1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
49 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
50 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
53 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
54 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
55 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
56 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
57 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
59 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
60 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
61 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
65 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
67 self.update_id.write(w)?;
68 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
69 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
70 update_step.write(w)?;
75 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
77 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
79 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
81 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
83 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
87 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
89 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
90 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
91 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
93 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
94 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
95 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
96 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
98 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
99 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
100 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
102 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
103 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
104 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
105 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
106 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
107 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
110 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
111 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
114 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
115 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
116 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
117 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
121 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
122 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
123 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
125 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
126 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
127 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
129 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
133 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
134 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
135 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
136 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
137 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
139 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
141 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
142 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
143 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
144 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
145 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
147 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
149 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
151 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
152 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
153 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
156 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
157 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
158 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
159 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
161 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
162 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
163 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
164 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
165 /// all registered listeners in one go.
166 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
167 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
169 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
170 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
171 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
173 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
174 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
175 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
177 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
178 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
179 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
181 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
183 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
184 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
185 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
187 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
188 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
189 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
191 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
192 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
193 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
195 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
196 /// with success or failure.
198 /// You should probably just call through to
199 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
201 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
204 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
205 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
207 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
209 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
210 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
211 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
213 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
214 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
215 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface {
216 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
217 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
219 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
220 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
224 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
227 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
228 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
230 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
231 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
232 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
234 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
235 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
236 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
237 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
238 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
239 outputs: spendable_outputs,
243 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
244 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
245 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
250 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
251 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
254 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
255 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
256 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
257 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
258 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
263 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
264 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
266 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
267 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
268 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T> {
269 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
270 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
273 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
275 fee_estimator: feeest,
281 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
282 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
283 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
284 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
285 Some(orig_monitor) => {
286 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
287 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
291 match monitor.key_storage {
292 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
295 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
297 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
298 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
299 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
300 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
304 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
305 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
308 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
309 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
310 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
313 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
317 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
318 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
319 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
320 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
321 Some(orig_monitor) => {
322 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor.key_storage));
323 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update)
325 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
330 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T>
331 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
333 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
334 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
336 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
340 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
341 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
343 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
347 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
348 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
349 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
350 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
352 pending_htlcs_updated
356 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
357 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
359 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
360 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
361 let mut ret = Vec::new();
362 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
367 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
368 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
369 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
370 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
371 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
372 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
373 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
374 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
375 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
376 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
377 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
378 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
379 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
380 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
381 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
382 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
383 /// accurate block height.
384 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
385 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
386 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
387 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
388 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
389 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
390 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
391 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
392 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
393 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
394 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
397 enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
400 funding_key: SecretKey,
401 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
402 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
403 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
404 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
405 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
406 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
407 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
408 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
411 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
412 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
416 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
417 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
418 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
420 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
423 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
424 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
427 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
428 let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
430 Storage::Local { .. } => false,
431 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
432 revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
439 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
440 struct LocalSignedTx {
441 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
443 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
444 revocation_key: PublicKey,
445 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
446 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
447 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
448 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
450 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
454 enum InputDescriptors {
459 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
462 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
463 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
464 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
465 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
469 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
477 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
483 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
484 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
489 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
490 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
492 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
493 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
494 script.write(writer)?;
495 pubkey.write(writer)?;
496 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
498 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
500 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
502 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
504 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
505 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
506 script.write(writer)?;
508 preimage.write(writer)?;
509 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
510 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
512 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
513 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
514 script.write(writer)?;
515 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
516 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
517 preimage.write(writer)?;
518 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
525 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
526 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
527 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
529 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
530 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
531 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
532 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
535 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
537 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
538 InputMaterial::Revoked {
547 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
548 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
549 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
550 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
551 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
552 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
561 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
562 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
563 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
564 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
565 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
566 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
568 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
573 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
579 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
580 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
581 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
583 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
584 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
586 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
588 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
589 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
590 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
592 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
594 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
595 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
596 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
597 ContentiousOutpoint {
598 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
599 input_material: InputMaterial,
603 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
604 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
605 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
606 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
607 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
609 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
610 feerate_previous: u64,
611 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
612 // a priority of not feerate
613 soonest_timelock: u32,
614 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
615 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
618 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
619 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
620 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
621 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
622 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
623 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
624 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
626 tx_material.write(writer)?;
632 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
633 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
634 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
635 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
636 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
637 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
638 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
639 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
640 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
641 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
642 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
644 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
648 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
649 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
651 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
653 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
654 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
655 // TODO: We really need to not be generating a fully-signed transaction in Channel and
656 // passing it here, we need to hold off so that the ChanSigner can enforce a
657 // only-sign-local-state-for-broadcast once invariant:
658 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
659 local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys,
661 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
663 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
664 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
665 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
666 commitment_number: u64,
667 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
670 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
676 /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should
677 /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state.
