1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 //! [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
22 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
26 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainWatchedUtil, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
40 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
43 use util::{byte_utils, events};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
50 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
51 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
52 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
55 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
56 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
57 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
58 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
59 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
61 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
62 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
63 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
67 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
68 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
69 self.update_id.write(w)?;
70 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
71 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
72 update_step.write(w)?;
77 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
78 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
79 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
80 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
81 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
83 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
85 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
89 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
91 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
92 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
93 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
95 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
96 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
97 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
98 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
100 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
101 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
102 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
104 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
105 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
106 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
107 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
108 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
109 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
112 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
113 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
116 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
117 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
118 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
119 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
120 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
123 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
124 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
125 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
127 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
128 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
129 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
130 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
132 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
137 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
138 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
139 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
141 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
143 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
145 /// Simple structure send back by `chain::Watch` in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
146 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
148 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
151 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
152 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
153 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
155 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
157 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`].
159 /// May be used in conjunction with [`ChannelManager`] to monitor channels locally or used
160 /// independently to monitor channels remotely.
162 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
163 /// [`ChannelManager`]: ../channelmanager/struct.ChannelManager.html
164 pub struct ChainMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
165 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
166 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
169 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
170 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
172 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
173 watch_events: Mutex<WatchEventQueue>,
179 struct WatchEventQueue {
180 watched: ChainWatchedUtil,
181 events: Vec<chain::WatchEvent>,
184 impl WatchEventQueue {
187 watched: ChainWatchedUtil::new(),
192 fn watch_tx(&mut self, txid: &Txid, script_pubkey: &Script) {
193 if self.watched.register_tx(txid, script_pubkey) {
194 self.events.push(chain::WatchEvent::WatchTransaction {
196 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone()
201 fn watch_output(&mut self, outpoint: (&Txid, usize), script_pubkey: &Script) {
202 let (txid, index) = outpoint;
203 if self.watched.register_outpoint((*txid, index as u32), script_pubkey) {
204 self.events.push(chain::WatchEvent::WatchOutput {
209 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
214 fn dequeue_events(&mut self) -> Vec<chain::WatchEvent> {
215 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(self.events.len());
216 pending_events.append(&mut self.events);
221 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L>
222 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
223 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
226 /// Delegates to [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`] for each watched channel. Any HTLCs that
227 /// were resolved on chain will be retuned by [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`].
229 /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
230 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_htlc_updates
231 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
232 let mut watch_events = self.watch_events.lock().unwrap();
233 let matched_txn: Vec<_> = txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| watch_events.watched.does_match_tx(tx)).map(|e| *e).collect();
235 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
236 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
237 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, &matched_txn, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
239 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
240 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
241 watch_events.watch_output((txid, idx), &output.script_pubkey);
248 /// Delegates to [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`] for each watched channel.
250 /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
251 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
252 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
253 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
254 monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
259 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
260 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
264 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
265 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
266 pub fn new(broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> Self {
268 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
269 watch_events: Mutex::new(WatchEventQueue::new()),
272 fee_estimator: feeest,
276 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
277 pub fn add_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
278 let mut watch_events = self.watch_events.lock().unwrap();
279 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
280 let entry = match monitors.entry(outpoint) {
281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given outpoint is already present")),
282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
285 let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
287 watch_events.watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
288 watch_events.watch_output((&funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as usize), &funding_txo.1);
289 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
290 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
291 watch_events.watch_output((txid, idx), script);
295 entry.insert(monitor);
299 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
300 pub fn update_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
301 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
302 match monitors.get_mut(&outpoint) {
303 Some(orig_monitor) => {
304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
305 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
307 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
312 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> chain::Watch for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
313 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
314 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
317 type Keys = ChanSigner;
319 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
320 match self.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor) {
322 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
326 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
327 match self.update_monitor(funding_txo, update) {
329 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
333 fn release_pending_htlc_updates(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
334 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
335 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
336 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
338 pending_htlcs_updated
342 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
343 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
344 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
347 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
348 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
349 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
350 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
356 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::WatchEventProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, T, F, L>
357 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
361 fn release_pending_watch_events(&self) -> Vec<chain::WatchEvent> {
362 self.watch_events.lock().unwrap().dequeue_events()
366 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
367 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
368 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
369 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
370 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
371 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
372 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
373 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
374 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
375 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
376 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
377 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
378 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
379 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
380 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
381 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
382 /// accurate block height.
