1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
32 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
41 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
42 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
46 use util::logger::Logger;
47 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
48 use util::{byte_utils, events};
49 use util::events::Event;
51 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
53 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
57 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
58 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
59 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
62 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
63 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
64 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
65 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
66 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
68 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
69 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
70 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
74 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
75 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
76 self.update_id.write(w)?;
77 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
78 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
79 update_step.write(w)?;
84 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
85 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
86 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
87 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
88 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
90 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
92 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
96 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
98 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
99 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
100 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
102 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
103 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
104 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
105 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
107 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
108 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
109 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
111 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
112 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
113 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
114 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
115 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
116 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
119 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
120 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
123 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
124 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
125 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
126 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
127 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
130 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
131 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
132 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
134 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
135 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
136 /// of this channel).
138 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
139 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
140 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
141 /// update must be rejected.
143 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
144 /// the channel monitor instance.
146 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
147 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
148 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
152 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
153 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
154 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
156 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
158 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
160 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
162 pub enum MonitorEvent {
163 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
164 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
166 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
167 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
170 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
171 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
172 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
173 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
174 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
175 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
176 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
178 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
180 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
181 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
183 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
185 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
186 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
187 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
189 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
190 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
192 /// (C-not exported) due to an unconstrained generic in `Key`
193 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref>
194 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
197 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
200 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
207 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send>
208 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
209 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
210 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
212 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
214 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
215 let mut reentered = true;
217 let matched_indexes = self.chain_monitor.filter_block(header, txdata);
218 let matched_txn: Vec<_> = matched_indexes.iter().map(|index| txdata[*index].1).collect();
219 let last_seen = self.chain_monitor.reentered();
220 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
222 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
223 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
224 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(&matched_txn, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
226 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
227 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
228 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
233 reentered = last_seen != self.chain_monitor.reentered();
237 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
238 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
239 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
240 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
241 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
246 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
247 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
248 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
250 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
252 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
253 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
254 pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C> {
255 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
256 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
260 fee_estimator: feeest,
266 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
267 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
268 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
269 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
274 let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
276 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
277 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as u32), &funding_txo.1);
278 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
279 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
280 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
284 entry.insert(monitor);
288 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
289 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
290 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
291 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
292 Some(orig_monitor) => {
293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
294 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
296 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
301 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
302 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
303 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
305 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
307 type Keys = ChanSigner;
309 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
310 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
312 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
316 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
317 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
319 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
323 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
324 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
325 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
326 pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
328 pending_monitor_events
332 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
333 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
334 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
336 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
338 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
339 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
340 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
341 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
347 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
348 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
349 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
350 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
351 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
352 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
353 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
354 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
355 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
356 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
357 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
358 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
359 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
360 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
361 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
362 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
363 /// accurate block height.
364 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
365 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
366 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
367 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
368 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
369 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
370 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
371 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
372 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
373 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
374 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
375 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
376 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
378 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
379 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
380 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
382 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
383 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
384 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
385 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
387 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
388 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
390 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
391 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
392 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
394 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
395 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
396 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
398 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
399 struct HolderSignedTx {
400 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
402 revocation_key: PublicKey,
403 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
404 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
405 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
406 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
408 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
411 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
412 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
414 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
415 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
416 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
417 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
418 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
421 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
422 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
423 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
424 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
425 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
426 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
427 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
428 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
429 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
430 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
437 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
438 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
439 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
440 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
441 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
442 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
443 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
444 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
445 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
446 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
447 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
448 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
449 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
450 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
453 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
457 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
458 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
459 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
460 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
464 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
468 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
469 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
470 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
471 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
472 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
474 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
475 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
476 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
477 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
478 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
480 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
481 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
484 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
485 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
486 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
487 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
488 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
491 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
495 funding_redeemscript: Script,
499 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
500 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
502 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
503 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
504 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
505 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
506 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
507 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
508 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
509 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
511 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
513 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
514 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
515 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
516 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
517 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
518 preimage.write(writer)?;
521 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
522 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
523 preimage.write(writer)?;
524 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
526 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
527 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
528 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
535 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
536 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
537 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
539 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
540 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
541 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
542 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
543 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
544 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
545 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
546 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
547 InputMaterial::Revoked {
548 per_commitment_point,
549 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
550 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
555 on_counterparty_tx_csv
559 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
560 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
561 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
562 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
563 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
564 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
565 per_commitment_point,
566 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
567 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
573 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
574 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
575 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
581 InputMaterial::Funding {
582 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
585 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
591 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
592 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
593 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
594 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
595 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
596 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
597 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
598 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
599 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
600 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
601 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
602 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
603 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
604 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
605 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
606 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
607 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
608 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
609 // and satisfy witness program.
