1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
49 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
50 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
51 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
53 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
54 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
55 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
56 /// the channel to an operational state.
58 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
59 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
60 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
62 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
63 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
64 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
65 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
66 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
67 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
70 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
71 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
72 /// channel operation.
74 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
75 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
76 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
78 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
79 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
80 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
82 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
86 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
87 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
88 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
89 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
90 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
92 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
94 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
95 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
96 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
97 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
98 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
99 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
102 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
103 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
104 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
107 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
108 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
109 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
110 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
113 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
114 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
115 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
116 /// all registered listeners in one go.
117 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
118 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
120 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
121 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
122 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
124 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
125 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
126 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
128 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
129 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in funds loss.
130 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
132 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
133 /// with success or failure backward
134 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
137 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
138 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
140 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
142 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
143 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
144 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
146 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
147 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
148 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
149 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
150 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
152 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
153 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
154 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
155 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
156 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
158 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
161 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
162 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
163 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
164 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
165 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
167 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
168 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
169 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
170 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
171 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
172 outputs: spendable_outputs,
176 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
177 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
178 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
181 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
185 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
186 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
187 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
188 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
190 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
191 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
192 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
193 let mut existing_claim = false;
194 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
195 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
196 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
197 existing_claim = true;
203 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
207 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
212 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
213 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
216 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
217 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
218 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
219 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
220 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
225 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
226 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
227 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
228 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
229 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
230 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
233 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
234 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
236 fee_estimator: feeest,
242 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
243 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
244 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
245 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
246 Some(orig_monitor) => {
247 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
248 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
252 match monitor.key_storage {
253 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
256 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
258 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
259 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
260 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
261 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
265 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
266 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
269 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
270 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
271 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
274 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
279 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner> {
280 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
281 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
283 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
287 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
288 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
289 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
290 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
292 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
294 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
299 pending_htlcs_updated
303 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
304 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
305 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
306 let mut ret = Vec::new();
307 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
312 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
313 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
314 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
315 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
316 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
317 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
318 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
319 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
320 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
321 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
322 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
323 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
324 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
325 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
326 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
327 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
328 /// accurate block height.
329 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
330 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
331 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
332 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
333 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
334 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
335 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
336 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
337 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
338 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
339 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
342 enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
345 funding_key: SecretKey,
346 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
347 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
348 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
349 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
350 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
351 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
352 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
353 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
356 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
357 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
361 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
362 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
363 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
365 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
368 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
369 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
372 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
373 let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
375 Storage::Local { .. } => false,
376 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
377 revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
384 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
385 struct LocalSignedTx {
386 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
388 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
389 revocation_key: PublicKey,
390 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
391 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
392 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
393 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
395 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
399 enum InputDescriptors {
404 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
407 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
408 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
409 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
410 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
414 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
422 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
428 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
429 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
434 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
435 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
437 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
438 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
439 script.write(writer)?;
440 pubkey.write(writer)?;
441 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
443 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
445 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
447 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
449 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
450 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
451 script.write(writer)?;
453 preimage.write(writer)?;
454 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
455 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
457 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
458 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
459 script.write(writer)?;
460 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
461 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
462 preimage.write(writer)?;
463 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
470 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
471 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
472 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
474 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
475 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
476 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
477 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
480 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
482 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
483 InputMaterial::Revoked {
492 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
493 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
494 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
495 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
496 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
497 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
506 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
507 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
508 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
509 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
510 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
511 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
513 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
518 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
524 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
525 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
526 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
528 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
529 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
531 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
533 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
534 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
535 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
537 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
539 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
540 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
541 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
542 ContentiousOutpoint {
543 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
544 input_material: InputMaterial,
548 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
549 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
550 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
551 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
552 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
554 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
555 feerate_previous: u64,
556 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
557 // a priority of not feerate
558 soonest_timelock: u32,
559 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
560 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
563 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
564 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
565 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
566 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
567 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
568 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
569 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
571 tx_material.write(writer)?;
577 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
578 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
579 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
580 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
581 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
582 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
583 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
584 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
585 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
586 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
587 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
589 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
593 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
594 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
596 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
597 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
599 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
600 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
602 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
603 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
605 key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
606 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
607 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
608 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
609 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
610 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
611 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
613 our_to_self_delay: u16,
614 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
616 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
617 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
618 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
619 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
620 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
621 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
622 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
623 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
624 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
625 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
626 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
627 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
628 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
630 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
631 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
632 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
633 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
634 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
635 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
637 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
639 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
641 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
643 destination_script: Script,
644 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
645 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
646 // scan every commitment transaction for that
647 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
649 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
650 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
651 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
652 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
653 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
654 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
655 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
656 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
657 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
658 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
659 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
660 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
661 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
663 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
665 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
666 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
667 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
668 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
669 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
670 // block with output gets disconnected.
