1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
22 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
27 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
28 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
33 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
34 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
35 use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
49 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
50 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
53 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
54 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
55 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
56 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
57 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
59 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
60 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
61 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
65 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
67 self.update_id.write(w)?;
68 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
69 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
70 update_step.write(w)?;
75 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
77 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
79 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
81 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
83 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
87 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
89 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
90 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
91 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
93 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
94 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
95 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
96 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
98 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
99 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
100 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
102 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
103 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
104 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
105 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
106 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
107 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
110 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
111 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
114 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
115 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
116 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
117 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
121 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
122 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
123 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
125 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
126 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
127 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
128 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
130 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
135 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
136 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
137 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
139 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
141 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
143 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
144 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
147 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
148 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
149 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
151 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
153 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
154 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
155 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
158 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
159 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
160 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
161 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
162 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
163 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
165 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
166 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
167 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
168 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
170 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
171 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
172 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
173 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
174 /// all registered listeners in one go.
175 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
176 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
178 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
179 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
180 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
182 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
183 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
184 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
186 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
187 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
188 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
190 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
192 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
193 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
194 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
196 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
197 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
198 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
200 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
201 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
202 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
204 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
205 /// with success or failure.
207 /// You should probably just call through to
208 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
210 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
213 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
214 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
216 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
218 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
219 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
220 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
222 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
223 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
224 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref>
225 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
226 F::Target: FeeEstimator
228 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
229 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
231 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
232 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
238 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
239 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
240 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
241 F::Target: FeeEstimator
243 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
244 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
246 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
247 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
248 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
250 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
251 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
252 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
259 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
260 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
261 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
262 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
263 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
268 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
269 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
270 F::Target: FeeEstimator
272 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
273 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
274 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F> {
275 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
276 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
280 fee_estimator: feeest,
286 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
287 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
288 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
289 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
293 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
294 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1);
295 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1);
296 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
297 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
298 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
301 entry.insert(monitor);
305 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
306 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
307 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
308 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
309 Some(orig_monitor) => {
310 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
311 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster)
313 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
318 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F>
319 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
320 F::Target: FeeEstimator
322 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
323 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
325 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
329 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
330 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
332 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
336 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
337 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
338 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
339 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
341 pending_htlcs_updated
345 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
346 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
347 F::Target: FeeEstimator
349 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
350 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
351 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
352 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
358 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
359 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
360 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
361 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
362 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
363 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
364 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
365 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
366 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
367 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
368 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
369 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
370 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
371 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
372 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
373 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
374 /// accurate block height.
375 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
376 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
377 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
378 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
379 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
380 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
381 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
382 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
383 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
384 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
385 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
386 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
387 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
389 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
390 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
391 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
393 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
394 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
395 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
396 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
398 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
399 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
401 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
402 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
403 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
405 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
406 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
407 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
409 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
410 struct LocalSignedTx {
411 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
413 revocation_key: PublicKey,
414 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
415 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
416 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
417 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
419 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
422 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
423 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
424 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
425 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
426 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
428 witness_script: Script,
429 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
435 witness_script: Script,
437 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
442 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
446 funding_redeemscript: Script,
450 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
451 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
453 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
454 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
455 witness_script.write(writer)?;
456 pubkey.write(writer)?;
457 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
458 is_htlc.write(writer)?;
459 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
461 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
462 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
463 witness_script.write(writer)?;
465 preimage.write(writer)?;
466 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
467 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
469 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
470 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
471 preimage.write(writer)?;
472 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
474 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
475 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
476 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
483 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
484 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
485 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
487 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
488 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
489 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
490 let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
491 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
492 InputMaterial::Revoked {
501 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
502 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
503 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
504 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
505 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
506 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
515 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
516 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
517 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
523 InputMaterial::Funding {
524 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
527 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
533 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
534 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
535 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
536 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
537 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
538 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
539 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
540 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
541 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
542 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
543 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
544 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
545 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
546 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
547 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
548 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
549 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
550 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
551 // and satisfy witness program.
552 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
555 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
556 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
557 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
559 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
560 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
561 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
563 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
566 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
570 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
571 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
573 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
575 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
576 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
577 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
578 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
580 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
581 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
582 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
583 commitment_number: u64,
584 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
587 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
593 /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should
594 /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state.
