1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use util::crypto::sign;
75 use alloc::string::ToString;
76 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
77 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
78 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
79 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
80 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
81 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
82 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
84 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
85 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
86 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
119 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
134 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
136 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
137 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
138 unknown => Err(unknown),
143 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
144 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
146 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
148 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
149 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
150 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
152 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
153 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
154 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
155 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
157 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
158 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
159 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
162 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
163 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
165 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
166 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
167 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
168 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
170 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
171 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
173 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
176 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
177 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
181 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
182 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
183 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
185 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
187 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
188 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
189 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
190 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
191 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
192 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
194 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
195 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
196 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
201 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
202 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
203 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
204 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
206 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
207 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
208 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
210 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
213 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
215 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
216 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
219 /// The metadata is constructed as:
220 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
221 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
223 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
224 /// match what was constructed.
226 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
227 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
228 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
229 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
231 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
232 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
233 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
236 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
237 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
238 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
240 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
242 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
244 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
245 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
246 where L::Target: Logger
248 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
250 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
251 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
252 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
253 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
254 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
255 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
256 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
258 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
260 let mut payment_preimage = None;
261 match payment_type_res {
262 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
263 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
264 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
265 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
266 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
267 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
271 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
272 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
273 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
274 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
280 Err(unknown_bits) => {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
286 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
287 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
291 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
292 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
299 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
300 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
302 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
303 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
304 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
305 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
306 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
309 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
310 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
312 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
316 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
317 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
318 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
319 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
321 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
322 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
323 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
324 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
327 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
330 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
332 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
333 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
334 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
335 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
336 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
337 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
338 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
340 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
344 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
346 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
347 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
348 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
350 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
351 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
352 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
353 // before we forward it.
355 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
356 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
357 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
358 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
359 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
361 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
362 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
364 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
365 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
368 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
369 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
370 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
373 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
374 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
378 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
379 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
380 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
381 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
382 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
383 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
384 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
387 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
388 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
389 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
390 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
393 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
394 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
395 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
396 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
397 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
400 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
402 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
404 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
405 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
406 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
408 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
410 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
414 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
418 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
419 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
420 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
421 short_channel_id: u64,
423 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
424 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
426 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
427 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
432 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
433 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
434 /// are part of the same payment.
435 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
436 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
437 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
440 struct ClaimableHTLC {
441 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
444 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
448 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
449 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
450 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
451 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
453 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
454 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
459 impl Readable for PaymentId {
460 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
461 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
465 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
466 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
467 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
468 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
469 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
472 session_priv: SecretKey,
473 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
474 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
475 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
476 payment_id: PaymentId,
477 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
478 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
481 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
482 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
483 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
485 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
487 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
489 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
492 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
493 payment_id.hash(hasher);
494 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
495 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
496 payment_params.hash(hasher);
503 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
504 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
506 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
507 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
508 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
509 payment_secret: None,
510 payment_params: None,
515 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
516 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
518 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
526 struct ReceiveError {
532 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
533 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
535 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
540 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
542 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
543 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
544 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
545 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
546 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
548 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
549 err: msgs::LightningError,
550 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
551 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
553 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
555 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
557 err: LightningError {
559 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
560 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
567 shutdown_finish: None,
571 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
573 err: LightningError {
575 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
578 shutdown_finish: None,
582 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
583 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
586 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
588 err: LightningError {
590 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
591 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
597 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
598 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
602 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
605 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
607 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
608 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
612 log_level: Level::Warn,
615 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
619 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
621 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
622 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
628 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
631 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
639 shutdown_finish: None,
644 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
645 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
646 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
647 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
648 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
650 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
651 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
652 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
653 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
654 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
655 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
656 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
658 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
662 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
663 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
664 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
665 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
666 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
667 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
668 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
669 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
671 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
672 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
673 /// and via the classic SCID.
675 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
676 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
677 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
678 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
679 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
680 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
681 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
683 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
684 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
685 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
686 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
689 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
690 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
691 /// quite some time lag.
692 enum BackgroundEvent {
693 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
694 /// commitment transaction.
695 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
698 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
699 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
701 latest_features: InitFeatures,
704 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
705 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
707 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
710 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
711 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
712 struct PendingInboundPayment {
713 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
714 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
715 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
716 /// this payment being removed.
718 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
719 user_payment_id: u64,
720 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
721 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
722 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
725 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
726 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
727 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
729 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
732 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
733 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
734 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
735 pending_amt_msat: u64,
736 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
737 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
738 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
740 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
741 starting_block_height: u32,
743 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
744 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
745 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
747 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
748 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
750 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
751 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
752 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
753 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
754 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
756 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
758 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
759 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
763 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
764 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
766 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
770 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
772 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
776 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
778 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
782 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
784 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
789 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
798 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
799 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
800 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
801 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
802 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
803 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
807 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
808 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
811 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
812 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
813 let our_payment_hash;
814 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
815 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
816 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
818 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
819 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
820 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
824 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
828 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
829 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
830 let remove_res = match self {
831 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
832 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
833 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
835 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
839 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
840 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
841 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
842 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
843 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
844 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
851 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
852 let insert_res = match self {
853 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
854 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
855 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
857 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
858 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
861 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
862 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
863 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
864 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
865 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
872 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
874 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
875 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
876 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
877 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
884 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
885 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
886 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
887 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
888 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
889 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
890 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
892 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
893 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
895 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
896 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
897 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
898 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
899 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
900 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
901 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
902 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
904 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
905 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
907 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
908 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
910 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
911 /// to individual Channels.
913 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
914 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
915 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
916 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
918 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
919 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
920 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
921 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
922 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
923 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
924 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
926 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
927 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
928 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
929 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
932 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
933 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
934 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
935 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
936 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
938 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
939 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
940 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
941 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
942 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
943 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
944 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
945 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
946 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
950 default_configuration: UserConfig,
951 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
957 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
959 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
960 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
962 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
963 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
964 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
965 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
967 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
968 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
969 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
970 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
971 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
972 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
974 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
975 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
976 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
977 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
978 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
979 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
980 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
981 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
983 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
985 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
986 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
988 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
989 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
990 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
991 /// active channel list on load.
992 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
994 our_network_key: SecretKey,
995 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
997 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
999 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1000 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1001 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1003 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1004 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1006 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
1007 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
1008 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
1010 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1011 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1012 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1013 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1015 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1016 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1017 /// are currently open with that peer.
