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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmonitor.rs
1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
2 //! here.
3 //!
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
7 //!
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
13
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
22
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
27
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use secp256k1;
31
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
33 use ln::chan_utils;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
49 #[derive(Clone)]
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52         /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
53         ///
54         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57         /// the channel to an operational state.
58         ///
59         /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60         /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61         /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
62         ///
63         /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64         /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65         /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66         /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67         /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68         /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
69         /// been "frozen".
70         ///
71         /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72         /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73         /// channel operation.
74         ///
75         /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76         /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77         /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
78         TemporaryFailure,
79         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
82         ///
83         /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
84         PermanentFailure,
85 }
86
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
92 #[derive(Debug)]
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
94
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98         pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99         pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100         pub(super) source: HTLCSource
101 }
102
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
106 /// server(s).
107 ///
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 ///
113 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
114 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
115 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
116 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
117 /// all registered listeners in one go.
118 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
119         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
120         ///
121         /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
122         /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
123         /// any spends of it.
124         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
125
126         /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
127         /// with success or failure backward
128         fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
129 }
130
131 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
132 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
133 ///
134 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
135 ///
136 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
137 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
138 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
139 ///
140 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
141 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
142 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
143         #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
144         pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
145         #[cfg(not(test))]
146         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
147         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
148         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
149         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
150         pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
151         logger: Arc<Logger>,
152         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
153 }
154
155 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
156
157         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
158                 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
159                 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
160                 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
161                 {
162                         let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
163                         for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
164                                 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
165                                 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
166                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
167                                                 outputs: spendable_outputs,
168                                         });
169                                 }
170
171                                 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
172                                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
173                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
174                                         }
175                                 }
176                                 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
177                         }
178                 }
179                 {
180                         // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
181                         let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
182                         for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
183                                 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
184                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
185                                                 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
186                                                 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
187                                                 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
188                                                 let mut existing_claim = false;
189                                                 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
190                                                         if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
191                                                                 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
192                                                                         existing_claim = true;
193                                                                         true
194                                                                 } else { false }
195                                                         } else { true }
196                                                 });
197                                                 if !existing_claim {
198                                                         e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
199                                                 }
200                                         }
201                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
202                                                 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
203                                         }
204                                 }
205                         }
206                 }
207                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
208                 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
209         }
210
211         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
212                 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
213                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
214                 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
215                         monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
216                 }
217         }
218 }
219
220 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
221         /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
222         /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
223         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
224                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
225                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
226                         chain_monitor,
227                         broadcaster,
228                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
229                         pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
230                         logger,
231                         fee_estimator: feeest,
232                 });
233
234                 res
235         }
236
237         /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
238         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
239                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
240                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
241                         Some(orig_monitor) => {
242                                 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
243                                 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
244                         },
245                         None => {}
246                 };
247                 match monitor.key_storage {
248                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
249                                 match funding_info {
250                                         &None => {
251                                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
252                                         },
253                                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
254                                                 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
255                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
256                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
257                                         },
258                                 }
259                         },
260                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
261                                 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
262                         }
263                 }
264                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
265                 Ok(())
266         }
267 }
268
269 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
270         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
271                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
272                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
273                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
274                 }
275         }
276
277         fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
278                 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
279                 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
280                 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
281                         for htlc_data in v {
282                                 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
283                                         payment_hash: k,
284                                         payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
285                                         source: htlc_data.0,
286                                 });
287                         }
288                 }
289                 pending_htlcs_updated
290         }
291 }
292
293 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
294         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
295                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
296                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
297                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
298                 ret
299         }
300 }
301
302 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
303 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
304 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
305 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
306 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
307 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
308 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
309 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
310 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
311 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
312 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
313 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
314 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
315 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
316 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
317 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
318 /// accurate block height.
319 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
320 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
321 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
322 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
323 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
324 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
325 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
326 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
327 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
328 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
329 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
330
331 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
332 enum Storage {
333         Local {
334                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
335                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
336                 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
337                 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
338                 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
339                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
340                 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
341                 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
342                 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
343                 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
344         },
345         Watchtower {
346                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
347                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
348         }
349 }
350
351 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
352 struct LocalSignedTx {
353         /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
354         txid: Sha256dHash,
355         tx: Transaction,
356         revocation_key: PublicKey,
357         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
358         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
359         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
360         feerate_per_kw: u64,
361         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
362 }
363
364 #[derive(PartialEq)]
365 enum InputDescriptors {
366         RevokedOfferedHTLC,
367         RevokedReceivedHTLC,
368         OfferedHTLC,
369         ReceivedHTLC,
370         RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
371 }
372
373 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
374 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
375 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
377 enum InputMaterial {
378         Revoked {
379                 script: Script,
380                 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
381                 key: SecretKey,
382                 is_htlc: bool,
383                 amount: u64,
384         },
385         RemoteHTLC {
386                 script: Script,
387                 key: SecretKey,
388                 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
389                 amount: u64,
390                 locktime: u32,
391         },
392         LocalHTLC {
393                 script: Script,
394                 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
395                 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
396                 amount: u64,
397         }
398 }
399
400 impl Writeable for InputMaterial  {
401         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
402                 match self {
403                         &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
404                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
405                                 script.write(writer)?;
406                                 pubkey.write(writer)?;
407                                 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
408                                 if *is_htlc {
409                                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
410                                 } else {
411                                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
412                                 }
413                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
414                         },
415                         &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
416                                 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
417                                 script.write(writer)?;
418                                 key.write(writer)?;
419                                 preimage.write(writer)?;
420                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
421                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
422                         },
423                         &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
424                                 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
425                                 script.write(writer)?;
426                                 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
427                                 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
428                                 preimage.write(writer)?;
429                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
430                         }
431                 }
432                 Ok(())
433         }
434 }
435
436 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
437         fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438                 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
439                         0 => {
440                                 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
441                                 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
442                                 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
443                                 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
444                                         0 => true,
445                                         1 => false,
446                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
447                                 };
448                                 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
449                                 InputMaterial::Revoked {
450                                         script,
451                                         pubkey,
452                                         key,
453                                         is_htlc,
454                                         amount
455                                 }
456                         },
457                         1 => {
458                                 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
459                                 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
460                                 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
461                                 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
462                                 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
463                                 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
464                                         script,
465                                         key,
466                                         preimage,
467                                         amount,
468                                         locktime
469                                 }
470                         },
471                         2 => {
472                                 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
473                                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
474                                 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
475                                 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
476                                 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
477                                 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
478                                         script,
479                                         sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
480                                         preimage,
481                                         amount
482                                 }
483                         }
484                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
485                 };
486                 Ok(input_material)
487         }
488 }
489
490 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
491 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
492 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
493 enum OnchainEvent {
494         /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
495         /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
496         Claim {
497                 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
498         },
499         /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
500         /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
501         /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
502         HTLCUpdate {
503                 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
504         },
505         /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
506         /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
507         /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
508         ContentiousOutpoint {
509                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
510                 input_material: InputMaterial,
511         }
512 }
513
514 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
515 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
516 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
517         // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
518         // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
519         height_timer: u32,
520         // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
521         feerate_previous: u64,
522         // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
523         // a priority of not feerate
524         soonest_timelock: u32,
525         // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
526         per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
527 }
528
529 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial  {
530         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
531                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
532                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
533                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
534                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
535                 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
536                         outp.write(writer)?;
537                         tx_material.write(writer)?;
538                 }
539                 Ok(())
540         }
541 }
542
543 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
544         fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
545                 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
546                 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
547                 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
548                 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
549                 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
550                 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
551                         let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
552                         let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
553                         per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
554                 }
555                 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
556         }
557 }
558
559 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
560 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
561
562 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
563 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
564 ///
565 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
566 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
567 #[derive(Clone)]
568 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
569         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
570
571         key_storage: Storage,
572         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
573         their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
574         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
575         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
576
577         our_to_self_delay: u16,
578         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
579
580         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
581         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
582         /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
583         /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
584         /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
585         /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
586         /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
587         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
588         /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
589         /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
590         /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
591         /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
592         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
593
594         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
595         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
596         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
597         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
598         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
599         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
600
601         // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
602         // deserialization
603         current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
604
605         payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
606
607         destination_script: Script,
608         // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
609         // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
610         // scan every commitment transaction for that
611         to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
612
613         // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
614         // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
615         // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
616         // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
617         // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
618         // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
619         // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
620         // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
621         // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
622         // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
623         // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
624         #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
625         pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
626         #[cfg(not(test))]
627         pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
628
629         // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
630         // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
631         // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
632         // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
633         // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
634         // block with output gets disconnected.
