1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
50 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
52 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
53 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
58 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
62 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
63 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
64 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
65 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
68 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
69 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
70 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
71 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
72 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
73 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
74 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
75 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
76 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
77 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
78 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
79 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
81 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
83 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
84 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
85 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
86 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
87 crate::sign::KeysManager,
91 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
95 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
98 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::cell::RefCell;
102 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
103 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
104 use core::time::Duration;
105 use core::ops::Deref;
107 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
108 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
109 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
111 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
113 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
114 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
115 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
117 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
118 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
119 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
120 // before we forward it.
122 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
123 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
124 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
125 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
126 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
128 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
131 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
132 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
134 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
135 /// do with the HTLC.
136 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
137 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
139 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
140 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
141 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
142 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
143 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
144 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
146 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
148 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
149 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
151 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
152 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
153 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
154 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
155 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
157 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
159 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
160 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
161 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
162 /// blinded path was not used.
164 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
165 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
166 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
168 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
169 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
170 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
171 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
173 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
176 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
177 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
179 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
180 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
181 requires_blinded_error: bool,
183 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
184 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
185 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
187 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
188 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
190 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
191 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
192 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
194 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
195 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
196 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
198 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
199 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
200 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
201 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
203 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
204 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
205 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
207 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
208 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
209 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
210 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
211 requires_blinded_error: bool,
215 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
216 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
217 pub struct BlindedForward {
218 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
219 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
220 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
221 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
222 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
223 /// the introduction node.
224 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
227 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
228 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
229 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
231 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
232 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
233 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
239 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
243 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
244 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
245 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
246 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
248 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
249 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
250 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
251 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
252 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
254 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
256 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
257 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
258 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
260 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
261 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
262 /// it along another path).
264 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
265 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
266 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
267 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
268 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
269 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
270 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
271 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
272 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
274 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
277 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
279 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
281 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
286 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
287 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
290 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
291 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
292 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
293 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
294 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
297 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
298 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
299 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
301 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
302 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
303 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
306 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
307 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
309 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
310 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
311 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
314 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
315 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
316 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
319 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
324 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
328 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
329 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
331 pub enum BlindedFailure {
332 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
333 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334 FromIntroductionNode,
335 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
336 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
343 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
344 short_channel_id: u64,
345 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
348 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
349 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
350 channel_id: ChannelId,
352 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
353 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
358 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
360 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
361 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
362 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
364 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
365 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
369 struct ClaimableHTLC {
370 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
372 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
374 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
375 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
376 sender_intended_value: u64,
377 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
379 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
380 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
381 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
382 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
384 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
389 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
390 events::ClaimedHTLC {
391 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
392 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
393 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
394 value_msat: val.value,
395 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
400 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
401 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
403 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
404 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
405 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408 /// Number of bytes in the id.
409 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
418 impl Readable for PaymentId {
419 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
420 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
425 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
426 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
427 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
431 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
433 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
434 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
435 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
437 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
443 impl Readable for InterceptId {
444 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
445 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
450 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
451 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
452 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
453 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
454 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
459 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
460 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
461 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
463 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
464 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
469 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
470 (0, short_channel_id, required),
471 (2, htlc_id, required),
473 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
474 (0, session_priv, required),
479 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
480 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
483 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486 session_priv: SecretKey,
487 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
488 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
489 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
490 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
494 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
495 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
497 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
499 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
505 payment_id.hash(hasher);
506 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
512 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
514 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
515 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
516 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
517 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
518 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
519 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
524 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
525 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
526 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
527 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
528 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
530 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
536 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
537 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
539 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
540 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
541 pub enum FailureCode {
542 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
543 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
544 TemporaryNodeFailure,
545 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
546 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
547 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
548 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
549 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
550 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
551 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
552 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
553 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
554 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
556 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
557 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
558 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
562 fn into(self) -> u16 {
564 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
565 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
566 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
567 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
572 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
573 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
574 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
575 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
576 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
578 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
579 err: msgs::LightningError,
580 closes_channel: bool,
581 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
583 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
585 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
587 err: LightningError {
589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
590 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
596 closes_channel: false,
597 shutdown_finish: None,
601 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
602 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
606 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
607 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
608 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
609 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
610 // commitment upon reconnecting.
611 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
613 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616 err: LightningError { err, action },
617 closes_channel: true,
618 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
622 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
628 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
632 log_level: Level::Warn,
635 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
639 ChannelError::Close((msg, _reason)) => LightningError {
641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
649 closes_channel: false,
650 shutdown_finish: None,
654 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
659 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
660 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
661 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
662 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
663 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
665 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
666 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
667 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
668 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
669 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
670 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
671 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
673 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
677 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
678 struct ClaimingPayment {
680 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
681 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
682 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
683 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
684 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
687 (0, amount_msat, required),
688 (2, payment_purpose, required),
689 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
690 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
691 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
692 (9, onion_fields, option),
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704 /// failed/claimed by the user.
706 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
709 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
713 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
730 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731 /// are regenerated on startup.
732 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734 /// channel to continue normal operation.
736 /// In general this should be used rather than
737 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
741 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742 /// are regenerated on startup.
743 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
749 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
752 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754 channel_id: ChannelId,
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763 /// event can be generated.
764 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766 /// operation of another channel.
768 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
773 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774 event: events::Event,
775 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
777 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
781 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
787 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788 /// stored for later processing.
789 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804 (4, blocking_action, required),
805 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
809 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815 // downgrades to prior versions.
816 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
845 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847 channel_id: ChannelId,
848 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
871 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
875 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881 latest_features: InitFeatures,
882 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886 /// user but which have not yet completed.
888 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890 /// for a missing channel.
891 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
895 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
900 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915 pub is_connected: bool,
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
926 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
928 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
931 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
936 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
940 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
945 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955 /// The original OpenChannel message.
956 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
965 /// The number of blocks of historical feerate estimates we keep around and consider when deciding
966 /// to force-close a channel for having too-low fees. Also the number of blocks we have to see
967 /// after startup before we consider force-closing channels for having too-low fees.
968 pub(super) const FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS: usize = 144;
970 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
971 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
973 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
976 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
977 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
978 struct PendingInboundPayment {
979 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
980 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
981 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
982 /// this payment being removed.
984 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
985 user_payment_id: u64,
986 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
987 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
988 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
991 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
992 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
993 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
994 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
995 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
996 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
997 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
998 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1000 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1001 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1002 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1010 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1013 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1014 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1015 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1020 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1021 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1022 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1023 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1024 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1025 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1026 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1027 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1028 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1030 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1031 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1032 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1041 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1044 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1045 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1046 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1051 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1053 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1055 pub trait AChannelManager {
1056 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1057 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1058 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1059 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1060 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1061 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1063 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1065 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1067 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1069 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1071 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1073 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1074 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1075 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1076 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1077 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1078 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1079 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1080 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1081 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1082 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1083 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1084 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1085 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1086 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1087 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1088 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1089 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1090 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1091 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1094 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1095 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1097 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1099 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1100 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1101 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1106 type Watch = M::Target;
1108 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1110 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1112 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1114 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1115 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1117 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1119 type Router = R::Target;
1121 type Logger = L::Target;
1123 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1126 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1127 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1129 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1130 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1132 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1133 /// closing channels
1134 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1135 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1136 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1137 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1139 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1140 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1142 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1143 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1144 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1145 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1146 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1147 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1149 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1150 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1152 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1154 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1155 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1156 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1157 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1158 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1160 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1161 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1162 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1164 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1165 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1166 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1168 /// # Initialization
1170 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1171 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1172 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1173 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1174 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1177 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1178 /// use bitcoin::network::Network;
1179 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1180 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1181 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1182 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1183 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1184 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1186 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1189 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1190 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1191 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1192 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1194 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1196 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1197 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1198 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1199 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1201 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1202 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1203 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1204 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1205 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1206 /// # mut reader: R,
1207 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1208 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1209 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1210 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1213 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1214 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1215 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1216 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1219 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1220 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1221 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1222 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1223 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1225 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1226 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1228 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1231 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1232 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1233 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1241 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1242 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1243 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1244 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1245 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1246 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1247 /// as documented by those traits
1248 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1250 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1251 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1252 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1254 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1255 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1257 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1258 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1259 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1260 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1264 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1265 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1266 /// currently open channels.
1269 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1271 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1272 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1273 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1274 /// for details in channels {
1275 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1280 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1281 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1282 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1283 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1285 /// ## Opening Channels
1287 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1288 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1289 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1292 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1293 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1294 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1295 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1297 /// # trait Wallet {
1298 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1299 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1300 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1303 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1304 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1305 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1306 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1307 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1308 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1309 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1312 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1313 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1314 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1315 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1316 /// user_channel_id, ..
1318 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1319 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1320 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1322 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1323 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1325 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1326 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1329 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1330 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1332 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1333 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1336 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1337 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1338 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1346 /// ## Accepting Channels
1348 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1349 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1350 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1353 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1354 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1355 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1357 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1359 /// # unimplemented!()
1362 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1363 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1364 /// # let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
1365 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1366 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1367 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1368 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1369 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()
1371 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1372 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1377 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1378 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1379 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1381 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1382 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1391 /// ## Closing Channels
1393 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1394 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1395 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1396 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1397 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1400 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1401 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1402 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1403 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1405 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1406 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1408 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1409 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1410 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1411 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1414 /// // On the event processing thread
1415 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1416 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1417 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1418 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1428 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1429 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1430 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1431 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1432 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1435 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1436 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1437 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1438 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1440 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1442 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1443 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1444 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1445 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1446 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1447 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1449 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1450 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1451 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1454 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1455 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1457 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1458 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1459 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1460 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1461 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1463 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1464 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1467 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1470 /// // On the event processing thread
1471 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1472 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1473 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1474 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1475 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1476 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1478 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1479 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1481 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1482 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1483 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1484 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1489 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1490 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1491 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1499 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1500 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1503 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1504 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1505 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1506 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1508 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1509 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1510 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1512 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1513 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1514 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1515 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1516 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1517 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1519 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1520 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1523 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1524 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1526 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1528 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1529 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1530 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1536 /// // On the event processing thread
1537 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1538 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1539 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1546 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1548 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1549 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1550 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1551 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1552 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1553 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1556 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1557 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1558 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1560 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1561 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1562 /// # let absolute_expiry = None;
1563 /// let offer = channel_manager
1564 /// .create_offer_builder(absolute_expiry)?
1566 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1567 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1568 /// # let offer = builder
1569 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1570 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1572 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1574 /// // On the event processing thread
1575 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1576 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1577 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1578 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1579 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1581 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1582 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1587 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1588 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1597 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1598 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1599 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1602 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1603 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1604 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1606 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1607 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1608 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1610 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1611 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1612 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1613 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1615 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1616 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1619 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1620 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1622 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1624 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1628 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1630 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1632 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1636 /// // On the event processing thread
1637 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1638 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1639 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1640 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1647 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1649 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1650 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1651 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1652 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1655 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1656 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1657 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1658 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1660 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1661 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1662 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1663 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1664 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1665 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1666 /// let refund = channel_manager
1667 /// .create_refund_builder(
1668 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1671 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1672 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1673 /// # let refund = builder
1674 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1675 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1677 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1679 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1680 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1682 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1684 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1688 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1690 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1692 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1696 /// // On the event processing thread
1697 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1698 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1699 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1707 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1708 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1711 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1712 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1713 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1715 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1716 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1717 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1718 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1719 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1720 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1723 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1726 /// // On the event processing thread
1727 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1728 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1729 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1730 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1731 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1732 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1734 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1735 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1740 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1741 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1742 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1752 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1753 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1754 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1755 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1757 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1758 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1759 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1760 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1761 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1762 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1763 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1764 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1765 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1767 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1768 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1769 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1771 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1773 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1774 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1775 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1776 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1777 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1779 /// # DoS Mitigation
1781 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1782 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1783 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1784 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1786 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1787 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1788 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1792 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1793 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1794 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1795 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1796 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1798 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1799 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1800 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1801 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1802 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1803 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1804 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1805 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1806 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1807 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1808 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1809 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1810 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1811 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1812 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1813 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1814 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1815 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1816 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1817 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1818 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1819 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1820 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1821 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1822 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1823 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1824 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1825 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1826 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1827 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1828 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1829 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1830 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1831 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1832 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1833 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1834 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1835 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1836 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1837 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1840 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1841 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1842 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1843 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1844 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1848 // `pending_offers_messages`
1850 // `total_consistency_lock`
1852 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1854 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1856 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1858 // |__`per_peer_state`
1860 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1862 // |__`claimable_payments`
1864 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1868 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1870 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1872 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1876 // |__`pending_events`
1878 // |__`pending_background_events`
1880 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1882 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1883 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1884 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1885 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1886 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1891 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1892 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1893 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1899 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1901 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1903 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1904 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1906 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1907 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1908 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1909 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1911 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1912 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1914 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1915 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1916 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1917 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1918 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1919 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1920 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1921 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1923 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1925 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1926 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1928 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1930 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1931 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1932 /// and via the classic SCID.
