1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
22 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
27 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
28 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
33 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
34 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
35 use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
49 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
50 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
53 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
54 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
55 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
56 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
57 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
59 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
60 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
61 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
65 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
67 self.update_id.write(w)?;
68 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
69 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
70 update_step.write(w)?;
75 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
77 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
79 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
81 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
83 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
87 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
89 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
90 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
91 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
93 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
94 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
95 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
96 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
98 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
99 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
100 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
102 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
103 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
104 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
105 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
106 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
107 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
110 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
111 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
114 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
115 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
116 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
117 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
121 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
122 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
123 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
125 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
126 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
127 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
128 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
130 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
135 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
136 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
137 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
139 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
141 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
143 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
144 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
147 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
148 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
149 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
151 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
153 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
154 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
155 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
158 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
159 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
160 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
161 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
162 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
163 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
165 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
166 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
167 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
168 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
170 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
171 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
172 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
173 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
174 /// all registered listeners in one go.
175 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
176 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
178 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
179 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
180 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
182 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
183 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
184 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
186 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
187 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
188 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
190 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
192 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
193 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
194 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
196 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
197 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
198 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
200 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
201 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
202 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
204 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
205 /// with success or failure.
207 /// You should probably just call through to
208 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
210 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
213 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
214 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
216 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
218 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
219 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
220 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
222 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
223 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
224 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref>
225 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
226 F::Target: FeeEstimator
228 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
229 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
231 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
232 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
238 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
239 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
240 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
241 F::Target: FeeEstimator
243 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
244 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
246 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
247 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
248 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
250 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
251 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
252 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
259 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
260 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
261 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
262 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
263 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
268 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
269 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
270 F::Target: FeeEstimator
272 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
273 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
274 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F> {
275 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
276 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
280 fee_estimator: feeest,
286 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
287 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
288 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
289 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
293 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
294 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1);
295 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1);
296 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
297 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
298 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
301 entry.insert(monitor);
305 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
306 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
307 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
308 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
309 Some(orig_monitor) => {
310 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
311 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster)
313 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
318 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F>
319 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
320 F::Target: FeeEstimator
322 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
323 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
325 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
329 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
330 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
332 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
336 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
337 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
338 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
339 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
341 pending_htlcs_updated
345 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
346 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
347 F::Target: FeeEstimator
349 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
350 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
351 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
352 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
358 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
359 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
360 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
361 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
362 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
363 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
364 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
365 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
366 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
367 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
368 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
369 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
370 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
371 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
372 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
373 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
374 /// accurate block height.
375 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
376 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
377 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
378 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
379 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
380 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
381 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
382 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
383 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
384 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
385 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
386 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
387 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
389 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
390 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
391 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
393 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
394 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
395 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
396 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
398 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
399 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
401 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
402 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
403 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
405 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
406 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
407 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
409 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
410 struct LocalSignedTx {
411 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
413 revocation_key: PublicKey,
414 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
415 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
416 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
417 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
419 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
422 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
423 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
424 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
425 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
426 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
428 witness_script: Script,
429 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
435 witness_script: Script,
437 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
442 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
448 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
449 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
451 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
452 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
453 witness_script.write(writer)?;
454 pubkey.write(writer)?;
455 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
456 is_htlc.write(writer)?;
457 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
459 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
460 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
461 witness_script.write(writer)?;
463 preimage.write(writer)?;
464 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
465 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
467 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
468 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
469 preimage.write(writer)?;
470 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
472 &InputMaterial::Funding {} => {
473 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
480 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
481 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
482 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
484 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
485 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
486 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
487 let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
488 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
489 InputMaterial::Revoked {
498 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
499 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
500 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
501 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
502 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
503 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
512 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
513 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
514 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
520 InputMaterial::Funding {}
522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
528 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
529 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
530 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
531 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
532 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
533 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
534 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
535 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
536 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
537 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
538 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
539 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
540 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
541 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
542 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
543 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
544 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
545 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
546 // and satisfy witness program.
547 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
550 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
551 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
552 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
554 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
555 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
556 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
558 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
561 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
565 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
566 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
568 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
570 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
571 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
572 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
573 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
575 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
576 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
577 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
578 commitment_number: u64,
579 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
582 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
588 /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should
589 /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state.
