1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
113 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
114 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
115 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
116 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
117 /// all registered listeners in one go.
118 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
119 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
121 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
122 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
123 /// any spends of it.
124 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
126 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
127 /// with success or failure backward
128 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
131 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
132 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
134 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
136 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
137 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
138 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
140 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
141 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
142 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
143 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
144 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
146 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
147 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
148 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
149 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
150 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
152 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
155 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
157 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
158 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
159 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
160 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
162 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
163 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
164 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
165 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
166 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
167 outputs: spendable_outputs,
171 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
172 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
173 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
176 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
180 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
181 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
182 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
183 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
185 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
186 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
187 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
188 let mut existing_claim = false;
189 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
190 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
191 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
192 existing_claim = true;
198 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
202 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
207 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
208 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
211 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
212 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
213 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
214 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
215 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
220 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
221 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
222 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
223 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
224 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
225 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
229 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
231 fee_estimator: feeest,
237 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
238 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
239 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
240 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
241 Some(orig_monitor) => {
242 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
243 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
247 match monitor.key_storage {
248 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
251 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
253 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
254 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
255 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
256 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
260 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
261 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
264 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
269 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
270 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
271 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
273 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
277 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
278 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
279 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
280 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
282 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
284 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
289 pending_htlcs_updated
293 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
294 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
295 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
296 let mut ret = Vec::new();
297 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
302 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
303 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
304 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
305 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
306 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
307 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
308 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
309 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
310 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
311 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
312 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
313 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
314 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
315 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
316 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
317 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
318 /// accurate block height.
319 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
320 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
321 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
322 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
323 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
324 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
325 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
326 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
327 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
328 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
329 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
331 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
334 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
335 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
336 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
337 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
338 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
339 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
340 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
341 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
342 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
343 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
346 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
347 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
351 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
352 struct LocalSignedTx {
353 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
356 revocation_key: PublicKey,
357 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
358 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
359 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
361 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
365 enum InputDescriptors {
370 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
373 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
374 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
375 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
380 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
388 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
394 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
395 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
401 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
403 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
404 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
405 script.write(writer)?;
406 pubkey.write(writer)?;
407 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
409 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
411 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
413 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
415 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
416 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
417 script.write(writer)?;
419 preimage.write(writer)?;
420 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
421 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
423 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
424 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
425 script.write(writer)?;
426 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
427 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
428 preimage.write(writer)?;
429 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
436 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
437 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
440 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
441 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
442 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
443 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
446 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
448 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
449 InputMaterial::Revoked {
458 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
459 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
460 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
461 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
462 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
463 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
472 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
473 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
474 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
475 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
476 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
477 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
479 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
484 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
490 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
491 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
492 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
494 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
495 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
497 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
499 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
500 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
501 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
503 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
505 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
506 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
507 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
508 ContentiousOutpoint {
509 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
510 input_material: InputMaterial,
514 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
515 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
516 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
517 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
518 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
520 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
521 feerate_previous: u64,
522 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
523 // a priority of not feerate
524 soonest_timelock: u32,
525 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
526 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
529 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
530 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
531 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
532 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
533 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
534 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
535 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
537 tx_material.write(writer)?;
543 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
544 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
545 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
546 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
547 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
548 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
549 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
550 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
551 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
552 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
553 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
555 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
559 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
560 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
562 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
563 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
565 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
566 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
568 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
569 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
571 key_storage: Storage,
572 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
573 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
574 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
575 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
576 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
577 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
579 our_to_self_delay: u16,
580 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
582 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
583 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
584 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
585 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
586 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
587 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
588 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
589 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
590 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
591 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
592 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
593 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
594 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
596 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
597 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
598 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
599 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
600 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
601 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
603 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
605 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
607 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
609 destination_script: Script,
610 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
611 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
612 // scan every commitment transaction for that
613 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
615 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
616 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
617 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
618 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
619 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
620 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
621 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
622 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
623 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
624 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
625 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
626 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
627 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
629 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
631 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
632 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
633 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
634 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
635 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
636 // block with output gets disconnected.
637 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
638 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
640 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
642 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
643 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
644 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
645 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
647 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
648 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
649 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
650 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
651 // the full block_connected).