610 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
613 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
614 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
615 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
617 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
618 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
619 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
621 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
624 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
628 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
629 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
631 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
633 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
634 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
635 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
636 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
638 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
639 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
640 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
641 commitment_number: u64,
642 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
645 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
651 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
652 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
654 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
655 /// think we've fallen behind!
656 should_broadcast: bool,
660 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
661 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
663 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
665 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
666 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
667 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
673 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
675 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
676 commitment_number.write(w)?;
677 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
678 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
679 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
681 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
684 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
686 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
688 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
693 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
695 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
701 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
702 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
703 match Readable::read(r)? {
705 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
706 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
708 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
709 let mut res = Vec::new();
711 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
718 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
719 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
720 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
721 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
723 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
724 let mut res = Vec::new();
726 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
733 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
734 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
738 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
739 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
740 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
744 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
745 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
748 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
753 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
754 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
756 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
757 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
759 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
760 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
761 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
762 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
763 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
764 latest_update_id: u64,
765 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
767 destination_script: Script,
768 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
769 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
770 shutdown_script: Script,
773 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
774 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
775 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
777 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
778 funding_redeemscript: Script,
779 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
780 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
781 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
783 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
785 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
786 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
787 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
788 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
789 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
790 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
791 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
792 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
793 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
794 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
795 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
796 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
797 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
799 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
800 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
801 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
802 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
803 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
804 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
806 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
808 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
809 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
811 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
813 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
815 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
816 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
818 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
819 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
820 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
821 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
823 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
824 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
825 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
826 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
827 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
830 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
832 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
834 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
835 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
836 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
837 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
839 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
840 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
841 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
843 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
844 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
845 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
846 holder_tx_signed: bool,
848 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
849 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
850 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
851 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
852 // the full block_connected).
853 last_block_hash: BlockHash,
854 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
857 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
858 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
859 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
862 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
863 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
864 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
865 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
866 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
867 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
869 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
870 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
871 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
872 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
874 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
875 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
876 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
877 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
878 /// all registered listeners in one go.
879 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
880 /// The concrete type which signs for transactions and provides access to our channel public
882 type Keys: ChannelKeys;
884 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
886 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
887 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
888 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
890 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
891 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
892 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
894 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
895 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
896 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<Self::Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
898 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
900 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
901 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
902 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
904 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
905 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
906 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
908 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
909 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
911 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, even if an Err is return, the new version
912 /// must be written to disk, as state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing
913 /// a commitment broadcast. This storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed
914 /// onchain by another watchtower, lagging behind on block processing.
915 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
917 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
918 /// with success or failure.
920 /// You should probably just call through to
921 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events() for each ChannelMonitor and return
923 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent>;
926 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
927 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
928 /// underlying object
929 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
930 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
931 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
932 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
933 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
934 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
935 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
936 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
937 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
938 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
939 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
940 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
941 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
942 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
943 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
944 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
945 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
946 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
947 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
948 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
949 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
950 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
951 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
952 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
953 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
954 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
955 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
956 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
957 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
958 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
959 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
968 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
969 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
971 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
972 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
973 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
974 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
975 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
976 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
977 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
978 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
979 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
980 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
982 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
984 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
985 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
987 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
988 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
989 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
990 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
991 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
992 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
994 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
997 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
998 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
1000 self.keys.write(writer)?;
1001 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
1002 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
1003 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
1004 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1005 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1007 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
1008 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
1009 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
1011 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1012 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1013 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1014 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1015 match second_option {
1016 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1017 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1020 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1025 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1029 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
1031 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1033 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1034 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1035 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1036 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1037 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1038 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1039 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1043 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1044 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1045 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1046 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1047 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1048 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1049 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1053 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1054 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1055 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1056 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1057 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1058 for script in txouts.iter() {
1059 script.write(writer)?;
1063 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1064 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1065 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1066 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1069 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
1070 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1071 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
1072 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1073 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1074 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1075 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1076 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1078 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1079 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1080 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1081 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1082 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1084 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1088 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
1093 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1094 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1095 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
