1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 //! [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
22 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
26 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchedUtil, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
40 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
43 use util::{byte_utils, events};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
50 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
51 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
52 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
55 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
56 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
57 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
58 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
59 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
61 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
62 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
63 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
67 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
68 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
69 self.update_id.write(w)?;
70 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
71 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
72 update_step.write(w)?;
77 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
78 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
79 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
80 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
81 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
83 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
85 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
89 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
91 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
92 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
93 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
95 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
96 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
97 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
98 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
100 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
101 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
102 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
104 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
105 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
106 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
107 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
108 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
109 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
112 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
113 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
116 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
117 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
118 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
119 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
120 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
123 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
124 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
125 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
127 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
128 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
129 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
130 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
132 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
137 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
138 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
139 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
141 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
143 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
145 /// Simple structure send back by `chain::Watch` in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
146 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
148 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
151 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
152 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
153 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
155 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
157 /// An implementation of a [`chain::Watch`] and ChainListener.
159 /// May be used in conjunction with [`ChannelManager`] to monitor channels locally or used
160 /// independently to monitor channels remotely.
162 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
163 /// [`ChannelManager`]: ../channelmanager/struct.ChannelManager.html
164 pub struct ChainMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
165 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
166 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
169 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
170 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
172 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
173 watch_events: Mutex<WatchEventQueue>,
179 struct WatchEventQueue {
180 watched: ChainWatchedUtil,
181 events: Vec<chain::WatchEvent>,
184 impl WatchEventQueue {
187 watched: ChainWatchedUtil::new(),
192 fn watch_tx(&mut self, txid: &Txid, script_pubkey: &Script) {
193 if self.watched.register_tx(txid, script_pubkey) {
194 self.events.push(chain::WatchEvent::WatchTransaction {
196 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone()
201 fn watch_output(&mut self, outpoint: (&Txid, usize), script_pubkey: &Script) {
202 let (txid, index) = outpoint;
203 if self.watched.register_outpoint((*txid, index as u32), script_pubkey) {
204 self.events.push(chain::WatchEvent::WatchOutput {
209 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
214 fn dequeue_events(&mut self) -> Vec<chain::WatchEvent> {
215 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(self.events.len());
216 pending_events.append(&mut self.events);
221 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
222 ChainListener for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
223 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
224 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
227 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
228 let mut watch_events = self.watch_events.lock().unwrap();
229 let matched_txn: Vec<_> = txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| watch_events.watched.does_match_tx(tx)).map(|e| *e).collect();
231 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
232 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
233 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, &matched_txn, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
235 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
236 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
237 watch_events.watch_output((txid, idx), &output.script_pubkey);
244 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
245 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
246 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
247 monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
252 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
253 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
254 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
257 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
258 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
259 pub fn new(broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> Self {
261 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
262 watch_events: Mutex::new(WatchEventQueue::new()),
265 fee_estimator: feeest,
269 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
270 pub fn add_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
271 let mut watch_events = self.watch_events.lock().unwrap();
272 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
273 let entry = match monitors.entry(outpoint) {
274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given outpoint is already present")),
275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
278 let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
279 log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
280 watch_events.watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
281 watch_events.watch_output((&funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as usize), &funding_txo.1);
282 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
283 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
284 watch_events.watch_output((txid, idx), script);
288 entry.insert(monitor);
292 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
293 pub fn update_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
294 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
295 match monitors.get_mut(&outpoint) {
296 Some(orig_monitor) => {
297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
298 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
300 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
305 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> chain::Watch for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
306 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
307 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
310 type Keys = ChanSigner;
312 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
313 match self.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor) {
315 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
319 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
320 match self.update_monitor(funding_txo, update) {
322 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
326 fn release_pending_htlc_updates(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
327 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
328 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
329 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
331 pending_htlcs_updated
335 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
336 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
337 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
340 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
341 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
342 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
343 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
349 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::WatchEventProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
350 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
354 fn release_pending_watch_events(&self) -> Vec<chain::WatchEvent> {
355 self.watch_events.lock().unwrap().dequeue_events()
359 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
360 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
361 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
362 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
363 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
364 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
365 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
366 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
367 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
368 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
369 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
370 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
371 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
372 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
373 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
374 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
375 /// accurate block height.