590 RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
591 their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
593 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
594 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
596 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
597 /// think we've fallen behind!
598 should_broadcast: bool,
602 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
603 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
605 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
607 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
608 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
609 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
615 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
617 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
618 commitment_number.write(w)?;
619 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
620 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
621 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
623 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
626 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
628 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
630 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
635 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => {
637 their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
639 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
641 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
647 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
648 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
649 match Readable::read(r)? {
651 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
652 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
654 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
655 let mut res = Vec::new();
657 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
664 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
665 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
666 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
667 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
669 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
670 let mut res = Vec::new();
672 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
679 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
680 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
684 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
685 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
686 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
690 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
691 their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
695 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
696 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
699 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
704 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
705 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
707 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
708 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
710 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
711 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
712 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
713 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
714 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
715 latest_update_id: u64,
716 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
718 destination_script: Script,
719 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>,
720 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
721 shutdown_script: Script,
724 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
725 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
726 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
728 their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
729 their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
730 funding_redeemscript: Script,
731 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
732 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
733 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
735 our_to_self_delay: u16,
736 their_to_self_delay: u16,
738 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
739 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
740 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
741 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
742 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
743 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
744 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
745 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
746 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
747 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
748 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
749 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
750 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
752 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
753 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
754 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
755 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
756 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
757 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
759 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
761 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
762 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
764 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
766 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
768 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
769 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
771 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
772 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
773 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
774 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
776 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
777 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
778 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
779 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
780 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
783 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
785 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
787 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
788 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
789 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
790 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
792 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
793 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
794 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
795 local_tx_signed: bool,
797 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
798 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
799 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
800 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
801 // the full block_connected).
802 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
803 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
807 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
808 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
809 /// underlying object
810 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
811 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
812 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
813 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
814 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
815 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
816 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script != other.broadcasted_remote_payment_script ||
817 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
818 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
819 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
820 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
821 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
822 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
823 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
824 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
825 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
826 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
827 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
828 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
829 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
830 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
831 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
832 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
833 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
834 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
835 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
836 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
837 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
838 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
839 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
840 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
841 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
842 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
851 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
852 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
854 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
855 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
856 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
857 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
858 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
859 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
860 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
861 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
862 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
863 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
865 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
867 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
868 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
870 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
871 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
872 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
873 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
874 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
875 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
877 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
880 if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
881 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
882 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0.write(writer)?;
883 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1.write(writer)?;
885 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
887 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
889 self.keys.write(writer)?;
890 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
891 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
892 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
893 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
894 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
896 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?;
897 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?;
898 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
899 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
901 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
902 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
903 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
904 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
905 match second_option {
906 Some(second_pubkey) => {
907 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
910 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
915 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
919 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?;
922 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
924 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
925 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
926 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
927 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
928 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
929 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
930 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
934 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
935 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
936 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
937 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
938 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
939 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
940 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
944 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
945 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
946 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
947 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
948 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
949 for script in txouts.iter() {
950 script.write(writer)?;
954 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
955 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
956 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
957 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
960 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
961 ($local_tx: expr) => {
962 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
963 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
964 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
965 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
966 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
967 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
969 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
970 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
971 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
972 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
973 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
975 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
979 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
984 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
985 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
986 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
988 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
991 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
993 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
994 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
996 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
997 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
998 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1001 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1002 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1003 data.write(writer)?;
1006 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1007 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1008 event.write(writer)?;
1011 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1013 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1014 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1015 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1016 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1017 for ev in events.iter() {
1019 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1021 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1022 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1024 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1026 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1032 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1033 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1034 txid.write(writer)?;
1035 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1036 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1037 script.write(writer)?;
1040 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1042 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1043 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1049 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1050 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1051 our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1052 their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1053 their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1054 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1055 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
1056 logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1058 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1059 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1060 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1062 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay, logger.clone());
1064 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64;
1065 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64;
1066 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1067 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1068 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1069 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1070 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1071 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1072 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1073 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1074 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1076 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1077 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1078 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1079 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1080 // now but we should consider it later.