1934 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1935 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1937 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1939 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1941 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1942 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1943 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1945 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1946 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1948 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1950 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1951 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1952 /// and via the classic SCID.
1954 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1955 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1957 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1958 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1960 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1961 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1964 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1966 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1967 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1968 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1969 /// active channel list on load.
1971 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1972 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1974 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1976 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1977 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1978 /// the handling of the events.
1980 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1981 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1984 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1985 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1986 /// would break backwards compatability.
1987 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1988 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1989 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1991 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1993 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1995 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1997 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1999 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
2000 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
2001 /// confirmation depth.
2003 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
2004 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
2005 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2009 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2011 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2013 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2015 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2017 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2018 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2019 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2021 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2022 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2024 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2025 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2026 /// keeping additional state.
2027 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2029 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2030 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2031 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2032 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2034 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2035 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2037 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2038 /// are currently open with that peer.
2040 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2041 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2044 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2046 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2047 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2048 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2049 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2050 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2052 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2053 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2054 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2055 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2056 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2058 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2059 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2061 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2062 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2063 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2064 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2065 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2067 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2068 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2070 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2071 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2072 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2073 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2074 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2076 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2078 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2080 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2081 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2082 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2083 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2084 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2085 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2086 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2087 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2088 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2089 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2090 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2092 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2093 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2094 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2096 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2098 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2099 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2101 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2103 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2104 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2106 /// We only want to force-close our channels on peers based on stale feerates when we're
2107 /// confident the feerate on the channel is *really* stale, not just became stale recently.
2108 /// Thus, we store the fee estimates we had as of the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks
2109 /// (after startup completed) here, and only force-close when channels have a lower feerate
2110 /// than we predicted any time in the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks.
2112 /// We only keep this in memory as we assume any feerates we receive immediately after startup
2113 /// may be bunk (as they often are if Bitcoin Core crashes) and want to delay taking any
2114 /// actions for a day anyway.
2116 /// The first element in the pair is the
2117 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate, the second the
2118 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate.
2119 last_days_feerates: Mutex<VecDeque<(u32, u32)>>,
2123 signer_provider: SP,
2128 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2130 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2131 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2132 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2133 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2134 pub struct ChainParameters {
2135 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2136 pub network: Network,
2138 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2140 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2141 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2144 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2148 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2149 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2152 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2153 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2154 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2155 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2156 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2157 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2159 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2160 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2161 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2162 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2163 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2164 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2166 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2167 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2170 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2171 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2172 /// events to handle.
2174 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2175 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2177 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2178 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2181 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2182 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2183 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2184 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2186 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2187 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2188 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2189 should_persist: move || {
2190 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2191 // processing and return that.
2192 let notify = persist_check();
2193 match (notify, force_notify) {
2194 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2195 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2196 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2197 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2198 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2201 _read_guard: read_guard,
2205 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2206 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2207 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2208 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2209 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2210 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2212 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2213 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2214 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2215 should_persist: persist_check,
2216 _read_guard: read_guard,
2221 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2222 fn drop(&mut self) {
2223 match (self.should_persist)() {
2224 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2225 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2226 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2228 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2229 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2230 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2235 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2236 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2238 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2240 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2241 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2242 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2243 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2244 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2246 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2247 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2249 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2251 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2252 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2253 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2254 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2255 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2256 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2257 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2258 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2259 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2260 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2261 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2262 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2263 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2265 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2266 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2268 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2269 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2270 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2271 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2273 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2274 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2275 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2276 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2277 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2278 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2280 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2282 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2283 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2285 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2287 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2288 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2290 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2291 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2292 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2294 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2295 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2296 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2298 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2299 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2300 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2301 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2303 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2304 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2305 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2307 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2308 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2309 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2311 /// The maximum expiration from the current time where an [`Offer`] or [`Refund`] is considered
2312 /// short-lived, while anything with a greater expiration is considered long-lived.
2314 /// Using [`ChannelManager::create_offer_builder`] or [`ChannelManager::create_refund_builder`],
2315 /// will included a [`BlindedPath`] created using:
2316 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`] when short-lived, and
2317 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] when long-lived.
2319 /// Using compact [`BlindedPath`]s may provide better privacy as the [`MessageRouter`] could select
2320 /// more hops. However, since they use short channel ids instead of pubkeys, they are more likely to
2321 /// become invalid over time as channels are closed. Thus, they are only suitable for short-term use.
2322 pub const MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60 * 24);
2324 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2325 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2326 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2327 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2328 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2330 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2331 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2332 payment_id: PaymentId,
2334 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2336 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2337 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2338 payment_id: PaymentId,
2339 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2341 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2342 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2343 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2346 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2347 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2348 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2350 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2351 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2352 payment_id: PaymentId,
2353 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2354 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2355 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2357 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2358 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2359 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2361 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2362 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2363 payment_id: PaymentId,
2364 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2365 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2369 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2371 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2373 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2374 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2375 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2376 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2378 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2379 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2380 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2383 macro_rules! handle_error {
2384 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2385 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2386 // entering the macro.
2387 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2388 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2392 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2393 let mut msg_event = None;
2395 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2396 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2397 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2398 let logger = WithContext::from(
2399 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2401 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2403 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2404 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2405 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2406 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2411 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2414 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2416 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2417 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2418 action: err.action.clone()
2422 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2423 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2424 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2425 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2426 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2430 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2437 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2438 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2439 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2440 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2442 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2443 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2444 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2446 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2447 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2448 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2449 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2450 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2452 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2453 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2455 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2459 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2460 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2463 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2464 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2466 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2467 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2469 ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) => {
2470 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2471 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2472 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2473 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2475 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2480 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2481 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2483 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2484 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2486 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2487 match $channel_phase {
2488 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2489 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2491 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2492 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2494 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2495 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2497 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2498 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2499 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2501 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2502 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2503 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2509 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2510 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2514 let key = *$entry.key();
2515 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2517 $entry.remove_entry();
2525 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2526 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2530 let key = *$entry.key();
2531 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2533 $entry.remove_entry();
2541 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2542 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2544 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2545 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2551 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2552 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2553 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2554 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2555 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2557 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2558 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2559 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2560 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2561 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2562 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2563 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2564 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2565 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2566 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2571 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2572 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2573 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2574 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2575 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2576 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2577 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2578 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2579 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2580 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2582 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2587 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2588 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2589 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2590 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2591 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2592 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2593 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2594 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2595 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2597 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2602 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2603 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2604 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2605 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2606 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2607 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2608 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2609 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2610 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2611 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2612 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2613 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2615 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2616 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2617 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2623 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2624 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2626 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2627 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2628 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2629 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2630 updates.announcement_sigs);
2631 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2632 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2635 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2636 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2637 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2638 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2640 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2641 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2642 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2643 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2644 let mut batch_completed = false;
2645 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2646 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2647 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2648 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2650 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2651 channel_state.2 = true;
2653 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2655 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2657 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2660 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2661 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2662 if batch_completed {
2663 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2664 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2665 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2666 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2667 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2668 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2669 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2670 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2671 chan.set_batch_ready();
2672 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2673 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2677 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2678 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2679 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2684 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2686 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2687 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2689 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2690 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2692 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2693 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2694 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2695 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2700 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2701 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2702 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2703 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2705 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2706 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2707 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2708 panic!("{}", err_str);
2710 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2711 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2712 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2715 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2721 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2722 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2723 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2725 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2726 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2727 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2728 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2729 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2730 // filter for uniqueness here.
2731 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2732 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2733 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2734 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2736 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2737 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2739 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2740 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2741 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2747 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2748 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2749 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2750 while !processed_all_events {
2751 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2758 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2759 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2760 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2762 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2763 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2764 result = $self.process_background_events();
2766 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2767 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2768 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2769 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2773 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2774 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2775 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2779 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2781 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2782 $event_to_handle = event;
2784 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2785 post_event_actions.push(action);
2790 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2791 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2792 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2793 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2794 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2795 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2798 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2799 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2800 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2801 processed_all_events = false;
2805 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2806 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2807 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2809 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2810 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2811 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2817 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2819 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2820 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2821 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2822 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2823 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2828 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2830 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2832 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2833 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2835 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2837 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2838 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2839 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2842 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2843 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2844 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2846 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2847 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2848 current_timestamp: u32,
2850 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2851 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2852 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2853 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2855 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2856 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2857 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2862 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2864 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2865 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2866 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2867 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2868 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2869 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2870 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2871 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2872 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2874 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2877 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2878 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2880 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2882 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2884 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2886 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2887 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2888 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2889 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2890 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2891 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2892 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2893 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2895 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2896 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2898 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2908 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2909 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2910 &self.default_configuration
2913 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2914 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2915 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2918 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2919 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2921 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2923 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2927 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2932 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2934 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2935 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2936 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2937 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2938 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2940 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2941 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2943 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2944 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2945 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2947 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2948 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2949 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2951 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2952 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2954 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2955 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2956 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2957 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2958 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2959 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2961 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2962 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2963 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2964 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2965 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2970 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2971 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2975 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2976 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2978 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2980 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2981 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2987 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2988 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2989 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2990 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2991 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2992 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2996 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3001 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3003 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3004 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3009 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3016 node_id: their_network_key,
3019 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3022 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3023 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3024 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3025 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3026 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3027 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3028 // the same channel.
3029 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3031 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3033 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3036 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3037 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3038 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3039 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3043 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3044 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3045 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3053 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3054 /// more information.
3055 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3056 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3057 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3058 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3059 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3060 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3061 // the same channel.
3062 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3064 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3066 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3067 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3068 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3069 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3070 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3071 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3079 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3080 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3082 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3083 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3085 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3086 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3087 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3088 // really wanted anyway.
3089 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3092 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3093 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3094 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3097 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3100 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3101 let context_to_details = |context| {
3102 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3104 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3106 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3107 .map(context_to_details)
3113 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3114 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3116 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3117 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3118 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3120 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3121 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3122 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3123 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3124 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3125 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3127 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3128 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3129 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3131 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3132 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3133 payment_id: *payment_id,
3134 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3135 total_msat: *total_msat,
3138 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3139 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3141 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3142 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3144 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3149 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3152 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3153 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3156 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3158 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3159 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3164 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3166 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3167 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3168 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3169 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3170 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3171 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3173 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3174 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3175 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3177 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3181 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3182 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3184 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3185 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3186 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3187 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3190 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3191 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
3194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3195 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3197 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3198 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3205 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3206 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3207 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3211 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3212 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3218 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3219 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3220 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3222 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3223 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3225 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3226 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3227 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3228 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3230 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3232 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3233 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3234 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3237 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3238 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3239 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3240 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3241 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3242 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3245 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3246 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3247 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3249 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3250 /// the channel being closed or not:
3251 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3252 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3253 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3254 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3255 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3256 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3257 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3259 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3260 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3261 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3262 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3264 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3266 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3267 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3268 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3271 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3272 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3273 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3274 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3275 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3278 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3279 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3280 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3281 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3282 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3285 let logger = WithContext::from(
3286 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3289 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3290 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3291 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3292 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3293 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3294 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3297 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3298 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3299 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3300 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3301 // ignore the result here.
3302 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3304 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3305 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3306 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3307 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3309 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3310 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3311 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3312 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3313 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3314 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3315 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3318 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3321 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3322 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3327 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3328 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3329 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3330 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3331 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3332 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3333 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3334 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3337 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3338 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3339 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3343 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3344 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3348 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3349 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3350 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3351 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3353 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3354 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3355 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3356 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3357 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3358 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3360 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(broadcast) }
3362 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3363 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3364 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3365 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3366 mem::drop(peer_state);
3367 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3369 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3370 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3371 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3373 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3374 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3375 // Unfunded channel has no update
3376 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3378 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3379 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3380 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3381 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3382 // Unfunded channel has no update
3383 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3386 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3387 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3388 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3389 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3391 (None, *peer_node_id)
3393 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3396 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3397 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3398 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3399 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3404 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3407 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool, error_message: String)
3408 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3410 log_debug!(self.logger,
3411 "Force-closing channel, The error message sent to the peer : {}", error_message);
3412 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3413 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3415 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3416 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3417 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3418 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3419 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: error_message }
3432 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s),
3433 /// rejecting new HTLCs.
3435 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing
3436 /// channels and should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3438 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id`
3439 /// isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3440 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3441 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3442 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, error_message)
3445 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3446 /// the latest local transaction(s).
3448 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3449 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3451 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3452 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3453 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3454 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3455 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3456 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3457 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, error_message)
3460 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3461 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3463 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3464 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3465 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3466 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3467 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3471 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3472 /// local transaction(s).
3474 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and
3475 /// should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3476 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3477 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3478 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3482 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3483 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3484 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3485 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3486 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3487 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3488 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3489 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3491 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3492 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3493 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3494 // we don't have the channel here.
3495 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3498 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3499 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3500 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3501 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3502 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3503 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3504 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3505 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3506 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3507 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3508 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.channel_flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3509 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3511 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3514 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3515 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3516 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3518 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3519 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3520 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3526 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3527 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3528 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3529 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3531 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3532 None => return None,
3533 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3536 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3537 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3542 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3543 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3546 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3550 fn can_forward_htlc(
3551 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3552 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3553 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3554 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3557 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3559 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3560 // intercept forward.
