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Add PaymentPurpose::is_keysend utility method
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 use {
80         crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
81         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
82         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
83         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
84         crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 };
86 #[cfg(c_bindings)]
87 use {
88         crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
89         crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 };
91
92 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
93
94 use crate::io;
95 use crate::prelude::*;
96 use core::{cmp, mem};
97 use core::cell::RefCell;
98 use crate::io::Read;
99 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
100 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
101 use core::time::Duration;
102 use core::ops::Deref;
103
104 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
105 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
106 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
107
108 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
109 //
110 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
111 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
112 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
113 //
114 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
115 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
116 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
117 // before we forward it.
118 //
119 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
120 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
121 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
122 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
123 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
124
125 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
128 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
129         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
130         Forward {
131                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
132                 /// do with the HTLC.
133                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
134                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
135                 ///
136                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
137                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
138                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
139                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
140                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
141                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
142         },
143         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
144         ///
145         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
146         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
147         Receive {
148                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
149                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
150                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
151                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
152                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
153                 ///
154                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
157                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
158                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
159                 /// blinded path was not used.
160                 ///
161                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
162                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
163                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
164                 ///
165                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
166                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
167                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
168                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
169                 /// instructions.
170                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
171                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
172                 ///
173                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
174                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
175                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
176                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
177                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
178                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
179         },
180         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
181         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
182         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
183         ReceiveKeysend {
184                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
185                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
186                 ///
187                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
188                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
189                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
191                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
192                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
193                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
194                 ///
195                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
196                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
197                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
198                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
199                 ///
200                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
201                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
202                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
203                 ///
204                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
205                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
206                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
207                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
208                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
209         },
210 }
211
212 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
213 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
214 pub struct BlindedForward {
215         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
216         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
217         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
218         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
219         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
220         /// the introduction node.
221         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
222 }
223
224 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
225         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
226         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
227                 match self {
228                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
229                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
230                         Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
231                         _ => None,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
237 /// should go next.
238 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
239 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
240 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
241         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
242         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
243         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
244         ///
245         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
246         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
247         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
248         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
250         ///
251         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
252         /// versions.
253         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
254         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
255         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
256         ///
257         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
258         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
259         /// it along another path).
260         ///
261         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
262         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
263         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
264         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
265         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
266         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
267         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
268         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
269         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
270         ///
271         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
272         /// HTLC.
273         ///
274         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
275         ///
276         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
277         /// shoulder them.
278         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
279 }
280
281 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
282 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
283         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
284         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
285 }
286
287 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
288 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
289 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
290         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
291         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
292 }
293
294 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
295 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
296         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
297
298         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
299         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
300         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
301         // HTLCs.
302         //
303         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
304         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
305         prev_htlc_id: u64,
306         prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
307         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
308         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
309 }
310
311 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
312 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
313         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
314         FailHTLC {
315                 htlc_id: u64,
316                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317         },
318         FailMalformedHTLC {
319                 htlc_id: u64,
320                 failure_code: u16,
321                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
322         },
323 }
324
325 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
326 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
328 pub enum BlindedFailure {
329         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
330         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
331         FromIntroductionNode,
332         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
333         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334         FromBlindedNode,
335 }
336
337 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
340         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
341         short_channel_id: u64,
342         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
343         htlc_id: u64,
344         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
345         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
346         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
347         channel_id: ChannelId,
348
349         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
350         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351         outpoint: OutPoint,
352 }
353
354 enum OnionPayload {
355         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
356         Invoice {
357                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
358                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
359                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
360                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
361                 /// blinded path was not used.
362                 ///
363                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
364                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
365         },
366         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
367         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 }
369
370 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
371 struct ClaimableHTLC {
372         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
373         cltv_expiry: u32,
374         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
375         value: u64,
376         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
377         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
378         sender_intended_value: u64,
379         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
380         timer_ticks: u8,
381         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
382         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
383         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
384         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
385         total_msat: u64,
386         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
387         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 }
389
390 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
391         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
392                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
393                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
394                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
395                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
396                         value_msat: val.value,
397                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
398                 }
399         }
400 }
401
402 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
403 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
404 ///
405 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
406 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
407 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408
409 impl PaymentId {
410         /// Number of bytes in the id.
411         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 }
413
414 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
415         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
416                 self.0.write(w)
417         }
418 }
419
420 impl Readable for PaymentId {
421         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
422                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
423                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
424         }
425 }
426
427 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
428         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
429                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
430         }
431 }
432
433 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
434 ///
435 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
436 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
437 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
438
439 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
440         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
441                 self.0.write(w)
442         }
443 }
444
445 impl Readable for InterceptId {
446         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
447                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
448                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
449         }
450 }
451
452 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
453 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
454 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
455         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
456         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 }
458 impl SentHTLCId {
459         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
460                 match source {
461                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
462                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
463                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
464                         },
465                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
466                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
467                 }
468         }
469 }
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
471         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
472                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
473                 (2, htlc_id, required),
474         },
475         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
476                 (0, session_priv, required),
477         };
478 );
479
480
481 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
482 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
483 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
484 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
485         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486         OutboundRoute {
487                 path: Path,
488                 session_priv: SecretKey,
489                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
490                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
491                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
492                 payment_id: PaymentId,
493         },
494 }
495 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
496 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
497         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
498                 match self {
499                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
500                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
501                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
502                         },
503                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
505                                 path.hash(hasher);
506                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
507                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
508                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
509                         },
510                 }
511         }
512 }
513 impl HTLCSource {
514         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
515         #[cfg(test)]
516         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
517                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
518                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
519                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
520                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
521                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
522                 }
523         }
524
525         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
526         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
527         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
528         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
529                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
530                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
531                 } else {
532                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
533                         true
534                 }
535         }
536 }
537
538 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
539 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
540 ///
541 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
542 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
543 pub enum FailureCode {
544         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
545         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
546         TemporaryNodeFailure,
547         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
548         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
549         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
550         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
551         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
552         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
553         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
554         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
555         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
556         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
557         ///
558         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
559         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
560         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 }
562
563 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
564     fn into(self) -> u16 {
565                 match self {
566                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
567                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
568                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
569                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
570                 }
571         }
572 }
573
574 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
575 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
576 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
577 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
578 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
579
580 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
581         err: msgs::LightningError,
582         closes_channel: bool,
583         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
584 }
585 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
586         #[inline]
587         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
588                 Self {
589                         err: LightningError {
590                                 err: err.clone(),
591                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
592                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
593                                                 channel_id,
594                                                 data: err
595                                         },
596                                 },
597                         },
598                         closes_channel: false,
599                         shutdown_finish: None,
600                 }
601         }
602         #[inline]
603         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
604                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605         }
606         #[inline]
607         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
608                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
609                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
610                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
611                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
612                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
613                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
614                 } else {
615                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616                 };
617                 Self {
618                         err: LightningError { err, action },
619                         closes_channel: true,
620                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
621                 }
622         }
623         #[inline]
624         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625                 Self {
626                         err: match err {
627                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
628                                         err: msg.clone(),
629                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
630                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
631                                                         channel_id,
632                                                         data: msg
633                                                 },
634                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
635                                         },
636                                 },
637                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
638                                         err: msg,
639                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
640                                 },
641                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
642                                         err: msg.clone(),
643                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
644                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
645                                                         channel_id,
646                                                         data: msg
647                                                 },
648                                         },
649                                 },
650                         },
651                         closes_channel: false,
652                         shutdown_finish: None,
653                 }
654         }
655
656         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
657                 self.closes_channel
658         }
659 }
660
661 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
662 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
663 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
664 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
665 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
666
667 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
668 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
669 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
670 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
671 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
672 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
673         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
674         CommitmentFirst,
675         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
676         RevokeAndACKFirst,
677 }
678
679 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
680 struct ClaimingPayment {
681         amount_msat: u64,
682         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
683         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
684         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
685         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
686 }
687 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
688         (0, amount_msat, required),
689         (2, payment_purpose, required),
690         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
691         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
692         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
693 });
694
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
699 }
700
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704         /// failed/claimed by the user.
705         ///
706         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
708         ///
709         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
712
713         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
717 }
718
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
723 #[derive(Debug)]
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
729         ///
730         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731         /// are regenerated on startup.
732         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734         /// channel to continue normal operation.
735         ///
736         /// In general this should be used rather than
737         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
740         ///
741         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742         /// are regenerated on startup.
743         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746                 channel_id: ChannelId,
747                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
748         },
749         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
751         /// on a channel.
752         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754                 channel_id: ChannelId,
755         },
756 }
757
758 #[derive(Debug)]
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763         /// event can be generated.
764         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766         /// operation of another channel.
767         ///
768         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
772         /// outbound edge.
773         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774                 event: events::Event,
775                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
776         },
777         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
780         ///
781         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
786         ///
787         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788         /// stored for later processing.
789         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793                 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
794         },
795 }
796
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804                 (4, blocking_action, required),
805                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807                 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
808         },
809         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815                 // downgrades to prior versions.
816                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
817         },
818 );
819
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825                 channel_id: ChannelId,
826         },
827 }
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834                 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
835         };
836 );
837
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
844         /// durably to disk.
845         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847                 channel_id: ChannelId,
848                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
849                 htlc_id: u64,
850         },
851 }
852
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
858                 }
859         }
860 }
861
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
864 ;);
865
866
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
870         ///
871         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
874         ///
875         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881         latest_features: InitFeatures,
882         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886         /// user but which have not yet completed.
887         ///
888         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890         /// for a missing channel.
891         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
894         ///
895         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
899         ///
900         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915         pub is_connected: bool,
916 }
917
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
924                         return false
925                 }
926                 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
927                         match phase {
928                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
931                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
933                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
934                         }
935                 )
936                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
938         }
939
940         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
943         }
944
945         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
949         }
950 }
951
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955         /// The original OpenChannel message.
956         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
959 }
960
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
964
965 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
966 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
967 ///
968 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
969 /// here.
970 ///
971 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
972 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
973 struct PendingInboundPayment {
974         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
975         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
976         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
977         /// this payment being removed.
978         expiry_time: u64,
979         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
980         user_payment_id: u64,
981         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
982         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
983         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
984 }
985
986 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
987 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
988 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
989 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
990 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
991 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
992 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
993 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
994 ///
995 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
996 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
997 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
998         Arc<M>,
999         Arc<T>,
1000         Arc<KeysManager>,
1001         Arc<KeysManager>,
1002         Arc<KeysManager>,
1003         Arc<F>,
1004         Arc<DefaultRouter<
1005                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1006                 Arc<L>,
1007                 Arc<KeysManager>,
1008                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1009                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1010                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1011         >>,
1012         Arc<L>
1013 >;
1014
1015 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1016 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1017 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1018 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1019 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1020 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1021 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1022 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1023 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1024 ///
1025 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1026 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1027 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1028         ChannelManager<
1029                 &'a M,
1030                 &'b T,
1031                 &'c KeysManager,
1032                 &'c KeysManager,
1033                 &'c KeysManager,
1034                 &'d F,
1035                 &'e DefaultRouter<
1036                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1037                         &'g L,
1038                         &'c KeysManager,
1039                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1040                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1041                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1042                 >,
1043                 &'g L
1044         >;
1045
1046 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1047 ///
1048 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1049 /// languages.
1050 pub trait AChannelManager {
1051         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1052         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1053         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1054         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1055         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1056         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1057         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1058         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1059         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1060         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1061         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1062         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1063         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1064         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1065         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1066         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1067         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1068         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1069         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1070         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1071         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1072         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1073         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1074         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1075         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1076         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1077         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1078         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1079         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1080         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1081         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1082         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1083         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1084         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1085         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1086         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1087 }
1088
1089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1090 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1091 where
1092         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1093         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1094         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1095         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1096         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1097         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1098         R::Target: Router,
1099         L::Target: Logger,
1100 {
1101         type Watch = M::Target;
1102         type M = M;
1103         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1104         type T = T;
1105         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1106         type ES = ES;
1107         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1108         type NS = NS;
1109         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1110         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1111         type SP = SP;
1112         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1113         type F = F;
1114         type Router = R::Target;
1115         type R = R;
1116         type Logger = L::Target;
1117         type L = L;
1118         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1119 }
1120
1121 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1122 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1123 ///
1124 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1125 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1126 ///   channel
1127 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1128 ///   closing channels
1129 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1130 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1131 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1132 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1133 ///   timely manner
1134 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1135 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1136 ///
1137 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1138 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1139 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1140 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1141 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1142 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1143 ///
1144 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1145 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1146 ///
1147 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1148 ///
1149 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1150 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1151 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1152 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1153 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1154 ///
1155 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1156 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1157 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1158 ///
1159 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1160 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1161 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1162 ///
1163 /// # Initialization
1164 ///
1165 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1166 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1167 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1168 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1169 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1170 ///
1171 /// ```
1172 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1173 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1174 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1175 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1176 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1177 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1178 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1179 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1180 ///
1181 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1182 /// # fn example<
1183 /// #     'a,
1184 /// #     L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1185 /// #     ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1186 /// #     S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1187 /// #     SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1188 /// #     SP: Sized,
1189 /// #     R: lightning::io::Read,
1190 /// # >(
1191 /// #     fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1192 /// #     chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1193 /// #     tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1194 /// #     router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1195 /// #     logger: &L,
1196 /// #     entropy_source: &ES,
1197 /// #     node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1198 /// #     signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1199 /// #     best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1200 /// #     current_timestamp: u32,
1201 /// #     mut reader: R,
1202 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1203 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1204 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1205 ///     network: Network::Bitcoin,
1206 ///     best_block,
1207 /// };
1208 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1209 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1210 ///     fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1211 ///     signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1212 /// );
1213 ///
1214 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1215 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1216 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1217 ///     entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1218 ///     router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1219 /// );
1220 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1221 ///     <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1222 ///
1223 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1224 /// // ...
1225 ///
1226 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1227 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1228 ///     chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1229 /// }
1230 /// # Ok(())
1231 /// # }
1232 /// ```
1233 ///
1234 /// # Operation
1235 ///
1236 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1237 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1238 ///   called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1239 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1240 ///   (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1241 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1242 ///   as documented by those traits
1243 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1244 ///   every minute
1245 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1246 ///   [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1247 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1248 ///
1249 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1250 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1251 ///
1252 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1253 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1254 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1255 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1256 ///
1257 /// # Channels
1258 ///
1259 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1260 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1261 /// currently open channels.
1262 ///
1263 /// ```
1264 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1265 /// #
1266 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1267 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1268 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1269 /// for details in channels {
1270 ///     println!("{:?}", details);
1271 /// }
1272 /// # }
1273 /// ```
1274 ///
1275 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1276 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1277 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1278 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1279 ///
1280 /// ## Opening Channels
1281 ///
1282 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1283 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1284 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1285 ///
1286 /// ```
1287 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1288 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1289 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1290 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1291 /// #
1292 /// # trait Wallet {
1293 /// #     fn create_funding_transaction(
1294 /// #         &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1295 /// #     ) -> Transaction;
1296 /// # }
1297 /// #
1298 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1299 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1300 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1301 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1302 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1303 ///     Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1304 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1305 /// }
1306 ///
1307 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1308 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1309 ///     Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1310 ///         temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1311 ///         user_channel_id, ..
1312 ///     } => {
1313 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1314 ///         let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1315 ///             channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1316 ///         );
1317 ///         match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1318 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1319 ///         ) {
1320 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1321 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1322 ///         }
1323 ///     },
1324 ///     Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1325 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1326 ///         println!(
1327 ///             "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1328 ///             former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1329 ///         );
1330 ///     },
1331 ///     Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1332 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1333 ///         println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1334 ///     },
1335 ///     // ...
1336 /// #     _ => {},
1337 /// });
1338 /// # }
1339 /// ```
1340 ///
1341 /// ## Accepting Channels
1342 ///
1343 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1344 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1345 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1346 ///
1347 /// ```
1348 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1349 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1350 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1351 /// #
1352 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1353 /// #     // ...
1354 /// #     unimplemented!()
1355 /// # }
1356 /// #
1357 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1358 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1359 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1360 ///     Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, ..  } => {
1361 ///         if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1362 ///             match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1363 ///                 &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1364 ///             ) {
1365 ///                 Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1366 ///                 Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1367 ///             }
1368 ///             return;
1369 ///         }
1370 ///
1371 ///         let user_channel_id = 43;
1372 ///         match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1373 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1374 ///         ) {
1375 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1376 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1377 ///         }
1378 ///     },
1379 ///     // ...
1380 /// #     _ => {},
1381 /// });
1382 /// # }
1383 /// ```
1384 ///
1385 /// ## Closing Channels
1386 ///
1387 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1388 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1389 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1390 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1391 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1392 ///
1393 /// ```
1394 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1395 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1396 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1397 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1398 /// #
1399 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1400 /// #     channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1401 /// # ) {
1402 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1403 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1404 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1405 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1406 /// }
1407 ///
1408 /// // On the event processing thread
1409 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1410 ///     Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, ..  } => {
1411 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1412 ///         println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1413 ///     },
1414 ///     // ...
1415 /// #     _ => {},
1416 /// });
1417 /// # }
1418 /// ```
1419 ///
1420 /// # Payments
1421 ///
1422 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1423 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1424 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1425 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1426 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1427 /// HTLCs.
1428 ///
1429 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1430 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1431 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1432 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1433 ///
1434 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1435 ///
1436 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1437 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1438 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1439 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1440 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1441 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1442 ///
1443 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1444 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1445 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1446 ///
1447 /// ```
1448 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1449 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1450 /// #
1451 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1452 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1453 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1454 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1455 ///     Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1456 /// ) {
1457 ///     Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1458 ///         println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1459 ///         payment_hash
1460 ///     },
1461 ///     Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1462 /// };
1463 ///
1464 /// // On the event processing thread
1465 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1466 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1467 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1468 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1469 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1470 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1471 ///         },
1472 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1473 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1474 ///         },
1475 ///         PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1476 ///             assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1477 ///             println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1478 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1479 ///         },
1480 ///     },
1481 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1482 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1483 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1484 ///     },
1485 ///     // ...
1486 /// #     _ => {},
1487 /// });
1488 /// # }
1489 /// ```
1490 ///
1491 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1492 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1493 ///
1494 /// ```
1495 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1496 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1497 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1498 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1499 /// #
1500 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1501 /// #     channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1502 /// #     route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1503 /// # ) {
1504 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1505 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1506 /// //     payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1507 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1508 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1509 ///     payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1510 /// ) {
1511 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1512 ///     Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1513 /// }
1514 ///
1515 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1516 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1517 /// assert!(
1518 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1519 ///         details,
1520 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1521 ///             payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1522 ///             payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1523 ///             ..
1524 ///         }
1525 ///     )).is_some()
1526 /// );
1527 ///
1528 /// // On the event processing thread
1529 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1530 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1531 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1532 ///     // ...
1533 /// #     _ => {},
1534 /// });
1535 /// # }
1536 /// ```
1537 ///
1538 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1539 ///
1540 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1541 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1542 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1543 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1544 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1545 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1546 ///
1547 /// ```
1548 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1549 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1550 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1551 /// #
1552 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1553 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1554 /// let offer = channel_manager
1555 ///     .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
1556 /// # ;
1557 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1558 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1559 /// # let offer = builder
1560 ///     .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1561 ///     .build()?;
1562 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1563 ///
1564 /// // On the event processing thread
1565 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1566 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1567 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1568 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1569 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1570 ///         },
1571 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1572 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1573 ///         },
1574 ///         // ...
1575 /// #         _ => {},
1576 ///     },
1577 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1578 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1579 ///     },
1580 ///     // ...
1581 /// #     _ => {},
1582 /// });
1583 /// # Ok(())
1584 /// # }
1585 /// ```
1586 ///
1587 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1588 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1589 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1590 ///
1591 /// ```
1592 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1593 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1594 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1595 /// #
1596 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1597 /// #     channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1598 /// #     payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1599 /// # ) {
1600 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1601 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1602 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1603 ///     offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1604 /// ) {
1605 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1606 ///     Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1607 /// }
1608 ///
1609 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1610 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1611 /// assert!(
1612 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1613 ///         details,
1614 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1615 ///     )).is_some()
1616 /// );
1617 ///
1618 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1619 /// assert!(
1620 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1621 ///         details,
1622 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1623 ///     )).is_some()
1624 /// );
1625 ///
1626 /// // On the event processing thread
1627 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1628 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1629 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1630 ///     Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1631 ///     // ...
1632 /// #     _ => {},
1633 /// });
1634 /// # }
1635 /// ```
1636 ///
1637 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1638 ///
1639 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1640 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1641 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1642 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1643 ///
1644 /// ```
1645 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1646 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1647 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1648 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1649 /// #
1650 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1651 /// #     channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1652 /// #     max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1653 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1654 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1655 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1656 /// let refund = channel_manager
1657 ///     .create_refund_builder(
1658 ///         "coffee".to_string(), amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry,
1659 ///         max_total_routing_fee_msat
1660 ///     )?
1661 /// # ;
1662 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1663 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1664 /// # let refund = builder
1665 ///     .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1666 ///     .build()?;
1667 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1668 ///
1669 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1670 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1671 /// assert!(
1672 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1673 ///         details,
1674 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1675 ///     )).is_some()
1676 /// );
1677 ///
1678 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1679 /// assert!(
1680 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1681 ///         details,
1682 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1683 ///     )).is_some()
1684 /// );
1685 ///
1686 /// // On the event processing thread
1687 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1688 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1689 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1690 ///     // ...
1691 /// #     _ => {},
1692 /// });
1693 /// # Ok(())
1694 /// # }
1695 /// ```
1696 ///
1697 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1698 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1699 ///
1700 /// ```
1701 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1702 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1703 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1704 /// #
1705 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1706 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1707 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1708 ///     Ok(invoice) => {
1709 ///         let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1710 ///         println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1711 ///         payment_hash
1712 ///     },
1713 ///     Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1714 /// };
1715 ///
1716 /// // On the event processing thread
1717 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1718 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1719 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1720 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1721 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1722 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1723 ///         },
1724 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1725 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1726 ///             },
1727 ///         // ...
1728 /// #         _ => {},
1729 ///     },
1730 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1731 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1732 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1733 ///     },
1734 ///     // ...