652 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
653 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
657 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
658 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
660 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
661 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
663 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
664 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
666 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
667 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
669 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
673 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
679 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
692 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
693 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
694 /// underlying object
695 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
696 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
697 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
698 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
699 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
700 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
701 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
702 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
703 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
704 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
705 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
706 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
707 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
708 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
709 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
710 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
711 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
712 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
713 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
714 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
715 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
716 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
717 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
721 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
722 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
731 impl ChannelMonitor {
732 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
734 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
736 key_storage: Storage::Local {
737 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
738 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
739 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
740 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
741 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
742 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
743 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
745 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
746 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
748 their_htlc_base_key: None,
749 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
750 funding_redeemscript: None,
751 channel_value_satoshis: None,
752 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
754 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
755 their_to_self_delay: None,
757 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
758 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
759 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
760 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
762 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
763 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
764 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
766 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
767 destination_script: destination_script,
768 to_remote_rescue: None,
770 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
772 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
774 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
776 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
777 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
782 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
783 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
785 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
786 tx_weight += match inp {
787 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
788 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
789 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
791 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
792 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
793 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
795 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
796 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
797 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
799 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
800 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
801 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
803 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
804 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
805 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
812 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
813 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
814 return current_height + 1
815 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
816 return current_height + 3
822 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
824 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
832 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
833 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
835 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
836 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
837 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
838 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
844 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
845 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
846 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
847 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
848 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
850 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
851 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
852 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
855 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
858 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
860 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
861 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
862 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
863 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
864 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
865 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
871 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
872 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
873 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
874 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
875 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
877 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
878 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
879 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
883 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
884 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
885 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
890 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
897 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
906 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
907 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
908 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
909 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
910 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
911 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
912 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
913 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
915 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
916 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
919 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
920 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
921 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
922 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
923 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
924 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
926 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
927 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
928 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
929 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
930 Some(old_points) => {
931 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
932 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
933 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
934 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
935 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
937 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
940 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
944 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
949 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
950 match self.key_storage {
951 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
952 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
953 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
954 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
956 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
957 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
961 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
965 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
966 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
967 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
968 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
969 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
970 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
971 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
972 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
973 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
974 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
975 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
976 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
977 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
978 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
979 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
980 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
981 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
986 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
987 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
989 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
993 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
994 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
995 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
996 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
999 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
1000 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
1001 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
1002 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1003 match self.key_storage {
1004 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1005 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1006 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1007 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1008 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1009 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1010 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1011 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1012 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1015 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1018 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1019 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1022 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1026 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1027 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1028 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1029 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1031 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1032 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1033 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1034 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1035 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1036 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1040 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1041 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1042 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1043 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1044 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1045 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1047 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1048 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1050 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1051 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1053 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1054 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1057 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1061 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1062 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1063 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1064 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1065 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1066 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1067 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1068 match self.key_storage {
1069 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1070 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1072 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1073 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1078 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1079 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1080 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1081 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1082 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1083 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1084 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1085 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1086 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1087 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1090 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1091 match self.key_storage {
1092 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1093 *funding_info = None;
1095 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1096 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1101 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1102 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1103 match self.key_storage {
1104 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1105 match funding_info {
1106 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1110 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1116 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1117 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1118 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1119 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1120 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1121 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1122 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1123 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1124 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1130 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
1131 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1132 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
1133 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
1134 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1135 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1137 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
1138 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
1140 macro_rules! write_option {
1147 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
1152 match self.key_storage {
1153 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
1154 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1155 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
1156 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
1157 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
1158 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
1159 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
1160 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
1161 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
1162 match funding_info {
1163 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
1164 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
1165 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
1166 script.write(writer)?;
1169 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1172 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1173 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1175 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1178 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1179 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1180 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
1181 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