635         #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
636         pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
637         #[cfg(not(test))]
638         claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
639
640         // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
641         // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
642         // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
643         onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
644
645         // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
646         // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
647         // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
648         // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
649         // the full block_connected).
650         pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
651         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
652         logger: Arc<Logger>,
653 }
654
655 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
656         ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
657                 {
658                         $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
659                         let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
660                         if $value <= fee {
661                                 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
662                                 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
663                                 if $value <= fee {
664                                         $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
665                                         fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
666                                         if $value <= fee {
667                                                 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
668                                                         fee, $value);
669                                                 false
670                                         } else {
671                                                 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
672                                                         $value);
673                                                 $value -= fee;
674                                                 true
675                                         }
676                                 } else {
677                                         log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
678                                                 $value);
679                                         $value -= fee;
680                                         true
681                                 }
682                         } else {
683                                 $value -= fee;
684                                 true
685                         }
686                 }
687         }
688 }
689
690 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
691 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
692 /// underlying object
693 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
694         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
695                 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
696                         self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
697                         self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
698                         self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
699                         self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
700                         self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
701                         self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
702                         self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
703                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
704                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
705                         self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
706                         self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
707                         self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
708                         self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
709                         self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
710                         self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
711                         self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
712                         self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
713                         self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
714                 {
715                         false
716                 } else {
717                         for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
718                                 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
719                                         return false
720                                 }
721                         }
722                         true
723                 }
724         }
725 }
726
727 impl ChannelMonitor {
728         pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
729                 ChannelMonitor {
730                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
731
732                         key_storage: Storage::Local {
733                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
734                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
735                                 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
736                                 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
737                                 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
738                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
739                                 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
740                                 funding_info: None,
741                                 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
742                                 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
743                         },
744                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
745                         their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
746                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
747
748                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
749                         their_to_self_delay: None,
750
751                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
752                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
753                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
754                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
755
756                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
757                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
758                         current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
759
760                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
761                         destination_script: destination_script,
762                         to_remote_rescue: None,
763
764                         pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
765
766                         claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
767
768                         onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
769
770                         last_block_hash: Default::default(),
771                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
772                         logger,
773                 }
774         }
775
776         fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
777                 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
778                 for inp in inputs {
779                         // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
780                         tx_weight +=  match inp {
781                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
782                                 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
783                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
784                                 },
785                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
786                                 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
787                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
788                                 },
789                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig  + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
790                                 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
791                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
792                                 },
793                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
794                                 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
795                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
796                                 },
797                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
798                                 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
799                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
800                                 },
801                         };
802                 }
803                 tx_weight
804         }
805
806         fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
807                 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
808                         return current_height + 1
809                 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
810                         return current_height + 3
811                 }
812                 current_height + 15
813         }
814
815         #[inline]
816         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
817                 for i in 0..48 {
818                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
819                                 return i
820                         }
821                 }
822                 48
823         }
824
825         #[inline]
826         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
827                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
828                 for i in 0..bits {
829                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
830                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
831                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
832                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
833                         }
834                 }
835                 res
836         }
837
838         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
839         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
840         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
841         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
842                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
843                 for i in 0..pos {
844                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
845                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
846                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
847                         }
848                 }
849                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
850                         return Ok(());
851                 }
852                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
853
854                 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
855                 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
856                 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
857                 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
858                         if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
859                                 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
860                                         *source = None;
861                                 }
862                         }
863                 }
864
865                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
866                         let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
867                         let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
868                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
869                         let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
870
871                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
872                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
873                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
874                                                 return true
875                                         }
876                                 }
877                                 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
878                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
879                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
880                                                         return true
881                                                 }
882                                         }
883                                 }
884                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
885                                         if *cn < min_idx {
886                                                 return true
887                                         }
888                                         true
889                                 } else { false };
890                                 if contains {
891                                         remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
892                                 }
893                                 false
894                         });
895                 }
896
897                 Ok(())
898         }
899
900         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
901         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
902         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
903         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
904         pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
905                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
906                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
907                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
908                 // timeouts)
909                 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
910                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
911                 }
912
913                 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
914                 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
915                 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
916                 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
917                         *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
918                         *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
919                 }
920                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
921                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
922                 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
923                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
924                         Some(old_points) => {
925                                 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
926                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
927                                 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
928                                         if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
929                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
930                                         } else {
931                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
932                                         }
933                                 } else {
934                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
935                                 }
936                         },
937                         None => {
938                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
939                         }
940                 }
941         }
942
943         pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
944                 match self.key_storage {
945                         Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
946                                 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
947                                         let to_remote_script =  Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
948                                                 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
949                                                 .into_script();
950                                         if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
951                                                 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
952                                         }
953                                 }
954                         },
955                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
956                 }
957         }
958
959         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
960         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
961         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
962         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
963         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
964         /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
965         /// case of onchain HTLC tx
966         pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
967                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
968                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
969                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
970                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
971                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
972                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
973                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
974                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
975                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
976                         feerate_per_kw,
977                         htlc_outputs,
978                 });
979
980                 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
981                         *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
982                 } else {
983                         panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
984                 }
985         }
986
987         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
988         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
989         pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
990                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
991         }
992
993         /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
994         /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
995         /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
996         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
997                 match self.key_storage {
998                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
999                                 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1000                                 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1001                                 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1002                                         if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1003                                         // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1004                                         // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1005                                         if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1006                                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1007                                         }
1008                                 } else {
1009                                         return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1010                                 }
1011                         },
1012                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1013                                 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1014                                         unimplemented!();
1015                                 } else {
1016                                         return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1017                                 }
1018                         },
1019                 }
1020                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1021                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1022                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1023                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1024                 }
1025                 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1026                         if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1027                                 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1028                                 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1029                                 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1030                                         self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1031                                 }
1032                         }
1033                 }
1034                 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1035                 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1036                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1037                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1038                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1039                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1040                         }
1041                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1042                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1043                         }
1044                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1045                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1046                         }
1047                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1048                         self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1049                 }
1050
1051                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1052                 Ok(())
1053         }
1054
1055         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1056         pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1057                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1058                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1059         }
1060
1061         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1062         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1063         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1064         /// provides slightly better privacy.