671 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
672 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
674 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
676 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
677 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
678 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
679 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
681 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
682 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
683 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
684 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
685 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
687 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
688 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
689 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
690 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
691 // the full block_connected).
692 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
693 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
697 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
698 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
700 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
701 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
703 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
704 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
706 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
707 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
709 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
713 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
719 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
732 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
733 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
734 /// underlying object
735 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
736 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
737 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
738 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
739 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
740 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
741 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
742 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
743 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
744 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
745 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
746 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
747 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
748 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
749 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
750 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
751 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
752 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
753 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
754 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
755 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
756 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
757 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
758 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
762 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
763 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
772 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
773 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
774 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
775 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
776 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
777 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
778 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
780 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
781 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
783 macro_rules! write_option {
790 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
795 match self.key_storage {
796 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
797 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
799 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
800 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
801 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
802 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
803 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
804 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
806 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
807 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
808 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
809 script.write(writer)?;
812 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
815 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
816 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
818 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
821 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
822 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
823 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
824 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
826 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
827 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
828 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
829 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
830 match second_option {
831 Some(second_pubkey) => {
832 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
835 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
840 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
845 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
847 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
848 writer.write_all(secret)?;
849 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
852 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
853 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
854 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
855 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
856 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
857 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
858 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
862 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
863 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
864 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
865 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
866 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
867 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
868 write_option!(htlc_source);
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
873 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
874 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
875 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
876 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
877 for script in txouts.iter() {
878 script.write(writer)?;
882 if for_local_storage {
883 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
884 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
885 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
886 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
889 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
892 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
893 ($local_tx: expr) => {
894 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
895 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
896 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
897 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
898 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
899 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
901 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
902 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
903 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
904 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
905 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
907 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
911 write_option!(htlc_source);
916 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
917 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
918 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
920 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
923 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
924 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
925 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
927 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
930 if for_local_storage {
931 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
936 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
937 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
938 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
941 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
942 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
943 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
944 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
945 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
946 local_key.write(writer)?;
948 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
951 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
952 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
953 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
954 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
957 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
958 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
960 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
961 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
964 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
965 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
966 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
967 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
968 for ev in events.iter() {
970 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
971 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
972 claim_request.write(writer)?;
974 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
975 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
976 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
977 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
979 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
980 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
981 outpoint.write(writer)?;
982 input_material.write(writer)?;
988 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
989 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
991 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
992 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
993 script.write(writer)?;
1000 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1002 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1003 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1004 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1005 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1006 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1007 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1008 self.write(writer, true)
1011 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1013 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1014 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1015 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1016 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1017 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1018 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1019 self.write(writer, false)
1023 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1024 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1026 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
1028 key_storage: Storage::Local {
1030 funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
1031 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
1032 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
1033 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1034 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
1035 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
1037 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1038 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1040 their_htlc_base_key: None,
1041 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
1042 funding_redeemscript: None,
1043 channel_value_satoshis: None,
1044 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1046 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
1047 their_to_self_delay: None,
1049 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
1050 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1051 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1052 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1054 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1055 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1056 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1058 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1059 destination_script: destination_script,
1060 to_remote_rescue: None,
1062 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
1064 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1066 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1067 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1069 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1070 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1075 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
1076 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
1078 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
1079 tx_weight += match inp {
1080 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1081 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
1082 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
1084 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1085 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1086 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
1088 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
1089 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1090 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
1092 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1093 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
1094 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
1096 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
1097 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
1098 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
1105 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
1106 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
1107 return current_height + 1
1108 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
1109 return current_height + 3
1115 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
1117 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
1125 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
1126 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
1128 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
1129 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
1130 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
1131 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
1137 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1138 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1139 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1140 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1141 let pos = ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::place_secret(idx);
1143 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
1144 if ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
1145 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1148 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
1151 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
1153 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1154 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1155 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
1156 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1157 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1158 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1164 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1165 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
1166 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1167 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1168 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1170 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1171 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1172 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1176 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1177 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1178 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1183 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1190 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1199 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1200 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1201 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1202 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1203 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1204 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1205 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1206 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1208 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1209 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1212 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1213 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1214 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1215 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1216 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1217 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1219 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1220 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1221 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1222 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1223 Some(old_points) => {