1018 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1019 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1022 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1023 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1025 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1026 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1027 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1028 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1029 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1030 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1031 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1032 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1033 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1035 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1042 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1044 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1045 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1046 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1047 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1048 pub struct ChainParameters {
1049 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1050 pub network: Network,
1052 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1054 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1055 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1058 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1064 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1065 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1066 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1067 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1068 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1069 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1071 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1072 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1073 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1074 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1075 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1077 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1078 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1081 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1082 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1083 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1086 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1087 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1089 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1090 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1091 should_persist: persist_check,
1092 _read_guard: read_guard,
1097 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1098 fn drop(&mut self) {
1099 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1100 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1105 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1106 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1108 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1110 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1111 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1112 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1113 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1114 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1116 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1117 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1119 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1121 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1122 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1123 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1124 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1125 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1126 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1127 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1129 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1130 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1132 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1133 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1134 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1135 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1137 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1138 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1139 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1140 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1141 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1142 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1145 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1147 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1148 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1151 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1153 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1154 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1155 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1157 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1158 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1160 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1161 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1162 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1163 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1164 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1165 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1166 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1167 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1168 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1169 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1170 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1173 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1174 /// to better separate parameters.
1175 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1176 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1177 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1178 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1179 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1180 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1181 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1182 pub features: InitFeatures,
1183 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1184 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1185 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1187 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1189 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1190 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1191 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1192 /// payments to us through this channel.
1193 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1196 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1197 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1198 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1199 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1200 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1201 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1202 /// lifetime of the channel.
1203 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1204 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1205 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1206 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1207 /// our counterparty already.
1209 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1210 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1211 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1212 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1214 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1215 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1216 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1217 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1219 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1220 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1222 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1223 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1224 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1225 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1226 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1227 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1228 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1230 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1231 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1233 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1234 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1235 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1236 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1237 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1238 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1239 /// this value on chain.
1241 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1243 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1245 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1246 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1247 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1248 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1249 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1250 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1251 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1253 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1254 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1255 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1256 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1258 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1259 pub balance_msat: u64,
1260 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1261 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1262 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1263 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1265 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1267 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1268 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1269 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1270 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1271 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1272 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1273 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1274 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1275 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1277 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1278 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1279 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1280 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1281 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1282 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1283 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1284 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1285 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1287 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1289 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1290 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1291 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1292 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1293 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1294 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1295 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1296 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1297 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1299 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1300 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1301 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1302 pub is_outbound: bool,
1303 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1304 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1305 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1306 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1307 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1309 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1310 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1311 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1312 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1314 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1315 pub is_usable: bool,
1316 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1317 pub is_public: bool,
1320 impl ChannelDetails {
1321 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1322 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1323 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1325 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1326 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1327 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1328 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1332 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1333 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1334 /// states for more.
1335 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1336 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1337 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1338 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1339 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1340 ParameterError(APIError),
1341 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1342 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1343 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1344 /// payment in full.
1346 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1348 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1349 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1350 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1351 /// paths than the ones selected).
1352 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1353 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1354 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1355 /// in over-/re-payment.
1357 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1358 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1359 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1361 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1362 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1363 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1364 /// with the latest update_id.
1366 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1367 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1368 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1369 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1370 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1371 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1372 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1373 payment_id: PaymentId,
1377 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1379 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1381 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1382 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1383 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1384 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1386 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1387 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1388 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1391 macro_rules! handle_error {
1392 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1395 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1396 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1398 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1399 // entering the macro.
1400 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1401 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1404 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1406 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1407 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1408 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1409 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1413 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1414 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1415 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1416 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1421 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1422 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1424 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1425 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1426 action: err.action.clone()
1430 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1431 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1434 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1441 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1442 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1443 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1444 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1446 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1447 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1448 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1449 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1450 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1452 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1453 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1455 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1459 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1460 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1463 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1464 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1466 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1467 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1469 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1470 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1471 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1472 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1473 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1474 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1476 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1477 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1478 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1479 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1480 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1481 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1487 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1488 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1492 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1494 $entry.remove_entry();
1502 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1503 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1507 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1509 $entry.remove_entry();
1517 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1518 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1520 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1521 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1527 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1528 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1530 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1531 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1532 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1533 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1534 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1535 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1536 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1537 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1538 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1539 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1540 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1541 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1542 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1543 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1546 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1547 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1548 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1549 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1550 match $action_type {
1551 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1552 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1554 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1555 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1557 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1558 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1559 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1560 if !$resend_commitment {
1561 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1564 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1566 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1567 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1571 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1572 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1574 $entry.remove_entry();
1578 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1579 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1580 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1582 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1583 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1585 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1586 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1588 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1589 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1593 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1594 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1595 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1597 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1598 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1602 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1603 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1604 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1605 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1606 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1609 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1614 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1615 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1616 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1617 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1618 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1620 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1621 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1622 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1623 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1624 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1625 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1626 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1627 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1628 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1633 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1634 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1635 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1636 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1637 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1639 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1640 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1641 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1643 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1644 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1645 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1646 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1649 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1650 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1651 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1652 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1653 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1654 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1655 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1656 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1657 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1658 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1659 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1660 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1663 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1664 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1665 // before it should be allowed to.
1666 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1667 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1669 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1670 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1671 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1676 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1677 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1678 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1679 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1680 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1681 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1682 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1683 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1684 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1685 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1686 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1687 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1688 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1689 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1690 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1691 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1692 let mut order = $order;
1694 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1696 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1700 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1701 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1702 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1703 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1708 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1709 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1710 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1711 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1712 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1717 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1721 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1726 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1727 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1728 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1733 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1734 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1735 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1736 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1737 assert!(res.is_ok());
1740 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1744 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1745 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1746 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1748 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1750 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1751 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1756 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1757 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1758 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1759 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1760 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1763 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1765 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1766 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1768 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1770 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1772 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1773 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1774 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1775 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1776 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1777 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1778 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1779 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1781 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1782 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1783 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1787 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1789 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1790 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1791 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1792 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1793 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1794 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1796 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1797 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1798 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1800 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1801 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1804 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1805 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1807 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1808 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1810 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1812 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1813 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1814 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1815 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1823 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1824 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1825 &self.default_configuration
1828 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1829 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1830 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1833 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1834 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1836 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1838 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1842 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1847 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1849 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1850 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1851 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1852 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1853 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1856 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1857 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1859 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1860 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1861 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1863 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1864 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1865 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1866 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1867 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1868 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1870 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1871 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1872 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1873 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1874 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1875 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1880 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1881 Some(peer_state) => {
1882 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1883 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1884 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1885 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1886 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1887 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1888 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1892 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1897 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1900 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1903 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1904 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1906 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1907 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1908 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1911 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1913 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1919 node_id: their_network_key,
1922 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1925 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1926 let mut res = Vec::new();
1928 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1929 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1930 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1931 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1932 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1933 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1934 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1935 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1936 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1937 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1938 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1939 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1940 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1941 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1943 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1944 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1945 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1946 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1947 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1948 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1949 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1950 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1952 inbound_capacity_msat,
1953 outbound_capacity_msat,
1954 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1955 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1956 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1957 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1958 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1959 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1960 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1965 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1966 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1967 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1973 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1974 /// more information.
