1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
113 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
114 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
115 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
116 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
117 /// all registered listeners in one go.
118 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
119 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
121 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
122 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
123 /// any spends of it.
124 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
126 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
127 /// with success or failure backward
128 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
131 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
132 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
134 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
136 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
137 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
138 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
140 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
141 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
142 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
143 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
144 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
146 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
147 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
148 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
149 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
150 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
152 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
155 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
157 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
158 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
159 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
160 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
162 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
163 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
164 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
165 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
166 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
167 outputs: spendable_outputs,
171 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
172 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
173 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
176 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
180 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
181 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
182 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
183 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
185 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
186 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
187 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
188 let mut existing_claim = false;
189 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
190 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
191 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
192 existing_claim = true;
198 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
202 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
207 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
208 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
211 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
212 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
213 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
214 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
215 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
220 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
221 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
222 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
223 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
224 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
225 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
229 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
231 fee_estimator: feeest,
237 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
238 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
239 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
240 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
241 Some(orig_monitor) => {
242 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
243 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
247 match monitor.key_storage {
248 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
251 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
253 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
254 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
255 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
256 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
260 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
261 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
264 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
269 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
270 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
271 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
273 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
277 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
278 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
279 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
280 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
282 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
284 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
289 pending_htlcs_updated
293 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
294 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
295 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
296 let mut ret = Vec::new();
297 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
302 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
303 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
304 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
305 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
306 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
307 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
308 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
309 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
310 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
311 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
312 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
313 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
314 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
315 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
316 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
317 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
318 /// accurate block height.
319 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
320 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
321 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
322 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
323 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
324 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
325 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
326 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
327 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
328 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
329 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
331 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
334 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
335 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
336 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
337 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
338 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
339 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
340 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
341 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
342 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
343 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
346 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
347 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
351 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
352 struct LocalSignedTx {
353 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
356 revocation_key: PublicKey,
357 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
358 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
359 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
361 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
365 enum InputDescriptors {
370 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
373 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
374 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
375 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
380 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
388 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
393 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
394 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
399 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
400 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
401 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
403 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
404 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
406 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
408 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
409 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
410 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
412 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
416 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
417 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
419 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
420 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
422 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
423 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
425 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
426 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
428 key_storage: Storage,
429 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
430 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
431 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
432 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
434 our_to_self_delay: u16,
435 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
437 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
438 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
439 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
440 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
441 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
442 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
443 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
444 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
445 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
446 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
447 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
448 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
449 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
451 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
452 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
453 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
454 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
455 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
456 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
458 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
460 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
462 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
464 destination_script: Script,
465 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
466 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
467 // scan every commitment transaction for that
468 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
470 // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
471 // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
472 // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
473 // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
474 // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
475 // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
476 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
478 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
479 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
480 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
481 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
483 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
484 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
485 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
486 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
487 // the full block_connected).