1735 /// #     _ => {},
1736 /// });
1737 /// # }
1738 /// ```
1739 ///
1740 /// # Persistence
1741 ///
1742 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1743 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1744 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1745 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1746 ///
1747 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1748 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1749 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1750 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1751 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1752 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1753 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1754 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1755 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1756 ///
1757 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1758 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1759 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1760 ///
1761 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1762 ///
1763 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1764 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1765 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1766 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1767 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1768 ///
1769 /// # DoS Mitigation
1770 ///
1771 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1772 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1773 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1774 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1775 ///
1776 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1777 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1778 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1779 ///
1780 /// # Type Aliases
1781 ///
1782 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1783 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1784 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1785 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1786 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1787 ///
1788 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1789 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1790 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1791 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1792 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1793 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1794 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1795 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1796 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1797 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1798 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1799 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1800 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1801 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1802 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1803 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1804 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1805 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1806 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1807 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1808 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1809 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1810 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1811 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1812 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1813 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1814 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1815 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1816 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1817 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1818 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1819 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1820 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1821 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1822 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1823 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1824 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1825 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1826 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1827 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1828 //
1829 // Lock order:
1830 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1831 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1832 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1833 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1834 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1835 //
1836 // Lock order tree:
1837 //
1838 // `pending_offers_messages`
1839 //
1840 // `total_consistency_lock`
1841 //  |
1842 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1843 //  |   |
1844 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1845 //  |
1846 //  |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1847 //  |
1848 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1849 //      |
1850 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1851 //          |
1852 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1853 //          |
1854 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1855 //              |
1856 //              |__`peer_state`
1857 //                  |
1858 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1859 //                  |
1860 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1861 //                  |
1862 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1863 //                  |
1864 //                  |__`best_block`
1865 //                  |
1866 //                  |__`pending_events`
1867 //                      |
1868 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1869 //
1870 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1871 where
1872         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1873         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1874         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1875         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1876         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1877         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1878         R::Target: Router,
1879         L::Target: Logger,
1880 {
1881         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1882         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1883         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1884         chain_monitor: M,
1885         tx_broadcaster: T,
1886         #[allow(unused)]
1887         router: R,
1888
1889         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1890         #[cfg(test)]
1891         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1892         #[cfg(not(test))]
1893         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1894         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1895
1896         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1897         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1898         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1899         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1900         ///
1901         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1902         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1903
1904         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1905         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1906         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1907         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1908         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1909         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1910         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1911         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1912         ///
1913         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1914         ///
1915         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1916         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1917
1918         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1919         ///
1920         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1921         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1922         /// and via the classic SCID.
1923         ///
1924         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1925         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1926         ///
1927         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1928         #[cfg(test)]
1929         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1930         #[cfg(not(test))]
1931         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1932         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1933         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1934         ///
1935         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1936         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1937
1938         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1939         ///
1940         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1941         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1942         /// and via the classic SCID.
1943         ///
1944         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1945         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1946         ///
1947         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1948         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1949
1950         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1951         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1952         ///
1953         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1954         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1955
1956         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1957         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1958         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1959         /// active channel list on load.
1960         ///
1961         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1962         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1963
1964         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1965         ///
1966         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1967         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1968         /// the handling of the events.
1969         ///
1970         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1971         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1972         ///
1973         /// TODO:
1974         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1975         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1976         /// would break backwards compatability.
1977         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1978         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1979         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1980         ///
1981         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1982         #[cfg(not(test))]
1983         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1984         #[cfg(test)]
1985         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1986
1987         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1988         ///
1989         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1990         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1991         /// confirmation depth.
1992         ///
1993         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1994         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1995         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1996         ///
1997         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1998         #[cfg(test)]
1999         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2000         #[cfg(not(test))]
2001         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2002
2003         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2004
2005         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2006
2007         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2008         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2009         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2010         ///
2011         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2012         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2013
2014         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2015         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2016         /// keeping additional state.
2017         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2018
2019         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2020         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2021         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2022         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2023
2024         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2025         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2026         ///
2027         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2028         /// are currently open with that peer.
2029         ///
2030         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2031         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2032         /// channels.
2033         ///
2034         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2035         ///
2036         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2037         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2038         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2039         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2040         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2041
2042         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2043         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2044         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2045         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2046         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2047         ///
2048         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2049         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2050         ///
2051         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2052         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2053         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2054         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2055         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2056
2057         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2058         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2059
2060         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2061         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2062         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2063         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2064         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2065         ///
2066         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2067         ///
2068         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2069         ///
2070         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2071         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2072         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2073         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2074         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2075         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2076         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2077         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2078         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2079         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2080         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2081         ///
2082         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2083         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2084         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2085
2086         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2087
2088         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2089         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2090
2091         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2092
2093         /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2094         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2095
2096         entropy_source: ES,
2097         node_signer: NS,
2098         signer_provider: SP,
2099
2100         logger: L,
2101 }
2102
2103 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2104 ///
2105 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2106 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2107 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2108 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2109 pub struct ChainParameters {
2110         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2111         pub network: Network,
2112
2113         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2114         ///
2115         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2116         pub best_block: BestBlock,
2117 }
2118
2119 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2120 #[must_use]
2121 enum NotifyOption {
2122         DoPersist,
2123         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2124         SkipPersistNoEvents,
2125 }
2126
2127 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2128 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2129 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2130 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2131 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2132 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2133 ///
2134 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2135 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2136 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2137 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2138         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2139         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2140         should_persist: F,
2141         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2142         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2143 }
2144
2145 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2146         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2147         /// events to handle.
2148         ///
2149         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2150         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2151         /// isn't ideal.
2152         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2153                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2154         }
2155
2156         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2157         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2158                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2159                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2160
2161                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2162                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2163                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2164                         should_persist: move || {
2165                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2166                                 // processing and return that.
2167                                 let notify = persist_check();
2168                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
2169                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2170                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2171                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2172                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2173                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2174                                 }
2175                         },
2176                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2177                 }
2178         }
2179
2180         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2181         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2182         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2183         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2184         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2185                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2186
2187                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2188                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2189                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2190                         should_persist: persist_check,
2191                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2192                 }
2193         }
2194 }
2195
2196 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2197         fn drop(&mut self) {
2198                 match (self.should_persist)() {
2199                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2200                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2201                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2202                         },
2203                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2204                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2205                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2206                 }
2207         }
2208 }
2209
2210 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2211 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2212 ///
2213 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2214 ///
2215 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2216 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2217 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2218 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2219 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2220
2221 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2222 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2223 ///
2224 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2225 ///
2226 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2227 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2228 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2229 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2230 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2231 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2232 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2233 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2234 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2235 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2236 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2237 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2238 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2239
2240 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2241 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2242 /// this value.
2243 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2244 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2245 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2246 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2247
2248 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2249 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2250 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2251 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2252 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2253 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2254 #[allow(dead_code)]
2255 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2256
2257 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2258 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2259 #[allow(dead_code)]
2260 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2261
2262 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2263 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2264
2265 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2266 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2267 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2268
2269 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2270 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2271 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2272
2273 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2274 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2275 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2276 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2277
2278 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2279 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2280 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2281
2282 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2283 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2284 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2285
2286 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2287 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2288 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2289         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2290         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2291         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2292         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2293         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2294         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2295         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2296         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2297 }
2298
2299 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2300 /// to better separate parameters.
2301 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2302 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2303         /// The node_id of our counterparty
2304         pub node_id: PublicKey,
2305         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2306         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2307         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2308         pub features: InitFeatures,
2309         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2310         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2311         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2312         ///
2313         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2314         ///
2315         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2316         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2317         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2318         /// payments to us through this channel.
2319         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2320         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2321         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2322         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2323         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2324         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2325         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2326 }
2327
2328 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2329 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2330 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2331         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2332         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2333         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2334         /// lifetime of the channel.
2335         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2336         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2337         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2338         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2339         /// our counterparty already.
2340         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2341         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2342         ///
2343         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2344         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2345         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2346         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2347         ///
2348         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2349         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2350         ///
2351         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2352         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2353         ///
2354         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2355         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2356         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2357         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2358         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2359         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2360         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2361         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2362         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2363         /// `Some(0)`).
2364         ///
2365         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2366         ///
2367         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2368         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2369         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2370         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2371         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2372         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2373         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2374         ///
2375         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2376         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2377         ///
2378         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2379         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2380         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2381         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2382         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2383         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2384         /// this value on chain.
2385         ///
2386         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2387         ///
2388         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2389         ///
2390         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2391         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2392         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2393         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2394         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2395         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
2396         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2397         ///
2398         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2399         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2400         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2401         pub user_channel_id: u128,
2402         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2403         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2404         ///
2405         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2406         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2407         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2408         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2409         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2410         ///
2411         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2412         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2413         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2414         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2415         ///
2416         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2417         pub balance_msat: u64,
2418         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2419         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2420         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2421         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2422         ///
2423         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2424         ///
2425         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2426         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2427         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2428         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2429         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2430         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2431         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2432         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2433         ///
2434         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2435         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2436         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2437         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2438         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2439         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2440         /// route which is valid.
2441         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2442         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2443         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2444         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2445         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2446         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2447         ///
2448         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2449         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2450         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2451         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2452         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2453         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2454         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2455         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2456         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2457         ///
2458         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2459         ///
2460         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2461         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2462         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2463         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2464         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2465         ///
2466         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2467         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2468         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2469         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2470         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2471         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2472         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2473         ///
2474         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2475         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2476         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2477         pub is_outbound: bool,
2478         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2479         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2480         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2481         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2482         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2483         ///
2484         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2485         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2486         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2487         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2488         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2489         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2490         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2491         ///
2492         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2493         pub is_usable: bool,
2494         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2495         pub is_public: bool,
2496         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2497         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2498         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2499         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2500         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2501         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2502         ///
2503         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2504         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2505         /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2506         ///
2507         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2508         pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2509         /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2510         ///
2511         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2512         pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2513 }
2514
2515 impl ChannelDetails {
2516         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2517         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2518         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2519         ///
2520         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2521         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2522         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2523                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2524         }
2525
2526         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2527         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2528         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2529         ///
2530         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2531         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2532         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2533                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2534         }
2535
2536         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2537                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2538                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2539         ) -> Self
2540         where
2541                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2542                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2543         {
2544                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2545                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2546                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2547                 ChannelDetails {
2548                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2549                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2550                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2551                                 features: latest_features,
2552                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2553                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2554                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2555                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2556                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2557                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2558                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2559                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2560                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2561                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2562                         },
2563                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2564                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2565                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2566                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2567                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2568                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2569                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2570                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2571                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2572                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2573                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2574                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2575                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2576                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2577                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2578                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2579                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2580                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2581                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2582                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2583                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2584                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
2585                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
2586                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2587                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2588                         config: Some(context.config()),
2589                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2590                         pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2591                         pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2592                 }
2593         }
2594 }
2595
2596 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2597 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2598 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2599 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2600 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2601 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2602 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2603 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2604         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2605         NotShuttingDown,
2606         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2607         ShutdownInitiated,
2608         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2609         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2610         ResolvingHTLCs,
2611         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2612         NegotiatingClosingFee,
2613         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2614         /// to drop the channel.
2615         ShutdownComplete,
2616 }
2617
2618 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2619 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2620 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2621 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2622         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2623         AwaitingInvoice {
2624                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2625                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2626                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2627         },
2628         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2629         Pending {
2630                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2631                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2632                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2633                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2634                 /// abandoned.
2635                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2636                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2637                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2638                 total_msat: u64,
2639         },
2640         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2641         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2642         /// payment is removed from tracking.
2643         Fulfilled {
2644                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2645                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2646                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2647                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2648                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2649                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2650         },
2651         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2652         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2653         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2654         Abandoned {
2655                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2656                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2657                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2658                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2659                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2660         },
2661 }
2662
2663 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2664 ///
2665 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2666 #[derive(Clone)]
2667 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2668         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2669         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2670         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2671         /// route hints.
2672         pub phantom_scid: u64,
2673         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2674         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2675 }
2676
2677 macro_rules! handle_error {
2678         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2679                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2680                 // entering the macro.
2681                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2682                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2683
2684                 match $internal {
2685                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2686                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2687                                 let mut msg_event = None;
2688
2689                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2690                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2691                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2692                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
2693                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2694                                         );
2695                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2696
2697                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2698                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
2699                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2700                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2701                                                         msg: update
2702                                                 });
2703                                         }
2704                                 } else {
2705                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2706                                 }
2707
2708                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2709                                 } else {
2710                                         msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2711                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2712                                                 action: err.action.clone()
2713                                         });
2714                                 }
2715
2716                                 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2717                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2718                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2719                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2720                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2721                                         }
2722                                 }
2723
2724                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2725                                 Err(err)
2726                         },
2727                 }
2728         } };
2729 }
2730
2731 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2732         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2733                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2734                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2735                 }
2736                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2737                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2738                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2739                 } else {
2740                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2741                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2742                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2743                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2744                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2745                         // stage.
2746                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2747                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2748                 }
2749                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2750         }}
2751 }
2752
2753 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2754 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2755         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2756                 match $err {
2757                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2758                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2759                         },
2760                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2761                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2762                         },
2763                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2764                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2765                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2766                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2767                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2768                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2769                                 let err =
2770                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2771                                 (true, err)
2772                         },
2773                 }
2774         };
2775         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2776                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2777         };
2778         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2779                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2780         };
2781         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2782                 match $channel_phase {
2783                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2784                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2785                         },
2786                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2787                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2788                         },
2789                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2790                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2791                         },
2792                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2793                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2794                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2795                         },
2796                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2797                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2798                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2799                         },
2800                 }
2801         };
2802 }
2803
2804 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2805         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2806                 match $res {
2807                         Ok(res) => res,
2808                         Err(e) => {
2809                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2810                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2811                                 if drop {
2812                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2813                                 }
2814                                 break Err(res);
2815                         }
2816                 }
2817         }
2818 }
2819
2820 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2821         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2822                 match $res {
2823                         Ok(res) => res,
2824                         Err(e) => {
2825                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2826                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2827                                 if drop {
2828                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2829                                 }
2830                                 return Err(res);
2831                         }
2832                 }
2833         }
2834 }
2835
2836 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2837         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2838                 {
2839                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2840                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2841                         channel
2842                 }
2843         }
2844 }
2845
2846 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2847         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2848                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2849                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2850                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2851                 });
2852                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2853                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2854                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2855                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2856                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2857                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2858                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2859                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2860                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2861                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2862                 }
2863         }}
2864 }
2865
2866 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2867         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2868                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2869                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2870                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2871                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2872                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2873                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2874                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2875                                 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2876                         }, None));
2877                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2878                 }
2879         }
2880 }
2881
2882 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2883         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2884                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2885                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2886                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2887                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2888                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2889                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2890                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2891                         }, None));
2892                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2893                 }
2894         }
2895 }
2896
2897 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2898         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2899                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2900                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2901                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2902                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2903                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2904                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2905                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2906                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2907                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2908                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2909                         // now.
2910                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2911                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2912                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2913                                         msg,
2914                                 })
2915                         } else { None }
2916                 } else { None };
2917
2918                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2919                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2920
2921                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2922                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2923                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2924                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2925                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2926                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2927                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2928                 }
2929
2930                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2931                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2932                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2933                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2934
2935                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2936                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2937                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2938                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2939                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2940                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2941                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2942                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2943                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2944                                 ));
2945                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2946                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2947                                 } else {
2948                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2949                                 }
2950                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2951                         } else {
2952                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2953                         }
2954
2955                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2956                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2957                         if batch_completed {
2958                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2959                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2960                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2961                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2962                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2963                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2964                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2965                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2966                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2967                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2968                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2969                                                 }
2970                                         }
2971                                 }
2972                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2973                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2974                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2975                                 }
2976                         }
2977                 }
2978
2979                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2980
2981                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2982                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2983                 }
2984                 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2985                         $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2986                 }
2987                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2988                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2989                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2990                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2991                 }
2992         } }
2993 }
2994
2995 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2996         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2997                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2998                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2999                 match $update_res {
3000                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
3001                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
3002                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3003                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
3004                         },
3005                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3006                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3007                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
3008                                 false
3009                         },
3010                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3011                                 $completed;
3012                                 true
3013                         },
3014                 }
3015         } };
3016         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3017                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3018                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3019         };
3020         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3021                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3022                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3023                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3024                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3025                 // filter for uniqueness here.
3026                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3027                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3028                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3029                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3030                         });
3031                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3032                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3033                         {
3034                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3035                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3036                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3037                                 }
3038                         })
3039         } };
3040 }
3041
3042 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3043         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3044                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3045                 while !processed_all_events {
3046                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3047                                 return;
3048                         }
3049
3050                         let mut result;
3051
3052                         {
3053                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3054                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3055                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3056
3057                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3058                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3059                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
3060
3061                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3062                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3063                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3064                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3065                                 }
3066                         }
3067
3068                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3069                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
3070                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3071                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3072                         }
3073
3074                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3075
3076                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3077                                 $event_to_handle = event;
3078                                 $handle_event;
3079                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3080                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
3081                                 }
3082                         }
3083
3084                         {
3085                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3086                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3087                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3088                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3089                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3090                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3091                         }
3092
3093                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3094                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3095                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3096                                 processed_all_events = false;
3097                         }
3098
3099                         match result {
3100                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3101                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3102                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3103                                 },
3104                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3105                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3106                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3107                         }
3108                 }
3109         }
3110 }
3111
3112 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3113 where
3114         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3115         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3116         ES::Target: EntropySource,
3117         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3118         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3119         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3120         R::Target: Router,
3121         L::Target: Logger,
3122 {
3123         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3124         ///
3125         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3126         ///
3127         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3128         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3129         ///
3130         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3131         ///
3132         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3133         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3134         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3135         /// more details.
3136         ///
3137         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3138         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3139         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3140         pub fn new(
3141                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3142                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3143                 current_timestamp: u32,
3144         ) -> Self {
3145                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3146                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3147                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3148                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3149                 ChannelManager {
3150                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
3151                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3152                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3153                         chain_monitor,
3154                         tx_broadcaster,
3155                         router,
3156
3157                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3158
3159                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3160                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3161                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3162                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3163                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3164                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3165                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3166                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3167                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3168
3169                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3170                         secp_ctx,
3171
3172                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3173                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3174
3175                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3176
3177                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3178
3179                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3180
3181                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3182                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3183                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3184                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3185                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3186                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3187                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3188                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3189
3190                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3191                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3192
3193                         entropy_source,
3194                         node_signer,
3195                         signer_provider,
3196
3197                         logger,
3198                 }
3199         }
3200
3201         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3202         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3203                 &self.default_configuration
3204         }
3205
3206         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3207                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3208                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3209                 let mut i = 0;
3210                 loop {
3211                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3212                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3213                         } else {
3214                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3215                         }
3216                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3217                                 break;
3218                         }
3219                         i += 1;
3220                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3221                 }
3222                 outbound_scid_alias
3223         }
3224
3225         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3226         ///
3227         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3228         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3229         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3230         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3231         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3232         ///
3233         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3234         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3235         ///
3236         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3237         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3238         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3239         ///
3240         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3241         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3242         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3243         ///
3244         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3245         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3246         ///
3247         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3248         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3249         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3250         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3251         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3252         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3253         ///
3254         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3255         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3256         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3257         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3258                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3259                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3260                 }
3261
3262                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3263                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3264                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3265
3266                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3267
3268                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3269                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3270
3271                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3272
3273                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3274                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3275                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3276                         }
3277                 }
3278
3279                 let channel = {
3280                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3281                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3282                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3283                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3284                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3285                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3286                         {
3287                                 Ok(res) => res,
3288                                 Err(e) => {
3289                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3290                                         return Err(e);
3291                                 },
3292                         }
3293                 };
3294                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3295
3296                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3297                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3298                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3299                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
3300                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3301                                 } else {
3302                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
3303                                 }
3304                         },
3305                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3306                 }
3307
3308                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3309                         node_id: their_network_key,
3310                         msg: res,
3311                 });
3312                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3313         }
3314
3315         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3316                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3317                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3318                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3319                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3320                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3321                 // the same channel.
3322                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3323                 {
3324                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3325                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3326                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3327                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3328                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3329                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3330                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3331                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3332                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3333                                                 _ => None,
3334                                         })
3335                                         .filter(f)
3336                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3337                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3338                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3339                                         })
3340                                 );
3341                         }
3342                 }
3343                 res
3344         }
3345
3346         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3347         /// more information.
3348         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3349                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3350                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3351                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3352                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3353                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3354                 // the same channel.
3355                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3356                 {
3357                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3358                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3359                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3360                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3361                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3362                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3363                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3364                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3365                                         res.push(details);
3366                                 }
3367                         }
3368                 }
3369                 res
3370         }
3371
3372         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3373         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3374         ///
3375         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3376         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3377         /// are.
3378         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3379                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3380                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3381                 // really wanted anyway.
3382                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3383         }
3384
3385         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3386         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3387                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3388                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3389
3390                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3391                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3392                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3393                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3394                         let context_to_details = |context| {
3395                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3396                         };
3397                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
3398                                 .iter()
3399                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3400                                 .map(context_to_details)
3401                                 .collect();
3402                 }
3403                 vec![]
3404         }
3405
3406         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3407         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3408         ///
3409         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3410         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3411         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3412         ///
3413         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3414         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3415                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3416                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3417                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3418                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3419                                 },
3420                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3421                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3422                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3423                                 },
3424                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3425                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3426                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
3427                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3428                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
3429                                         })
3430                                 },
3431                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3432                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3433                                 },
3434                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3435                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3436                                 },
3437                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3438                         })
3439                         .collect()
3440         }
3441
3442         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3443                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3444
3445                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3446                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3447
3448                 {
3449                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3450
3451                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3452                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3453
3454                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3455                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3456
3457                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3458                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3459                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3460                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3461                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3462                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3463                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3464                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3465
3466                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3467                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3468                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3469                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3470                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3471                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
3472                                                 });
3473
3474                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3475                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3476
3477                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3478                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3479                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3480                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3481                                                 }
3482                                         } else {
3483                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3484                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3485                                         }
3486                                 },
3487                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3488                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3489                                                 err: format!(
3490                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3491                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3492                                                 )
3493                                         });
3494                                 },
3495                         }
3496                 }
3497
3498                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3499                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3500                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3501                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3502                 }
3503
3504                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3505                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3506                 }
3507
3508                 Ok(())
3509         }
3510
3511         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3512         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3513         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3514         ///
3515         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3516         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3517         ///    fee estimate.
3518         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3519         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3520         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3521         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3522         ///
3523         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3524         ///
3525         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3526         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3527         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3528         /// channel.
3529         ///
3530         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3531         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3532         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3533         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3534         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3535                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3536         }
3537
3538         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3539         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3540         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3541         ///
3542         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3543         /// the channel being closed or not:
3544         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3545         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3546         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3547         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3548         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3549         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3550         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3551         ///
3552         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3553         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3554         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3555         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3556         ///
3557         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3558         ///
3559         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3560         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3561         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3562         /// channel.