678 RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
679 their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
683 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
684 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
686 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref local_keys, ref feerate_per_kw, ref htlc_outputs } => {
688 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
689 local_keys.write(w)?;
690 feerate_per_kw.write(w)?;
691 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
692 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
698 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
700 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
701 commitment_number.write(w)?;
702 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
703 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
704 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
707 &None => 0u8.write(w)?,
715 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
717 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
719 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
724 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => {
726 their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
732 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
733 fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
734 match Readable::read(r)? {
736 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
737 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
738 local_keys: Readable::read(r)?,
739 feerate_per_kw: Readable::read(r)?,
741 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
742 let mut res = Vec::new();
744 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
751 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
752 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
753 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
754 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
756 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
757 let mut res = Vec::new();
759 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
766 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
767 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
771 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
772 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
773 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
777 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
778 their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
781 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
786 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
787 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
789 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
790 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
792 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
793 latest_update_id: u64,
794 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
796 key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
797 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
798 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
799 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
800 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
801 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
802 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
804 our_to_self_delay: u16,
805 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
807 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
808 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
809 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
810 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
811 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
812 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
813 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
814 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
815 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
816 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
817 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
818 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
819 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
821 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
822 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
823 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
824 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
825 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
826 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
828 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
830 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
832 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
834 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
836 destination_script: Script,
837 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
838 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
839 // scan every commitment transaction for that
840 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
842 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
843 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
844 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
845 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
846 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
847 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
848 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
849 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
850 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
851 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
852 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
853 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
854 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
856 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
858 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
859 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
860 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
861 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
862 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
863 // block with output gets disconnected.
864 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
865 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
867 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
869 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
870 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
871 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
872 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
874 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
875 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
876 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
877 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
878 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
880 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
881 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
882 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
883 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
884 // the full block_connected).
885 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
886 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
889 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
890 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
892 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
893 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
895 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
896 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
898 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
899 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
901 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
905 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
911 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
924 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
925 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
926 /// underlying object
927 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
928 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
929 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
930 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
931 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
932 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
933 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
934 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
935 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
936 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
937 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
938 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
939 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
940 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
941 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
942 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
943 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
944 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
945 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
946 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
947 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
948 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
949 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
950 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
951 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
952 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
953 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
962 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
963 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
964 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
965 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
966 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
967 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
968 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
970 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
972 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
973 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
975 macro_rules! write_option {
982 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
987 match self.key_storage {
988 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
989 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
991 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
993 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
994 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
995 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
996 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
998 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
999 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
1000 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
1001 script.write(writer)?;
1004 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1007 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1008 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1010 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1013 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1014 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1015 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
1016 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
1018 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1019 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1020 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1021 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1022 match second_option {
1023 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1024 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1027 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1032 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1036 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1037 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1039 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1041 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1042 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1043 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1044 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1045 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1046 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1047 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1051 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1052 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1053 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1054 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1055 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1056 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1057 write_option!(htlc_source);
1061 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1062 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1063 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1064 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1065 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1066 for script in txouts.iter() {
1067 script.write(writer)?;
1071 if for_local_storage {
1072 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1073 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1074 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1075 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1078 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1081 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1082 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1083 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
1084 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1085 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1086 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1087 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1088 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1090 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1091 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1092 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1093 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1094 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1096 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1100 write_option!(htlc_source);
1105 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1106 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1107 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1109 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1112 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1113 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1114 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1116 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1119 if for_local_storage {
1120 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1122 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1125 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1126 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1127 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1130 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1131 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1132 data.write(writer)?;
1135 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1136 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1137 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1138 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1139 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1140 local_key.write(writer)?;
1142 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1145 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
1146 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
1147 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
1148 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
1151 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1152 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1153 outp.write(writer)?;
1154 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
1155 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
1158 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1159 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1160 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1161 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1162 for ev in events.iter() {
1164 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
1165 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1166 claim_request.write(writer)?;
1168 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1169 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1170 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1171 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1173 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
1174 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1175 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1176 input_material.write(writer)?;
1182 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1183 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1184 txid.write(writer)?;
1185 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1186 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1187 script.write(writer)?;
1194 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1196 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1197 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1198 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1199 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1200 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1201 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1202 self.write(writer, true)
1205 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1207 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1208 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1209 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1210 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1211 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1212 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1213 self.write(writer, false)
