1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
29 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
32 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
33 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
37 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
41 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
42 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
43 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
44 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
45 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
46 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
47 use util::logger::Logger;
48 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
49 use util::{byte_utils, events};
51 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
53 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
56 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
57 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
58 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
61 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
62 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
63 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
64 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
65 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
67 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
68 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
69 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
73 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
74 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
75 self.update_id.write(w)?;
76 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
77 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
78 update_step.write(w)?;
83 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
84 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
85 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
86 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
87 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
89 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
91 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
95 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
97 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
98 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
99 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
101 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
102 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
103 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
104 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
106 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
107 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
108 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
110 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
111 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
112 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
113 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
114 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
115 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
118 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
119 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
122 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
123 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
124 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
125 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
126 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
129 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
130 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
131 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
133 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
134 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
135 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
136 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
138 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
143 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
144 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
145 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
147 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
149 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
151 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
152 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
153 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
154 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
155 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
157 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
159 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
161 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
162 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
164 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
166 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
167 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
168 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
170 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
171 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
172 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref>
173 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
174 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
176 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
179 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
186 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send>
187 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
188 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
191 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
193 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) {
194 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
196 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
197 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
198 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
200 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
201 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
202 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
209 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
210 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
211 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
212 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
213 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
218 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
219 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
220 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
222 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
224 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
225 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
226 pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C> {
227 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
228 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
232 fee_estimator: feeest,
238 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
239 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
240 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
241 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
246 let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
248 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
249 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as u32), &funding_txo.1);
250 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
251 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
252 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
256 entry.insert(monitor);
260 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
261 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
262 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
263 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
264 Some(orig_monitor) => {
265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
266 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
268 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
273 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
274 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
277 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
279 type Keys = ChanSigner;
281 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
282 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
284 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
288 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
289 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
291 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
295 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
296 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
297 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
298 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
300 pending_htlcs_updated
304 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
305 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
306 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
308 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
310 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
311 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
312 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
313 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
319 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
320 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
321 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
322 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
323 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
324 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
325 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
326 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
327 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
328 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
329 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
330 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
331 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
332 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
333 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
334 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
335 /// accurate block height.
336 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
337 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
338 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
339 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
340 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
341 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
342 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
343 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
344 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
345 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
346 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
347 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
348 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
350 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
351 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
352 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
354 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
355 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
356 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
357 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
359 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
360 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
362 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
363 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
364 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
366 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
367 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
368 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
370 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
371 struct LocalSignedTx {
372 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
374 revocation_key: PublicKey,
375 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
376 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
377 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
378 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
380 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
383 /// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
384 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
386 struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
387 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
388 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
389 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
390 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
393 impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
394 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
395 self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
396 self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
397 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?;
398 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
399 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
400 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
401 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
402 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
409 impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
410 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
411 let remote_commitment_transaction = {
412 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
413 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
414 let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
415 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
416 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
417 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
418 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
419 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
420 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
421 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
422 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
425 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
429 RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
430 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
431 remote_htlc_base_key,
436 Ok(remote_commitment_transaction)
440 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
441 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
442 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
443 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
444 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
446 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
447 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
448 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
449 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
450 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
452 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
453 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
456 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
457 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
458 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
459 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
460 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
463 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
467 funding_redeemscript: Script,
471 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
472 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
474 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => {
475 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
476 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
477 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
478 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
479 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
480 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
481 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
483 on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
485 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
486 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
487 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
488 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
489 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
490 preimage.write(writer)?;
493 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
494 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
495 preimage.write(writer)?;
496 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
498 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
499 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
500 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
507 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
508 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
509 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
511 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
512 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
513 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
514 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
515 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
516 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
517 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
518 let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
519 InputMaterial::Revoked {
520 per_commitment_point,
521 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
522 remote_htlc_base_key,
531 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
532 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
533 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
534 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
535 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
536 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
537 per_commitment_point,
538 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
539 remote_htlc_base_key,
545 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
546 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
547 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
553 InputMaterial::Funding {
554 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
557 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
563 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
564 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
565 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
566 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
567 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
568 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
569 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
570 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
571 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
572 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
573 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
574 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
575 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
576 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
577 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
578 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
579 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
580 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
581 // and satisfy witness program.