3563         ///
3564         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3565         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3566         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3567         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3568                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3569         }
3570
3571         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3572                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3573                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3574                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3575                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3576                 }
3577
3578                 let logger = WithContext::from(
3579                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3580                 );
3581
3582                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3583                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3584                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3585                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3586                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3587                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3588                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3589                 }
3590                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3591                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3592                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3593                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3594                         // ignore the result here.
3595                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3596                 }
3597                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3598                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3599                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3600                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3601                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3602                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3603                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3604                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3605                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3606                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3607                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3608                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3609                                         }
3610                                 }
3611                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3612                         }
3613                         debug_assert!(
3614                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3615                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3616                         );
3617                 }
3618
3619                 {
3620                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3621                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3622                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3623                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3624                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3625                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3626                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3627                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3628                         }, None));
3629
3630                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3631                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3632                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3633                                 }, None));
3634                         }
3635                 }
3636                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3637                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3638                 }
3639         }
3640
3641         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3642         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3643         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3644         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3645                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3646                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3647                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3648                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3649                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3650                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3651                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3652                         } else {
3653                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3654                         };
3655                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3656                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3657                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3658                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3659                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
3660                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3661                                 match chan_phase {
3662                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3663                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3664                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3665                                         },
3666                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3667                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3668                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3669                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3670                                         },
3671                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3672                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3673                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3674                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3675                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3676                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3677                                         },
3678                                 }
3679                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3680                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3681                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3682                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3683                                 // events anyway.
3684                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
3685                         } else {
3686                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3687                         }
3688                 };
3689                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3690                         // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3691                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3692                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3693                                 msg: update
3694                         });
3695                 }
3696
3697                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3698         }
3699
3700         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3701                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3702                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3703                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3704                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3705                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3706                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3707                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3708                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3709                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3710                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3711                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3712                                                         },
3713                                                 }
3714                                         );
3715                                 }
3716                                 Ok(())
3717                         },
3718                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3719                 }
3720         }
3721
3722         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3723         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3724         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3725         /// channel.
3726         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3727         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3728                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3729         }
3730
3731         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3732         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3733         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3734         ///
3735         /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3736         /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3737         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3738         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3739                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3740         }
3741
3742         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3743         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3744         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3745                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3746                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3747                 }
3748         }
3749
3750         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3751         /// local transaction(s).
3752         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3753                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3754                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3755                 }
3756         }
3757
3758         fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3759                 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3760         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3761                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3762                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3763                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3764                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3765                         return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3766                 }
3767                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3768                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3769                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3770                         // we don't have the channel here.
3771                         return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3772                 }
3773
3774                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3775                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3776                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3777                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3778                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3779                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3780                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3781                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3782                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3783                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3784                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3785                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3786                         } else {
3787                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3788                         }
3789                 }
3790                 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3791                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3792                         return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3793                 }
3794                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3795                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3796                         return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3797                 }
3798
3799                 Ok(())
3800         }
3801
3802         /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3803         /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3804         fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3805                 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3806         ) -> Option<X> {
3807                 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3808                         None => return None,
3809                         Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3810                 };
3811                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3812                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3813                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3814                         return None;
3815                 }
3816                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3817                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3818                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3819                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3820                 ) {
3821                         None => None,
3822                         Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3823                 }
3824         }
3825
3826         fn can_forward_htlc(
3827                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3828         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3829                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3830                         self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3831                 }) {
3832                         Some(Ok(())) => {},
3833                         Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3834                         None => {
3835                                 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3836                                 // intercept forward.
3837                                 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3838                                         fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3839                                         fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3840                                 {} else {
3841                                         return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3842                                 }
3843                         }
3844                 }
3845
3846                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3847                 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3848                         cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3849                 ) {
3850                         let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3851                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3852                         }).flatten();
3853                         return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3854                 }
3855
3856                 Ok(())
3857         }
3858
3859         fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3860                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3861                 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3862                 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3863         ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3864                 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3865                 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3866                         let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3867                         if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3868                                 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3869                         }
3870                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3871                                 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3872                         }
3873                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3874                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3875                                 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3876                         }
3877                         (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3878                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3879                         chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3880                 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3881                         // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3882                         // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3883                         // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3884                         // instead.
3885                         err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3886                 }
3887
3888                 log_info!(
3889                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3890                         "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3891                 );
3892                 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3893                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3894                         return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3895                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3896                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3897                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3898                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3899                         });
3900                 }
3901
3902                 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3903                         (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3904                 } else {
3905                         (err_code, &res.0[..])
3906                 };
3907                 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3908                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3909                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3910                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3911                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3912                 })
3913         }
3914
3915         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3916                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3917         ) -> Result<
3918                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3919         > {
3920                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3921                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3922                 )?;
3923
3924                 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3925                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3926                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3927                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3928                 };
3929
3930                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3931                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3932                 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3933                         let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3934                         self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3935                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3936                                 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3937                         )
3938                 })?;
3939
3940                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3941         }
3942
3943         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3944                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3945                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3946                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3947         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3948                 macro_rules! return_err {
3949                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3950                                 {
3951                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3952                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3953                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3954                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3955                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3956                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3957                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3958                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3959                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3960                                                         }
3961                                                 ))
3962                                         }
3963                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3964                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3965                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3966                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3967                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3968                                         }));
3969                                 }
3970                         }
3971                 }
3972                 match decoded_hop {
3973                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3974                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3975                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3976                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3977                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3978                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3979                                 {
3980                                         Ok(info) => {
3981                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3982                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3983                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3984                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3985                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3986                                         },
3987                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3988                                 }
3989                         },
3990                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3991                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3992                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3993                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3994                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3995                                 }
3996                         }
3997                 }
3998         }
3999
4000         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
4001         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
4002         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4003         ///
4004         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4005         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4006         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4007         ///
4008         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4009         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4010         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4011                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4012                         return Err(LightningError {
4013                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4014                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4015                         });
4016                 }
4017                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4018                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4019                 }
4020                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4021                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4022                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4023         }
4024
4025         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4026         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4027         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4028         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4029         ///
4030         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4031         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4032         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4033         ///
4034         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4035         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4036         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4037                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4038                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4039                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4040                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4041                         Some(id) => id,
4042                 };
4043
4044                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4045         }
4046
4047         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4048                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4049                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4050                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4051
4052                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4053                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4054                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4055                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4056                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4057                 };
4058
4059                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4060                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4061                         short_channel_id,
4062                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4063                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4064                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4065                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4066                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4067                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4068                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4069                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4070                 };
4071                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4072                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4073                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4074                 // channel.
4075                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4076
4077                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4078                         signature: sig,
4079                         contents: unsigned
4080                 })
4081         }
4082
4083         #[cfg(test)]
4084         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4085                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4086                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4087                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4088                         session_priv_bytes
4089                 })
4090         }
4091
4092         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4093                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4094                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4095                         session_priv_bytes
4096                 } = args;
4097                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4098                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4099                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4100                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4101
4102                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4103                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4104                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4105                 ).map_err(|e| {
4106                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4107                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4108                         e
4109                 })?;
4110
4111                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4112                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4113                                 None => {
4114                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4115                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4116                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4117                                 },
4118                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4119                         };
4120
4121                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4122                         log_trace!(logger,
4123                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4124                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4125
4126                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4127                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4128                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4129                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4130                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4131                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4132                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4133                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4134                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4135                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4136                                                 }
4137                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4138                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4139                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4140                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4141                                                                 path: path.clone(),
4142                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4143                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4144                                                                 payment_id,
4145                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4146                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4147                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
4148                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4149                                                                         false => {
4150                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4151                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4152                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4153                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4154                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4155                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4156                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4157                                                                         },
4158                                                                         true => {},
4159                                                                 }
4160                                                         },
4161                                                         None => {},
4162                                                 }
4163                                         },
4164                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4165                                 };
4166                         } else {
4167                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4168                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4169                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
4170                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4171                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4172                         }
4173                         return Ok(());
4174                 };
4175                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4176                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4177                         Err(e) => {
4178                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4179                         },
4180                 }
4181         }
4182
4183         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4184         ///
4185         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4186         /// fields for more info.
4187         ///
4188         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4189         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4190         ///
4191         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4192         ///
4193         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4194         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4195         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4196         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4197         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4198         ///
4199         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4200         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4201         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4202         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4203         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4204         ///
4205         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4206         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4207         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4208         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4209         ///
4210         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4211         ///
4212         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4213         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4214         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4215         ///
4216         /// In general, a path may raise:
4217         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4218         ///    node public key) is specified.
4219         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4220         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4221         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4222         ///    relevant updates.
4223         ///
4224         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4225         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4226         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4227         ///
4228         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4229         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4230         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4231         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4232         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4233         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4234         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4235                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4236                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4237                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4238                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4239                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4240                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4241         }
4242
4243         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4244         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4245         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4246                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4247                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4248                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4249                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4250                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4251                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4252                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4253         }
4254
4255         #[cfg(test)]
4256         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4257                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4258                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4259                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4260                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4261                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4262         }
4263
4264         #[cfg(test)]
4265         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4266                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4267                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4268         }
4269
4270         #[cfg(test)]
4271         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4272                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4273         }
4274
4275         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4276                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4277                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4278                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4279                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4280                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4281                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4282                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4283                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4284                         )
4285         }
4286
4287         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4288         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4289         /// retries are exhausted.
4290         ///
4291         /// # Event Generation
4292         ///
4293         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4294         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4295         ///
4296         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4297         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4298         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4299         ///
4300         /// # Requested Invoices
4301         ///
4302         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4303         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4304         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4305         /// once the invoice has been received.
4306         ///
4307         /// # Restart Behavior
4308         ///
4309         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4310         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4311         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4312         ///
4313         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4314         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4315                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4316                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4317         }
4318
4319         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4320         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4321         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4322         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4323         /// never reach the recipient.
4324         ///
4325         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4326         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4327         ///
4328         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4329         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4330         ///
4331         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4332         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4333                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4334                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4335                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4336                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4337                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4338         }
4339
4340         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4341         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4342         ///
4343         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4344         /// payments.
4345         ///
4346         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4347         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4348                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4349                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4350                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4351                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4352                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4353                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4354         }
4355
4356         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4357         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4358         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4359         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4360                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4361                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4362                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4363                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4364                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4365         }
4366
4367         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4368         /// payment probe.
4369         #[cfg(test)]
4370         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4371                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4372         }
4373
4374         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4375         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4376         ///
4377         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4378         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4379                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4380                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4381         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4382                 let payment_params =
4383                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4384
4385                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4386
4387                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4388         }
4389
4390         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4391         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4392         ///
4393         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4394         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4395         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4396         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4397         ///
4398         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4399         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4400         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4401         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4402         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4403         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4404         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4405                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4406         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4407                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4408
4409                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4410                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4411                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4412                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4413
4414                 let route = self
4415                         .router
4416                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4417                         .map_err(|e| {
4418                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4419                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4420                         })?;
4421
4422                 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4423
4424                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4425
4426                 for mut path in route.paths {
4427                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4428                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4429                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4430                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4431                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4432                                         break;
4433                                 } else {
4434                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4435                                         log_debug!(
4436                                                 self.logger,
4437                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4438                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4439                                         );
4440                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4441                                         path.hops.pop();
4442                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4443                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4444                                         }
4445                                 }
4446                         }
4447
4448                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4449                                 log_debug!(
4450                                         self.logger,
4451                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4452                                 );
4453                                 continue;
4454                         }
4455
4456                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4457                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4458                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4459                                 }) {
4460                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4461                                         let used_liquidity =
4462                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4463
4464                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4465                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4466                                         {
4467                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4468                                                 continue;
4469                                         } else {
4470                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4471                                         }
4472                                 }
4473                         }
4474
4475                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4476                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4477                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4478                         })?);
4479                 }
4480
4481                 Ok(res)
4482         }
4483
4484         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4485         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4486         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4487                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4488                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4489         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4490                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4491                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4492                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4493
4494                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4495                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4496                 let funding_txo;
4497                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4498                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4499                                 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4500
4501                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4502                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4503                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4504                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4505                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4506                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4507                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4508                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
4509                                 match funding_res {
4510                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4511                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
4512                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4513                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4514                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4515                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4516                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4517                                                 });
4518                                         },
4519                                 }
4520                         },
4521                         Some(phase) => {
4522                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4523                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4524                                         err: format!(
4525                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4526                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4527                                 })
4528                         },
4529                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4530                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4531                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4532                                 }),
4533                 };
4534
4535                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4536                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4537                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4538                                 msg,
4539                         });
4540                 }
4541                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4542                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4543                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4544                         },
4545                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4546                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4547                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4548                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4549                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4550                                                 let err = format!(
4551                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4552                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
4553                                                 );
4554                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4555                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4556                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4557                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4558                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4559                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4560                                         }
4561                                 }
4562                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4563                         }
4564                 }
4565                 Ok(())
4566         }
4567
4568         #[cfg(test)]
4569         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4570                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4571                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4572                 })
4573         }
4574
4575         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4576         ///
4577         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4578         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4579         ///
4580         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4581         /// across the p2p network.
4582         ///
4583         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4584         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4585         ///
4586         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4587         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4588         /// keys per-channel).
4589         ///
4590         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4591         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4592         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4593         ///
4594         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4595         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4596         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4597         ///
4598         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4599         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4600         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4601         /// for more details.
4602         ///
4603         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4604         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4605         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4606                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4607         }
4608
4609         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4610         ///
4611         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4612         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4613         ///
4614         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4615         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4616         /// signature for each channel.
4617         ///
4618         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4619         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4620                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4621                 let mut result = Ok(());
4622
4623                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4624                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4625                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4626                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4627                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4628                                         }));
4629                                 }
4630                         }
4631                 }
4632                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4633                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4634                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4635                         }));
4636                 }
4637                 {
4638                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4639                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4640                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4641                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4642                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4643                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4644                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4645                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4646                         {
4647                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4648                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4649                                 }));
4650                         }
4651                 }
4652
4653                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4654                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4655                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4656                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4657                 } else {
4658                         None
4659                 };
4660                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4661                         match states.entry(txid) {
4662                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4663                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4664                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4665                                         }));
4666                                         None
4667                                 },
4668                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4669                         }
4670                 });
4671                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4672                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4673                                 temporary_channel_id,
4674                                 counterparty_node_id,
4675                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
4676                                 is_batch_funding,
4677                                 |chan, tx| {
4678                                         let mut output_index = None;
4679                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4680                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4681                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4682                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
4683                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4684                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4685                                                                 });
4686                                                         }
4687                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4688                                                 }
4689                                         }
4690                                         if output_index.is_none() {
4691                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4692                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4693                                                 });
4694                                         }
4695                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4696                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4697                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4698                                                 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4699                                                 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4700                                                 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4701                                         }
4702                                         Ok(outpoint)
4703                                 })
4704                         );
4705                 }
4706                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4707                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4708                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4709                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4710                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4711                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4712                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4713                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4714                         );
4715                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4716                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4717                         );
4718                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4719                         {
4720                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4721                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4722                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4723                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4724                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4725                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
4726                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4727                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4728                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4729                                                 });
4730                                 }
4731                         }
4732                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4733                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4734                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4735                         }
4736                 }
4737                 result
4738         }
4739
4740         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4741         ///
4742         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4743         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4744         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4745         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4746         ///
4747         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4748         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4749         ///
4750         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4751         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4752         ///
4753         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4754         ///
4755         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4756         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4757         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4758         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4759         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4760         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4761         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4762         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4763                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4764         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4765                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4766                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4767                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4768                         });
4769                 }
4770
4771                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4772                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4773                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4774                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4775                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4776                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4777
4778                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4779                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4780                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4781                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4782                                 });
4783                         };
4784                 }
4785                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4786                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4787                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4788                                 config.apply(config_update);
4789                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4790                                         continue;
4791                                 }
4792                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4793                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4794                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4795                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4796                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4797                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4798                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4799                                                         msg,
4800                                                 });
4801                                         }
4802                                 }
4803                                 continue;
4804                         } else {
4805                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4806                                 debug_assert!(false);
4807                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4808                                         err: format!(
4809                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4810                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4811                                 });
4812                         };
4813                 }
4814                 Ok(())
4815         }
4816
4817         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4818         ///
4819         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4820         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4821         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4822         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4823         ///
4824         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4825         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4826         ///
4827         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4828         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4829         ///
4830         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4831         ///
4832         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4833         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4834         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4835         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4836         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4837         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4838         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4839         pub fn update_channel_config(
4840                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4841         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4842                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4843         }
4844
4845         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4846         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4847         ///
4848         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4849         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4850         ///
4851         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4852         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4853         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4854         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4855         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4856         ///
4857         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4858         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4859         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4860         /// than expected.
4861         ///
4862         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4863         /// backwards.
4864         ///
4865         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4866         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4867         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4868         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4869         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4870         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4871                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4872
4873                 let next_hop_scid = {
4874                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4875                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4876                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4877                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4878                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4879                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4880                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4881                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4882                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4883                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4884                                                 })
4885                                         }
4886                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4887                                 },
4888                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4889                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4890                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4891                                 }),
4892                                 None => {
4893                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4894                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4895                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4896                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4897                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4898                                                 err: error
4899                                         })
4900                                 }
4901                         }
4902                 };
4903
4904                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4905                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4906                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4907                         })?;
4908
4909                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4910                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4911                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4912                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4913                                 }
4914                         },
4915                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4916                 };
4917                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4918                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4919                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4920                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4921                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4922                 };
4923
4924                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4925                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4926                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4927                         payment.prev_channel_id,
4928                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4929                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4930                 )];
4931                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4932                 Ok(())
4933         }
4934
4935         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4936         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4937         ///
4938         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4939         /// backwards.
4940         ///
4941         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4942         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4943                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4944
4945                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4946                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4947                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4948                         })?;
4949
4950                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4951                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4952                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4953                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4954                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4955                                 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4956                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4957                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4958                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4959                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4960                         });
4961
4962                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4963                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4964                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4965                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4966
4967                 Ok(())
4968         }
4969
4970         fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4971                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4972                 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4973
4974                 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4975                         if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4976                                 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4977                                         Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4978                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4979                                                         node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4980                                                         channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4981                                                 },
4982                                         None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4983                                                 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4984                                         },
4985                                 }
4986                         } else {
4987                                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4988                         }
4989                 };
4990
4991                 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4992                         let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4993                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4994                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4995                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4996                                 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4997                                 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4998                                 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4999                         });
5000                         let (
5001                                 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5002                                 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5003                          ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5004                                 incoming_channel_details
5005                         } else {
5006                                 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5007                                 continue;
5008                         };
5009
5010                         let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5011                         let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5012                         for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5013                                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5014                                         &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5015                                 ) {
5016                                         Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5017                                         Err(htlc_fail) => {
5018                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5019                                                 continue;
5020                                         },
5021                                 };
5022
5023                                 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5024                                 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5025
5026                                 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5027                                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5028                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5029                                         chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5030                                                 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5031                                         )
5032                                 }) {
5033                                         Some(Ok(_)) => {},
5034                                         Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5035                                                 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5036                                                         self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5037                                                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5038                                                         }).flatten()
5039                                                 } else {
5040                                                         None
5041                                                 };
5042                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5043                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5044                                                         outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5045                                                 );
5046                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5047                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5048                                                 continue;
5049                                         },
5050                                         // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5051                                         None => continue 'outer_loop,
5052                                 }
5053
5054                                 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5055                                 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5056                                         if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5057                                                 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5058                                         ) {
5059                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5060                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5061                                                         chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5062                                                 );
5063                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5064                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5065                                                 continue;
5066                                         }
5067                                 }
5068
5069                                 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5070                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5071                                         incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5072                                 ) {
5073                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5074                                                 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5075                                         },
5076                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5077                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5078                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5079                                         },
5080                                 }
5081                         }
5082
5083                         // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5084                         // proposed to as a batch.
5085                         let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5086                                 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5087                         self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5088                         for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5089                                 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5090                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5091                                                 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5092                                                 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5093                                         },
5094                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5095                                                 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5096                                                 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5097                                                 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5098                                         },
5099                                 };
5100                                 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5101                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5102                                         prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5103                                         failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5104                                 }, None));
5105                         }
5106                 }
5107         }
5108
5109         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5110         ///
5111         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5112         /// Will likely generate further events.