1975 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1976 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1979 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1980 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1982 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1983 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1985 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1986 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1987 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1988 // really wanted anyway.
1989 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1992 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1993 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1994 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1995 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1996 Some(transaction) => {
1997 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
2001 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2002 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2003 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2004 reason: closure_reason
2008 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2011 let counterparty_node_id;
2012 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2013 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2014 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2015 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2016 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2018 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2020 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2021 Some(peer_state) => {
2022 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
2023 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2024 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
2026 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
2028 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2030 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2031 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
2032 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2033 let (result, is_permanent) =
2034 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
2036 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2042 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2043 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2047 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2048 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2049 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2054 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
2062 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2063 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2066 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
2070 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2071 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2072 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2074 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2075 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2077 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2078 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2079 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2080 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2082 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2084 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2085 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2086 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2087 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2088 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
2091 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2092 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2093 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2095 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2096 /// the channel being closed or not:
2097 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2098 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2099 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2100 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2101 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2102 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2103 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2105 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2107 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2108 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2109 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2110 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2111 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2115 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2116 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2117 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2118 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2119 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2121 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2122 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2123 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2124 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2125 // ignore the result here.
2126 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2130 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2131 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2132 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2134 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2135 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2136 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2137 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2138 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2139 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2142 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2143 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2144 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2147 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2149 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
2151 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2154 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2155 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2156 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2157 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2158 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2163 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2166 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2167 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2168 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2170 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2171 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2172 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2173 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2174 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2175 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2176 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2186 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2187 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2188 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2189 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2190 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2194 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2195 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2197 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2198 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2199 return Err(ReceiveError {
2200 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2202 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2205 // final_expiry_too_soon
2206 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2207 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2208 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2209 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2210 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2211 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2212 return Err(ReceiveError {
2214 err_data: Vec::new(),
2215 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2218 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2219 return Err(ReceiveError {
2221 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2222 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2226 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2227 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2228 return Err(ReceiveError {
2229 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2230 err_data: Vec::new(),
2231 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2234 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2235 return Err(ReceiveError {
2236 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2237 err_data: Vec::new(),
2238 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2241 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2242 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2243 return Err(ReceiveError {
2244 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2245 err_data: Vec::new(),
2246 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2248 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2249 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2251 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2252 phantom_shared_secret,
2254 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2255 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2256 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2257 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2258 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2259 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2260 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2261 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2262 return Err(ReceiveError {
2263 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2264 err_data: Vec::new(),
2265 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2269 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2271 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2274 return Err(ReceiveError {
2275 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2276 err_data: Vec::new(),
2277 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2282 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2285 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2286 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2287 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2291 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2292 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2293 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2295 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2296 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2297 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2298 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2299 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2300 failure_code: $err_code,
2301 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2306 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2307 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2310 let shared_secret = {
2311 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2312 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2316 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2317 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2318 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2319 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2320 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2321 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2322 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2323 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2326 let mut channel_state = None;
2327 macro_rules! return_err {
2328 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2330 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2331 if channel_state.is_none() {
2332 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2334 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2335 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2336 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2337 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2338 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2343 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2345 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2346 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2348 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2349 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2353 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2354 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2356 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2358 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2359 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2360 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2361 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2362 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2364 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2367 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2368 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2370 let blinding_factor = {
2371 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2372 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2373 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2374 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2377 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2379 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2381 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2384 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2385 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2388 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2389 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2390 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2391 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2392 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2396 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2397 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2398 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2401 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2402 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2403 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2404 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2409 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2410 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2411 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2412 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2413 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2414 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2415 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2416 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2417 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2418 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2419 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2421 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2424 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2427 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2429 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2430 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2431 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2432 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2433 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2434 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2435 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2437 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2438 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2439 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2440 // we don't have the channel here.
2441 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2443 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2445 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2446 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2447 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2448 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2449 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2450 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2451 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2453 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2454 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2456 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2457 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2458 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2459 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2460 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2462 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2463 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2465 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2466 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2468 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2469 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2470 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2471 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2472 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2473 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2475 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2476 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2478 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2479 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2480 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2481 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2482 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2483 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2484 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2485 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2486 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2487 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2493 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
2494 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2495 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2496 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2498 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2499 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2501 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2502 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2503 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2505 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2506 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2508 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2513 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2516 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2517 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2518 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2520 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2521 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2522 if !chan.should_announce() {
2523 return Err(LightningError {
2524 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2525 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2529 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2532 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2533 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2534 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2535 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2536 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2537 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2539 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2540 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2544 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2546 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2548 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2550 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2551 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2553 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2554 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2555 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2556 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2557 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2558 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2559 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2560 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2563 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2564 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2566 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2572 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2573 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2575 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2576 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2577 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2579 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2580 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2581 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2582 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2583 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2585 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2589 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2590 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2592 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2593 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2594 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2595 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2596 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2597 err: "Payment already completed"
2602 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2603 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2604 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2607 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2609 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2610 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2611 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2612 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2613 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2614 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2615 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2616 total_msat: total_value,
2618 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2622 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2623 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2625 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2626 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2628 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2629 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2631 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2632 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2634 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2635 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2637 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2638 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2639 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2640 channel_state, chan)
2642 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2643 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2644 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2645 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2646 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2647 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2648 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2649 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2650 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2651 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2653 insert_outbound_payment!();
2655 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2657 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2658 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2659 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2660 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2661 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2662 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2668 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2670 } else { unreachable!(); }
2674 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2675 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2677 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2682 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2684 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2685 /// fields for more info.
2687 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2688 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2689 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2690 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2691 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2692 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2694 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2696 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2697 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2698 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2700 /// In general, a path may raise:
2701 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2702 /// node public key) is specified.
2703 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2704 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2706 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2707 /// relevant updates.
2709 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2710 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2711 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2713 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2714 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2715 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2716 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2718 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2719 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2720 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2721 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2722 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2725 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2726 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2727 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2729 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2730 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2731 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2732 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2733 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2735 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2736 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2738 let mut total_value = 0;
2739 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2740 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2741 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2742 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2743 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2744 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2745 continue 'path_check;
2747 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2748 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2749 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2750 continue 'path_check;
2753 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2754 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2756 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2757 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2759 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2760 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2761 total_value = amt_msat;
2764 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2765 let mut results = Vec::new();
2766 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2767 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2769 let mut has_ok = false;
2770 let mut has_err = false;
2771 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2772 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2773 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2774 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2775 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2776 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2777 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2781 } else if res.is_err() {
2782 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2783 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2786 if has_err && has_ok {
2787 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2790 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2791 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2792 Some(RouteParameters {
2793 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2794 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2795 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2801 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2802 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2803 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2804 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2810 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2812 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2813 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2814 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2815 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2816 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2818 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2819 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2820 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2821 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2822 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2823 if path.len() == 0 {
2824 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2825 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2830 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2831 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2832 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2834 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2835 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2837 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2838 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2839 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2840 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2843 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2845 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2846 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2847 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2850 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2851 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2852 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2855 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2856 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2857 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2862 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2863 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2867 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2870 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2872 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2873 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2874 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2875 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2877 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2878 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2879 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2881 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2882 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2883 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2884 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2887 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2888 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2889 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2890 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2891 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2893 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2901 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2902 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2903 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2904 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2905 /// never reach the recipient.
