1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
113 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
114 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
115 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
116 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
117 /// all registered listeners in one go.
118 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
119 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
121 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
122 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
123 /// any spends of it.
124 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
126 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
127 /// with success or failure backward
128 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
131 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
132 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
134 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
136 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
137 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
138 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
140 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
141 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
142 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
143 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
144 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
146 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
147 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
148 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
149 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
150 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
152 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
155 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
157 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
158 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
159 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
160 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
162 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
163 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
164 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
165 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
166 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
167 outputs: spendable_outputs,
171 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
172 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
173 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
176 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
180 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
181 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
182 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
183 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
185 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
186 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
187 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
188 let mut existing_claim = false;
189 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
190 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
191 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
192 existing_claim = true;
198 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
202 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
207 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
208 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
211 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
212 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
213 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
214 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
215 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
220 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
221 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
222 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
223 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
224 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
225 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
229 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
231 fee_estimator: feeest,
237 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
238 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
239 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
240 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
241 Some(orig_monitor) => {
242 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
243 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
247 match monitor.key_storage {
248 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
251 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
253 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
254 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
255 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
256 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
260 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
261 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
264 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
269 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
270 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
271 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
273 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
277 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
278 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
279 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
280 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
282 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
284 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
289 pending_htlcs_updated
293 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
294 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
295 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
296 let mut ret = Vec::new();
297 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
302 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
303 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
304 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
305 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
306 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
307 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
308 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
309 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
310 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
311 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
312 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
313 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
314 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
315 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
316 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
317 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
318 /// accurate block height.
319 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
320 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
321 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
322 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
323 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
324 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
325 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
326 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
327 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
328 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
329 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
331 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
334 funding_key: SecretKey,
335 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
336 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
337 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
338 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
339 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
340 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
341 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
342 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
345 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
346 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
350 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
351 struct LocalSignedTx {
352 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
354 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
355 revocation_key: PublicKey,
356 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
357 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
358 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
359 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
361 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
365 enum InputDescriptors {
370 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
373 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
374 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
375 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
380 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
388 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
394 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
395 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
401 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
403 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
404 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
405 script.write(writer)?;
406 pubkey.write(writer)?;
407 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
409 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
411 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
413 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
415 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
416 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
417 script.write(writer)?;
419 preimage.write(writer)?;
420 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
421 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
423 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
424 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
425 script.write(writer)?;
426 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
427 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
428 preimage.write(writer)?;
429 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
436 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
437 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
440 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
441 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
442 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
443 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
446 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
448 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
449 InputMaterial::Revoked {
458 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
459 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
460 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
461 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
462 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
463 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
472 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
473 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
474 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
475 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
476 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
477 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
479 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
484 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
490 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
491 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
492 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
494 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
495 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
497 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
499 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
500 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
501 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
503 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
505 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
506 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
507 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
508 ContentiousOutpoint {
509 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
510 input_material: InputMaterial,
514 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
515 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
516 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
517 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
518 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
520 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
521 feerate_previous: u64,
522 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
523 // a priority of not feerate
524 soonest_timelock: u32,
525 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
526 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
529 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
530 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
531 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
532 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
533 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
534 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
535 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
537 tx_material.write(writer)?;
543 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
544 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
545 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
546 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
547 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
548 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
549 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
550 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
551 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
552 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
553 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
555 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
559 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
560 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
562 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
563 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
565 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
566 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
568 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
569 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
571 key_storage: Storage,
572 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
573 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
574 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
575 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
576 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
577 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
579 our_to_self_delay: u16,
580 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
582 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
583 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
584 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
585 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
586 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
587 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
588 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
589 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
590 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
591 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
592 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
593 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
594 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
596 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
597 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
598 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
599 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
600 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
601 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
603 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
605 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
607 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
609 destination_script: Script,
610 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
611 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
612 // scan every commitment transaction for that
613 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
615 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
616 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
617 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
618 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
619 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
620 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
621 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
622 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
623 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
624 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
625 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
626 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
627 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
629 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
631 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
632 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
633 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
634 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
635 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
636 // block with output gets disconnected.