1065         /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1066         /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1067         pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1068                 match self.key_storage {
1069                         Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1070                                 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1071                         },
1072                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1073                                 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1074                         }
1075                 }
1076         }
1077
1078         /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1079         pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
1080                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1081                 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1082         }
1083
1084         pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
1085                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1086         }
1087
1088         pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1089                 match self.key_storage {
1090                         Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1091                                 *funding_info = None;
1092                         },
1093                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1094                                 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1095                         },
1096                 }
1097         }
1098
1099         /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1100         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1101                 match self.key_storage {
1102                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1103                                 match funding_info {
1104                                         &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1105                                         &None => None
1106                                 }
1107                         },
1108                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1109                                 return None;
1110                         }
1111                 }
1112         }
1113
1114         /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1115         /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1116         /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1117         /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1118         pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1119                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1120                 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1121                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1122                                 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1123                         }
1124                 }
1125                 res
1126         }
1127
1128         /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
1129         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1130                 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
1131                 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
1132                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1133                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1134
1135                 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
1136                 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
1137
1138                 macro_rules! write_option {
1139                         ($thing: expr) => {
1140                                 match $thing {
1141                                         &Some(ref t) => {
1142                                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
1143                                                 t.write(writer)?;
1144                                         },
1145                                         &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
1146                                 }
1147                         }
1148                 }
1149
1150                 match self.key_storage {
1151                         Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
1152                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1153                                 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
1154                                 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
1155                                 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
1156                                 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
1157                                 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
1158                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
1159                                 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
1160                                 match funding_info  {
1161                                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
1162                                                 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
1163                                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
1164                                                 script.write(writer)?;
1165                                         },
1166                                         &None => {
1167                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1168                                         },
1169                                 }
1170                                 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1171                                 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1172                         },
1173                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1174                 }
1175
1176                 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1177                 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1178
1179                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1180                         Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1181                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1182                                 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1183                                 match second_option {
1184                                         Some(second_pubkey) => {
1185                                                 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1186                                         },
1187                                         None => {
1188                                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1189                                         },
1190                                 }
1191                         },
1192                         None => {
1193                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1194                         },
1195                 }
1196
1197                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1198                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1199
1200                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1201                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
1202                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1203                 }
1204
1205                 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1206                         ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1207                                 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1208                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1209                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1210                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1211                                 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1212                         }
1213                 }
1214
1215                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1216                 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1217                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1218                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1219                         for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1220                                 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1221                                 write_option!(htlc_source);
1222                         }
1223                 }
1224
1225                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1226                 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1227                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1228                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1229                         (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1230                         for script in txouts.iter() {
1231                                 script.write(writer)?;
1232                         }
1233                 }
1234
1235                 if for_local_storage {
1236                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1237                         for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1238                                 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1239                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1240                         }
1241                 } else {
1242                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1243                 }
1244
1245                 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1246                         ($local_tx: expr) => {
1247                                 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1248                                         match e {
1249                                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1250                                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1251                                         }
1252                                 }
1253
1254                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1255                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1256                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1257                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1258
1259                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1260                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1261                                 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1262                                         serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1263                                         if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1264                                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
1265                                                 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1266                                                 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1267                                         } else {
1268                                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
1269                                         }
1270                                         write_option!(htlc_source);
1271                                 }
1272                         }
1273                 }
1274
1275                 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1276                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1277                         serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1278                 } else {
1279                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1280                 }
1281
1282                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1283                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1284                         serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1285                 } else {
1286                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1287                 }
1288
1289                 if for_local_storage {
1290                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1291                 } else {
1292                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1293                 }
1294
1295                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1296                 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1297                         writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1298                 }
1299
1300                 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1301                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1302                 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1303                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1304                         to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1305                         local_key.write(writer)?;
1306                 } else {
1307                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1308                 }
1309
1310                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
1311                 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
1312                         ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
1313                         claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
1314                 }
1315
1316                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1317                 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1318                         outp.write(writer)?;
1319                         claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
1320                         claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
1321                 }
1322
1323                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1324                 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1325                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1326                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1327                         for ev in events.iter() {
1328                                 match *ev {
1329                                         OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
1330                                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1331                                                 claim_request.write(writer)?;
1332                                         },
1333                                         OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1334                                                 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1335                                                 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1336                                                 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1337                                         },
1338                                         OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
1339                                                 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1340                                                 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1341                                                 input_material.write(writer)?;
1342                                         }
1343                                 }
1344                         }
1345                 }
1346
1347                 Ok(())
1348         }
1349
1350         /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1351         ///
1352         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1353         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1354         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1355         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1356         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1357         pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1358                 self.write(writer, true)
1359         }
1360
1361         /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1362         ///
1363         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1364         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1365         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1366         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1367         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1368         pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1369                 self.write(writer, false)
1370         }
1371
1372         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1373         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1374                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1375                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1376                                 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1377                         }
1378                 }
1379                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1380                 None
1381         }
1382
1383         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1384                 //TODO This can be optimized?
1385                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1386                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1387                         if idx < min {
1388                                 min = idx;
1389                         }
1390                 }
1391                 min
1392         }
1393
1394         pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1395                 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1396         }
1397
1398         pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1399                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1400                         0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1401                 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1402         }
1403
1404         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1405         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1406         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1407         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1408         /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1409         /// revoked remote commitment tx
1410         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1411                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1412                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1413                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1414                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1415                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1416
1417                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1418                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1419
1420                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1421                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
1422                                 match $thing {
1423                                         Ok(a) => a,
1424                                         Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1425                                 }
1426                         };
1427                 }
1428
1429                 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1430                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1431                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1432                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1433                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1434                                 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1435                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1436                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1437                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1438                                         Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1439                                 },
1440                                 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1441                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1442                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1443                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1444                                         None)
1445                                 },
1446                         };
1447                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1448                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1449                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1450                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1451                         };
1452
1453                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1454                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1455
1456                         let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1457                                 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1458                                 // script_pubkey version.
1459                                 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1460                                 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1461                         } else { None };
1462
1463                         let mut total_value = 0;
1464                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1465                         let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1466                         let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1467
1468                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1469                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1470                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
1471                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1472                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1473                                                         vout: idx as u32,
1474                                                 },
1475                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1476                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1477                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1478                                         });
1479                                         inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1480                                         inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1481                                         total_value += outp.value;
1482                                 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1483                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1484                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1485                                                 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1486                                                 output: outp.clone(),
1487                                         });
1488                                 }
1489                         }
1490
1491                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1492                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1493                                         {
1494                                                 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1495                                                         Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1496                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1497                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1498                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1499                                                                 };
1500                                                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1501                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1502                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1503                                                         },
1504                                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1505                                                                 unimplemented!();
1506                                                         }
1507                                                 };
1508                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1509                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1510                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1511                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1512                                                 } else {
1513                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1514                                                 }
1515                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1516                                                 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1517                                         }
1518                                 }
1519                         }
1520
1521                         if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1522                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1523
1524                                 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1525                                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1526                                                 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1527                                                 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1528                                                                 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1529                                                                 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1530                                                         return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1531                                                 }
1532                                                 let input = TxIn {
1533                                                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1534                                                                 txid: commitment_txid,
1535                                                                 vout: transaction_output_index,
1536                                                         },
1537                                                         script_sig: Script::new(),
1538                                                         sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1539                                                         witness: Vec::new(),
1540                                                 };
1541                                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1542                                                         inputs.push(input);
1543                                                         inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1544                                                         inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1545                                                         total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1546                                                 } else {
1547                                                         let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1548                                                                 version: 2,
1549                                                                 lock_time: 0,
1550                                                                 input: vec![input],
1551                                                                 output: vec!(TxOut {
1552                                                                         script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1553                                                                         value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1554                                                                 }),
1555                                                         };
1556                                                         let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1557                                                         let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1558                                                         let mut used_feerate;
1559                                                         if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1560                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1561                                                                 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1562                                                                 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1563                                                                 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1564                                                                 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1565                                                                 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1566                                                                 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1567                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1568                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1569                                                                 }
1570                                                                 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1571                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1572                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1573                                                                 }
1574                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1575                                                         }
1576                                                 }
1577                                         }
1578                                 }
1579                         }
1580
1581                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1582                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1583                                 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1584                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1585                                 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1586
1587                                 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1588                                         ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1589                                                 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1590                                                         for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1591                                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1592                                                                         log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1593                                                                         match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1594                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1595                                                                                         let e = entry.get_mut();
1596                                                                                         e.retain(|ref event| {
1597                                                                                                 match **event {
1598                                                                                                         OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1599                                                                                                                 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1600                                                                                                         },
1601                                                                                                         _ => return true
1602                                                                                                 }
1603                                                                                         });
1604                                                                                         e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1605                                                                                 }
1606                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1607                                                                                         entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1608                                                                                 }
1609                                                                         }
1610                                                                 }
1611                                                         }
1612                                                 }
1613                                         }
1614                                 }
1615                                 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1616                                         if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1617                                                 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1618                                         }
1619                                         if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1620                                                 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1621                                         }
1622                                 }
1623                                 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1624                         }
1625                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1626
1627                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1628                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1629                                 value: total_value,
1630                         });
1631                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1632                                 version: 2,
1633                                 lock_time: 0,
1634                                 input: inputs,
1635                                 output: outputs,
1636                         };
1637
1638                         let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1639
1640                         let mut used_feerate;
1641                         if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1642                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1643                         }
1644
1645                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1646
1647                         let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1648                         let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1649                         for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1650                                 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1651                                         soonest_timelock = info.2;
1652                                 }
1653                         }
1654                         let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1655                         let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1656                         for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1657                                 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1658                                 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1659                                 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1660                                 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1661                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1662                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1663                                 }
1664                         }
1665                         match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1666                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1667                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1668                         }
1669
1670                         assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1671
1672                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1673                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1674                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1675                         });
1676                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1677                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1678                         // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1679                         // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1680                         // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1681                         // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1682                         // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1683                         // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1684                         // insert it here.