1217 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1218 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1220 latest_update_id: 0,
1221 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
1223 key_storage: Storage::Local {
1225 funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
1226 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
1227 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
1228 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1229 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
1230 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
1232 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1233 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1235 their_htlc_base_key: None,
1236 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
1237 funding_redeemscript: None,
1238 channel_value_satoshis: None,
1239 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1241 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
1242 their_to_self_delay: None,
1244 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1245 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1246 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1247 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1249 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1250 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1251 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1253 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1254 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1256 destination_script: destination_script,
1257 to_remote_rescue: None,
1259 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
1261 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1263 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1264 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1266 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1267 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1272 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
1273 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
1275 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
1276 tx_weight += match inp {
1277 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1278 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
1279 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
1281 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1282 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1283 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
1285 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
1286 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1287 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
1289 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1290 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
1291 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
1293 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
1294 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
1295 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
1302 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
1303 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
1304 return current_height + 1
1305 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
1306 return current_height + 3
1311 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1312 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1313 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1314 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1315 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1316 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1319 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1320 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1321 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
1322 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1323 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1324 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1330 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1331 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
1332 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1333 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1334 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1336 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1337 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1338 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1342 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1343 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1344 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1349 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1356 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1365 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1366 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1367 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1368 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1369 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1370 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1371 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1372 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1374 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1375 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1378 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1379 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1380 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1381 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1382 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1383 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1385 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1386 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1387 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1388 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1389 Some(old_points) => {
1390 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1391 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1392 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1393 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1394 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1396 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1399 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1403 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1408 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1409 match self.key_storage {
1410 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
1411 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1412 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1413 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1415 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1416 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1420 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1424 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1425 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1426 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1427 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1428 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1429 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1430 if self.their_to_self_delay.is_none() {
1431 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Got a local commitment tx info update before we'd set basic information about the channel"));
1433 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
1434 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
1435 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
1437 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
1438 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1439 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1440 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1441 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1448 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1449 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1450 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1451 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1454 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1455 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1456 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1458 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } =>
1459 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?,
1460 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1461 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1462 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1463 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1464 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1465 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1466 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1467 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1470 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1474 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1477 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1478 pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1479 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1480 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1482 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1484 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } =>
1485 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?,
1486 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1487 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1488 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1489 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1490 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1491 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1492 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1493 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1496 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1500 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
1501 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
1502 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
1503 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1504 match self.key_storage {
1505 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1506 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1507 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1508 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1509 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1510 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1511 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1512 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1513 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1516 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1519 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1520 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1523 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1527 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1528 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1529 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1530 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1532 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1533 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1534 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1535 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1536 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1537 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1541 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1542 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1543 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1544 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1545 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1546 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1548 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1549 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1551 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1552 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1554 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1555 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1558 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1562 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1563 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1564 /// avoid this on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it provides slightly better
1566 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1567 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1568 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1569 match self.key_storage {
1570 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1571 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1573 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1574 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1579 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1580 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1581 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1582 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1583 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1584 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1585 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1586 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1587 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1588 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1591 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1593 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1594 self.latest_update_id
1597 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1598 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1599 match self.key_storage {
1600 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1601 match funding_info {
1602 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1606 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1612 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1613 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1614 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1615 &self.outputs_to_watch
1618 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1619 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1620 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1621 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1622 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1623 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1624 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1625 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1626 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1632 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1633 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1634 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1635 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1636 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1640 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1641 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1642 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1645 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1646 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1649 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1650 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1653 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1654 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1655 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1656 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1659 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1660 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1661 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1662 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1663 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1664 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1665 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1666 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1667 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1668 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1669 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1670 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1672 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1673 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1675 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1676 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1679 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1684 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1685 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1686 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1687 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1688 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1689 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1690 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1691 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1692 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
1693 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1695 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1696 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1697 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1698 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1702 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1703 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1704 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1705 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1708 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1709 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1711 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1712 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1713 // script_pubkey version.