383 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
384 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
385 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
386 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
387 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
388 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
389 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
390 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
391 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
392 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
393 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
394 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
395 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
397 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
398 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
399 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
401 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
402 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
403 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
404 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
406 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
407 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
409 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
410 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
411 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
413 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
414 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
415 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
417 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
418 struct LocalSignedTx {
419 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
421 revocation_key: PublicKey,
422 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
423 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
424 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
425 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
427 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
430 /// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
431 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
433 struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
434 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
435 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
436 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
437 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
440 impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
441 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
442 self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
443 self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
444 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?;
445 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
446 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
447 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
448 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
449 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
456 impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
457 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
458 let remote_commitment_transaction = {
459 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
460 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
461 let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
462 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
463 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
464 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
465 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
466 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
467 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
468 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
469 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
472 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
473 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
476 RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
477 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
478 remote_htlc_base_key,
483 Ok(remote_commitment_transaction)
487 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
488 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
489 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
490 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
491 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
493 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
494 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
495 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
496 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
497 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
499 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
500 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
503 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
504 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
505 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
506 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
507 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
510 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
514 funding_redeemscript: Script,
518 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
519 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
521 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => {
522 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
523 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
524 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
525 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
526 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
527 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
528 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
530 on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
532 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
533 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
534 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
535 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
536 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
537 preimage.write(writer)?;
540 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
541 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
542 preimage.write(writer)?;
543 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
545 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
546 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
547 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
554 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
555 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
556 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
558 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
559 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
560 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
561 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
562 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
563 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
564 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
565 let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
566 InputMaterial::Revoked {
567 per_commitment_point,
568 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
569 remote_htlc_base_key,
578 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
579 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
580 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
581 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
582 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
583 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
584 per_commitment_point,
585 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
586 remote_htlc_base_key,
592 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
593 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
594 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
600 InputMaterial::Funding {
601 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
604 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
610 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
611 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
612 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
613 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
614 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
615 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
616 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
617 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
618 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
619 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
620 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
621 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
622 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
623 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
624 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
625 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
626 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
627 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
628 // and satisfy witness program.
629 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
632 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
633 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
634 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
636 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
637 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
638 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
640 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
643 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
647 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
648 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
650 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
652 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
653 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
654 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
655 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
657 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
658 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
659 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
660 commitment_number: u64,
661 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
664 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
670 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
671 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
673 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
674 /// think we've fallen behind!
675 should_broadcast: bool,
679 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
680 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
682 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
684 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
685 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
686 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
692 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
694 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
695 commitment_number.write(w)?;
696 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
697 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
698 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
700 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
703 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
705 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
707 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
712 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
714 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
720 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
721 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
722 match Readable::read(r)? {
724 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
725 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
727 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
728 let mut res = Vec::new();
730 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
737 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
738 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
739 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
740 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
742 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
743 let mut res = Vec::new();
745 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
752 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
753 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
757 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
758 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
759 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
763 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
764 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
767 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
772 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
773 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
775 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
776 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
778 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
779 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
780 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
781 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
782 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
783 latest_update_id: u64,
784 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
786 destination_script: Script,
787 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
788 remote_payment_script: Script,
789 shutdown_script: Script,
792 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
793 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
794 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
796 remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction,
797 funding_redeemscript: Script,
798 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
799 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
800 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
802 on_local_tx_csv: u16,
804 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
805 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
806 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
807 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
808 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
809 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
810 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
811 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
812 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
813 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
814 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
815 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
816 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
818 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
819 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
820 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
821 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
822 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
823 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
825 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
827 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
828 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
830 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
832 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
834 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
835 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
837 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
838 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
839 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
840 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
842 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
843 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
844 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
845 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
846 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
849 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
851 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
853 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
854 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
855 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
856 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
858 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
859 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
860 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
861 local_tx_signed: bool,
863 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
864 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
865 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
866 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
867 // the full block_connected).