376 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
377 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
378 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
379 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
380 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
381 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
382 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
383 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
384 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
385 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
386 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
387 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
388 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
390 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
391 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
392 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
394 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
395 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
396 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
397 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
399 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
400 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
402 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
403 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
404 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
406 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
407 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
408 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
410 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
411 struct LocalSignedTx {
412 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
414 revocation_key: PublicKey,
415 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
416 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
417 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
418 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
420 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
423 /// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
424 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
426 struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
427 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
428 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
429 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
430 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
433 impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
434 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
435 self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
436 self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
437 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?;
438 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
439 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
440 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
441 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
442 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
449 impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
450 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
451 let remote_commitment_transaction = {
452 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
453 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
454 let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
455 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
456 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
457 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
458 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
459 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
460 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
461 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
462 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
465 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
466 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
469 RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
470 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
471 remote_htlc_base_key,
476 Ok(remote_commitment_transaction)
480 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
481 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
482 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
483 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
484 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
486 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
487 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
488 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
489 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
490 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
492 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
493 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
496 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
497 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
498 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
499 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
500 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
503 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
507 funding_redeemscript: Script,
511 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
512 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
514 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => {
515 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
516 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
517 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
518 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
519 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
520 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
521 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
523 on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
525 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
526 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
527 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
528 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
529 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
530 preimage.write(writer)?;
533 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
534 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
535 preimage.write(writer)?;
536 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
538 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
539 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
540 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
547 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
548 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
549 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
551 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
552 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
553 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
554 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
555 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
556 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
557 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
558 let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
559 InputMaterial::Revoked {
560 per_commitment_point,
561 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
562 remote_htlc_base_key,
571 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
572 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
573 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
574 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
575 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
576 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
577 per_commitment_point,
578 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
579 remote_htlc_base_key,
585 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
586 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
587 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
593 InputMaterial::Funding {
594 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
597 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
603 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
604 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
605 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
606 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
607 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
608 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
609 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
610 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
611 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
612 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
613 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
614 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
615 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
616 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
617 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
618 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
619 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
620 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
621 // and satisfy witness program.
622 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
625 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
626 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
627 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
629 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
630 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
631 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
633 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
636 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
640 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
641 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
643 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
645 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
646 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
647 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
648 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
650 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
651 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
652 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
653 commitment_number: u64,
654 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
657 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
663 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
664 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
666 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
667 /// think we've fallen behind!
668 should_broadcast: bool,
672 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
673 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
675 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
677 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
678 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
679 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
685 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
687 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
688 commitment_number.write(w)?;
689 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
690 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
691 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
693 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
696 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
698 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
700 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
705 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
707 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
713 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
714 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
715 match Readable::read(r)? {
717 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
718 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
720 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
721 let mut res = Vec::new();
723 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
730 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
731 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
732 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
733 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
735 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
736 let mut res = Vec::new();
738 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
745 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
746 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
750 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
751 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
752 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
756 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
757 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
760 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
765 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
766 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
768 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
769 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
771 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
772 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
773 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
774 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
775 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
776 latest_update_id: u64,
777 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
779 destination_script: Script,
780 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
781 remote_payment_script: Script,
782 shutdown_script: Script,
785 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
786 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
787 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
789 remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction,
790 funding_redeemscript: Script,
791 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
792 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
793 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
795 on_local_tx_csv: u16,
797 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
798 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
799 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
800 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
801 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
802 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
803 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
804 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
805 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
806 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
807 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
808 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
809 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
811 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
812 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
813 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
814 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
815 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
816 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
818 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
820 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
821 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
823 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
825 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
827 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
828 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
830 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
831 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
832 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
833 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
835 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
836 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
837 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
838 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
839 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
842 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
844 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
846 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
847 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
848 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
849 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
851 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
852 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
853 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
854 local_tx_signed: bool,
856 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
857 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
858 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
859 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
860 // the full block_connected).