1714 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1715 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1718 let mut total_value = 0;
1719 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1720 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1721 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1723 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1724 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1726 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1727 txid: commitment_txid,
1730 script_sig: Script::new(),
1731 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1732 witness: Vec::new(),
1734 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1735 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1736 total_value += outp.value;
1737 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1738 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1739 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1740 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1741 output: outp.clone(),
1746 macro_rules! sign_input {
1747 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1749 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1750 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1751 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1752 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1753 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1755 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1756 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1757 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1759 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1763 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1764 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1765 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1766 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1768 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1770 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1771 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1776 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1777 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1779 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1780 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1781 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1782 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1783 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1784 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1785 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1788 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1789 txid: commitment_txid,
1790 vout: transaction_output_index,
1792 script_sig: Script::new(),
1793 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1794 witness: Vec::new(),
1796 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1798 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1799 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1800 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1802 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1806 output: vec!(TxOut {
1807 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1808 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1811 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1812 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1813 let mut used_feerate;
1814 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1815 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1816 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1817 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1818 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1819 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1820 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1821 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1825 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1829 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1836 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1837 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1838 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1839 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1840 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1842 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1843 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1844 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1845 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1846 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1847 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1848 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1850 let e = entry.get_mut();
1851 e.retain(|ref event| {
1853 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1854 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1859 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1862 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1870 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1871 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1872 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1874 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1875 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1878 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1880 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1882 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1883 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1886 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1893 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1895 let mut used_feerate;
1896 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1897 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1900 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1902 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1903 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1904 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1905 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1906 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1909 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1910 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1911 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1912 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1913 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1914 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1915 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1920 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1925 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1927 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1928 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1929 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1931 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1932 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1933 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1934 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1935 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1936 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1937 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1938 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1940 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1941 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1943 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1945 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1946 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1947 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1948 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1949 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1950 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1951 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1952 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1953 // payment_preimage.
1954 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1955 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1956 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1957 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1959 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1960 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1964 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1965 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1967 let e = entry.get_mut();
1968 e.retain(|ref event| {
1970 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1971 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1976 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1979 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1987 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1988 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1989 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1991 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1992 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1996 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1997 let revocation_point_option =
1998 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1999 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
2000 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
2002 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
2003 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
2004 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
2005 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
2006 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
2008 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
2009 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
2010 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
2013 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
2014 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
2015 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
2018 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2019 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2020 match self.key_storage {
2021 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
2022 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
2023 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2024 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
2026 output: outp.clone(),
2030 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
2032 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
2036 let mut total_value = 0;
2037 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2038 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
2039 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
2041 macro_rules! sign_input {
2042 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
2044 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
2045 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
2046 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
2047 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
2048 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
2049 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
2050 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
2052 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2056 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2057 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2058 $input.witness.push($preimage);
2059 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2060 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
2065 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2066 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2067 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
2068 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2069 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
2070 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
2071 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2073 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2076 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2077 txid: commitment_txid,
2078 vout: transaction_output_index,
2080 script_sig: Script::new(),
2081 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
2082 witness: Vec::new(),
2084 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
2086 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
2087 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
2088 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
2090 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
2094 output: vec!(TxOut {
2095 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2096 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2099 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
2100 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2101 let mut used_feerate;
2102 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2103 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
2104 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
2105 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
2106 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2107 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2108 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
2110 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2111 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2112 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
2113 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
2117 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
2118 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
2121 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
2127 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
2128 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
2130 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2131 txid: commitment_txid,
2132 vout: transaction_output_index,
2134 script_sig: Script::new(),
2135 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
2136 witness: Vec::new(),
2138 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
2140 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2142 output: vec!(TxOut {
2143 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2144 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2147 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
2148 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2149 let mut used_feerate;
2150 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2151 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
2152 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
2153 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
2154 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
2155 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2156 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2157 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
2158 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
2162 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
2163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
2167 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
2172 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
2174 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2175 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2178 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2185 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
2187 let mut used_feerate;
2188 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2189 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
2192 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2194 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
2195 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
2196 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
2197 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
2198 soonest_timelock = info.2;
2201 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
2202 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
2203 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
2204 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
2205 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2206 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
2207 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
2208 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
2212 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
2213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
2216 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2217 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2218 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2219 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
2221 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
2224 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
2225 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2226 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
2227 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2228 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
2229 key: local_key.clone(),
2230 output: outp.clone(),
2236 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
2239 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2240 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
2241 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
2242 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
2246 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2247 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2250 Err(_) => return (None, None)