488 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
489 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
493 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
494 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
496 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
497 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
499 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
500 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
502 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
503 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
505 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
506 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
509 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
510 $spent_txid, $value);
515 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
516 $spent_txid, $value);
528 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
529 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
530 /// underlying object
531 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
532 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
533 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
534 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
535 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
536 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
537 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
538 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
539 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
540 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
541 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
542 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
543 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
544 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
545 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
546 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
547 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
548 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
549 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
550 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
554 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
555 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
564 impl ChannelMonitor {
565 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
567 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
569 key_storage: Storage::Local {
570 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
571 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
572 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
573 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
574 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
575 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
576 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
578 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
579 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
581 their_htlc_base_key: None,
582 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
583 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
585 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
586 their_to_self_delay: None,
588 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
589 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
590 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
591 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
593 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
594 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
595 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
597 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
598 destination_script: destination_script,
599 to_remote_rescue: None,
601 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
603 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
605 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
606 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
611 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
612 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
614 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
615 tx_weight += match inp {
616 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
617 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
618 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
620 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
621 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
622 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
624 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
625 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
626 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
628 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
629 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
630 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
632 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
633 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
634 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
641 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
642 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
643 return current_height + 1
644 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
645 return current_height + 3
651 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
653 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
661 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
662 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
664 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
665 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
666 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
667 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
673 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
674 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
675 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
676 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
677 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
679 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
680 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
681 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
684 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
687 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
689 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
690 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
691 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
692 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
693 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
694 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
700 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
701 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
702 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
703 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
704 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
706 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
707 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
708 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
712 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
713 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
714 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
719 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
726 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
735 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
736 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
737 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
738 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
739 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
740 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
741 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
742 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
744 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
745 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
748 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
749 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
750 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
751 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
752 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
753 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
755 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
756 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
757 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
758 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
759 Some(old_points) => {
760 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
761 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
762 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
763 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
764 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
766 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
769 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
773 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
778 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
779 match self.key_storage {
780 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
781 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
782 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
783 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
785 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
786 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
790 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
794 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
795 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
796 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
797 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
798 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
799 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
800 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
801 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
802 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
803 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
804 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
805 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
806 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
807 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
808 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
809 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
810 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
815 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
816 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
818 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
822 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
823 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
824 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
825 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
828 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
829 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
830 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
831 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
832 match self.key_storage {
833 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
834 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
835 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
836 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
837 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
838 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
839 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
840 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
841 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
844 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
847 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
848 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
851 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
855 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
856 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
857 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
858 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
860 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
861 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
862 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
863 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
864 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
865 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
869 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
870 // local transactions to decide how to merge
871 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
872 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
873 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
874 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
876 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
877 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
879 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
880 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
882 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
883 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
886 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
890 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
891 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
892 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
893 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
896 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
897 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
898 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
899 /// provides slightly better privacy.
900 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
901 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
902 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
903 match self.key_storage {
904 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
905 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
907 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
908 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
913 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
914 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
915 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
916 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
919 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
920 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
923 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
924 match self.key_storage {
925 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
926 *funding_info = None;
928 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
929 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
934 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
935 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
936 match self.key_storage {
937 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
939 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
943 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
949 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
950 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
951 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
952 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
953 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
954 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
955 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
956 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
957 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
963 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
964 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
965 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
966 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
967 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
968 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
970 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
971 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
973 macro_rules! write_option {
980 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
985 match self.key_storage {
986 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
987 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
988 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
989 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
990 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
991 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
993 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
994 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
996 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
997 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
998 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
999 script.write(writer)?;
1002 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1005 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1006 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1008 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1011 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1012 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1014 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1015 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1016 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1017 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1018 match second_option {
1019 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1020 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1023 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1028 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1032 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1033 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1035 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1036 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1037 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1040 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1041 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1042 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1043 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1044 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1045 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1046 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1050 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1051 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1052 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1053 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1054 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1055 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1056 write_option!(htlc_source);
1060 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1061 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1062 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1063 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1064 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1065 for script in txouts.iter() {
1066 script.write(writer)?;
1070 if for_local_storage {
1071 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1072 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1073 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1074 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1077 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1080 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1081 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1082 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1084 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1085 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1089 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1090 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1091 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1092 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1094 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1095 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1096 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1097 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1098 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1100 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1101 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1105 write_option!(htlc_source);
1110 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1111 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1112 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1114 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1117 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1118 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1119 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1121 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1124 if for_local_storage {
1125 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1127 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1130 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1131 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1132 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1135 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1136 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1137 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1138 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1139 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1140 local_key.write(writer)?;
1142 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1145 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
1146 for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
1147 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1148 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
1149 match claim_tx_data.1 {
1150 TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
1151 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1152 script.write(writer)?;
1153 pubkey.write(writer)?;
1154 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
1156 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1158 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1160 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1162 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1163 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1164 script.write(writer)?;
1166 preimage.write(writer)?;
1167 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1169 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1170 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1171 script.write(writer)?;
1172 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
1173 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
1174 preimage.write(writer)?;
1175 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1178 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
1179 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
1180 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
1183 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1184 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1185 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1186 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1187 for ev in events.iter() {
1189 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
1190 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1191 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1193 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1194 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1195 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1196 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1205 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1207 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1208 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1209 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1210 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1211 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1212 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1213 self.write(writer, true)
1216 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1218 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1219 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1220 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1221 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1222 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1223 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1224 self.write(writer, false)
1227 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1228 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1229 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1230 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1231 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1234 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1238 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1239 //TODO This can be optimized?
