1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
113 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
114 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
115 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
116 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
117 /// all registered listeners in one go.
118 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
119 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
121 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
122 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
123 /// any spends of it.
124 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
126 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
127 /// with success or failure backward
128 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
131 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
132 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
134 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
136 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
137 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
138 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
140 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
141 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
142 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
143 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
144 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
146 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
147 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
148 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
149 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
150 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
152 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
155 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
156 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
157 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
158 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
159 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
161 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
162 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
163 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
164 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
165 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
166 outputs: spendable_outputs,
170 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
171 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
172 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
175 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
179 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
180 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
181 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
182 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
184 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
185 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
186 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
187 let mut existing_claim = false;
188 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
189 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
190 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
191 existing_claim = true;
197 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
201 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
206 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
207 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
210 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
211 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
212 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
213 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
214 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
219 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
220 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
221 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
222 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
223 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
224 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
227 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
228 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
230 fee_estimator: feeest,
236 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
237 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
238 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
239 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
240 Some(orig_monitor) => {
241 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
242 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
246 match monitor.key_storage {
247 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
250 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
252 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
253 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
254 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
255 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
259 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
260 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
263 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
268 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
269 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
270 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
272 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
276 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
277 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
278 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
279 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
281 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
283 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
288 pending_htlcs_updated
292 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
293 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
294 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
295 let mut ret = Vec::new();
296 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
301 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
302 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
303 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
304 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
305 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
306 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
307 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
308 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
309 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
310 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
311 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
312 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
313 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
314 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
315 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
316 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
317 /// accurate block height.
318 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
319 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
320 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
321 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
322 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
323 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
324 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
325 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
326 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
327 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
328 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
330 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
333 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
334 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
335 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
336 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
337 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
338 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
339 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
340 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
341 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
342 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
345 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
346 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
350 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
351 struct LocalSignedTx {
352 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
355 revocation_key: PublicKey,
356 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
357 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
358 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
360 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
364 enum InputDescriptors {
369 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
372 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
373 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
374 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
375 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
379 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
387 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
392 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
393 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
398 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
399 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
400 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
402 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
403 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
405 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
407 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
408 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
409 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
411 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
415 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
416 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
418 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
419 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
421 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
422 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
424 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
425 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
427 key_storage: Storage,
428 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
429 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
430 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
431 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
433 our_to_self_delay: u16,
434 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
436 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
437 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
438 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
439 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
440 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
441 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
442 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
443 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
444 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
445 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
446 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
447 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
448 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
450 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
451 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
452 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
453 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
454 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
455 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
457 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
459 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
461 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
463 destination_script: Script,
464 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
465 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
466 // scan every commitment transaction for that
467 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
469 // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
470 // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
471 // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
472 // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
473 // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
474 // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
475 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
477 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
478 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
479 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
480 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
482 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
483 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
484 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
485 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
486 // the full block_connected).