595 RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
596 their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
598 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
599 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
601 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
602 /// think we've fallen behind!
603 should_broadcast: bool,
607 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
608 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
610 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
612 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
613 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
614 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
620 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
622 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
623 commitment_number.write(w)?;
624 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
625 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
626 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
628 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
631 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
633 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
635 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
640 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => {
642 their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
644 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
646 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
652 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
653 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
654 match Readable::read(r)? {
656 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
657 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
659 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
660 let mut res = Vec::new();
662 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
669 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
670 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
671 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
672 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
674 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
675 let mut res = Vec::new();
677 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
684 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
685 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
689 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
690 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
691 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
695 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
696 their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
700 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
701 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
704 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
709 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
710 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
712 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
713 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
715 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
716 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
717 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
718 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
719 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
720 latest_update_id: u64,
721 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
723 destination_script: Script,
724 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>,
725 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
726 shutdown_script: Script,
729 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
730 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
731 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
733 their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
734 their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
735 funding_redeemscript: Script,
736 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
737 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
738 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
740 our_to_self_delay: u16,
741 their_to_self_delay: u16,
743 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
744 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
745 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
746 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
747 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
748 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
749 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
750 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
751 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
752 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
753 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
754 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
755 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
757 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
758 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
759 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
760 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
761 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
762 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
764 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
766 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
767 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
769 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
771 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
773 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
774 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
776 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
777 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
778 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
779 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
781 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
782 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
783 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
784 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
785 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
788 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
790 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
792 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
793 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
794 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
795 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
797 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
798 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
799 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
800 local_tx_signed: bool,
802 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
803 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
804 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
805 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
806 // the full block_connected).
807 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
808 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
812 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
813 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
814 /// underlying object
815 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
816 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
817 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
818 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
819 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
820 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
821 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script != other.broadcasted_remote_payment_script ||
822 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
823 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
824 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
825 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
826 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
827 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
828 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
829 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
830 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
831 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
832 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
833 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
834 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
835 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
836 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
837 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
838 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
839 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
840 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
841 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
842 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
843 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
844 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
845 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
846 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
847 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
856 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
857 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
859 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
860 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
861 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
862 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
863 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
864 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
865 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
866 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
867 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
868 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
870 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
872 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
873 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
875 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
876 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
877 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
878 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
879 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
880 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
882 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
885 if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
886 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
887 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0.write(writer)?;
888 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1.write(writer)?;
890 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
892 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
894 self.keys.write(writer)?;
895 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
896 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
897 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
898 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
899 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
901 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?;
902 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?;
903 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
904 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
906 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
907 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
908 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
909 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
910 match second_option {
911 Some(second_pubkey) => {
912 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
915 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
924 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
925 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?;
927 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
929 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
930 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
931 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
932 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
934 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
935 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
939 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
940 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
941 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
942 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
943 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
944 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
945 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
949 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
950 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
951 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
952 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
953 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
954 for script in txouts.iter() {
955 script.write(writer)?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
960 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
961 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
965 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
966 ($local_tx: expr) => {
967 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
968 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
969 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
970 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
971 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
972 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
974 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
976 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
977 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
978 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
980 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
984 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
989 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
990 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
991 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
993 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
996 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
998 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
999 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
1001 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1002 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1003 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1006 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1007 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1008 data.write(writer)?;
1011 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1012 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1013 event.write(writer)?;
1016 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1018 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1019 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1020 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1021 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1022 for ev in events.iter() {
1024 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1026 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1027 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1029 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1031 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1037 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1038 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1039 txid.write(writer)?;
1040 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1041 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1042 script.write(writer)?;
1045 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1047 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1048 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1054 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1055 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1056 our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1057 their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1058 their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1059 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1060 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
1061 logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1063 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1064 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1065 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1067 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay, logger.clone());
1069 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1070 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1071 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1072 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1073 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1074 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1075 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1076 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1077 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1078 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1079 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1081 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1082 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1083 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1084 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1085 // now but we should consider it later.