868 pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
869 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
872 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
873 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
874 /// underlying object
875 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
876 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
877 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
878 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
879 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
880 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
881 self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script ||
882 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
883 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
884 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
885 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
886 self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache ||
887 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
888 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
889 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
890 self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv ||
891 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
892 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
893 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
894 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
895 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
896 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
897 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
898 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
899 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
900 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
901 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
902 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
903 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
904 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
905 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
914 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
915 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
917 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
918 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
919 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
920 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
921 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
922 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
923 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
924 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
925 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
926 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
928 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
930 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
931 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
933 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
934 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
935 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
936 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
937 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
938 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
940 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
943 self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?;
944 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
946 self.keys.write(writer)?;
947 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
948 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
949 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
950 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
951 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
953 self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
954 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
955 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
957 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
958 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
960 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
961 match second_option {
962 Some(second_pubkey) => {
963 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
966 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
971 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?;
977 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
979 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
980 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
981 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
982 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
983 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
984 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
985 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
989 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
990 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
991 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
993 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
994 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
995 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
999 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1000 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1001 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1002 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1003 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1004 for script in txouts.iter() {
1005 script.write(writer)?;
1009 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1010 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1011 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1012 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1015 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1016 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1017 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
1018 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1019 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1020 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1021 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1022 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1024 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1025 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1026 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1027 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1028 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1030 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1034 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
1039 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1040 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1041 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1043 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1046 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1048 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1049 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
1051 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1052 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1053 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1056 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1057 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1058 data.write(writer)?;
1061 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1062 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1063 event.write(writer)?;
1066 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1068 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1069 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1070 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1071 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1072 for ev in events.iter() {
1074 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1076 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1077 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1079 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1081 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1087 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1088 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1089 txid.write(writer)?;
1090 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1091 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1092 script.write(writer)?;
1095 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1097 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1098 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1104 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1105 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1106 on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1107 remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1108 on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1109 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1110 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1112 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1113 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1114 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1115 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1116 let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1118 let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1120 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv);
1122 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1123 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1124 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1125 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1126 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1127 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1128 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1129 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1130 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1131 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1132 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1134 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1135 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1136 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1137 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1138 // now but we should consider it later.
1139 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1142 latest_update_id: 0,
1143 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1145 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1146 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1147 remote_payment_script,
1152 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1153 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1156 funding_redeemscript,
1157 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1158 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1162 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1163 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1164 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1165 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1167 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1168 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1169 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1170 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1172 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1173 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1174 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1176 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1177 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1181 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1182 local_tx_signed: false,
1184 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1185 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1189 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1190 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1191 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1192 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1193 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1194 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1197 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1198 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1199 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1200 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1205 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1206 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1207 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1208 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1209 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1211 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1212 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1213 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1217 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1218 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1219 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1224 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1231 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1240 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1241 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1242 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1243 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1244 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1245 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1246 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1247 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1249 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1250 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1253 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1254 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1255 log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1256 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1257 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1258 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1259 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1260 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1261 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1262 Some(old_points) => {
1263 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1264 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1265 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1266 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1267 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1269 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1272 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1276 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1279 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1280 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1281 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1285 self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1288 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1289 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1290 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1291 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1292 /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called.
1293 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1294 if self.local_tx_signed {
1295 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1297 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1298 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1299 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1300 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1302 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1303 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1304 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1305 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1306 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1307 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1308 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1310 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1311 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1312 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1313 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1314 // now but we should consider it later.
1315 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1316 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1318 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1319 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1320 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1324 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1325 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1326 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1327 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1330 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1331 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1334 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1335 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1339 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1340 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
1341 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1343 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1344 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1345 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1347 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1348 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1349 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1350 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1351 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1352 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1353 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1356 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1360 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1363 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1364 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1365 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1368 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1369 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1371 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1373 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1374 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1375 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1377 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1378 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1379 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1380 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1381 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1382 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1383 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1384 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1385 if should_broadcast {
1386 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1388 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1393 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1397 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1399 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1400 self.latest_update_id
1403 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1404 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1408 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1409 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1410 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1411 &self.outputs_to_watch
1414 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1415 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1416 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1417 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1418 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1419 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1420 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1421 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1422 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1428 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1429 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`].
1431 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_htlc_updates
1432 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1433 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1434 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1438 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1441 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1442 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1443 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1444 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1445 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1446 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1450 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1451 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1452 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1455 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1456 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1459 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1460 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1463 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1464 self.current_local_commitment_number
1467 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1468 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1469 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1470 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1471 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1472 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1473 fn check_spend_remote_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1474 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1475 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1476 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1477 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1479 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1480 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1482 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1483 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1486 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1491 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1492 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1493 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1494 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1495 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1496 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1497 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key));
1499 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1500 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1502 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1503 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1504 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1505 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1506 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1510 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1511 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1512 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1513 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1514 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1515 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1516 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1518 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1519 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1524 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1525 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1526 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1527 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1528 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1529 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1531 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1532 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1533 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1534 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1535 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1536 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1537 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1539 let e = entry.get_mut();
1540 e.retain(|ref event| {
1542 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1543 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1548 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1551 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1559 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1560 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1562 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1563 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1565 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1567 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1568 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1569 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1570 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1571 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1572 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1573 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1575 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1576 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1578 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1580 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1581 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1582 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1583 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1584 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1585 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1586 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1587 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1588 // payment_preimage.