637 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
638 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
640 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
642 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
643 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
644 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
645 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
647 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
648 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
649 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
650 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
651 // the full block_connected).
652 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
653 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
657 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
658 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
660 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
661 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
663 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
664 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
666 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
667 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
669 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
673 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
679 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
692 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
693 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
694 /// underlying object
695 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
696 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
697 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
698 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
699 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
700 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
701 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
702 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
703 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
704 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
705 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
706 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
707 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
708 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
709 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
710 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
711 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
712 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
713 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
714 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
715 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
716 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
717 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
721 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
722 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
731 impl ChannelMonitor {
732 pub(super) fn new(funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
734 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
736 key_storage: Storage::Local {
737 funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
738 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
739 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
740 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
741 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
742 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
744 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
745 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
747 their_htlc_base_key: None,
748 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
749 funding_redeemscript: None,
750 channel_value_satoshis: None,
751 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
753 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
754 their_to_self_delay: None,
756 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
757 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
758 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
759 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
761 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
762 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
763 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
765 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
766 destination_script: destination_script,
767 to_remote_rescue: None,
769 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
771 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
773 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
775 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
776 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
781 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
782 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
784 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
785 tx_weight += match inp {
786 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
787 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
788 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
790 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
791 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
792 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
794 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
795 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
796 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
798 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
799 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
800 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
802 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
803 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
804 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
811 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
812 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
813 return current_height + 1
814 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
815 return current_height + 3
821 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
823 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
831 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
832 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
834 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
835 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
836 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
837 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
843 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
844 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
845 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
846 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
847 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
849 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
850 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
851 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
854 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
857 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
859 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
860 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
861 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
862 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
863 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
864 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
870 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
871 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
872 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
873 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
874 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
876 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
877 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
878 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
882 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
883 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
884 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
889 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
896 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
905 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
906 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
907 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
908 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
909 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
910 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
911 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
912 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
914 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
915 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
918 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
919 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
920 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
921 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
922 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
923 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
925 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
926 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
927 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
928 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
929 Some(old_points) => {
930 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
931 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
932 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
933 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
934 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
936 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
939 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
943 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
948 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
949 match self.key_storage {
950 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
951 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
952 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
953 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
955 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
956 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
960 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
964 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
965 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
966 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
967 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
968 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
969 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
970 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
971 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
972 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
973 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
975 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
976 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
977 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
978 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
979 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
985 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
986 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
987 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
988 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
991 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
992 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
993 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
994 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
995 match self.key_storage {
996 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
997 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
998 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
999 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1000 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1001 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1002 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1003 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1004 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1007 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1010 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1011 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1014 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1018 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1019 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1020 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1021 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1023 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1024 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1025 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1026 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1027 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1028 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1032 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1033 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1034 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1035 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1036 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1037 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1039 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1040 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1042 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1043 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1045 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1046 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1049 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1053 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1054 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1055 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1056 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1057 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1058 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1059 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1060 match self.key_storage {
1061 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1062 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1064 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1065 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1070 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1071 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1072 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1073 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1074 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1075 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1076 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1077 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1078 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1079 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1082 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1083 match self.key_storage {
1084 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1085 *funding_info = None;
1087 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1088 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1093 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1094 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1095 match self.key_storage {
1096 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1097 match funding_info {
1098 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1102 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1108 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1109 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1110 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1111 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1112 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1113 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1114 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1115 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1116 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1122 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
1123 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1124 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
1125 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
1126 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1127 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1129 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
1130 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
1132 macro_rules! write_option {
1139 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
1144 match self.key_storage {
1145 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
1146 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1147 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
1148 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
1149 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
1150 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
1151 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
1152 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
1153 match funding_info {
1154 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
1155 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
1156 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
1157 script.write(writer)?;
1160 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1163 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1164 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1166 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1169 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1170 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1171 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
