1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
113 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
114 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
115 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
116 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
117 /// all registered listeners in one go.
118 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
119 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
121 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
122 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
123 /// any spends of it.
124 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
126 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
127 /// with success or failure backward
128 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
131 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
132 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
134 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
136 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
137 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
138 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
140 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
141 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
142 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
143 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
144 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
146 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
147 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
148 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
149 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
150 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
152 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
155 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
157 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
158 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
159 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
160 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
162 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
163 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
164 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
165 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
166 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
167 outputs: spendable_outputs,
171 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
172 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
173 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
176 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
180 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
181 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
182 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
183 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
185 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
186 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
187 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
188 let mut existing_claim = false;
189 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
190 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
191 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
192 existing_claim = true;
198 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
202 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
207 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
208 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
211 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
212 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
213 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
214 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
215 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
220 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
221 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
222 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
223 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
224 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
225 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
229 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
231 fee_estimator: feeest,
237 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
238 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
239 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
240 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
241 Some(orig_monitor) => {
242 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
243 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
247 match monitor.key_storage {
248 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
251 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
253 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
254 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
255 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
256 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
260 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
261 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
264 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
269 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
270 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
271 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
273 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
277 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
278 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
279 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
280 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
282 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
284 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
289 pending_htlcs_updated
293 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
294 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
295 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
296 let mut ret = Vec::new();
297 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
302 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
303 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
304 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
305 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
306 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
307 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
308 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
309 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
310 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
311 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
312 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
313 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
314 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
315 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
316 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
317 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
318 /// accurate block height.
319 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
320 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
321 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
322 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
323 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
324 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
325 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
326 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
327 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
328 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
329 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
331 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
334 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
335 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
336 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
337 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
338 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
339 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
340 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
341 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
342 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
343 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
346 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
347 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
351 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
352 struct LocalSignedTx {
353 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
356 revocation_key: PublicKey,
357 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
358 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
359 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
361 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
365 enum InputDescriptors {
370 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
373 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
374 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
375 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
380 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
388 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
394 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
395 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
401 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
403 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
404 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
405 script.write(writer)?;
406 pubkey.write(writer)?;
407 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
409 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
411 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
413 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
415 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
416 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
417 script.write(writer)?;
419 preimage.write(writer)?;
420 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
421 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
423 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
424 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
425 script.write(writer)?;
426 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
427 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
428 preimage.write(writer)?;
429 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
436 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
437 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
440 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
441 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
442 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
443 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
446 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
448 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
449 InputMaterial::Revoked {
458 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
459 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
460 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
461 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
462 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
463 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
472 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
473 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
474 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
475 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
476 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
477 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
479 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
484 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
490 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
491 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
492 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
494 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
495 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
497 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
499 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
500 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
501 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
503 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
507 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
508 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
509 struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
510 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
511 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
513 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
514 feerate_previous: u64,
515 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
516 // a priority of not feerate
517 soonest_timelock: u32,
518 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
519 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
522 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
523 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
524 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
525 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
526 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
527 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
528 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
530 tx_material.write(writer)?;
536 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
537 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
538 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
539 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
540 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
541 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
542 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
543 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
544 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
545 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
546 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
548 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
552 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
553 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
555 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
556 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
558 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
559 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
561 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
562 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
564 key_storage: Storage,
565 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
566 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
567 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
568 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
570 our_to_self_delay: u16,
571 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
573 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
574 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
575 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
576 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
577 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
578 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
579 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
580 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
581 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
582 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
583 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
584 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
585 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
587 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
588 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
589 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
590 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
591 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
592 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
594 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
596 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
598 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
600 destination_script: Script,
601 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
602 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
603 // scan every commitment transaction for that
604 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
606 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
607 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
608 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
609 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
610 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
611 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
612 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
613 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
614 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
615 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
616 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
617 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
619 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
620 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
621 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
622 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
623 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
624 // block with output gets disconnected.