1224 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1225 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1226 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1227 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1228 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1230 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1233 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1237 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1242 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1243 match self.key_storage {
1244 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
1245 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1246 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1247 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1249 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1250 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1254 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1258 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1259 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1260 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1261 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1262 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1263 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
1264 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
1265 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
1266 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
1267 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
1269 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
1270 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1271 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1272 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1273 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1279 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1280 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1281 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1282 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1285 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
1286 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
1287 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
1288 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1289 match self.key_storage {
1290 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1291 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1292 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1293 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1294 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1295 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1296 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1297 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1298 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1301 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1304 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1305 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1308 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1312 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1313 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1314 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1315 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1317 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1318 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1319 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1320 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1321 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1322 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1326 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1327 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1328 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1329 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1330 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1331 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1333 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1334 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1336 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1337 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1339 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1340 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1343 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1347 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1348 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1349 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1350 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1351 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1352 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1353 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1354 match self.key_storage {
1355 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1356 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1358 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1359 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1364 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1365 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1366 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1367 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1368 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1369 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1370 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1371 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1372 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1373 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1376 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1377 match self.key_storage {
1378 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1379 *funding_info = None;
1381 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1382 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1387 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1388 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1389 match self.key_storage {
1390 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1391 match funding_info {
1392 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1396 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1402 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1403 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1404 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1405 &self.outputs_to_watch
1408 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1409 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1410 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1411 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1412 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1413 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1414 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1415 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1416 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1422 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1423 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1424 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1425 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1426 return Some(ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1429 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1433 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1434 //TODO This can be optimized?
1435 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1436 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1444 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1445 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1448 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1449 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1450 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1451 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1454 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1455 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1456 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1457 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1458 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1459 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1460 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1461 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1462 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1463 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1464 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1465 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1467 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1468 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1470 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1471 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1474 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1479 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1480 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1481 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1482 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1483 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1484 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1485 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1486 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1487 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
1488 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1490 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1491 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1492 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1493 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1497 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1498 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1499 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1500 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1503 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1504 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1506 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1507 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1508 // script_pubkey version.
1509 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1510 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1513 let mut total_value = 0;
1514 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1515 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1516 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1518 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1519 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1521 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1522 txid: commitment_txid,
1525 script_sig: Script::new(),
1526 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1527 witness: Vec::new(),
1529 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1530 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1531 total_value += outp.value;
1532 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1533 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1534 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1535 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1536 output: outp.clone(),
1541 macro_rules! sign_input {
1542 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1544 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1545 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1546 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1547 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1548 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1550 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1551 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1552 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1554 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1558 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1559 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1560 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1561 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1563 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1565 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1566 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1571 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1572 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1574 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1575 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1576 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1577 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1578 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1579 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1580 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1583 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1584 txid: commitment_txid,
1585 vout: transaction_output_index,
1587 script_sig: Script::new(),
1588 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1589 witness: Vec::new(),
1591 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1593 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1594 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1595 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1597 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1601 output: vec!(TxOut {
1602 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1603 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1606 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1607 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1608 let mut used_feerate;
1609 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1610 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1611 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1612 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1613 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1614 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1615 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1616 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1620 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1624 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1631 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1632 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1633 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1634 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1635 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1637 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1638 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1639 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1640 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1641 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1642 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1643 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1645 let e = entry.get_mut();
1646 e.retain(|ref event| {
1648 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1649 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1654 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1657 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1665 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1666 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1667 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1669 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1670 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1673 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1675 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1677 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1678 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1681 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1688 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1690 let mut used_feerate;
1691 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1692 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1695 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1697 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1698 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1699 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1700 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1701 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1704 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1705 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1706 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1707 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1708 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1709 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1710 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1715 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1720 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1722 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1723 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1724 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1726 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1727 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1728 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1729 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1730 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1731 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1732 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1733 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1735 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1736 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1738 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1740 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1741 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1742 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1743 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1744 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1745 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1746 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1747 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1748 // payment_preimage.