1081 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1084 latest_update_id: 0,
1085 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1087 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1088 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1089 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: None,
1094 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1095 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1097 their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
1098 their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1099 funding_redeemscript,
1100 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1101 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1104 their_to_self_delay,
1106 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1107 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1108 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1109 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1111 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1112 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1113 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1114 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1116 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1117 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1118 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1120 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1121 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1125 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1126 local_tx_signed: false,
1128 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1129 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1134 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1135 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1136 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1137 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1138 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1139 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1142 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1143 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1144 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1145 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1150 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1151 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1152 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1153 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1154 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1156 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1157 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1158 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1162 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1163 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1164 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1169 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1176 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1185 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1186 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1187 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1188 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1189 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1190 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1191 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1192 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1194 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1195 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1198 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1199 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1200 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1201 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1202 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1203 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1204 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1205 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1206 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1207 Some(old_points) => {
1208 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1209 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1210 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1211 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1212 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1214 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1217 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1221 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1226 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1227 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1228 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1229 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1231 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()) {
1232 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1237 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1238 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1239 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1240 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1241 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1242 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1243 if self.local_tx_signed {
1244 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1246 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1247 let sequence = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64;
1248 let locktime = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64;
1249 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1251 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1252 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1253 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1254 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1255 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1256 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1257 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1259 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1260 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1261 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1262 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1263 // now but we should consider it later.
1264 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1265 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1267 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1268 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1269 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1273 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1274 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1275 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1276 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1279 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B)
1280 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1282 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn().iter() {
1283 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1287 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1288 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1289 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1291 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1292 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1293 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1295 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1296 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1297 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1298 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1299 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1300 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1301 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1302 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1303 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1306 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1310 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1313 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1314 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1315 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1317 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1318 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1320 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1322 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1323 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1324 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1326 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1327 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1328 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1329 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1330 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1331 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1332 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1333 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1334 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1335 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1336 if should_broadcast {
1337 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster);
1339 log_error!(self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1344 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1348 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1350 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1351 self.latest_update_id
1354 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1355 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint {
1359 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1360 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1361 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1362 &self.outputs_to_watch
1365 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1366 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1367 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1368 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1369 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1370 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1371 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1372 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1373 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1379 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1380 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1381 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1382 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1383 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1387 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1390 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1391 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1392 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1393 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1394 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1395 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1399 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1400 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1401 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1404 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1405 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1408 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1409 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1412 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1413 self.current_local_commitment_number
1416 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1417 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1418 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1419 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1420 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1421 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1422 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1423 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1424 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1425 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1426 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1428 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1429 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1431 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1432 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1435 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1440 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1441 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1442 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1443 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1444 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1445 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1446 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1447 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1448 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1449 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1450 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1452 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1453 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1455 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1456 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1457 // script_pubkey version
1458 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1459 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1462 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1463 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1464 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1465 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value };
1466 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1470 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1471 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1472 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1473 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1474 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1475 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1476 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1477 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1478 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1480 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value };
1481 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1486 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1487 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1488 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1489 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1490 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1491 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1493 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1494 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1495 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1496 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1497 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1498 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1499 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1501 let e = entry.get_mut();
1502 e.retain(|ref event| {
1504 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1505 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1510 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1513 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1521 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1522 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1524 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1525 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1527 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1529 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1530 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1531 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1532 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1533 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1534 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1535 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1537 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1538 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1540 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1542 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1543 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1544 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1545 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1546 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1547 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1548 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1549 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1550 // payment_preimage.