3561 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3562 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3563 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3565 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3570 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3571 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3572 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3574 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3575 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3577 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3583 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3584 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3585 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3586 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3587 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3588 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3589 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3590 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3591 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3592 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3594 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3595 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3597 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3598 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3599 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3601 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3602 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3603 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3604 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3605 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3606 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3607 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3609 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3613 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3614 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3616 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3617 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3618 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3619 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3620 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3621 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3622 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3626 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3627 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3629 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3631 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3632 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3633 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3634 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3635 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3639 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3640 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3642 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3644 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3645 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3648 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3649 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3650 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3651 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3654 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3655 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3656 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3657 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3658 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3659 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3660 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3664 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3667 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3668 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3669 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3670 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3671 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3672 macro_rules! return_err {
3673 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3675 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3676 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3677 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3678 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3679 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3680 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3681 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3682 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3683 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3687 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3688 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3689 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3690 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3691 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3697 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3699 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3700 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3701 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3702 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3705 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3706 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3707 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3708 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3709 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3711 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3714 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3715 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3716 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3717 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3718 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3724 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3725 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3726 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3728 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3729 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3730 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3732 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3733 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3734 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3735 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3736 return Err(LightningError {
3737 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3738 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3741 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3742 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3744 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3745 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3746 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3749 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3750 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3751 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3752 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3754 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3755 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3756 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3758 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3759 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3760 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3761 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3762 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3763 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3764 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3768 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3771 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3772 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3773 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3774 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3776 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3777 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3778 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3779 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3780 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3783 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3784 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3786 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3787 message_flags: 1, // Only must_be_one
3788 channel_flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3789 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3790 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3791 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3792 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3793 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3794 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3796 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3797 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3798 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3800 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3802 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3809 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3810 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3811 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3812 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
3813 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
3817 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3818 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3819 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3822 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3823 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3824 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3825 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3827 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3828 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3829 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3831 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3832 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3836 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3837 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3839 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3840 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3841 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3843 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3846 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
3848 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3849 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3852 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3853 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3856 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3857 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3858 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3859 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3860 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3862 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3863 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
3864 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3865 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3867 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3868 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3870 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3871 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3872 Some(monitor_update) => {
3873 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3875 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3876 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3877 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3878 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3879 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3880 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3881 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3889 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3892 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3893 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3894 // `channel_by_id` map.
3895 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3896 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3900 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3901 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3903 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3908 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3910 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3911 /// fields for more info.
3913 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3914 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3916 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3918 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3919 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3920 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3921 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3922 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3924 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3925 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3926 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3927 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3928 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3930 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3931 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3932 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3933 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3935 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3937 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3938 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3939 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3941 /// In general, a path may raise:
3942 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3943 /// node public key) is specified.
3944 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3945 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3946 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3947 /// relevant updates.
3949 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3950 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3951 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3953 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3954 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3955 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3956 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3957 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3958 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3959 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3960 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3962 self.pending_outbound_payments
3963 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3964 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3965 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3968 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3969 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3970 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3971 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3973 self.pending_outbound_payments
3974 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3975 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3976 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3977 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3981 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3982 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3984 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3985 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3986 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3990 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3991 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3992 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3996 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3997 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4000 /// Pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] associated with the `payment_id` encoded in its `payer_metadata`.
4002 /// The invoice's `payer_metadata` is used to authenticate that the invoice was indeed requested
4003 /// before attempting a payment. [`Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice`] is returned if this
4004 /// fails or if the encoded `payment_id` is not recognized. The latter may happen once the
4005 /// payment is no longer tracked because the payment was attempted after:
4006 /// - an invoice for the `payment_id` was already paid,
4007 /// - one full [timer tick] has elapsed since initially requesting the invoice when paying an
4009 /// - the refund corresponding to the invoice has already expired.
4011 /// To retry the payment, request another invoice using a new `payment_id`.
4013 /// Attempting to pay the same invoice twice while the first payment is still pending will
4014 /// result in a [`Bolt12PaymentError::DuplicateInvoice`].
4016 /// Otherwise, either [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] are used to indicate
4017 /// whether or not the payment was successful.
4019 /// [timer tick]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
4020 pub fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4021 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
4022 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
4023 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
4024 Ok(payment_id) => self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(invoice, payment_id),
4025 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice),
4029 fn send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4030 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4032 self.pending_outbound_payments
4033 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4034 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4035 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, &self,
4036 &self.secp_ctx, best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4037 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4041 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4042 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4043 /// retries are exhausted.
4045 /// # Event Generation
4047 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4048 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4050 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4051 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4052 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4054 /// # Requested Invoices
4056 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4057 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4058 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4059 /// once the invoice has been received.
4061 /// # Restart Behavior
4063 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4064 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4065 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4067 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4068 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4070 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4073 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4074 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4075 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4076 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4077 /// never reach the recipient.
4079 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4080 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4082 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4083 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4085 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4086 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4087 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4088 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4089 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4090 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4091 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4094 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4095 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4097 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4100 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4101 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4102 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4103 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4104 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4105 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4106 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4107 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4110 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4111 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4112 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4113 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4114 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4116 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4117 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4118 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4121 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4124 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4125 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4128 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4129 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4131 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4132 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4133 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4134 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4135 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4136 let payment_params =
4137 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4139 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4141 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4144 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4145 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4147 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4148 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4149 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4150 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4152 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4153 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4154 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4155 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4156 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4157 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4158 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4159 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4160 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4161 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4163 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4164 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4165 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4166 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4170 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4172 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4173 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4176 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4178 let mut res = Vec::new();
4180 for mut path in route.paths {
4181 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4182 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4183 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4184 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4185 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4188 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4191 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4192 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4194 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4196 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4197 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4202 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4205 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4210 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4211 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4212 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4214 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4215 let used_liquidity =
4216 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4218 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4219 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4221 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4224 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4229 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4230 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4231 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4238 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4239 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4240 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4241 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4242 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4243 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4245 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4246 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4248 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4249 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4251 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4252 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4253 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4255 let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
4256 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4257 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4258 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4259 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4260 } else { unreachable!(); };
4262 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4263 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4264 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4267 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4268 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4270 let chan_err = ChannelError::close(err.to_owned());
4271 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4272 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4276 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4277 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4279 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4280 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4281 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4282 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4287 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4288 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4290 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4291 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4294 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4295 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4296 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4300 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4301 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4302 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4306 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4308 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4311 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4312 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4316 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4317 funding_txo, o.get()
4319 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4320 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4321 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4322 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4323 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4324 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4327 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4334 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4335 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4336 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4340 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4342 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4343 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4345 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4346 /// across the p2p network.
4348 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4349 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4351 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4352 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4353 /// keys per-channel).
4355 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4356 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4357 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4359 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4360 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4361 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4363 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4364 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4365 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4366 /// for more details.
4368 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4369 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4370 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4371 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4374 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4376 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4377 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4379 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4380 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4381 /// signature for each channel.
4383 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4384 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4386 let mut result = Ok(());
4388 if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
4389 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4390 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4391 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4392 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4397 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4398 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4399 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4403 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4404 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4405 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4406 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4407 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4408 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4409 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4410 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4412 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4413 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4418 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4419 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4420 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4421 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4425 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4426 match states.entry(txid) {
4427 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4428 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4429 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4433 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4436 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4437 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4438 temporary_channel_id,
4439 counterparty_node_id,
4440 funding_transaction.clone(),
4443 let mut output_index = None;
4444 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
4445 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4446 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4447 if output_index.is_some() {
4448 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4450 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4453 if output_index.is_none() {
4454 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4456 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4457 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4458 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4459 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4460 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4461 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4467 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4468 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4469 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4470 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4471 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4472 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4473 .into_iter().flatten()
4474 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4476 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4477 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4479 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4482 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4483 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4484 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4485 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4486 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4487 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4488 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4489 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4490 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4491 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4492 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4493 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4495 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4502 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4503 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4504 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4510 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4512 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4513 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4514 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4515 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4517 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4518 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4520 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4521 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4523 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4525 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4526 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4527 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4528 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4529 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4530 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4531 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4532 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4533 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4534 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4535 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4536 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4537 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4543 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4544 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4545 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4546 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4548 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4549 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4550 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4551 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4555 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4556 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4557 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4558 config.apply(config_update);
4559 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4562 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4563 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4564 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4565 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4566 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4568 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4575 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4576 debug_assert!(false);
4577 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4579 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4580 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4587 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4589 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4590 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4591 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4592 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4594 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4595 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4597 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4598 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4600 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4602 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4603 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4604 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4605 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4606 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4607 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4608 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4609 pub fn update_channel_config(
4610 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4611 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4612 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4615 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4616 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4618 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4619 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4621 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4622 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4623 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4624 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4625 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4627 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4628 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4629 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4632 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4635 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4636 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4637 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4638 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4639 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4640 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4643 let next_hop_scid = {
4644 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4645 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4646 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4647 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4648 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4649 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4650 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4651 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4652 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4653 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4656 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4658 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4659 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4660 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4663 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4664 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4665 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4666 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4667 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4674 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4675 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4676 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4679 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4680 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4681 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4682 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4685 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4687 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4688 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4689 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4690 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4691 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4694 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4695 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4696 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4697 payment.prev_channel_id,
4698 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4699 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4701 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4705 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4706 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4708 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4711 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4712 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4715 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4716 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4717 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4720 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4721 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4722 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4723 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4724 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4725 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4726 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4727 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4728 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4729 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4732 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4733 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4735 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4740 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4741 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4742 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4744 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4745 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4746 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4747 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4748 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4749 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4750 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4752 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4753 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4757 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4761 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4762 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4763 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4764 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4765 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4766 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4767 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4768 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4771 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4772 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4773 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4774 incoming_channel_details
4776 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4780 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4781 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4782 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4783 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4784 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4786 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4788 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4793 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4794 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4796 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4797 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4798 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
4799 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4800 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4804 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4805 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4806 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4807 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4812 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4813 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4814 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4816 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4817 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4820 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4821 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4824 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4825 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4826 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4827 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4829 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4830 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4831 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4833 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4834 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4839 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4840 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4841 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4843 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4844 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4846 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4847 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4848 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4853 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4854 // proposed to as a batch.
4855 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4856 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4857 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4858 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4859 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4860 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4861 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4862 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4864 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4865 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4866 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4867 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4870 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4871 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4872 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4873 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4879 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4881 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4882 /// Will likely generate further events.
4883 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4886 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4888 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4889 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4890 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4892 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4893 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4895 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4896 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4897 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4898 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4899 ($forward_infos: expr) => {
4900 for forward_info in $forward_infos {
4901 match forward_info {
4902 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4903 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4904 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4905 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4906 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4909 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4910 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4911 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
4912 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4914 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4915 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4916 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4917 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4918 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4919 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4920 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4921 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4922 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4925 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4926 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4928 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4931 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4932 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4938 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4939 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4941 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4945 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4946 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4948 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4952 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4953 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4954 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4955 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4956 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4957 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4958 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4961 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4962 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4963 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4964 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4965 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4967 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4969 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4970 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4974 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4975 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4976 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4977 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4978 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4979 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4981 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4982 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4988 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4991 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4994 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4995 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4996 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4997 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4998 // problem, not ours.
5004 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5005 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5006 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5008 forwarding_channel_not_found!(pending_forwards.drain(..));
5012 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5014 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5015 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5016 forwarding_channel_not_found!(pending_forwards.drain(..));
5019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5021 let mut draining_pending_forwards = pending_forwards.drain(..);
5022 while let Some(forward_info) = draining_pending_forwards.next() {
5023 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5024 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5025 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5026 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5027 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5028 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5029 ref onion_packet, blinded, ..
5030 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5033 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5034 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5035 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5036 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5037 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5038 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5039 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5040 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5041 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5042 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5044 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5045 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5046 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5047 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5048 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5049 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5053 // Forward the HTLC over the most appropriate channel with the corresponding peer,
5054 // applying non-strict forwarding.
5055 // The channel with the least amount of outbound liquidity will be used to maximize the
5056 // probability of being able to successfully forward a subsequent HTLC.
5057 let maybe_optimal_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.values_mut().filter_map(|phase| match phase {
5058 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5059 let balances = chan.context.get_available_balances(&self.fee_estimator);
5060 if outgoing_amt_msat <= balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat &&
5061 outgoing_amt_msat >= balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat &&
5062 chan.context.is_usable() {
5063 Some((chan, balances))
5069 }).min_by_key(|(_, balances)| balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat).map(|(c, _)| c);
5070 let optimal_channel = match maybe_optimal_channel {
5073 // Fall back to the specified channel to return an appropriate error.