1749 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1750 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1751 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1752 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1754 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1755 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1759 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1760 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1762 let e = entry.get_mut();
1763 e.retain(|ref event| {
1765 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1766 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1771 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1774 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1782 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1783 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1784 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1786 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1787 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1791 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1792 let revocation_point_option =
1793 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1794 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1795 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1797 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1798 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1799 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
1800 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1801 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
1803 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1804 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1805 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1808 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1809 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1810 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1813 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1814 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1815 match self.key_storage {
1816 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1817 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1818 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1819 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1821 output: outp.clone(),
1825 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1827 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1831 let mut total_value = 0;
1832 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1833 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1834 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1836 macro_rules! sign_input {
1837 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
1839 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1840 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1841 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
1842 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1843 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1844 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1845 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1847 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1851 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1852 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1853 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1854 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1855 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1860 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1861 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1862 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1863 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1864 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1865 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1866 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1868 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1871 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1872 txid: commitment_txid,
1873 vout: transaction_output_index,
1875 script_sig: Script::new(),
1876 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1877 witness: Vec::new(),
1879 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1881 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1882 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
1883 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1885 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1889 output: vec!(TxOut {
1890 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1891 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1894 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1895 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1896 let mut used_feerate;
1897 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1898 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1899 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
1900 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1901 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1902 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1903 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1905 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1906 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1907 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1908 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1910 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1912 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1916 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1922 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1923 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1925 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1926 txid: commitment_txid,
1927 vout: transaction_output_index,
1929 script_sig: Script::new(),
1930 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1931 witness: Vec::new(),
1933 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1935 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1937 output: vec!(TxOut {
1938 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1939 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1942 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1943 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1944 let mut used_feerate;
1945 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1946 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1947 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
1948 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1949 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1950 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1951 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1952 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1953 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1954 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1957 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1958 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1962 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1967 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1969 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1970 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1973 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1980 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1982 let mut used_feerate;
1983 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1984 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1987 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1989 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1990 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1991 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1992 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1993 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1996 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1997 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1998 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1999 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
2000 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2001 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
2002 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
2003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
2007 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
2008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
2011 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2012 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2013 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2014 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
2016 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
2019 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
2020 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2021 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
2022 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2023 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
2024 key: local_key.clone(),
2025 output: outp.clone(),
2031 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
2034 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2035 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
2036 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
2037 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
2041 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2042 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2045 Err(_) => return (None, None)
2050 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2051 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2052 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2053 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2054 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
2055 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
2057 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2058 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2061 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2062 None => return (None, None),
2063 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2065 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2066 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2067 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2069 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2072 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2074 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2078 script_sig: Script::new(),
2079 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2080 witness: Vec::new(),
2082 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2085 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2086 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2087 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2091 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2097 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2098 let mut used_feerate;
2099 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2100 return (None, None);
2103 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2105 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2106 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2107 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2108 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2109 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2111 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2115 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2116 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2117 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2118 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2120 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2121 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2122 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2123 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
2124 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2125 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2126 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2127 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2131 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2135 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2136 } else { (None, None) }
2139 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2140 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2141 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2142 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2143 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2145 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2146 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2147 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2148 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2149 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2150 key: local_delayedkey,
2151 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2152 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2153 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2159 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2160 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2161 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2162 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2163 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2168 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2169 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2170 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2171 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2173 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2174 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2175 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2176 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2181 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2182 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2183 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2184 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2185 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2186 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2187 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2188 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2190 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2191 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2192 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2193 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2194 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2199 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2200 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2201 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2202 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2203 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2204 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2205 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2206 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2209 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2210 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2215 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2218 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2219 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2220 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2221 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2222 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2223 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2224 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2225 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2227 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2228 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2229 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2230 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2232 let e = entry.get_mut();