1551 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1552 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1553 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1554 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1556 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1557 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1561 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1562 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1564 let e = entry.get_mut();
1565 e.retain(|ref event| {
1567 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1568 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1573 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1576 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1584 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1585 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1587 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1588 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1591 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1592 let revocation_point_option =
1593 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1594 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1595 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1597 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1598 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1599 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1600 let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key()));
1601 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1602 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1604 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1605 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1606 // script_pubkey version
1607 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1608 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1611 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1612 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1613 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1614 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1615 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1616 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1617 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1618 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1620 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1621 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1622 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1623 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry };
1624 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1631 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1634 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1635 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>) {
1636 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1637 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1638 return (Vec::new(), None)
1641 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1642 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1645 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1650 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1651 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1652 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1653 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1654 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1655 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1656 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1658 log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1659 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value };
1660 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1661 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1664 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) {
1665 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1666 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1668 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1669 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) {
1670 Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript))
1673 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1674 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1675 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1676 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }});
1677 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1681 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1684 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1685 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1686 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1687 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1688 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1689 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1690 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1692 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1693 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1694 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1695 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1697 let e = entry.get_mut();
1698 e.retain(|ref event| {
1700 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1701 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1706 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1709 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1715 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1716 ($updates: expr) => {
1717 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1718 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1719 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1723 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1724 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1726 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1728 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1729 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1730 append_onchain_update!(res);
1731 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1732 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1734 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1735 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1736 append_onchain_update!(res);
1740 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1741 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1742 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1743 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1744 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1745 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1753 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1754 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1755 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1759 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1762 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1763 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1764 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1765 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1766 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1767 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1768 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1769 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1770 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1771 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1772 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1773 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1774 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() {
1775 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1776 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1777 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1778 if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1779 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1780 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) {
1785 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1786 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1792 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1793 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1794 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1796 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1797 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1798 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx() {
1799 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1800 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1801 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1802 if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1803 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1804 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) {
1814 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
1815 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
1816 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
1817 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
1819 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>
1820 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1821 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1823 for tx in txn_matched {
1824 let mut output_val = 0;
1825 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1826 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1827 output_val += out.value;
1828 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1832 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1833 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1834 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1835 for tx in txn_matched {
1836 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1837 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1838 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1839 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1841 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1842 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1843 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1844 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height);
1845 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1846 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1848 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1849 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
1850 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1851 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1853 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1855 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1858 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1859 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height);
1860 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1861 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1862 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1867 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1868 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1869 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1870 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
1872 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height);
1874 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height);
1875 if should_broadcast {
1876 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding {}});
1878 if should_broadcast {
1879 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() {
1880 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1881 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1882 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1884 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1887 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1890 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1891 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1892 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1893 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1894 payment_preimage: None,
1895 source: htlc_update.0,
1898 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1899 log_trace!(self, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1900 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1901 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1907 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator);
1909 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1910 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1911 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1917 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)
1918 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1919 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1921 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1922 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1924 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1925 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1928 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator);
1930 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1933 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1934 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1935 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1936 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1937 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1938 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1939 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1940 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1941 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1942 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1943 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1944 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1945 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1946 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1947 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1948 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1949 // time out the HTLC first.
1950 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1951 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1952 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1953 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1954 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1955 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1956 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1957 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1958 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1959 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1960 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1961 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1962 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1963 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1964 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1965 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1966 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1967 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1968 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1969 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1970 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1971 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1972 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1973 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1980 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1982 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1983 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1984 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1987 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1988 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1989 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1996 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1997 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1998 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
1999 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2000 let mut payment_data = None;
2001 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2002 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2003 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2004 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2006 macro_rules! log_claim {
2007 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2008 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2009 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2010 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2011 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2012 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2013 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2014 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2015 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2016 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2017 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2018 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2020 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2021 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2022 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2023 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2028 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2029 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2030 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2031 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2032 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2033 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2034 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2035 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2044 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2045 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2046 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2047 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2048 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2049 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2050 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2051 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2052 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2053 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2054 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2055 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2056 } else if !$local_tx {
2057 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2058 if payment_data.is_none() {
2059 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2062 if payment_data.is_none() {
2063 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2064 continue 'outer_loop;
2071 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2072 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2073 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2075 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2076 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2077 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2078 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2081 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2082 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2083 "remote commitment tx", false);
2086 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2087 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2088 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2089 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2090 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2091 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2092 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2093 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2095 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2099 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2100 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2101 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2102 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2104 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2109 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2110 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2112 let e = entry.get_mut();
2113 e.retain(|ref event| {
2115 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2116 return htlc_update.0 != source
2121 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2124 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2132 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2133 fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2134 let mut spendable_output = None;