1172 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
1174 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1175 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1176 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1177 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1178 match second_option {
1179 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1180 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1183 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1188 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1192 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1193 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1195 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1196 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1197 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1200 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1201 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1202 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1203 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1204 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1205 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1206 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1210 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1211 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1212 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1213 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1214 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1215 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1216 write_option!(htlc_source);
1220 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1221 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1222 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1223 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1224 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1225 for script in txouts.iter() {
1226 script.write(writer)?;
1230 if for_local_storage {
1231 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1232 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1233 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1234 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1237 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1240 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1241 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1242 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
1243 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1244 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1245 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1246 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1247 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1249 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1250 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1251 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1252 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1253 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1255 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1259 write_option!(htlc_source);
1264 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1265 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1266 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1268 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1271 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1272 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1273 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1275 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1278 if for_local_storage {
1279 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1281 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1284 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1285 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1286 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1289 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1290 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1291 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1292 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1293 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1294 local_key.write(writer)?;
1296 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1299 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
1300 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
1301 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
1302 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
1305 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1306 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1307 outp.write(writer)?;
1308 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
1309 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
1312 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1313 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1314 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1315 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1316 for ev in events.iter() {
1318 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
1319 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1320 claim_request.write(writer)?;
1322 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1323 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1324 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1325 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1327 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
1328 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1329 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1330 input_material.write(writer)?;
1339 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1341 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1342 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1343 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1344 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1345 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1346 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1347 self.write(writer, true)
1350 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1352 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1353 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1354 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1355 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1356 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1357 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1358 self.write(writer, false)
1361 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1362 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1363 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1364 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1365 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1368 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1372 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1373 //TODO This can be optimized?
1374 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1375 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1383 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1384 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1387 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1388 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1389 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1390 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1393 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1394 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1395 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1396 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1397 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1398 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1399 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1400 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1401 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1402 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1403 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1404 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1406 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1407 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1409 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1410 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1413 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1418 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1419 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1420 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1421 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1422 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1423 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1424 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1425 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1426 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1427 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1429 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1430 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1431 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1432 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1436 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1437 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1438 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1439 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1442 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1443 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1445 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1446 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1447 // script_pubkey version.
1448 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1449 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1452 let mut total_value = 0;
1453 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1454 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1455 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1457 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1458 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1460 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1461 txid: commitment_txid,
1464 script_sig: Script::new(),
1465 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1466 witness: Vec::new(),
1468 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1469 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1470 total_value += outp.value;
1471 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1472 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1473 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1474 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1475 output: outp.clone(),
1480 macro_rules! sign_input {
1481 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1483 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1484 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1485 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1486 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1487 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1489 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1490 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1491 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1493 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1497 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1498 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1499 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1500 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1502 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1504 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1505 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1510 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1511 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1513 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1514 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1515 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1516 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1517 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1518 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1519 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1522 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1523 txid: commitment_txid,
1524 vout: transaction_output_index,
1526 script_sig: Script::new(),
1527 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1528 witness: Vec::new(),
1530 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1532 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1533 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1534 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1536 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1540 output: vec!(TxOut {
1541 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1542 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1545 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1546 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1547 let mut used_feerate;
1548 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1549 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1550 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1551 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1552 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1553 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1554 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1555 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1559 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1563 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1570 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1571 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1572 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1573 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1574 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1576 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1577 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1578 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1579 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1580 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1581 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1582 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1584 let e = entry.get_mut();
1585 e.retain(|ref event| {
1587 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1588 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1593 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1596 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1604 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1605 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1606 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1608 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1609 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1612 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1614 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1616 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1617 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1620 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1627 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1629 let mut used_feerate;
1630 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1631 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1634 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1636 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1637 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1638 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1639 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1640 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1643 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1644 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1645 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1646 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1647 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1648 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1649 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1654 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1659 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1661 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1662 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1663 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1665 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1666 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1667 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1668 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1669 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1670 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1671 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1672 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1674 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1675 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1677 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1679 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1680 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1681 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1682 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1683 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1684 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1685 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1686 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1687 // payment_preimage.