2907 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2909 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2910 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2912 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2914 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2915 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2916 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2918 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2920 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2921 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2922 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2927 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2928 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2929 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2930 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2932 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2934 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2936 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2937 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2938 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2939 } else { unreachable!(); })
2942 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2944 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2945 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2948 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2949 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2954 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2956 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2959 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2961 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2971 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2972 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2973 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2977 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2979 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2980 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2982 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2983 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2985 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2986 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2987 /// keys per-channel).
2989 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2990 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2991 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2993 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2994 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2995 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2997 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2998 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2999 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3002 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3003 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3004 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3005 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3009 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3010 let mut output_index = None;
3011 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3012 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3013 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3014 if output_index.is_some() {
3015 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3016 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3019 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3020 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3021 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3024 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3027 if output_index.is_none() {
3028 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3029 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3032 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3037 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
3038 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
3039 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
3041 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
3044 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
3045 // smaller than 500:
3046 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
3048 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
3049 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
3050 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
3051 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
3052 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
3053 /// our network addresses.
3055 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
3056 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
3058 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
3059 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
3060 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
3061 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
3063 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
3065 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3066 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
3067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3069 if addresses.len() > 500 {
3070 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
3073 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
3074 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
3075 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
3077 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3078 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3079 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
3080 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
3081 rgb, alias, addresses,
3082 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
3083 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3085 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3086 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3088 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3089 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3091 let mut announced_chans = false;
3092 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3093 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
3094 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3096 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
3101 announced_chans = true;
3103 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
3104 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
3105 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
3109 if announced_chans {
3110 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3111 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3112 signature: node_announce_sig,
3113 contents: announcement
3119 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3121 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3122 /// Will likely generate further events.
3123 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3124 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3126 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3127 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3128 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3129 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3132 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3134 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3135 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3136 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3137 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3139 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3140 match forward_info {
3141 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3142 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3143 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3144 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3145 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3147 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3148 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3149 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3150 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3151 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3153 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3155 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3156 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3162 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3163 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3164 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3165 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3166 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3167 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3170 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3172 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3173 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3174 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3175 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3176 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3178 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3180 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3181 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3185 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3186 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3187 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3188 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3194 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3197 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3200 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3201 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3202 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3203 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3204 // problem, not ours.
3211 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3212 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3213 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3214 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3215 match forward_info {
3216 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3217 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3219 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3220 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3221 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3222 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3223 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3224 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3225 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3226 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3227 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3228 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3230 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3232 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3235 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3237 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3238 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3239 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3245 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3247 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3248 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3249 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3250 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3251 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3252 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3253 // this channel currently :/.
3259 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3260 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3262 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3264 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3266 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3269 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3271 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3272 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3273 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3276 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3278 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3279 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3280 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3281 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3282 // messages when we can.
3283 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3284 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3285 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3292 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3293 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3296 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3297 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3298 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3299 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3300 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3301 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3303 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3305 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3306 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3307 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3309 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3311 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3315 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3316 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3319 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3320 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3322 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3323 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3324 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3325 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3326 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3327 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3329 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3337 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3338 match forward_info {
3339 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3340 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3341 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3342 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3343 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3344 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3345 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3346 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3348 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3351 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3352 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3353 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3354 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3355 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3356 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3357 phantom_shared_secret,
3359 value: amt_to_forward,
3365 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3367 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3368 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3369 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3371 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3372 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3373 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3374 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3375 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3376 phantom_shared_secret,
3378 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3383 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3384 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3385 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3386 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3387 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3388 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3389 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3391 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3395 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3396 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3397 total_value += htlc.value;
3398 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3399 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3400 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3402 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3403 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3405 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3407 _ => unreachable!(),
3410 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3412 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3413 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3414 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3415 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3416 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3418 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3419 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3420 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3424 payment_received_generated = true;
3426 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3427 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3429 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3431 payment_received_generated
3435 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3436 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3437 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3438 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3439 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3440 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3441 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3442 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3444 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3445 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3446 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3447 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3449 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3453 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3454 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3455 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3457 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3458 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3460 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3461 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3463 amt: amt_to_forward,
3464 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3469 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3477 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3481 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3484 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3486 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3487 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3489 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3490 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3492 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3493 if payment_received_generated {
3494 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3500 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3501 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3509 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3512 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3514 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3515 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3518 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3519 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3520 events.append(&mut new_events);
3523 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3525 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3526 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3528 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3529 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3530 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3531 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3532 if background_events.is_empty() {
3536 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3538 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3539 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3540 // monitor updating completing.
3541 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3548 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3549 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3550 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3551 self.process_background_events();
3554 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3555 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3556 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3557 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3559 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3560 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3562 if !chan.is_live() {
3563 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3564 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3565 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3568 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3570 let mut retain_channel = true;
3571 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3574 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3575 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3579 let ret_err = match res {
3580 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3581 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3582 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3583 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3586 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3587 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3588 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3589 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3590 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3591 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3592 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3593 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3603 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3607 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3608 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3609 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3610 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3611 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3612 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3613 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3615 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3617 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3619 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3620 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3621 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3622 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3623 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3624 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3625 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3627 handle_errors.push(err);
3637 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3639 /// This currently includes:
3640 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3641 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3642 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3645 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3646 /// estimate fetches.
3647 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3648 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3649 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3650 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3652 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3654 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3655 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3657 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3659 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3660 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3661 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3662 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3663 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3664 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3666 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3668 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3670 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3671 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3672 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3673 if needs_close { return false; }
3676 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3677 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3678 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3679 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3680 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3681 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3682 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3683 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3687 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3688 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3690 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3691 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3692 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3696 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3697 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3705 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3706 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3707 // This should be unreachable
3708 debug_assert!(false);
3711 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3712 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3713 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3714 if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3716 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3717 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3718 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3720 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3728 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3729 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3732 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3733 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3739 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3740 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3741 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3742 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3743 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3744 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3747 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3748 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3749 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3750 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3751 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3752 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3753 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3754 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3755 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3756 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3757 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3763 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3764 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3766 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3768 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3769 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3770 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3771 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3772 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3773 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3774 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3776 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3778 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3779 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3781 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3786 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3787 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3788 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3789 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3790 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3791 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
3792 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3793 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3794 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3796 (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3797 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3798 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3800 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3801 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3802 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3803 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3804 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3808 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3809 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3810 // be surfaced to the user.