2233 e.retain(|ref event| {
2235 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2236 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2241 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2244 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2250 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2251 ($updates: expr) => {
2252 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2253 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2254 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2255 for claim in $updates.3 {
2256 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2257 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2264 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2265 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2267 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2268 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2269 match self.key_storage {
2270 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2271 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2277 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2278 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2280 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2281 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2282 match self.key_storage {
2283 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2284 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2285 append_onchain_update!(res);
2287 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2291 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2292 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2293 match self.key_storage {
2294 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2295 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2301 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2302 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2304 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2305 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2306 match self.key_storage {
2307 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2308 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2309 append_onchain_update!(res);
2311 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2316 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2317 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2318 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2319 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2320 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2321 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2329 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2330 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2332 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2333 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2337 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2340 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2341 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2342 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2343 match self.key_storage {
2344 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2345 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2346 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2347 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2348 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2349 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2350 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2351 output: output.clone(),
2356 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2357 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2358 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2365 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2366 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2367 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2368 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2369 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2370 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2371 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2372 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2373 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2374 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2375 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2376 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2377 match self.key_storage {
2378 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2379 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2384 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2385 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2386 match self.key_storage {
2387 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2388 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2389 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2390 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2392 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2400 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
2401 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
2402 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
2403 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
2405 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2406 for tx in txn_matched {
2407 let mut output_val = 0;
2408 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2409 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2410 output_val += out.value;
2411 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2415 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2416 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2417 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2418 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2419 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2420 for tx in txn_matched {
2421 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2422 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2423 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2424 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2426 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2427 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2428 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2429 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2430 funding_info.clone()
2432 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2436 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2437 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2438 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2440 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2441 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2442 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2445 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2446 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2448 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2449 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2453 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2454 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2455 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2459 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2460 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2461 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2464 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2465 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2469 for tx in txn.iter() {
2470 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2471 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2474 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2475 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2476 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2477 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2478 if updated.len() > 0 {
2479 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2482 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2483 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2484 for inp in &tx.input {
2485 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2486 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2487 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2488 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2489 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2491 let mut set_equality = true;
2492 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2493 set_equality = false;
2495 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2496 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2497 set_equality = false;
2502 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2504 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2505 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2507 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2508 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2512 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2518 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2519 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2520 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2522 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2523 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2524 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2525 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2526 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2528 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2529 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2530 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2533 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2534 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2536 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2538 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2542 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2543 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2544 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2546 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2547 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2551 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2556 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2557 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2559 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2560 if should_broadcast {
2561 match self.key_storage {
2562 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2563 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2569 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2570 if should_broadcast {
2571 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2572 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2573 match self.key_storage {
2574 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2575 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2576 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2577 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2578 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2581 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2582 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2585 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2589 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2592 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2593 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2594 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2595 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2596 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2597 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2601 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2602 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2603 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2605 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2606 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2611 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2612 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2613 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2616 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2617 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2618 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2619 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2620 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2621 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2623 } else { unreachable!(); }
2625 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2626 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2627 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2628 } else { unreachable!(); }
2631 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2632 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
2633 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
2635 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2638 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
2639 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2640 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2641 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2643 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2644 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2645 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2648 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2649 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2650 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2651 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2652 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2653 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2654 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2662 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2663 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2664 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2665 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2666 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2669 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2670 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2672 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2673 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2674 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2675 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2677 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2680 for req in remove_request {
2681 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2683 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2686 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2687 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2688 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2689 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2690 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2691 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2692 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2693 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2694 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2695 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2696 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2697 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2698 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2699 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2700 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2701 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2702 // time out the HTLC first.