625 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
627 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
628 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
629 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
630 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
632 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
633 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
634 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
635 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
636 // the full block_connected).
637 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
638 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
642 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
643 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
645 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
646 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
648 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
649 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
651 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
652 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
654 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
658 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
664 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
677 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
678 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
679 /// underlying object
680 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
681 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
682 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
683 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
684 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
685 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
686 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
687 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
688 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
689 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
690 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
691 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
692 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
693 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
694 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
695 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
696 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
697 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
698 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
699 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
700 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
704 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
705 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
714 impl ChannelMonitor {
715 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
717 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
719 key_storage: Storage::Local {
720 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
721 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
722 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
723 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
724 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
725 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
726 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
728 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
729 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
731 their_htlc_base_key: None,
732 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
733 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
735 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
736 their_to_self_delay: None,
738 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
739 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
740 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
741 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
743 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
744 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
745 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
747 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
748 destination_script: destination_script,
749 to_remote_rescue: None,
751 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
753 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
755 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
757 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
758 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
763 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
764 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
766 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
767 tx_weight += match inp {
768 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
769 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
770 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
772 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
773 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
774 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
776 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
777 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
778 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
780 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
781 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
782 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
784 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
785 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
786 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
793 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
794 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
795 return current_height + 1
796 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
797 return current_height + 3
803 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
805 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
813 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
814 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
816 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
817 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
818 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
819 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
825 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
826 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
827 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
828 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
829 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
831 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
832 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
833 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
836 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
839 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
841 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
842 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
843 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
844 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
845 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
846 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
852 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
853 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
854 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
855 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
856 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
858 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
859 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
860 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
864 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
865 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
866 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
871 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
878 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
887 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
888 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
889 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
890 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
891 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
892 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
893 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
894 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
896 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
897 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
900 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
901 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
902 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
903 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
904 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
905 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
907 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
908 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
909 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
910 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
911 Some(old_points) => {
912 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
913 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
914 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
915 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
916 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
918 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
921 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
925 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
930 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
931 match self.key_storage {
932 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
933 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
934 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
935 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
937 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
938 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
942 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
946 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
947 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
948 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
949 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
950 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
951 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
952 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
953 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
954 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
955 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
956 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
957 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
958 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
959 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
960 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
961 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
962 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
967 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
968 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
970 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
974 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
975 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
976 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
977 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
980 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
981 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
982 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
983 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
984 match self.key_storage {
985 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
986 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
987 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
988 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
989 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
990 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
991 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
992 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
993 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
996 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
999 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1000 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1003 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1007 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1008 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1009 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1010 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1012 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1013 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1014 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1015 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1016 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1017 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1021 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1022 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1023 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1024 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1025 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1026 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1028 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1029 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1031 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1032 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1034 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1035 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1038 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1042 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1043 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1044 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1045 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1048 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1049 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1050 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1051 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1052 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1053 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1054 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1055 match self.key_storage {
1056 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1057 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1059 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1060 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1065 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1066 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
1067 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1068 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1071 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
1072 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1075 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1076 match self.key_storage {
1077 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1078 *funding_info = None;
1080 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1081 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1086 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1087 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1088 match self.key_storage {
1089 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1090 match funding_info {
1091 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1095 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1101 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1102 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1103 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1104 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1105 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1106 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1107 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1108 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1109 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1115 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
1116 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1117 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
1118 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
1119 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1120 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1122 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
1123 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
1125 macro_rules! write_option {
1132 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
1137 match self.key_storage {
1138 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
1139 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1140 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
1141 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
1142 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
1143 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
1144 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
1145 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
1146 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
1147 match funding_info {
1148 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
1149 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
1150 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
1151 script.write(writer)?;