582 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
585 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
586 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
587 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
589 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
590 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
591 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
593 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
596 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
600 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
601 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
603 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
605 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
606 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
607 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
608 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
610 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
611 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
612 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
613 commitment_number: u64,
614 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
617 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
623 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
624 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
626 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
627 /// think we've fallen behind!
628 should_broadcast: bool,
632 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
633 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
635 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
637 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
638 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
639 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
645 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
647 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
648 commitment_number.write(w)?;
649 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
650 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
651 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
653 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
656 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
658 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
660 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
665 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
667 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
673 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
674 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
675 match Readable::read(r)? {
677 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
678 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
680 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
681 let mut res = Vec::new();
683 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
690 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
691 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
692 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
693 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
695 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
696 let mut res = Vec::new();
698 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
705 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
706 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
710 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
711 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
712 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
716 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
717 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
720 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
725 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
726 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
728 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
729 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
731 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
732 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
733 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
734 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
735 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
736 latest_update_id: u64,
737 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
739 destination_script: Script,
740 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
741 remote_payment_script: Script,
742 shutdown_script: Script,
745 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
746 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
747 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
749 remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction,
750 funding_redeemscript: Script,
751 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
752 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
753 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
755 on_local_tx_csv: u16,
757 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
758 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
759 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
760 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
761 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
762 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
763 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
764 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
765 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
766 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
767 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
768 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
769 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
771 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
772 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
773 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
774 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
775 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
776 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
778 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
780 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
781 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
783 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
785 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
787 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
788 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
790 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
791 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
792 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
793 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
795 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
796 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
797 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
798 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
799 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
802 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
804 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
806 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
807 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
808 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
809 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
811 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
812 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
813 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
814 local_tx_signed: bool,
816 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
817 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
818 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
819 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
820 // the full block_connected).
821 pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
822 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
825 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
826 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
827 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
830 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
831 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
832 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
833 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
834 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
835 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
837 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
838 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
839 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
840 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
842 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
843 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
844 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
845 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
846 /// all registered listeners in one go.
847 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
848 /// The concrete type which signs for transactions and provides access to our channel public
850 type Keys: ChannelKeys;
852 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
854 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
855 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
856 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
858 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
859 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
860 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
862 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
863 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
864 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<Self::Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
866 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
868 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
869 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
870 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
872 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
873 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
874 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
876 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
877 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
878 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
880 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
881 /// with success or failure.
883 /// You should probably just call through to
884 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
886 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
889 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
890 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
891 /// underlying object
892 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
893 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
894 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
895 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
896 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
897 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
898 self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script ||
899 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
900 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
901 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
902 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
903 self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache ||
904 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
905 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
906 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
907 self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv ||
908 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
909 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
910 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
911 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
912 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
913 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
914 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
915 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
916 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
917 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
918 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
919 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
920 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
921 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
922 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
931 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
932 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
934 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
935 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
936 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
937 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
938 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
939 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
940 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
941 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
942 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
943 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
945 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
947 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
948 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
950 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
951 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
952 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
953 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
954 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
955 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
957 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
960 self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?;
961 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
963 self.keys.write(writer)?;
964 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
965 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
966 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
967 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
968 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
970 self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
971 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
972 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
974 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
975 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
976 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
977 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
978 match second_option {
979 Some(second_pubkey) => {
980 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
983 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
988 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
992 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?;
994 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
996 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
997 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
998 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
999 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1000 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1001 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1002 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1006 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1007 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1008 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1009 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1010 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1011 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1012 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1016 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1017 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1018 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1019 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1020 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1021 for script in txouts.iter() {
1022 script.write(writer)?;
1026 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1027 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1028 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1029 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1032 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1033 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1034 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
1035 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1036 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1037 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1038 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1039 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1041 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1042 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1043 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1044 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1045 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1047 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1051 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
1056 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1057 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1058 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1060 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1063 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1065 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1066 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
1068 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1069 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1070 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1073 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1074 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1075 data.write(writer)?;
1078 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1079 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1080 event.write(writer)?;
1083 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1085 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1086 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1087 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1088 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1089 for ev in events.iter() {
1091 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1093 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1094 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1096 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1098 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1104 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1105 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1106 txid.write(writer)?;
1107 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1108 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1109 script.write(writer)?;
1112 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1114 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1115 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1121 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1122 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1123 on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1124 remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1125 on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1126 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1127 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1129 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1130 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1131 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1132 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1133 let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1135 let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1137 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv);
1139 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1140 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1141 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1142 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1143 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1144 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1145 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1146 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1147 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1148 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1149 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1151 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1152 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1153 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1154 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1155 // now but we should consider it later.