1097 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1100 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1102 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1103 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1105 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1106 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1107 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1110 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
1111 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1113 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1117 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
1121 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1122 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1123 event.write(writer)?;
1126 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1128 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1129 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1130 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1131 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1132 for ev in events.iter() {
1134 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1136 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1137 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1139 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1141 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1147 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1148 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1149 txid.write(writer)?;
1150 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1151 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1152 script.write(writer)?;
1155 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1157 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1158 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1164 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1165 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1166 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1167 counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1168 on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1169 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1170 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1172 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1173 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1174 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1175 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1176 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1178 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1180 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
1182 let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1183 let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1184 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1185 txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
1186 revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
1187 a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1188 b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1189 delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1190 per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
1191 feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1192 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1194 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
1197 latest_update_id: 0,
1198 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1200 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1201 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1202 counterparty_payment_script,
1207 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1208 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1210 counterparty_tx_cache,
1211 funding_redeemscript,
1212 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1213 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1217 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1218 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1219 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1220 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1222 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1223 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1224 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1225 current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1227 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1228 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1229 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1231 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1232 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1236 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1237 holder_tx_signed: false,
1239 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1240 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1244 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1245 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1246 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1247 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1248 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1249 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1252 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1253 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1254 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1255 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1260 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1261 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1262 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1263 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1264 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1266 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1267 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1268 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1272 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1273 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1274 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1279 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1286 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1295 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1296 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1297 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1298 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1299 pub(super) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1300 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1301 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1302 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1304 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1305 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1308 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1309 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1310 log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1311 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1312 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1313 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1314 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1315 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1316 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1317 Some(old_points) => {
1318 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1319 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1320 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1321 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1322 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1324 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1327 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1331 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1334 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1335 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1336 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1340 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1343 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1344 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1345 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1346 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1347 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1348 pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1349 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1350 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1351 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1352 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1354 revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
1355 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1356 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1357 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1358 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
1359 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1360 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1362 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
1363 self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1364 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1365 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1366 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1367 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1372 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1373 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1374 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1375 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1378 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1379 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1382 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1383 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1385 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1388 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1391 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1392 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1393 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1396 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1397 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1399 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1401 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1402 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1403 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1405 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1406 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1407 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1408 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1409 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1410 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1411 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1412 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1413 if should_broadcast {
1414 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1416 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1421 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1425 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1427 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1428 self.latest_update_id
1431 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1432 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1436 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1437 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1439 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
1440 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1441 &self.outputs_to_watch
1444 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1445 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1446 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1447 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1449 /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
1450 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1451 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1452 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1453 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1454 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1460 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1461 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events().
1462 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1463 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1464 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1468 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1471 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1472 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1473 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1474 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1475 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1476 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1480 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1481 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1482 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1485 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1486 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1489 pub(super) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1490 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1493 pub(super) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1494 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1497 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1498 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1499 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1500 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1501 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1502 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1503 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1504 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1505 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1506 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1507 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1509 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1510 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1512 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1513 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1516 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1521 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1522 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1523 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1524 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1525 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1526 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1527 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1529 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1530 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1532 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1533 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1534 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1535 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1536 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1540 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1541 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1542 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1543 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1544 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1545 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1546 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1548 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1549 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1554 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1555 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1556 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1557 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1558 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1559 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1561 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1562 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1563 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1564 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1565 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1566 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1567 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1568 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1569 let e = entry.get_mut();
1570 e.retain(|ref event| {
1572 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1573 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1578 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1581 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1589 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1590 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1592 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1593 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1595 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1597 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1598 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1599 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1600 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1601 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1602 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1603 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1605 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1606 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1608 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1610 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1611 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1612 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1613 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1614 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1615 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1616 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1617 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1618 // payment_preimage.