861 pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
862 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
865 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
866 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
867 /// underlying object
868 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
869 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
870 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
871 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
872 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
873 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
874 self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script ||
875 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
876 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
877 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
878 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
879 self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache ||
880 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
881 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
882 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
883 self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv ||
884 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
885 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
886 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
887 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
888 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
889 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
890 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
891 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
892 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
893 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
894 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
895 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
896 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
897 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
898 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
907 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
908 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
910 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
911 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
912 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
913 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
914 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
915 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
916 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
917 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
918 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
919 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
921 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
923 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
924 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
926 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
927 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
928 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
929 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
930 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
931 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
933 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
936 self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?;
937 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
939 self.keys.write(writer)?;
940 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
942 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
943 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
944 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
946 self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
947 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
948 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
950 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
951 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
952 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
953 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
954 match second_option {
955 Some(second_pubkey) => {
956 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
959 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
964 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
968 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?;
970 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
972 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
973 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
974 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
976 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
977 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
978 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
982 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
983 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
984 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
985 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
986 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
987 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
988 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
992 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
993 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
994 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
995 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
996 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
997 for script in txouts.iter() {
998 script.write(writer)?;
1002 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1003 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1004 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1005 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1008 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1009 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1010 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
1011 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1012 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1013 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1014 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1015 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1018 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1019 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1020 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1021 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1023 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1027 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
1032 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1033 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1034 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1036 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1039 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1041 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1042 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
1044 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1045 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1046 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1049 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1050 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1051 data.write(writer)?;
1054 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1055 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1056 event.write(writer)?;
1059 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1061 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1062 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1063 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1064 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1065 for ev in events.iter() {
1067 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1069 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1070 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1072 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1074 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1080 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1081 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1082 txid.write(writer)?;
1083 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1084 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1085 script.write(writer)?;
1088 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1090 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1091 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1097 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1098 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1099 on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1100 remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1101 on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1102 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1103 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1105 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1106 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1107 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1108 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1109 let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1111 let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1113 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv);
1115 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1116 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1117 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1118 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1119 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1120 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1121 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1122 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1123 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1124 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1125 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1127 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1128 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1129 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1130 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1131 // now but we should consider it later.
1132 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1135 latest_update_id: 0,
1136 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1138 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1139 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1140 remote_payment_script,
1145 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1146 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1149 funding_redeemscript,
1150 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1151 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1155 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1156 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1157 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1158 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1160 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1161 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1162 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1163 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1165 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1166 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1167 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1169 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1170 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1174 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1175 local_tx_signed: false,
1177 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1178 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1182 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1183 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1184 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1185 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1186 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1187 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1190 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1191 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1192 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1193 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1198 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1199 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1200 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1201 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1202 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1204 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1205 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1206 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1210 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1211 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1212 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1217 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1224 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1233 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1234 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1235 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1236 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1237 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1238 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1239 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1240 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1242 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1243 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1246 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1247 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1248 log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1249 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1250 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1251 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1252 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1253 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1254 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1255 Some(old_points) => {
1256 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1257 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1258 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1259 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1260 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1262 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1265 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1269 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1272 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1273 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1274 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1278 self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1281 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1282 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1283 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1284 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1285 /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called.
1286 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1287 if self.local_tx_signed {
1288 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1290 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1291 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1292 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1293 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1295 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1296 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1297 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1298 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1299 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1300 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1301 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1303 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1304 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1305 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1306 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1307 // now but we should consider it later.
1308 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1309 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1311 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1312 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1313 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1317 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1318 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1319 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1320 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1323 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1324 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1327 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1328 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1332 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1333 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
1334 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1336 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1337 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1338 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1340 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1341 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1342 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1343 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1345 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1346 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1349 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1353 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1356 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1357 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1358 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1361 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1362 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1364 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1366 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1367 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1368 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1370 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1371 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1372 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1373 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1374 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1375 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1376 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1377 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1378 if should_broadcast {
1379 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1381 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1386 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1390 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1392 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1393 self.latest_update_id
1396 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1397 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1401 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1402 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1403 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1404 &self.outputs_to_watch
1407 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1408 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1409 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1410 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1411 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1412 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1413 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1414 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1415 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1421 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1422 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`].
1424 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_htlc_updates
1425 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1426 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1427 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1431 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1434 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1435 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1436 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1437 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1438 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1439 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1443 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1444 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1445 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1448 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1449 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1452 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1453 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1456 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1457 self.current_local_commitment_number
1460 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1461 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1462 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1463 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1464 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1465 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1466 fn check_spend_remote_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1467 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1468 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1469 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1470 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1472 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1473 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1475 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1476 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1479 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1484 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1485 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1486 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1487 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1488 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1489 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1490 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key));
1492 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1493 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1495 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1496 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1497 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1498 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1499 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1503 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1504 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1505 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1506 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1507 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1508 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1509 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1511 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1512 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1517 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1518 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1519 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1520 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1521 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1522 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1524 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1525 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1526 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1527 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1528 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1529 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1530 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1532 let e = entry.get_mut();
1533 e.retain(|ref event| {
1535 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1536 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1541 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1544 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1552 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1553 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1555 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1556 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1558 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1560 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1561 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1562 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1563 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1564 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1565 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1566 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1568 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1569 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1571 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1573 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1574 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1575 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1576 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1577 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1578 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1579 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1580 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1581 // payment_preimage.
