                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12711                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12712                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12713                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12714                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12715                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12716                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12717                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12718                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12719                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12720                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12721                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12723                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12724                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12725                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12726                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12727                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12728                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12729                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12730                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12731                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12732
12733                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12734                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12735         }
12736
12737         #[test]
12738         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12739                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12740                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12741                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12742                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12743                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12744                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12745
12746                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12747                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12748
12749                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12750                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12751                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12752                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12753                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12754                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12755                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12756                 let route = find_route(
12757                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12758                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12759                 ).unwrap();
12760
12761                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12762                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12763                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12764                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12765                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12766                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12767                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12768
12769                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12770                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12771                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12772                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12773                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12774                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12775                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12776
12777                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12778         }
12779
12780         #[test]
12781         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12782                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12783                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12784                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12785                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12786                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12787                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12788                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12789                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12790
12791                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12792                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12793
12794                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12795                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12796                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12797                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12798                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12799                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12800                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12801                 let route = find_route(
12802                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12803                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12804                 ).unwrap();
12805
12806                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12807                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12808                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12809                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12810                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12811                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12812                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12813                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12814                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12815
12816                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12817                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12818                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12819                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12820                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12821                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12822                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12823
12824                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12825         }
12826
12827         #[test]
12828         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12829                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12830                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12831                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12832                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12833
12834                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12835                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12836                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12837                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12838
12839                 // Marshall an MPP route.
12840                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12841                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12842                 route.paths.push(path);
12843                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12844                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12845                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12846                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12847                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12848                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12849
12850                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12851                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12852                 .unwrap_err() {
12853                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12854                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12855                         },
12856                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12857                 }
12858         }
12859
12860         #[test]
12861         fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12862                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12863                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12864                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12865                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12866
12867                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12868
12869                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12870                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12871                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12872
12873                 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12874                 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12875                 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12876
12877                 {
12878                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12879                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12880                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12881                 }
12882
12883                 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12884                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12885                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12886
12887                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12888                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12889
12890                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12891                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12892
12893                 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12894                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12895                         features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12896                 }, true).unwrap();
12897                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12898                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12899                 }, false).unwrap();
12900
12901                 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12902                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12903                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12904                 match &node_0_events[0] {
12905                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12906                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12907                 }
12908                 {
12909                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12910                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12911                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12912                 }
12913         }
12914
12915         #[test]
12916         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12917                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12918                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12919                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12920                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12921
12922                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12923
12924                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12925                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12926
12927                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12928                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12929                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12930                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12931
12932                 {
12933                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12934                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12935                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12936                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12937                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12938                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12939                 }
12940
12941                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12942
12943                 {
12944                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12945                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12946                 }
12947         }
12948
12949         #[test]
12950         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12951                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12952                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12953                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12954                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12955                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12956
12957                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12958                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12959                         payment_secret,
12960                         total_msat: 100_000,
12961                 };
12962
12963                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12964                 // payment verification fails as expected.
12965                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12966                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12967                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12968                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12969                         Err(()) => {
12970                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12971                         }
12972                 }
12973
12974                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12975                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12976         }
12977
12978         #[test]
12979         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12980                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12981                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12982                 // the channel is successfully closed.
12983                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12984                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12985                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12986                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12987
12988                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12989                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12990                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12991                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12992                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12993
12994                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12995                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12996                 {
12997                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12998                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12999                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13000                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13001                 }
13002
13003                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13004                 {
13005                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
13006                         // as it has the funding transaction.
13007                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13008                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13009                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13010                 }
13011
13012                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13013
13014                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13015
13016                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13017                 {
13018                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13019                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13020                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13021                 }
13022                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13023
13024                 {
13025                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13026                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13027                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13028                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13029                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13030                 }
13031                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13032                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13033                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13034                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13035                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13036                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13037                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13038                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13039
13040                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13041                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13042                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13043                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13044
13045                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13046                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13047                 {
13048                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13049                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13050                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13051                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13052                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13053                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13054                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13055                 }
13056
13057                 {
13058                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13059                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13060                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13061                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13062                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13063                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13064                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13065                 }
13066
13067                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13068                 {
13069                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13070                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13071                         // closing transaction).
13072                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13073                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13074                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13075
13076                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13077                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13078                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13079                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13080                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13081                 }
13082
13083                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13084
13085                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13086                 {
13087                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13088                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13089                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13090                 }
13091                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13092
13093                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13094                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13095         }
13096
13097         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13098                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13099                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13100         }
13101
13102         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13103                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13104                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13105         }
13106
13107         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13108                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13109                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13110         }
13111
13112         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13113                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13114                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13115         }
13116
13117         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13118                 match res_err {
13119                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13120                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13121                         },
13122                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13123                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13124                         },
13125                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13126                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13127                 }
13128         }
13129
13130         #[test]
13131         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13132                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13133                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13134                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13135                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13136                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13137                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13138                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13139
13140                 // Dummy values
13141                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13142                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13143                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13144
13145                 // Test the API functions.