3811 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3812 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3814 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3815 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3816 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3818 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3822 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3823 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3824 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3826 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3827 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3828 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3829 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3830 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3831 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3832 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3833 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3834 Some(RouteParameters {
3835 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3836 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3837 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3840 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3841 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3842 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3844 rejected_by_dest: false,
3845 network_update: None,
3846 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3848 short_channel_id: None,
3855 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3856 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3858 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3864 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3871 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3872 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3873 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3874 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3875 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3876 /// still-available channels.
3877 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3878 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3879 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3880 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3883 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3884 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3885 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3887 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3888 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3889 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3890 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3891 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3892 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3893 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3894 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3895 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3898 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3899 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3902 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3903 all_paths_failed = true;
3904 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3905 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3907 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3913 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3916 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3917 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3918 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3919 Some(RouteParameters {
3920 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3921 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3922 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3927 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3928 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3930 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3932 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3933 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3934 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3935 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3936 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3937 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3938 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3939 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3946 error_code: onion_error_code,
3948 error_data: onion_error_data
3951 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3957 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3958 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3959 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3960 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3962 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3963 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3964 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3965 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3966 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3967 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3968 network_update: None,
3971 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3974 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3976 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3980 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3981 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3982 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3984 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3985 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3986 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3987 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3988 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3989 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3990 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3991 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3993 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3994 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3997 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3998 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3999 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4003 let mut forward_event = None;
4004 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4005 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4007 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4009 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4012 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4015 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4016 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4017 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4018 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4019 time_forwardable: time
4026 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4027 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4029 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4030 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4031 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4032 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4034 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
4035 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
4037 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4038 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4039 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4040 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4041 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
4042 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4046 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4047 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4048 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
4049 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4051 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4052 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4053 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4054 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4056 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4057 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4058 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4059 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4060 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4062 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4063 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4064 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4070 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4071 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4072 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4074 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4075 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4076 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4077 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4079 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4080 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4082 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4083 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4084 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4085 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4086 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4087 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4088 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4089 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4091 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4092 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4093 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4094 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4095 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4096 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4098 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4103 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4104 // which were generated.
4105 channel_state.take();
4107 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4108 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4109 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4116 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4117 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4118 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4119 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4120 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4122 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4126 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4127 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4128 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4129 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4130 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4131 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4132 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4133 payment_preimage, e);
4134 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4135 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4136 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4137 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4140 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4141 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4142 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4143 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4144 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4145 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4146 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4147 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4148 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4149 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4155 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4157 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4160 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4161 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4162 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4163 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4164 payment_preimage, e);
4166 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4167 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4169 chan.remove_entry();
4171 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4174 } else { unreachable!(); }
4177 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4178 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4179 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4180 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4181 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4182 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4183 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4184 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4185 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4186 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4187 pending_events.push(
4188 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4190 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4195 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4203 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4205 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4206 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4207 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4208 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4209 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4210 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4212 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4213 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4214 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4215 pending_events.push(
4216 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4217 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4223 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4227 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4228 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4229 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4231 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4232 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4233 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4234 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4235 pending_events.push(
4236 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4244 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4252 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4253 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4254 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4255 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4256 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4257 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4258 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4261 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4262 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4263 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4264 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4265 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4268 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4269 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4270 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4271 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4272 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4273 payment_preimage, e);
4275 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4276 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4277 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4278 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4281 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4282 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4283 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4284 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4288 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4289 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4290 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4293 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4295 let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4296 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4299 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4307 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4308 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4309 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4312 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4315 let chan_restoration_res;
4316 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4317 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4319 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4323 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4327 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4328 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4329 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4330 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4331 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4332 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4334 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4335 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4336 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4341 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4342 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4343 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4345 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4347 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4348 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4349 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4350 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4354 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4357 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4359 /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4360 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4361 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
4363 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4364 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4365 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4368 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4369 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4370 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4372 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4373 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4375 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4376 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4377 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4381 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4387 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4388 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4389 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4392 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4393 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4396 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4397 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4398 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4399 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4402 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4407 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4408 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4409 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4411 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4412 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4415 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4416 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4417 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4418 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4421 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4422 pending_events.push(
4423 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4424 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4425 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4426 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4427 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4428 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4433 entry.insert(channel);
4439 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4440 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4441 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4442 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4443 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4445 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4446 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4448 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4449 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4454 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4455 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4456 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4457 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4459 user_channel_id: user_id,
4464 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4465 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4466 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4467 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4471 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4474 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4479 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4480 // lock before watch_channel
4481 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4483 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4484 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4485 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4486 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4487 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4488 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4489 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4490 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4491 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4492 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4495 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4496 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4497 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4498 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4499 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4500 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4504 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4505 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4506 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4511 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4512 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4521 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4523 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4524 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4526 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4528 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4531 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4532 Ok(update) => update,
4533 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4535 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4536 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4537 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4538 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4539 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4540 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4541 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4542 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4552 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4553 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4557 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4558 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4559 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4560 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4562 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4565 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4566 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4567 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4570 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4571 msg: announcement_sigs,
4573 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4574 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4575 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4576 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4577 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4578 // announcement_signatures.
4579 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4580 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4582 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4593 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4594 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4595 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4596 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4597 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4599 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4601 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4605 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4606 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4607 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4608 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4611 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4612 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4614 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4615 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4616 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4617 let (result, is_permanent) =
4618 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4620 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4626 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4627 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4628 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4638 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4642 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4646 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4647 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4648 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4649 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4650 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4651 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4652 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4655 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4656 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4657 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4658 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4663 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4664 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4665 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4666 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4667 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4668 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4669 } else { (tx, None) }
4671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4674 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4675 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4676 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4678 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4679 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4680 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4681 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4685 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4690 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4691 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4692 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4693 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4695 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4696 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4697 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4698 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4700 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4701 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4703 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4705 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4706 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4709 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4710 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4711 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4712 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4713 match pending_forward_info {
4714 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4715 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4716 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4717 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4719 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4721 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4722 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4723 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4726 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4728 _ => pending_forward_info
4731 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4738 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4739 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4740 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4741 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4742 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4744 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4747 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4752 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4756 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4757 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4758 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4761 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4764 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4771 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4772 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4773 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4774 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4776 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4779 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4780 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4781 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4783 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4790 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4793 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4795 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4796 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4798 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4799 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4800 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4801 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4802 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4803 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4804 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4809 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4810 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4813 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4814 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4816 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4817 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4818 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4819 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4820 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4821 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4822 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4823 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4825 commitment_signed: msg,
4831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4836 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4837 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4838 let mut forward_event = None;
4839 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4840 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4841 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4842 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4844 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4845 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4846 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4847 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4848 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4851 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4852 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4855 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4856 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4861 match forward_event {
4863 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4864 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4865 time_forwardable: time
4873 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4874 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4877 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4878 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4880 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4881 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4883 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4884 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4885 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4886 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4887 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4888 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4889 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4890 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4891 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4892 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4893 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4895 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4896 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4897 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4898 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4899 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4901 } else { unreachable!(); }
4904 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4905 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4906 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4910 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4911 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4912 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4913 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4914 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4919 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4921 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4922 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4924 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4925 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4927 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4928 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4935 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4936 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4937 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4938 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4940 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4941 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4943 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4950 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4951 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4952 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4954 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4956 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4957 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4959 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4960 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4964 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4965 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4966 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4967 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4968 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4976 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4977 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4980 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4981 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4983 // It's not a local channel
4984 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4987 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4989 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4990 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4991 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4992 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4993 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4994 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4998 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4999 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5000 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5001 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5003 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5008 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5011 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5012 let chan_restoration_res;
5013 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5014 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5015 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5017 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5019 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5022 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5023 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5024 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5025 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5026 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5027 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5028 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5029 let mut channel_update = None;
5030 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5032 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5035 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5036 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5037 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5038 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5039 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5040 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5041 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5046 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5047 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5048 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5049 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
5050 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5053 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5055 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5058 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5059 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
5061 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5062 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
5067 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5068 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5069 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5070 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5071 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5072 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5073 match monitor_event {
5074 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5075 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5076 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5077 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
5079 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5080 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5083 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5084 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5085 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5086 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5087 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5088 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5089 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5090 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5091 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5092 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5093 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5097 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5098 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5100 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5102 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5103 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5104 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5105 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5106 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5111 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5112 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5117 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5118 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5121 has_pending_monitor_events
5124 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5125 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5126 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5128 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5129 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5132 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5133 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5134 /// update was applied.