1688 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1689 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1690 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1691 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1693 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1694 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1698 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1699 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1701 let e = entry.get_mut();
1702 e.retain(|ref event| {
1704 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1705 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1710 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1713 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1721 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1722 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1723 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1725 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1726 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1730 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1731 let revocation_point_option =
1732 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1733 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1734 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1736 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1737 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1738 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1739 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1740 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1742 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1743 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1744 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1747 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1748 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1749 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1752 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1753 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1754 match self.key_storage {
1755 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1756 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1757 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1758 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1760 output: outp.clone(),
1764 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1766 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1770 let mut total_value = 0;
1771 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1772 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1773 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1775 macro_rules! sign_input {
1776 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1778 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1779 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1780 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1781 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1782 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1783 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1784 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1786 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1790 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1791 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1792 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1793 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1794 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1799 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1800 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1801 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1802 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1803 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1804 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1805 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1807 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1810 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1811 txid: commitment_txid,
1812 vout: transaction_output_index,
1814 script_sig: Script::new(),
1815 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1816 witness: Vec::new(),
1818 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1820 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1821 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1822 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1824 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1828 output: vec!(TxOut {
1829 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1830 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1833 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1834 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1835 let mut used_feerate;
1836 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1837 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1838 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1839 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1840 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1841 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1842 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1844 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1845 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1846 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1847 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1851 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1855 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1861 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1862 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1864 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1865 txid: commitment_txid,
1866 vout: transaction_output_index,
1868 script_sig: Script::new(),
1869 sequence: idx as u32,
1870 witness: Vec::new(),
1872 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1874 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1876 output: vec!(TxOut {
1877 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1878 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1881 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1882 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1883 let mut used_feerate;
1884 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1885 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1886 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1887 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1888 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1889 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1890 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1891 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1892 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1896 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1901 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1906 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1908 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1909 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1912 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1919 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1921 let mut used_feerate;
1922 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1923 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1926 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1928 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1929 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1930 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1931 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1932 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1935 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1936 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1937 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1938 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1939 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1940 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1941 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1946 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1950 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1951 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1952 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1953 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1955 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1958 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1959 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1960 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1961 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1962 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1963 key: local_key.clone(),
1964 output: outp.clone(),
1970 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1973 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1974 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1975 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
1976 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1980 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1981 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1984 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1989 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1990 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1991 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1992 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1993 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1994 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1996 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1997 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2000 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2001 None => return (None, None),
2002 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2004 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2005 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2006 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2008 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2011 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2013 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2017 script_sig: Script::new(),
2018 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2019 witness: Vec::new(),
2021 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2024 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2025 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2026 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2030 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2036 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2037 let mut used_feerate;
2038 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2039 return (None, None);
2042 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2044 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2045 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2046 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2047 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2048 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2050 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2054 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2055 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2056 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2057 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2059 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2060 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2061 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2062 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
2063 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2064 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2065 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2066 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2070 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2071 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2072 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2074 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2075 } else { (None, None) }
2078 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2079 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2080 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2081 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2082 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2084 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2085 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2086 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2087 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2088 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2089 key: local_delayedkey,
2090 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2091 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2092 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2098 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2099 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2100 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2101 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2102 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2107 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2108 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2109 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2110 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2112 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2113 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2114 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2115 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2120 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2121 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2122 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2123 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2124 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2125 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2126 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2127 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2129 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2130 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2131 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2132 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2133 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2138 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2139 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2140 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2141 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2142 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2143 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2144 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2145 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2148 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2149 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2154 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2157 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2158 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2159 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2160 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2161 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2162 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2163 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2164 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2166 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2167 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2168 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2169 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2171 let e = entry.get_mut();