1156 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1159 latest_update_id: 0,
1160 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1162 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1163 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1164 remote_payment_script,
1169 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1170 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1173 funding_redeemscript,
1174 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1175 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1179 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1180 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1181 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1182 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1184 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1185 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1186 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1187 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1189 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1190 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1191 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1193 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1194 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1198 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1199 local_tx_signed: false,
1201 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1202 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1206 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1207 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1208 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1209 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1210 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1211 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1214 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1215 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1216 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1217 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1222 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1223 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1224 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1225 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1226 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1228 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1229 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1230 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1234 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1235 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1236 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1241 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1248 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1257 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1258 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1259 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1260 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1261 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1262 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1263 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1264 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1266 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1267 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1270 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1271 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1272 log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1273 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1274 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1275 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1276 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1277 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1278 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1279 Some(old_points) => {
1280 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1281 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1282 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1283 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1284 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1286 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1289 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1293 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1296 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1297 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1298 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1302 self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1305 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1306 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1307 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1308 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1309 /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called.
1310 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1311 if self.local_tx_signed {
1312 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1314 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1315 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1316 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1317 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1319 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1320 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1321 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1322 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1323 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1324 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1325 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1327 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1328 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1329 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1330 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1331 // now but we should consider it later.
1332 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1333 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1335 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1336 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1337 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1341 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1342 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1343 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1344 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1347 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1348 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1351 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1352 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1356 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1357 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
1358 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1360 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1361 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1362 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1364 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1365 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1366 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1367 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1368 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1369 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1370 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1373 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1377 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1380 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1381 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1382 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1385 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1386 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1388 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1390 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1391 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1392 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1394 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1395 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1396 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1397 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1398 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1399 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1400 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1401 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1402 if should_broadcast {
1403 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1405 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1410 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1414 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1416 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1417 self.latest_update_id
1420 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1421 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1425 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1426 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1427 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1428 &self.outputs_to_watch
1431 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1432 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1433 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1434 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1435 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1436 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1437 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1438 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1439 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1445 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1446 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1447 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1448 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1449 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1453 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1456 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1457 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1458 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1459 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1460 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1461 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1465 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1466 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1467 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1470 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1471 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1474 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1475 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1478 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1479 self.current_local_commitment_number
1482 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1483 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1484 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1485 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1486 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1487 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1488 fn check_spend_remote_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1489 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1490 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1491 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1492 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1494 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1495 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1497 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1498 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1501 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1506 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1507 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1508 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1509 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1510 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1511 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1512 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key));
1514 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1515 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1517 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1518 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1519 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1520 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1521 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1525 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1526 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1527 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1528 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1529 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1530 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1531 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1533 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1534 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1539 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1540 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1541 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1542 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1543 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1544 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1546 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1547 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1548 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1549 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1550 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1551 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1552 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1554 let e = entry.get_mut();
1555 e.retain(|ref event| {
1557 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1558 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1563 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1566 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1574 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1575 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1577 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1578 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1580 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1582 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1583 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1584 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1585 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1586 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1587 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1588 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1590 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1591 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1593 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1595 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1596 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1597 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1598 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1599 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1600 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1601 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1602 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1603 // payment_preimage.