1183 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1184 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1185 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1186 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1187 match second_option {
1188 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1189 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1192 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1197 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1201 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1202 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1204 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1205 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1206 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1209 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1210 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1211 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1212 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1213 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1214 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1215 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1219 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1220 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1221 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1222 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1223 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1224 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1225 write_option!(htlc_source);
1229 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1230 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1231 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1232 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1233 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1234 for script in txouts.iter() {
1235 script.write(writer)?;
1239 if for_local_storage {
1240 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1241 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1242 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1243 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1246 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1249 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1250 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1251 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1253 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1254 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1258 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1259 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1260 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1261 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1263 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1264 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1265 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1266 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1267 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1269 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1270 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1274 write_option!(htlc_source);
1279 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1280 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1281 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1283 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1286 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1287 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1288 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1290 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1293 if for_local_storage {
1294 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1296 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1299 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1300 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1301 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1304 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1305 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1306 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1307 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1308 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1309 local_key.write(writer)?;
1311 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1314 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
1315 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
1316 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
1317 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
1320 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1321 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1322 outp.write(writer)?;
1323 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
1324 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
1327 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1328 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1329 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1330 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1331 for ev in events.iter() {
1333 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
1334 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1335 claim_request.write(writer)?;
1337 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1338 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1339 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1340 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1342 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
1343 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1344 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1345 input_material.write(writer)?;
1354 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1356 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1357 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1358 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1359 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1360 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1361 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1362 self.write(writer, true)
1365 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1367 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1368 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1369 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1370 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1371 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1372 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1373 self.write(writer, false)
1376 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1377 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1378 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1379 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1380 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1383 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1387 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1388 //TODO This can be optimized?
1389 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1390 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1398 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1399 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1402 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1403 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1404 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1405 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1408 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1409 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1410 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1411 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1412 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1413 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1414 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1415 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1416 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1417 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1418 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1419 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1421 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1422 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1424 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1425 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1428 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1433 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1434 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1435 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1436 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1437 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1438 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1439 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1440 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1441 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1442 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1444 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1445 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1446 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1447 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1451 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1452 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1453 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1454 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1457 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1458 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1460 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1461 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1462 // script_pubkey version.
1463 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1464 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1467 let mut total_value = 0;
1468 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1469 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1470 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1472 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1473 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1475 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1476 txid: commitment_txid,
1479 script_sig: Script::new(),
1480 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1481 witness: Vec::new(),
1483 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1484 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1485 total_value += outp.value;
1486 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1487 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1488 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1489 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1490 output: outp.clone(),
1495 macro_rules! sign_input {
1496 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1498 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1499 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1500 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1501 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1502 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1504 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1505 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1506 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1508 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1512 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1513 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1514 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1515 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1517 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1519 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1520 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1525 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1526 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1528 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1529 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1530 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1531 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1532 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1533 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1534 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1537 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1538 txid: commitment_txid,
1539 vout: transaction_output_index,
1541 script_sig: Script::new(),
1542 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1543 witness: Vec::new(),
1545 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1547 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1548 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1549 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1551 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1555 output: vec!(TxOut {
1556 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1557 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1560 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1561 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1562 let mut used_feerate;
1563 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1564 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1565 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1566 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1567 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1568 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1569 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1570 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1574 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1578 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1585 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1586 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1587 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1588 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1589 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1591 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1592 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1593 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1594 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1595 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1596 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1597 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1599 let e = entry.get_mut();
1600 e.retain(|ref event| {
1602 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1603 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1608 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1611 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1619 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1620 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1621 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1623 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1624 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1627 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1629 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1631 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1632 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1635 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1642 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1644 let mut used_feerate;
1645 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1646 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1649 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1651 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1652 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1653 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1654 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1655 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1658 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1659 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1660 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1661 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1662 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1663 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1664 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1666 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1669 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1674 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1676 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1677 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1678 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1680 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1681 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1682 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1683 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1684 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1685 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1686 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1687 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1689 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1690 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1692 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1694 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1695 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1696 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1697 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1698 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1699 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1700 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1701 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1702 // payment_preimage.