5136 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5137 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5138 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5139 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5140 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5141 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5142 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5143 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5145 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5146 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5147 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5148 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5149 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5151 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5152 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5153 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5154 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5155 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
5157 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5158 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5159 has_monitor_update = true;
5160 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5161 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5162 if close_channel { return false; }
5164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5165 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5166 updates: commitment_update,
5173 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5174 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5175 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5182 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5183 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5184 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5187 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5188 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5194 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5195 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5196 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5197 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5198 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5199 let mut has_update = false;
5201 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5202 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5203 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5204 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5205 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5207 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5208 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5209 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5210 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5212 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5213 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5216 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5217 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5218 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5219 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5225 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5227 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5228 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5229 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5235 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5236 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5243 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5244 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5250 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5251 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5253 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5254 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5255 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5256 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5257 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5258 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5259 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5260 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5261 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5262 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5263 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5264 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5265 assert!(should_broadcast);
5266 } else { unreachable!(); }
5267 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5269 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5273 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5274 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5276 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5277 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5280 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5283 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5284 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5286 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5287 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5288 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5289 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5290 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5291 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5292 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5293 // never fail a payment too early.
5294 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5296 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5304 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5307 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5308 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5310 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5311 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5312 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5314 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5316 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5317 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5321 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5322 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5324 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5326 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5327 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5328 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5329 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5330 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5331 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5334 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5335 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5337 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5340 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5342 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5344 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5345 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5346 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5347 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5348 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5351 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5352 /// stored external to LDK.
5354 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5355 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5356 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5358 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5359 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5362 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5363 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5364 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5365 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5367 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5368 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5369 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5370 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5371 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5373 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5374 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5375 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5376 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5377 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5379 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5380 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5382 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5383 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5387 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5388 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5390 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5392 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5393 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5394 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5395 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5398 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5399 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5401 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5404 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5406 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5408 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5409 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5412 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5413 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5415 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5416 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5417 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5420 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5421 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5423 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5424 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5425 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5426 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5428 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5429 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5430 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5437 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5439 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5440 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5442 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5443 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5444 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5448 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5449 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5450 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5451 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5452 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5457 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5458 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5462 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5463 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5467 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5468 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5469 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5470 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5471 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5474 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5475 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5476 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5477 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5479 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5480 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5481 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5482 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5485 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5486 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5488 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5489 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5492 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5493 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5494 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5496 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5497 events.replace(pending_events);
5506 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5508 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5510 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5511 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5514 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5516 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5517 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5519 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5520 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5521 /// restarting from an old state.
5522 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5523 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5524 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5526 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5527 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5528 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5529 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5532 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5533 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5534 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5537 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5538 handler.handle_event(&event);
5546 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5548 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5549 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5550 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5551 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5554 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5556 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5557 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5558 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5559 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5560 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5563 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5564 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5565 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5568 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5570 let new_height = height - 1;
5572 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5573 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5574 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5575 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5576 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5577 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5580 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5584 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5586 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5587 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5588 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5589 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5592 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5593 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5594 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5595 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5597 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5598 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5601 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5602 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5604 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5605 if height < last_best_block_height {
5606 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5607 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5611 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5612 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5613 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5614 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5616 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5617 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5621 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5623 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5625 macro_rules! max_time {
5626 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5628 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5629 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5630 // having an explicit local time source.