1604 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1605 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1606 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1607 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1609 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1610 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1614 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1615 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1617 let e = entry.get_mut();
1618 e.retain(|ref event| {
1620 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1621 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1626 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1629 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1637 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1638 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1640 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1641 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1644 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1645 let revocation_point_option =
1646 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1647 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1648 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1650 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1651 self.remote_payment_script = {
1652 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1653 // script_pubkey version
1654 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1655 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1658 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1659 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1660 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1661 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1662 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1663 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1665 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1666 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1667 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1668 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1669 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1676 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1679 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1680 fn check_spend_remote_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1681 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1682 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1683 return (Vec::new(), None)
1686 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1687 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1690 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1695 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1696 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1697 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1699 log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1700 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv };
1701 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1702 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1705 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1706 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1707 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1709 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1710 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1712 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1713 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1714 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1715 witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
1716 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1717 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1718 Some(preimage.clone())
1720 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1724 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1726 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1730 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1733 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1734 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1735 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1736 fn check_spend_local_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1737 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1738 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1739 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1741 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1742 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1743 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1744 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1746 let e = entry.get_mut();
1747 e.retain(|ref event| {
1749 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1750 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1755 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1758 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1764 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1765 ($updates: expr) => {
1766 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1767 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1768 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1772 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1773 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1775 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1777 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1778 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1779 append_onchain_update!(res);
1780 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1781 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1783 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1784 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1785 append_onchain_update!(res);
1789 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1790 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1791 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1792 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1793 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1794 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1802 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1803 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1804 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1808 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1811 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1812 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1813 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1814 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1815 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1816 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1817 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1818 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1819 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1820 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1821 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1822 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1823 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1824 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1825 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1826 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1827 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1828 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1829 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1830 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1834 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1835 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1840 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1841 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1847 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1848 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1849 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1850 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1851 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1852 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1853 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1854 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1855 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1856 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1857 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1858 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1859 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1860 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1864 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1865 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1875 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
1876 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
1877 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
1878 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
1880 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1881 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1882 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1885 for tx in txn_matched {
1886 let mut output_val = 0;
1887 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1888 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1889 output_val += out.value;
1890 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1894 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1895 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1896 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1897 for tx in txn_matched {
1898 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1899 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1900 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1901 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1903 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1904 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1905 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1906 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1907 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1908 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1910 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1911 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1912 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1913 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1915 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1917 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1920 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1921 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1922 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1923 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1924 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1929 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1930 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1931 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1932 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1934 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1936 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1937 if should_broadcast {
1938 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1940 if should_broadcast {
1941 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1942 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1943 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1944 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1946 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1949 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1952 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1953 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1954 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1955 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1956 payment_preimage: None,
1957 source: htlc_update.0,
1960 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1961 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1962 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1963 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1969 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1971 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1972 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1973 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1979 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1980 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1981 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1984 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1985 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1987 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1988 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1991 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1993 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1996 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1997 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1998 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1999 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2000 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2001 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2002 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2003 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2004 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2005 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2006 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2007 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2008 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2009 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2010 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2011 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2012 // time out the HTLC first.
2013 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2014 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2015 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2016 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2017 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2018 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2019 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2020 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2021 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2022 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2023 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2024 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2025 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2026 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2027 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2028 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2029 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2030 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2031 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2032 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2033 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2034 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2035 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2036 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2043 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2045 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
2046 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2047 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2050 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2051 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2052 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2059 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2060 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2061 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2062 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2063 let mut payment_data = None;
2064 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2065 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2066 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2067 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2069 macro_rules! log_claim {
2070 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2071 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2072 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2073 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2074 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2075 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2076 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2077 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2078 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2079 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2080 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2081 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2083 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2084 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2085 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2086 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2091 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2092 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2093 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2094 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2095 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2096 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2097 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2098 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2107 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2108 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2109 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2110 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2111 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2112 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2113 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2114 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2115 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2116 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2117 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2118 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2119 } else if !$local_tx {
2120 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2121 if payment_data.is_none() {
2122 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2125 if payment_data.is_none() {
2126 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2127 continue 'outer_loop;
2134 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2135 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2136 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2138 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2139 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2140 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2141 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2144 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2145 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2146 "remote commitment tx", false);
2149 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2150 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2151 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2152 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2153 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2154 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2155 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2156 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2158 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2162 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2163 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2164 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2165 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2167 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2172 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2173 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2175 let e = entry.get_mut();
2176 e.retain(|ref event| {
2178 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2179 return htlc_update.0 != source