5113         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5114                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5115
5116                 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5117
5118                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5119                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5120                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5121                 {
5122                         let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5123                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5124
5125                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5126                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5127                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5128                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5129                                                 () => {
5130                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5131                                                                 match forward_info {
5132                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5133                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5134                                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5135                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5136                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5137                                                                                 }
5138                                                                         }) => {
5139                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5140                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5141                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5142                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5143
5144                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5145                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5146                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5147                                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5148                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5149                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5150                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5151                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5152                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5153                                                                                                 });
5154
5155                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5156                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5157                                                                                                 } else {
5158                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5159                                                                                                 };
5160
5161                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5162                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5163                                                                                                         reason
5164                                                                                                 ));
5165                                                                                                 continue;
5166                                                                                         }
5167                                                                                 }
5168                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5169                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5170                                                                                                 {
5171                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5172                                                                                                 }
5173                                                                                         }
5174                                                                                 }
5175                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5176                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5177                                                                                                 {
5178                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5179                                                                                                 }
5180                                                                                         }
5181                                                                                 }
5182                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5183                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5184                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5185                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5186                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5187                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5188                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5189                                                                                                 ) {
5190                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
5191                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5192                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5193                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5194                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5195                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5196                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
5197                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5198                                                                                                         },
5199                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5200                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5201                                                                                                         },
5202                                                                                                 };
5203                                                                                                 match next_hop {
5204                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5205                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5206                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5207                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5208                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5209                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5210                                                                                                                 {
5211                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5212                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5213                                                                                                                 }
5214                                                                                                         },
5215                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
5216                                                                                                 }
5217                                                                                         } else {
5218                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5219                                                                                         }
5220                                                                                 } else {
5221                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5222                                                                                 }
5223                                                                         },
5224                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5225                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5226                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5227                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5228                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
5229                                                                         }
5230                                                                 }
5231                                                         }
5232                                                 }
5233                                         }
5234                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5235                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5236                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5237                                                 None => {
5238                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5239                                                         continue;
5240                                                 }
5241                                         };
5242                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5243                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5244                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5245                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5246                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5247                                                 continue;
5248                                         }
5249                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5250                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5251                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5252                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5253                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5254                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5255                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5256                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5257                                                                         prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5258                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5259                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5260                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
5261                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5262                                                                         },
5263                                                                 }) => {
5264                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5265                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5266                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5267                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5268                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5269                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5270                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5271                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5272                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5273                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5274                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5275                                                                         });
5276                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5277                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5278                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5279                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5280                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5281                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5282                                                                                 ).ok()
5283                                                                         });
5284                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5285                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5286                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5287                                                                                 &&logger)
5288                                                                         {
5289                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5290                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5291                                                                                 } else {
5292                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5293                                                                                 }
5294                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5295                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5296                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5297                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5298                                                                                 ));
5299                                                                                 continue;
5300                                                                         }
5301                                                                         None
5302                                                                 },
5303                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5304                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5305                                                                 },
5306                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5307                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5308                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5309                                                                 },
5310                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5311                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5312                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5313                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5314                                                                         );
5315                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
5316                                                                 },
5317                                                         };
5318                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5319                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5320                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5321                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5322                                                                         } else {
5323                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5324                                                                         }
5325                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5326                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5327                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5328                                                                         continue;
5329                                                                 }
5330                                                         }
5331                                                 }
5332                                         } else {
5333                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5334                                                 continue;
5335                                         }
5336                                 } else {
5337                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5338                                                 match forward_info {
5339                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5340                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5341                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5342                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5343                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5344                                                                 }
5345                                                         }) => {
5346                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5347                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5348                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5349                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5350                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5351                                                                                 requires_blinded_error: _
5352                                                                         } => {
5353                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5354                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5355                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5356                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data, payment_context },
5357                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5358                                                                         },
5359                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5360                                                                                 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5361                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5362                                                                         } => {
5363                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5364                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5365                                                                                         payment_metadata,
5366                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
5367                                                                                 };
5368                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5369                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
5370                                                                         },
5371                                                                         _ => {
5372                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5373                                                                         }
5374                                                                 };
5375                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5376                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5377                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5378                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5379                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5380                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5381                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5382                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5383                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5384                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5385                                                                         },
5386                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5387                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5388                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
5389                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5390                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5391                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
5392                                                                         total_value_received: None,
5393                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5394                                                                         cltv_expiry,
5395                                                                         onion_payload,
5396                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5397                                                                 };
5398
5399                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5400
5401                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5402                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5403                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5404                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5405                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5406                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5407                                                                                 );
5408                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5409                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5410                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5411                                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5412                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5413                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5414                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5415                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5416                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5417                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
5418                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5419                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5420                                                                                 ));
5421                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5422                                                                         }
5423                                                                 }
5424                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5425                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5426                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5427                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5428                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5429                                                                 }
5430
5431                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5432                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
5433                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5434                                                                                 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5435                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5436                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5437                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5438                                                                                 }
5439                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5440                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
5441                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5442                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
5443                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5444                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
5445                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5446                                                                                                 }
5447                                                                                         });
5448                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5449                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5450                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5451                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5452                                                                                 }
5453                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5454                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5455                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5456                                                                                 }
5457                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5458                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5459                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5460                                                                                         }
5461                                                                                 } else {
5462                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5463                                                                                 }
5464                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5465                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5466                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5467                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5468                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5469                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5470                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5471                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5472                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5473                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5474                                                                                         }
5475                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5476                                                                                 }
5477                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5478                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5479                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5480                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5481                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5482                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5483                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
5484                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5485                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5486                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5487                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5488                                                                                         }
5489                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5490                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5491                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5492                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5493                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5494                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5495                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5496                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5497                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5498                                                                                                 payment_hash,
5499                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
5500                                                                                                 amount_msat,
5501                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5502                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5503                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5504                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5505                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5506                                                                                         }, None));
5507                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
5508                                                                                 } else {
5509                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5510                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5511                                                                                         // MPP parts.
5512                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5513                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5514                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5515                                                                                         }
5516                                                                                 }
5517                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
5518                                                                         }}
5519                                                                 }
5520
5521                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5522                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5523                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5524                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5525                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5526                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5527                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5528                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5529                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5530                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5531                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5532                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5533                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5534                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
5535                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
5536                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5537                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5538                                                                                                         }
5539                                                                                                 };
5540                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5541                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5542                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5543                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5544                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5545                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5546                                                                                                         }
5547                                                                                                 }
5548                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
5549                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5550                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5551                                                                                                 };
5552                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5553                                                                                         },
5554                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5555                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5556                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5557                                                                                         }
5558                                                                                 }
5559                                                                         },
5560                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5561                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5562                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5563                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5564                                                                                 }
5565                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5566                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5567                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5568                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5569                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5570                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5571                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5572                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5573                                                                                 } else {
5574                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
5575                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5576                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5577                                                                                         };
5578                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5579                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
5580                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5581                                                                                         }
5582                                                                                 }
5583                                                                         },
5584                                                                 };
5585                                                         },
5586                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5587                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5588                                                         }
5589                                                 }
5590                                         }
5591                                 }
5592                         }
5593                 }
5594
5595                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5596                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5597                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5598                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5599
5600                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5601                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5602                 }
5603                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5604
5605                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5606                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5607                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5608                 // network stack.
5609                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5610
5611                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5612                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5613                 events.append(&mut new_events);
5614         }
5615
5616         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5617         ///
5618         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5619         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5620                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5621
5622                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5623
5624                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5625                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5626                 if background_events.is_empty() {
5627                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5628                 }
5629
5630                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5631                         match event {
5632                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5633                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5634                                         // monitor updating completing.
5635                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5636                                 },
5637                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5638                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
5639                                         {
5640                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5641                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5642                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5643                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5644                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5645                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5646                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5647                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
5648                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5649                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5650                                                                         } else {
5651                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5652                                                                         }
5653                                                                 },
5654                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5655                                                         }
5656                                                 }
5657                                         }
5658                                         if !updated_chan {
5659                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5660                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5661                                         }
5662                                 },
5663                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5664                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5665                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5666                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5667                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5668                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5669                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5670                                                 } else {
5671                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5672                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5673                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5674                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5675                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5676                                                 }
5677                                         }
5678                                 },
5679                         }
5680                 }
5681                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5682         }
5683
5684         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5685         /// Process background events, for functional testing
5686         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5687                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5688                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5689         }
5690
5691         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5692                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5693
5694                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5695
5696                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5697                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5698                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5699                 }
5700                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5701                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5702                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5703                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5704                 }
5705                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5706                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5707
5708                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5709                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5710         }
5711
5712         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5713         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5714         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5715         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5716         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5717         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5718                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5719                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5720
5721                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5722                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5723
5724                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5725                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5726                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5727                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5728                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5729                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5730                                 ) {
5731                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5732                                                 anchor_feerate
5733                                         } else {
5734                                                 non_anchor_feerate
5735                                         };
5736                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5737                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5738                                 }
5739                         }
5740
5741                         should_persist
5742                 });
5743         }
5744
5745         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5746         ///
5747         /// This currently includes:
5748         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5749         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5750         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5751         ///    the channel.
5752         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5753         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5754         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5755         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5756         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5757         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5758         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5759         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
5760         ///
5761         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5762         /// estimate fetches.
5763         ///
5764         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5765         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5766         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5767                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5768                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5769
5770                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5771                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5772
5773                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5774                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5775                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5776                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5777
5778                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5779                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5780                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5781                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5782                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5783                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5784                         | {
5785                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5786                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5787                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5788                                         log_error!(logger,
5789                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5790                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5791                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5792                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5793                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5794                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5795                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5796                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5797                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5798                                                         },
5799                                                 },
5800                                         });
5801                                         false
5802                                 } else {
5803                                         true
5804                                 }
5805                         };
5806
5807                         {
5808                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5809                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5810                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5811                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5812                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5813                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5814                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5815                                                 match phase {
5816                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5817                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5818                                                                         anchor_feerate
5819                                                                 } else {
5820                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
5821                                                                 };
5822                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5823                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5824
5825                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5826                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5827                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5828                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
5829                                                                 }
5830
5831                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5832                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5833                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5834                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5835                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5836                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5837                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5838                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5839                                                                                 n += 1;
5840                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5841                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5842                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5843                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5844                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5845                                                                                                         msg: update
5846                                                                                                 });
5847                                                                                         }
5848                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5849                                                                                 } else {
5850                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5851                                                                                 }
5852                                                                         },
5853                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5854                                                                                 n += 1;
5855                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5856                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5857                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5858                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5859                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5860                                                                                                         msg: update
5861                                                                                                 });
5862                                                                                         }
5863                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5864                                                                                 } else {
5865                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5866                                                                                 }
5867                                                                         },
5868                                                                         _ => {},
5869                                                                 }
5870
5871                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5872
5873                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5874                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5875                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5876                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5877                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5878                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5879                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5880                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5881                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5882                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5883                                                                                         },
5884                                                                                 },
5885                                                                         });
5886                                                                 }
5887
5888                                                                 true
5889                                                         },
5890                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5891                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5892                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5893                                                         },
5894                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5895                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5896                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5897                                                         },
5898                                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5899                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5900                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5901                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5902                                                         },
5903                                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5904                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5905                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5906                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5907                                                         },
5908                                                 }
5909                                         });
5910
5911                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5912                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5913                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5914                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5915                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5916                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5917                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5918                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5919                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5920                                                                         },
5921                                                                 }
5922                                                         );
5923                                                 }
5924                                         }
5925                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5926
5927                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5928                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5929                                         }
5930                                 }
5931                         }
5932
5933                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5934                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5935                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5936                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5937                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5938                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5939                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5940                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5941                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5942                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5943                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5944                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5945                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5946                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5947                                                         let remove_entry = {
5948                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5949                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5950                                                         };
5951                                                         if remove_entry {
5952                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5953                                                         }
5954                                                 },
5955                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5956                                         }
5957                                 }
5958                         }
5959
5960                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5961                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5962                                         // This should be unreachable
5963                                         debug_assert!(false);
5964                                         return false;
5965                                 }
5966                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5967                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5968                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5969                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5970                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5971                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5972                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5973                                         {
5974                                                 return true;
5975                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5976                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5977                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5978                                         }) {
5979                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5980                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5981                                                 return false;
5982                                         }
5983                                 }
5984                                 true
5985                         });
5986
5987                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5988                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5989                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5990                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5991                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5992                         }
5993
5994                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5995                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5996                         }
5997
5998                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5999                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6000                         }
6001
6002                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6003                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6004                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6005                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6006                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6007                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6008                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6009                         );
6010
6011                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6012                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6013                         );
6014
6015                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6016                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6017                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6018                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6019                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6020                         }
6021
6022                         should_persist
6023                 });
6024         }
6025
6026         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6027         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6028         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6029         ///
6030         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6031         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6032         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6033         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6034         ///
6035         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6036         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6037         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6038         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6039         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6040                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6041         }
6042
6043         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6044         /// reason for the failure.
6045         ///
6046         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6047         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6048                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6049
6050                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6051                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6052                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6053                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6054                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6055                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6056                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6057                         }
6058                 }
6059         }
6060
6061         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6062         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6063                 match failure_code {
6064                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6065                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6066                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6067                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6068                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6069                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6070                         },
6071                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6072                                 let fail_data = match data {
6073                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6074                                         None => Vec::new(),
6075                                 };
6076                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6077                         }
6078                 }
6079         }
6080
6081         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6082         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6083         ///
6084         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6085         /// forwarding
6086         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6087                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6088                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6089                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6090                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6091                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6092                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6093                 } else {
6094                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6095                 };
6096                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6097                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6098                 } else {
6099                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6100                 }
6101         }
6102
6103
6104         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6105         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6106         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6107                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6108                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6109                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6110                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6111                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6112                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6113                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6114                         }
6115                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6116                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6117                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6118                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6119                 } else {
6120                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6121                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6122                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6123                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6124                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6125                 }
6126         }
6127
6128         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6129         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6130         // be surfaced to the user.
6131         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6132                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6133                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6134         ) {
6135                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6136                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6137                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6138                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6139                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6140                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6141                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6142                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6143                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6144                                                 } else {
6145                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6146                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6147                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6148                                                 }
6149                                         },
6150                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6151                                 }
6152                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6153                 };
6154
6155                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6156                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6157                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6158                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6159                 }
6160         }
6161
6162         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6163                 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6164                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6165         }
6166
6167         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6168         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6169         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6170                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6171                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6172                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6173                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6174                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6175                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6176                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6177                 }
6178
6179                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6180                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6181                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6182                 //timer handling.
6183
6184                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6185                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6186                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6187                 let mut push_forward_event;
6188                 match source {
6189                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6190                                 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6191                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6192                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6193                         },
6194                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6195                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6196                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6197                         }) => {
6198                                 log_trace!(
6199                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6200                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6201                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6202                                 );
6203                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6204                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6205                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6206                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6207                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6208                                                 );
6209                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6210                                         },
6211                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6212                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6213                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
6214                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6215                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6216                                                 }
6217                                         },
6218                                         None => {
6219                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6220                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6221                                                 );
6222                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6223                                         }
6224                                 };
6225
6226                                 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6227                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6228                                 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6229                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6230                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6231                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6232                                         },
6233                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6234                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6235                                         }
6236                                 }
6237                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6238                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6239                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6240                                         prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6241                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
6242                                 }, None));
6243                         },
6244                 }
6245                 push_forward_event
6246         }
6247
6248         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6249         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6250         ///
6251         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6252         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6253         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6254         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6255         ///
6256         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6257         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6258         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6259         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6260         ///
6261         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6262         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6263         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6264         ///
6265         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6266         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6267         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6268         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6269         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6270         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6271         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6272         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6273                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6274         }
6275
6276         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6277         /// even type numbers.
6278         ///
6279         /// # Note
6280         ///
6281         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6282         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6283         ///
6284         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6285         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6286                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6287         }
6288
6289         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6290                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6291
6292                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6293
6294                 let mut sources = {
6295                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6296                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6297                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6298                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6299                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6300                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6301                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6302                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6303                                                 break;
6304                                         }
6305                                 }
6306
6307                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6308                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6309                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6310                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6311                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6312                                 });
6313                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6314                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6315                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6316                                                 &payment_hash);
6317                                 }
6318
6319                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6320                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6321                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6322                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6323                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6324                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6325                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6326                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6327                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6328                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6329                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6330                                                 }
6331                                                 return;
6332                                         }
6333                                 }
6334
6335                                 payment.htlcs
6336                         } else { return; }
6337                 };
6338                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6339
6340                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6341                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6342                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6343                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6344                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6345                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6346                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6347                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6348                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6349                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6350                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6351                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6352                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6353                                 debug_assert!(false);
6354                                 valid_mpp = false;
6355                                 break;
6356                         }
6357                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6358
6359                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6360                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6361                                 debug_assert!(false);
6362                                 valid_mpp = false;
6363                                 break;
6364                         }
6365                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6366                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6367                 }
6368                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6369                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6370                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6371                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6372                         return;
6373                 }
6374                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6375                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6376                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6377                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6378                         return;
6379                 }
6380                 if valid_mpp {
6381                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6382                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6383                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6384                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6385                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6386                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6387                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6388                                         }
6389                                 ) {
6390                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6391                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6392                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6393                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6394                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6395                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6396                                 }
6397                         }
6398                 }
6399                 if !valid_mpp {
6400                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6401                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6402                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6403                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6404                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6405                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6406                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6407                         }
6408                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6409                 }
6410
6411                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6412                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6413                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6414                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6415                 }
6416         }
6417
6418         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6419                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6420         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6421                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6422
6423                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6424                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6425                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6426                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6427
6428                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6429                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6430                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6431                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6432
6433                 {
6434                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6435                         let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6436                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6437                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6438                                 None => None
6439                         };
6440
6441                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6442                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6443                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6444                         ).unwrap_or(None);
6445
6446                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6447                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6448                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6449                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6450                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6451                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6452                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6453                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6454
6455                                                 match fulfill_res {
6456                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6457                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6458                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6459                                                                                 chan_id, action);
6460                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6461                                                                 }
6462                                                                 if !during_init {
6463                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6464                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6465                                                                 } else {
6466                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6467                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6468                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
6469                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6470                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6471                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
6472                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6473                                                                                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6474                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
6475                                                                                 });
6476                                                                 }
6477                                                         }
6478                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6479                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6480                                                                         action
6481                                                                 } else {
6482                                                                         return Ok(());
6483                                                                 };
6484                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6485
6486                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6487                                                                         chan_id, action);
6488                                                                 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6489                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6490                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6491                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6492                                                                         blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6493                                                                 } = action {
6494                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6495                                                                 } else {
6496                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
6497                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6498                                                                         return Ok(());
6499                                                                 };
6500                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6501                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6502                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6503                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6504                                                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6505                                                                         {
6506                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
6507                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6508                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6509                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
6510                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6511                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6512                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6513                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6514                                                                                 });
6515                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6516                                                                         }
6517                                                                 } else {
6518                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6519                                                                 }
6520                                                         }
6521                                                 }
6522                                         }
6523                                         return Ok(());
6524                                 }
6525                         }
6526                 }
6527                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6528                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6529                         counterparty_node_id: None,
6530                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6531                                 payment_preimage,
6532                         }],
6533                         channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6534                 };
6535
6536                 if !during_init {
6537                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6538                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6539                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6540                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6541                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6542                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6543                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6544                                 // again on restart.
6545                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6546                                         "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6547                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
6548                         }
6549                 } else {
6550                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6551                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6552                         // event.
6553                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6554                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6555                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6556                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6557                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6558                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6559                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6560                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6561                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6562                                         prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6563                                 )));
6564                 }
6565                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6566                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6567                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6568                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6569                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6570                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6571                 Ok(())
6572         }
6573
6574         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6575                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6576         }
6577
6578         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6579                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6580                 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6581                 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6582         ) {
6583                 match source {
6584                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6585                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6586                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6587                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6588                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6589                                 }
6590                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6591                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6592                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6593                                 };
6594                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6595                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6596                                         &self.logger);
6597                         },
6598                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6599                                 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6600                                 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6601                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6602                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6603                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6604                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6605                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6606                                                 let chan_to_release =
6607                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6608                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6609                                                         } else {
6610                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6611                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6612                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6613                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6614                                                                 // closed.
6615                                                                 None
6616                                                         };
6617
6618                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6619                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6620                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6621                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6622                                                         // in the background.
6623                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6624                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6625                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6626                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6627                                                                         match ev {
6628                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6629                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6630                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
6631                                                                                 } => {
6632                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6633                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6634                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6635                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6636                                                                                                         } = upd {
6637                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6638                                                                                                         } else { false }
6639                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
6640                                                                                                 true
6641                                                                                         } else { false }
6642                                                                                 },
6643                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6644                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6645                                                                                         (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6646                                                                                 ) => {
6647                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6648                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6649                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
6650                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
6651                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6652                                                                                                 ));
6653                                                                                                 true
6654                                                                                         } else { false }
6655                                                                                 },
6656                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6657                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
6658                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6659                                                                                         channel_id, ..
6660                                                                                 } =>
6661                                                                                         *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6662                                                                         }
6663                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6664                                                         }
6665                                                         None
6666                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6667                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6668                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6669                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6670                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6671                                                                         downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6672                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6673                                                                 })
6674                                                         } else { None }
6675                                                 } else {
6676                                                         let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6677                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6678                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6679                                                                 } else { None }
6680                                                         } else { None };
6681                                                         debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6682                                                                 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6683                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6684                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6685                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6686                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6687                                                                         prev_user_channel_id,
6688                                                                         next_user_channel_id,
6689                                                                         total_fee_earned_msat,
6690                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6691                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6692                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6693                                                                 },
6694                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6695                                                         })
6696                                                 }
6697                                         });
6698                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6699                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6700                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6701                                 }
6702                         },
6703                 }
6704         }
6705
6706         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6707         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6708                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6709         }
6710
6711         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6712                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6713                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6714                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6715
6716                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6717                         match action {
6718                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6719                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6720                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6721                                                 amount_msat,
6722                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
6723                                                 receiver_node_id,
6724                                                 htlcs,
6725                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6726                                         }) = payment {
6727                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6728                                                         payment_hash,
6729                                                         purpose,
6730                                                         amount_msat,
6731                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6732                                                         htlcs,
6733                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
6734                                                 }, None));
6735                                         }
6736                                 },
6737                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6738                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6739                                 } => {
6740                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6741                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6742                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6743                                         }
6744                                 },
6745                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6746                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6747                                 } => {
6748                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6749                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6750                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6751                                                 downstream_channel_id,
6752                                                 Some(blocking_action),
6753                                         );
6754                                 },
6755                         }
6756                 }
6757         }
6758
6759         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6760         /// update completion.
6761         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6762                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6763                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6764                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6765                 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6766                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6767         -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6768                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6769                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6770                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
6771                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6772                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6773                         pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6774                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6775                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6776                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6777
6778                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6779                 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6780
6781                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6782                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6783                         htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6784                                 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6785                 }
6786                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6787                 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6788                         decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6789                 }
6790
6791                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6792                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6793                 }
6794                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6795                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6796                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6797                                 msg,
6798                         });
6799                 }
6800
6801                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6802                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6803                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6804                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6805                                         updates: update,
6806                                 });
6807                         }
6808                 } }
6809                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6810                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6811                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6812                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6813                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
6814                                 });
6815                         }
6816                 } }
6817                 match order {
6818                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6819                                 handle_cs!();
6820                                 handle_raa!();
6821                         },
6822                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6823                                 handle_raa!();
6824                                 handle_cs!();
6825                         },
6826                 }
6827
6828                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6829                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6830                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6831                 }
6832
6833                 {
6834                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6835                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6836                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6837                 }
6838
6839                 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6840         }
6841
6842         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6843                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6844
6845                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6846                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6847                         None => {
6848                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6849                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6850                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6851                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6852                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6853                                         None => return,
6854                                 }
6855                         }
6856                 };
6857                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6858                 let mut peer_state_lock;
6859                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6860                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6861                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6862                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6863                 let channel =
6864                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6865                                 chan
6866                         } else {
6867                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6868                                         .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6869                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6870                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6871                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6872                                 return;
6873                         };
6874                 let remaining_in_flight =
6875                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6876                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6877                                 pending.len()
6878                         } else { 0 };
6879                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6880                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6881                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6882                         remaining_in_flight);
6883                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6884                         return;
6885                 }
6886                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6887         }
6888
6889         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6890         ///
6891         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6892         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6893         /// the channel.
6894         ///
6895         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6896         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6897         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6898         ///
6899         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6900         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6901         /// used to accept such channels.
6902         ///
6903         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6904         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6905         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6906                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6907         }
6908
6909         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6910         /// it as confirmed immediately.