1685                         watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1686                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1687
1688                         log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1689
1690                         macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1691                                 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1692                                         if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1693                                                 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1694                                                         if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1695                                                                 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1696                                                                 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1697                                                                 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1698                                                                 // payment_preimage.
1699                                                                 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1700                                                                 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1701                                                                 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1702                                                                 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1703                                                                 // need to here.
1704                                                                 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1705                                                                         if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1706                                                                                 continue $id;
1707                                                                         }
1708                                                                 }
1709                                                                 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1710                                                                 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1711                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1712                                                                                 let e = entry.get_mut();
1713                                                                                 e.retain(|ref event| {
1714                                                                                         match **event {
1715                                                                                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1716                                                                                                         return htlc_update.0 != **source
1717                                                                                                 },
1718                                                                                                 _ => return true
1719                                                                                         }
1720                                                                                 });
1721                                                                                 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1722                                                                         }
1723                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1724                                                                                 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1725                                                                         }
1726                                                                 }
1727                                                         }
1728                                                 }
1729                                         }
1730                                 }
1731                         }
1732                         if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1733                                 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1734                                         check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1735                                 }
1736                                 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1737                                         check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1738                                 }
1739                         }
1740
1741                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1742                                 let revocation_point_option =
1743                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1744                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1745                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1746                                         } else { None };
1747                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1748                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1749                                                 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1750                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1751                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1752                                                 },
1753                                                 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1754                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1755                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1756                                                 },
1757                                         };
1758                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1759                                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1760                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1761                                         };
1762
1763                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1764                                                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1765                                                         match self.key_storage {
1766                                                                 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1767                                                                         if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1768                                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1769                                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1770                                                                                         key: local_key,
1771                                                                                         output: outp.clone(),
1772                                                                                 });
1773                                                                         }
1774                                                                 },
1775                                                                 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1776                                                         }
1777                                                         break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1778                                                 }
1779                                         }
1780
1781                                         let mut total_value = 0;
1782                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1783                                         let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1784                                         let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1785
1786                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1787                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1788                                                         {
1789                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1790                                                                         Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1791                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1792                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1793                                                                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1794                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1795                                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1796                                                                         },
1797                                                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1798                                                                                 unimplemented!();
1799                                                                         }
1800                                                                 };
1801                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1802                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1803                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1804                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1805                                                                 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1806                                                         }
1807                                                 }
1808                                         }
1809
1810                                         for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1811                                                 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1812                                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1813                                                         if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1814                                                                         tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1815                                                                         tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1816                                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1817                                                         }
1818                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1819                                                                 if htlc.offered {
1820                                                                         let input = TxIn {
1821                                                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1822                                                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1823                                                                                         vout: transaction_output_index,
1824                                                                                 },
1825                                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1826                                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1827                                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1828                                                                         };
1829                                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1830                                                                                 inputs.push(input);
1831                                                                                 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1832                                                                                 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1833                                                                                 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1834                                                                         } else {
1835                                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1836                                                                                         version: 2,
1837                                                                                         lock_time: 0,
1838                                                                                         input: vec![input],
1839                                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1840                                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1841                                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1842                                                                                         }),
1843                                                                                 };
1844                                                                                 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1845                                                                                 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1846                                                                                 let mut used_feerate;
1847                                                                                 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1848                                                                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1849                                                                                         let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1850                                                                                         assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1851                                                                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1852                                                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1853                                                                                                 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1854                                                                                         });
1855                                                                                         log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1856                                                                                         let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1857                                                                                         per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1858                                                                                         match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1859                                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1860                                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1861                                                                                         }
1862                                                                                         match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1863                                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1864                                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1865                                                                                         }
1866                                                                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1867                                                                                 }
1868                                                                         }
1869                                                                 }
1870                                                         }
1871                                                         if !htlc.offered {
1872                                                                 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1873                                                                 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1874                                                                 let input = TxIn {
1875                                                                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1876                                                                                 txid: commitment_txid,
1877                                                                                 vout: transaction_output_index,
1878                                                                         },
1879                                                                         script_sig: Script::new(),
1880                                                                         sequence: idx as u32,
1881                                                                         witness: Vec::new(),
1882                                                                 };
1883                                                                 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1884                                                                         version: 2,
1885                                                                         lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1886                                                                         input: vec![input],
1887                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1888                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1889                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1890                                                                         }),
1891                                                                 };
1892                                                                 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1893                                                                 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1894                                                                 let mut used_feerate;
1895                                                                 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1896                                                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1897                                                                         let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1898                                                                         assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1899                                                                         //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1900                                                                         log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1901                                                                         let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1902                                                                         per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1903                                                                         match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1904                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1905                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1906                                                                         }
1907                                                                         match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1908                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1909                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1910                                                                         }
1911                                                                 }
1912                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1913                                                         }
1914                                                 }
1915                                         }
1916
1917                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1918
1919                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1920                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1921                                                 value: total_value
1922                                         });
1923                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1924                                                 version: 2,
1925                                                 lock_time: 0,
1926                                                 input: inputs,
1927                                                 output: outputs,
1928                                         };
1929
1930                                         let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1931
1932                                         let mut used_feerate;
1933                                         if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1934                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1935                                         }
1936
1937                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1938
1939                                         let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1940                                         let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1941                                         for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1942                                                 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1943                                                         soonest_timelock = info.2;
1944                                                 }
1945                                         }
1946                                         let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1947                                         let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1948                                         for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1949                                                 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1950                                                 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1951                                                 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1952                                                 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1953                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1954                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1955                                                 }
1956                                         }
1957                                         match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1958                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1959                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1960                                         }
1961                                         assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1962                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1963                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1964                                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1965                                         });
1966                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1967                                 }
1968                         }
1969                 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1970                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1971                                 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1972                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1973                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1974                                                 key: local_key.clone(),
1975                                                 output: outp.clone(),
1976                                         });
1977                                 }
1978                         }
1979                 }
1980
1981                 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1982         }
1983
1984         /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1985         fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1986                 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
1987                 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1988                         return (None, None)
1989                 }
1990
1991                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1992                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
1993                                 match $thing {
1994                                         Ok(a) => a,
1995                                         Err(_) => return (None, None)
1996                                 }
1997                         };
1998                 }
1999
2000                 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2001                 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2002                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2003                 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2004                         Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2005                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