2255 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2256 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2257 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2258 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2259 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
2260 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
2262 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2263 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2266 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2267 None => return (None, None),
2268 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2270 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2271 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2272 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2274 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2277 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2279 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2283 script_sig: Script::new(),
2284 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2285 witness: Vec::new(),
2287 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2290 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2291 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2292 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2296 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2302 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2303 let mut used_feerate;
2304 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2305 return (None, None);
2308 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2310 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2311 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2312 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2313 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2314 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2316 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2320 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2321 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2322 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2323 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2325 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2326 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2327 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2328 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
2329 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2330 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2331 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2332 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2336 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2340 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2341 } else { (None, None) }
2344 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2345 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2346 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2347 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2348 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2350 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2351 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2352 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2353 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2354 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2355 key: local_delayedkey,
2356 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2357 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2358 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2364 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2365 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2366 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2367 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2368 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2373 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2374 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2375 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2376 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2378 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2379 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2380 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2381 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2386 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2387 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2388 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2389 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2390 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2391 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2392 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2393 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2395 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2396 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2397 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2398 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2399 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2404 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2405 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2406 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2407 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2408 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2409 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2410 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2411 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2414 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2415 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2420 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2423 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2424 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2425 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2426 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2427 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2428 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2429 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2430 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2432 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2433 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2434 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2435 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2437 let e = entry.get_mut();
2438 e.retain(|ref event| {
2440 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2441 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2446 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2449 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2455 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2456 ($updates: expr) => {
2457 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2458 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2459 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2460 for claim in $updates.3 {
2461 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2469 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2470 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2472 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2473 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2474 match self.key_storage {
2475 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2476 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2482 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2483 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2485 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2486 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2487 match self.key_storage {
2488 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2489 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2490 append_onchain_update!(res);
2492 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2496 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2497 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2498 match self.key_storage {
2499 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2500 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2506 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2507 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2509 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2510 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2511 match self.key_storage {
2512 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2513 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2514 append_onchain_update!(res);
2516 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2521 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2522 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2523 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2524 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2525 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2526 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2534 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2535 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2537 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2538 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2542 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2545 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2546 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2547 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2548 match self.key_storage {
2549 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2550 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2551 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2552 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2553 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2554 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2555 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2556 output: output.clone(),
2561 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2562 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2563 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2570 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2571 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2572 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2573 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2574 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2575 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2576 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2577 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2578 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2579 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2580 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2581 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2582 match self.key_storage {
2583 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2584 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2589 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2590 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2591 match self.key_storage {
2592 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2593 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2594 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2595 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2597 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2605 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
2606 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
2607 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
2608 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
2610 fn block_connected<B: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>)
2611 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2613 for tx in txn_matched {
2614 let mut output_val = 0;
2615 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2616 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2617 output_val += out.value;
2618 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2622 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2623 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2624 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2625 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2626 for tx in txn_matched {
2627 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2628 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2629 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2630 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2632 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2633 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2634 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2635 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2636 funding_info.clone()
2638 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2642 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2643 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2644 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2646 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2647 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2648 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2651 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2652 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2654 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2655 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2659 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2660 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2661 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2665 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2666 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2667 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2670 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2671 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2675 for tx in txn.iter() {
2676 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2677 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2680 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2681 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2682 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2683 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2685 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2686 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2687 for inp in &tx.input {
2688 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2689 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2690 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2691 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2692 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2694 let mut set_equality = true;
2695 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2696 set_equality = false;
2698 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2699 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2700 set_equality = false;
2705 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2707 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2708 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2710 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2711 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2715 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2721 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2722 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2723 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2725 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2726 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2727 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2728 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2729 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2731 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2732 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2733 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2736 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2737 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2739 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2741 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2745 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2746 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2747 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2749 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2750 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2754 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2759 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2760 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2762 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2763 if should_broadcast {
2764 match self.key_storage {
2765 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2766 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2772 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2773 if should_broadcast {
2774 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2775 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2776 match self.key_storage {