6911         ///
6912         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6913         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6914         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6915         ///
6916         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6917         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6918         ///
6919         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6920         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6921         ///
6922         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6923         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6924         ///
6925         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6926         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6927         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6928                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6929         }
6930
6931         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6932
6933                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6934                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6935
6936                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6937                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6938                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6939                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6940                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6941                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6942                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6943
6944                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6945                 })?;
6946                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6947                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6948                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6949
6950                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6951                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6952                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6953                 // succeed.
6954                 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6955                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6956                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6957                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6958                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6959                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6960                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6961                         },
6962                         _ => {
6963                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6964                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6965
6966                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6967                         }
6968                 };
6969
6970                 match res {
6971                         Err(err) => {
6972                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6973                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6974                                 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6975                                         Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6976                                         Err(e) => {
6977                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6978                                         },
6979                                 }
6980                         }
6981                         Ok(mut channel) => {
6982                                 if accept_0conf {
6983                                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6984                                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6985                                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6986                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6987                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6988                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6989                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6990                                                 }
6991                                         };
6992                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6993                                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6994                                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6995
6996                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6997                                 } else {
6998                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6999                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7000                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7001                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7002                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7003                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7004                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7005                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7006                                                         }
7007                                                 };
7008                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7009                                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7010                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7011
7012                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7013                                         }
7014                                 }
7015
7016                                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7017                                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7018                                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7019
7020                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7021                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7022                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7023                                 });
7024
7025                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7026
7027                                 Ok(())
7028                         },
7029                 }
7030         }
7031
7032         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7033         /// or 0-conf channels.
7034         ///
7035         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7036         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7037         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7038         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7039                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7040                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7041                 {
7042                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7043                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7044                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7045                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7046                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7047                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7048                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7049                                 }
7050                         }
7051                 }
7052                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7053         }
7054
7055         fn unfunded_channel_count(
7056                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7057         ) -> usize {
7058                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7059                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7060                         match phase {
7061                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7062                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7063                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7064                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7065                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7066                                         {
7067                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7068                                         }
7069                                 },
7070                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7071                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7072                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7073                                         }
7074                                 },
7075                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
7076                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7077                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7078                                         // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7079                                         // included in the unfunded count.
7080                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7081                                                 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7082                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7083                                         }
7084                                 },
7085                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7086                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7087                                         continue;
7088                                 },
7089                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
7090                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7091                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7092                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7093                                         continue;
7094                                 }
7095                         }
7096                 }
7097                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7098         }
7099
7100         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7101                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7102                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7103                 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7104                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7105                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7106                 }
7107
7108                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7109                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7110                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7111                 }
7112
7113                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7114                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7115                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7116                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7117                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7118
7119                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7120                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7121                     .ok_or_else(|| {
7122                                 debug_assert!(false);
7123                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7124                                         format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7125                                         msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7126                         })?;
7127                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7128                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7129
7130                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7131                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7132                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7133                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7134                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7135                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7136                 {
7137                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7138                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7139                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7140                 }
7141
7142                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7143                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7144                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7145                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7146                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7147                 }
7148
7149                 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7150                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7151                 if channel_exists {
7152                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7153                                 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7154                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7155                 }
7156
7157                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7158                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7159                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7160                                         &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7161                                 ).map_err(|e|
7162                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7163                                 )?;
7164                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7165                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7166                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7167                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7168                                 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7169                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7170                                 channel_type,
7171                         }, None));
7172                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7173                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7174                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7175                         });
7176                         return Ok(());
7177                 }
7178
7179                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7180                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7181                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7182                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7183                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7184                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7185                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7186                 {
7187                         Err(e) => {
7188                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7189                         },
7190                         Ok(res) => res
7191                 };
7192
7193                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7194                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7195                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7196                                 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7197                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7198                 }
7199                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7200                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7201                                 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7202                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7203                 }
7204
7205                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7206                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7207
7208                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7209                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7210                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7211                 });
7212                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7213                 Ok(())
7214         }
7215
7216         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7217                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7218                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7219                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7220                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7221                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7222                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7223                                         debug_assert!(false);
7224                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7225                                 })?;
7226                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7227                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7228                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7229                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7230                                         match phase.get_mut() {
7231                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7232                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7233                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7234                                                 },
7235                                                 _ => {
7236                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7237                                                 }
7238                                         }
7239                                 },
7240                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7241                         }
7242                 };
7243                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7244                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7245                         temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7246                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7247                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
7248                         output_script,
7249                         user_channel_id: user_id,
7250                 }, None));
7251                 Ok(())
7252         }
7253
7254         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7255                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7256
7257                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7258                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7259                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7260                                 debug_assert!(false);
7261                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7262                         })?;
7263
7264                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7265                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7266                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7267                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7268                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7269                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7270                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7271                                                 Ok(res) => res,
7272                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7273                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7274                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7275                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7276                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7277                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7278                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7279                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7280                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7281                                                 },
7282                                         }
7283                                 },
7284                                 Some(mut phase) => {
7285                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7286                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7287                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7288                                 },
7289                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7290                         };
7291
7292                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7293
7294                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7295                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7296                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7297                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7298                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7299                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7300                         // on the channel.
7301                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7302                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7303                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7304                 } } }
7305
7306                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7307                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7308                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7309                         },
7310                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7311                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7312                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7313                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7314                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7315                                         },
7316                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7317                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7318                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7319                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7320                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7321
7322                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7323                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7324                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7325                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
7326                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7327                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7328                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7329                                                                         msg,
7330                                                                 });
7331                                                         }
7332
7333                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7334                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7335                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7336                                                         } else {
7337                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7338                                                         }
7339                                                         Ok(())
7340                                                 } else {
7341                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7342                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7343                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7344                                                 }
7345                                         }
7346                                 }
7347                         }
7348                 }
7349         }
7350
7351         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7352                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7353                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7354                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7355                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7356                                 debug_assert!(false);
7357                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7358                         })?;
7359
7360                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7361                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7362                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7363                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7364                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7365                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7366                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
7367                                                 &self.logger,
7368                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7369                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7370                                         );
7371                                         let res =
7372                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7373                                         match res {
7374                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7375                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7376                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7377                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7378                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7379                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7380                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7381                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7382                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7383                                                                 Ok(())
7384                                                         } else {
7385                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7386                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7387                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7388                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7389                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7390                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7391                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7392                                                         }
7393                                                 },
7394                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
7395                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7396                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7397                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7398                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7399                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7400                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7401                                                 }
7402                                         }
7403                                 } else {
7404                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7405                                 }
7406                         },
7407                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7408                 }
7409         }
7410
7411         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7412                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7413                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7414                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7415                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7416                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7417                                 debug_assert!(false);
7418                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7419                         })?;
7420                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7421                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7422                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7423                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7424                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7425                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7426                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7427                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7428                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7429                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7430                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7431                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7432                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
7433                                                 });
7434                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7435                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7436                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7437                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7438                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7439                                                 // announcement_signatures.
7440                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7441                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7442                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7443                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7444                                                                 msg,
7445                                                         });
7446                                                 }
7447                                         }
7448
7449                                         {
7450                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7451                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7452                                         }
7453
7454                                         Ok(())
7455                                 } else {
7456                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7457                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7458                                 }
7459                         },
7460                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7461                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7462                         }
7463                 }
7464         }
7465
7466         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7467                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7468                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7469                 {
7470                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7471                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7472                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7473                                         debug_assert!(false);
7474                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7475                                 })?;
7476                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7477                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7478                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7479                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7480                                 match phase {
7481                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7482                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7483                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7484                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7485                                                                 msg.channel_id,
7486                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7487                                                 }
7488
7489                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7490                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7491                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7492                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7493
7494                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7495                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7496                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7497                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7498                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7499                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7500                                                                 msg,
7501                                                         });
7502                                                 }
7503                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7504                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7505                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7506                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7507                                                 }
7508                                         },
7509                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7510                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7511                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7512                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7513                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7514                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7515                                         },
7516                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7517                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7518                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7519                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7520                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7521                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7522                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7523                                         },
7524                                 }
7525                         } else {
7526                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7527                         }
7528                 }
7529                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7530                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7531                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7532                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7533                 }
7534                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7535                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7536                 }
7537
7538                 Ok(())
7539         }
7540
7541         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7542                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7543                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7544                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7545                                 debug_assert!(false);
7546                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7547                         })?;
7548                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7549                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7550                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7551                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7552                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7553                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7554                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7555                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7556                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7557                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7558                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7559                                                                 msg,
7560                                                         });
7561                                                 }
7562                                                 if tx.is_some() {
7563                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7564                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7565                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7566                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7567                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7568                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7569                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7570                                         } else {
7571                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7572                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7573                                         }
7574                                 },
7575                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7576                         }
7577                 };
7578                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7579                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7580                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7581                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7582                 }
7583                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7584                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7585                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7586                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7587                                         msg: update
7588                                 });
7589                         }
7590                 }
7591                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7592                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7593                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7594                 }
7595                 Ok(())
7596         }
7597
7598         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7599                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7600                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7601                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7602                 //
7603                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7604                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7605                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7606                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7607
7608                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7609                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7610
7611                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7612                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7613                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7614                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7615                                 debug_assert!(false);
7616                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7617                         })?;
7618                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7619                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7620                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7621                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7622                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7623                                         let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7624                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7625                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7626                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7627                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7628                                                         ),
7629                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7630                                         };
7631                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7632                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7633                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7634                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7635                                         if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7636                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7637                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7638                                                                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7639                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7640                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7641                                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7642                                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7643                                                                 }
7644                                                         ))
7645                                                 } else {
7646                                                         match pending_forward_info {
7647                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7648                                                                         ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7649                                                                 }) => {
7650                                                                         let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7651                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7652                                                                         } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7653                                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7654                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7655                                                                         } else {
7656                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7657                                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7658                                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7659                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7660                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7661                                                                                 reason
7662                                                                         };
7663                                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7664                                                                 },
7665                                                                 _ => {},
7666                                                         }
7667                                                 }
7668                                         }
7669                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7670                                 } else {
7671                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7672                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7673                                 }
7674                         },
7675                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7676                 }
7677                 Ok(())
7678         }
7679
7680         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7681                 let funding_txo;
7682                 let next_user_channel_id;
7683                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7684                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7685                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7686                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7687                                         debug_assert!(false);
7688                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7689                                 })?;
7690                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7691                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7692                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7693                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7694                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7695                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7696                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7697                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7698                                                         log_trace!(logger,
7699                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7700                                                                 msg.channel_id);
7701                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7702                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7703                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7704                                                 }
7705                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7706                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7707                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7708                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7709                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7710                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7711                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7712                                                 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7713                                                 res
7714                                         } else {
7715                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7716                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7717                                         }
7718                                 },
7719                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7720                         }
7721                 };
7722                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7723                         Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7724                         funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7725                 );
7726
7727                 Ok(())
7728         }
7729
7730         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7731                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7732                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7733                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7734                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7735                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7736                                 debug_assert!(false);
7737                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7738                         })?;
7739                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7740                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7741                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7742                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7743                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7744                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7745                                 } else {
7746                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7747                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7748                                 }
7749                         },
7750                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7751                 }
7752                 Ok(())
7753         }
7754
7755         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7756                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7757                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7758                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7759                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7760                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7761                                 debug_assert!(false);
7762                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7763                         })?;
7764                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7765                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7766                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7767                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7768                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7769                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7770                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7771                                 }
7772                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7773                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7774                                 } else {
7775                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7776                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7777                                 }
7778                                 Ok(())
7779                         },
7780                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7781                 }
7782         }
7783
7784         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7785                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7786                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7787                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7788                                 debug_assert!(false);
7789                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7790                         })?;
7791                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7792                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7793                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7794                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7795                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7796                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7797                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7798                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7799                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7800                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7801                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7802                                         }
7803                                         Ok(())
7804                                 } else {
7805                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7806                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7807                                 }
7808                         },
7809                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7810                 }
7811         }
7812
7813         fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7814                 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7815                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7816                 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7817                 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7818                 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7819                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7820                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7821                 }
7822                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7823         }
7824
7825         #[inline]
7826         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7827                 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7828                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7829         }
7830
7831         #[inline]
7832         fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7833                 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7834                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7835                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7836                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7837                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7838                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7839                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7840                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7841                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7842                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7843                                         };
7844                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7845                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7846
7847                                         let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7848                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7849                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7850                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7851                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7852                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7853                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7854                                                 },
7855                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7856                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7857                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7858                                                         {
7859                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7860                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7861                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7862                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7863                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7864                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7865                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7866                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7867                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7868                                                                                         intercept_id
7869                                                                                 }, None));
7870                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7871                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7872                                                                         },
7873                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7874                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7875                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7876                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7877                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7878                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7879                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7880                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7881                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7882                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7883                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
7884                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7885                                                                                 });
7886
7887                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7888                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7889                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7890                                                                                 ));
7891                                                                         }
7892                                                                 }
7893                                                         } else {
7894                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7895                                                                 // payments are being processed.
7896                                                                 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7897                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7898                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7899                                                         }
7900                                                 }
7901                                         }
7902                                 }
7903                         }
7904
7905                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7906                                 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7907                         }
7908
7909                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7910                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7911                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7912                         }
7913                 }
7914                 push_forward_event
7915         }
7916
7917         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7918                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7919                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7920                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7921                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7922                 ).count();
7923                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7924                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7925                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7926                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7927                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7928                 // real by taking more time.
7929                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7930                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7931                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7932                         }, None));
7933                 }
7934         }
7935
7936         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7937         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7938         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7939         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7940         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7941                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7942                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7943         ) -> bool {
7944                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7945                         .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7946                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7947                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7948                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
7949                                 channel_id,
7950                                 counterparty_node_id,
7951                         })
7952                 })
7953         }
7954
7955         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7956         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7957                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7958         ) -> bool {
7959                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7960                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7961                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7962                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7963
7964                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7965                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7966                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7967                         }
7968                 }
7969                 false
7970         }
7971
7972         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7973                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7974                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7975                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7976                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7977                                         debug_assert!(false);
7978                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7979                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7980                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7981                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7982                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7983                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7984                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7985                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7986                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7987                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7988                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7989                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
7990                                                 } else { false };
7991                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7992                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7993                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7994                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7995                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7996                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7997                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7998                                                 }
7999                                                 htlcs_to_fail
8000                                         } else {
8001                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8002                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8003                                         }
8004                                 },
8005                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8006                         }
8007                 };
8008                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8009                 Ok(())
8010         }
8011
8012         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8013                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8014                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8015                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8016                                 debug_assert!(false);
8017                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8018                         })?;
8019                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8020                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8021                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8022                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8023                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8024                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8025                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8026                                 } else {
8027                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8028                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8029                                 }
8030                         },
8031                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8032                 }
8033                 Ok(())
8034         }
8035
8036         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8037                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8038                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8039                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8040                                 debug_assert!(false);
8041                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8042                         })?;
8043                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8044                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8045                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8046                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8047                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8048                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8049                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8050                                         }
8051
8052                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8053                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8054                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8055                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
8056                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
8057                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8058                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8059                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8060                                         });
8061                                 } else {
8062                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8063                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8064                                 }
8065                         },
8066                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8067                 }
8068                 Ok(())
8069         }
8070
8071         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8072         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8073                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8074                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8075                         None => {
8076                                 // It's not a local channel
8077                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8078                         }
8079                 };
8080                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8081                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8082                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8083                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8084                 }
8085                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8086                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8087                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8088                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8089                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8090                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8091                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8092                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8093                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8094                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8095                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8096                                                 }
8097                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8098                                         }
8099                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8100                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8101                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8102                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8103                                         } else {
8104                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8105                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8106                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8107                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8108                                                 // persisting.
8109                                                 if !did_change {
8110                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8111                                                 }
8112                                         }
8113                                 } else {
8114                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8115                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8116                                 }
8117                         },
8118                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8119                 }
8120                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8121         }
8122
8123         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8124                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8125                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8126
8127                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8128                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
8129                                         debug_assert!(false);
8130                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8131                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8132                                                 msg.channel_id
8133                                         )
8134                                 })?;
8135                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8136                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8137                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8138                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8139                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8140                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8141                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8142                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8143                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8144                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8145                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8146                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8147                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8148                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
8149                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8150                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8151                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8152                                                                 msg,
8153                                                         });
8154                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8155                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8156                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8157                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
8158                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8159                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8160                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8161                                                                         msg,
8162                                                                 });
8163                                                         }
8164                                                 }
8165                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8166                                                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8167                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8168                                                         Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8169                                                 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8170                                                 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8171                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8172                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8173                                                 }
8174                                                 need_lnd_workaround
8175                                         } else {
8176                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8177                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8178                                         }
8179                                 },
8180                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8181                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8182                                                 msg.channel_id);
8183                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8184                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8185                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8186                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8187                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8188                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8189                                         //
8190                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8191                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8192                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8193                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8194                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8195                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8196                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8197                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8198                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8199                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8200                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8201                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8202                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8203                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8204                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8205                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
8206                                                 },
8207                                         });
8208                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8209                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8210                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8211                                         )
8212                                 }
8213                         }
8214                 };
8215
8216                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8217                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8218                 }
8219                 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8220         }
8221
8222         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8223         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8224                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8225
8226                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8227                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8228                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8229                 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8230                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8231                                 match monitor_event {
8232                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8233                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8234                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8235                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8236                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8237                                                                 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8238                                                                 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8239                                                 } else {
8240                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8241                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8242                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8243                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8244                                                 }
8245                                         },
8246                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8247                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8248                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8249                                                         None => {
8250                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8251                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8252                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8253                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8254                                                         }
8255                                                 };
8256                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8257                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8258                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8259                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8260                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8261                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8262                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8263                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8264                                                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8265                                                                                         reason
8266                                                                                 } else {
8267                                                                                         ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8268                                                                                 };
8269                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8270                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8271                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8272                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8273                                                                                                 msg: update
8274                                                                                         });
8275                                                                                 }
8276                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8277                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8278                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8279                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8280                                                                                         },
8281                                                                                 });
8282                                                                         }
8283                                                                 }
8284                                                         }
8285                                                 }
8286                                         },
8287                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8288                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8289                                         },
8290                                 }
8291                         }
8292                 }
8293
8294                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8295                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8296                 }
8297
8298                 has_pending_monitor_events
8299         }
8300
8301         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8302         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8303         /// update events as a separate process method here.
8304         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
8305         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8306                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8307                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8308         }
8309
8310         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8311         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8312         /// update was applied.
8313         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8314                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8315                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8316
8317                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8318                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8319                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8320                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8321                 'peer_loop: loop {
8322                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8323                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8324                                 'chan_loop: loop {
8325                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8326                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8327                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8328                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8329                                         ) {
8330                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8331                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8332                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8333                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8334                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8335                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8336                                                 }
8337                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8338                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
8339
8340                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8341                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8342                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
8343                                                 }
8344                                         }
8345                                         break 'chan_loop;
8346                                 }
8347                         }
8348                         break 'peer_loop;
8349                 }
8350
8351                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8352                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8353                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8354                 }
8355
8356                 has_update
8357         }
8358
8359         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8360         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8361         ///
8362         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8363         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8364         ///
8365         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8366         #[cfg(async_signing)]
8367         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8368                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8369
8370                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8371                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8372                         match phase {
8373                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8374                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8375                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8376                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8377                                                         node_id,
8378                                                         updates,
8379                                                 });
8380                                         }
8381                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8382                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8383                                                         node_id,
8384                                                         msg,
8385                                                 });
8386                                         }
8387                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8388                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8389                                         }
8390                                 }
8391                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8392                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8393                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8394                                                         node_id,
8395                                                         msg,
8396                                                 });
8397                                         }
8398                                 }
8399                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8400                         }
8401                 };
8402
8403                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8404                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8405                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8406                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8407                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8408                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8409                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8410                                 }
8411                         }
8412                 } else {
8413                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8414                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8415                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8416                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8417                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8418                                 }
8419                         }
8420                 }
8421         }
8422
8423         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8424         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8425         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8426         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8427                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8428                 let mut has_update = false;
8429                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8430                 {
8431                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8432
8433                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8434                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8435                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8436                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8437                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8438                                         match phase {
8439                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8440                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8441                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8442                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8443                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8444                                                                                 has_update = true;
8445                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8446                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8447                                                                                 });
8448                                                                         }
8449                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8450                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8451                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8452                                                                         }
8453                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8454                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8455                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8456                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8457                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8458                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8459                                                                                                 msg: update
8460                                                                                         });
8461                                                                                 }
8462
8463                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8464                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8465                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8466                                                                                 false
8467                                                                         } else { true }
8468                                                                 },
8469                                                                 Err(e) => {
8470                                                                         has_update = true;
8471                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8472                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8473                                                                         !close_channel
8474                                                                 }
8475                                                         }
8476                                                 },
8477                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8478                                         }
8479                                 });
8480                         }
8481                 }
8482
8483                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8484                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8485                 }
8486
8487                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8488                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8489                 }
8490
8491                 has_update
8492         }
8493
8494         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8495         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8496         /// Channel object.
8497         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8498                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8499                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8500                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8501                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
8502                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8503                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8504                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8505                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8506                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8507                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8508                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8509                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
8510                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
8511                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8512                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8513                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8514                                         });
8515                         }
8516                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8517                 }
8518         }
8519 }
8520
8521 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8522         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8523         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8524         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8525         ///
8526         /// # Privacy
8527         ///
8528         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8529         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8530         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8531         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8532         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8533         ///
8534         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8535         ///
8536         /// # Limitations
8537         ///
8538         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8539         /// reply path.
8540         ///
8541         /// # Errors
8542         ///
8543         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8544         ///
8545         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8546         ///
8547         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8548         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8549         pub fn create_offer_builder(
8550                 &$self, description: String
8551         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8552                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8553                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8554                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8555                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8556
8557                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8558                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8559                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8560                 )
8561                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8562                         .path(path);
8563
8564                 Ok(builder.into())
8565         }
8566 } }
8567
8568 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8569         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8570         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8571         ///
8572         /// # Payment
8573         ///
8574         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8575         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8576         ///
8577         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8578         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8579         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8580         /// expired.
8581         ///
8582         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8583         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8584         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8585         ///
8586         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8587         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8588         ///
8589         /// # Privacy
8590         ///
8591         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8592         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8593         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8594         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8595         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8596         ///
8597         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8598         ///
8599         /// # Limitations
8600         ///
8601         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8602         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8603         ///
8604         /// # Errors
8605         ///
8606         /// Errors if:
8607         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8608         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8609         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8610         ///
8611         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8612         ///
8613         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8614         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8615         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8616         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8617         pub fn create_refund_builder(
8618                 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8619                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8620         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8621                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8622                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8623                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8624                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8625
8626                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8627                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8628                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8629                 )?