1703 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1704 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1705 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1706 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1708 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1709 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1713 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1714 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1716 let e = entry.get_mut();
1717 e.retain(|ref event| {
1719 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1720 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1725 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1728 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1736 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1737 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1738 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1740 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1741 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1745 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1746 let revocation_point_option =
1747 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1748 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1749 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1751 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1752 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1753 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1754 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1755 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1757 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1758 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1759 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1762 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1763 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1764 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1767 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1768 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1769 match self.key_storage {
1770 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1771 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1772 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1773 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1775 output: outp.clone(),
1779 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1781 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1785 let mut total_value = 0;
1786 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1787 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1788 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1790 macro_rules! sign_input {
1791 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1793 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1794 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1795 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1796 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1797 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1798 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1799 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1801 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1805 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1806 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1807 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1808 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1809 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1814 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1815 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1816 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1817 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1818 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1819 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1820 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1822 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1825 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1826 txid: commitment_txid,
1827 vout: transaction_output_index,
1829 script_sig: Script::new(),
1830 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1831 witness: Vec::new(),
1833 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1835 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1836 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1837 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1839 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1843 output: vec!(TxOut {
1844 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1845 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1848 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1849 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1850 let mut used_feerate;
1851 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1852 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1853 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1854 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1855 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1856 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1857 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1859 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1860 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1861 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1862 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1866 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1870 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1876 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1877 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1879 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1880 txid: commitment_txid,
1881 vout: transaction_output_index,
1883 script_sig: Script::new(),
1884 sequence: idx as u32,
1885 witness: Vec::new(),
1887 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1889 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1891 output: vec!(TxOut {
1892 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1893 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1896 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1897 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1898 let mut used_feerate;
1899 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1900 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1901 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1902 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1903 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1904 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1905 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1906 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1907 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1908 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1911 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1916 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1921 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1923 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1924 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1927 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1934 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1936 let mut used_feerate;
1937 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1938 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1941 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1943 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1944 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1945 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1946 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1947 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1950 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1951 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1952 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1953 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1954 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1955 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1956 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1961 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1965 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1966 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1967 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1968 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1970 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1973 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1974 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1975 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1976 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1977 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1978 key: local_key.clone(),
1979 output: outp.clone(),
1985 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1988 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1989 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1990 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
1991 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1995 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1996 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1999 Err(_) => return (None, None)
2004 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2005 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2006 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2007 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2008 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2009 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
2011 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2012 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2015 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2016 None => return (None, None),
2017 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2019 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2020 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2021 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2023 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2026 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2028 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2032 script_sig: Script::new(),
2033 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2034 witness: Vec::new(),
2036 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2039 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2040 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2041 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2045 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2051 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2052 let mut used_feerate;
2053 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2054 return (None, None);
2057 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2059 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2060 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2061 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2062 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2063 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2065 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2069 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2070 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2071 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2072 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2074 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2075 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2076 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2077 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
2078 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2079 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2080 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2081 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2085 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2089 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2090 } else { (None, None) }
2093 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2094 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2095 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2096 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2097 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2099 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2100 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2101 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
2102 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
2103 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2104 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2105 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2106 key: local_delayedkey,
2107 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2108 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2109 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2117 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2118 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2119 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2120 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2121 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
2126 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2127 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2128 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
2130 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2131 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2133 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2135 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2136 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2137 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2138 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2140 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
2141 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2142 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
2144 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2145 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2146 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2147 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2148 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2149 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2150 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2151 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2153 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2154 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2155 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2157 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2159 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2160 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2161 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2162 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2164 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
2165 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2166 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
2168 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2169 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2170 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2171 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2172 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2173 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2174 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2175 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2178 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2179 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2183 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2186 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2187 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2188 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2189 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2190 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2191 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2192 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2193 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2195 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2196 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2197 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2198 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2200 let e = entry.get_mut();
2201 e.retain(|ref event| {
2203 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2204 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2209 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2211 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2212 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2218 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2219 ($updates: expr) => {
2220 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2221 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2222 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2223 for claim in $updates.3 {
2224 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2232 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2233 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2235 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2236 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2238 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2239 match self.key_storage {
2240 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2241 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2243 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2244 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2249 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2250 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2252 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2253 match self.key_storage {
2254 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2255 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2257 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2258 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2264 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2265 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2266 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2267 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2268 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2269 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2277 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2278 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2280 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2281 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2285 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2288 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2289 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2290 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2291 match self.key_storage {