2172 e.retain(|ref event| {
2174 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2175 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2180 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2183 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2189 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2190 ($updates: expr) => {
2191 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2192 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2193 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2194 for claim in $updates.3 {
2195 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2203 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2204 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2206 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2207 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2208 match self.key_storage {
2209 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2210 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2216 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2217 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2219 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2220 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2221 match self.key_storage {
2222 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2223 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height));
2225 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2229 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2230 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2231 match self.key_storage {
2232 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2233 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2239 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2240 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2242 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2243 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2244 match self.key_storage {
2245 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2246 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height));
2248 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2253 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2254 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2255 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2256 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2257 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2258 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2266 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2267 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2269 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2270 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2274 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2277 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2278 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2279 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2280 match self.key_storage {
2281 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2282 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2283 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2284 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2285 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2286 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2287 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2288 output: output.clone(),
2293 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2294 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2295 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2302 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2303 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2304 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2305 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2306 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2307 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2308 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2309 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2310 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2311 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2312 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2313 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2314 match self.key_storage {
2315 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2316 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2321 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2322 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2323 match self.key_storage {
2324 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2325 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2326 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2327 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2329 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2337 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2338 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2339 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2340 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2341 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2342 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2343 for tx in txn_matched {
2344 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2345 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2346 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2347 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2349 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2350 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2351 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2352 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2353 funding_info.clone()
2355 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2359 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2360 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2361 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2363 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2364 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2365 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2368 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2369 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2371 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2372 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2376 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2377 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2378 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2382 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2383 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2384 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2387 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2388 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2392 for tx in txn.iter() {
2393 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2394 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2397 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2398 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2399 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2400 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2401 if updated.len() > 0 {
2402 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2405 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2406 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2407 for inp in &tx.input {
2408 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2409 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2410 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2411 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2412 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2414 let mut set_equality = true;
2415 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2416 set_equality = false;
2418 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2419 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2420 set_equality = false;
2425 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2427 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2428 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2430 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2431 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2435 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2441 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2442 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2443 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2445 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2446 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2447 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2448 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2449 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2451 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2452 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2453 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2456 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2457 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2459 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2461 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2465 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2466 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2467 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2469 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2470 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2474 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2479 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2480 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2482 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2483 if should_broadcast {
2484 match self.key_storage {
2485 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2486 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2492 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2493 if should_broadcast {
2494 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2495 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2496 match self.key_storage {
2497 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2498 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2499 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2500 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2501 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2504 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2505 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2508 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2512 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2515 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2516 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2517 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2518 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2519 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2520 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2524 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2525 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2526 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2528 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2529 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2534 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2535 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2536 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2539 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2540 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2541 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2542 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2543 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2544 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2546 } else { unreachable!(); }
2548 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2549 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2550 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2551 } else { unreachable!(); }
2554 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2555 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2558 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
2559 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2560 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2562 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2563 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2564 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2567 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2568 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2569 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2570 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2571 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2572 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2573 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2581 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2582 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2583 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2584 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2585 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2588 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2589 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2591 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2592 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2593 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2594 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2596 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2599 for req in remove_request {
2600 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2602 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2605 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2606 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2607 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2608 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2609 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2610 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2611 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2612 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2613 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2614 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2615 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2616 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2617 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2618 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2619 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2620 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2621 // time out the HTLC first.