1240 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1241 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1249 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1250 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1253 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1254 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1255 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1256 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1259 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1260 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1261 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1262 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1263 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1264 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1265 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1266 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1267 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1268 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1269 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1270 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1272 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1273 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1275 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1276 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1279 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1284 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1285 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1286 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1287 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1288 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1289 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1290 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1291 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1292 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1293 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1295 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1296 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1297 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1298 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1302 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1303 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1304 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1305 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1308 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1309 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1311 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1312 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1313 // script_pubkey version.
1314 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1315 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1318 let mut total_value = 0;
1319 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1320 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1321 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1323 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1324 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1326 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1327 txid: commitment_txid,
1330 script_sig: Script::new(),
1331 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1332 witness: Vec::new(),
1334 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1335 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1336 total_value += outp.value;
1337 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1338 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1339 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1340 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1341 output: outp.clone(),
1346 macro_rules! sign_input {
1347 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1349 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1350 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1351 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1352 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1353 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1355 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1356 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1357 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1359 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1363 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1364 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1365 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1366 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1368 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1370 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1371 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1376 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1377 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1379 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1380 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1381 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1382 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1383 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1384 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1385 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1388 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1389 txid: commitment_txid,
1390 vout: transaction_output_index,
1392 script_sig: Script::new(),
1393 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1394 witness: Vec::new(),
1396 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1398 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1399 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1400 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1402 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1406 output: vec!(TxOut {
1407 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1408 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1411 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1412 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1413 let mut used_feerate;
1414 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1415 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1416 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1417 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1418 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1422 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1429 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1430 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1431 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1432 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1433 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1435 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1436 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1437 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1438 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1439 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1440 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1441 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1443 let e = entry.get_mut();
1444 e.retain(|ref event| {
1446 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1447 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1452 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1455 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1463 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1464 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1465 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1467 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1468 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1471 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1473 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1475 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1476 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1479 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1486 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1488 let mut used_feerate;
1489 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1490 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1493 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1495 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1496 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1497 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1498 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
1503 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1505 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1506 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1507 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1509 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1510 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1511 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1512 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1513 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1514 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1515 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1516 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1518 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1519 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1521 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1523 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1524 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1525 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1526 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1527 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1528 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1529 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1530 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1531 // payment_preimage.
1532 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1533 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1534 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1535 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1537 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1538 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1542 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1543 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1545 let e = entry.get_mut();
1546 e.retain(|ref event| {
1548 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1549 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1554 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1557 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1565 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1566 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1567 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1569 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1570 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1574 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1575 let revocation_point_option =
1576 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1577 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1578 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1580 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1581 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1582 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1583 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1584 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1586 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1587 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1588 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1591 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1592 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1593 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1596 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1597 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1598 match self.key_storage {
1599 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1600 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1601 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1602 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1604 output: outp.clone(),
1608 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1610 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1614 let mut total_value = 0;
1615 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1616 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1617 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1619 macro_rules! sign_input {
1620 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1622 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1623 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1624 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1625 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1626 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1627 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1628 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1630 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1634 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1635 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1636 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1637 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1638 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1643 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1644 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1645 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1646 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1647 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1648 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1649 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1651 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1654 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1655 txid: commitment_txid,
1656 vout: transaction_output_index,
1658 script_sig: Script::new(),
1659 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1660 witness: Vec::new(),
1662 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1664 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1665 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1666 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1668 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1672 output: vec!(TxOut {
1673 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1674 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1677 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1678 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1679 let mut used_feerate;
1680 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1681 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1682 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1683 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1684 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1685 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1686 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1688 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1692 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1698 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1699 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1701 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1702 txid: commitment_txid,
1703 vout: transaction_output_index,
1705 script_sig: Script::new(),
1706 sequence: idx as u32,
1707 witness: Vec::new(),
1709 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1711 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1713 output: vec!(TxOut {
1714 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1715 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1718 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1719 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1720 let mut used_feerate;
1721 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1722 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1723 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1724 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1725 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1726 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1731 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1736 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1738 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1739 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1742 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1749 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1751 let mut used_feerate;
1752 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1753 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1756 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1758 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1759 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1760 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1761 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