2006                         },
2007                         Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2008                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2009                         },
2010                 };
2011                 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2012                         None => return (None, None),
2013                         Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2014                 };
2015                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2016                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2017                 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2018
2019                 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2020                 let mut amount = 0;
2021
2022                 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2023                         inputs.push(TxIn {
2024                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2025                                         txid: htlc_txid,
2026                                         vout: 0,
2027                                 },
2028                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
2029                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2030                                 witness: Vec::new(),
2031                         });
2032                         amount = tx.output[0].value;
2033                 }
2034
2035                 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2036                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2037                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2038                                 value: amount
2039                         });
2040
2041                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2042                                 version: 2,
2043                                 lock_time: 0,
2044                                 input: inputs,
2045                                 output: outputs,
2046                         };
2047                         let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2048                         let mut used_feerate;
2049                         if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2050                                 return (None, None);
2051                         }
2052
2053                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2054
2055                         let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2056                                 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2057                                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2058                                         let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2059                                         (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2060                                 }
2061                                 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2062                                         unimplemented!();
2063                                 }
2064                         };
2065                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2066                         spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2067                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2068                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2069
2070                         assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2071                         let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2072                         let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2073                         let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
2074                         log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2075                         let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2076                         per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2077                         match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2078                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2079                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2080                         }
2081                         match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2082                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2083                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2084                         }
2085                         (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2086                 } else { (None, None) }
2087         }
2088
2089         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2090                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2091                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2092                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2093                 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2094
2095                 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2096                         ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2097                                 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
2098                                         if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
2099                                                 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2100                                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2101                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2102                                                                 key: local_delayedkey,
2103                                                                 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2104                                                                 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2105                                                                 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2106                                                         });
2107                                                 }
2108                                         }
2109                                 }
2110                         }
2111                 }
2112
2113                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2114                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2115                 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2116                         if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2117                                 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
2118                                 break;
2119                         }
2120                 }
2121
2122                 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2123                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2124                                 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
2125                                         if htlc.offered {
2126                                                 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2127                                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2128
2129                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2130
2131                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2132                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2133                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2134                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2135
2136                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
2137                                                 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2138                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
2139
2140                                                 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2141                                                 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2142                                                 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2143                                                 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2144                                                 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2145                                                 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2146                                                 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2147                                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2148                                         } else {
2149                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2150                                                         log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2151                                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2152
2153                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2154
2155                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2156                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2157                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2158                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2159
2160                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
2161                                                         let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2162                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
2163
2164                                                         add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2165                                                         let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2166                                                         let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2167                                                         per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2168                                                         //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2169                                                         log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2170                                                         pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2171                                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2172                                                 }
2173                                         }
2174                                         watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2175                                 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2176                         }
2177                 }
2178
2179                 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2180         }
2181
2182         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2183         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2184         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2185         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2186                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2187                 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2188                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2189                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2190
2191                 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2192                         ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2193                                 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2194                                 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2195                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2196                                                 let e = entry.get_mut();
2197                                                 e.retain(|ref event| {
2198                                                         match **event {
2199                                                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2200                                                                         return htlc_update.0 != $source
2201                                                                 },
2202                                                                 _ => return true
2203                                                         }
2204                                                 });
2205                                                 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2206                                         }
2207                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2208                                                 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2209                                         }
2210                                 }
2211                         }
2212                 }
2213
2214                 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2215                         ($updates: expr) => {
2216                                 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2217                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2218                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2219                                 for claim in $updates.3 {
2220                                         match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2221                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2222                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2223                                         }
2224                                 }
2225                         }
2226                 }
2227
2228                 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2229                 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2230
2231                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2232                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2233                                 is_local_tx = true;
2234                                 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2235                                 match self.key_storage {
2236                                         Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2237                                                 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2238                                         },
2239                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2240                                                 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2241                                         }
2242                                 }
2243                         }
2244                 }
2245                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2246                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2247                                 is_local_tx = true;
2248                                 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2249                                 match self.key_storage {
2250                                         Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2251                                                 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2252                                         },
2253                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2254                                                 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2255                                         }
2256                                 }
2257                         }
2258                 }
2259
2260                 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2261                         ($local_tx: expr) => {
2262                                 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2263                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2264                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2265                                                         wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2266                                                 }
2267                                         }
2268                                 }
2269                         }
2270                 }
2271
2272                 if is_local_tx {
2273                         if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2274                                 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2275                         }
2276                         if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2277                                 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2278                         }
2279                 }
2280
2281                 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2282         }
2283
2284         /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2285         fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2286                 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2287                         match self.key_storage {
2288                                 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } =>  {
2289                                         let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2290                                         let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2291                                         for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2292                                                 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2293                                                         return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2294                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2295                                                                 output: output.clone(),
2296                                                         });
2297                                                 }
2298                                         }
2299                                 }
2300                                 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2301                                         //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2302                                         // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2303                                 }
2304                         }
2305                 }
2306                 None
2307         }
2308
2309         /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2310         /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2311         /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2312         /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2313         /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2314         /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2315         /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2316         /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2317         /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2318         pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2319                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2320                         let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2321                         match self.key_storage {
2322                                 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2323                                         res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2324                                         // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2325                                         // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2326                                 },
2327                                 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2328                         };
2329                         res
2330                 } else {
2331                         Vec::new()
2332                 }
2333         }
2334
2335         fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2336                 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2337                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2338                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2339                 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2340                 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2341                 for tx in txn_matched {
2342                         if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2343                                 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2344                                 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2345                                 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2346                                 // filters.
2347                                 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2348                                 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2349                                 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2350                                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2351                                                 funding_info.clone()
2352                                         }
2353                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2354                                                 unimplemented!();
2355                                         }
2356                                 };
2357                                 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2358                                         if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2359                                                 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2360                                                 txn = remote_txn;
2361                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2362                                                 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2363                                                         watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2364                                                 }
2365                                                 if txn.is_empty() {
2366                                                         let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2367                                                         spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2368                                                         txn = local_txn;
2369                                                         if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2370                                                                 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2371                                                         }
2372                                                 }
2373                                         }
2374                                         if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2375                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2376                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2377                                                 }
2378                                         }
2379                                 } else {
2380                                         if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2381                                                 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2382                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2383                                                         txn.push(tx);
2384                                                 }
2385                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2386                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2387                                                 }
2388                                         }
2389                                 }
2390                                 for tx in txn.iter() {
2391                                         log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2392                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2393                                 }
2394                         }
2395                         // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2396                         // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2397                         // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2398                         let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2399                         if updated.len() > 0 {
2400                                 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2401                         }
2402
2403                         // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2404                         let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2405                         for inp in &tx.input {
2406                                 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2407                                         // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2408                                         if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2409                                                 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2410                                                 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2411                                                 // by us.