1154 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1157 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1158 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1160 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1163 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1164 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1166 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1167 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1168 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1169 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1170 match second_option {
1171 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1172 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1175 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1180 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1184 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1185 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1187 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1188 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1189 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1192 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1193 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1194 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1195 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1196 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1197 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1198 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1202 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1203 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1204 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1205 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1206 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1207 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1208 write_option!(htlc_source);
1212 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1213 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1214 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1215 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1216 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1217 for script in txouts.iter() {
1218 script.write(writer)?;
1222 if for_local_storage {
1223 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1224 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1225 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1226 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1229 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1232 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1233 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1234 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1236 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1237 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1241 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1242 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1243 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1244 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1246 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1247 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1248 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1249 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1250 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1252 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1253 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1257 write_option!(htlc_source);
1262 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1263 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1264 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1266 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1269 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1270 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1271 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1273 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1276 if for_local_storage {
1277 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1279 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1282 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1283 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1284 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1287 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1288 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1289 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1290 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1291 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1292 local_key.write(writer)?;
1294 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1297 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
1298 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
1299 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
1300 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
1303 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1304 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1305 outp.write(writer)?;
1306 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
1307 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
1310 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1311 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1312 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1313 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1314 for ev in events.iter() {
1316 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
1317 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1318 claim_request.write(writer)?;
1320 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1321 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1322 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1323 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1332 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1334 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1335 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1336 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1337 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1338 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1339 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1340 self.write(writer, true)
1343 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1345 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1346 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1347 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1348 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1349 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1350 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1351 self.write(writer, false)
1354 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1355 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1356 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1357 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1358 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1361 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1365 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1366 //TODO This can be optimized?
1367 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1368 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1376 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1377 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1380 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1381 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1382 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1383 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1386 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1387 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1388 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1389 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1390 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1391 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1392 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1393 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1394 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1395 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1396 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1397 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1399 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1400 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1402 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1403 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1406 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1411 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1412 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1413 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1414 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1415 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1416 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1417 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1418 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1419 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1420 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1422 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1423 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1424 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1425 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1429 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1430 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1431 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1432 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1435 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1436 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1438 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1439 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1440 // script_pubkey version.
1441 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1442 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1445 let mut total_value = 0;
1446 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1447 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1448 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1450 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1451 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1453 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1454 txid: commitment_txid,
1457 script_sig: Script::new(),
1458 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1459 witness: Vec::new(),
1461 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1462 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1463 total_value += outp.value;
1464 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1465 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1466 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1467 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1468 output: outp.clone(),
1473 macro_rules! sign_input {
1474 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1476 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1477 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1478 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1479 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1480 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1482 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1483 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1484 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1486 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1490 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1491 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1492 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1493 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1495 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1497 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1498 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1503 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1504 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1506 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1507 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1508 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1509 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1510 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1511 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1512 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1515 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1516 txid: commitment_txid,
1517 vout: transaction_output_index,
1519 script_sig: Script::new(),
1520 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1521 witness: Vec::new(),
1523 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1525 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1526 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1527 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1529 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1533 output: vec!(TxOut {
1534 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1535 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1538 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1539 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1540 let mut used_feerate;
1541 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1542 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1543 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1544 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1545 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1546 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1547 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1548 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1552 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1559 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1560 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1561 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1562 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1563 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1565 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1566 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1567 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1568 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1569 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1570 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1571 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1573 let e = entry.get_mut();
1574 e.retain(|ref event| {
1576 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1577 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1582 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1585 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1593 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1594 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1595 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1597 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1598 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1601 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1603 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1605 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1606 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1609 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1616 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1618 let mut used_feerate;
1619 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1620 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1623 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1625 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1626 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1627 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1628 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1629 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1632 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1633 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1634 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1635 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1636 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1637 if info.2 < soonest_timelock {
1638 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1641 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
1642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1646 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1648 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1649 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1650 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1652 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1653 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1654 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1655 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1656 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1657 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1658 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1659 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1661 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1662 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1664 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1666 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1667 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1668 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1669 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1670 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1671 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1672 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1673 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1674 // payment_preimage.