1086 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1089 latest_update_id: 0,
1090 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1092 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1093 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1094 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: None,
1099 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1100 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1102 their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
1103 their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1104 funding_redeemscript,
1105 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1106 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1109 their_to_self_delay,
1111 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1112 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1113 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1114 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1116 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1117 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1118 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1119 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1121 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1122 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1123 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1125 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1126 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1130 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1131 local_tx_signed: false,
1133 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1134 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1139 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1140 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1141 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1142 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1143 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1144 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1147 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1148 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1149 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1150 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1155 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1156 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1157 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1158 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1159 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1161 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1162 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1163 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1167 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1168 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1169 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1174 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1181 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1190 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1191 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1192 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1193 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1194 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1195 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1196 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1197 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1199 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1200 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1203 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1204 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1205 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1206 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1207 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1208 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1209 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1210 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1211 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1212 Some(old_points) => {
1213 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1214 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1215 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1216 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1217 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1219 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1222 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1226 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1231 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1232 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1233 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1234 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1236 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()) {
1237 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1242 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1243 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1244 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1245 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1246 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1247 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1248 if self.local_tx_signed {
1249 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1251 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1252 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1253 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1254 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1256 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1257 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1258 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1259 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1260 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1261 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1262 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1264 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1265 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1266 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1267 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1268 // now but we should consider it later.
1269 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1270 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1272 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1273 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1274 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1278 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1279 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1280 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1281 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1284 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B)
1285 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1287 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn().iter() {
1288 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1292 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1293 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1294 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1296 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1297 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1298 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1300 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1301 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1302 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1303 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1304 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1305 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1306 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1307 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1308 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1311 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1315 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1318 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1319 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1320 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1322 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1323 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1325 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1327 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1328 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1329 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1331 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1332 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1333 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1334 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1335 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1336 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1337 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1338 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1340 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1341 if should_broadcast {
1342 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster);
1344 log_error!(self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1349 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1353 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1355 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1356 self.latest_update_id
1359 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1360 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint {
1364 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1365 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1366 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1367 &self.outputs_to_watch
1370 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1371 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1372 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1373 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1374 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1375 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1376 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1377 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1378 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1384 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1385 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1386 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1387 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1388 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1392 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1395 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1396 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1397 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1398 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1399 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1400 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1404 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1405 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1406 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1409 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1410 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1413 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1414 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1417 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1418 self.current_local_commitment_number
1421 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1422 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1423 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1424 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1425 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1426 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1427 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1428 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1429 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1430 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1431 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1433 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1434 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1436 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1437 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1440 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1445 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1446 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1447 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1448 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1449 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1450 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1451 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1452 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1453 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1454 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1455 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1457 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1458 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1460 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1461 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1462 // script_pubkey version
1463 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1464 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1467 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1468 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1469 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1470 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value };
1471 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1475 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1476 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1477 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1478 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1479 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1480 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1481 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1482 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1483 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1485 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value };
1486 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1491 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1492 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1493 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1494 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1495 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1496 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1498 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1499 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1500 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1501 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1502 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1503 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1504 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1506 let e = entry.get_mut();
1507 e.retain(|ref event| {
1509 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1510 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1515 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1518 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1526 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1527 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1529 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1530 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1532 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1534 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1535 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1536 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1537 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1538 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1539 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1540 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1542 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1543 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1545 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1547 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1548 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1549 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1550 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1551 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1552 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1553 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1554 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1555 // payment_preimage.