2412                                                 let mut set_equality = true;
2413                                                 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2414                                                         set_equality = false;
2415                                                 } else {
2416                                                         for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2417                                                                 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2418                                                                         set_equality = false;
2419                                                                 }
2420                                                         }
2421                                                 }
2422
2423                                                 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2424                                                         () => {
2425                                                                 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2426                                                                 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2427                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2428                                                                                 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2429                                                                                         entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2430                                                                                 }
2431                                                                         },
2432                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2433                                                                                 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2434                                                                         }
2435                                                                 }
2436                                                         }
2437                                                 }
2438
2439                                                 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2440                                                 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2441                                                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2442                                                 if set_equality {
2443                                                         clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2444                                                 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2445                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
2446                                                                 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2447                                                                         claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2448                                                                 }
2449                                                                 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2450                                                                 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2451                                                                         clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2452                                                                 }
2453                                                         }
2454                                                         //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2455                                                         bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2456                                                 }
2457                                                 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2458                                         } else {
2459                                                 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2460                                         }
2461                                 }
2462                         }
2463                         for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2464                                 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2465                                 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2466                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2467                                                 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2468                                                         entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2469                                                 }
2470                                         },
2471                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2472                                                 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2473                                         }
2474                                 }
2475                         }
2476                 }
2477                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2478                         if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2479                                 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx));
2480                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2481                                 match self.key_storage {
2482                                         Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2483                                                 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2484                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2485                                                 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2486                                                         watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2487                                                 }
2488                                                 for tx in txs {
2489                                                         log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2490                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2491                                                 }
2492                                         },
2493                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2494                                                 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2495                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2496                                                 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2497                                                         watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2498                                                 }
2499                                                 for tx in txs {
2500                                                         log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2501                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2502                                                 }
2503                                         }
2504                                 }
2505                         }
2506                 }
2507                 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2508                         for ev in events {
2509                                 match ev {
2510                                         OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2511                                                 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2512                                                 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2513                                                 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2514                                                         for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2515                                                                 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2516                                                         }
2517                                                 }
2518                                         },
2519                                         OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2520                                                 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2521                                                 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2522                                         },
2523                                         OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2524                                                 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2525                                         }
2526                                 }
2527                         }
2528                 }
2529                 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2530                         if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2531                                 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2532                         }
2533                 }
2534                 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2535                         if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2536                                 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2537                                         if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2538                                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2539                                                 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2540                                         } else { None }
2541                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
2542                         } {
2543                                 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2544                                         claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2545                                         claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2546                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
2547                         }
2548                 }
2549                 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2550                 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2551         }
2552
2553         fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
2554                 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2555                 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2556                         //We may discard:
2557                         //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2558                         //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2559                         //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2560                         for ev in events {
2561                                 match ev {
2562                                         OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2563                                                 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2564                                                         if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2565                                                                 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2566                                                                 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2567                                                                 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2568                                                                 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2569                                                         }
2570                                                 }
2571                                         },
2572                                         _ => {},
2573                                 }
2574                         }
2575                 }
2576                 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2577                         if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2578                                 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2579                                 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2580                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2581                         }
2582                 }
2583                 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2584                         self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2585                 }
2586                 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2587                 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2588                 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2589                 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2590                         if v.1 == height {
2591                         remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2592                         false
2593                         } else { true });
2594                 for req in remove_request {
2595                         self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2596                 }
2597                 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2598         }
2599
2600         pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2601                 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2602                 //  * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2603                 //    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2604                 //  * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2605                 //    broadcast if we go on-chain.
2606                 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2607                 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2608                 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2609                 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2610                 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2611                 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2612                         ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2613                                 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2614                                         // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2615                                         // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2616                                         // time out the HTLC first.
2617                                         // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2618                                         // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2619                                         // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2620                                         // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2621                                         // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2622                                         // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2623                                         // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2624                                         // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2625                                         // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2626                                         // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2627                                         // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2628                                         // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2629                                         //  aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2630                                         //      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2631                                         //      outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2632                                         //      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2633                                         //      CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2634                                         //      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2635                                         //  The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2636                                         //  with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2637                                         let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2638                                         if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2639                                            (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2640                                                 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2641                                                 return true;
2642                                         }
2643                                 }
2644                         }
2645                 }
2646
2647                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2648                         scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2649                 }
2650
2651                 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2652                         if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2653                                 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2654                                         scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2655                                 }
2656                         }
2657                         if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2658                                 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2659                                         scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2660                                 }
2661                         }
2662                 }
2663
2664                 false
2665         }
2666
2667         /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2668         /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2669         fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2670                 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2671
2672                 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2673                         let mut payment_data = None;
2674                         let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2675                                 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2676                         let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2677                         let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2678
2679                         macro_rules! log_claim {
2680                                 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2681                                         // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2682                                         // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2683                                         // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2684                                         // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2685                                         let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2686                                         if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2687                                                         (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2688                                                 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2689                                                         $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2690                                                         if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2691                                                         if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2692                                         } else {
2693                                                 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2694                                                         $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2695                                                         if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2696                                                         if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2697                                         }
2698                                 }
2699                         }
2700
2701                         macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2702                                 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2703                                         if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2704                                                 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2705                                                         if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2706                                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2707                                                                         log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2708                                                                         payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2709                                                                         break;
2710                                                                 }
2711                                                         }
2712                                                 }
2713                                         }
2714                                 }
2715                         }
2716
2717                         macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2718                                 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2719                                         for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2720                                                 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2721                                                         if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2722                                                                 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2723                                                                 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2724                                                                 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2725                                                                 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2726                                                                 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2727                                                                 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2728                                                                 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2729                                                         } else if !$local_tx {
2730                                                                 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2731                                                                         check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2732                                                                 }
2733                                                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
2734                                                                         if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2735                                                                                 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2736                                                                         }
2737                                                                 }
2738                                                         }
2739                                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
2740                                                                 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2741                                                                 continue 'outer_loop;
2742                                                         }
2743                                                 }
2744                                         }
2745                                 }
2746                         }
2747
2748                         if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2749                                 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2750                                         scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2751                                                 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2752                                 }
2753                         }
2754                         if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2755                                 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2756                                         scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2757                                                 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2758                                 }
2759                         }
2760                         if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2761                                 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2762                                         "remote commitment tx", false);
2763                         }
2764
2765                         // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2766                         // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2767                         if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2768                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2769                                 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2770                                         payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2771                                         htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2772                                 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2773                                         payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2774                                         htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2775                                 } else {
2776                                         log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2777                                         match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2778                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2779                                                         let e = entry.get_mut();
2780                                                         e.retain(|ref event| {
2781                                                                 match **event {
2782                                                                         OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2783                                                                                 return htlc_update.0 != source
2784                                                                         },
2785                                                                         _ => return true
2786                                                                 }
2787                                                         });
2788                                                         e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2789                                                 }
2790                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2791                                                         entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2792                                                 }
2793                                         }
2794                                 }
2795                         }
2796                 }
2797                 htlc_updated
2798         }
2799
2800         /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2801         /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2802         fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2803                 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2804                 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2805                 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2806                         inputs.push(TxIn {
2807                                 previous_output: *outp,