1675 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1676 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1677 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1678 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1680 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1681 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1685 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1686 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1688 let e = entry.get_mut();
1689 e.retain(|ref event| {
1691 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1692 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1697 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1700 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1708 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1709 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1710 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1712 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1713 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1717 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1718 let revocation_point_option =
1719 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1720 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1721 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1723 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1724 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1725 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1726 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1727 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1729 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1730 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1731 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1734 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1735 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1736 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1739 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1740 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1741 match self.key_storage {
1742 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1743 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1744 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1745 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1747 output: outp.clone(),
1751 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1753 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1757 let mut total_value = 0;
1758 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1759 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1760 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1762 macro_rules! sign_input {
1763 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1765 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1766 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1767 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1768 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1769 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1770 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1771 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1773 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1777 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1778 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1779 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1780 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1781 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1786 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1787 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1788 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1789 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1790 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1791 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1792 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1794 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1797 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1798 txid: commitment_txid,
1799 vout: transaction_output_index,
1801 script_sig: Script::new(),
1802 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1803 witness: Vec::new(),
1805 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1807 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1808 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1809 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1811 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1815 output: vec!(TxOut {
1816 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1817 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1820 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1821 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1822 let mut used_feerate;
1823 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1824 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1825 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1826 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1827 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1828 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1829 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1831 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1832 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1833 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1834 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1835 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1838 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1844 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1845 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1847 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1848 txid: commitment_txid,
1849 vout: transaction_output_index,
1851 script_sig: Script::new(),
1852 sequence: idx as u32,
1853 witness: Vec::new(),
1855 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1857 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1859 output: vec!(TxOut {
1860 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1861 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1864 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1865 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1866 let mut used_feerate;
1867 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1868 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1869 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1870 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1871 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1872 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1873 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1874 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1875 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1880 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1885 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1887 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1888 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1891 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1898 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1900 let mut used_feerate;
1901 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1902 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1905 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1907 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1908 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1909 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1910 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1911 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1914 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1915 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1916 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1917 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1918 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1920 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
1921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1924 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1925 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1926 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1927 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1929 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1932 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1933 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1934 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1935 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1936 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1937 key: local_key.clone(),
1938 output: outp.clone(),
1944 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1947 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1948 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1949 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1953 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1954 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1957 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1962 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1963 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1964 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1965 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1966 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1967 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1969 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1970 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1973 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1974 None => return (None, None),
1975 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1977 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1978 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1979 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1981 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1984 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1986 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1990 script_sig: Script::new(),
1991 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1992 witness: Vec::new(),
1994 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1997 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1998 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1999 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2003 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2009 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2010 let mut used_feerate;
2011 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2012 return (None, None);
2015 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2017 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2018 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2019 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2020 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2021 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2023 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2027 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2028 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2029 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2030 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2032 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2033 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2034 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2035 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
2036 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2037 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2038 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2039 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2043 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2044 } else { (None, None) }
2047 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2048 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2049 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2050 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2051 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2053 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2054 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2055 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
2056 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
2057 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2058 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2059 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2060 key: local_delayedkey,
2061 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2062 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2063 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2071 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2072 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2073 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2074 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2075 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
2080 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2081 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2082 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
2084 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2085 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2087 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2089 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2090 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2091 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2092 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2094 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
2095 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2096 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