2777 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2778 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2779 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2780 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2781 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2784 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2785 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2788 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2792 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2795 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2796 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2797 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2798 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2799 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2800 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2804 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2805 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2806 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2807 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2808 payment_preimage: None,
2809 source: htlc_update.0,
2812 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2813 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2818 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2819 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2820 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2823 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2824 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2825 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2826 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2827 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2828 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2830 } else { unreachable!(); }
2832 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2833 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2834 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2835 } else { unreachable!(); }
2838 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2839 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
2840 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
2842 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
2845 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)
2846 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2848 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2849 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2850 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2852 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2853 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2854 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2857 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2858 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2859 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2860 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2861 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2862 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2863 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2871 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2872 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2873 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2874 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2875 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2878 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2879 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2881 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2882 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2883 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2884 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2886 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2889 for req in remove_request {
2890 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2892 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2895 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2896 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2897 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2898 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2899 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2900 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2901 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2902 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2903 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2904 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2905 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2906 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2907 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2908 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2909 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2910 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2911 // time out the HTLC first.
2912 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2913 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2914 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2915 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2916 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2917 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2918 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2919 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2920 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2921 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2922 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2923 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2924 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2925 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2926 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2927 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2928 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2929 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2930 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2931 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2932 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2933 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2934 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2935 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2942 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2943 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2946 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2947 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2948 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2949 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2952 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2953 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2954 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2962 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2963 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2964 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2965 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2966 let mut payment_data = None;
2967 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2968 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2969 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2970 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2972 macro_rules! log_claim {
2973 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2974 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2975 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2976 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2977 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2978 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2979 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2980 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2981 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2982 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2983 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2984 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2986 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2987 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2988 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2989 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2994 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2995 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2996 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2997 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2998 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2999 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3000 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3001 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
3010 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3011 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
3012 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3013 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3014 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3015 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
3016 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3017 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
3018 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3019 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3020 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3021 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
3022 } else if !$local_tx {
3023 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
3024 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3026 if payment_data.is_none() {
3027 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
3028 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3032 if payment_data.is_none() {
3033 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
3034 continue 'outer_loop;
3041 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
3042 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3043 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3044 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
3047 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
3048 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3049 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3050 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
3053 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3054 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3055 "remote commitment tx", false);
3058 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3059 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3060 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
3061 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3062 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3063 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
3064 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
3066 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3069 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3070 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
3071 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
3073 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3077 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3078 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
3079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3080 let e = entry.get_mut();
3081 e.retain(|ref event| {
3083 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
3084 return htlc_update.0 != source
3089 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
3091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3092 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
3100 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
3101 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
3102 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
3103 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
3104 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
3105 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
3107 previous_output: *outp,
3108 script_sig: Script::new(),
3109 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3110 witness: Vec::new(),
3113 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
3117 output: vec![TxOut {
3118 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
3123 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
3124 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
3126 let mut used_feerate;
3127 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
3128 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
3129 let mut value = $amount;
3130 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
3131 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
3134 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
3137 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
3139 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
3141 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
3147 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
3148 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
3149 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
3150 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
3151 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
3152 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
3153 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
3157 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
3162 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
3163 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
3165 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
3166 match per_outp_material {
3167 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
3168 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
3171 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
3172 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
3175 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
3179 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
3181 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
3182 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
3184 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
3186 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
3188 new_feerate = feerate;
3192 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
3194 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
3195 match per_outp_material {
3196 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
3197 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
3198 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
3199 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
3200 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3201 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3203 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
3205 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
3207 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
3208 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
3210 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
3211 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
3212 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
3213 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
3214 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
3215 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3216 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3217 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
3218 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
3220 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
3222 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
3223 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
3225 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
3226 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
3227 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
3228 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
3233 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
3234 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
3238 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3240 impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
3241 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3242 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3243 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3247 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3252 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3253 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3254 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3255 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3258 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3259 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3261 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3263 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3264 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3265 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3266 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3268 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3269 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3271 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3272 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3273 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3274 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3276 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
3277 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3278 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3282 revocation_base_key,
3284 delayed_payment_base_key,
3288 current_remote_commitment_txid,
3289 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