2808                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
2809                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2810                                 witness: Vec::new(),
2811                         });
2812                 }
2813                 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2814                         version: 2,
2815                         lock_time: 0,
2816                         input: inputs,
2817                         output: vec![TxOut {
2818                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2819                                 value: 0
2820                         }],
2821                 };
2822
2823                 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2824                         ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2825                                 {
2826                                         let mut used_feerate;
2827                                         // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2828                                         let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2829                                                 let mut value = $amount;
2830                                                 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2831                                                         // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2832                                                         $amount - value
2833                                                 } else {
2834                                                         log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2835                                                         return None;
2836                                                 }
2837                                         // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2838                                         } else {
2839                                                 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2840                                                 if $amount <= fee {
2841                                                         log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2842                                                         return None;
2843                                                 }
2844                                                 fee
2845                                         };
2846
2847                                         let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2848                                         let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2849                                         // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2850                                         //      * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2851                                         //      * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2852                                         let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2853                                                 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2854                                         } else {
2855                                                 new_fee
2856                                         };
2857                                         Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2858                                 }
2859                         }
2860                 }
2861
2862                 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2863                 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2864                 let mut amt = 0;
2865                 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2866                         match per_outp_material {
2867                                 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2868                                         inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { &[] });
2869                                         amt += *amount;
2870                                 },
2871                                 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2872                                         inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2873                                         amt += *amount;
2874                                 },
2875                                 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2876                         }
2877                 }
2878
2879                 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2880                 let new_feerate;
2881                 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2882                         // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2883                         if new_fee > amt {
2884                                 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2885                         } else {
2886                                 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2887                         }
2888                         new_feerate = feerate;
2889                 } else {
2890                         return None;
2891                 }
2892                 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2893
2894                 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2895                         match per_outp_material {
2896                                 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2897                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2898                                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2899                                         let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2900                                         bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2901                                         bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2902                                         if *is_htlc {
2903                                                 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2904                                         } else {
2905                                                 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2906                                         }
2907                                         bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2908                                         log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2909                                 },
2910                                 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2911                                         if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2912                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2913                                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2914                                         let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2915                                         bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2916                                         bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2917                                         if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
2918                                                 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
2919                                         } else {
2920                                                 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
2921                                         }
2922                                         bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2923                                         log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2924                                 },
2925                                 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
2926                                         //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
2927                                         // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
2928                                         // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
2929                                         return None;
2930                                 }
2931                         }
2932                 }
2933                 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
2934                 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
2935         }
2936 }
2937
2938 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2939
2940 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2941         fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2942                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2943                 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2944                         ($key: expr) => {
2945                                 match $key {
2946                                         Ok(res) => res,
2947                                         Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2948                                 }
2949                         }
2950                 }
2951
2952                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2953                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2954                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2955                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2956                 }
2957
2958                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2959
2960                 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2961                         0 => {
2962                                 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2963                                 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2964                                 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2965                                 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2966                                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2967                                 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2968                                 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2969                                 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2970                                 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2971                                 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2972                                         txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2973                                         index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2974                                 };
2975                                 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2976                                 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2977                                 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2978                                 Storage::Local {
2979                                         revocation_base_key,
2980                                         htlc_base_key,
2981                                         delayed_payment_base_key,
2982                                         payment_base_key,
2983                                         shutdown_pubkey,
2984                                         prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2985                                         latest_per_commitment_point,
2986                                         funding_info,
2987                                         current_remote_commitment_txid,
2988                                         prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2989                                 }
2990                         },
2991                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2992                 };
2993
2994                 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2995                 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2996
2997                 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2998                         let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2999                         if first_idx == 0 {
3000                                 None
3001                         } else {
3002                                 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3003                                 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3004                                 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3005                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3006                                 } else {
3007                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3008                                 }
3009                         }
3010                 };
3011
3012                 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3013                 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3014
3015                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
3016                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
3017                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
3018                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3019                 }
3020
3021                 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3022                         () => {
3023                                 {
3024                                         let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3025                                         let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3026                                         let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3027                                         let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3028                                         let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3029
3030                                         HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3031                                                 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3032                                         }
3033                                 }
3034                         }
3035                 }
3036
3037                 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3038                 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3039                 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3040                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3041                         let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3043                         for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3044                                 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3045                         }
3046                         if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3047                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3048                         }
3049                 }
3050
3051                 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3052                 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3053                 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3054                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3055                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3056                         let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3057                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3058                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3059                                 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3060                         }
3061                         if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3062                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3063                         }
3064                 }
3065
3066                 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3067                 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3068                 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3069                         let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3070                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3071                         if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3072                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3073                         }
3074                 }
3075
3076                 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3077                         () => {
3078                                 {
3079                                         let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
3080                                                 Ok(tx) => tx,
3081                                                 Err(e) => match e {
3082                                                         encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
3083                                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3084                                                 },
3085                                         };
3086
3087                                         if tx.input.is_empty() {
3088                                                 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
3089                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3090                                         }
3091
3092                                         let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3093                                         let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3094                                         let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3095                                         let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3096                                         let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3097
3098                                         let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3099                                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3100                                         for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3101                                                 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3102                                                 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3103                                                         0 => None,
3104                                                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3105                                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3106                                                 };
3107                                                 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3108                                         }
3109
3110                                         LocalSignedTx {
3111                                                 txid: tx.txid(),
3112                                                 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
3113                                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs
3114                                         }
3115                                 }
3116                         }
3117                 }
3118
3119                 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3120                         0 => None,
3121                         1 => {
3122                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
3123                         },
3124                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3125                 };
3126
3127                 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3128                         0 => None,
3129                         1 => {
3130                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
3131                         },
3132                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3133                 };
3134
3135                 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3136
3137                 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3138                 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3139                 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3140                         let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3141                         let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3142                         if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3143                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3144                         }
3145                 }
3146
3147                 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3148                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3149                 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3150                         0 => None,
3151                         1 => {
3152                                 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3153                                 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3154                                 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3155                         }
3156                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3157                 };
3158
3159                 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3160                 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3161                 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3162                         pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3163                 }
3164
3165                 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3166                 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3167                 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3168                         let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3169                         let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3170                         let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3171                         claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3172                 }
3173
3174                 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3175                 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3176                 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3177                         let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178                         let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3179                         let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3180                         for _ in 0..events_len {
3181                                 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3182                                         0 => {
3183                                                 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3184                                                 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3185                                                         claim_request
3186                                                 }
3187                                         },
3188                                         1 => {
3189                                                 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3190                                                 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3191                                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3192                                                         htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3193                                                 }
3194                                         },
3195                                         2 => {
3196                                                 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3197                                                 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3198                                                 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3199                                                         outpoint,
3200                                                         input_material
3201                                                 }
3202                                         }
3203                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3204                                 };
3205                                 events.push(ev);
3206                         }
3207                         onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3208                 }
3209
3210                 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3211                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3212
3213                         key_storage,
3214                         their_htlc_base_key,
3215                         their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3216                         their_cur_revocation_points,
3217
3218                         our_to_self_delay,
3219                         their_to_self_delay,
3220
3221                         old_secrets,
3222                         remote_claimable_outpoints,
3223                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3224                         remote_hash_commitment_number,
3225
3226                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3227                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3228                         current_remote_commitment_number,
3229
3230                         payment_preimages,
3231
3232                         destination_script,
3233                         to_remote_rescue,
3234
3235                         pending_claim_requests,
3236
3237                         claimable_outpoints,
3238
3239                         onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3240
3241                         last_block_hash,
3242                         secp_ctx,
3243                         logger,
3244                 }))
3245         }
3246
3247 }
3248
3249 #[cfg(test)]
3250 mod tests {
3251         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3252         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3253         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3254         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3255         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3256         use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3257         use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3258         use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3259         use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3260         use hex;
3261         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3262         use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3263         use ln::chan_utils;
3264         use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
3265         use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3266         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3267         use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3268         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3269         use std::sync::Arc;
3270
3271         #[test]
3272         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3273                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3274                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3275                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
3276                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3277                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3278
3279                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3280                         () => {
3281                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3282                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3283                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3284                                         idx -= 1;
3285                                 }
3286                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3287                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3288                         };
3289                 }
3290
3291                 {
3292                         // insert_secret correct sequence
3293                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3294                         secrets.clear();
3295
3296                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3297                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3298                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3299                         test_secrets!();
3300
3301                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3302                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3303                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3304                         test_secrets!();
3305
3306                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3307                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3308                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3309                         test_secrets!();