487 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
488 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
492 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
493 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
495 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
496 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
498 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
499 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
501 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
502 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
504 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
505 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
508 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
509 $spent_txid, $value);
514 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
515 $spent_txid, $value);
527 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
528 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
529 /// underlying object
530 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
531 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
532 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
533 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
534 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
535 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
536 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
537 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
538 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
539 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
540 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
541 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
542 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
543 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
544 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
545 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
546 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
547 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
548 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
549 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
553 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
554 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
563 impl ChannelMonitor {
564 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
566 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
568 key_storage: Storage::Local {
569 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
570 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
571 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
572 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
573 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
574 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
575 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
577 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
578 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
580 their_htlc_base_key: None,
581 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
582 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
584 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
585 their_to_self_delay: None,
587 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
588 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
589 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
590 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
592 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
593 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
594 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
596 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
597 destination_script: destination_script,
598 to_remote_rescue: None,
600 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
602 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
604 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
605 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
610 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
611 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
613 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
614 tx_weight += match inp {
615 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
616 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
617 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
619 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
620 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
621 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
623 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
624 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
625 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
627 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
628 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
629 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
631 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
632 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
633 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
640 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
641 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
642 return current_height + 1
643 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
644 return current_height + 3
650 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
652 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
660 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
661 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
663 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
664 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
665 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
666 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
672 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
673 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
674 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
675 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
676 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
678 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
679 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
680 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
683 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
686 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
688 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
689 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
690 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
691 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
692 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
693 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
699 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
700 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
701 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
702 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
703 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
705 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
706 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
707 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
711 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
712 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
713 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
718 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
725 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
734 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
735 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
736 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
737 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
738 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
739 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
740 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
741 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
743 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
744 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
747 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
748 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
749 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
750 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
751 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
752 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
754 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
755 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
756 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
757 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
758 Some(old_points) => {
759 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
760 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
761 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
762 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
763 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
765 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
768 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
772 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
777 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
778 match self.key_storage {
779 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
780 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
781 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
782 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
784 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
785 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
789 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
793 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
794 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
795 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
796 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
797 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
798 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
799 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
800 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
801 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
802 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
803 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
804 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
805 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
806 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
807 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
808 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
809 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
814 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
815 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
817 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
821 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
822 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
823 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
824 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
827 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
828 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
829 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
830 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
831 match self.key_storage {
832 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
833 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
834 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
835 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
836 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
837 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
838 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
839 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
840 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
843 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
846 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
847 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
850 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
854 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
855 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
856 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
857 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
859 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
860 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
861 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
862 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
863 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
864 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
868 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
869 // local transactions to decide how to merge
870 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
871 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
872 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
873 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
875 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
876 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
878 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
879 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
881 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
882 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
885 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
889 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
890 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
891 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
892 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
895 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
896 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
897 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
898 /// provides slightly better privacy.
899 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
900 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
901 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
902 match self.key_storage {
903 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
904 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
906 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
907 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
912 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
913 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
914 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
915 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
918 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
919 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
922 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
923 match self.key_storage {
924 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
925 *funding_info = None;
927 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
928 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
933 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
934 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
935 match self.key_storage {
936 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
938 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
942 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
948 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
949 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
950 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
951 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
952 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
953 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
954 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
955 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
956 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
962 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
963 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
964 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
965 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
966 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
967 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
969 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
970 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
972 macro_rules! write_option {
979 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
984 match self.key_storage {
985 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
986 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
987 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
988 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
989 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
990 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
991 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
992 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
993 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
995 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
996 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
997 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
998 script.write(writer)?;
1001 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1004 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1005 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1007 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1010 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1011 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1013 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1014 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1015 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1016 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1017 match second_option {
1018 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1019 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1022 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1027 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1031 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1032 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1034 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1035 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1036 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1039 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1040 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1041 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1042 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1043 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1044 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1045 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1049 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1050 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1051 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1052 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1053 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1054 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1055 write_option!(htlc_source);
1059 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1060 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1061 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1062 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1063 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1064 for script in txouts.iter() {
1065 script.write(writer)?;
1069 if for_local_storage {
1070 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1071 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1072 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1073 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1076 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1079 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1080 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1081 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1083 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1084 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1088 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1089 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1090 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1091 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1093 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1094 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1095 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1096 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1097 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1099 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1100 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1104 write_option!(htlc_source);
1109 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1110 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1111 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1113 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1116 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1117 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1118 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1120 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1123 if for_local_storage {
1124 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1126 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1129 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1130 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1131 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1134 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1135 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1136 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1137 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1138 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1139 local_key.write(writer)?;
1141 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1144 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
1145 for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
1146 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1147 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
1148 match claim_tx_data.1 {
1149 TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
1150 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1151 script.write(writer)?;
1152 pubkey.write(writer)?;
1153 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
1155 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1157 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1159 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1161 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1162 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1163 script.write(writer)?;
1165 preimage.write(writer)?;
1166 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1168 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1169 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1170 script.write(writer)?;
1171 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
1172 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
1173 preimage.write(writer)?;
1174 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1177 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
1178 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
1179 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
1182 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1183 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1184 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1185 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1186 for ev in events.iter() {
1188 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
1189 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1190 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1192 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1193 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1194 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1195 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1204 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1206 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1207 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1208 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1209 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1210 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1211 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1212 self.write(writer, true)
1215 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1217 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1218 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1219 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1220 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1221 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1222 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1223 self.write(writer, false)
1226 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1227 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1228 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1229 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1230 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1233 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1237 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1238 //TODO This can be optimized?