5074 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5077 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5083 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &optimal_channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
5084 let channel_description = if optimal_channel.context.get_short_channel_id() == Some(short_chan_id) {
5089 log_trace!(logger, "Forwarding HTLC from SCID {} with payment_hash {} and next hop SCID {} over {} channel {} with corresponding peer {}",
5090 prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id, channel_description, optimal_channel.context.channel_id(), &counterparty_node_id);
5091 if let Err(e) = optimal_channel.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5092 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5093 onion_packet.clone(), skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5096 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5097 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {} to peer {}: {}", &payment_hash, &counterparty_node_id, msg);
5099 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5102 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5103 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5104 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5105 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5106 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5109 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5115 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5116 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5118 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5119 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5120 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5121 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5122 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), &&logger), htlc_id))
5124 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5128 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5129 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5130 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5131 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5132 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5133 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5135 Some((res, htlc_id))
5137 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5142 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5143 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5144 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5145 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5146 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5147 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5150 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5152 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5153 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5154 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5160 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5161 match forward_info {
5162 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5163 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5164 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5165 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5166 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5169 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5170 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5171 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5172 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5173 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5174 requires_blinded_error: _
5176 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5177 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5178 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5179 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5180 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5182 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5183 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5184 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5186 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5187 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5191 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5192 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5195 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5198 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5199 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5200 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5201 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5202 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5203 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5204 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5205 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5206 phantom_shared_secret,
5209 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5210 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5211 // if routing nodes overpay
5212 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5213 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5215 total_value_received: None,
5216 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5219 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5222 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5224 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5225 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5226 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5227 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5228 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5229 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5231 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5232 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5233 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5234 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5235 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5236 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5237 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5238 phantom_shared_secret,
5241 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5242 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5244 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5247 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5248 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5249 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5250 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5251 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5254 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5255 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5256 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5257 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5258 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5259 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5260 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5262 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5263 .entry(payment_hash)
5264 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5265 .or_insert_with(|| {
5266 committed_to_claimable = true;
5268 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5271 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5272 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5273 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5274 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5276 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5278 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5280 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5281 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5282 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5285 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5287 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5288 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5289 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5290 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5291 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5292 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5293 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5295 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5296 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5298 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5300 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5301 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5302 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5303 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5304 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5307 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5308 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5309 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5310 committed_to_claimable = true;
5312 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5313 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5314 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5315 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5316 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5317 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5318 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5319 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5320 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5324 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5325 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5326 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5327 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5328 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5330 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5332 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5333 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5335 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5336 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5337 committed_to_claimable = true;
5340 payment_claimable_generated
5344 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5345 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5346 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5347 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5348 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5349 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5350 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5351 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5353 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5354 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5355 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5356 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5357 Ok(result) => result,
5359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5363 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5364 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5365 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5367 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5368 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5371 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5373 payment_data.payment_secret,
5376 check_total_value!(purpose);
5378 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5379 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5380 check_total_value!(purpose);
5384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5385 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5387 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5389 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5390 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5393 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5395 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5396 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5398 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5399 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5400 payment_data.payment_secret,
5403 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5404 if payment_claimable_generated {
5405 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5411 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5412 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5420 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5421 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5422 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5423 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5425 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5426 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5428 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5430 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5431 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5432 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5434 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5436 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5437 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5438 events.append(&mut new_events);
5441 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5443 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5444 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5445 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5447 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5449 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5450 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5451 if background_events.is_empty() {
5452 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5455 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5457 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5458 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5459 // monitor updating completing.
5460 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5462 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5463 let mut updated_chan = false;
5465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5466 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5469 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5471 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5472 updated_chan = true;
5473 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5474 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5476 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5484 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5485 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5488 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5490 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5493 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5494 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5496 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5497 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5498 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5499 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5500 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5506 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5509 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5510 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5511 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5512 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5513 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5516 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5517 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5519 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5521 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5522 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5523 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5525 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5526 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5527 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5528 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5530 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5531 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5533 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5534 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5538 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5539 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5540 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5541 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5542 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5543 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5544 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5546 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5547 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5549 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5550 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5551 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5552 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5553 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5554 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5556 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5561 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5562 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5570 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5572 /// This currently includes:
5573 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5574 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5575 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5577 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5578 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5579 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5580 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5581 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5582 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5583 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5584 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5586 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5587 /// estimate fetches.
5589 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5590 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5591 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5592 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5593 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5595 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5596 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5598 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5599 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5600 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5601 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5603 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5604 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5605 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5606 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5607 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5608 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5610 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5611 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5612 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5614 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5615 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5616 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
5617 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5618 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5621 channel_id: *chan_id,
5622 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5634 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5635 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5637 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5638 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5639 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5641 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5642 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5647 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5648 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5650 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5651 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5652 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5653 if needs_close { return false; }
5656 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5657 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5658 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5659 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5660 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5661 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5662 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5663 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5665 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5666 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5667 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5668 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5669 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5673 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5675 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5678 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5680 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5681 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5682 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5683 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5684 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5688 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5690 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5696 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5698 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5699 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5700 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5701 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5702 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5703 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5704 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5705 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5706 channel_id: *chan_id,
5707 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5715 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5716 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5717 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5719 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5720 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5721 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5723 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5724 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5725 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5726 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5728 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5729 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5730 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5731 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5736 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5737 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5738 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5739 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5741 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5742 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5743 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5744 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5750 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5752 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5753 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5758 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5759 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5760 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5761 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5762 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5763 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5764 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5765 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5766 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5767 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5768 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5770 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5771 // have no channels to the peer.
5772 let remove_entry = {
5773 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5774 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5777 entry.remove_entry();
5780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5785 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5786 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5787 // This should be unreachable
5788 debug_assert!(false);
5791 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5792 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5793 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5794 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5795 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5796 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5797 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5800 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5801 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5802 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5804 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5805 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5812 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5813 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5814 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5815 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5819 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5820 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5823 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5824 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5827 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5828 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5829 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5830 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5831 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5832 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5833 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5836 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5837 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5840 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5841 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5842 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5843 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5844 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5851 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5852 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5853 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5855 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5856 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5857 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5858 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5860 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5861 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5862 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5863 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5864 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5865 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5868 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5869 /// reason for the failure.
5871 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5872 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5875 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5876 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5877 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5878 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5879 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5880 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5881 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5886 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5887 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5888 match failure_code {
5889 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5890 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5891 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5892 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5893 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5894 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5896 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5897 let fail_data = match data {
5898 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5901 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5906 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5907 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5909 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5911 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5912 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5913 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5914 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5915 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5916 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5917 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5919 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5921 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5922 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5924 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5929 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5930 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5931 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5932 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5933 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5934 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5935 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5936 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5937 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5938 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5940 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5941 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5942 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5943 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5945 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5946 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5947 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5948 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5949 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5953 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5954 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5955 // be surfaced to the user.
5956 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5957 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5958 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5960 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5962 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5965 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5967 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5968 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5970 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5971 debug_assert!(false);
5972 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5975 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5977 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5980 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5981 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5982 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5983 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5987 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5988 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5989 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5992 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5993 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5994 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5995 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5996 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5997 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5998 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5999 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6000 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6001 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6004 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6005 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6006 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6009 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6010 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6011 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6012 let mut push_forward_event;
6014 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6015 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6016 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6017 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6019 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6020 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6021 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6024 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
6025 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6026 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6028 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6029 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6030 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6031 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6032 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6034 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6036 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6037 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6039 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6040 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6044 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6045 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6047 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6051 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6052 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6053 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6054 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6055 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6056 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6059 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6062 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6063 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6064 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6065 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6066 failed_next_destination: destination,
6073 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6074 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6076 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6077 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6078 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6079 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6081 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6082 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6083 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6084 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6086 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6087 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6088 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6090 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6091 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6092 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6093 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6094 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6095 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6096 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6097 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6098 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6101 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6102 /// even type numbers.
6106 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6107 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6109 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6110 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6111 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6114 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6115 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6120 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6121 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6122 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6123 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6124 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6125 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6126 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6127 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6132 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6133 .entry(payment_hash)
6135 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6136 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6139 .or_insert_with(|| {
6140 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6141 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6143 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6144 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6147 sender_intended_value,
6148 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6152 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6153 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6154 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6155 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6156 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6157 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6158 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6159 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6160 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6161 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6162 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6171 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6173 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6174 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6175 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6176 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6177 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6178 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6179 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6180 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6181 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6183 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6184 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6185 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6186 debug_assert!(false);
6190 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6192 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6193 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6194 debug_assert!(false);
6198 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6199 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6201 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6202 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6203 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6204 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6207 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6208 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6209 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6210 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6214 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6215 self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6216 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6217 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6218 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6219 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6225 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6226 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6227 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6228 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6229 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6230 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6231 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6233 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6236 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6237 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6238 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6239 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6243 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(
6244 &self, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6245 completion_action: ComplFunc,
6247 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6249 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6250 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6251 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6252 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6254 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6255 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6256 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6257 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6261 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6262 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6263 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6267 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6268 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6269 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6272 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6273 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6275 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6276 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6277 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6278 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6279 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6282 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6283 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6284 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6286 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6289 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6290 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6292 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6293 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6294 // monitor update as a background event.
6295 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6296 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6297 counterparty_node_id,
6298 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6299 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6300 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6304 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6305 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6310 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6312 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6314 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6315 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6316 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6317 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6318 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6320 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6322 debug_assert!(false,
6323 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6326 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6327 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6328 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6329 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6330 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6332 let mut found_blocker = false;
6333 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6334 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6335 // which case we need to only remove the one
6336 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6337 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6338 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6339 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6341 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6344 debug_assert!(false);
6353 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6354 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6355 counterparty_node_id: None,
6356 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6359 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6363 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6364 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6365 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6366 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6367 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6368 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6369 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6370 // again on restart.
6371 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6372 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6373 payment_preimage, update_res);
6376 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6377 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6379 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6380 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6381 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6382 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6383 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6384 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6385 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6386 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6387 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6388 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6391 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6392 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6393 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6394 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6395 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6396 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6399 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6400 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6403 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6404 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6405 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6406 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6409 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6410 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6411 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6412 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6413 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6415 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6416 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6417 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6419 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6420 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6423 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6424 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6425 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6426 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6427 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6428 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6429 self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6430 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6431 let chan_to_release =
6432 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6433 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6435 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6436 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6437 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6438 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6443 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6444 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6445 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6446 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6447 // in the background.
6448 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6449 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6450 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6451 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6453 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6454 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6455 funding_txo, update, ..
6457 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6458 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6459 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6460 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6462 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6468 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6469 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6470 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6472 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6473 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6475 monitor_update.updates[0],
6476 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6481 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6482 // immediately once we get going.
6483 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6486 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6488 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6491 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6492 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6493 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6494 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6495 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6496 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6497 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6501 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6502 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6503 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6506 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6507 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6508 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6509 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6510 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6511 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6512 prev_user_channel_id,
6513 next_user_channel_id,
6514 total_fee_earned_msat,
6516 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6517 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6519 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6527 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6528 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6529 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6532 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6533 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6534 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6535 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6537 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6539 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6540 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6541 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6543 payment_purpose: purpose,
6546 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6549 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6553 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6555 sender_intended_total_msat,
6560 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6561 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6563 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6564 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6565 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6568 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6569 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6571 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6572 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6573 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6574 downstream_channel_id,
6575 Some(blocking_action),
6582 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6583 /// update completion.
6584 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6585 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6586 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6587 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6588 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6589 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6590 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6591 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6592 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6593 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6594 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6595 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6596 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6597 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6598 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6599 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6601 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6602 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6604 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6605 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6606 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6607 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6609 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6610 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6611 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6614 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6615 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6617 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6619 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6624 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6625 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6626 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6627 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6632 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6633 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6634 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6635 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6636 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6641 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6645 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6651 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6652 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6653 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6657 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6658 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6659 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6662 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6665 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6666 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6668 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6669 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6671 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6672 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6673 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6674 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6675 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6680 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6681 let mut peer_state_lock;
6682 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6683 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6684 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6687 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6690 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6691 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6692 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6693 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6694 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6697 let remaining_in_flight =
6698 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6699 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6702 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6703 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6704 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6705 remaining_in_flight);
6706 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || remaining_in_flight != 0 {
6709 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6712 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6714 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6715 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6718 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6719 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6720 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6722 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6723 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6724 /// used to accept such channels.
6726 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6727 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6728 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6729 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6732 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6733 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6735 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6736 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6737 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6739 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6740 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6742 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6743 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6745 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6746 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6748 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6750 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6751 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6754 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6756 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6759 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6760 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6762 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6764 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6765 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6767 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6771 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6773 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6774 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6775 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6777 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6778 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6779 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6780 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6781 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6782 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6783 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6786 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6787 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6789 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6795 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6796 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6797 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6798 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6800 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6804 Ok(mut channel) => {
6806 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6807 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6808 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6809 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6810 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6811 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6812 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6815 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6816 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6817 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6819 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6821 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6822 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6823 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6824 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6825 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6826 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6827 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6828 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6831 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6832 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6833 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6835 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6839 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6840 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6841 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6843 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6844 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6845 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6848 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6855 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6856 /// or 0-conf channels.