1619 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1620 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1621 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1622 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1624 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1625 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1629 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1630 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1632 let e = entry.get_mut();
1633 e.retain(|ref event| {
1635 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1636 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1641 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1644 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1652 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1653 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1655 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1656 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1659 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1660 let revocation_point_option =
1661 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1662 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1663 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1665 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1666 self.counterparty_payment_script = {
1667 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1668 // script_pubkey version
1669 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1670 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1673 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1674 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1675 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1676 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1677 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1678 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1680 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1681 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1682 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1683 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1684 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1691 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1694 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1695 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1696 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1697 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1698 return (Vec::new(), None)
1701 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1702 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1705 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1710 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1711 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1712 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1714 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1715 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1716 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1717 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1720 fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1721 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1722 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1724 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1725 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1727 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1728 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1729 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1730 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1731 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1732 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1733 Some(preimage.clone())
1735 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1739 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1741 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1745 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1748 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1749 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1750 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1751 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1752 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1753 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1754 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1756 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1757 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1758 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1759 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1761 let e = entry.get_mut();
1762 e.retain(|ref event| {
1764 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1765 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1770 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1773 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1779 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1780 ($updates: expr) => {
1781 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1782 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1783 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1787 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1788 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1790 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1791 is_holder_tx = true;
1792 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1793 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1794 append_onchain_update!(res);
1795 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1796 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1797 is_holder_tx = true;
1798 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1799 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
1800 append_onchain_update!(res);
1804 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1805 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1806 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
1807 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1808 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1809 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1817 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1818 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1819 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
1823 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1826 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1827 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1828 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1829 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1830 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1831 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1832 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1833 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1834 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1835 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1836 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
1837 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1838 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1839 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1840 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1841 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1842 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1843 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1844 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1845 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1849 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1850 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1855 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1856 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1862 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1863 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1864 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1865 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1866 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1867 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
1868 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1869 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1870 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1871 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1872 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1873 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1874 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1875 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1879 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1880 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1890 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
1891 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
1892 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
1893 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
1895 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1896 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1897 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1900 for tx in txn_matched {
1901 let mut output_val = 0;
1902 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1903 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1904 output_val += out.value;
1905 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1909 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1910 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1911 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1912 for tx in txn_matched {
1913 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1914 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1915 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1916 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1918 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1919 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1920 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1921 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1922 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1923 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1925 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1926 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1927 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1928 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1930 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1932 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1935 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1936 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1937 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1938 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1939 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1944 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1945 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1946 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1947 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1949 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1951 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1952 if should_broadcast {
1953 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1955 if should_broadcast {
1956 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1957 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1958 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1959 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1960 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1961 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1963 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1966 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1969 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1970 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1971 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
1972 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1973 payment_preimage: None,
1974 source: htlc_update.0,
1977 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1978 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1979 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
1980 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1987 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1989 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1990 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1991 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1997 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1998 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1999 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2002 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2003 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2005 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2006 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2009 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2011 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2014 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2015 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2016 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2017 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2018 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2019 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2020 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2021 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2022 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2023 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2024 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2025 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2026 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2027 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2028 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2029 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2030 // time out the HTLC first.
2031 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2032 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2033 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2034 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2035 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2036 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2037 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2038 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2039 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2040 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2041 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2042 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2043 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2044 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2045 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2046 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2047 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2048 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2049 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2050 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2051 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2052 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2053 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2054 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2061 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2063 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2064 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2065 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2068 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2069 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2070 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2077 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2078 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2079 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2080 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2081 let mut payment_data = None;
2082 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2083 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2084 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2085 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2087 macro_rules! log_claim {
2088 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2089 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2090 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
2091 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2092 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2093 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2094 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2095 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2096 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2097 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2098 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2099 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2101 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2102 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2103 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2104 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2109 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2110 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2111 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2112 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2113 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2114 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2115 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2116 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2125 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2126 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2127 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2128 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2129 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2130 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2131 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2132 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2133 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2134 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2135 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2136 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2137 } else if !$holder_tx {
2138 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2139 if payment_data.is_none() {
2140 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2143 if payment_data.is_none() {
2144 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2145 continue 'outer_loop;
2152 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2153 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2154 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2156 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2157 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2158 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2159 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2162 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2163 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2164 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2167 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2168 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2169 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2170 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2171 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2172 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2173 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2174 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2175 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2177 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2181 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2182 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2183 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2184 upd.source == source
2186 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2187 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2189 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2194 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2195 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2197 let e = entry.get_mut();
2198 e.retain(|ref event| {
2200 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2201 return htlc_update.0 != source
2206 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2209 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2217 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2218 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2219 let mut spendable_output = None;
2220 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2221 if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
2222 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2223 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2224 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2225 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2226 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2227 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2228 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2229 // non-standard due to their size.