2703 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2704 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2705 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2706 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2707 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2708 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2709 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2710 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2711 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2712 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2713 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2714 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2715 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2716 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2717 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2718 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2719 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2720 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2721 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2722 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2723 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2724 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2725 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2726 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2733 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2734 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2737 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2738 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2739 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2740 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2743 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2744 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2745 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2753 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2754 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2755 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2756 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2758 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2759 let mut payment_data = None;
2760 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2761 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2762 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2763 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2765 macro_rules! log_claim {
2766 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2767 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2768 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2769 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2770 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2771 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2772 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2773 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2774 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2775 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2776 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2777 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2779 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2780 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2781 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2782 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2787 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2788 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2789 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2790 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2791 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2792 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2793 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2794 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2803 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2804 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2805 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2806 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2807 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2808 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2809 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2810 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2811 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2812 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2813 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2814 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2815 } else if !$local_tx {
2816 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2817 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2819 if payment_data.is_none() {
2820 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2821 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2825 if payment_data.is_none() {
2826 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2827 continue 'outer_loop;
2834 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2835 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2836 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2837 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2840 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2841 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2842 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2843 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2846 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2847 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2848 "remote commitment tx", false);
2851 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2852 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2853 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2854 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2855 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2856 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2857 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2858 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2859 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2860 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2862 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2863 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2865 let e = entry.get_mut();
2866 e.retain(|ref event| {
2868 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2869 return htlc_update.0 != source
2874 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2877 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2886 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2887 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2888 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2889 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2890 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2891 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2893 previous_output: *outp,
2894 script_sig: Script::new(),
2895 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2896 witness: Vec::new(),
2899 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2903 output: vec![TxOut {
2904 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2909 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2910 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2912 let mut used_feerate;
2913 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2914 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2915 let mut value = $amount;
2916 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2917 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2920 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2923 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2925 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2927 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2933 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2934 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2935 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2936 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2937 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2938 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2939 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2943 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2948 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2949 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2951 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2952 match per_outp_material {
2953 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2954 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
2957 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2958 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2961 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2965 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2967 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2968 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2970 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2972 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2974 new_feerate = feerate;
2978 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2980 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2981 match per_outp_material {
2982 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2983 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2984 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2985 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2986 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2987 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2989 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2991 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2993 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2994 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2996 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2997 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2998 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2999 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
3000 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
3001 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3002 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3003 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
3004 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
3006 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
3008 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
3009 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
3011 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
3012 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
3013 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
3014 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
3019 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
3020 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
3024 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3026 impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
3027 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3028 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3029 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3033 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3038 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3039 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3040 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3041 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3044 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3046 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3048 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3049 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3050 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3051 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3052 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3053 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3054 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3055 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3056 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3057 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3058 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3059 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3061 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
3062 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3063 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3067 revocation_base_key,
3069 delayed_payment_base_key,
3073 current_remote_commitment_txid,
3074 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
3077 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3080 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3081 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3082 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3083 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3085 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3086 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3090 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3091 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3092 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3093 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3095 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3100 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3101 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3103 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
3104 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
3105 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
3106 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3109 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3112 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3113 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3114 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3115 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3116 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3118 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3119 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3125 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3126 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3127 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3128 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3129 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3130 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3131 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3132 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3134 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3135 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3139 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3140 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3141 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3142 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3143 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3144 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3145 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3146 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3147 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3149 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3150 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3154 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3155 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3156 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3157 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3158 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3159 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3160 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3164 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3167 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3168 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3169 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3170 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3171 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3172 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3173 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3175 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3176 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3177 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3178 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3179 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3181 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3182 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3184 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3189 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3196 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3199 Some(read_local_tx!())
3201 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3204 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3207 Some(read_local_tx!())
3209 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3212 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3214 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3216 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3217 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3218 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3219 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3220 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3224 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3225 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3226 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3229 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3230 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3231 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3233 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3236 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3237 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3238 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3239 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3242 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3243 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3244 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3245 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3246 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3247 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3248 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3251 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3252 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3253 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3254 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3256 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3257 for _ in 0..events_len {
3258 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3260 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3261 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3266 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3268 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3269 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3273 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3274 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3275 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3280 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3284 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3287 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3288 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3289 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3290 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3291 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3292 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
3293 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3294 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3296 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3301 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3302 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3305 their_htlc_base_key,
3306 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3307 funding_redeemscript,
3308 channel_value_satoshis,
3309 their_cur_revocation_points,
3312 their_to_self_delay,
3315 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3316 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3317 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3319 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3320 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3321 current_remote_commitment_number,
3328 pending_claim_requests,
3330 claimable_outpoints,
3332 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3345 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3346 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3347 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3348 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3349 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3350 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3351 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3352 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3353 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3355 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3356 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3358 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3359 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3360 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3361 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3362 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3364 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