2098 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2099 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2100 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2101 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2102 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2103 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2104 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2106 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2107 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2108 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2110 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2112 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2113 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2114 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2115 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2117 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
2118 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2119 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
2121 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2122 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2123 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2124 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2125 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2126 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2127 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2130 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2131 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2135 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2138 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2139 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2140 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2141 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2142 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2143 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2144 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2145 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2147 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2148 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2149 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2150 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2152 let e = entry.get_mut();
2153 e.retain(|ref event| {
2155 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2156 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2161 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2164 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2170 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2171 ($updates: expr) => {
2172 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2173 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2174 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2175 for claim in $updates.3 {
2176 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2184 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2185 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2187 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2188 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2190 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2191 match self.key_storage {
2192 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2193 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2195 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2196 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2201 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2202 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2204 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2205 match self.key_storage {
2206 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2207 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2209 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2210 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2216 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2217 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2218 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2219 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2220 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2221 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2229 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2230 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2232 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2233 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2237 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2240 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2241 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2242 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2243 match self.key_storage {
2244 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2245 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2246 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2247 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2248 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2249 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2250 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2251 output: output.clone(),
2256 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2257 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2258 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2265 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2266 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2267 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2268 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2269 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2270 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2271 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2272 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2273 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2274 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2275 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2276 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2277 match self.key_storage {
2278 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2279 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2280 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2281 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2283 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2291 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2292 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2293 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2294 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2295 let mut bump_candidates = Vec::new();
2296 for tx in txn_matched {
2297 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2298 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2299 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2300 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2302 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2303 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2304 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2305 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2306 funding_info.clone()
2308 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2312 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2313 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2314 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2316 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2317 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2318 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2321 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2322 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2324 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2325 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2329 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2330 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2331 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2335 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2336 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2337 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2340 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2341 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2345 for tx in txn.iter() {
2346 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2347 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2350 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2351 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2352 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2353 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2354 if updated.len() > 0 {
2355 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2358 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2359 for inp in &tx.input {
2360 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2361 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2362 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2363 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2364 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2366 let mut claimed_outpoints = Vec::new();
2367 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2368 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2369 claimed_outpoints.push(tx_inp.previous_output.clone());
2372 if claimed_outpoints.len() == 0 && claim_material.per_input_material.len() == tx.input.len() { // If true, register claim request to be removed after reaching a block security height
2373 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2376 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: ancestor_claimable_txid.0.clone()}]);
2379 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2380 for already_claimed in claimed_outpoints {
2381 claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&already_claimed);
2383 // Avoid bump engine using inaccurate feerate due to new transaction size
2384 claim_material.feerate_previous = 0;
2385 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2386 bump_candidates.push((ancestor_claimable_txid.0.clone(), claim_material.clone()));
2389 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2394 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2395 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2396 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx));
2397 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2398 match self.key_storage {
2399 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2400 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2401 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2402 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2403 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2406 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2407 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2410 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2411 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2412 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2413 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2414 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2417 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2418 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2424 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2427 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2428 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2429 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request);
2431 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2432 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2433 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2438 for (ancestor_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2439 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2440 bump_candidates.push((ancestor_claim_txid.clone(), cached_claim_datas.clone()));
2443 for &mut (_, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2444 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &cached_claim_datas, fee_estimator) {
2445 cached_claim_datas.height_timer = new_timer;
2446 cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2447 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2450 for (ancestor_claim_txid, cached_claim_datas) in bump_candidates.drain(..) {
2451 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid, cached_claim_datas);
2453 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2454 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2457 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2458 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2460 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2461 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2463 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v| if v.1 == height { false } else { true });
2464 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2467 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2468 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2469 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2470 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2471 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2472 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2473 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2474 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2475 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2476 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2477 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2478 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2479 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2480 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2481 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2482 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2483 // time out the HTLC first.