6858 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6859 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6860 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6861 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6862 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6863 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6865 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6866 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6867 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6868 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6869 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6870 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6871 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6875 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6878 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6879 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6881 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6882 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6884 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6885 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6886 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6887 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6888 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6890 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6893 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6894 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6895 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6898 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6899 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6900 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6901 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6902 // included in the unfunded count.
6903 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6904 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6905 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6908 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6909 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6912 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6913 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6915 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6920 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6923 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6924 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6925 // likely to be lost on restart!
6926 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6927 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6928 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6931 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6932 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6933 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6936 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6937 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6938 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6939 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6940 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6943 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6945 debug_assert!(false);
6946 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6947 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6948 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6953 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6954 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6955 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6956 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6957 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6958 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6960 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6961 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6962 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6965 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6966 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6968 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6969 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6972 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6973 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6976 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6977 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6980 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6981 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6982 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6983 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6985 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6987 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6988 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6989 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6990 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6991 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6992 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6995 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6996 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6997 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7002 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7003 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7004 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7005 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7006 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7007 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7008 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7011 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7016 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7017 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7019 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7020 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7022 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7023 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7024 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7025 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7028 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7029 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7031 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7032 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7033 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7035 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7039 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7040 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7041 // likely to be lost on restart!
7042 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7044 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7046 debug_assert!(false);
7047 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7049 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7050 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7051 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7052 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7053 match phase.get_mut() {
7054 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7055 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7056 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7059 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7066 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7067 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7068 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7069 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7070 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7072 user_channel_id: user_id,
7077 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7078 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7081 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7083 debug_assert!(false);
7084 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7087 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7089 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7090 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7091 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7092 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
7093 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7095 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7096 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7097 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7098 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7099 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7100 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7101 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7102 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7103 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7107 Some(mut phase) => {
7108 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7109 let err = ChannelError::close(err_msg);
7110 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7112 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7115 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7117 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7118 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7119 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7120 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7121 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7122 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7124 let err = ChannelError::close($err.to_owned());
7125 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7126 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7129 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7131 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7134 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7135 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7136 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7137 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7140 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7141 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7142 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7143 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7145 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7146 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7147 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7148 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7149 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7150 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7151 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7156 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7157 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7158 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7160 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7164 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7165 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7166 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7174 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7175 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7177 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7179 debug_assert!(false);
7180 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7185 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7186 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7187 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7188 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7189 let logger = WithContext::from(
7191 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7192 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7196 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7198 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7199 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7200 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7201 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7202 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7203 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7204 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7205 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7206 } else { unreachable!(); }
7209 let e = ChannelError::close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7210 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7211 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7212 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7213 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7214 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7215 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7219 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7220 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7221 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7222 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7223 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7224 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7228 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7235 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7236 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7237 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7238 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7239 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7241 debug_assert!(false);
7242 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7244 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7245 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7246 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7248 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7249 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7250 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7251 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7252 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7253 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7254 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7255 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7256 msg: announcement_sigs,
7258 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7259 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7260 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7261 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7262 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7263 // announcement_signatures.
7264 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7265 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7266 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7267 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7274 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7275 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7280 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7281 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7285 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7290 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7291 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7292 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7294 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7295 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7297 debug_assert!(false);
7298 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7302 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7303 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7305 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7306 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7307 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7308 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7310 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7313 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7314 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7315 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7316 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7318 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7319 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7320 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7321 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7322 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7323 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7327 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7328 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7329 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7330 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7333 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7334 let context = phase.context_mut();
7335 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7336 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7337 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7338 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7340 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7341 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7342 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7343 let context = phase.context_mut();
7344 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7345 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7346 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7353 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7354 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7355 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7356 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7358 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7359 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7365 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7366 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7367 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7369 debug_assert!(false);
7370 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7372 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7375 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7377 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7378 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7379 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7380 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7381 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7382 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7387 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7388 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7389 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7390 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7391 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7392 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7393 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7395 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7396 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7399 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7402 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7403 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7404 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7405 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7407 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7408 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7409 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7410 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7415 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7416 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7417 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7422 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7423 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7424 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7425 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7427 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7428 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7429 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7430 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7432 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7433 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7435 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7437 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7439 debug_assert!(false);
7440 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7444 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7446 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7447 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7448 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7449 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7450 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7451 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7453 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7455 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7456 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7457 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7458 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7459 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7460 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7461 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7462 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7463 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7464 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7465 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7466 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7470 match pending_forward_info {
7471 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7472 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7474 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7475 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7476 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7477 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7478 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7480 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7481 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7482 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7483 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7484 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7487 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7493 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7495 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7496 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7504 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7506 let next_user_channel_id;
7507 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7508 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7509 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7511 debug_assert!(false);
7512 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7514 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7515 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7516 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7517 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7518 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7519 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7520 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7521 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7523 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7525 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7526 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7527 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7529 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7530 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7531 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7532 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7533 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7534 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7535 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7536 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7539 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7540 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7546 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7547 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7548 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7554 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7555 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7556 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7558 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7560 debug_assert!(false);
7561 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7565 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7567 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7568 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7570 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7571 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7579 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7580 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7581 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7585 debug_assert!(false);
7586 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7590 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7592 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7593 let chan_err = ChannelError::close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7594 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7596 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7597 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7599 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7600 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7604 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7608 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7609 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7610 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7612 debug_assert!(false);
7613 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7617 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7619 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7620 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7621 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7622 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7623 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7624 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7625 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7629 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7630 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7637 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7638 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7639 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7640 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7641 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7642 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7646 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7650 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7651 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7652 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7656 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7657 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7658 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7659 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7660 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7661 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7662 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7663 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7664 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7665 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7666 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7668 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7669 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7671 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7672 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7673 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7674 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7676 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7677 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7680 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7681 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7683 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7684 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7685 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7687 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7688 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7689 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7690 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7691 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7694 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7695 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7698 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7699 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7700 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7701 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7702 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7703 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7704 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7705 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7706 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7707 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7708 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7711 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7712 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7713 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7718 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7719 // payments are being processed.
7720 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7721 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7722 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7729 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7730 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7733 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7734 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7735 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7741 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7742 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7743 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7744 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7745 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7747 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7748 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7749 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7750 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7751 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7752 // real by taking more time.
7753 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7754 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7755 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7760 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7761 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7762 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7763 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7764 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7765 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7766 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7768 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7769 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7770 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7771 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7772 channel_funding_outpoint,
7774 counterparty_node_id,
7779 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7780 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7781 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7784 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7785 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7788 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7789 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7790 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7796 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7797 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7799 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7801 debug_assert!(false);
7802 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7803 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7805 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7807 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7808 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7809 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7810 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7811 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7812 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7813 *counterparty_node_id)
7815 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7816 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7817 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7818 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7819 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7820 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7821 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7825 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7826 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7832 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7836 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7838 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7840 debug_assert!(false);
7841 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7845 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7847 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7848 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7849 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7851 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7852 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7860 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7862 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7864 debug_assert!(false);
7865 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7869 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7871 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7872 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7873 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7876 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7877 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7878 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7879 msg, &self.default_configuration
7880 ), chan_phase_entry),
7881 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7882 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7883 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7886 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7887 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7895 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7896 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7897 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7898 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7900 // It's not a local channel
7901 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7905 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7906 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7907 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7913 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7914 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7915 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7916 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7917 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7918 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7919 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7921 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7923 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7924 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0;
7925 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7926 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7928 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7929 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7930 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7931 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7934 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7938 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7939 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7944 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7947 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7948 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7951 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7953 debug_assert!(false);
7954 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7955 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7959 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
7960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7962 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7964 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7965 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7966 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7967 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7968 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7969 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7970 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7971 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7972 let mut channel_update = None;
7973 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7974 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7975 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7978 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7979 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7980 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7981 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7982 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7983 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7984 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7989 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7990 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7991 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7992 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7993 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7994 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7995 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8000 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
8001 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8005 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8007 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8008 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8009 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8010 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8011 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8012 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8014 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8015 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8016 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8017 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8018 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8019 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8020 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8021 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8022 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8023 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8024 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8025 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8026 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8027 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8028 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8029 next_funding_txid: None,
8032 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8033 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8034 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8040 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8041 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8043 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8046 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8047 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8048 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8050 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8051 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8052 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8053 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8054 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8055 match monitor_event {
8056 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8057 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
8058 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8059 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8060 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8061 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8062 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8064 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8065 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8066 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8067 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8070 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8071 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8072 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8074 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8075 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8076 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8077 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8080 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8082 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8085 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8086 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8087 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8088 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8091 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }
8093 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8094 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8095 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8096 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8100 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8101 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8102 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8103 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8111 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8112 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8118 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8119 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8122 has_pending_monitor_events
8125 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8126 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8127 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8129 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8131 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8134 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8135 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8136 /// update was applied.
8137 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8138 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8139 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8141 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8142 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8143 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8144 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8146 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8147 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8149 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8150 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8151 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8152 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8154 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8155 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8156 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8157 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8158 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8159 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8161 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8162 has_monitor_update = true;
8164 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8165 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8166 continue 'peer_loop;
8175 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8176 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8177 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8183 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8184 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8186 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8187 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8189 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8190 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8191 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8194 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8195 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8197 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8198 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8199 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8200 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8205 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8211 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8212 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8215 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8216 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8223 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8227 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8228 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8229 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8232 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8233 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8237 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8238 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8240 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8241 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8247 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8248 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8249 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8250 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8251 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8252 let mut has_update = false;
8253 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8257 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8260 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8261 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8263 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8264 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8265 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8266 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8267 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8270 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8273 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8274 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8275 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8277 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8278 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8279 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8280 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8281 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8282 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8287 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8288 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8289 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8295 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8296 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8301 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8307 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8308 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8311 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8312 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8318 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8319 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8321 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8322 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8323 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8324 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8325 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8326 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8327 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8328 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8329 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8330 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8331 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8332 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8333 assert!(should_broadcast);
8334 } else { unreachable!(); }
8335 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8336 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8337 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8340 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8345 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8346 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8347 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer's
8348 /// expiration will be `absolute_expiry` if `Some`, otherwise it will not expire.
8352 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer based on the given
8353 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8354 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8355 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8357 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8361 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8366 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8368 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8369 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8370 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8371 &$self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8372 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8373 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8374 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8375 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8376 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8378 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8379 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8380 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8381 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8383 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8386 let builder = match absolute_expiry {
8388 Some(absolute_expiry) => builder.absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry),
8395 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8396 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8397 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8401 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8402 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8404 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8405 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8406 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8409 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8410 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8411 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8413 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8414 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8418 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund based on the given
8419 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8420 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8421 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8423 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8427 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8428 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8433 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8434 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8435 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8437 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8438 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8439 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8440 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8441 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8442 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8443 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8444 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8445 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8446 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8447 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8448 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8450 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(Some(absolute_expiry))
8451 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8452 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8453 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8455 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8456 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8461 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8462 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8463 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8464 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8466 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8472 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8474 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8475 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8476 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8477 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8478 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8479 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8483 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8484 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8485 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8486 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8489 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8491 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8493 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8494 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8495 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8497 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8498 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8499 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8500 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8501 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8502 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8503 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8505 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8506 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8510 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8511 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8514 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8515 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8516 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8520 /// For payer privacy, uses a derived payer id and uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`]
8521 /// to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path. For further privacy implications, see the
8522 /// docs of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements [`MessageRouter`].
8526 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8527 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8528 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8533 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8534 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8535 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8536 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8539 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8540 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8541 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8542 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8543 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8544 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8545 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8546 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8547 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8548 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8549 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8550 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8551 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8552 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8553 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8555 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8556 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8558 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8560 let builder = match quantity {
8562 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8564 let builder = match amount_msats {
8566 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8568 let builder = match payer_note {
8570 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8572 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8573 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8577 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8578 self.pending_outbound_payments
8579 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8580 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8582 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8584 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8585 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8586 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8587 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8588 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8589 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8590 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8591 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8592 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8593 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8594 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8596 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8598 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8599 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8600 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8601 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8604 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8606 debug_assert!(false);
8607 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8613 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8616 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8617 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8618 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8622 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8623 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8624 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8625 /// received and no retries will be made.
8630 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8631 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8634 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8635 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8636 &self, refund: &Refund
8637 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8638 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8639 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8640 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8642 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8643 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8645 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8646 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8651 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8652 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8653 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8654 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8655 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8657 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8659 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8660 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8661 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8663 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8664 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8665 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8667 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8668 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8669 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8671 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8672 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8673 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8674 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8676 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8677 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8678 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8679 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8680 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8683 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8685 for path in refund.paths() {
8686 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8687 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8688 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8689 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8691 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8697 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8701 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8704 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8705 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8707 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8708 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8709 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8711 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8713 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8714 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8718 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8719 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8721 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8723 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8724 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8726 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8727 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8728 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8729 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8730 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8731 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8732 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8733 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8734 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8735 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8738 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8739 /// stored external to LDK.