3368 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3369 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3370 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3371 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor<InMemoryChannelKeys>;
3372 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3373 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3375 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3377 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3378 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3379 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3382 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3383 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3387 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3389 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3390 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3391 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3392 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3393 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3399 // insert_secret correct sequence
3400 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3403 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3404 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3405 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3408 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3409 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3410 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3413 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3414 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3415 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3418 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3419 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3420 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3423 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3424 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3425 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3428 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3429 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3430 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3433 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3434 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3435 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3438 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3439 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3440 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3445 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3446 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3449 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3450 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3451 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3454 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3455 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3456 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3457 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3461 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3462 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3465 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3466 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3467 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3470 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3471 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3472 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3475 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3476 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3477 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3480 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3481 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3482 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3483 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3487 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3488 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3491 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3492 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3493 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3496 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3497 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3498 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3501 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3502 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3503 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3506 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3507 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3508 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3509 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3513 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3514 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3517 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3518 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3519 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3522 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3523 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3524 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3527 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3528 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3529 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3532 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3533 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3534 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3537 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3538 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3539 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3542 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3543 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3544 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3547 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3548 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3549 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3552 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3553 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3554 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3555 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3559 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3560 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3563 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3564 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3565 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3568 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3569 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3570 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3573 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3574 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3575 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3578 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3579 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3580 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3583 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3584 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3585 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3588 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3589 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3590 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3591 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3595 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3596 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3599 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3600 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3601 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3604 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3605 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3606 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3609 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3610 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3611 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3614 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3615 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3616 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3619 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3620 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3621 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3624 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3625 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3626 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3629 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3630 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3631 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3634 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3635 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3636 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3637 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3641 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3642 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3645 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3646 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3647 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3650 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3651 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3652 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3655 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3656 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3657 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3660 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3661 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3662 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3665 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3666 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3667 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3670 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3671 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3672 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3675 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3676 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3677 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3680 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3681 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3682 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3683 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3687 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3688 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3691 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3692 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3693 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3696 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3697 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3698 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3701 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3702 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3703 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3706 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3707 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3708 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3711 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3712 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3713 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3716 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3717 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3718 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3721 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3722 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3723 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3726 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3727 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3728 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3729 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3734 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3735 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3736 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3738 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3739 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3743 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3744 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3745 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3746 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3747 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3748 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3753 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3755 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3757 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3759 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3760 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3761 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3762 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3766 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3767 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3769 let mut res = Vec::new();
3770 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3771 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3775 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3776 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3783 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3784 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3786 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3787 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3793 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3794 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3795 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3796 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3801 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3803 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3804 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3805 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3806 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3807 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3812 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3814 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3815 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3817 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3818 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3819 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3820 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3821 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3822 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3823 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3826 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3827 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3828 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3829 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3830 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3831 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3832 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3834 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3835 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3836 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3837 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3838 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3839 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3841 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3842 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3843 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3844 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3845 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3846 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3847 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3848 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3850 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3851 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3852 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3853 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3854 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3855 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3859 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3860 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3861 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3864 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3865 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3866 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3868 macro_rules! sign_input {
3869 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3870 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3871 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3873 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3874 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3875 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3877 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3878 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3879 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3880 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3881 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3882 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3883 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3884 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3885 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3886 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3887 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3888 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3890 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3892 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3893 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3894 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3895 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3899 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3900 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3902 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3903 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3905 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3906 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3910 script_sig: Script::new(),
3911 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3912 witness: Vec::new(),
3915 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3916 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3919 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3920 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3921 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3922 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3923 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3925 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3927 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3928 claim_tx.input.clear();
3929 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3931 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3932 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3936 script_sig: Script::new(),
3937 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3938 witness: Vec::new(),
3941 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3942 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3943 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3944 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3945 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3947 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3949 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3950 claim_tx.input.clear();
3951 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3952 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3953 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3957 script_sig: Script::new(),
3958 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3959 witness: Vec::new(),
3961 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3962 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3963 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3964 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3965 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3967 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3970 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.