1239 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1240 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1248 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1249 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1252 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1253 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1254 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1255 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1258 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1259 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1260 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1261 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1262 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1263 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1264 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1265 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1266 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1267 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1268 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1269 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1271 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1272 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1274 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1275 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1278 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1283 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1284 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1285 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1286 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1287 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1288 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1289 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1290 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1291 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1292 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1294 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1295 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1296 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1297 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1301 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1302 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1303 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1304 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1307 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1308 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1310 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1311 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1312 // script_pubkey version.
1313 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1314 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1317 let mut total_value = 0;
1318 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1319 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1320 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1322 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1323 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1325 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1326 txid: commitment_txid,
1329 script_sig: Script::new(),
1330 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1331 witness: Vec::new(),
1333 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1334 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1335 total_value += outp.value;
1336 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1337 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1338 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1339 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1340 output: outp.clone(),
1345 macro_rules! sign_input {
1346 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1348 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1349 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1350 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1351 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1352 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1354 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1355 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1356 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1358 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1362 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1363 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1364 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1365 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1367 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1369 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1370 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1375 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1376 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1378 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1379 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1380 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1381 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1382 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1383 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1384 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1387 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1388 txid: commitment_txid,
1389 vout: transaction_output_index,
1391 script_sig: Script::new(),
1392 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1393 witness: Vec::new(),
1395 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1397 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1398 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1399 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1401 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1405 output: vec!(TxOut {
1406 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1407 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1410 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1411 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1412 let mut used_feerate;
1413 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1414 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1415 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1416 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1417 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1421 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1428 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1429 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1430 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1431 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1432 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1434 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1435 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1436 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1437 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1438 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1439 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1440 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1441 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1442 let e = entry.get_mut();
1443 e.retain(|ref event| {
1445 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1446 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1451 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1453 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1454 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1462 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1463 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1464 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1466 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1467 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1470 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1472 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1474 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1475 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1478 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1485 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1487 let mut used_feerate;
1488 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1489 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1492 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1494 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1495 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1496 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1497 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
1502 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1504 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1505 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1506 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1508 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1509 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1510 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1511 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1512 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1513 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1514 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1515 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1517 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1518 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1520 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1522 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1523 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1524 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1525 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1526 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1527 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1528 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1529 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1530 // payment_preimage.