1582 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1583 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1584 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1585 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1587 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1588 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1592 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1593 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1595 let e = entry.get_mut();
1596 e.retain(|ref event| {
1598 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1599 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1604 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1607 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1615 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1616 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1618 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1619 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1622 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1623 let revocation_point_option =
1624 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1625 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1626 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1628 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1629 self.remote_payment_script = {
1630 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1631 // script_pubkey version
1632 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1633 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1636 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1637 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1638 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1639 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1640 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1641 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1643 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1644 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1645 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1646 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1647 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1654 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1657 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1658 fn check_spend_remote_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1659 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1660 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1661 return (Vec::new(), None)
1664 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1665 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1668 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1673 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1674 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1675 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1677 log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1678 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv };
1679 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1680 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1683 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1684 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1685 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1687 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1688 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1690 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1691 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1692 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1693 witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
1694 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1695 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1696 Some(preimage.clone())
1698 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1702 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1704 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1708 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1711 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1712 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1713 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1714 fn check_spend_local_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1715 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1716 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1717 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1719 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1720 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1721 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1722 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1724 let e = entry.get_mut();
1725 e.retain(|ref event| {
1727 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1728 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1733 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1736 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1742 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1743 ($updates: expr) => {
1744 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1745 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1746 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1750 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1751 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1753 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1755 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1756 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1757 append_onchain_update!(res);
1758 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1759 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1761 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1762 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1763 append_onchain_update!(res);
1767 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1768 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1769 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1770 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1771 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1772 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1780 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1781 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1782 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1786 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1789 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1790 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1791 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1792 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1793 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1794 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1795 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1796 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1797 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1798 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1799 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1800 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1801 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1802 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1803 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1804 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1805 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1806 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1807 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1808 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1812 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1813 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1818 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1819 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1825 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1826 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1827 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1829 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1830 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1831 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1832 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1833 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1834 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1835 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1836 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1837 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1838 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1842 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1843 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1853 /// Determines if any HTLCs have been resolved on chain in the connected block.
1855 /// TODO: Include how `broadcaster` and `fee_estimator` are used.
1857 /// Returns any transaction outputs from `txn_matched` that spends of should be watched for.
1858 /// After called these are also available via [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1860 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1861 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txn_matched: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1862 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1863 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1866 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1867 let mut output_val = 0;
1868 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1869 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1870 output_val += out.value;
1871 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1875 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1876 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1878 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1879 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1880 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1881 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1882 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1883 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1884 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1886 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1887 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1888 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1889 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1890 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1891 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1893 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1894 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1895 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1896 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1898 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1900 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1903 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1904 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1905 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1906 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1907 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1912 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1913 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1914 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1915 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1917 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1919 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1920 if should_broadcast {
1921 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1923 if should_broadcast {
1924 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1925 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1926 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1927 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1929 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1932 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1935 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1936 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1937 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1938 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1939 payment_preimage: None,
1940 source: htlc_update.0,
1943 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1944 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1945 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1946 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1952 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1954 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1955 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1956 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1962 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1965 /// TODO: Include how `broadcaster` and `fee_estimator` are used.
1966 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1967 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1968 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1971 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1972 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1974 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1976 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1977 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1980 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1982 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1985 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1986 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1987 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1988 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1989 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1990 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1991 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1992 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1993 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1994 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1995 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1996 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1997 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1998 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1999 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2000 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2001 // time out the HTLC first.