1766 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1767 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1768 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1769 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1771 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1774 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1775 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1776 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1777 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1778 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1779 key: local_key.clone(),
1780 output: outp.clone(),
1786 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1789 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1790 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1791 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1795 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1796 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1799 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1804 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1805 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1806 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1807 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1808 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1809 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1811 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1812 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1815 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1816 None => return (None, None),
1817 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1819 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1820 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1821 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1823 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1826 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1828 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1832 script_sig: Script::new(),
1833 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1834 witness: Vec::new(),
1836 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1839 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1840 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1841 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1845 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1851 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1852 let mut used_feerate;
1853 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1854 return (None, None);
1857 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1859 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1860 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1861 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1862 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1863 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
1865 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1869 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1870 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1871 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1872 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1874 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1875 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1876 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1877 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
1878 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
1882 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1883 } else { (None, None) }
1886 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
1887 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1888 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1889 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1890 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1892 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1893 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1894 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1895 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1896 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1897 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1898 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1899 key: local_delayedkey,
1900 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1901 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1902 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1911 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1912 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1913 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1914 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1915 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1920 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1921 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1922 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1924 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1925 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1927 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1929 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1930 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1931 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1932 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1934 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1935 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1936 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1938 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1939 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1940 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1941 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1943 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1944 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1945 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1947 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1949 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1950 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1951 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1952 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1954 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1955 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1956 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1958 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1959 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1960 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1961 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1964 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1965 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1969 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
1972 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1973 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1974 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1975 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1976 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1977 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
1978 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1979 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1981 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1982 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1983 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1984 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1986 let e = entry.get_mut();
1987 e.retain(|ref event| {
1989 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1990 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1995 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1998 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2004 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2005 ($updates: expr) => {
2006 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2007 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2008 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2009 for claim in $updates.3 {
2010 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2018 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2019 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2021 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2022 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2024 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2025 match self.key_storage {
2026 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2027 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2029 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2030 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2035 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2036 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2038 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2039 match self.key_storage {
2040 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2041 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2043 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2044 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2050 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2051 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2052 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2053 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2054 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2055 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2063 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2064 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2066 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2067 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2071 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2074 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2075 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2076 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2077 match self.key_storage {
2078 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2079 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2080 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2081 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2082 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2083 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2084 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2085 output: output.clone(),
2090 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2091 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2092 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2099 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2100 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2101 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2102 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2103 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2104 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2105 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2106 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2107 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2108 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2109 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2110 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2111 match self.key_storage {
2112 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2113 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2114 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2115 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2117 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2125 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2126 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2127 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2128 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2129 for tx in txn_matched {
2130 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2131 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2132 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2133 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2135 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2136 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2137 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2138 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2139 funding_info.clone()
2141 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2145 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2146 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2147 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2149 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2150 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2151 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2154 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2155 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2157 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2158 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2162 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2163 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2164 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2168 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2169 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2170 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2173 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2174 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2178 for tx in txn.iter() {
2179 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2180 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2183 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2184 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2185 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2186 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2187 if updated.len() > 0 {
2188 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2190 for inp in &tx.input {
2191 if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
2192 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2194 let e = entry.get_mut();
2195 e.retain(|ref event| {
2197 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2198 return outpoint != inp.previous_output
2203 e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
2205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2206 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
2212 let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
2213 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2214 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2215 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx));
2216 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2217 match self.key_storage {
2218 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2219 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2220 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2221 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2222 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2223 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2226 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2227 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2230 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2231 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2232 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2233 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2234 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2235 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2238 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2239 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2245 for claim in pending_claims {
2246 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2251 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2254 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2255 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
2257 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2258 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2259 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2264 //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
2265 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2266 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2269 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2270 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2272 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2273 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2275 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
2276 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2279 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2280 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2281 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2282 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2283 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2284 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2285 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2286 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2287 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2288 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2289 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2290 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2291 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2292 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2293 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2294 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2295 // time out the HTLC first.