8741 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8742 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8743 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8745 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8746 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8749 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8750 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8751 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8752 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8754 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8755 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8756 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8757 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8758 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8760 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8761 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8762 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8763 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8764 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8766 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8767 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8769 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8770 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8774 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8775 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8777 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8779 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8780 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8782 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8783 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8784 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8785 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8786 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8787 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8788 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8791 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8792 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8794 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8795 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8796 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8799 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter`] based on the path's intended
8802 /// Whether or not the path is compact depends on whether the path is short-lived or long-lived,
8803 /// respectively, based on the given `absolute_expiry` as seconds since the Unix epoch. See
8804 /// [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`].
8805 fn create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(
8806 &self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8807 ) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8808 let now = self.duration_since_epoch();
8809 let max_short_lived_absolute_expiry = now.saturating_add(MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY);
8811 if absolute_expiry.unwrap_or(Duration::MAX) <= max_short_lived_absolute_expiry {
8812 self.create_compact_blinded_path()
8814 self.create_blinded_path()
8818 pub(super) fn duration_since_epoch(&self) -> Duration {
8819 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8820 let now = Duration::from_secs(
8821 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8823 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8824 let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
8825 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
8826 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
8831 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8833 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8834 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8835 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8836 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8838 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8840 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8841 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8842 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8843 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8844 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8847 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8848 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8851 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`].
8853 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8854 fn create_compact_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8855 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8856 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8858 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8860 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8861 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8862 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8863 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
8865 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
8867 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
8868 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
8869 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
8871 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8874 .create_compact_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8875 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8878 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8879 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8880 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8881 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8882 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8883 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8885 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8886 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8887 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8888 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8889 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8891 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8893 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8897 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8898 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8902 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8903 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8905 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8906 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8907 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8908 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8910 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8911 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8912 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8913 Some(_) => continue,
8914 None => return scid_candidate
8919 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8921 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8922 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8924 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8925 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8926 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8930 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8931 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8932 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8934 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8935 /// times to get a unique scid.
8936 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8937 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8938 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8940 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8941 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8942 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8943 return scid_candidate
8947 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8948 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8949 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8950 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8953 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8956 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8957 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8959 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8960 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8961 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8970 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8971 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8972 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8973 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8974 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8978 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8979 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8980 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8981 events.push_back((event, None));
8985 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8986 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8987 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8991 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8992 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8996 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8997 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9000 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9001 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9002 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9003 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9004 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9005 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9006 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9008 let logger = WithContext::from(
9009 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
9012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9013 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9014 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9016 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9017 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9018 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9019 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9021 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9025 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9026 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9027 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9028 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9029 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9030 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9035 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9037 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9038 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9039 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9040 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9042 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9043 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9044 if further_update_exists {
9045 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9050 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9057 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9058 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9064 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9065 for action in actions {
9067 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9068 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9070 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9076 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9077 /// using the given event handler.
9079 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9080 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9084 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9088 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9090 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9091 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9092 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9093 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9094 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9099 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9100 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9101 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9102 /// is always placed next to each other.
9104 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9105 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9106 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9107 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9109 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9110 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9111 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9112 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9113 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9114 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9115 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9117 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9118 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9119 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9120 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9123 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9124 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9126 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9127 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9130 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9131 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9133 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9134 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9135 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9136 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9137 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9139 if peer_state.is_connected {
9140 is_any_peer_connected = true
9144 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9145 if is_any_peer_connected {
9146 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9147 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9150 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9151 events.replace(pending_events);
9160 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9162 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9163 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9164 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9165 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9166 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9171 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9173 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9174 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9175 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9177 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9181 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9183 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9185 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9186 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9187 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9188 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9192 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9194 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9195 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9196 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9197 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9198 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9201 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9202 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9205 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9206 let _persistence_guard =
9207 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9208 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9209 let new_height = height - 1;
9211 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9212 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9213 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9214 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9215 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9216 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9219 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9223 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9225 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9227 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9228 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9229 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9230 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9234 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9235 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9236 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9237 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9239 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9240 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9242 let _persistence_guard =
9243 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9244 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9245 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9246 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9248 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9249 if height < last_best_block_height {
9250 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9251 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9255 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9256 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9257 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9258 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9260 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9261 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9263 let _persistence_guard =
9264 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9265 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9266 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9268 let mut min_anchor_feerate = None;
9269 let mut min_non_anchor_feerate = None;
9270 if self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
9271 // If we're past the startup phase, update our feerate cache
9272 let mut last_days_feerates = self.last_days_feerates.lock().unwrap();
9273 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9274 last_days_feerates.pop_front();
9276 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9277 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9278 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9279 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9280 last_days_feerates.push_back((anchor_feerate, non_anchor_feerate));
9281 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9282 min_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(f, _)| f).min().copied();
9283 min_non_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(_, f)| f).min().copied();
9287 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| {
9288 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9289 if channel.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
9290 if let Some(feerate) = min_anchor_feerate {
9291 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9294 if let Some(feerate) = min_non_anchor_feerate {
9295 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9298 channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9301 macro_rules! max_time {
9302 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9304 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9305 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9306 // having an explicit local time source.
9307 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9308 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9309 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9310 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9311 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9317 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9318 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9319 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9320 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9324 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9325 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9326 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9329 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9330 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9331 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9332 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9333 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9334 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9341 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9342 let _persistence_guard =
9343 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9344 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9345 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9346 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9347 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9348 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9349 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9350 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9355 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9357 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9358 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9359 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9360 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9361 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9362 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9366 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9367 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9369 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9370 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9371 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9372 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9373 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9375 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9376 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9378 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9379 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9380 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9381 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9382 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9384 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9386 // Retain unfunded channels.
9387 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9388 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9389 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9390 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9391 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9392 let res = f(channel);
9393 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9394 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9395 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9396 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9397 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9399 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9400 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9401 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9402 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9403 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9404 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9406 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9411 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9416 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9417 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9420 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9421 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9422 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9423 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9424 msg: announcement_sigs,
9426 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9427 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9430 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9431 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9432 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9437 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9438 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9439 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9440 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9441 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9442 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9443 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9444 // is always consistent.
9445 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9446 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9447 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9448 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9449 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9452 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9453 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9454 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9455 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9456 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9457 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9458 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9459 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9460 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9465 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9466 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9467 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9468 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9469 data: reason_message,
9482 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9483 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9484 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9485 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9486 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9487 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9488 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9489 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9490 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9491 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9493 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9494 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9495 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9499 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9502 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9503 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9504 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9505 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9506 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9507 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9508 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9509 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9510 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9511 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9512 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9513 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9516 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9517 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9518 _ => unreachable!(),
9520 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9521 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9522 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9523 let logger = WithContext::from(
9524 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9526 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9532 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9534 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9535 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9539 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9540 /// may have events that need processing.
9542 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9543 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9545 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9546 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9547 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9548 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9551 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9553 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9554 /// indicates this should be checked.
9555 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9556 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9559 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9560 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9561 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9564 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9565 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9566 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9567 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9570 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9571 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9572 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9573 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9576 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9577 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9579 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9580 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9581 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9582 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9583 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9586 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9587 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9588 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9589 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9592 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9593 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9594 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9595 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9598 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9599 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9600 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9601 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9604 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9605 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9606 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9607 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9611 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9612 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9614 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9615 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9616 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9617 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9618 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9619 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9623 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9624 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9625 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9626 // change to the contents.
9627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9628 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9629 let persist = match &res {
9630 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9631 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9632 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9634 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9636 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9641 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9642 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9643 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9644 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9647 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9648 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9649 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9650 // change to the contents.
9651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9652 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9653 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9657 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9658 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9659 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9660 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9663 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9665 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9668 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9670 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9673 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9674 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9675 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9676 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9677 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9679 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9680 let persist = match &res {
9681 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9682 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9684 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9689 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9690 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9691 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9692 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9696 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9697 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9698 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9699 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9703 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9704 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9705 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9706 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9710 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9711 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9712 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9713 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9716 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9718 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9721 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9723 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9726 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9727 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9728 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9729 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9731 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9732 let persist = match &res {
9733 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9734 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9735 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9737 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9742 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9744 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9747 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9748 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9749 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9750 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9752 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9753 let persist = match &res {
9754 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9755 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9756 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9758 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9763 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9764 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9765 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9766 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9768 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9769 let persist = match &res {
9770 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9771 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9772 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9774 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9779 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9781 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9784 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9786 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9789 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9790 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9791 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9792 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9794 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9795 let persist = match &res {
9796 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9797 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9798 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9800 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9805 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9806 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9807 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9810 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9811 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9812 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9815 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9820 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9821 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9822 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9823 let persist = match &res {
9824 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9825 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9826 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9828 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9833 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9835 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9836 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9837 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9840 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9841 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9842 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9844 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9845 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9846 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9847 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9848 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9849 let context = match phase {
9850 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9851 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9852 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9853 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9858 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9859 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9860 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9861 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9862 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9864 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9865 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9866 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9867 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9870 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9871 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9874 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9875 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9879 // Clean up for removal.
9880 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9881 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9884 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9885 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9886 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9887 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9889 // V1 Channel Establishment
9890 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9891 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9894 // V2 Channel Establishment
9895 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9897 // Common Channel Establishment
9898 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9901 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9903 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9906 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9907 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9908 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9911 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9914 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9916 // Channel Operations
9917 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9918 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9919 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9921 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9922 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9925 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9926 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9927 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9928 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9929 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9932 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9940 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9941 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9942 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9943 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9946 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9948 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9950 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9951 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9955 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9956 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
9957 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9958 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9962 let mut res = Ok(());
9964 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9965 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9966 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9967 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9968 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9969 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9970 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9973 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9974 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9975 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9976 if inbound_peer_limited {
9978 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9980 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9981 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9982 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9983 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9984 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9985 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9986 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9987 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9991 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9992 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9993 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9995 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9996 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9997 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9998 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10001 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10004 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10005 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10010 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10013 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10016 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10018 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10020 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10021 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
10022 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10023 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10024 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10028 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10029 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10030 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10031 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10035 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10036 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10037 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10038 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10039 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10040 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10044 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10045 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10046 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10047 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10048 debug_assert!(false);
10051 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10052 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10053 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10054 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10055 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10056 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10057 debug_assert!(false);
10063 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10064 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10069 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10070 match &msg.data as &str {
10071 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10072 "link failed to shutdown" =>
10074 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10075 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10076 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10077 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10078 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10079 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10080 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10081 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10082 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10084 || -> NotifyOption {
10085 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10086 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10087 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10088 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10089 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10090 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10091 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10092 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10096 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10097 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10098 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10099 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10100 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10101 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10103 log_level: Level::Trace,
10106 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10107 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10108 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10110 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10119 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10121 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10122 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10124 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10125 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10128 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10129 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10130 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10131 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10133 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10134 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10135 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10139 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10141 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10142 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10143 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10144 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10145 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10146 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10147 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10148 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10149 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10155 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10156 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10157 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10158 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10159 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10165 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10166 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10167 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10171 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10172 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10176 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10177 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10180 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10181 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10184 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10185 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10188 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10189 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10190 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10191 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10194 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10195 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10196 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10197 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10200 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10201 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10202 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10203 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10206 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10207 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10208 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10209 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10212 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10213 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10214 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10215 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10218 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10219 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10220 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10221 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10224 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10225 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10226 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10227 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10230 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10231 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10232 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10233 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10236 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10237 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10238 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10239 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10243 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10244 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10246 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10247 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10249 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10255 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10256 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10257 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10260 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10261 let responder = match responder {
10262 Some(responder) => responder,
10263 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10265 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10268 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10269 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10271 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10272 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10274 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10275 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10279 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10280 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10281 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10283 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10285 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10286 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10290 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10291 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10292 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10294 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10295 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10297 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10299 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10300 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10304 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10305 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10306 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10309 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10310 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10311 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10312 payment_paths, payment_hash
10314 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10315 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10316 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10319 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10320 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10321 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10323 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10324 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10325 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10326 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10327 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10330 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10331 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10332 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10333 .and_then(|invoice| {
10335 let mut invoice = invoice;
10337 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10338 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10340 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10345 Ok(invoice) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10346 Err(error) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10349 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10350 let result = match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10351 Ok(payment_id) => {
10352 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10353 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10354 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10355 } else if self.default_configuration.manually_handle_bolt12_invoices {
10356 let event = Event::InvoiceReceived { payment_id, invoice, responder };
10357 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
10358 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10360 self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10363 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10367 Err(()) => Err(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())),
10371 Ok(()) => ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10372 Err(e) => match responder {
10373 Some(responder) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10375 log_trace!(self.logger, "No reply path for sending invoice error: {:?}", e);
10376 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10381 #[cfg(async_payments)]
10382 OffersMessage::StaticInvoice(_invoice) => {
10384 Some(responder) => {
10385 responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
10386 InvoiceError::from_string("Static invoices not yet supported".to_string())
10389 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10392 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10394 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10399 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10400 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10404 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10405 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10407 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10408 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10409 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10410 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10411 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10412 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10416 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10417 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10421 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10422 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10423 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10424 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10425 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10429 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10430 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10432 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10433 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10434 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10435 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10436 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10439 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10440 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10441 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10442 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10445 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10446 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10447 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10448 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10451 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10452 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10453 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10454 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10457 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10458 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10459 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10460 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10461 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10462 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10463 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10464 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10465 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10466 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10467 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10468 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10469 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10470 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10471 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10472 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10473 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10474 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10475 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10476 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10477 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10482 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10483 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10485 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10486 (2, channels, required_vec),
10487 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10488 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10491 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10492 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10493 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10496 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10498 (0, onion_packet, required),
10499 (1, blinded, option),
10500 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10503 (0, payment_data, required),
10504 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10505 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10506 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10507 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10508 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10509 (9, payment_context, option),
10511 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10512 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10513 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10514 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10515 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10516 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10517 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10521 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10522 (0, routing, required),
10523 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10524 (4, payment_hash, required),
10525 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10526 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10527 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10528 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10532 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10533 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10535 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10536 0u8.write(writer)?;
10537 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10538 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10539 reason.write(writer)?;
10541 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10542 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10544 1u8.write(writer)?;
10545 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10546 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10547 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10548 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10555 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10556 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10557 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10560 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10561 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10562 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10563 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10567 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10568 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10569 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10570 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10571 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10574 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10575 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10576 // messages contained in the variants.