8630                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8631                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8632                         .path(path);
8633
8634                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8635
8636                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8637                 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8638                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8639                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8640                         )
8641                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8642
8643                 Ok(builder.into())
8644         }
8645 } }
8646
8647 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8648 where
8649         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8650         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8651         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8652         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8653         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8654         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8655         R::Target: Router,
8656         L::Target: Logger,
8657 {
8658         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8659         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8660         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8661         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8662
8663         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8664         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8665         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8666         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8667
8668         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8669         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8670         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8671         ///
8672         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8673         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8674         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8675         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8676         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8677         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8678         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8679         ///
8680         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8681         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8682         ///
8683         /// # Payment
8684         ///
8685         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8686         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8687         /// been sent.
8688         ///
8689         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8690         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8691         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8692         ///
8693         /// # Privacy
8694         ///
8695         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8696         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8697         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8698         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8699         ///
8700         /// # Limitations
8701         ///
8702         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8703         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8704         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8705         ///
8706         /// # Errors
8707         ///
8708         /// Errors if:
8709         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8710         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8711         /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8712         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8713         ///   request.
8714         ///
8715         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8716         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8717         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8718         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8719         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8720         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8721         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8722         pub fn pay_for_offer(
8723                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8724                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8725                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8726         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8727                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8728                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8729                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8730
8731                 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8732                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8733                         .into();
8734                 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8735
8736                 let builder = match quantity {
8737                         None => builder,
8738                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8739                 };
8740                 let builder = match amount_msats {
8741                         None => builder,
8742                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8743                 };
8744                 let builder = match payer_note {
8745                         None => builder,
8746                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8747                 };
8748                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8749                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8750
8751                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8752
8753                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8754                 self.pending_outbound_payments
8755                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8756                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8757                         )
8758                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8759
8760                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8761                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8762                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8763                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8764                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8765                                 Some(reply_path),
8766                         );
8767                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8768                 } else {
8769                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8770                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8771                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8772                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8773                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8774                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8775                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8776                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8777                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8778                                 );
8779                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8780                         }
8781                 }
8782
8783                 Ok(())
8784         }
8785
8786         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8787         /// message.
8788         ///
8789         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8790         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8791         /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8792         ///
8793         /// # Limitations
8794         ///
8795         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8796         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8797         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8798         /// received and no retries will be made.
8799         ///
8800         /// # Errors
8801         ///
8802         /// Errors if:
8803         /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8804         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8805         ///   the invoice.
8806         ///
8807         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8808         pub fn request_refund_payment(
8809                 &self, refund: &Refund
8810         ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8811                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8812                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8813                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8814
8815                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8816                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8817
8818                 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8819                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8820                 }
8821
8822                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8823
8824                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8825                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8826                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8827                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8828                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8829                                 )
8830                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8831
8832                                 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8833                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8834                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8835                                 )?;
8836                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8837                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8838                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8839                                 );
8840                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8841                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8842                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8843                                 )?;
8844                                 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8845                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8846                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8847                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8848
8849                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8850                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8851                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8852                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8853                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8854                                                 Some(reply_path),
8855                                         );
8856                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8857                                 } else {
8858                                         for path in refund.paths() {
8859                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8860                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8861                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8862                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8863                                                 );
8864                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8865                                         }
8866                                 }
8867
8868                                 Ok(invoice)
8869                         },
8870                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8871                 }
8872         }
8873
8874         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8875         /// to pay us.
8876         ///
8877         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8878         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8879         ///
8880         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8881         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment`] with
8882         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should
8883         /// then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8884         ///
8885         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8886         ///
8887         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8888         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8889         ///
8890         /// # Note
8891         ///
8892         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8893         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8894         ///
8895         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8896         ///
8897         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8898         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8899         ///
8900         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8901         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8902         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8903         /// [`PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment
8904         /// [`PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8905         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8906         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8907                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8908                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8909                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8910                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8911         }
8912
8913         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8914         /// stored external to LDK.
8915         ///
8916         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8917         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8918         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8919         ///
8920         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8921         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8922         /// payments.
8923         ///
8924         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8925         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8926         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8927         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8928         ///
8929         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8930         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8931         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8932         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8933         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8934         ///
8935         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8936         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8937         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8938         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8939         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8940         ///
8941         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8942         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8943         ///
8944         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8945         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8946         ///
8947         /// # Note
8948         ///
8949         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8950         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8951         ///
8952         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8953         ///
8954         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8955         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8956         ///
8957         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8958         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8959         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8960                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8961                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8962                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8963                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
8964         }
8965
8966         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8967         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8968         ///
8969         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8970         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8971                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8972         }
8973
8974         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8975         ///
8976         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8977         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8978                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8979                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8980
8981                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8982                         .iter()
8983                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8984                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8985                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8986
8987                 self.router
8988                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8989                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8990         }
8991
8992         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8993         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8994         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8995                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8996         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8997                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8998
8999                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9000                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9001                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9002                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9003                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9004                         payment_secret,
9005                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9006                                 max_cltv_expiry,
9007                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9008                         },
9009                         payment_context,
9010                 };
9011                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9012                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9013                 )
9014         }
9015
9016         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9017         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9018         ///
9019         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9020         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9021                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9022                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9023                 loop {
9024                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9025                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9026                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9027                                 Some(_) => continue,
9028                                 None => return scid_candidate
9029                         }
9030                 }
9031         }
9032
9033         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9034         ///
9035         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9036         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9037                 PhantomRouteHints {
9038                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9039                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9040                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9041                 }
9042         }
9043
9044         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9045         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9046         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9047         ///
9048         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9049         /// times to get a unique scid.
9050         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9051                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9052                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9053                 loop {
9054                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9055                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9056                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9057                         return scid_candidate
9058                 }
9059         }
9060
9061         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9062         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9063         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9064                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9065
9066                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9067                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9068                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9069                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9070                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9071                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9072                         ) {
9073                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9074                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9075                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9076                                         }
9077                                 }
9078                         }
9079                 }
9080
9081                 inflight_htlcs
9082         }
9083
9084         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9085         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9086                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9087                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9088                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9089                 events.into_inner()
9090         }
9091
9092         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9093         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9094                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9095                 events.push_back((event, None));
9096         }
9097
9098         #[cfg(test)]
9099         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9100                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9101                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9102         }
9103
9104         #[cfg(test)]
9105         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9106                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9107         }
9108
9109         #[cfg(test)]
9110         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9111                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9112         }
9113
9114         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9115         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9116         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9117         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9118         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9119                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9120                 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9121
9122                 let logger = WithContext::from(
9123                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9124                 );
9125                 loop {
9126                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9127                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9128                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9129                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9130                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9131                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9132                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9133                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9134                                         {
9135                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9136                                         }
9137                                 }
9138
9139                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9140                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9141                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9142                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9143                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9144                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9145                                                 &channel_id);
9146                                         break;
9147                                 }
9148
9149                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9150                                         channel_id) {
9151                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9152                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9153                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9154                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9155                                                                 channel_id);
9156                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9157                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9158                                                         if further_update_exists {
9159                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9160                                                                 // top of the loop.
9161                                                                 continue;
9162                                                         }
9163                                                 } else {
9164                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9165                                                                 channel_id);
9166                                                 }
9167                                         }
9168                                 }
9169                         } else {
9170                                 log_debug!(logger,
9171                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9172                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9173                         }
9174                         break;
9175                 }
9176         }
9177
9178         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9179                 for action in actions {
9180                         match action {
9181                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9182                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9183                                 } => {
9184                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9185                                 }
9186                         }
9187                 }
9188         }
9189
9190         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9191         /// using the given event handler.
9192         ///
9193         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9194         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9195                 &self, handler: H
9196         ) {
9197                 let mut ev;
9198                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9199         }
9200 }
9201
9202 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9203 where
9204         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9205         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9206         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9207         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9208         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9209         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9210         R::Target: Router,
9211         L::Target: Logger,
9212 {
9213         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9214         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9215         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9216         /// is always placed next to each other.
9217         ///
9218         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9219         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9220         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9221         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9222         ///
9223         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9224         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9225         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9226         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9227                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9228                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9229                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9230
9231                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9232                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9233                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9234                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9235                         }
9236
9237                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9238                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9239                         }
9240                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9241                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9242                         }
9243
9244                         let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9245                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9246                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9247                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9248                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9249                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9250                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9251                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9252                                 }
9253                                 if peer_state.is_connected {
9254                                         is_any_peer_connected = true
9255                                 }
9256                         }
9257
9258                         // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9259                         if is_any_peer_connected {
9260                                 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9261                                 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9262                         }
9263
9264                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9265                                 events.replace(pending_events);
9266                         }
9267
9268                         result
9269                 });
9270                 events.into_inner()
9271         }
9272 }
9273
9274 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9275 where
9276         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9277         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9278         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9279         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9280         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9281         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9282         R::Target: Router,
9283         L::Target: Logger,
9284 {
9285         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9286         ///
9287         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9288         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9289         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9290                 let mut ev;
9291                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9292         }
9293 }
9294
9295 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9296 where
9297         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9298         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9299         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9300         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9301         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9302         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9303         R::Target: Router,
9304         L::Target: Logger,
9305 {
9306         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9307                 {
9308                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9309                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9310                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9311                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9312                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9313                 }
9314
9315                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9316                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9317         }
9318
9319         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9320                 let _persistence_guard =
9321                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9322                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9323                 let new_height = height - 1;
9324                 {
9325                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9326                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9327                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9328                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9329                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9330                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9331                 }
9332
9333                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9334         }
9335 }
9336
9337 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9338 where
9339         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9340         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9341         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9342         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9343         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9344         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9345         R::Target: Router,
9346         L::Target: Logger,
9347 {
9348         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9349                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9350                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9351                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9352
9353                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9354                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9355
9356                 let _persistence_guard =
9357                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9358                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9359                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9360                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9361
9362                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9363                 if height < last_best_block_height {
9364                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9365                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9366                 }
9367         }
9368
9369         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9370                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9371                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9372                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9373
9374                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9375                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9376
9377                 let _persistence_guard =
9378                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9379                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9380                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9381
9382                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9383
9384                 macro_rules! max_time {
9385                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
9386                                 loop {
9387                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9388                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9389                                         // having an explicit local time source.
9390                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9391                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9392                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9393                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9394                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9395                                                 break;
9396                                         }
9397                                 }
9398                         }
9399                 }
9400                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9401                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9402                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9403                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9404                 });
9405         }
9406
9407         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9408                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9409                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9410                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9411                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9412                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9413                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9414                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9415                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9416                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9417                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9418                                 }
9419                         }
9420                 }
9421                 res
9422         }
9423
9424         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9425                 let _persistence_guard =
9426                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9427                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9428                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9429                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9430                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9431                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9432                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9433                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9434                 });
9435         }
9436 }
9437
9438 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9439 where
9440         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9441         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9442         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9443         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9444         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9445         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9446         R::Target: Router,
9447         L::Target: Logger,
9448 {
9449         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9450         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9451         /// the function.
9452         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9453                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9454                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9455                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9456                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9457
9458                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9459                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9460                 {
9461                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9462                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9463                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9464                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9465                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9466
9467                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9468                                         match phase {
9469                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
9470                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9471                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9472                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9473                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9474                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9475                                                         let res = f(channel);
9476                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9477                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9478                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9479                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9480                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9481                                                                 }
9482                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9483                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9484                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9485                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
9486                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9487                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9488                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9489                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9490                                                                                                 msg,
9491                                                                                         });
9492                                                                                 }
9493                                                                         } else {
9494                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9495                                                                         }
9496                                                                 }
9497
9498                                                                 {
9499                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9500                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9501                                                                 }
9502
9503                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9504                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9505                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9506                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9507                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
9508                                                                         });
9509                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9510                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9511                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9512                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
9513                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9514                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9515                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9516                                                                                         });
9517                                                                                 }
9518                                                                         }
9519                                                                 }
9520                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9521                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9522                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9523                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9524                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9525                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9526                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9527                                                                                 // is always consistent.
9528                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9529                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9530                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9531                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9532                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9533                                                                         }
9534                                                                 }
9535                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9536                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9537                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9538                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9539                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9540                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9541                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9542                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9543                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9544                                                                                 msg: update
9545                                                                         });
9546                                                                 }
9547                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9548                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9549                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9550                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9551                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9552                                                                                         data: reason_message,
9553                                                                                 })
9554                                                                         },
9555                                                                 });
9556                                                                 return false;
9557                                                         }
9558                                                         true
9559                                                 }
9560                                         }
9561                                 });
9562                         }
9563                 }
9564
9565                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9566                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9567                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9568                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9569                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9570                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9571                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9572                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9573                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9574                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9575
9576                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9577                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9578                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9579                                                 false
9580                                         } else { true }
9581                                 });
9582                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9583                         });
9584
9585                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9586                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9587                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9588                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9589                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9590                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9591                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9592                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9593                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9594                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9595                                                 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9596                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9597                                         });
9598
9599                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9600                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9601                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
9602                                         };
9603                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9604                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9605                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9606                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
9607                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9608                                         );
9609                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9610                                         false
9611                                 } else { true }
9612                         });
9613                 }
9614
9615                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9616
9617                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9618                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9619                 }
9620         }
9621
9622         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9623         /// may have events that need processing.
9624         ///
9625         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9626         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9627         ///
9628         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9629         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9630         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9631                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9632         }
9633
9634         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9635         ///
9636         /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9637         /// indicates this should be checked.
9638         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9639                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9640         }
9641
9642         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9643         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9644                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9645         }
9646
9647         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9648         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9649         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9650                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9651         }
9652
9653         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9654         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9655         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9656                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9657         }
9658
9659         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9660         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9661         ///
9662         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9663         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9664         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9665         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9666                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9667         }
9668
9669         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9670         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9671         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9672                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9673         }
9674
9675         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9676         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9677         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9678                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9679         }
9680
9681         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9682         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9683         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9684                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9685         }
9686
9687         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9688         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9689         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9690                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9691         }
9692 }
9693
9694 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9695         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9696 where
9697         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9698         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9699         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9700         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9701         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9702         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9703         R::Target: Router,
9704         L::Target: Logger,
9705 {
9706         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9707                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9708                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9709                 // change to the contents.
9710                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9711                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9712                         let persist = match &res {
9713                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9714                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9715                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
9716                                 },
9717                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9718                         };
9719                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9720                         persist
9721                 });
9722         }
9723
9724         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9725                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9726                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9727                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9728         }
9729
9730         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9731                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9732                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9733                 // change to the contents.
9734                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9735                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9736                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9737                 });
9738         }
9739
9740         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9741                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9742                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9743                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9744         }
9745
9746         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9747                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9748                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9749         }
9750
9751         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9752                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9753                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9754         }
9755
9756         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9757                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9758                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9759                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9760                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9761                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9762                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9763                         let persist = match &res {
9764                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9765                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9766                         };
9767                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9768                         persist
9769                 });
9770         }
9771
9772         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9773                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9774                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9775                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9776         }
9777
9778         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9779                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9780                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9781                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9782         }
9783
9784         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9785                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9786                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9787                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9788         }
9789
9790         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9791                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9792                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9793                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9794         }
9795
9796         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9797                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9798                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9799         }
9800
9801         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9802                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9803                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9804         }
9805
9806         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9807                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9808                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9809                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9810                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9811                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9812                         let persist = match &res {
9813                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9814                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9815                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9816                         };
9817                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9818                         persist
9819                 });
9820         }
9821
9822         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9823                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9824                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9825         }
9826
9827         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9828                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9829                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9830                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9831                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9832                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9833                         let persist = match &res {
9834                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9835                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9836                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9837                         };
9838                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9839                         persist
9840                 });
9841         }
9842
9843         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9844                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9845                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9846                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9847                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9848                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9849                         let persist = match &res {
9850                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9851                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9852                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9853                         };
9854                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9855                         persist
9856                 });
9857         }
9858
9859         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9860                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9861                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9862         }
9863
9864         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9865                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9866                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9867         }
9868
9869         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9870                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9871                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9872                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9873                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9874                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9875                         let persist = match &res {
9876                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9877                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9878                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9879                         };
9880                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9881                         persist
9882                 });
9883         }
9884
9885         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9886                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9887                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9888         }
9889
9890         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9891                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9892                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9893                                 persist
9894                         } else {
9895                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9896                         }
9897                 });
9898         }
9899
9900         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9901                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9902                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9903                         let persist = match &res {
9904                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9905                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9906                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9907                         };
9908                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9909                         persist
9910                 });
9911         }
9912
9913         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9914                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9915                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9916                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9917                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9918                 let remove_peer = {
9919                         log_debug!(
9920                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9921                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9922                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9923                         );
9924                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9925                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9926                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9927                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9928                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9929                                         let context = match phase {
9930                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9931                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9932                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9933                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9934                                                                 return true;
9935                                                         }
9936                                                         &mut chan.context
9937                                                 },
9938                                                 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9939                                                 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9940                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9941                                                         return true;
9942                                                 },
9943                                                 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9944                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9945                                                         &mut chan.context
9946                                                 },
9947                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9948                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9949                                                         &mut chan.context
9950                                                 },
9951                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9952                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9953                                                         &mut chan.context
9954                                                 },
9955                                         };
9956                                         // Clean up for removal.