2484 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2485 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2486 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2487 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2488 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2489 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2490 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2491 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2492 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2493 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2494 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2495 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2496 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2497 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2498 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2499 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2500 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2501 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2502 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2503 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2504 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2505 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2506 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2507 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2514 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2515 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2518 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2519 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2520 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2521 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2524 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2525 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2526 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2534 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2535 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2536 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2537 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2539 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2540 let mut payment_data = None;
2541 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2542 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2543 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2544 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2546 macro_rules! log_claim {
2547 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2548 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2549 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2550 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2551 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2552 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2553 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2554 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2555 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2556 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2557 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2558 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2560 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2561 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2562 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2563 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2568 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2569 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2570 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2571 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2572 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2573 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2574 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2575 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2584 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2585 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2586 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2587 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2588 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2589 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2590 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2591 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2592 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2593 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2594 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2595 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2596 } else if !$local_tx {
2597 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2598 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2600 if payment_data.is_none() {
2601 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2602 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2606 if payment_data.is_none() {
2607 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2608 continue 'outer_loop;
2615 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2616 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2617 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2618 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2621 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2622 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2623 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2624 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2627 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2628 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2629 "remote commitment tx", false);
2632 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2633 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2634 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2635 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2636 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2637 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2638 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2639 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2640 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2641 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2643 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2644 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2646 let e = entry.get_mut();
2647 e.retain(|ref event| {
2649 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2650 return htlc_update.0 != source
2655 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2658 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2667 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2668 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2669 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2670 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2671 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2672 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2674 previous_output: *outp,
2675 script_sig: Script::new(),
2676 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2677 witness: Vec::new(),
2680 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2684 output: vec![TxOut {
2685 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2690 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2691 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2693 let mut used_feerate;
2694 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2695 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2696 let mut value = $amount;
2697 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2698 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2701 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2704 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2706 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2708 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2714 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2715 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2716 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2717 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2718 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2719 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2720 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2724 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2729 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2730 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2732 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2733 match per_outp_material {
2734 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2735 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { &[] });
2738 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2739 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2742 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2746 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2748 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2749 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2751 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2753 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2755 new_feerate = feerate;
2759 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2761 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2762 match per_outp_material {
2763 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2764 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2765 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2766 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2767 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2768 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2770 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2772 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2774 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2775 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2777 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2778 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2779 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2780 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2781 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2782 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2783 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2784 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
2785 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
2787 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
2789 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2790 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2792 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
2793 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
2794 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
2795 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
2800 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
2801 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
2805 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2807 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2808 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2810 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2814 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2819 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2820 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2821 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2822 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2825 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2827 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2829 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2830 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2831 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2832 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2833 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2834 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2835 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2836 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2837 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2838 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2839 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2840 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2842 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2843 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2844 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2846 revocation_base_key,
2848 delayed_payment_base_key,
2851 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2852 latest_per_commitment_point,
2854 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2855 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2858 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2861 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2862 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2864 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2865 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2869 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2870 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2871 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2872 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2874 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2879 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2880 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2882 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2883 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2884 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2885 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2888 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2891 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2892 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2893 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2894 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2895 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2897 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2898 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2904 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2905 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2906 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2907 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2908 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2909 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2910 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2911 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2913 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2914 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2918 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2919 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2920 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2921 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2922 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2923 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2924 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2925 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2926 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2928 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2929 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2933 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2934 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2935 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2936 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2937 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2938 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2943 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2946 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2949 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2950 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2954 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2955 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2956 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2959 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2960 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2961 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2962 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2963 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2965 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2966 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2967 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2968 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2969 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2971 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2972 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2974 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2979 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2986 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2989 Some(read_local_tx!())
2991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2994 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2997 Some(read_local_tx!())
2999 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3002 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3004 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3005 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3006 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3007 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3008 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3009 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3010 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3014 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3015 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3016 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3019 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3020 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3021 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3023 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3026 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3027 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3028 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3029 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3032 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3033 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3034 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3035 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3036 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3037 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3038 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3041 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3043 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3044 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3045 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3046 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3047 for _ in 0..events_len {
3048 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3050 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3051 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3056 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3057 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3058 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3059 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3062 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3066 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3069 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3070 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3073 their_htlc_base_key,
3074 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3075 their_cur_revocation_points,
3078 their_to_self_delay,
3081 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3082 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3083 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3085 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3086 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3087 current_remote_commitment_number,
3094 pending_claim_requests,
3096 claimable_outpoints,
3098 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3110 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3111 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3112 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3113 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3114 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3115 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3116 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3117 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3118 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3120 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3121 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3123 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