10577 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10578 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10579 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10581 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10582 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10583 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10584 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10585 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10588 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10589 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10590 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10591 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10592 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10594 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10599 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10604 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10605 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10606 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10609 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10610 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10611 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10612 (2, outpoint, required),
10613 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10614 (4, htlc_id, required),
10615 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10616 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10617 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10618 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10619 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10622 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10623 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10624 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10625 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10626 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10628 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10630 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10631 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10632 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10633 (2, self.value, required),
10634 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10635 (4, payment_data, option),
10636 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10637 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10638 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10639 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10645 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10646 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10647 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10648 (0, prev_hop, required),
10649 (1, total_msat, option),
10650 (2, value_ser, required),
10651 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10652 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10653 (5, total_value_received, option),
10654 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10655 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10656 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10658 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10659 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10660 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10662 if payment_data.is_some() {
10663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10665 if total_msat.is_none() {
10666 total_msat = Some(value);
10668 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10671 if total_msat.is_none() {
10672 if payment_data.is_none() {
10673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10675 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10677 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10681 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10684 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10685 total_value_received,
10686 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10688 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10689 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10694 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10695 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10696 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10699 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10700 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10701 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10702 let mut payment_id = None;
10703 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10704 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10705 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10706 (0, session_priv, required),
10707 (1, payment_id, option),
10708 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10709 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10710 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10711 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10713 if payment_id.is_none() {
10714 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10716 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10718 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10719 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10720 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10722 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10723 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10724 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10725 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10729 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10730 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10731 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10733 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10736 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10737 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10742 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10743 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10745 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10746 0u8.write(writer)?;
10747 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10748 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10749 (0, session_priv, required),
10750 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10751 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10752 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10753 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10754 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10755 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10758 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10759 1u8.write(writer)?;
10760 field.write(writer)?;
10767 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10768 (0, forward_info, required),
10769 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10770 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10771 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10772 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10773 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10774 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10775 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10778 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10779 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10780 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10782 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10786 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10787 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10788 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10789 (0, htlc_id, required),
10790 (2, err_packet, required),
10793 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10794 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10795 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10796 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10797 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10798 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10799 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10800 (0, htlc_id, required),
10801 (1, failure_code, required),
10802 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10803 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10811 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10812 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10813 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10815 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10817 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10818 (0, htlc_id, required),
10819 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10820 (2, err_packet, required),
10821 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10823 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10824 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10825 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10827 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10831 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10832 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10836 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10841 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10842 (0, payment_secret, required),
10843 (2, expiry_time, required),
10844 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10845 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10846 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10849 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10851 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10852 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10853 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10854 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10855 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10856 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10861 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10863 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10865 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10867 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10868 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10869 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10874 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10876 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10877 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10878 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10879 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10880 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10881 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10884 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10885 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10889 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10891 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10894 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10895 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10896 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10899 channel.write(writer)?;
10905 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10906 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10907 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10908 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10909 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10910 for forward in pending_forwards {
10911 forward.write(writer)?;
10916 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10917 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10918 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10919 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10922 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10923 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10924 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10926 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10927 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10928 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10929 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10930 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10931 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10932 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10933 htlc.write(writer)?;
10935 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10936 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10939 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10940 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10941 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10942 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10943 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10944 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10945 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10948 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10949 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10950 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10951 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10952 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10954 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10955 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10956 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10957 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10958 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10959 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10960 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10965 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10966 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10967 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10968 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10969 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10970 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10971 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10972 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10973 0u64.write(writer)?;
10975 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10976 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10977 event.write(writer)?;
10981 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10982 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10983 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10984 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10985 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10986 0u64.write(writer)?;
10988 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10989 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10990 // likely to be identical.
10991 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10992 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10994 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10995 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10996 hash.write(writer)?;
10997 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11000 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11001 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11002 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11003 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11004 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11007 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11008 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11010 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11011 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11012 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11013 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11016 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11017 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11018 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11019 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11023 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11024 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11025 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11027 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11028 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11029 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11035 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11036 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11037 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11038 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11041 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11042 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11043 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11044 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11045 pending_claiming_payments = None;
11048 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11049 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11050 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11051 if !updates.is_empty() {
11052 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11053 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11058 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11059 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11060 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11061 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11062 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11063 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11064 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11065 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11066 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11067 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11068 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11069 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11070 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11071 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11078 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11079 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11080 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11081 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11084 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11085 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11086 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11087 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11088 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11089 // check that the event is sane here.
11090 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11091 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11092 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11093 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11099 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11100 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11101 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11102 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11103 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11104 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11107 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11108 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11109 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11110 events.push_back((ev, action));
11111 } else if action.is_some() {
11112 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11119 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11121 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11123 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11124 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11125 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11126 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11127 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11128 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11129 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11130 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11131 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11132 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11133 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11134 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11135 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11137 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11138 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11140 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11141 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11143 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11144 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11145 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11146 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11147 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11148 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11150 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11151 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11153 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11154 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11155 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11156 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11157 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11158 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11162 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11163 pub entropy_source: ES,
11165 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11166 pub node_signer: NS,
11168 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11169 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11171 pub signer_provider: SP,
11173 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11175 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11176 pub fee_estimator: F,
11177 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11179 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11180 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11181 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11182 pub chain_monitor: M,
11184 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11185 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11186 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11187 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11188 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11189 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11191 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11193 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11194 /// deserialization.
11196 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11197 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11198 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11200 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11201 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11203 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11204 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11205 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11206 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11208 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11211 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11212 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11215 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11216 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11218 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11219 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11220 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11221 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11222 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11223 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11227 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11228 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11229 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11230 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11231 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11233 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11234 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11235 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11241 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11242 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11243 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11244 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11246 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11247 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11249 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11255 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11256 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11257 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11261 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11262 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11264 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11265 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11266 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11267 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11268 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11269 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11273 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11274 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11276 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11277 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11278 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11280 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11282 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11283 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11284 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11285 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11286 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11287 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11288 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11289 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11290 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11291 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11292 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11294 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11295 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11296 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11297 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11298 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11299 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11300 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11301 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11302 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11303 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11304 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11305 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11306 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11307 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11308 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11310 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11311 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11312 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11314 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11315 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11316 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11318 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11319 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11320 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11322 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11323 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11324 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11326 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11327 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11328 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11331 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11332 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11333 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11334 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11335 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11336 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11337 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11338 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11340 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11341 let mut found_htlc = false;
11342 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11343 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11346 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11347 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11348 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11349 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11350 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11351 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11352 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11353 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11355 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11356 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11357 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11361 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11362 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11363 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11364 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11365 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11366 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11368 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11369 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11371 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11373 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11374 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11377 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11378 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11379 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11383 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11384 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11385 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11386 // safely discard the channel.
11387 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11388 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11389 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11390 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11391 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11392 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11393 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11394 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11397 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11398 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11399 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11400 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11401 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11402 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11406 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11407 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11408 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11409 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11410 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11412 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11413 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11414 counterparty_node_id: None,
11415 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11416 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11418 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11422 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11423 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11424 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11425 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11426 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11427 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11428 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11429 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11430 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11432 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11435 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11436 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11437 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11438 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11439 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11440 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11441 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11442 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11444 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11447 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11450 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11451 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11452 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11453 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11454 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11455 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11456 is_connected: false,
11460 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11461 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11462 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11463 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11464 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11465 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11466 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11467 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11470 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11471 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11472 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11473 for _ in 0..event_count {
11474 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11475 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11480 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11481 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11482 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11484 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11485 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11486 // on-startup monitor updates.
11487 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11488 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11490 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11494 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11495 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11497 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11498 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11499 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11500 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11501 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11505 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11506 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11507 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11508 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11509 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11510 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11511 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11513 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11514 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11518 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11519 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11520 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11521 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11522 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11523 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11524 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11525 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11526 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11527 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11528 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11529 let mut events_override = None;
11530 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11531 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11532 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11533 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11534 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11535 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11536 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11537 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11538 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11539 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11540 (8, events_override, option),
11541 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11542 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11543 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11544 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11545 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11547 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11548 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11549 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11552 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11553 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11556 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11557 pending_events_read = events;
11560 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11561 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11564 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11565 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11566 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11567 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11568 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11569 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11571 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11573 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11574 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11575 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11578 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11579 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11580 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11581 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11582 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11584 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11585 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11586 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11588 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11589 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11590 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11591 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11592 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11594 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11595 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11596 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11597 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11598 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11599 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11600 pending_background_events.push(
11601 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11602 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11603 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11604 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11605 update: update.clone(),
11608 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11609 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11610 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11611 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11612 pending_background_events.push(
11613 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11614 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11615 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11618 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11619 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11622 max_in_flight_update_id
11626 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11629 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11630 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11631 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11633 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11635 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11636 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11637 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11638 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11639 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11640 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11641 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11642 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11643 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11646 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11647 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11648 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11649 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11650 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11651 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11652 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11653 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11654 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11655 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11656 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11659 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11660 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11661 debug_assert!(false);
11662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11667 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11668 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11669 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11670 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11671 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11672 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11673 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11674 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11675 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11676 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11678 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11679 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11680 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11682 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11683 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11684 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11685 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11686 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11687 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11688 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11689 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11690 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11695 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11696 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11698 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11699 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11700 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11701 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11704 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11705 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11706 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11707 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11708 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11709 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11710 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11712 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11713 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11714 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11715 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11716 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11717 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11718 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11719 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11720 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11723 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11724 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11725 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11726 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11728 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11729 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11730 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11732 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11733 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11734 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11735 retry_strategy: None,
11736 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11737 payment_params: None,
11738 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11739 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11740 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11741 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11742 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11743 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11744 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11745 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11746 total_msat: path_amt,
11747 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11748 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11750 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11751 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11756 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11757 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11758 match htlc_source {
11759 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11760 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11761 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11762 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11764 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11765 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11766 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11767 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11768 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11769 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11770 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11771 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11772 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11774 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11775 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11779 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11781 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11782 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11783 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11784 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11785 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11786 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11791 !forwards.is_empty()
11793 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11794 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11795 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11796 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11797 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11798 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11799 intercepted_id != ev_id
11806 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11807 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11808 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11809 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11810 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11811 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11812 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11813 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11814 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11815 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11816 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11818 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11819 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11820 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11821 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11823 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11824 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11825 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11832 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11833 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11835 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11837 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11838 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11839 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11840 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11841 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11842 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11843 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11844 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11845 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11846 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11849 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11850 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11851 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11852 // channel still live case here.
11856 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11857 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11862 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11863 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11864 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11865 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11866 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11867 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11868 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11869 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11873 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11874 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11876 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11877 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11878 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11879 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11881 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11882 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11883 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11885 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11886 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11888 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11889 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11891 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11894 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11895 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11896 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11898 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11902 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11903 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11904 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11905 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11906 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11908 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11909 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11910 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11911 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
11912 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11913 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11914 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11915 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11917 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11918 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11922 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11924 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11926 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11927 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11929 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11930 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11935 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11936 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11938 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11940 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11942 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11943 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11944 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11945 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11949 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11950 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11951 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11952 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11953 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11954 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11955 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11956 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11957 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11959 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11960 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11961 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11963 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11964 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11965 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11966 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11967 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11968 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11970 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11971 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11972 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11973 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11974 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11975 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11979 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11980 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11981 debug_assert!(false);
11982 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11987 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11989 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11990 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11991 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11992 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11993 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11994 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11995 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11996 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11997 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11998 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11999 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12001 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12002 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12004 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12005 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12006 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12007 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12009 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12010 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12011 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12012 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12014 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12015 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12016 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12017 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12019 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12020 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12021 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12022 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12023 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12024 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12025 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
12026 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12029 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12030 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12033 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12036 purpose: payment.purpose,
12037 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12038 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12039 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12040 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
12046 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12047 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12048 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12049 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
12050 for action in actions.iter() {
12051 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12052 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12053 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12055 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12057 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12058 blocked_channel_id);
12059 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12060 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12061 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12063 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12064 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12065 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12066 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12070 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12071 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12075 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12077 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12078 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12082 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12084 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12085 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12086 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12087 router: args.router,
12089 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12091 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12092 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12093 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12094 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12096 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12097 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12098 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12099 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12100 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12101 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12102 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12104 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12106 our_network_pubkey,
12109 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12111 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12113 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12114 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12115 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12116 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12117 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12119 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12120 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12122 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12124 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12126 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12128 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12129 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12130 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12132 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
12134 logger: args.logger,
12135 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12138 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12139 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12140 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12141 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12142 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12145 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12146 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12147 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12148 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12149 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12150 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12151 downstream_channel_id, None
12155 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12156 //connection or two.