3310
3311                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3312                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3313                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3314                         test_secrets!();
3315
3316                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3317                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3318                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3319                         test_secrets!();
3320
3321                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3322                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3323                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3324                         test_secrets!();
3325
3326                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3327                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3328                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3329                         test_secrets!();
3330
3331                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3332                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3333                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3334                         test_secrets!();
3335                 }
3336
3337                 {
3338                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3339                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3340                         secrets.clear();
3341
3342                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3343                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3344                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3345                         test_secrets!();
3346
3347                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3348                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3349                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3350                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3351                 }
3352
3353                 {
3354                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3355                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3356                         secrets.clear();
3357
3358                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3359                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3360                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3361                         test_secrets!();
3362
3363                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3364                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3365                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3366                         test_secrets!();
3367
3368                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3369                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3370                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3371                         test_secrets!();
3372
3373                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3374                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3375                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3376                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3377                 }
3378
3379                 {
3380                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3381                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3382                         secrets.clear();
3383
3384                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3385                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3386                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3387                         test_secrets!();
3388
3389                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3390                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3391                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3392                         test_secrets!();
3393
3394                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3395                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3396                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3397                         test_secrets!();
3398
3399                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3400                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3401                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3402                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3403                 }
3404
3405                 {
3406                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3407                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3408                         secrets.clear();
3409
3410                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3411                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3412                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3413                         test_secrets!();
3414
3415                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3416                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3417                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3418                         test_secrets!();
3419
3420                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3421                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3422                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3423                         test_secrets!();
3424
3425                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3426                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3427                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3428                         test_secrets!();
3429
3430                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3431                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3432                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3433                         test_secrets!();
3434
3435                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3436                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3437                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3438                         test_secrets!();
3439
3440                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3441                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3442                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3443                         test_secrets!();
3444
3445                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3446                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3447                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3448                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3449                 }
3450
3451                 {
3452                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3453                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3454                         secrets.clear();
3455
3456                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3457                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3458                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3459                         test_secrets!();
3460
3461                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3462                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3463                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3464                         test_secrets!();
3465
3466                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3467                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3468                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3469                         test_secrets!();
3470
3471                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3472                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3473                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3474                         test_secrets!();
3475
3476                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3477                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3478                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3479                         test_secrets!();
3480
3481                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3482                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3483                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3484                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3485                 }
3486
3487                 {
3488                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3489                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3490                         secrets.clear();
3491
3492                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3493                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3494                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3495                         test_secrets!();
3496
3497                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3498                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3499                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3500                         test_secrets!();
3501
3502                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3503                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3504                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3505                         test_secrets!();
3506
3507                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3508                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3509                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3510                         test_secrets!();
3511
3512                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3513                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3514                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3515                         test_secrets!();
3516
3517                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3518                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3519                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3520                         test_secrets!();
3521
3522                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3523                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3524                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3525                         test_secrets!();
3526
3527                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3528                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3529                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3530                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3531                 }
3532
3533                 {
3534                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3535                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3536                         secrets.clear();
3537
3538                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3539                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3540                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3541                         test_secrets!();
3542
3543                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3544                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3545                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3546                         test_secrets!();
3547
3548                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3549                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3550                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3551                         test_secrets!();
3552
3553                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3554                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3555                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3556                         test_secrets!();
3557
3558                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3559                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3560                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3561                         test_secrets!();
3562
3563                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3564                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3565                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3566                         test_secrets!();
3567
3568                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3569                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3570                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3571                         test_secrets!();
3572
3573                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3574                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3575                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3576                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3577                 }
3578
3579                 {
3580                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3581                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3582                         secrets.clear();
3583
3584                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3585                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3586                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3587                         test_secrets!();
3588
3589                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3590                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3591                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3592                         test_secrets!();
3593
3594                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3595                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3596                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3597                         test_secrets!();
3598
3599                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3600                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3601                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3602                         test_secrets!();
3603
3604                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3605                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3606                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3607                         test_secrets!();
3608
3609                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3610                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3611                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3612                         test_secrets!();
3613
3614                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3615                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3616                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3617                         test_secrets!();
3618
3619                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
3620                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3621                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3622                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
3623                 }
3624         }
3625
3626         #[test]
3627         fn test_prune_preimages() {
3628                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3629                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3630
3631                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3632                 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3633                         () => {
3634                                 {
3635                                         TxCreationKeys {
3636                                                 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3637                                                 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3638                                                 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3639                                                 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3640                                                 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3641                                                 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3642                                         }
3643                                 }
3644                         }
3645                 }
3646                 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3647
3648                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3649                 {
3650                         let mut rng  = thread_rng();
3651                         for _ in 0..20 {
3652                                 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3653                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3654                                 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3655                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3656                         }
3657                 }
3658
3659                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3660                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3661                                 {
3662                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
3663                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3664                                                 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3665                                                         offered: true,
3666                                                         amount_msat: 0,
3667                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
3668                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3669                                                         transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3670                                                 }, None));
3671                                         }
3672                                         res
3673                                 }
3674                         }
3675                 }
3676                 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3677                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3678                                 {
3679                                         let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3680                                         let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3681                                         res
3682                                 }
3683                         }
3684                 }
3685
3686                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3687                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3688                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3689                                         assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3690                                 }
3691                         }
3692                 }
3693
3694                 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3695                 // old state.
3696                 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3697                 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3698
3699                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3700                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3701                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3702                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3703                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3704                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3705                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3706                 }
3707
3708                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3709                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3710                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3711                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3712                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3713                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3714                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3715
3716                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3717                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3718                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3719                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3720                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3721                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3722
3723                 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3724                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3725                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3726                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3727                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3728                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3729                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3730                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3731
3732                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3733                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3734                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3735                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3736                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3737                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3738         }
3739
3740         #[test]
3741         fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3742                 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3743                 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3744
3745                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3746                 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3747                 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3748                 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3749
3750                 macro_rules! sign_input {
3751                         ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3752                                 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3753                                         offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3754                                         amount_msat: 0,
3755                                         cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3756                                         payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3757                                         transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3758                                 };
3759                                 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3760                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3761                                 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3762                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3763                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3764                                 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3765                                 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3766                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3767                                 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3768                                         $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3769                                 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3770                                         $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3771                                 } else {
3772                                         $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3773                                 }
3774                                 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3775                                 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3776                                 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3777                                 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3778                         }
3779                 }
3780
3781                 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3782                 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3783
3784                 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3785                 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3786                 for i in 0..4 {
3787                         claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3788                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3789                                         txid,
3790                                         vout: i,
3791                                 },
3792                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
3793                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3794                                 witness: Vec::new(),
3795                         });
3796                 }
3797                 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3798                         script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3799                         value: 0,
3800                 });
3801                 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3802                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3803                 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3804                 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3805                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3806                 }
3807                 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3808
3809                 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3810                 claim_tx.input.clear();
3811                 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3812                 for i in 0..4 {
3813                         claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3814                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3815                                         txid,
3816                                         vout: i,
3817                                 },
3818                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
3819                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3820                                 witness: Vec::new(),
3821                         });
3822                 }
3823                 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3824                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3825                 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3826                 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3827                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3828                 }
3829                 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3830
3831                 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3832                 claim_tx.input.clear();
3833                 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3834                 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3835                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3836                                 txid,
3837                                 vout: 0,
3838                         },
3839                         script_sig: Script::new(),
3840                         sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3841                         witness: Vec::new(),
3842                 });
3843                 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3844                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3845                 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3846                 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3847                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3848                 }
3849                 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3850         }
3851
3852         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
3853 }