1531 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1532 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1533 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1534 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1536 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1537 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1541 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1542 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1544 let e = entry.get_mut();
1545 e.retain(|ref event| {
1547 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1548 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1553 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1556 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1564 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1565 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1566 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1568 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1569 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1573 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1574 let revocation_point_option =
1575 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1576 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1577 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1579 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1580 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1581 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1582 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1583 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1585 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1586 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1587 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1590 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1591 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1592 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1595 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1596 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1597 match self.key_storage {
1598 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1599 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1600 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1601 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1603 output: outp.clone(),
1607 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1609 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1613 let mut total_value = 0;
1614 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1615 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1616 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1618 macro_rules! sign_input {
1619 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1621 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1622 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1623 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1624 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1625 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1626 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1627 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1629 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1633 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1634 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1635 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1636 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1637 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1642 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1643 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1644 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1645 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1646 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1647 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1648 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1650 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1653 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1654 txid: commitment_txid,
1655 vout: transaction_output_index,
1657 script_sig: Script::new(),
1658 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1659 witness: Vec::new(),
1661 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1663 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1664 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1665 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1667 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1671 output: vec!(TxOut {
1672 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1673 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1676 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1677 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1678 let mut used_feerate;
1679 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1680 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1681 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1682 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1683 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1684 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1685 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1687 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1688 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1689 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1691 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1697 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1698 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1700 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1701 txid: commitment_txid,
1702 vout: transaction_output_index,
1704 script_sig: Script::new(),
1705 sequence: idx as u32,
1706 witness: Vec::new(),
1708 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1710 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1712 output: vec!(TxOut {
1713 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1714 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1717 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1718 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1719 let mut used_feerate;
1720 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1721 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1722 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1723 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1724 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1725 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1730 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1735 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1737 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1738 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1741 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1748 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1750 let mut used_feerate;
1751 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1752 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1755 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1757 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1758 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1759 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1760 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
1765 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1766 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1767 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1768 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1770 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1773 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1774 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1775 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1776 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1777 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1778 key: local_key.clone(),
1779 output: outp.clone(),
1785 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1788 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1789 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1790 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1794 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1795 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1798 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1803 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1804 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1805 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1806 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1807 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1808 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1810 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1811 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1814 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1815 None => return (None, None),
1816 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1818 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1819 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1820 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1822 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1825 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1827 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1831 script_sig: Script::new(),
1832 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1833 witness: Vec::new(),
1835 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1838 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1839 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1840 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1844 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1850 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1851 let mut used_feerate;
1852 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1853 return (None, None);
1856 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1858 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1859 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1860 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1861 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1862 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
1864 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1868 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1869 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1870 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1871 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1873 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1874 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1875 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1876 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
1877 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
1881 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1882 } else { (None, None) }
1885 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
1886 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1887 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1888 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1889 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1891 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1892 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1893 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1894 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1895 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1896 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1897 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1898 key: local_delayedkey,
1899 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1900 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1901 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1910 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1911 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1912 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1913 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1914 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1919 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1920 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1921 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1923 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1924 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1926 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1928 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1929 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1930 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1931 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1933 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1934 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1935 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1937 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1938 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1939 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1940 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1942 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1943 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1944 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1946 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1948 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1949 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1950 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1951 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1953 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1954 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1955 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1957 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1958 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1959 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1960 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1963 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1964 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1968 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
1971 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1972 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1973 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1974 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1975 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1976 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
1977 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1978 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1980 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1981 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1982 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1983 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1985 let e = entry.get_mut();
1986 e.retain(|ref event| {
1988 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1989 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1994 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1997 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2003 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2004 ($updates: expr) => {
2005 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2006 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2007 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2008 for claim in $updates.3 {
2009 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2017 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2018 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2020 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2021 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2023 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2024 match self.key_storage {
2025 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2026 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2028 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2029 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2034 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2035 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2037 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2038 match self.key_storage {
2039 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2040 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2042 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2043 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2049 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2050 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2051 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2052 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2053 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2054 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2062 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2063 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2065 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2066 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2070 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2073 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2074 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2075 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2076 match self.key_storage {
2077 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2078 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2079 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2080 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2081 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2082 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2083 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2084 output: output.clone(),
2089 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2090 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2091 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2098 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2099 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2100 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2101 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2102 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2103 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2104 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2105 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2106 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2107 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2108 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2109 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2110 match self.key_storage {
2111 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2112 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2113 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2114 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2116 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2124 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2125 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2126 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2127 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2128 for tx in txn_matched {
2129 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2130 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2131 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2132 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2134 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2135 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2136 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2137 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2138 funding_info.clone()
2140 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2144 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2145 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2146 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
2148 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2149 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2150 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2153 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
2154 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2156 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2157 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2161 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2162 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
2163 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2167 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2168 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2169 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2172 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2173 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2177 for tx in txn.iter() {
2178 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2181 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2182 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2183 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2184 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
2185 if updated.len() > 0 {
2186 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2188 for inp in &tx.input {
2189 if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
2190 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2192 let e = entry.get_mut();
2193 e.retain(|ref event| {
2195 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2196 return outpoint != inp.previous_output
2201 e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
2203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2204 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
2210 let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
2211 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2212 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2213 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2214 match self.key_storage {
2215 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2216 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2217 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2218 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2219 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2220 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2223 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2226 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2227 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2228 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2229 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2230 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2231 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2234 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2240 for claim in pending_claims {
2241 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2246 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2249 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2250 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
2252 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2253 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2254 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2259 //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
2260 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2261 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2264 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2265 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2267 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2268 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2270 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
2271 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2274 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2275 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2276 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2277 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2278 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2279 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2280 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2281 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2282 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2283 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2284 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2285 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2286 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2287 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2288 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2289 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2290 // time out the HTLC first.