5631 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5632 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5633 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5634 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5635 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5641 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5642 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5643 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5644 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5645 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5648 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5649 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5650 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5651 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5652 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5653 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5654 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5655 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5656 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5664 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5665 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5666 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5667 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5668 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5669 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5675 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5678 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5679 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5680 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5681 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5682 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5687 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5689 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5691 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5695 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5696 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5698 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5699 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5700 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5701 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5702 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5704 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5705 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5707 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5708 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5709 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5710 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5711 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5712 let res = f(channel);
5713 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5714 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5715 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5716 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5720 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5721 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5722 if channel.is_usable() {
5723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5724 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5725 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5726 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5734 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5736 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5737 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5738 msg: announcement_sigs,
5740 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5741 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5742 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5744 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5745 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5746 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5751 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5752 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5753 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5754 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5755 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5756 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5757 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5761 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5762 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5764 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5765 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5766 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5767 data: reason_message,
5775 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5776 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5777 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5778 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5779 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5780 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5781 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5782 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5783 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5784 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5785 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5786 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5787 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5792 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5797 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5799 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5800 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5804 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5805 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5806 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5809 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5810 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5811 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5812 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5815 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5816 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5818 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5819 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5822 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5823 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5824 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5825 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5826 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5830 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5831 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5832 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5833 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5837 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5838 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5839 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5840 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5841 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5842 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5845 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5846 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5847 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5850 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5852 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5855 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5857 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5860 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5862 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5865 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5867 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5870 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5872 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5875 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5877 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5880 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5882 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5885 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5887 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5890 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5892 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5895 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5897 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5900 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5902 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5905 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5910 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5915 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5920 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5921 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5922 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5925 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5930 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5935 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5937 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5938 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5940 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5941 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5942 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5943 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5944 if no_connection_possible {
5945 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5946 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5947 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5948 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5949 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5950 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5951 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5955 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5962 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5963 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5964 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5965 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5966 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5967 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5968 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5971 no_channels_remain = false;
5977 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5979 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5980 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5981 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5982 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5983 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5984 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5985 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5986 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5987 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5988 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5989 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5990 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5991 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5992 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5993 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5994 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5995 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5996 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5997 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5998 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6002 if no_channels_remain {
6003 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6006 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6007 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6011 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6012 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6017 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6018 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6020 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6021 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6024 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6025 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6030 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6031 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6032 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6033 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6034 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6035 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6036 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6037 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6038 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6043 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6044 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6050 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6053 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6056 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6057 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6058 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6059 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6060 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6065 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6066 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6067 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6068 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6071 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6073 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6081 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6082 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6087 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6088 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6089 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6090 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6091 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6092 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6095 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6098 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6104 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6105 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6110 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6111 let result = *guard;
6119 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6120 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6121 let current_time = Instant::now();
6123 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6124 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6129 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6130 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6131 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6132 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6133 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6135 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6136 let result = *guard;
6137 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6141 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6142 None => return result,
6148 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6150 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6151 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6152 *persistence_lock = true;
6153 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6158 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6159 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6161 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6162 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6163 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6164 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6167 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6168 (2, node_id, required),
6169 (4, features, required),
6170 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6171 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6174 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6175 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6176 (2, channel_id, required),
6177 (3, channel_type, option),
6178 (4, counterparty, required),
6179 (6, funding_txo, option),
6180 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6181 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6182 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6183 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6184 (16, balance_msat, required),
6185 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6186 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6187 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6188 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6189 (26, is_outbound, required),
6190 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
6191 (30, is_usable, required),
6192 (32, is_public, required),
6195 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6196 (2, channels, vec_type),
6197 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6198 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6201 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6203 (0, onion_packet, required),
6204 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6207 (0, payment_data, required),
6208 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6209 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6211 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6212 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6213 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6217 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6218 (0, routing, required),
6219 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6220 (4, payment_hash, required),
6221 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6222 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6226 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6229 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6231 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6232 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6233 reason.write(writer)?;
6235 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6236 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6239 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6240 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6241 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6242 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6249 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6250 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6251 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6254 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6255 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6256 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6257 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6261 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6262 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6263 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6264 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6265 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6268 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6269 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6270 // messages contained in the variants.
6271 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6272 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6273 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6275 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6276 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6277 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6278 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6279 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6282 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6283 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6284 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6285 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6286 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6288 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6293 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6298 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6299 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6300 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6301 (2, outpoint, required),
6302 (4, htlc_id, required),
6303 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6306 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6307 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6308 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6309 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6312 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6313 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6314 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6319 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6320 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6321 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6327 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6328 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6329 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6331 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6332 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6333 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6337 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6338 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6339 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6341 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6343 if payment_data.is_some() {
6344 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6346 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6349 if payment_data.is_none() {
6350 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6352 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6356 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6365 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6366 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6367 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6370 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6371 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6372 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6373 let mut payment_id = None;
6374 let mut payment_secret = None;
6375 let mut payment_params = None;
6376 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6377 (0, session_priv, required),
6378 (1, payment_id, option),
6379 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6380 (3, payment_secret, option),
6381 (4, path, vec_type),
6382 (5, payment_params, option),
6384 if payment_id.is_none() {
6385 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6387 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6389 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6390 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6391 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6392 path: path.unwrap(),
6393 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6398 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6399 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6404 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6407 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6409 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6410 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6411 (0, session_priv, required),
6412 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6413 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6414 (3, payment_secret, option),
6415 (4, path, vec_type),
6416 (5, payment_params, option),
6419 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6421 field.write(writer)?;
6428 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6429 (0, LightningError) => {
6433 (0, failure_code, required),
6434 (2, data, vec_type),
6438 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6440 (0, forward_info, required),
6441 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6442 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6443 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6446 (0, htlc_id, required),
6447 (2, err_packet, required),
6451 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6452 (0, payment_secret, required),
6453 (2, expiry_time, required),
6454 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6455 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6456 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6459 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6461 (0, session_privs, required),
6464 (0, session_privs, required),
6465 (1, payment_hash, option),
6468 (0, session_privs, required),
6469 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6470 (2, payment_hash, required),
6471 (4, payment_secret, option),
6472 (6, total_msat, required),
6473 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6474 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6477 (0, session_privs, required),
6478 (2, payment_hash, required),
6482 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6483 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6484 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6485 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6489 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6490 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6492 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6494 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6496 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6497 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6498 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6501 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6502 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6503 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6504 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6505 unfunded_channels += 1;
6508 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6509 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6510 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6511 channel.write(writer)?;
6515 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6516 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6517 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6518 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6519 for forward in pending_forwards {
6520 forward.write(writer)?;
6524 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6525 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6526 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6527 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6528 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6529 htlc.write(writer)?;
6533 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6534 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6535 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6536 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6537 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6538 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6541 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6542 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6543 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6544 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6545 for event in events.iter() {
6546 event.write(writer)?;
6549 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6550 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6551 for event in background_events.iter() {
6553 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6555 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6556 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6561 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6562 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6564 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6565 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6566 hash.write(writer)?;
6567 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6570 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6571 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6572 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6573 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6574 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6577 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6578 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6580 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6581 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6582 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6583 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6586 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6587 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6591 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6592 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6593 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6595 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6596 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6597 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6602 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6603 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6604 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6605 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6606 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6613 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6615 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6617 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6618 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6619 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6620 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6621 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6622 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6623 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6624 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6625 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6626 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6627 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6628 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6629 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6631 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6632 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6634 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6635 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6637 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6638 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6639 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6640 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6641 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6642 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6644 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6645 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6646 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6647 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6648 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6649 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6652 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6653 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6655 pub keys_manager: K,
6657 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6659 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6660 pub fee_estimator: F,
6661 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6663 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6664 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6665 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6666 pub chain_monitor: M,
6668 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6669 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6670 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6671 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6672 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6673 /// deserialization.