3292 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3295 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3296 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3297 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3298 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3300 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3301 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3305 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3306 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3307 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3308 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3310 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3315 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3316 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3318 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3320 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3323 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3324 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3325 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3326 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3327 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3329 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3330 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3336 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3337 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3338 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3339 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3340 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3341 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3342 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3343 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3345 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3346 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3350 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3351 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3352 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3353 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3354 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3355 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3356 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3357 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3358 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3360 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3361 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3365 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3366 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3367 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3368 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3369 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3370 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3371 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3375 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3378 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3379 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3380 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3381 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3382 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3383 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3384 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3386 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3387 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3388 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3389 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3390 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3392 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3393 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3395 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3400 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3407 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3410 Some(read_local_tx!())
3412 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3415 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3418 Some(read_local_tx!())
3420 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3423 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3425 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3426 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3427 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3428 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3429 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3430 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3435 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3436 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
3437 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
3438 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3441 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3442 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3443 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3446 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3447 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3448 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3450 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3453 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3454 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3455 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3456 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3459 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3460 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3461 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3462 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3463 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3464 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3465 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3468 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3469 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3470 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3471 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3472 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3473 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3474 for _ in 0..events_len {
3475 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3477 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3478 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3483 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3484 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3485 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3486 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3490 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3491 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3492 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3497 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3501 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3504 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3505 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3506 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3507 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3508 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3509 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
3510 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3511 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3513 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3514 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3518 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3520 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3523 their_htlc_base_key,
3524 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3525 funding_redeemscript,
3526 channel_value_satoshis,
3527 their_cur_revocation_points,
3530 their_to_self_delay,
3533 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3534 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3535 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3537 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3538 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3539 current_remote_commitment_number,
3542 pending_htlcs_updated,
3547 pending_claim_requests,
3549 claimable_outpoints,
3551 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3564 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3565 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3566 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3567 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3568 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3569 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3570 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3571 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3572 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3574 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3575 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3577 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3578 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3579 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3580 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3581 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3583 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
3586 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3588 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3590 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3591 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3595 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3596 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3597 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3598 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3599 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3600 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3605 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3607 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3609 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3611 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3612 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3613 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3614 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3618 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3619 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3621 let mut res = Vec::new();
3622 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3623 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3627 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3628 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3635 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3636 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3638 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3639 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3645 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3646 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3647 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3648 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3653 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3655 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3656 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3657 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3658 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3659 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3664 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3666 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3667 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3669 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3670 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3671 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3672 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3673 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3674 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3675 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3678 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3679 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3680 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3681 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3682 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3683 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3684 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3686 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3687 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3688 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3689 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3690 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3691 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3693 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3694 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3695 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3696 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3697 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3698 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3699 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3700 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3702 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3703 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3704 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3705 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3706 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3707 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3711 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3712 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3713 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3715 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3716 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3717 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3718 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3720 macro_rules! sign_input {
3721 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3722 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3723 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3725 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3726 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3727 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3729 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3730 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3731 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3732 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3733 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3734 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3735 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3736 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3737 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3738 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3739 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3740 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3742 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3744 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3745 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3746 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3747 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3751 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3752 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3754 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3755 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3757 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3758 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3762 script_sig: Script::new(),
3763 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3764 witness: Vec::new(),
3767 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3768 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3771 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3772 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3773 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3774 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3775 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3777 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3779 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3780 claim_tx.input.clear();
3781 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3783 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3784 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3788 script_sig: Script::new(),
3789 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3790 witness: Vec::new(),
3793 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3794 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3795 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3796 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3797 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3799 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3801 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3802 claim_tx.input.clear();
3803 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3804 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3805 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3809 script_sig: Script::new(),
3810 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3811 witness: Vec::new(),
3813 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3814 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3815 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3816 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3817 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3819 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3822 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.