1589 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1590 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1591 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1592 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1594 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1595 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1599 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1600 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1602 let e = entry.get_mut();
1603 e.retain(|ref event| {
1605 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1606 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1611 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1614 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1622 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1623 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1625 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1626 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1629 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1630 let revocation_point_option =
1631 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1632 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1633 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1635 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1636 self.remote_payment_script = {
1637 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1638 // script_pubkey version
1639 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1640 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1643 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1644 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1645 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1646 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1647 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1648 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1650 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1651 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1652 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1653 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1654 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1661 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1664 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1665 fn check_spend_remote_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1666 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1667 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1668 return (Vec::new(), None)
1671 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1672 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1675 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1680 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1681 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1682 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1684 log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1685 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv };
1686 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1687 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1690 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1691 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1692 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1694 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1695 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1697 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1698 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1699 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1700 witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
1701 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1702 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1703 Some(preimage.clone())
1705 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1709 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1711 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1715 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1718 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1719 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1720 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1721 fn check_spend_local_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1722 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1723 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1724 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1726 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1727 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1728 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1729 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1731 let e = entry.get_mut();
1732 e.retain(|ref event| {
1734 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1735 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1740 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1743 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1749 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1750 ($updates: expr) => {
1751 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1752 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1753 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1757 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1758 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1760 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1762 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1763 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1764 append_onchain_update!(res);
1765 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1766 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1768 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1769 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1770 append_onchain_update!(res);
1774 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1775 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1776 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1777 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1778 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1779 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1787 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1788 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1789 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1793 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1796 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1797 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1798 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1799 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1800 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1801 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1802 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1803 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1804 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1805 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1806 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1807 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1808 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1809 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1810 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1811 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1812 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1813 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1814 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1815 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1819 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1820 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1825 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1826 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1832 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1833 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1834 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1836 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1837 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1838 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1839 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1840 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1841 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1842 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1843 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1844 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1845 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1849 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1850 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1860 /// Determines if any HTLCs have been resolved on chain in the connected block.
1862 /// TODO: Include how `broadcaster` and `fee_estimator` are used.
1864 /// Returns any transaction outputs from `txn_matched` that spends of should be watched for.
1865 /// After called these are also available via [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1867 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1868 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txn_matched: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1869 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1870 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1873 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1874 let mut output_val = 0;
1875 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1876 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1877 output_val += out.value;
1878 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1882 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1883 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1885 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1886 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1887 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1888 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1889 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1890 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1891 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1893 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1894 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1895 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1896 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1897 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1898 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1900 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1901 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1902 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1903 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1905 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1907 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1910 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1911 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1912 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1913 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1914 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1919 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1920 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1921 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1922 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1924 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1926 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1927 if should_broadcast {
1928 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1930 if should_broadcast {
1931 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1932 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1933 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1934 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1936 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1939 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1942 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1943 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1944 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1945 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1946 payment_preimage: None,
1947 source: htlc_update.0,
1950 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1951 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1952 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1953 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1959 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1961 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1962 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1963 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1969 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1972 /// TODO: Include how `broadcaster` and `fee_estimator` are used.
1973 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1974 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1975 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1978 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1979 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1981 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1983 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1984 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1987 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1989 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1992 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1993 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1994 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1995 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1996 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1997 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1998 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1999 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2000 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2001 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2002 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2003 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2004 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2005 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2006 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2007 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2008 // time out the HTLC first.