2296 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2297 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2298 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2299 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2300 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2301 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2302 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2303 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2304 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2305 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2306 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2307 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2308 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2309 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2310 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2311 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2312 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2313 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2314 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2315 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2316 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2317 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2318 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2319 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2326 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2327 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2330 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2331 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2332 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2333 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2336 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2337 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2338 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2346 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2347 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2348 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2349 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2351 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2352 let mut payment_data = None;
2353 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2354 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2355 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2356 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2358 macro_rules! log_claim {
2359 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2360 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2361 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2362 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2363 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2364 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2365 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2366 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2367 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2368 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2369 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2370 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2372 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2373 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2374 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2375 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2380 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2381 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2382 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2383 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2384 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2385 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2386 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2387 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2396 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2397 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2398 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2399 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2400 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2401 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2402 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2403 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2404 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2405 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2406 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2407 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2408 } else if !$local_tx {
2409 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2410 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2412 if payment_data.is_none() {
2413 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2414 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2418 if payment_data.is_none() {
2419 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2420 continue 'outer_loop;
2427 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2428 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2429 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2430 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2433 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2434 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2435 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2436 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2439 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2440 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2441 "remote commitment tx", false);
2444 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2445 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2446 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2447 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2448 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2449 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2450 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2451 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2452 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2453 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2455 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2456 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2458 let e = entry.get_mut();
2459 e.retain(|ref event| {
2461 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2462 return htlc_update.0 != source
2467 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2470 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2480 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2482 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2483 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2484 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2485 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2489 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2494 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2495 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2496 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2497 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2500 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2502 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2504 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2505 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2506 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2507 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2508 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2509 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2510 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2511 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2512 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2513 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2514 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2515 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2517 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2518 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2519 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2521 revocation_base_key,
2523 delayed_payment_base_key,
2526 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2527 latest_per_commitment_point,
2529 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2530 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2533 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2536 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2537 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2539 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2540 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2544 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2545 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2546 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2547 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2549 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2554 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2555 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2557 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2558 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2559 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2560 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2563 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2566 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2567 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2568 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2569 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2570 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2572 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2573 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2579 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2580 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2581 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2582 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2583 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2584 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2585 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2586 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2588 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2593 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2594 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2595 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2596 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2597 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2598 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2599 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2600 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2601 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2603 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2604 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2608 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2609 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2610 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2611 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2612 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2613 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2614 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2618 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2621 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2624 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2625 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2629 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2630 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2631 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2634 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2635 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2636 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2637 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2638 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2640 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2641 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2642 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2643 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2644 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2646 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2647 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2649 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2654 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2661 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2664 Some(read_local_tx!())
2666 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2669 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2672 Some(read_local_tx!())
2674 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2677 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2679 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2680 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2681 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2682 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2683 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2684 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2685 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2689 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2690 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2691 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2694 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2695 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2696 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
2698 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2701 let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2702 let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2703 for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
2704 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2705 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2706 let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2708 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2709 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2710 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2711 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2714 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2716 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2717 TxMaterial::Revoked {
2726 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2727 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2728 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2729 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2730 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
2738 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2739 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2740 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2741 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2742 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2743 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
2745 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
2750 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2752 let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
2753 let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
2754 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2755 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
2758 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2759 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2760 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2761 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2762 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2763 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2764 for _ in 0..events_len {
2765 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2767 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2768 OnchainEvent::Claim {
2773 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2774 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2775 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2776 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2779 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2783 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2786 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2787 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2790 their_htlc_base_key,
2791 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2792 their_cur_revocation_points,
2795 their_to_self_delay,
2798 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2799 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2800 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2802 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2803 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2804 current_remote_commitment_number,
2811 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
2813 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2825 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2826 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2827 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2828 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2829 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2830 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2831 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2832 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2833 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2835 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2836 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2838 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2839 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2840 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2841 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2842 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2846 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2847 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2848 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2849 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2850 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2851 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2853 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2855 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2856 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2857 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2860 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2861 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2866 // insert_secret correct sequence