2291 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2292 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2293 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2294 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2295 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2296 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2297 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2298 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2299 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2300 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2301 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2302 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2303 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2304 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2305 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2306 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2307 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2308 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2309 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2310 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2311 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2312 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2313 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2314 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2321 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2322 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2325 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2326 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2327 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2328 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2331 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2332 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2333 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2341 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2342 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2343 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2344 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2346 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2347 let mut payment_data = None;
2348 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2349 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2350 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2351 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2353 macro_rules! log_claim {
2354 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2355 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2356 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2357 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2358 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2359 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2360 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2361 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2362 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2363 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2364 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2365 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2367 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2368 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2369 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2370 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2375 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2376 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2377 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2378 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2379 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2380 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2381 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2382 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2391 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2392 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2393 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2394 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2395 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2396 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2397 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2398 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2399 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2400 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2401 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2402 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2403 } else if !$local_tx {
2404 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2405 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2407 if payment_data.is_none() {
2408 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2409 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2413 if payment_data.is_none() {
2414 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2415 continue 'outer_loop;
2422 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2423 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2424 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2425 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2428 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2429 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2430 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2431 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2434 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2435 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2436 "remote commitment tx", false);
2439 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2440 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2441 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2442 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2443 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2444 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2445 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2446 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2447 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2448 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2450 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2451 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2453 let e = entry.get_mut();
2454 e.retain(|ref event| {
2456 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2457 return htlc_update.0 != source
2462 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2465 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2475 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2477 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2478 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2479 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2480 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2484 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2489 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2490 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2491 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2492 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2495 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2497 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2499 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2500 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2501 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2502 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2503 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2504 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2505 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2506 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2507 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2508 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2509 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2510 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2512 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2513 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2514 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2516 revocation_base_key,
2518 delayed_payment_base_key,
2521 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2522 latest_per_commitment_point,
2524 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2525 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2528 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2531 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2532 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2534 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2535 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2539 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2540 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2541 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2542 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2544 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2549 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2550 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2552 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2553 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2554 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2555 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2558 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2561 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2562 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2563 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2564 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2565 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2567 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2568 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2574 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2575 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2576 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2577 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2578 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2579 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2580 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2581 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2583 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2584 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2588 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2589 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2590 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2591 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2592 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2593 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2594 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2595 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2596 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2598 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2603 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2604 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2605 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2606 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2607 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2608 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2609 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2613 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2616 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2619 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2620 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2624 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2625 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2629 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2630 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2631 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2632 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2633 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2635 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2636 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2637 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2638 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2639 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2641 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2642 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2644 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2649 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2656 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2659 Some(read_local_tx!())
2661 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2664 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2667 Some(read_local_tx!())
2669 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2672 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2674 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2675 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2676 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2677 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2678 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2679 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2684 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2685 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2686 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2689 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2690 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2691 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
2693 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2696 let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2697 let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2698 for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
2699 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2700 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2701 let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2703 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2704 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2705 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2706 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2709 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2711 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2712 TxMaterial::Revoked {
2721 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2722 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2723 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2724 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2725 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
2733 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2734 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2735 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2736 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2737 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2738 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
2740 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
2745 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2747 let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
2748 let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
2749 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2750 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
2753 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2754 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2755 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2756 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2757 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2758 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2759 for _ in 0..events_len {
2760 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2762 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2763 OnchainEvent::Claim {
2768 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2769 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2770 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2771 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2774 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2778 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2781 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2782 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2785 their_htlc_base_key,
2786 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2787 their_cur_revocation_points,
2790 their_to_self_delay,
2793 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2794 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2795 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2797 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2798 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2799 current_remote_commitment_number,
2806 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
2808 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2820 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2821 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2822 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2823 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2824 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2825 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2826 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2827 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2828 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2830 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2831 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2833 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2834 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2835 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2836 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2837 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2841 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2842 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2843 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2844 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2845 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2846 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2848 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2850 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2851 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2852 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2855 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2856 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2861 // insert_secret correct sequence