2009 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2010 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2011 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2012 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2013 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2014 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2015 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2016 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2017 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2018 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2019 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2020 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2021 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2022 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2023 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2024 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2025 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2026 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2027 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2028 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2029 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2030 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2031 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2032 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2039 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2041 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
2042 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2043 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2046 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2047 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2048 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2055 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2056 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2057 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2058 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2059 let mut payment_data = None;
2060 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2061 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2062 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2063 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2065 macro_rules! log_claim {
2066 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2067 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2068 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2069 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2070 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2071 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2072 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2073 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2074 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2075 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2076 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2077 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2079 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2080 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2081 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2082 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2087 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2088 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2089 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2090 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2091 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2092 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2093 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2094 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2103 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2104 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2105 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2106 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2107 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2108 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2109 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2110 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2111 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2112 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2113 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2114 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2115 } else if !$local_tx {
2116 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2117 if payment_data.is_none() {
2118 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2121 if payment_data.is_none() {
2122 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2123 continue 'outer_loop;
2130 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2131 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2132 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2134 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2135 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2136 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2137 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2140 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2141 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2142 "remote commitment tx", false);
2145 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2146 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2147 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2148 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2149 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2150 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2151 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2152 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2154 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2158 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2159 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2160 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2161 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2163 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2168 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2169 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2171 let e = entry.get_mut();
2172 e.retain(|ref event| {
2174 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2175 return htlc_update.0 != source
2180 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2183 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2191 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2192 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2193 let mut spendable_output = None;
2194 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2195 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2196 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2197 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2198 output: outp.clone(),
2201 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2202 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2203 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2204 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2205 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2206 to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv,
2207 output: outp.clone(),
2208 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2209 remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2213 } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2214 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
2215 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2216 output: outp.clone(),
2217 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2220 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2221 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2222 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2223 output: outp.clone(),
2227 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2228 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2229 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2231 let e = entry.get_mut();
2232 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2235 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2242 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2244 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2245 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2246 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2250 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2255 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2256 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2257 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2258 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2261 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2262 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2264 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2265 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2267 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2268 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2269 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2270 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2273 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2275 let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2276 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2278 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2279 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2280 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2281 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2282 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2283 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2285 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2286 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2287 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2289 let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2290 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2291 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2293 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2294 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2298 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2299 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2300 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2301 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2303 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2308 let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2310 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2312 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2315 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2316 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2317 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2318 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2319 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2321 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2322 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2328 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2329 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2330 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2331 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2332 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2334 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2335 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2337 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2342 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2343 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2344 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2345 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2346 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2347 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2348 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2349 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2350 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2352 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2353 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2357 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2358 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2359 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2360 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2361 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2362 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2363 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2367 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2370 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2371 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2372 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2373 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2374 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2375 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2376 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2378 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2379 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2380 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2381 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2382 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2384 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2385 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2387 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2392 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2399 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2402 Some(read_local_tx!())
2404 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2406 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2408 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2409 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2411 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2412 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2413 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2414 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2415 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2416 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2417 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2421 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2422 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2423 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2424 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2427 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2428 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2429 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2430 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2431 pending_events.push(event);
2435 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2437 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2438 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2439 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2440 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2441 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2442 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2443 for _ in 0..events_len {
2444 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2446 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2447 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2448 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2449 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2453 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2454 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2458 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2462 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2465 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2466 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2467 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2468 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2469 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2470 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2471 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2472 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2474 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2475 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2478 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2480 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2481 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2483 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2485 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2488 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2489 remote_payment_script,
2494 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2495 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2498 funding_redeemscript,
2499 channel_value_satoshis,
2500 their_cur_revocation_points,
2505 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2506 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2507 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2509 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2510 current_local_commitment_tx,
2511 current_remote_commitment_number,
2512 current_local_commitment_number,
2515 pending_htlcs_updated,
2518 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2523 lockdown_from_offchain,
2527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2534 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2535 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2536 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2537 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2538 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2539 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2540 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2541 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2542 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2544 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2545 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2546 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2547 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2549 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2550 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2551 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2552 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2554 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2557 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2558 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2559 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2561 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2562 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2564 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2567 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2568 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2569 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2573 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2574 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2576 let mut res = Vec::new();
2577 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2578 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2582 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2583 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2590 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2591 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2593 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2594 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2600 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2601 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2602 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2603 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2608 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2610 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2611 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2612 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2613 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2614 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2620 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2622 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2623 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2624 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2625 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2626 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2627 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2629 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2630 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2631 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2632 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2633 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2634 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2635 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2638 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2639 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2640 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2641 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2642 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2643 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2644 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2646 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2647 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2648 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2649 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2650 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2651 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2653 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2654 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2655 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2656 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2657 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2658 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2659 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2660 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2662 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2663 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2664 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2665 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2666 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2667 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2671 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2672 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2673 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2675 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2676 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2677 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2678 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2680 macro_rules! sign_input {
2681 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2682 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2683 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2685 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2686 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2687 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2689 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2690 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2691 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2692 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2693 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2694 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2695 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2696 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2697 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2698 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2699 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2700 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2702 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2704 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2705 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2706 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2707 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2711 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2712 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2714 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2715 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2717 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2718 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2722 script_sig: Script::new(),
2723 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2724 witness: Vec::new(),
2727 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2728 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2731 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2732 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2733 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2734 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2735 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2737 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2739 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2740 claim_tx.input.clear();
2741 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2743 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2744 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2748 script_sig: Script::new(),
2749 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2750 witness: Vec::new(),
2753 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2754 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2755 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2756 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2757 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2759 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2761 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2762 claim_tx.input.clear();
2763 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2764 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2765 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2769 script_sig: Script::new(),
2770 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2771 witness: Vec::new(),
2773 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2774 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2775 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2776 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2777 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2779 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2782 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.