9957                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9958                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9959                                         false
9960                                 });
9961                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9962                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9963                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9964                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9965                                         match msg {
9966                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
9967                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9968                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9969                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9970                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9971                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
9972                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9973                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9974                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
9975                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9976                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9977                                                 // Quiescence
9978                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9979                                                 // Splicing
9980                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9981                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9982                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9983                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9984                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9985                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9986                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9987                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9988                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9989                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9990                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9991                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9992                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9993                                                 // Channel Operations
9994                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9995                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9996                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9997                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9998                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9999                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10000                                                 // Gossip
10001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10002                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10003                                                 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10004                                                 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10005                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10006                                                         debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10007                                                         false
10008                                                 },
10009                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10010                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10011                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10012                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10013                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10014                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10015                                         }
10016                                 });
10017                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10018                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10019                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10020                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10021                 };
10022                 if remove_peer {
10023                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10024                 }
10025                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10026
10027                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10028                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10029                 }
10030         }
10031
10032         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10033                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10034                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10035                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10036                         return Err(());
10037                 }
10038
10039                 let mut res = Ok(());
10040
10041                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10042                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10043                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10044                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10045                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10046                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10047                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10048
10049                         {
10050                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10051                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10052                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10053                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
10054                                                         res = Err(());
10055                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10056                                                 }
10057                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10058                                                         channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10059                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10060                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10061                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10062                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10063                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10064                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10065                                                         is_connected: true,
10066                                                 }));
10067                                         },
10068                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10069                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10070                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10071
10072                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10073                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10074                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10075                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10076                                                 {
10077                                                         res = Err(());
10078                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10079                                                 }
10080
10081                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10082                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10083                                         },
10084                                 }
10085                         }
10086
10087                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10088
10089                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10090                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10091                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10092                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10093                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10094
10095                                 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10096                                         match phase {
10097                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10098                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10099                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10100                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10101                                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10102                                                         });
10103                                                 }
10104
10105                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10106                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10107                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10108                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10109                                                         });
10110                                                 }
10111
10112                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
10113                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10114                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10115                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10116                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10117                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10118                                                         });
10119                                                 },
10120
10121                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10122                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10123                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10124                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10125                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10126                                                 }
10127
10128                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
10129                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10130                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10131                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10132                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10133                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10134                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10135                                                 },
10136                                         }
10137                                 }
10138                         }
10139
10140                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10141                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10142                 });
10143                 res
10144         }
10145
10146         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10147                 match &msg.data as &str {
10148                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10149                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
10150                         {
10151                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10152                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10153                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10154                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10155                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10156                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10157                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10158                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10159                                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10160                                                 self,
10161                                                 || -> NotifyOption {
10162                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10163                                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10164                                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10165                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10166                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10167                                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10168                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10169                                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10170                                                                                 msg,
10171                                                                         });
10172                                                                 }
10173                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10174                                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10175                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10176                                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10177                                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10178                                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10179                                                                                 },
10180                                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
10181                                                                         }
10182                                                                 });
10183                                                                 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10184                                                                 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10185                                                                 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10186                                                         }
10187                                                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10188                                                 }
10189                                         );
10190                                 }
10191                                 return;
10192                         }
10193                         _ => {}
10194                 }
10195
10196                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10197
10198                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10199                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10200                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10201                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10202                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10203                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10204                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10205                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10206                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10207                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10208                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10209                         };
10210                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
10211                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10212                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10213                         }
10214                 } else {
10215                         {
10216                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10217                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10218                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10219                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10220                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10221                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10222                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10223                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10224                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10225                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10226                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10227                                                                 msg,
10228                                                         });
10229                                                         return;
10230                                                 }
10231                                         },
10232                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10233                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10234                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10235                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10236                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10237                                                                 msg,
10238                                                         });
10239                                                         return;
10240                                                 }
10241                                         },
10242                                         None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10243                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10244                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10245                                 }
10246                         }
10247
10248                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10249                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10250                 }
10251         }
10252
10253         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10254                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10255         }
10256
10257         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10258                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10259         }
10260
10261         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10262                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10263         }
10264
10265         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10266                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10267                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10268                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10269         }
10270
10271         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10272                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10273                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10274                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10275         }
10276
10277         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10278                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10279                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10280                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10281         }
10282
10283         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10284                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10285                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10286                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10287         }
10288
10289         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10290                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10291                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10292                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10293         }
10294
10295         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10296                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10297                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10298                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10299         }
10300
10301         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10302                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10303                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10304                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10305         }
10306
10307         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10308                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10309                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10310                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10311         }
10312
10313         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10314                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10315                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10316                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10317         }
10318 }
10319
10320 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10321 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10322 where
10323         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10324         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10325         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10326         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10327         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10328         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10329         R::Target: Router,
10330         L::Target: Logger,
10331 {
10332         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10333                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10334                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10335
10336                 match message {
10337                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10338                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10339                                         &invoice_request
10340                                 ) {
10341                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10342                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10343                                 };
10344                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10345                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10346                                         Err(()) => {
10347                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10348                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10349                                         },
10350                                 };
10351
10352                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10353                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10354                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10355                                 ) {
10356                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10357                                         Err(()) => {
10358                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10359                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10360                                         },
10361                                 };
10362
10363                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10364                                         offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10365                                 });
10366                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10367                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10368                                 ) {
10369                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10370                                         Err(()) => {
10371                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10372                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10373                                         },
10374                                 };
10375
10376                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10377                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10378                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10379                                 );
10380
10381                                 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10382                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10383                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10384                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
10385                                         );
10386                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10387                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10388                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10389                                         );
10390                                         builder
10391                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10392                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10393                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10394                                 } else {
10395                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10396                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10397                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10398                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10399                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10400                                         );
10401                                         builder
10402                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10403                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10404                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10405                                                 .and_then(|invoice| {
10406                                                         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
10407                                                         let mut invoice = invoice;
10408                                                         invoice
10409                                                                 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10410                                                                         self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10411                                                                 )
10412                                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10413                                                 })
10414                                 };
10415
10416                                 match response {
10417                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10418                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10419                                 }
10420                         },
10421                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10422                                 let response = invoice
10423                                         .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10424                                         .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10425                                         .and_then(|payment_id| {
10426                                                 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10427                                                 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10428                                                         Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10429                                                 } else {
10430                                                         self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10431                                                                 .map_err(|e| {
10432                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10433                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10434                                                                 })
10435                                                 }
10436                                         });
10437
10438                                 match response {
10439                                         Ok(()) => None,
10440                                         Err(e) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10441                                 }
10442                         },
10443                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10444                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10445                                 None
10446                         },
10447                 }
10448         }
10449
10450         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10451                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10452         }
10453 }
10454
10455 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10456 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10457 where
10458         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10459         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10460         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10461         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10462         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10463         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10464         R::Target: Router,
10465         L::Target: Logger,
10466 {
10467         fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10468                 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10469         }
10470 }
10471
10472 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10473 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10474 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10475         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10476         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10477         node_features
10478 }
10479
10480 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10481 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10482 ///
10483 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10484 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10485 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10486 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10487         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10488 }
10489
10490 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10491 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10492 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10493         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10494 }
10495
10496 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10497 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10498 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10499         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10500 }
10501
10502 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10503 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10504 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10505         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10506 }
10507
10508 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10509 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10510 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10511         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10512         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10513         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10514         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10515         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10516         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10517         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10518         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10519         features.set_payment_secret_required();
10520         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10521         features.set_wumbo_optional();
10522         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10523         features.set_channel_type_optional();
10524         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10525         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10526         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10527         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10528                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10529         }
10530         features
10531 }
10532
10533 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10534 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10535
10536 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10537         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10538         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10539         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10540 });
10541
10542 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10543         (2, node_id, required),
10544         (4, features, required),
10545         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10546         (8, forwarding_info, option),
10547         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10548         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10549 });
10550
10551 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10552         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10553                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10554                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10555                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10556                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10557                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10558                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10559                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
10560                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
10561                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
10562                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10563                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10564                         (7, self.config, option),
10565                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10566                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
10567                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10568                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10569                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10570                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10571                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10572                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10573                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10574                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10575                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10576                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10577                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10578                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10579                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
10580                         (32, self.is_public, required),
10581                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10582                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10583                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10584                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10585                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10586                         (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10587                         (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10588                 });
10589                 Ok(())
10590         }
10591 }
10592
10593 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10594         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10595                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10596                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10597                         (2, channel_id, required),
10598                         (3, channel_type, option),
10599                         (4, counterparty, required),
10600                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10601                         (6, funding_txo, option),
10602                         (7, config, option),
10603                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
10604                         (9, confirmations, option),
10605                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10606                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10607                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10608                         (16, balance_msat, required),
10609                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10610                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10611                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10612                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10613                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10614                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10615                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
10616                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10617                         (26, is_outbound, required),
10618                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10619                         (30, is_usable, required),
10620                         (32, is_public, required),
10621                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10622                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10623                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10624                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10625                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10626                         (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10627                         (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10628                 });
10629
10630                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10631                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10632                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10633                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10634                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10635
10636                 Ok(Self {
10637                         inbound_scid_alias,
10638                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10639                         channel_type,
10640                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10641                         outbound_scid_alias,
10642                         funding_txo,
10643                         config,
10644                         short_channel_id,
10645                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10646                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10647                         user_channel_id,
10648                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10649                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10650                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10651                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10652                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10653                         confirmations_required,
10654                         confirmations,
10655                         force_close_spend_delay,
10656                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10657                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10658                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10659                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10660                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10661                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10662                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10663                         channel_shutdown_state,
10664                         pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10665                         pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10666                 })
10667         }
10668 }
10669
10670 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10671         (2, channels, required_vec),
10672         (4, phantom_scid, required),
10673         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10674 });
10675
10676 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10677         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10678         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10679 });
10680
10681 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10682         (0, Forward) => {
10683                 (0, onion_packet, required),
10684                 (1, blinded, option),
10685                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10686         },
10687         (1, Receive) => {
10688                 (0, payment_data, required),
10689                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10690                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10691                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10692                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10693                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10694                 (9, payment_context, option),
10695         },
10696         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10697                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10698                 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10699                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10700                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10701                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10702                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10703         },
10704 ;);
10705
10706 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10707         (0, routing, required),
10708         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10709         (4, payment_hash, required),
10710         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10711         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10712         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10713         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10714 });
10715
10716
10717 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10718         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10719                 match self {
10720                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10721                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10722                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10723                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10724                                 reason.write(writer)?;
10725                         },
10726                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10727                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10728                         }) => {
10729                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10730                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10731                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10732                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10733                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10734                         },
10735                 }
10736                 Ok(())
10737         }
10738 }
10739
10740 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10741         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10742                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10743                 match id {
10744                         0 => {
10745                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10746                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10747                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10748                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10749                                 }))
10750                         },
10751                         1 => {
10752                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10753                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10754                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10755                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10756                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10757                                 }))
10758                         },
10759                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10760                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10761                         // messages contained in the variants.
10762                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10763                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10764                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10765                         2 => {
10766                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10767                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10768                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10769                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10770                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10771                         },
10772                         3 => {
10773                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10774                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10775                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10776                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10777                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10778                         },
10779                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10780                 }
10781         }
10782 }
10783
10784 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10785         (0, Forward),
10786         (1, Fail),
10787 );
10788
10789 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10790         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10791         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10792 );
10793
10794 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10795         (0, short_channel_id, required),
10796         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10797         (2, outpoint, required),
10798         (3, blinded_failure, option),
10799         (4, htlc_id, required),
10800         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10801         (7, user_channel_id, option),
10802         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10803         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10804         (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10805 });
10806
10807 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10808         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10809                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_context) = match &self.onion_payload {
10810                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data, payment_context } => {
10811                                 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None, payment_context.as_ref())
10812                         },
10813                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage), None),
10814                 };
10815                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10816                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10817                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
10818                         (2, self.value, required),
10819                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10820                         (4, payment_data, option),
10821                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10822                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10823                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10824                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10825                         (11, payment_context, option),
10826                 });
10827                 Ok(())
10828         }
10829 }
10830
10831 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10832         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10833                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10834                         (0, prev_hop, required),
10835                         (1, total_msat, option),
10836                         (2, value_ser, required),
10837                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10838                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10839                         (5, total_value_received, option),
10840                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10841                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10842                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10843                         (11, payment_context, option),
10844                 });
10845                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10846                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10847                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10848                         Some(p) => {
10849                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
10850                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10851                                 }
10852                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10853                                         total_msat = Some(value);
10854                                 }
10855                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10856                         },
10857                         None => {
10858                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10859                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
10860                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10861                                         }
10862                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10863                                 }
10864                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data, payment_context }
10865                         },
10866                 };
10867                 Ok(Self {
10868                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10869                         timer_ticks: 0,
10870                         value,
10871                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10872                         total_value_received,
10873                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10874                         onion_payload,
10875                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10876                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10877                 })
10878         }
10879 }
10880
10881 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10882         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10883                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10884                 match id {
10885                         0 => {
10886                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10887                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10888                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10889                                 let mut payment_id = None;
10890                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10891                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10892                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10893                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10894                                         (1, payment_id, option),
10895                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10896                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10897                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10898                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
10899                                 });
10900                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
10901                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10902                                         // instead.
10903                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10904                                 }
10905                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10906                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10907                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10908                                 }
10909                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10910                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10911                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10912                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10913                                                 }
10914                                         }
10915                                 }
10916                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10917                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10918                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
10919                                         path,
10920                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10921                                 })
10922                         }
10923                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10924                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10925                 }
10926         }
10927 }
10928
10929 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10930         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10931                 match self {
10932                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10933                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10934                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10935                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10936                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10937                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10938                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10939                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10940                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10941                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10942                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10943                                  });
10944                         }
10945                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10946                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10947                                 field.write(writer)?;
10948                         }
10949                 }
10950                 Ok(())
10951         }
10952 }
10953
10954 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10955         (0, forward_info, required),
10956         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10957         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10958         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10959         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10960         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10961         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10962         (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10963 });
10964
10965 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10966         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10967                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10968                 match self {
10969                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10970                                 0u8.write(w)?;
10971                                 info.write(w)?;
10972                         },
10973                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10974                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10975                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10976                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10977                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10978                                 });
10979                         },
10980                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10981                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10982                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10983                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10984                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10985                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10986                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10987                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10988                                         (1, failure_code, required),
10989                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10990                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10991                                 });
10992                         },
10993                 }
10994                 Ok(())
10995         }
10996 }
10997
10998 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10999         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11000                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11001                 Ok(match id {
11002                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11003                         1 => {
11004                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11005                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11006                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11007                                         (2, err_packet, required),
11008                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11009                                 });
11010                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11011                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11012                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11013                                                 failure_code,
11014                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11015                                         }
11016                                 } else {
11017                                         Self::FailHTLC {
11018                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11019                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11020                                         }
11021                                 }
11022                         },
11023                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11024                 })
11025         }
11026 }
11027
11028 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11029         (0, payment_secret, required),
11030         (2, expiry_time, required),
11031         (4, user_payment_id, required),
11032         (6, payment_preimage, required),
11033         (8, min_value_msat, required),
11034 });
11035
11036 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11037 where
11038         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11039         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11040         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11041         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11042         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11043         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11044         R::Target: Router,
11045         L::Target: Logger,
11046 {
11047         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11048                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11049
11050                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11051
11052                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11053                 {
11054                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11055                         best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11056                         best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11057                 }
11058
11059                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11060                 {
11061                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11062                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11063                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11064                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11065                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11066                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11067                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
11068                                 }
11069
11070                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11071                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11072                                 ).count();
11073                         }
11074
11075                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11076
11077                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11078                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11079                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11080                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11081                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11082                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11083                                         } else { None }
11084                                 ) {
11085                                         channel.write(writer)?;
11086                                 }
11087                         }
11088                 }
11089
11090                 {
11091                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11092                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11093                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11094                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11095                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11096                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
11097                                         forward.write(writer)?;
11098                                 }
11099                         }
11100                 }
11101
11102                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11103                 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11104                 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11105                         decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11106                 }
11107
11108                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11109
11110                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11111                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11112                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11113
11114                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11115                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11116                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11117                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11118                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11119                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11120                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11121                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
11122                         }
11123                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11124                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11125                 }
11126
11127                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11128                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11129                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11130                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11131                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11132                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
11133                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11134                 }
11135
11136                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11137                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11138                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11139                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11140                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11141                         // no channels.
11142                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11143                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11144                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11145                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11146                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11147                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11148                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11149                                 }
11150                         }
11151                 }
11152
11153                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11154                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11155                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11156                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11157                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11158                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11159                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11160                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
11161                         0u64.write(writer)?;
11162                 } else {
11163                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11164                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11165                                 event.write(writer)?;
11166                         }
11167                 }
11168
11169                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11170                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11171                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11172                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11173                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11174                 0u64.write(writer)?;
11175
11176                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11177                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11178                 // likely to be identical.
11179                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11180                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11181
11182                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11183                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11184                         hash.write(writer)?;
11185                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11186                 }
11187
11188                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11189                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11190                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11191                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11192                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11193                         }
11194                 }
11195                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11196                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11197                         match outbound {
11198                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11199                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11200                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11201                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11202                                         }
11203                                 }
11204                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11205                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11206                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11207                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11208                         }
11209                 }
11210
11211                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11212                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11213                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11214                         match outbound {
11215                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11216                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11217                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11218                                 },
11219                                 _ => {},
11220                         }
11221                 }
11222
11223                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11224                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11225                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11226                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11227                 }
11228
11229                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11230                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11231                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11232                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11233                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
11234                 }
11235
11236                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11237                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11238                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11239                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
11240                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11241                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11242                                 }
11243                         }
11244                 }
11245
11246                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11247                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11248                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11249                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11250                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11251                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11252                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11253                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11254                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11255                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11256                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11257                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11258                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11259                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11260                 });
11261
11262                 Ok(())
11263         }
11264 }
11265
11266 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11267         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11268                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11269                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11270                         event.write(w)?;
11271                         action.write(w)?;
11272                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11273                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11274                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11275                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11276                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11277                                 // check that the event is sane here.
11278                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11279                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11280                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11281                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11282                         }
11283                 }
11284                 Ok(())
11285         }
11286 }
11287 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11288         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11289                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11290                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11291                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11292                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11293                         len) as usize);
11294                 for _ in 0..len {
11295                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11296                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11297                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11298                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
11299                         } else if action.is_some() {
11300                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11301                         }
11302                 }
11303                 Ok(events)
11304         }
11305 }
11306
11307 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11308         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11309         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11310         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11311         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11312         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11313 );
11314
11315 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11316 ///
11317 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11318 /// is:
11319 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11320 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11321 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11322 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11323 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11324 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11325 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11326 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11327 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11328 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11329 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11330 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11331 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11332 ///    the next step.
11333 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11334 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11335 ///
11336 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11337 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11338 ///
11339 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11340 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11341 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11342 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11343 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11344 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11345 ///
11346 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11347 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11348 where
11349         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11350         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11351         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11352         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11353         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11354         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11355         R::Target: Router,
11356         L::Target: Logger,
11357 {
11358         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11359         pub entropy_source: ES,
11360
11361         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11362         pub node_signer: NS,
11363
11364         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11365         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11366         /// signing data.
11367         pub signer_provider: SP,
11368
11369         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11370         ///
11371         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11372         pub fee_estimator: F,
11373         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11374         ///
11375         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11376         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11377         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11378         pub chain_monitor: M,
11379
11380         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11381         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11382         /// force-closed during deserialization.
11383         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11384         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11385         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11386         ///
11387         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11388         pub router: R,
11389         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11390         /// deserialization.
11391         pub logger: L,
11392         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11393         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11394         pub default_config: UserConfig,
11395
11396         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11397         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11398         ///
11399         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11400         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11401         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11402         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11403         ///
11404         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11405         /// this struct.
11406         ///
11407         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11408         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11409 }
11410
11411 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11412                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11413 where
11414         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11415         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11416         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11417         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11418         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11419         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11420         R::Target: Router,
11421         L::Target: Logger,
11422 {
11423         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11424         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11425         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11426         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11427                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11428                 Self {
11429                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11430                         channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11431                                 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11432                         ),
11433                 }
11434         }
11435 }
11436
11437 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11438 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11439 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11440         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11441 where
11442         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11443         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11444         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11445         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11446         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11447         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11448         R::Target: Router,
11449         L::Target: Logger,
11450 {
11451         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11452                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11453                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11454         }
11455 }
11456
11457 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11458         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11459 where
11460         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11461         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11462         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11463         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11464         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11465         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11466         R::Target: Router,
11467         L::Target: Logger,
11468 {
11469         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11470                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11471
11472                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11473                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11474                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11475
11476                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11477
11478                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11479                 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11480                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11481                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11482                 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11483                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11484                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11485                 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11486                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11487                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11488                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11489                         ))?;
11490                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11491                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11492                         funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11493                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11494                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11495                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11496                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11497                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11498                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11499                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11500                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11501                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11502                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11503                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11504                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11505                                         }
11506                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11507                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11508                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11509                                         }
11510                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11511                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11512                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11513                                         }
11514                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11515                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11516                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11517                                         }
11518                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11519                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11520                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11521                                         }
11522                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11523                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11524                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11525                                                 });
11526                                         }
11527                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11528                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11529                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11530                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11531                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11532                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11533                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11534                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11535                                         }, None));
11536                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11537                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
11538                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11539                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11540                                                 }
11541                                                 if !found_htlc {
11542                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11543                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11544                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11545                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11546                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11547                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11548                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11549                                                         log_info!(logger,
11550                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11551                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11552                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11553                                                 }
11554                                         }
11555                                 } else {
11556                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
11557                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11558                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11559                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11560                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11561                                         }
11562                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11563                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11564                                         }
11565                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11566                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11567                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11568                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11569                                                 },
11570                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11571                                                         let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11572                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11573                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
11574                                                 }
11575                                         }
11576                                 }
11577                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11578                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11579                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11580                                 // safely discard the channel.
11581                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11582                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11583                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11584                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11585                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11586                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11587                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11588                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11589                                 }, None));
11590                         } else {
11591                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11592                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11593                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11594                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11595                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11596                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11597                         }
11598                 }
11599
11600                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11601                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11602                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11603                                 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11604                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11605                                         &channel_id);
11606                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11607                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11608                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
11609                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11610                                         channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11611                                 };
11612                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11613                         }
11614                 }
11615
11616                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11617                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11618                 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11619                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11620                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11621                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11622                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11623                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11624                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11625                         }
11626                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11627                 }
11628
11629                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11630                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11631                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11632                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11633                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11634                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11635                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11636                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11637                         }
11638                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11639                 }
11640
11641                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11642                         PeerState {
11643                                 channel_by_id,
11644                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11645                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11646                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11647                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11648                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11649                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11650                                 is_connected: false,
11651                         }
11652                 };
11653
11654                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11655                 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11656                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11657                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11658                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11659                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11660                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11661                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11662                 }
11663
11664                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11665                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11666                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11667                 for _ in 0..event_count {
11668                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11669                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11670                                 None => continue,
11671                         }
11672                 }
11673
11674                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11675                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11676                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11677                                 0 => {
11678                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11679                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11680                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
11681                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11682                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11683                                 }
11684                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11685                         }
11686                 }
11687
11688                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11689                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11690
11691                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11692                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11693                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11694                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11695                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11696                         }
11697                 }
11698
11699                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11700                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11701                         hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11702                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11703                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11704                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11705                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11706                         };
11707                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11708                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11709                         };
11710                 }
11711
11712                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11713                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11714                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11715                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11716                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11717                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11718                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11719                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11720                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11721                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11722                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11723                 let mut events_override = None;
11724                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11725                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11726                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11727                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11728                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11729                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11730                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11731                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11732                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11733                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11734                         (8, events_override, option),
11735                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11736                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11737                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11738                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11739                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11740                 });
11741                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11742                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11743                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11744                 }
11745
11746                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11747                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11748                 }
11749
11750                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11751                         pending_events_read = events;
11752                 }
11753
11754                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11755                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11756                 }
11757
11758                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11759                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11760                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11761                         let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11762                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11763                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11764                         }
11765                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11766                 }
11767                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11768                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11769                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11770                 };
11771
11772                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11773                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11774                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11775                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11776                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11777                 //
11778                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11779                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11780                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11781                 //
11782                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11783                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11784                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11785                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11786                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11787                         ) => { {
11788                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11789                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11790                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11791                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11792                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11793                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11794                                         pending_background_events.push(
11795                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11796                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11797                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11798                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11799                                                         update: update.clone(),
11800                                                 });
11801                                 }
11802                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11803                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11804                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11805                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11806                                         pending_background_events.push(
11807                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11808                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11809                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11810                                                 });
11811                                 }
11812                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11813                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11814                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11815                                 }
11816                                 max_in_flight_update_id
11817                         } }
11818                 }
11819
11820                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11821                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11822                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11823                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11824                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11825                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11826
11827                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11828                                         // discarded.
11829                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11830                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11831                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11832                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11833                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11834                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11835                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11836                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11837                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11838                                                 }
11839                                         }
11840                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11841                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11842                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11843                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11844                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11845                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11846                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11847                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11848                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11849                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11850                                                 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11851                                         }
11852                                 } else {
11853                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11854                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11855                                         debug_assert!(false);
11856                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11857                                 }
11858                         }
11859                 }
11860
11861                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11862                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11863                                 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11864                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11865                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11866                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11867                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11868                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11869                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11870                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11871                                         });
11872                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11873                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11874                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11875                                 } else {
11876                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11877                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11878                                                 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11879                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11880                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11881                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11882                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11883                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11884                                 }
11885                         }
11886                 }
11887
11888                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11889                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11890
11891                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11892                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11893                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11894                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11895
11896                 {
11897                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11898                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11899                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11900                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11901                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11902                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11903                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11904                         // 0.0.102+
11905                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11906                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11907                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11908                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11909                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11910                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11911                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
11912                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11913                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11914                                                         }
11915
11916                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11917                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11918                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11919                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11920                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11921                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11922                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11923                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11924                                                                 },
11925                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11926                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11927                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11928                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
11929                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11930                                                                                 payment_params: None,
11931                                                                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11932                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11933                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11934                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11935                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11936                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11937                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11938                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11939                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
11940                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11941                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11942                                                                         });
11943                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11944                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11945                                                                 }
11946                                                         }
11947                                                 }
11948                                         }
11949                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11950                                                 match htlc_source {
11951                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11952                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11953                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11954                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11955                                                                 };
11956                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11957                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11958                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11959                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11960                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11961                                                                 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11962                                                                         update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11963                                                                                 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11964                                                                                         update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11965                                                                                 if matches {
11966                                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11967                                                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11968                                                                                 }
11969                                                                                 !matches
11970                                                                         });
11971                                                                         !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11972                                                                 });
11973                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11974                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
11975                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11976                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11977                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11978                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11979                                                                                                 false
11980                                                                                         } else { true }
11981                                                                                 } else { true }
11982                                                                         });
11983                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
11984                                                                 });
11985                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11986                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11987                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11988                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11989                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11990                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11991                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
11992                                                                                         } else { true }
11993                                                                                 });
11994                                                                                 false
11995                                                                         } else { true }
11996                                                                 });
11997                                                         },
11998                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11999                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12000                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12001                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12002                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12003                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12004                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12005                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12006                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12007                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12008                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12009                                                                         let compl_action =
12010                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12011                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12012                                                                                         channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12013                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12014                                                                                 };
12015                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12016                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12017                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12018                                                                 }
12019                                                         },
12020                                                 }
12021                                         }
12022                                 }
12023
12024                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12025                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12026                                 // payments.
12027                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12028                                         .into_iter()
12029                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12030                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12031                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12032                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12033                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12034                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12035                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12036                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12037                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12038                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12039                                                         } else { None }
12040                                                 } else {
12041                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12042                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12043                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12044                                                         // channel still live case here.