2622 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2623 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2624 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2625 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2626 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2627 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2628 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2629 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2630 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2631 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2632 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2633 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2634 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2635 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2636 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2637 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2638 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2639 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2640 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2641 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2642 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2643 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2644 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2645 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2652 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2653 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2656 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2657 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2658 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2659 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2662 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2663 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2664 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2672 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2673 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2674 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2675 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2677 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2678 let mut payment_data = None;
2679 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2680 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2681 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2682 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2684 macro_rules! log_claim {
2685 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2686 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2687 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2688 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2689 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2690 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2691 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2692 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2693 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2694 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2695 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2696 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2698 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2699 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2700 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2701 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2706 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2707 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2708 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2709 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2710 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2711 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2712 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2713 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2722 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2723 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2724 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2725 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2726 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2727 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2728 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2729 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2730 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2731 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2732 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2733 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2734 } else if !$local_tx {
2735 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2736 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2738 if payment_data.is_none() {
2739 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2740 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2744 if payment_data.is_none() {
2745 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2746 continue 'outer_loop;
2753 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2754 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2755 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2756 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2759 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2760 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2761 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2762 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2765 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2766 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2767 "remote commitment tx", false);
2770 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2771 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2772 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2773 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2774 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2775 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2776 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2777 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2778 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2779 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2781 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2782 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2784 let e = entry.get_mut();
2785 e.retain(|ref event| {
2787 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2788 return htlc_update.0 != source
2793 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2796 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2805 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2806 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2807 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2808 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2809 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2810 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2812 previous_output: *outp,
2813 script_sig: Script::new(),
2814 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2815 witness: Vec::new(),
2818 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2822 output: vec![TxOut {
2823 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2828 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2829 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2831 let mut used_feerate;
2832 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2833 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2834 let mut value = $amount;
2835 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2836 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2839 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2842 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2844 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2846 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2852 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2853 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2854 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2855 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2856 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2857 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2858 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2862 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2867 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2868 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2870 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2871 match per_outp_material {
2872 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2873 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { &[] });
2876 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2877 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2880 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2884 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2886 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2887 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2889 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2891 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2893 new_feerate = feerate;
2897 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2899 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2900 match per_outp_material {
2901 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2902 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2903 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2904 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2905 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2906 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2908 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2910 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2912 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2913 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2915 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2916 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2917 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2918 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2919 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2920 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2921 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2922 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
2923 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
2925 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
2927 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2928 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2930 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
2931 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
2932 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
2933 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
2938 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
2939 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
2943 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2945 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2946 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2947 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2948 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2952 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2957 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2958 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2959 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2960 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2963 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2965 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2967 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2968 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2969 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2970 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2971 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2972 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2973 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2974 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2975 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2976 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2977 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2979 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2980 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2981 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2984 revocation_base_key,
2986 delayed_payment_base_key,
2990 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2991 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2994 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2997 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2998 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2999 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3000 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3002 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3003 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3007 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3008 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3009 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3010 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3012 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3017 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3018 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3020 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
3021 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
3022 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
3023 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3026 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3029 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3030 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3031 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3032 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3033 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3035 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3036 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3042 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3043 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3044 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3045 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3046 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3047 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3048 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3049 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3051 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3052 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3056 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3057 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3058 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3059 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3060 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3061 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3062 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3063 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3064 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3066 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3067 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3071 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3072 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3073 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3074 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3075 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3076 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3077 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3081 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3084 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3085 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3086 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3087 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3088 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3089 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3090 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3092 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3093 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3094 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3095 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3096 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3098 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3099 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3101 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3106 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3113 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3116 Some(read_local_tx!())
3118 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3121 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3124 Some(read_local_tx!())
3126 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3129 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3131 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3132 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3133 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3134 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3135 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3136 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3137 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3141 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3142 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3143 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3146 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3147 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3148 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3150 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3153 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3154 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3155 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3156 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3159 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3160 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3161 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3162 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3163 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3164 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3165 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3168 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3169 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3170 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3171 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3172 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3173 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3174 for _ in 0..events_len {
3175 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3177 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3183 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3184 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3185 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3186 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3190 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3191 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3192 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3197 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3201 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3204 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3205 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3208 their_htlc_base_key,
3209 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3210 funding_redeemscript,
3211 channel_value_satoshis,
3212 their_cur_revocation_points,
3215 their_to_self_delay,
3218 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3219 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3220 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3222 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3223 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3224 current_remote_commitment_number,
3231 pending_claim_requests,
3233 claimable_outpoints,