2002 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2003 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2004 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2005 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2006 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2007 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2008 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2009 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2010 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2011 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2012 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2013 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2014 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2015 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2016 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2017 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2018 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2019 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2020 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2021 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2022 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2023 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2024 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2025 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2032 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2034 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
2035 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2036 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2039 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2040 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2041 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2048 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2049 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2050 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2051 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2052 let mut payment_data = None;
2053 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2054 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2055 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2056 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2058 macro_rules! log_claim {
2059 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2060 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2061 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2062 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2063 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2064 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2065 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2066 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2067 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2068 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2069 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2070 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2072 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2073 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2074 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2075 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2080 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2081 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2082 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2083 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2084 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2085 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2086 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2087 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2096 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2097 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2098 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2099 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2100 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2101 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2102 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2103 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2104 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2105 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2106 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2107 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2108 } else if !$local_tx {
2109 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2110 if payment_data.is_none() {
2111 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2114 if payment_data.is_none() {
2115 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2116 continue 'outer_loop;
2123 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2124 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2125 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2127 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2128 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2129 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2130 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2133 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2134 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2135 "remote commitment tx", false);
2138 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2139 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2140 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2141 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2142 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2143 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2144 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2145 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2147 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2151 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2152 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2153 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2154 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2156 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2161 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2162 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2164 let e = entry.get_mut();
2165 e.retain(|ref event| {
2167 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2168 return htlc_update.0 != source
2173 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2175 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2176 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2184 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2185 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2186 let mut spendable_output = None;
2187 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2188 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2189 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2190 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2191 output: outp.clone(),
2194 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2195 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2196 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2197 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2198 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2199 to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv,
2200 output: outp.clone(),
2201 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2202 remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2206 } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2207 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
2208 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2209 output: outp.clone(),
2210 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2213 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2214 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2215 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2216 output: outp.clone(),
2220 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2221 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2222 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2223 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2224 let e = entry.get_mut();
2225 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2227 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2228 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2235 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2237 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2238 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2239 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2243 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2248 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2249 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2250 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2251 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2254 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2255 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2257 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2258 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2260 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2261 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2262 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2263 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2266 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2268 let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2269 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2271 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2272 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2273 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2274 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2275 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2276 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2278 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2279 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2280 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2282 let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2283 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2284 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2286 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2287 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2291 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2292 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2293 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2294 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2296 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2301 let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2303 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2305 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2308 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2309 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2310 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2311 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2312 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2314 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2315 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2321 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2322 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2323 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2324 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2325 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2326 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2327 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2328 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2330 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2331 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2335 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2336 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2337 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2338 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2339 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2340 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2341 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2342 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2343 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2345 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2346 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2350 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2351 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2352 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2353 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2354 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2355 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2356 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2360 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2363 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2364 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2365 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2366 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2367 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2368 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2369 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2371 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2372 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2373 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2374 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2375 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2377 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2378 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2380 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2385 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2392 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2395 Some(read_local_tx!())
2397 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2399 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2401 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2402 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2404 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2405 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2406 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2407 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2408 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2409 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2410 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2414 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2415 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2416 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2417 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2420 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2421 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2422 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2423 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2424 pending_events.push(event);
2428 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2430 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2431 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2432 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2433 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2434 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2435 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2436 for _ in 0..events_len {
2437 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2439 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2440 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2441 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2442 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2446 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2447 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2451 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2455 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2458 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2459 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2460 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2461 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2462 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2463 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2464 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2465 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2467 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2468 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2471 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2473 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2474 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2476 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2478 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2481 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2482 remote_payment_script,
2487 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2488 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2491 funding_redeemscript,
2492 channel_value_satoshis,
2493 their_cur_revocation_points,
2498 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2499 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2500 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2502 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2503 current_local_commitment_tx,
2504 current_remote_commitment_number,
2505 current_local_commitment_number,
2508 pending_htlcs_updated,
2511 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2516 lockdown_from_offchain,
2520 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2527 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2528 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2529 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2530 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2531 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2532 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2533 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2534 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2535 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2537 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2538 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2539 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2540 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2542 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2543 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2544 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2545 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2547 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2550 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2551 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2552 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2554 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2555 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2557 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2560 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2561 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2562 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2566 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2567 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2569 let mut res = Vec::new();
2570 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2571 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2575 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2576 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2583 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2584 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2586 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2587 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2593 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2594 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2595 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2596 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2601 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2603 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2604 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2605 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2606 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2607 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2613 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2615 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2616 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2617 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2618 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2619 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2620 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2622 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2623 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2624 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2625 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2626 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2627 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2628 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2631 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2632 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2633 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2634 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2635 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2636 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2637 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2639 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2640 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2641 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2642 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2643 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2644 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2646 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2647 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2648 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2649 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2650 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2651 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2652 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2653 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2655 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2656 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2657 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2658 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2659 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2660 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2664 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2665 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2666 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2668 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2669 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2670 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2671 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2673 macro_rules! sign_input {
2674 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2675 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2676 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2678 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2679 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2680 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2682 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2683 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2684 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2685 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2686 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2687 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2688 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2689 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2690 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2691 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2692 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2693 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2695 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2697 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2698 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2699 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2700 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2704 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2705 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2707 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2708 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2710 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2711 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2715 script_sig: Script::new(),
2716 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2717 witness: Vec::new(),
2720 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2721 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2724 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2725 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2726 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2727 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2728 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2730 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2732 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2733 claim_tx.input.clear();
2734 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2736 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2737 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2741 script_sig: Script::new(),
2742 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2743 witness: Vec::new(),
2746 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2747 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2748 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2749 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2750 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2752 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2754 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2755 claim_tx.input.clear();
2756 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2757 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2758 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2762 script_sig: Script::new(),
2763 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2764 witness: Vec::new(),
2766 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2767 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2768 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2769 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2770 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2772 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2775 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.