2862 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2887 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2907 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2908 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2918 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2919 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2923 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2924 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2927 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2928 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2929 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2932 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2933 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2934 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2937 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2938 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2939 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2942 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2943 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2944 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2945 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2949 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2950 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2953 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2954 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2955 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2958 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2959 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2960 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2963 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2964 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2965 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2968 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2969 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2970 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2971 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2975 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2976 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2979 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2980 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2981 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2986 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2989 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2990 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2991 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2994 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2995 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2996 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2999 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3000 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3001 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3004 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3005 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3006 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3009 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3010 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3011 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3014 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3015 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3016 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3017 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3021 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3022 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3025 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3026 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3027 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3030 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3031 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3032 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3035 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3036 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3040 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3041 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3042 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3045 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3046 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3047 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3050 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3051 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3052 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3053 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3057 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3058 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3061 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3062 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3063 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3073 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3076 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3077 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3078 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3088 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3091 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3092 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3093 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3096 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3097 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3098 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3099 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3103 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3104 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3107 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3108 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3109 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3112 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3113 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3114 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3117 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3118 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3119 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3122 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3123 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3124 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3127 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3128 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3129 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3132 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3133 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3134 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3137 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3138 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3139 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3142 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3143 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3144 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3145 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3149 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3150 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3153 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3154 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3155 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3158 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3159 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3160 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3163 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3164 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3165 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3168 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3169 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3170 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3173 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3174 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3175 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3178 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3179 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3180 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3183 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3184 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3185 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3188 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3189 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3190 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3191 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3196 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3197 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3198 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3200 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3201 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3205 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3206 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3207 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3208 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3209 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3210 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3215 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3217 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3219 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3221 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3222 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3223 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3224 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3228 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3229 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3231 let mut res = Vec::new();
3232 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3233 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3237 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3238 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3245 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3246 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3248 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3249 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3255 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3256 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3257 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3258 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3263 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3265 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3266 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3268 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3269 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3270 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3271 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3272 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3273 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3274 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3277 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3278 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3279 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3280 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3281 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3282 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3283 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3285 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3286 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3287 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3288 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3289 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3290 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3292 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3293 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3294 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3295 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3296 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3297 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3298 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3299 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3301 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3302 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3303 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3304 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3305 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3306 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3310 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3311 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3312 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3314 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3315 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3316 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3317 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3319 macro_rules! sign_input {
3320 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3321 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3322 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3324 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3325 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3326 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3328 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3329 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3330 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3331 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3332 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3333 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3334 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3335 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3336 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3337 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3338 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3339 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3341 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3343 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3344 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3345 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3346 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3350 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3351 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3353 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3354 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3356 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3357 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3361 script_sig: Script::new(),
3362 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3363 witness: Vec::new(),
3366 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3367 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3370 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3371 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3372 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3373 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3374 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3376 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3378 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3379 claim_tx.input.clear();
3380 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3382 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3383 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3387 script_sig: Script::new(),
3388 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3389 witness: Vec::new(),
3392 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3393 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3394 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3395 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3396 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3398 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3400 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3401 claim_tx.input.clear();
3402 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3403 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3404 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3408 script_sig: Script::new(),
3409 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3410 witness: Vec::new(),
3412 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3413 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3414 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3415 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3416 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3418 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3421 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.