12158 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12164 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12165 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12166 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12167 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12168 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12169 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12170 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12171 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12172 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12173 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12174 use crate::prelude::*;
12175 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12176 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12177 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12178 use crate::util::test_utils;
12179 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12180 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12183 fn test_notify_limits() {
12184 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12185 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12186 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12187 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12188 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12189 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12191 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12192 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12193 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12194 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12195 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12197 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12199 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12200 // to connect messages with new values
12201 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12202 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12203 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12204 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12205 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12206 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12208 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12209 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12210 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12211 // ... but the last node should not.
12212 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12213 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12214 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12215 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12217 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12218 // about the channel.
12219 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12220 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12221 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12223 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12225 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12226 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12227 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12228 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12229 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12230 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12232 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12233 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12234 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12236 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12237 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12238 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12239 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12240 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12241 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12243 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12244 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12245 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12246 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12247 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12248 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12249 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12250 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12252 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12253 // the channel info has updated.
12254 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12255 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12256 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12257 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12258 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12259 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12263 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12264 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12269 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12270 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12272 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12273 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12274 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12275 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12277 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12278 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12279 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12280 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12281 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12282 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12283 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12284 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12286 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12287 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12288 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12290 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12291 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12292 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12294 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12295 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12296 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12297 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12298 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12300 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12301 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12302 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12304 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12305 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12306 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12307 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12308 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12309 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12310 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12311 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12312 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12314 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12315 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12316 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12318 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12319 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12320 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12322 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12323 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12324 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12325 // lightning messages manually.
12326 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12327 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12330 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12331 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12332 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12333 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12335 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12336 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12338 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12339 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12341 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12342 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12343 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12345 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12346 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12347 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12349 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12351 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12353 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12354 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12357 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12358 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12359 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12362 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12363 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12364 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12365 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12370 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12371 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12372 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12373 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12375 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12380 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12381 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12382 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12385 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12386 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12387 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12388 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12389 // fails as expected.
12390 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12391 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12392 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12393 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12394 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12395 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12398 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12399 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12400 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12401 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12402 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12403 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12404 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12406 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12407 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12408 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12410 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12411 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12412 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12413 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12414 let route = find_route(
12415 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12416 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12418 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12419 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12421 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12422 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12423 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12424 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12427 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12428 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12429 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12430 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12431 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12433 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12434 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12435 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12436 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12437 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12438 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12439 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12440 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12441 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12443 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12444 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12446 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12447 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12448 let route = find_route(
12449 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12450 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12452 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12453 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12455 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12457 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12458 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12459 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12461 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12462 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12463 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12464 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12466 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12468 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12469 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12470 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12472 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12473 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12474 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12476 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12477 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12478 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12479 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12480 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12481 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12482 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12483 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12484 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12486 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12487 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12489 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12490 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12491 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12492 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12494 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12496 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12497 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12498 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12500 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12501 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12502 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12505 let route = find_route(
12506 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12507 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12509 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12510 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12511 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12513 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12515 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12516 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12520 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12521 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12523 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12524 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12525 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12526 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12527 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12528 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12529 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12530 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12531 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12533 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12538 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12539 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12540 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12546 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12547 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12549 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12550 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12551 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12552 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12553 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12554 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12555 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12556 let route = find_route(
12557 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12558 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12561 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12562 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12563 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12564 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12565 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12566 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12569 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12570 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12571 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12572 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12573 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12574 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12575 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12577 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12581 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12582 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12583 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12584 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12585 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12591 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12592 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12594 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12595 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12596 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12597 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12598 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12599 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12600 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12601 let route = find_route(
12602 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12603 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12606 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12607 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12608 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12609 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12610 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12611 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12612 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12613 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12616 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12617 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12618 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12619 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12620 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12621 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12622 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12624 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12628 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12629 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12630 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12631 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12632 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12634 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12635 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12636 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12637 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12639 // Marshall an MPP route.
12640 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12641 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12642 route.paths.push(path);
12643 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12644 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12645 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12646 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12647 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12648 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12650 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12651 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12653 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12654 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12656 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12661 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12667 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12669 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12671 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12673 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12674 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12675 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12678 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12679 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12680 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12683 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12684 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12685 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12687 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12688 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12690 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12691 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12693 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12694 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12695 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12697 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12698 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12699 }, false).unwrap();
12701 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12702 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12703 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12704 match &node_0_events[0] {
12705 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12709 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12710 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12711 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12716 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12720 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12722 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12724 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12725 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12726 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12727 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
12728 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12730 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12733 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12734 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12735 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12736 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12737 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12738 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12741 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12744 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12745 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12750 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12751 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12755 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12757 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12758 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12760 total_msat: 100_000,
12763 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12764 // payment verification fails as expected.
12765 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12766 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12767 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12768 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12770 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12774 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12775 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12779 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12780 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12781 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12782 // the channel is successfully closed.
12783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12786 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12788 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12789 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12790 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12791 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12792 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12794 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12795 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12797 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12798 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12799 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12800 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12803 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12805 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12806 // as it has the funding transaction.
12807 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12808 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12809 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12812 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12814 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12816 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12818 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12819 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12820 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12822 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12825 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12826 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12827 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12828 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12829 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12832 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12833 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12835 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12836 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12837 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12838 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12840 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12841 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12842 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12843 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12845 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12846 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12848 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12849 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12850 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12851 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12852 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12853 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12854 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12858 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12859 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12860 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12861 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12862 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12863 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12864 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12867 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12869 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12870 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12871 // closing transaction).
12872 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12873 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12874 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12876 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12877 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12878 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12879 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12880 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12883 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12885 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12887 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12888 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12889 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12891 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12893 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12894 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12897 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12898 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12899 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12902 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12903 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12904 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12907 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12908 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12909 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12912 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12913 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12914 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12917 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12919 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12920 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12922 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12923 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12925 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12926 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12931 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12932 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12933 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12934 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12935 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12936 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12937 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12941 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12942 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12943 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12944 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12946 // Test the API functions.
12947 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12949 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12951 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12953 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12955 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12957 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12959 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12963 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12964 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12965 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12966 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12967 // the given `channel_id`.
12968 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12969 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12970 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12973 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12976 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12977 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12979 // Test the API functions.
12980 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12982 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12984 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12986 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12988 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12990 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12994 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12995 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12999 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13001 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13003 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13004 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13006 let mut funding_tx = None;
13007 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13008 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13009 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13012 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13013 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13014 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13015 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13016 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13018 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13020 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13022 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13024 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13026 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13028 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13031 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13032 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13033 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13035 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13036 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13038 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13039 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13041 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13042 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13043 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13044 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13045 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13046 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13047 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13050 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13051 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13052 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13053 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13054 }, true).unwrap_err();
13056 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13057 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13058 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13059 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13060 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13061 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13062 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13064 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13065 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13067 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13068 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13069 }, true).unwrap_err();
13071 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13072 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13073 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13074 }, false).unwrap();
13075 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13077 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13078 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13080 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13081 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13082 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13083 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13084 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13086 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13087 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13088 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13090 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13091 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13092 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13094 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13095 // "protected" and can connect again.
13096 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13097 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13098 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13100 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13102 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13104 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13105 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13109 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13110 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13114 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13116 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13118 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13119 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13121 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13122 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13123 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13124 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13127 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13129 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13130 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13131 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13133 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13134 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13135 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13137 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13138 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13139 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13140 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13144 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13145 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13146 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13149 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13150 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13154 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13156 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13157 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13159 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13160 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13161 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13162 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13163 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13164 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13167 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13168 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13170 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13171 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13175 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13176 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13179 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13180 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13181 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13182 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13183 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13185 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13186 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13188 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13189 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13190 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13191 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13195 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13197 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13198 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13200 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13201 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13202 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13204 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13205 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13209 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13213 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13214 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13215 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13216 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13217 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13218 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13219 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13220 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13221 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13222 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13223 payment_metadata: None,
13224 keysend_preimage: None,
13225 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13226 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13228 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13230 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13231 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13232 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13233 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13234 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13235 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13236 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13238 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13239 } else { panic!(); }
13241 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13242 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13243 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13244 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13245 payment_metadata: None,
13246 keysend_preimage: None,
13247 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13248 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13250 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13252 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13253 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13254 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13255 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13259 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13260 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13261 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13262 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13263 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13265 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13266 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13267 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13268 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13269 payment_metadata: None,
13270 keysend_preimage: None,
13271 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13272 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13274 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13275 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13276 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13278 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13279 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13280 // is not satisfied.
13281 assert!(result.is_ok());
13285 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13286 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13287 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13288 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13289 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13291 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13292 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13297 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13298 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13300 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13301 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13303 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13304 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13305 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13306 match &msg_events[0] {
13307 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13308 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13310 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13311 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13312 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13318 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13319 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13321 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13322 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13325 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13329 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13330 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13331 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13332 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13335 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13336 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13337 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13339 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13340 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13342 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13343 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13344 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13346 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13347 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13349 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13350 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13355 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13356 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13358 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13359 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13361 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13362 // not have generated any events.
13363 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13367 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13368 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13369 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13370 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13371 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13372 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13373 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13374 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13376 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13377 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13378 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13380 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13381 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13382 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13383 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13386 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13387 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13390 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13391 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13394 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13395 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13396 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13397 ..Default::default()
13399 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13400 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13401 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13403 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13404 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13407 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13408 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13409 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13410 ..Default::default()
13412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13413 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13414 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13417 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13418 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13421 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13422 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13423 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13424 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13425 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13428 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13429 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13430 ..Default::default()
13432 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13435 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13436 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13437 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13442 fn test_payment_display() {
13443 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13444 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13445 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13446 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13447 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13448 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13452 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13453 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13454 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13455 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13456 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13457 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13458 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13460 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13461 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13462 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13463 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13464 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13465 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13466 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13467 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13469 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13470 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13471 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13474 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13475 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13477 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13478 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13480 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13481 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13482 }, false).unwrap();
13483 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13484 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13485 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13487 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13489 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13490 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13491 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13492 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13493 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13494 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13495 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13496 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13497 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13498 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13499 } else { panic!() };
13500 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13501 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13502 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13503 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13505 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13507 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13508 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13509 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13514 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13515 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13516 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13517 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13520 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13521 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13522 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13524 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13525 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13527 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13528 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13531 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13532 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13533 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13535 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13539 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13540 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13541 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13543 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13548 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13549 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13550 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13551 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13553 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13554 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13555 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13557 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13559 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13560 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13561 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13562 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13564 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13565 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13567 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13573 use crate::chain::Listen;
13574 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13575 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13576 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13577 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13578 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13579 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13580 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13581 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13582 use crate::util::test_utils;
13583 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13585 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
13586 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13587 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13588 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13589 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13590 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
13592 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13594 use criterion::Criterion;
13596 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13597 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13598 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13599 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13600 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13601 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13602 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13604 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13605 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13607 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13608 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13610 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13612 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13615 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13616 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13619 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13620 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13621 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13623 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13624 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13626 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13627 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13628 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13629 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13630 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13632 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13633 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13634 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13636 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13637 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13638 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13639 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13641 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13642 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13643 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13645 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13646 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13647 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13648 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13649 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13651 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13652 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13653 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13655 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13656 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13658 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13659 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13660 }, false).unwrap();
13661 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13662 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13663 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13666 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13667 tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13668 value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
13670 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13671 } else { panic!(); }
13673 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13674 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13675 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13676 match events_b[0] {
13677 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13678 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13683 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13684 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13685 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13686 match events_a[0] {
13687 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13688 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13693 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13695 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13696 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13697 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13699 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13700 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13701 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13702 match msg_events[0] {
13703 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13704 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13705 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13709 match msg_events[1] {
13710 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13714 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13715 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13716 match events_a[0] {
13717 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13718 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13723 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13724 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13725 match events_b[0] {
13726 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13727 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13732 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13733 macro_rules! send_payment {
13734 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13735 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13736 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13737 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13738 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13739 payment_count += 1;
13740 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13741 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13743 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13744 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13745 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13746 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13747 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13748 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13749 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13750 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13751 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13752 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13753 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13755 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13756 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13757 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13758 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13760 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13761 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13762 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13763 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13764 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13766 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13769 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13770 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13771 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13772 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13774 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13778 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13779 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13780 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);