13146                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13147
13148                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13149
13150                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13151
13152                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13153
13154                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13155
13156                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13157
13158                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13159         }
13160
13161         #[test]
13162         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13163                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13164                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13165                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13166                 // the given `channel_id`.
13167                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13168                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13169                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13170                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13171
13172                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13173
13174                 // Dummy values
13175                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13176
13177                 // Test the API functions.
13178                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13179
13180                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13181
13182                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13183
13184                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13185
13186                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13187
13188                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13189         }
13190
13191         #[test]
13192         fn test_connection_limiting() {
13193                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13194                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13195                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13196                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13197                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13198
13199                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13200
13201                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13202                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13203
13204                 let mut funding_tx = None;
13205                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13206                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13207                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13208
13209                         if idx == 0 {
13210                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13211                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13212                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13213                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13214                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13215
13216                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13217                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13218                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13219
13220                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13221
13222                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13223                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13224                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13225                         }
13226                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13227                 }
13228
13229                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13230                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13231                         &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13232                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13233                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13234                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13235
13236                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13237                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13238                 // limit.
13239                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13240                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13241                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13242                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13243                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13244                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13245                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13246                         }, true).unwrap();
13247                 }
13248                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13249                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13250                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13251                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13252                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13253
13254                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13255                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13256                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13257                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13258                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13259                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13260                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13261                 }
13262                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13263                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13264                 }, true).unwrap();
13265                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13266                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13267                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13268
13269                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13270                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13271                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13272                 }, false).unwrap();
13273                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13274
13275                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13276                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13277                 // open channels.
13278                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13279                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13280                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13281                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13282                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13283                 }
13284                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13285                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13286                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13287
13288                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13289                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13290                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13291
13292                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13293                 // "protected" and can connect again.
13294                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13295                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13296                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13297                 }, true).unwrap();
13298                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13299
13300                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13301                 // last_random_pk.
13302                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13303                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13304         }
13305
13306         #[test]
13307         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13308                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13309                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13310                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13311                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13312                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13313
13314                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13315
13316                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13317                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13318
13319                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13320                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13321                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13322                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13323                 }
13324
13325                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13326                 // rejected.
13327                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13328                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13329                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13330
13331                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13332                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13333                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13334
13335                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13336                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13337                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13338                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13339         }
13340
13341         #[test]
13342         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13343                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13344                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13345                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13346                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13347                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13348                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13349                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13350                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13351
13352                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13353
13354                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13355                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13356
13357                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13358                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13359                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13360                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13361                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13362                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13363                         }, true).unwrap();
13364
13365                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13366                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13367                         match events[0] {
13368                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13369                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13370                                 }
13371                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13372                         }
13373                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13374                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13375                 }
13376
13377                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13378                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13379                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13380                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13381                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13382                 }, true).unwrap();
13383                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13384                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13385                 match events[0] {
13386                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13387                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13388                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13389                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13390                                         _ => panic!(),
13391                                 }
13392                         }
13393                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13394                 }
13395                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13396                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13397
13398                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13399                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13400                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13401                 match events[0] {
13402                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13403                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13404                         }
13405                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13406                 }
13407                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13408         }
13409
13410         #[test]
13411         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13412                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13413                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13414                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13415                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13416                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13417                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13418                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13419                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13420                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13421                         payment_metadata: None,
13422                         keysend_preimage: None,
13423                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13424                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13425                         }),
13426                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13427                 };
13428                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13429                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13430                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13431                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13432                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13433                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13434                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13435                 {
13436                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13437                 } else { panic!(); }
13438
13439                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13440                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13441                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13442                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13443                         payment_metadata: None,
13444                         keysend_preimage: None,
13445                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13446                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13447                         }),
13448                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13449                 };
13450                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13451                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13452                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13453                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13454         }
13455
13456         #[test]
13457         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13458                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13459                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13460                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13461                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13462
13463                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13464                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13465                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13466                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13467                         payment_metadata: None,
13468                         keysend_preimage: None,
13469                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13470                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13471                         }),
13472                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13473                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13474                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13475
13476                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13477                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13478                 // is not satisfied.
13479                 assert!(result.is_ok());
13480         }
13481
13482         #[test]
13483         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13484                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13485                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13486                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13487                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13488
13489                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13490                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13491
13492                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13493                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13494                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13495                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13496                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13497
13498                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13499                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13500
13501                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13502                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13503                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13504                 match &msg_events[0] {
13505                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13506                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13507                                 match action {
13508                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13509                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13510                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13511                                 }
13512                         }
13513                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13514                 }
13515
13516                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13517                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13518                 match events[0] {
13519                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13520                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13521                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13522                 }
13523                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13524         }
13525
13526         #[test]
13527         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13528                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13529                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13530                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13531                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13532                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13533                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13534                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13535                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13536                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13537                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13538
13539                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13540                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13541                 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13542
13543                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13544                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13545                 match events[0] {
13546                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13547                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13548                         }
13549                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13550                 }
13551
13552                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13553                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13554
13555                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13556                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13557
13558                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13559                 // not have generated any events.