2184 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2186 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2187 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2195 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2196 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2197 let mut spendable_output = None;
2198 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2199 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2200 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2201 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2202 output: outp.clone(),
2205 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2206 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2207 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2208 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2209 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2210 to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv,
2211 output: outp.clone(),
2212 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2213 remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2217 } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2218 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
2219 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2220 output: outp.clone(),
2221 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2224 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2225 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2226 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2227 output: outp.clone(),
2231 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2232 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2233 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2235 let e = entry.get_mut();
2236 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2239 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2246 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2248 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2249 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2250 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2254 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2259 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2260 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2261 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2262 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2265 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2266 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2268 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2269 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2271 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2272 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2273 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2274 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2277 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2279 let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2280 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2282 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2283 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2284 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2285 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2286 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2287 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2289 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2290 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2291 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2293 let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2294 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2295 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2297 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2298 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2302 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2303 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2304 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2305 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2307 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2312 let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2314 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2316 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2319 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2320 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2321 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2322 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2323 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2325 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2326 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2332 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2334 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2335 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2336 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2337 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2338 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2339 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2341 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2346 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2347 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2348 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2349 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2350 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2351 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2352 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2353 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2354 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2356 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2357 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2361 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2362 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2363 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2364 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2365 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2366 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2367 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2371 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2374 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2375 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2376 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2377 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2378 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2379 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2380 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2382 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2383 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2384 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2385 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2386 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2388 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2389 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2391 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2396 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2403 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2406 Some(read_local_tx!())
2408 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2410 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2412 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2413 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2415 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2416 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2417 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2418 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2419 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2420 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2421 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2425 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2426 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2427 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2428 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2431 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2432 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2433 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2434 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2435 pending_events.push(event);
2439 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2441 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2442 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2443 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2444 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2445 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2446 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2447 for _ in 0..events_len {
2448 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2450 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2451 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2452 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2453 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2457 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2458 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2462 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2466 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2469 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2470 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2471 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2472 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2473 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2474 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2475 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2476 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2478 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2479 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2482 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2484 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2485 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2487 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2489 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2492 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2493 remote_payment_script,
2498 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2499 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2502 funding_redeemscript,
2503 channel_value_satoshis,
2504 their_cur_revocation_points,
2509 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2510 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2511 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2513 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2514 current_local_commitment_tx,
2515 current_remote_commitment_number,
2516 current_local_commitment_number,
2519 pending_htlcs_updated,
2522 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2527 lockdown_from_offchain,
2531 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2538 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2539 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2540 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2541 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2542 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2543 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2544 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2545 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2546 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2548 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2549 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2550 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2551 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2553 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2554 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2555 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2556 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2558 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2561 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2562 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2563 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2565 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2566 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2568 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2571 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2572 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2573 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2577 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2578 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2580 let mut res = Vec::new();
2581 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2582 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2586 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2587 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2594 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2595 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2597 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2598 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2604 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2605 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2606 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2607 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2612 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2614 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2615 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2616 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2617 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2618 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2624 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2626 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2627 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2628 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2629 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2630 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2631 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2633 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2634 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2635 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2636 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2637 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2638 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2639 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2642 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2643 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2644 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2645 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2646 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2647 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2648 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2650 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2651 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2652 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2653 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2654 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2655 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2657 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2658 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2659 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2660 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2661 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2662 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2663 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2664 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2666 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2667 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2668 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2669 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2670 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2671 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2675 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2676 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2677 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2679 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2680 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2681 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2682 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2684 macro_rules! sign_input {
2685 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2686 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2687 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2689 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2690 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2691 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2693 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2694 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2695 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2696 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2697 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2698 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2699 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2700 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2701 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2702 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2703 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2704 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2706 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2708 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2709 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2710 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2711 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2715 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2716 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2718 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2719 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2721 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2722 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2726 script_sig: Script::new(),
2727 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2728 witness: Vec::new(),
2731 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2732 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2735 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2736 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2737 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2738 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2739 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2741 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2743 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2744 claim_tx.input.clear();
2745 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2747 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2748 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2752 script_sig: Script::new(),
2753 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2754 witness: Vec::new(),
2757 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2758 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2759 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2760 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2761 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2763 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2765 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2766 claim_tx.input.clear();
2767 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2768 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2769 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2773 script_sig: Script::new(),
2774 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2775 witness: Vec::new(),
2777 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2778 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2779 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2780 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2781 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2783 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2786 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.