3124 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3125 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3126 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3127 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3131 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3132 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3133 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3134 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
3135 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3136 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3138 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3140 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3141 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3142 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3145 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3146 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3151 // insert_secret correct sequence
3152 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3155 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3156 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3157 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3160 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3161 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3162 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3165 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3166 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3167 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3170 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3171 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3172 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3175 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3176 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3177 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3180 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3181 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3182 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3185 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3186 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3187 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3190 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3191 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3192 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3197 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3198 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3201 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3202 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3203 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3206 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3207 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3208 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3209 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3213 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3214 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3217 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3218 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3219 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3222 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3223 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3224 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3227 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3228 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3229 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3232 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3233 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3234 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3235 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3239 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3240 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3243 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3244 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3245 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3248 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3249 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3250 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3253 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3254 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3255 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3258 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3259 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3260 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3261 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3265 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3266 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3269 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3270 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3271 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3274 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3275 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3276 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3279 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3280 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3281 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3284 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3285 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3286 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3289 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3290 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3291 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3294 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3295 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3296 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3299 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3300 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3301 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3304 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3305 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3306 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3307 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3311 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3312 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3315 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3316 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3317 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3320 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3321 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3322 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3325 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3326 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3327 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3330 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3331 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3332 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3335 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3336 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3337 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3340 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3341 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3342 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3343 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3347 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3348 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3351 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3352 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3353 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3356 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3357 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3358 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3361 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3362 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3363 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3366 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3367 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3368 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3371 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3372 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3373 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3376 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3377 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3378 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3381 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3382 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3383 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3386 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3387 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3388 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3389 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3393 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3394 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3397 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3398 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3399 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3402 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3403 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3404 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3407 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3408 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3409 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3412 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3413 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3414 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3417 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3418 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3419 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3422 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3423 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3424 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3427 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3428 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3429 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3432 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3433 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3434 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3435 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3439 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3440 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3443 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3444 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3445 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3448 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3449 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3450 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3453 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3454 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3455 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3458 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3459 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3460 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3463 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3464 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3465 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3468 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3469 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3470 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3473 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3474 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3475 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3478 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3479 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3480 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3481 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3486 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3487 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3488 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3490 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3491 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3495 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3496 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3497 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3498 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3499 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3500 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3505 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3507 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3509 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3511 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3512 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3513 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3514 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3518 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3519 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3521 let mut res = Vec::new();
3522 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3523 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3527 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3528 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3535 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3536 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3538 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3539 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3545 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3546 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3547 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3548 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3553 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3555 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3556 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3558 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3559 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3560 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3561 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3562 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3563 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3564 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3567 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3568 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3569 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3570 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3571 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3572 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3573 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3575 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3576 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3577 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3578 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3579 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3580 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3582 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3583 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3584 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3585 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3586 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3587 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3588 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3589 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3591 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3592 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3593 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3594 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3595 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3596 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3600 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3601 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3602 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3604 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3605 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3606 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3607 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3609 macro_rules! sign_input {
3610 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3611 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3612 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3614 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3615 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3616 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3618 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3619 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3620 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3621 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3622 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3623 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3624 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3625 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3626 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3627 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3628 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3629 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3631 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3633 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3634 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3635 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3636 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3640 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3641 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3643 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3644 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3646 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3647 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3651 script_sig: Script::new(),
3652 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3653 witness: Vec::new(),
3656 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3657 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3660 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3661 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3662 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3663 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3664 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3666 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3668 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3669 claim_tx.input.clear();
3670 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3672 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3673 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3677 script_sig: Script::new(),
3678 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3679 witness: Vec::new(),
3682 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3683 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3684 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3685 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3686 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3688 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3690 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3691 claim_tx.input.clear();
3692 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3693 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3694 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3698 script_sig: Script::new(),
3699 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3700 witness: Vec::new(),
3702 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3703 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3704 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3705 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3706 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3708 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3711 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.