1556 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1557 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1558 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1559 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1561 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1562 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1566 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1567 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1568 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1569 let e = entry.get_mut();
1570 e.retain(|ref event| {
1572 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1573 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1578 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1581 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1589 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1590 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1592 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1593 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1596 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1597 let revocation_point_option =
1598 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1599 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1600 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1602 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1603 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1604 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1605 let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key()));
1606 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1607 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1609 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1610 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1611 // script_pubkey version
1612 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1613 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1616 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1617 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1618 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1619 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1620 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1621 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1622 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1623 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1625 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1626 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1627 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1628 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry };
1629 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1636 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1639 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1640 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>) {
1641 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1642 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1643 return (Vec::new(), None)
1646 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1647 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1650 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1655 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1656 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1657 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1658 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1659 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1660 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1661 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1663 log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1664 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value };
1665 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1666 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1669 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) {
1670 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1671 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1673 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1674 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) {
1675 Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript))
1678 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1679 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1680 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1681 witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
1682 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1683 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1684 Some(preimage.clone())
1686 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1690 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1692 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1696 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1699 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1700 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1701 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1702 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1703 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1704 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1705 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1707 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1708 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1709 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1710 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1712 let e = entry.get_mut();
1713 e.retain(|ref event| {
1715 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1716 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1721 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1724 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1730 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1731 ($updates: expr) => {
1732 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1733 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1734 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1738 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1739 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1741 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1743 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1744 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1745 append_onchain_update!(res);
1746 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1747 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1749 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1750 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1751 append_onchain_update!(res);
1755 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1756 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1757 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1758 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1759 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1760 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1768 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1769 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1770 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1774 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1777 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1778 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1779 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1780 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1781 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1782 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1783 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1784 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1785 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1786 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1787 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1788 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1789 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1790 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1791 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1792 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1793 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1794 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1795 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1796 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1800 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1801 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1806 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1807 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1813 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1814 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1815 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1817 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1818 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1819 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1820 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1821 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1822 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1823 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1824 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1825 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1826 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1830 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1831 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1841 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
1842 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
1843 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
1844 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
1846 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>
1847 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1848 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1850 for tx in txn_matched {
1851 let mut output_val = 0;
1852 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1853 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1854 output_val += out.value;
1855 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1859 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1860 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1861 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1862 for tx in txn_matched {
1863 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1864 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1865 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1866 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1868 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1869 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1870 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1871 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height);
1872 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1873 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1875 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1876 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
1877 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1878 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1880 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1882 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1885 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1886 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height);
1887 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1888 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1889 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1894 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1895 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1896 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1897 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
1899 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height);
1901 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height);
1902 if should_broadcast {
1903 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1905 if should_broadcast {
1906 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1907 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1908 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1909 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1911 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1914 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1917 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1918 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1919 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1920 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1921 payment_preimage: None,
1922 source: htlc_update.0,
1925 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1926 log_trace!(self, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1927 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1928 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1934 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator);
1936 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1937 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1938 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1944 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)
1945 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1946 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1948 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1949 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1951 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1952 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1955 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator);
1957 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1960 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1961 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1962 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1963 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1964 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1965 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1966 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1967 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1968 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1969 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1970 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1971 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1972 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1973 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1974 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1975 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1976 // time out the HTLC first.
1977 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1978 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1979 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1980 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1981 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1982 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1983 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1984 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1985 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1986 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1987 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1988 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1989 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1990 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1991 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1992 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1993 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1994 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1995 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1996 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1997 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1998 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1999 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2000 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2007 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2009 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
2010 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2011 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2014 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2015 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2016 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2023 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2024 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2025 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2026 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2027 let mut payment_data = None;
2028 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2029 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2030 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2031 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2033 macro_rules! log_claim {
2034 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2035 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2036 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2037 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2038 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2039 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2040 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2041 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2042 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2043 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2044 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2045 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2047 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2048 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2049 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2050 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2055 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2056 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2057 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2058 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2059 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2060 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2061 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2062 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2071 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2072 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2073 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2074 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2075 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2076 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2077 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2078 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2079 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2080 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2081 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2082 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2083 } else if !$local_tx {
2084 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2085 if payment_data.is_none() {
2086 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2089 if payment_data.is_none() {
2090 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2091 continue 'outer_loop;
2098 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2099 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2100 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2102 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2103 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2104 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2105 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2108 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2109 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2110 "remote commitment tx", false);
2113 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2114 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2115 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2116 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2117 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2118 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2119 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2120 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2122 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2126 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2127 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2128 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2129 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2131 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2136 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2137 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2139 let e = entry.get_mut();
2140 e.retain(|ref event| {
2142 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2143 return htlc_update.0 != source