13560                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13561         }
13562
13563         #[test]
13564         fn test_update_channel_config() {
13565                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13566                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13567                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13568                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13569                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13570                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13571                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13572
13573                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13574                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13575                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13576
13577                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13578                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13579                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13580                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13581                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13582                 match &events[0] {
13583                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13584                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13585                 }
13586
13587                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13588                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13589                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13590
13591                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13592                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13593                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13594                         ..Default::default()
13595                 }).unwrap();
13596                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13597                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13598                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13599                 match &events[0] {
13600                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13601                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13602                 }
13603
13604                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13605                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13606                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13607                         ..Default::default()
13608                 }).unwrap();
13609                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13610                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13611                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13612                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13613                 match &events[0] {
13614                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13615                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13616                 }
13617
13618                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13619                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13620                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13621                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13622                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13623                 assert!(
13624                         matches!(
13625                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13626                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13627                                         ..Default::default()
13628                                 }),
13629                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13630                         )
13631                 );
13632                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13633                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13634                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13635                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13636         }
13637
13638         #[test]
13639         fn test_payment_display() {
13640                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13641                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13642                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13643                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13644                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13645                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13646         }
13647
13648         #[test]
13649         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13650                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13651                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13652                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13653                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13654                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13655
13656                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13657                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13658                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13659                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13660                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13661                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13662                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13663                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13664                 {
13665                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13666                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13667                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13668                 }
13669
13670                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13671                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13672                 // their side.
13673                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13674                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13675                 }, true).unwrap();
13676                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13677                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13678                 }, false).unwrap();
13679                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13680                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13681                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13682                 );
13683                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13684
13685                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13686                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13687                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13688                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13689                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13690                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13691                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13692                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13693                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13694                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13695                 } else { panic!() };
13696                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13697                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13698                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13699                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13700                 };
13701                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13702                 {
13703                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13704                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13705                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13706                 }
13707         }
13708
13709         #[test]
13710         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13711                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13712                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13713                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13714                 let persister;
13715                 let chain_monitor;
13716                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13717                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13718                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13719
13720                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13721                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13722                 };
13723                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13724                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13725                 };
13726
13727                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13728                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13729                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13730                         } else {
13731                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13732                         }
13733                 }).collect();
13734
13735                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13736                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13737                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13738                         } else {
13739                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13740                         }
13741                 }).collect();
13742
13743
13744                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13745                 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13746                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13747                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13748
13749                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13750                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13751                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13752
13753                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13754
13755                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13756                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13757                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13758                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13759                 }
13760                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13761                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13762
13763                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13764         }
13765 }
13766
13767 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
13768 pub mod bench {
13769         use crate::chain::Listen;
13770         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13771         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13772         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13773         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13774         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13775         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13776         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13777         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13778         use crate::util::test_utils;
13779         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13780
13781         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13782         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13783         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13784         use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13785
13786         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13787
13788         use criterion::Criterion;
13789
13790         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13791                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13792                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13793                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13794                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13795                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13796                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13797
13798         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13799                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13800         }
13801         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13802                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13803                 #[inline]
13804                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13805                 #[inline]
13806                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13807         }
13808
13809         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13810                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13811         }
13812
13813         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13814                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13815                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13816                 // calls per node.
13817                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13818                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13819
13820                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13821                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13822                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13823                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13824                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13825
13826                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13827                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13828                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13829
13830                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13831                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13832                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13833                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13834                         network,
13835                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13836                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13837                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13838
13839                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13840                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13841                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13842                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13843                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13844                         network,
13845                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13846                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13847                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13848
13849                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13850                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13851                 }, true).unwrap();
13852                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13853                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13854                 }, false).unwrap();
13855                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13856                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13857                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13858
13859                 let tx;
13860                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13861                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13862                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13863                         }]};
13864                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13865                 } else { panic!(); }
13866
13867                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13868                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13869                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13870                 match events_b[0] {
13871                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13872                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13873                         },
13874                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13875                 }
13876
13877                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13878                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13879                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13880                 match events_a[0] {
13881                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13882                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13883                         },
13884                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13885                 }
13886
13887                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13888
13889                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13890                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13891                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13892
13893                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13894                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13895                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13896                 match msg_events[0] {
13897                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13898                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13899                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13900                         },
13901                         _ => panic!(),
13902                 }
13903                 match msg_events[1] {
13904                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13905                         _ => panic!(),
13906                 }
13907
13908                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13909                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13910                 match events_a[0] {
13911                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13912                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13913                         },
13914                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13915                 }
13916
13917                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13918                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13919                 match events_b[0] {
13920                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13921                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13922                         },
13923                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13924                 }
13925
13926                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13927                 macro_rules! send_payment {
13928                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13929                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13930                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13931                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13932                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13933                                 payment_count += 1;
13934                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13935                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13936
13937                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13938                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13939                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13940                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13941                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13942                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13943                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13944                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13945                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13946                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13947                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13948
13949                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13950                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13951                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13952                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13953
13954                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13955                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13956                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13957                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13958                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13959                                         },
13960                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13961                                 }
13962
13963                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13964                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13965                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13966                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13967
13968                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13969                         }
13970                 }
13971
13972                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13973                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13974                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
13975                 }));
13976         }
13977 }