2230 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2231 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2232 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2235 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2236 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2237 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2238 output: outp.clone(),
2241 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2242 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2243 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2244 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2245 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2246 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2247 output: outp.clone(),
2248 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2249 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2253 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2254 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
2255 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2256 output: outp.clone(),
2257 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2260 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2261 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2262 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2263 output: outp.clone(),
2267 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2268 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2269 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2271 let e = entry.get_mut();
2272 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2275 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2282 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2284 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2285 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2286 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2290 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2295 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2296 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2297 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2298 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2301 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2302 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2304 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2305 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2307 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2308 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2309 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2310 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2313 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2315 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2316 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2318 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2319 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2320 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2321 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2322 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2323 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2325 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2326 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2327 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2329 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2330 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2331 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2334 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2338 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2339 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2340 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2341 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2343 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2348 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2350 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2352 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2355 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2356 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2357 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2358 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2359 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2361 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2362 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2368 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2369 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2370 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2371 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2372 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2373 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2374 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2375 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2377 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2378 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2382 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2383 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2384 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2385 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2386 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2387 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2388 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2389 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2390 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2392 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2397 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2398 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2399 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2400 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2401 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2402 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2403 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2407 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2410 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2411 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2412 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2413 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2414 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2415 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2416 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2418 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2419 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2420 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2421 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2422 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2424 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2425 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2427 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2432 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2439 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2442 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2444 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2446 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2448 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2449 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2451 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2452 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2453 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2454 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2455 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2456 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2457 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2461 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2462 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2463 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2464 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2465 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2466 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2467 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2469 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2472 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2473 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2474 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2475 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2476 pending_events.push(event);
2480 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2482 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2483 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2484 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2485 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2486 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2487 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2488 for _ in 0..events_len {
2489 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2491 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2492 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2493 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2494 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2498 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2499 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2503 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2507 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2510 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2511 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2512 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2513 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2514 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2515 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2516 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2517 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2519 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2520 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2523 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2525 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2526 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2528 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2530 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2533 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2534 counterparty_payment_script,
2539 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2540 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2542 counterparty_tx_cache,
2543 funding_redeemscript,
2544 channel_value_satoshis,
2545 their_cur_revocation_points,
2550 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2551 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2552 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2554 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2555 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2556 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2557 current_holder_commitment_number,
2560 pending_monitor_events,
2563 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2568 lockdown_from_offchain,
2572 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2579 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2580 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2581 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2582 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2583 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2584 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2585 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2586 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2587 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2589 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2590 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2591 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2592 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2594 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
2595 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2596 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2597 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2599 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2602 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2603 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2604 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2606 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2607 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2609 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2612 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2613 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2614 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2618 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2619 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2621 let mut res = Vec::new();
2622 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2623 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2627 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2628 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2635 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
2636 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2638 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2639 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2645 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2646 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2647 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2648 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2653 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2655 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2656 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2657 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2658 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2659 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2665 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2667 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2668 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2669 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2670 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2671 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2672 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2674 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2675 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2676 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2677 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2678 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2679 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2680 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2683 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2684 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2685 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2686 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2687 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2688 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2689 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2691 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2692 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2693 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2694 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2695 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2696 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2698 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2699 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2700 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2701 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2702 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2703 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2704 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2705 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2707 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2708 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2709 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2710 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2711 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2712 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2716 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2717 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2718 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2721 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2722 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2723 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2725 macro_rules! sign_input {
2726 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2727 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2728 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2730 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2731 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2732 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
2734 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2735 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2736 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2737 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2738 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2739 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
2740 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2741 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
2742 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2743 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2744 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2745 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
2747 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2749 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2750 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
2751 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
2752 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
2756 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2757 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2759 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2760 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2762 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2763 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2767 script_sig: Script::new(),
2768 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2769 witness: Vec::new(),
2772 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2773 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2776 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2777 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2779 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2780 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2781 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2784 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2786 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2787 claim_tx.input.clear();
2788 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2790 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2791 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2795 script_sig: Script::new(),
2796 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2797 witness: Vec::new(),
2800 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2801 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2803 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2804 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2805 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2808 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2810 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2811 claim_tx.input.clear();
2812 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2813 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2814 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2818 script_sig: Script::new(),
2819 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2820 witness: Vec::new(),
2822 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2823 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2825 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2826 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2827 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2830 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2833 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.