2148 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2151 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2159 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2160 fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2161 let mut spendable_output = None;
2162 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2163 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2164 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2165 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2166 output: outp.clone(),
2169 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2170 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2171 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2172 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2173 key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2174 witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2175 to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
2176 output: outp.clone(),
2180 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
2181 if broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2182 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2183 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2184 key: broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1,
2185 output: outp.clone(),
2189 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2190 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2191 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2192 output: outp.clone(),
2196 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2197 log_trace!(self, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2198 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2200 let e = entry.get_mut();
2201 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2204 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2211 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2213 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2214 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2215 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2219 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2224 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2225 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2226 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2227 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2230 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2231 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2233 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2234 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2236 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2237 let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2238 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2239 Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script))
2242 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2244 let broadcasted_remote_payment_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2246 let payment_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2247 let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2248 Some((payment_address, payment_key))
2251 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2253 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2255 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2256 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2257 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2258 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2259 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2260 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2262 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2263 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2264 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2266 let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2267 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2268 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2269 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2271 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2272 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2276 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2277 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2278 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2279 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2281 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2286 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2287 let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2289 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2291 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2294 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2295 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2296 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2297 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2298 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2300 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2301 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2307 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2308 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2309 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2310 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2311 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2312 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2313 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2314 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2316 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2317 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2321 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2322 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2323 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2324 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2325 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2326 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2327 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2328 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2329 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2331 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2332 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2336 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2337 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2338 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2339 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2340 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2341 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2346 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2349 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2350 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2351 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2352 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2353 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2354 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2355 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2357 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2358 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2359 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2360 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2361 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2363 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2364 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2366 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2371 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2378 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2381 Some(read_local_tx!())
2383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2385 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2387 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2388 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2390 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2391 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2392 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2393 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2394 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2395 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2400 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2401 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2402 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2403 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2406 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2407 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2408 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2409 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2410 pending_events.push(event);
2414 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2416 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2417 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2418 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2419 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2420 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2421 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2422 for _ in 0..events_len {
2423 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2425 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2426 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2427 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2428 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2432 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2433 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2437 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2441 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2444 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2445 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2446 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2447 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2448 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2449 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2450 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2451 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2453 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2457 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
2459 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2460 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2462 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2464 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2467 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2468 broadcasted_remote_payment_script,
2473 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2474 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2476 their_htlc_base_key,
2477 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2478 funding_redeemscript,
2479 channel_value_satoshis,
2480 their_cur_revocation_points,
2483 their_to_self_delay,
2486 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2487 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2488 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2490 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2491 current_local_commitment_tx,
2492 current_remote_commitment_number,
2493 current_local_commitment_number,
2496 pending_htlcs_updated,
2499 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2504 lockdown_from_offchain,
2508 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2516 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2517 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2518 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2519 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2520 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2521 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2522 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2523 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2524 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2526 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2527 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2528 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2529 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2531 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2532 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2533 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2534 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2535 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2537 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2540 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2541 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2542 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2544 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2545 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2547 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2549 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2551 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2552 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2553 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2554 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2558 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2559 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2561 let mut res = Vec::new();
2562 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2563 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2567 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2568 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2575 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2576 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2578 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2579 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2585 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2586 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2587 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2588 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2593 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2595 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2596 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2597 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2598 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2599 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2604 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2606 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2607 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2608 (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2609 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2610 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2611 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), logger.clone());
2613 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2614 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2615 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2616 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2617 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2618 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2619 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2622 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2623 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2624 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2625 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2626 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2627 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2628 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2630 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2631 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2632 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2633 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2634 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2635 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2637 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2638 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2639 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2640 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2641 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2642 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2643 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2644 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2646 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2647 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2648 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2649 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2650 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2651 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2655 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2656 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2657 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2660 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2661 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2662 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2664 macro_rules! sign_input {
2665 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2666 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2667 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2669 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2670 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2671 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2673 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2674 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2675 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2676 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2677 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2678 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2679 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2680 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2681 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2682 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2683 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2684 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2686 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2688 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2689 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2690 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2691 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2695 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2696 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2698 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2699 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2701 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2702 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2706 script_sig: Script::new(),
2707 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2708 witness: Vec::new(),
2711 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2712 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2715 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2716 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2717 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2718 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2719 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2721 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2723 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2724 claim_tx.input.clear();
2725 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2727 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2728 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2732 script_sig: Script::new(),
2733 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2734 witness: Vec::new(),
2737 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2738 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2739 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2740 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2741 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2743 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2745 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2746 claim_tx.input.clear();
2747 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2748 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2749 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2753 script_sig: Script::new(),
2754 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2755 witness: Vec::new(),
2757 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2758 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2759 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2760 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2761 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2763 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2766 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.