2135 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2136 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2137 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2138 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2139 output: outp.clone(),
2142 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2143 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2144 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2145 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2146 key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2147 witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2148 to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
2149 output: outp.clone(),
2153 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
2154 if broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2155 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2156 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2157 key: broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1,
2158 output: outp.clone(),
2162 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2163 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2164 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2165 output: outp.clone(),
2169 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2170 log_trace!(self, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2171 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2173 let e = entry.get_mut();
2174 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2177 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2184 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2186 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2187 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2188 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2192 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2197 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2198 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2199 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2200 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2203 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2204 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2206 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2207 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2209 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2210 let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2211 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2212 Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script))
2215 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2217 let broadcasted_remote_payment_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2219 let payment_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2220 let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2221 Some((payment_address, payment_key))
2224 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2226 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2228 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2229 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2230 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2231 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2232 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2233 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2235 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2236 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2237 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2239 let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2240 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2241 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2242 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2244 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2245 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2249 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2250 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2251 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2252 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2254 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2259 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2260 let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2262 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2264 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2267 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2268 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2269 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2270 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2271 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2273 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2274 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2280 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2281 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2282 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2283 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2284 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2285 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2286 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2287 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2289 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2290 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2294 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2295 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2296 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2297 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2298 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2299 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2300 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2301 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2302 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2304 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2309 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2310 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2311 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2312 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2313 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2314 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2319 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2322 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2323 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2324 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2325 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2326 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2327 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2328 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2330 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2331 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2332 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2333 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2334 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2336 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2337 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2339 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2344 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2351 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2354 Some(read_local_tx!())
2356 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2358 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2360 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2361 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2363 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2364 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2365 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2366 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2367 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2368 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2373 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2374 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2375 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2376 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2379 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2380 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2381 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2382 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2383 pending_events.push(event);
2387 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2389 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2390 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2391 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2392 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2393 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2394 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2395 for _ in 0..events_len {
2396 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2398 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2399 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2400 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2401 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2405 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2406 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2410 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2414 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2417 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2418 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2419 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2420 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2421 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2422 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2423 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2424 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2426 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2427 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2430 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
2432 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2433 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2435 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2437 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2440 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2441 broadcasted_remote_payment_script,
2446 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2447 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2449 their_htlc_base_key,
2450 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2451 funding_redeemscript,
2452 channel_value_satoshis,
2453 their_cur_revocation_points,
2456 their_to_self_delay,
2459 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2460 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2461 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2463 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2464 current_local_commitment_tx,
2465 current_remote_commitment_number,
2466 current_local_commitment_number,
2469 pending_htlcs_updated,
2472 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2477 lockdown_from_offchain,
2481 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2489 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2490 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2491 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2492 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2493 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2494 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2495 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2496 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2497 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2499 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2500 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2501 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2502 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2504 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2505 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2506 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2507 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2508 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2510 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2513 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2514 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2515 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2517 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2518 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2520 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2522 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2524 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2525 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2526 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2527 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2531 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2532 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2534 let mut res = Vec::new();
2535 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2536 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2540 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2541 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2548 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2549 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2551 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2552 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2558 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2559 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2560 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2561 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2566 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2568 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2569 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2570 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2571 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2572 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2577 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2579 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2580 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2581 (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2582 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2583 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2584 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), logger.clone());
2586 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2587 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2588 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2589 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2590 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2591 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2592 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2595 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2596 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2597 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2599 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2600 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2601 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2603 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2604 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2605 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2606 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2607 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2608 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2610 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2611 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2612 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2613 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2614 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2615 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2616 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2617 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2619 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2620 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2621 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2622 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2623 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2624 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2628 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2629 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2630 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2632 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2633 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2634 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2635 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2637 macro_rules! sign_input {
2638 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2639 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2640 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2642 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2643 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2644 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2646 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2647 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2648 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2649 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2650 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2651 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2652 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2653 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2654 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2655 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2656 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2657 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2659 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2661 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2662 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2663 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2664 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2668 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2669 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2671 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2672 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2674 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2675 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2679 script_sig: Script::new(),
2680 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2681 witness: Vec::new(),
2684 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2685 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2688 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2689 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2690 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2691 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2692 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2694 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2696 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2697 claim_tx.input.clear();
2698 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2700 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2701 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2705 script_sig: Script::new(),
2706 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2707 witness: Vec::new(),
2710 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2711 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2712 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2713 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2714 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2716 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2718 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2719 claim_tx.input.clear();
2720 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2721 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2722 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2726 script_sig: Script::new(),
2727 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2728 witness: Vec::new(),
2730 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2731 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2732 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2733 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2734 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2736 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2739 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.