6675 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6676 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6677 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6679 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6680 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6682 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6683 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6684 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6685 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6687 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6690 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6691 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6694 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6695 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6696 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6697 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6698 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6699 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6702 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6703 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6704 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6705 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6706 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6708 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6709 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6714 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6715 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6716 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6717 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6718 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6719 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6720 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6721 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6724 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6725 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6726 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6730 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6731 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6732 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6733 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6734 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6735 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6738 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6739 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6741 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6742 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6747 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6748 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6749 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6750 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6751 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6752 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6753 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6754 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6755 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6756 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6757 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6758 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6759 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6760 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6761 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6762 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6763 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6764 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6765 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6766 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6767 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6768 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6769 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6770 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6771 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6772 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6773 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6774 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6775 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6776 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6777 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6778 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6779 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6780 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6781 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6782 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6783 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6784 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6785 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6788 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6789 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6790 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6792 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6795 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6796 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6797 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6798 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6799 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6800 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6804 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6805 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6806 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6807 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6811 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6812 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6814 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6815 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6816 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6817 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6818 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6819 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6821 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6824 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6826 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6827 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6830 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6831 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6833 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6836 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6838 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6839 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let peer_state = PeerState {
6841 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6843 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6846 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6847 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6848 for _ in 0..event_count {
6849 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6850 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6854 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6855 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6856 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6857 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6858 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6859 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6860 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6861 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6865 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6867 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6868 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6869 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6870 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6874 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6879 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6880 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6881 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6885 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6887 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6888 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6889 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6891 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6893 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6898 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6899 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6900 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6901 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6902 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6903 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6904 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6905 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6906 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6907 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6909 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6910 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6913 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6914 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6915 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6916 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6917 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6918 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6920 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6922 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6923 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6924 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6925 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6926 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6927 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6928 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6930 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6931 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6932 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6933 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6934 if path.is_empty() {
6935 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6936 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6938 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6939 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6940 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6941 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6943 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6944 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6945 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6948 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6949 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6950 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6951 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6953 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6954 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6955 total_msat: path_amt,
6956 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6958 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6959 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6968 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6969 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6971 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6972 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6975 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6977 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6979 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6980 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6981 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6982 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6983 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6987 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6988 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6989 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6990 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6992 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6993 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6994 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6996 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6997 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6998 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6999 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7000 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7001 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7003 if chan.is_usable() {
7004 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
7005 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7006 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7007 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7008 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7013 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7014 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7015 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7017 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7018 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7019 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7021 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7023 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7028 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7030 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7031 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7032 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7034 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7035 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7041 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7042 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7044 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7046 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7047 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7048 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7049 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7051 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7052 logger: args.logger,
7053 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7056 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7057 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7060 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7061 //connection or two.
7063 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7069 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7070 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7071 use core::time::Duration;
7072 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7073 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7074 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7075 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7076 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7077 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7079 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7080 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7081 use util::errors::APIError;
7082 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7083 use util::test_utils;
7084 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7086 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7088 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7089 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7091 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7094 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7095 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7097 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7098 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7099 thread::spawn(move || {
7101 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7102 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7103 *persistence_lock = true;
7106 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7112 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7113 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7115 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7118 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7123 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7125 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7128 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7135 fn test_notify_limits() {
7136 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7137 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7141 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7143 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7144 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7145 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7146 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7147 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7149 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7151 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7152 // to connect messages with new values
7153 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7154 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7155 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7156 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7158 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7159 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7160 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7161 // ... but the last node should not.
7162 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7163 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7164 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7165 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7167 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7168 // about the channel.
7169 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7170 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7171 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7173 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7175 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7176 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7177 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7178 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7179 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7180 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7182 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7183 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7184 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7186 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7187 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7188 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7189 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7190 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7191 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7193 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7194 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7195 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7196 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7197 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7198 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7199 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7200 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7202 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7203 // the channel info has updated.
7204 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7205 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7206 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7207 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7208 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7209 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7213 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7214 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7216 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7217 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7218 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7219 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7222 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7223 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7224 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7225 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7226 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7227 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7228 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7230 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7232 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7234 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7235 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7237 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7239 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7240 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7241 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7243 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7244 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7245 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7247 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7248 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7249 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7250 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7251 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7252 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7253 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7254 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7255 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7257 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7258 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7260 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7262 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7264 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7265 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7266 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7267 // lightning messages manually.
7268 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7270 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7274 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7275 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7277 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7280 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7281 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7282 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7284 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7285 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7286 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7290 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7292 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7293 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7296 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7297 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7301 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7302 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7303 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7304 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7309 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7310 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7311 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7312 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7317 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7318 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7319 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7320 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7327 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7328 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7329 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7330 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7331 // fails as expected.
7332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7335 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7336 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7337 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7338 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7340 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7341 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7342 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7344 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7345 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7346 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7347 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7348 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7350 let route = find_route(
7351 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7352 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7354 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7356 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7358 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7359 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7360 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7362 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7363 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7364 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7366 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7367 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7368 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7369 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7370 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7371 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7372 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7373 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7374 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7376 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7377 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7379 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7380 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7381 let route = find_route(
7382 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7383 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7385 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7387 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7388 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7389 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7390 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7391 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7393 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7394 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7395 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7397 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7398 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7399 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7400 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7401 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7403 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7404 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7405 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7407 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7408 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7409 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7410 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7411 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7412 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7413 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7414 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7415 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7417 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7418 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7422 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7423 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7424 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7428 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7430 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7431 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7432 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7433 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7435 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7436 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7437 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7438 final_value_msat: 10000,
7439 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7441 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7442 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7443 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7444 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7445 let route = find_route(
7446 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7447 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7450 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7451 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7452 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7455 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7456 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7457 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7458 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7459 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7460 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7461 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7463 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7467 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7468 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7474 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7475 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7476 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7477 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7479 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7480 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7481 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7482 final_value_msat: 10000,
7483 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7485 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7486 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7487 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7488 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7489 let route = find_route(
7490 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7491 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7494 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7495 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7496 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7497 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7500 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7501 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7502 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7503 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7504 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7505 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7506 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7508 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7512 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7516 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7518 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7519 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7520 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7521 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7523 // Marshall an MPP route.
7524 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7525 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7526 route.paths.push(path);
7527 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7528 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7529 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7530 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7531 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7532 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7534 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7535 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7536 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7537 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7542 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7543 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7549 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7550 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7552 total_msat: 100_000,
7555 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7556 // payment verification fails as expected.
7557 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7558 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7559 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7560 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7562 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7566 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7567 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7571 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7574 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7575 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7576 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7577 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7578 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7579 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7580 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7581 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7582 use util::test_utils;
7583 use util::config::UserConfig;
7584 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7586 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7587 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7588 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7590 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7594 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7595 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7596 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7597 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7598 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7599 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7600 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7605 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7606 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7609 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7610 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7611 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7613 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7614 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7616 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7617 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7619 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7620 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7622 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7623 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7624 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7625 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7626 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7628 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7630 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7632 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7633 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7634 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7635 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7636 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7638 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7640 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7642 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7643 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7644 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7645 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7646 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7649 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7650 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7651 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7653 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7654 } else { panic!(); }
7656 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7657 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7659 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7662 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7665 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7666 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7668 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7669 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7670 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7671 match msg_events[0] {
7672 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7673 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7674 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7678 match msg_events[1] {
7679 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7683 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7685 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7686 macro_rules! send_payment {
7687 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7688 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7689 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7690 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7691 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7692 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7693 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7694 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7695 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7696 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7698 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7699 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7701 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7702 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7704 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7705 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7706 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7707 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7708 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7709 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7710 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7711 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7714 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7715 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7717 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7718 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7719 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7720 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7721 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7723 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7726 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7727 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7728 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7729 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7731 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7736 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7737 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);