3235 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3247 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3248 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3249 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3250 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3251 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3252 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3253 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3254 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3255 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3257 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3258 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3260 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3261 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3262 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3263 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3264 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3268 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3269 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3270 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3271 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
3272 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3273 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3275 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3277 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3278 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3279 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3282 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3283 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3288 // insert_secret correct sequence
3289 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3292 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3293 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3294 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3297 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3298 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3299 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3302 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3303 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3304 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3307 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3308 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3309 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3312 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3313 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3314 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3317 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3318 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3319 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3322 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3323 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3324 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3327 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3328 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3329 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3334 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3335 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3338 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3339 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3340 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3343 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3344 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3345 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3346 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3350 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3351 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3354 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3355 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3356 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3361 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3369 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3370 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3371 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3372 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3376 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3377 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3380 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3381 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3382 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3385 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3386 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3387 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3390 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3391 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3392 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3395 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3396 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3397 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3398 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3402 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3403 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3406 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3407 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3408 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3411 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3412 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3413 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3416 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3417 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3418 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3421 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3422 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3423 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3426 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3427 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3428 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3431 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3432 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3433 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3436 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3437 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3438 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3441 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3442 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3443 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3444 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3448 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3449 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3452 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3453 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3454 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3457 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3458 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3459 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3462 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3463 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3464 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3467 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3468 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3469 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3472 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3473 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3474 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3477 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3478 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3479 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3480 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3484 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3485 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3488 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3489 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3490 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3493 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3494 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3495 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3498 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3499 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3500 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3503 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3504 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3505 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3508 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3509 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3510 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3513 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3514 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3515 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3518 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3519 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3520 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3523 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3524 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3525 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3526 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3530 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3531 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3534 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3535 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3536 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3539 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3540 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3541 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3551 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3554 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3555 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3556 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3559 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3560 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3561 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3564 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3565 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3566 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3569 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3570 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3571 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3572 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3576 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3577 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3580 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3581 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3582 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3585 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3586 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3587 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3590 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3591 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3592 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3595 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3596 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3597 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3600 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3601 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3602 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3605 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3606 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3607 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3610 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3611 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3612 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3615 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3616 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3617 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3618 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3623 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3624 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3625 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3627 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3628 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3632 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3633 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3634 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3635 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3636 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3637 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3642 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3644 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3646 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3648 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3649 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3650 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3651 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3655 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3656 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3658 let mut res = Vec::new();
3659 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3660 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3664 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3665 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3672 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3673 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3675 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3676 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3682 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3683 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3684 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3685 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3690 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3692 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3693 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3695 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3696 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3697 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3698 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3699 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3700 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3701 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3704 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3705 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3706 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3707 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3708 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3709 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3710 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3712 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3713 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3714 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3715 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3716 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3717 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3719 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3720 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3721 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3722 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3723 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3724 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3725 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3726 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3728 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3729 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3730 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3731 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3732 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3733 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3737 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3738 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3739 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3741 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3742 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3743 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3744 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3746 macro_rules! sign_input {
3747 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3748 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3749 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3751 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3752 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3753 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3755 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3756 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3757 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3758 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3759 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3760 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3761 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3762 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3763 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3764 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3765 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3766 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3768 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3770 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3771 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3772 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3773 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3777 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3778 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3780 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3781 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3783 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3784 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3788 script_sig: Script::new(),
3789 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3790 witness: Vec::new(),
3793 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3794 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3797 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3798 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3799 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3800 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3801 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3803 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3805 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3806 claim_tx.input.clear();
3807 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3809 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3810 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3814 script_sig: Script::new(),
3815 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3816 witness: Vec::new(),
3819 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3820 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3821 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3822 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3823 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3825 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3827 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3828 claim_tx.input.clear();
3829 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3830 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3831 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3835 script_sig: Script::new(),
3836 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3837 witness: Vec::new(),
3839 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3840 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3841 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3842 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3843 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3845 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3848 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.