12045                                                         None
12046                                                 }
12047                                         });
12048                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12049                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12050                                 }
12051                         }
12052                 }
12053
12054                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12055                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12056                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12057                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12058                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12059                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12060                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12061                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12062                         }, None));
12063                 }
12064
12065                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12066                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12067
12068                 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12069                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12070                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12071                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12072                         }
12073                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12074                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12075                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12076                                 }
12077                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12078                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12079                                 {
12080                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12081                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12082                                         });
12083                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12084                                 }
12085                         } else {
12086                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12087                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12088                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12089                                         });
12090                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12091                                 }
12092                         }
12093                 } else {
12094                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12095                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12096                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12097                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12098                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12099                                 }
12100                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12101                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data, payment_context: _ } => {
12102                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12103                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12104                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12105                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12106                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12107                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12108                                                                                 Err(()) => {
12109                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12110                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12111                                                                                 }
12112                                                                         }
12113                                                                 },
12114                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12115                                                         }
12116                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12117                                         },
12118                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12119                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12120                                 };
12121                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12122                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12123                                 });
12124                         }
12125                 }
12126
12127                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12128                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12129
12130                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12131                         Ok(key) => key,
12132                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12133                 };
12134                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12135                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12136                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12137                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12138                         }
12139                 }
12140
12141                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12142                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12143                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12144                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12145                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12146                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12147                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12148                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12149                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12150                                                 loop {
12151                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12152                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12153                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12154                                                 }
12155                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12156                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12157                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12158                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12159                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12160                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12161                                         }
12162                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
12163                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12164                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12165                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12166                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12167                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12168                                                 }
12169                                         }
12170                                 } else {
12171                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12172                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12173                                         debug_assert!(false);
12174                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12175                                 }
12176                         }
12177                 }
12178
12179                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12180
12181                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12182                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12183                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12184                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12185                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12186                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12187                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12188                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12189                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12190                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12191                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12192                                         }
12193                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12194                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12195
12196                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12197                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12198                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12199                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12200                                                 //
12201                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12202                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12203                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12204                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12205                                                 // reason to.
12206                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12207                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12208                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12209                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12210                                                 // restart.
12211                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12212                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12213                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12214                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12215                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12216                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12217                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12218                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12219                                                         }
12220                                                 }
12221                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12222                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12223                                                 }
12224                                         }
12225                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12226                                                 receiver_node_id,
12227                                                 payment_hash,
12228                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
12229                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12230                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12231                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12232                                         }, None));
12233                                 }
12234                         }
12235                 }
12236
12237                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12238                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12239                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12240                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12241                                         for action in actions.iter() {
12242                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12243                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12244                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12245                                                 } = action {
12246                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12247                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
12248                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12249                                                                         blocked_channel_id);
12250                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12251                                                                         .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12252                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12253                                                         } else {
12254                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12255                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12256                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12257                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12258                                                                 // anymore.
12259                                                         }
12260                                                 }
12261                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12262                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12263                                                 }
12264                                         }
12265                                 }
12266                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12267                         } else {
12268                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12269                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12270                         }
12271                 }
12272
12273                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12274                         chain_hash,
12275                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12276                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12277                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12278                         router: args.router,
12279
12280                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12281
12282                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12283                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12284                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12285                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12286
12287                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12288                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12289                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12290                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12291                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12292                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12293                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12294
12295                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12296
12297                         our_network_pubkey,
12298                         secp_ctx,
12299
12300                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12301
12302                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12303
12304                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12305                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12306                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12307                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12308                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12309
12310                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12311                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12312
12313                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12314
12315                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12316
12317                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12318
12319                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12320                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
12321                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12322
12323                         logger: args.logger,
12324                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
12325                 };
12326
12327                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12328                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12329                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12330                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12331                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12332                 }
12333
12334                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12335                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12336                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12337                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12338                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12339                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12340                                 downstream_channel_id, None
12341                         );
12342                 }
12343
12344                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12345                 //connection or two.
12346
12347                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12348         }
12349 }
12350
12351 #[cfg(test)]
12352 mod tests {
12353         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12354         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12355         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12356         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12357         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12358         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12359         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12360         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12361         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12362         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12363         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12364         use crate::prelude::*;
12365         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12366         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12367         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12368         use crate::util::test_utils;
12369         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12370         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12371
12372         #[test]
12373         fn test_notify_limits() {
12374                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12375                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12376                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12377                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12378                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12379                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12380
12381                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12382                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12383                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12384                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12385                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12386
12387                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12388
12389                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12390                 // to connect messages with new values
12391                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12392                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12393                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12394                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12395                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12396                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12397
12398                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12399                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12400                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12401                 // ... but the last node should not.
12402                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12403                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12404                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12405                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12406
12407                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12408                 // about the channel.
12409                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12410                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12411                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12412
12413                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12414                 // parties.
12415                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12416                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12417                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12418                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12419                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12420                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12421
12422                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12423                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12424                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12425
12426                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12427                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12428                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12429                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12430                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12431                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12432
12433                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12434                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12435                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12436                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12437                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12438                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12439                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12440                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12441
12442                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12443                 // the channel info has updated.
12444                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12445                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12446                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12447                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12448                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12449                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12450         }
12451
12452         #[test]
12453         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12454                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12455                 // expected.
12456                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12457                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12458                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12459                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12460                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12461
12462                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12463                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12464                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12465                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12466
12467                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12468                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12469                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12470                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12471                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12472                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12473                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12474                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12476                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12477                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12478                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12479
12480                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12481                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12482                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12483                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12484                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12485                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12486                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12487                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12488                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12489                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12490                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12491                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12492                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12493                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12494                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12495                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12496                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12497                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12498                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12499                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12500                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12501                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12502                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12503
12504                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12505                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12506                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12507                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12508                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12509                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12510                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12511
12512                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12513                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12514                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12515                 // lightning messages manually.
12516                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12517                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12518                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12519
12520                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12521                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12522                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12523                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12525                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12526                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12528                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12529                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12530                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12531                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12532                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12533                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12534                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12535                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12536                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12537                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12539                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12541                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12542                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12543                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12544                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12545                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12546
12547                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12548                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12549                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12550                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12551                 match events[0] {
12552                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12553                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12554                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12555                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12556                         },
12557                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12558                 }
12559                 match events[1] {
12560                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12561                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12562                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12563                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12564                         },
12565                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12566                 }
12567         }
12568
12569         #[test]
12570         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12571                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12572                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12573         }
12574
12575         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12576                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12577                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12578                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12579                 //      fails as expected.
12580                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12581                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12582                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12583                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12584                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12585                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12586                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12587                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12588                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12589                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12590                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12591                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12592                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12593                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12594                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12595
12596                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12597                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12598                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12599
12600                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12601                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12602                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12603                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12604                 let route = find_route(
12605                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12606                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12607                 ).unwrap();
12608                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12609                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12610                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12611                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12612                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12613                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12614                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12615                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12616                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12617                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12618                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12619                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12620                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12621                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12622                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12623                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12624                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12625                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12626                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12627                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12628                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12629                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12630                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12631                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12632
12633                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12634                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12635
12636                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12637                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12638                 let route = find_route(
12639                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12640                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12641                 ).unwrap();
12642                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12643                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12644                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12645                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12646                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12647                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12648                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12649                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12650
12651                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12652                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12653                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12654                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12655                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12656                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12657                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12658                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12659                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12660                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12661                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12662                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12663                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12664                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12665                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12666                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12667                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12668                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12669                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12670                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12671                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12672                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12673                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12674                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12675
12676                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12677                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12678
12679                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12680                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12681                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12682                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12683                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12684                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12685                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12686                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12687                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12688                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12689
12690                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12691                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12692                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12693                         100_000
12694                 );
12695                 let route = find_route(
12696                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12697                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12698                 ).unwrap();
12699                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12700                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12701                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12702                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12703                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12704                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12705                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12706                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12707                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12708                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12709                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12710                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12711                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12712                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12713                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12714                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12715                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12716                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12717                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12718                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12719                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12720                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12721                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12722
12723                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12724                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12725         }
12726
12727         #[test]
12728         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12729                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12730                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12731                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12732                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12733                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12734                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12735
12736                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12737                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12738
12739                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12740                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12741                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12742                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12743                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12744                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12745                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12746                 let route = find_route(
12747                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12748                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12749                 ).unwrap();
12750
12751                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12752                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12753                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12754                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12755                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12756                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12757                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12758
12759                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12760                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12761                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12762                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12763                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12764                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12765                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12766
12767                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12768         }
12769
12770         #[test]
12771         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12772                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12773                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12774                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12775                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12776                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12777                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12778                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12779                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12780
12781                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12782                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12783
12784                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12785                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12786                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12787                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12788                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12789                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12790                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12791                 let route = find_route(
12792                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12793                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12794                 ).unwrap();
12795
12796                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12797                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12798                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12799                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12800                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12801                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12802                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12803                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12804                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12805
12806                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12807                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12808                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12809                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12810                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12811                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12812                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12813
12814                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12815         }
12816
12817         #[test]
12818         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12819                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12820                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12821                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12822                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12823
12824                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12825                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12826                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12827                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12828
12829                 // Marshall an MPP route.
12830                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12831                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12832                 route.paths.push(path);
12833                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12834                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12835                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12836                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12837                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12838                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12839
12840                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12841                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12842                 .unwrap_err() {
12843                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12844                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12845                         },
12846                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12847                 }
12848         }
12849
12850         #[test]
12851         fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12852                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12853                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12854                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12855                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12856
12857                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12858
12859                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12860                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12861                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12862
12863                 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12864                 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12865                 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12866
12867                 {
12868                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12869                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12870                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12871                 }
12872
12873                 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12874                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12875                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12876
12877                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12878                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12879
12880                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12881                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12882
12883                 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12884                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12885                         features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12886                 }, true).unwrap();
12887                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12888                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12889                 }, false).unwrap();
12890
12891                 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12892                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12893                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12894                 match &node_0_events[0] {
12895                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12896                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12897                 }
12898                 {
12899                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12900                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12901                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12902                 }
12903         }
12904
12905         #[test]
12906         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12907                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12908                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12909                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12910                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12911
12912                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12913
12914                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12915                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12916
12917                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12918                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12919                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12920                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12921
12922                 {
12923                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12924                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12925                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12926                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12927                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12928                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12929                 }
12930
12931                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12932
12933                 {
12934                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12935                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12936                 }
12937         }
12938
12939         #[test]
12940         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12941                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12942                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12943                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12944                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12945                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12946
12947                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12948                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12949                         payment_secret,
12950                         total_msat: 100_000,
12951                 };
12952
12953                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12954                 // payment verification fails as expected.
12955                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12956                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12957                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12958                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12959                         Err(()) => {
12960                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12961                         }
12962                 }
12963
12964                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12965                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12966         }
12967
12968         #[test]
12969         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12970                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12971                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12972                 // the channel is successfully closed.
12973                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12974                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12975                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12976                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12977
12978                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12979                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12980                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12981                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12982                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12983
12984                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12985                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12986                 {
12987                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12988                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12989                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12990                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12991                 }
12992
12993                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12994                 {
12995                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12996                         // as it has the funding transaction.
12997                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12998                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12999                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13000                 }
13001
13002                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13003
13004                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13005
13006                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13007                 {
13008                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13009                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13010                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13011                 }
13012                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13013
13014                 {
13015                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13016                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13017                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13018                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13019                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13020                 }
13021                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13022                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13023                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13024                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13025                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13026                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13027                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13028                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13029
13030                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13031                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13032                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13033                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13034
13035                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13036                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13037                 {
13038                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13039                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13040                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13041                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13042                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13043                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13044                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13045                 }
13046
13047                 {
13048                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13049                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13050                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13051                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13052                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13053                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13054                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13055                 }
13056
13057                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13058                 {
13059                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13060                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13061                         // closing transaction).
13062                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13063                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13064                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13065
13066                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13067                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13068                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13069                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13070                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13071                 }
13072
13073                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13074
13075                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13076                 {
13077                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13078                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13079                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13080                 }
13081                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13082
13083                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13084                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13085         }
13086
13087         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13088                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13089                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13090         }
13091
13092         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13093                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13094                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13095         }
13096
13097         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13098                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13099                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13100         }
13101
13102         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13103                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13104                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13105         }
13106
13107         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13108                 match res_err {
13109                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13110                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13111                         },
13112                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13113                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13114                         },
13115                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13116                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13117                 }
13118         }
13119
13120         #[test]
13121         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13122                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13123                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13124                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13125                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13126                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13127                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13128                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13129
13130                 // Dummy values
13131                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13132                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13133                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13134
13135                 // Test the API functions.
13136                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13137
13138                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13139
13140                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13141
13142                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13143
13144                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13145
13146                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13147
13148                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13149         }
13150
13151         #[test]
13152         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13153                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13154                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13155                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13156                 // the given `channel_id`.
13157                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13158                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13159                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13160                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13161
13162                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13163
13164                 // Dummy values
13165                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13166
13167                 // Test the API functions.
13168                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13169
13170                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13171
13172                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13173
13174                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13175
13176                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13177
13178                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13179         }
13180
13181         #[test]
13182         fn test_connection_limiting() {
13183                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13184                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13185                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13186                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13187                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13188
13189                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13190
13191                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13192                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13193
13194                 let mut funding_tx = None;
13195                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13196                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13197                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13198
13199                         if idx == 0 {
13200                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13201                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13202                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13203                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13204                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13205
13206                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13207                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13208                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13209
13210                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13211
13212                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13213                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13214                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13215                         }
13216                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13217                 }
13218
13219                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13220                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13221                         &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13222                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13223                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13224                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13225
13226                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13227                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13228                 // limit.
13229                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13230                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13231                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13232                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13233                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13234                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13235                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13236                         }, true).unwrap();
13237                 }
13238                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13239                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13240                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13241                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13242                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13243
13244                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13245                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13246                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13247                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13248                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13249                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13250                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13251                 }
13252                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13253                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13254                 }, true).unwrap();
13255                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13256                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13257                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13258
13259                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13260                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13261                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13262                 }, false).unwrap();
13263                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13264
13265                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13266                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13267                 // open channels.
13268                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13269                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13270                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13271                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13272                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13273                 }
13274                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13275                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13276                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13277
13278                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13279                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13280                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13281
13282                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13283                 // "protected" and can connect again.
13284                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13285                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13286                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13287                 }, true).unwrap();
13288                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13289
13290                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13291                 // last_random_pk.
13292                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13293                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13294         }
13295
13296         #[test]
13297         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13298                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13299                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13300                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13301                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13302                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13303
13304                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13305
13306                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13307                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13308
13309                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13310                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13311                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13312                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13313                 }
13314
13315                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13316                 // rejected.
13317                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13318                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13319                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13320
13321                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13322                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13323                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13324
13325                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13326                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13327                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13328                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13329         }
13330
13331         #[test]
13332         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13333                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13334                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13335                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13336                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13337                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13338                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13339                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13340                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13341
13342                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13343
13344                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13345                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13346
13347                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13348                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13349                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13350                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13351                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13352                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13353                         }, true).unwrap();
13354
13355                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13356                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13357                         match events[0] {
13358                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13359                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13360                                 }
13361                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13362                         }
13363                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13364                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13365                 }
13366
13367                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13368                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13369                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13370                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13371                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13372                 }, true).unwrap();
13373                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13374                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13375                 match events[0] {
13376                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13377                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13378                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13379                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13380                                         _ => panic!(),
13381                                 }
13382                         }
13383                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13384                 }
13385                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13386                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13387
13388                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13389                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13390                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13391                 match events[0] {
13392                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13393                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13394                         }
13395                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13396                 }
13397                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13398         }
13399
13400         #[test]
13401         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13402                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13403                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13404                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13405                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13406                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13407                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13408                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13409                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13410                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13411                         payment_metadata: None,
13412                         keysend_preimage: None,
13413                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13414                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13415                         }),
13416                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13417                 };
13418                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13419                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13420                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13421                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13422                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13423                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13424                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13425                 {
13426                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13427                 } else { panic!(); }
13428
13429                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13430                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13431                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13432                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13433                         payment_metadata: None,
13434                         keysend_preimage: None,
13435                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13436                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13437                         }),
13438                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13439                 };
13440                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13441                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13442                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13443                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13444         }
13445
13446         #[test]
13447         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13448                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13449                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13450                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13451                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13452
13453                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13454                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13455                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13456                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13457                         payment_metadata: None,
13458                         keysend_preimage: None,
13459                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13460                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13461                         }),
13462                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13463                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13464                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13465
13466                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13467                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13468                 // is not satisfied.
13469                 assert!(result.is_ok());
13470         }
13471
13472         #[test]
13473         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13474                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13475                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13476                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13477                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13478
13479                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13480                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13481
13482                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13483                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13484                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13485                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13486                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13487
13488                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13489                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13490
13491                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13492                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13493                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13494                 match &msg_events[0] {
13495                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13496                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13497                                 match action {
13498                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13499                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13500                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13501                                 }
13502                         }
13503                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13504                 }
13505
13506                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13507                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13508                 match events[0] {
13509                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13510                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13511                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13512                 }
13513                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13514         }
13515
13516         #[test]
13517         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13518                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13519                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13520                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13521                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13522                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13523                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13524                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13525                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13526                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13527                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13528
13529                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13530                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13531                 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13532
13533                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13534                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13535                 match events[0] {
13536                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13537                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13538                         }
13539                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13540                 }
13541
13542                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13543                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13544
13545                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13546                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13547
13548                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13549                 // not have generated any events.
13550                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13551         }
13552
13553         #[test]
13554         fn test_update_channel_config() {
13555                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13556                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13557                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13558                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13559                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13560                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13561                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13562
13563                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13564                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13565                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13566
13567                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13568                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13569                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13570                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13571                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13572                 match &events[0] {
13573                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13574                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13575                 }
13576
13577                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13578                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13579                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13580
13581                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13582                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13583                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13584                         ..Default::default()
13585                 }).unwrap();
13586                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13587                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13588                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13589                 match &events[0] {
13590                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13591                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13592                 }
13593
13594                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13595                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13596                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13597                         ..Default::default()
13598                 }).unwrap();
13599                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13600                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13601                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13602                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13603                 match &events[0] {
13604                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13605                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13606                 }
13607
13608                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13609                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13610                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13611                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13612                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13613                 assert!(
13614                         matches!(
13615                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13616                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13617                                         ..Default::default()
13618                                 }),
13619                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13620                         )
13621                 );
13622                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13623                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13624                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13625                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13626         }
13627
13628         #[test]
13629         fn test_payment_display() {
13630                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13631                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13632                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13633                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13634                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13635                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13636         }
13637
13638         #[test]
13639         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13640                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13641                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13642                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13643                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13644                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13645
13646                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13647                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13648                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13649                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13650                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13651                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13652                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13653                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13654                 {
13655                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13656                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13657                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13658                 }
13659
13660                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13661                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13662                 // their side.
13663                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13664                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13665                 }, true).unwrap();
13666                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13667                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13668                 }, false).unwrap();
13669                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13670                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13671                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13672                 );
13673                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13674
13675                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13676                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13677                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13678                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13679                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13680                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13681                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13682                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13683                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13684                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13685                 } else { panic!() };
13686                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13687                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13688                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13689                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13690                 };
13691                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13692                 {
13693                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13694                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13695                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13696                 }
13697         }
13698
13699         #[test]
13700         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13701                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13702                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13703                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13704                 let persister;
13705                 let chain_monitor;
13706                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13707                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13708                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13709
13710                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13711                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13712                 };
13713                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13714                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13715                 };
13716
13717                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13718                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13719                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13720                         } else {
13721                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13722                         }
13723                 }).collect();
13724
13725                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13726                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13727                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13728                         } else {
13729                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13730                         }
13731                 }).collect();
13732
13733
13734                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13735                 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13736                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13737                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13738
13739                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13740                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13741                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13742
13743                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13744
13745                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13746                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13747                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13748                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13749                 }
13750                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13751                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13752
13753                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13754         }
13755 }
13756
13757 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
13758 pub mod bench {
13759         use crate::chain::Listen;
13760         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13761         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13762         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13763         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13764         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13765         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13766         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13767         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13768         use crate::util::test_utils;
13769         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13770
13771         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13772         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13773         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13774         use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13775
13776         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13777
13778         use criterion::Criterion;
13779
13780         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13781                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13782                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13783                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13784                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13785                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13786                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13787
13788         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13789                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13790         }
13791         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13792                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13793                 #[inline]
13794                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13795                 #[inline]
13796                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13797         }
13798
13799         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13800                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13801         }
13802
13803         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13804                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13805                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13806                 // calls per node.
13807                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13808                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13809
13810                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13811                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13812                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13813                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13814                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13815
13816                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13817                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13818                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13819
13820                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13821                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13822                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13823                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13824                         network,
13825                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13826                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13827                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13828
13829                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13830                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13831                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13832                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13833                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13834                         network,
13835                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13836                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13837                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13838
13839                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13840                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13841                 }, true).unwrap();
13842                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13843                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13844                 }, false).unwrap();
13845                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13846                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13847                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13848
13849                 let tx;
13850                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13851                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13852                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13853                         }]};
13854                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13855                 } else { panic!(); }
13856
13857                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13858                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13859                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13860                 match events_b[0] {
13861                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13862                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13863                         },
13864                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13865                 }
13866
13867                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13868                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13869                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13870                 match events_a[0] {
13871                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13872                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13873                         },
13874                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13875                 }
13876
13877                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13878
13879                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13880                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13881                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13882
13883                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13884                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13885                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13886                 match msg_events[0] {
13887                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13888                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13889                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13890                         },
13891                         _ => panic!(),
13892                 }
13893                 match msg_events[1] {
13894                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13895                         _ => panic!(),
13896                 }
13897
13898                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13899                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13900                 match events_a[0] {
13901                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13902                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13903                         },
13904                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13905                 }
13906
13907                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13908                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13909                 match events_b[0] {
13910                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13911                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13912                         },
13913                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13914                 }
13915
13916                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13917                 macro_rules! send_payment {
13918                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13919                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13920                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13921                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13922                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13923                                 payment_count += 1;
13924                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13925                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13926
13927                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13928                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13929                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13930                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13931                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13932                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13933                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13934                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13935                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13936                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13937                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13938
13939                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13940                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13941                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13942                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13943
13944                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13945                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13946                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13947                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13948                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13949                                         },
13950                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13951                                 }
13952
13953                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13954                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13955                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13956                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13957
13958                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13959                         }
13960                 }
13961
13962                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13963                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13964                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
13965                 }));
13966         }
13967 }