2867 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2887 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2912 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2913 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2923 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2924 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2928 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2929 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2932 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2933 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2934 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2937 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2938 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2939 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2942 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2943 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2944 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2947 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2948 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2949 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2950 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2954 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2955 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2958 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2959 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2960 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2963 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2964 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2965 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2968 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2969 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2970 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2973 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2974 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2975 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2976 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2980 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2981 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2986 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2989 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2990 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2991 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2994 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2995 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2996 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2999 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3000 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3001 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3004 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3005 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3006 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3009 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3010 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3011 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3014 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3015 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3016 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3019 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3020 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3021 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3022 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3026 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3027 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3030 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3031 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3032 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3035 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3036 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3040 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3041 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3042 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3045 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3046 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3047 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3050 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3051 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3052 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3055 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3056 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3057 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3058 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3062 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3063 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3073 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3076 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3077 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3078 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3088 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3091 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3092 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3093 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3096 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3097 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3098 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3101 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3102 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3103 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3104 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3108 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3109 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3112 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3113 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3114 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3117 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3118 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3119 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3122 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3123 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3124 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3127 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3128 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3129 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3132 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3133 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3134 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3137 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3138 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3139 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3142 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3143 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3144 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3147 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3148 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3149 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3150 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3154 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3155 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3158 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3159 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3160 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3163 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3164 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3165 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3168 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3169 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3170 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3173 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3174 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3175 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3178 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3179 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3180 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3183 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3184 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3185 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3188 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3189 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3190 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3193 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3194 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3195 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3196 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3201 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3202 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3203 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3205 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3206 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3210 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3211 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3212 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3213 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3214 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3215 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3220 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3222 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3224 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3226 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3227 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3228 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3229 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3233 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3234 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3236 let mut res = Vec::new();
3237 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3238 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3242 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3243 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3250 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3251 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3253 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3254 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3260 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3261 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3262 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3263 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3268 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3270 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3271 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3273 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3274 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3275 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3276 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3277 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3278 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3279 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3282 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3283 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3284 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3285 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3286 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3287 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3288 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3290 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3291 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3292 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3293 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3294 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3295 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3297 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3298 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3299 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3300 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3301 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3302 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3303 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3304 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3306 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3307 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3308 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3309 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3310 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3311 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3315 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3316 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3317 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3319 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3320 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3321 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3322 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3324 macro_rules! sign_input {
3325 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3326 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3327 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3329 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3330 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3331 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3333 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3334 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3335 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3336 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3337 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3338 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3339 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3340 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3341 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3342 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3343 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3344 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3346 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3348 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3349 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3350 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3351 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3355 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3356 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3358 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3359 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3361 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3362 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3366 script_sig: Script::new(),
3367 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3368 witness: Vec::new(),
3371 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3372 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3375 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3376 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3377 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3378 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3379 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3381 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3383 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3384 claim_tx.input.clear();
3385 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3387 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3388 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3392 script_sig: Script::new(),
3393 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3394 witness: Vec::new(),
3397 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3398 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3399 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3400 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3401 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3403 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3405 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3406 claim_tx.input.clear();
3407 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3408 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3409 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3413 script_sig: Script::new(),
3414 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3415 witness: Vec::new(),
3417 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3418 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3419 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3420 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3421 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3423 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3426 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.