2292 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2293 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2294 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2295 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2296 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2297 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2298 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2299 output: output.clone(),
2304 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2305 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2306 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2313 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2314 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2315 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2316 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2317 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2318 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2319 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2320 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2321 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2322 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2323 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2324 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2325 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2326 match self.key_storage {
2327 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2328 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2329 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2330 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2332 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2340 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2341 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2342 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2343 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2344 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2345 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2346 for tx in txn_matched {
2347 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2348 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2349 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2350 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2352 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2353 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2354 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2355 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2356 funding_info.clone()
2358 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2362 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2363 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2364 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2366 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2367 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2368 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2371 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2372 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2374 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2375 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2379 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2380 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2381 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2385 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2386 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2387 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2390 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2391 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2395 for tx in txn.iter() {
2396 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2397 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2400 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2401 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2402 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2403 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2404 if updated.len() > 0 {
2405 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2408 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2409 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2410 for inp in &tx.input {
2411 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2412 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2413 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2414 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2415 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2417 let mut set_equality = true;
2418 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2419 set_equality = false;
2421 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2422 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2423 set_equality = false;
2428 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2430 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2431 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2432 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2433 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2434 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2437 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2438 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2444 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2445 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2446 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2448 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2449 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2450 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2451 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2452 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2454 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2455 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2456 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2459 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2460 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2462 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2464 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2468 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2469 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2470 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2472 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2473 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2477 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2482 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2483 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2484 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx));
2485 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2486 match self.key_storage {
2487 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2488 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2489 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2490 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2491 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2494 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2495 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2498 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2499 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2500 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2501 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2502 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2505 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2506 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2512 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2515 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2516 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2517 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2518 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2519 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2520 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2524 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2525 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2526 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2528 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2529 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2534 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2535 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2536 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2539 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2540 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2541 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2542 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2543 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2544 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2546 } else { unreachable!(); }
2548 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2549 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2550 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2551 } else { unreachable!(); }
2554 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2555 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2558 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
2559 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2560 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2562 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2563 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2564 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2567 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2568 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2569 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2570 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2571 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2572 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2573 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2581 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2582 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2583 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2584 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2585 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2588 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2589 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2591 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2592 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2593 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2594 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2596 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2599 for req in remove_request {
2600 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2602 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2605 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2606 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2607 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2608 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2609 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2610 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2611 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2612 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2613 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2614 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2615 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2616 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2617 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2618 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2619 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2620 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2621 // time out the HTLC first.
2622 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2623 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2624 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2625 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2626 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2627 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2628 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2629 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2630 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2631 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2632 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2633 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2634 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2635 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2636 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2637 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2638 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2639 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2640 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2641 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2642 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2643 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2644 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2645 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2652 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2653 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2656 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2657 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2658 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2659 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2662 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2663 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2664 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2672 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2673 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2674 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2675 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2677 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2678 let mut payment_data = None;
2679 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2680 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2681 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2682 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2684 macro_rules! log_claim {
2685 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2686 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2687 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2688 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2689 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2690 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2691 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2692 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2693 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2694 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2695 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2696 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2698 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2699 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2700 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2701 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2706 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2707 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2708 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2709 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2710 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2711 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2712 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2713 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2722 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2723 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2724 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2725 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2726 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2727 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2728 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2729 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2730 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2731 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2732 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2733 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2734 } else if !$local_tx {
2735 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2736 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2738 if payment_data.is_none() {
2739 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2740 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2744 if payment_data.is_none() {
2745 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2746 continue 'outer_loop;
2753 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2754 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2755 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2756 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2759 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2760 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2761 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2762 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2765 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2766 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2767 "remote commitment tx", false);
2770 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2771 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2772 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2773 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2774 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2775 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2776 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2777 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2778 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2779 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2781 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2782 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2784 let e = entry.get_mut();
2785 e.retain(|ref event| {
2787 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2788 return htlc_update.0 != source
2793 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2796 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2805 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2806 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2807 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2808 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2809 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2810 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2812 previous_output: *outp,
2813 script_sig: Script::new(),
2814 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2815 witness: Vec::new(),
2818 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2822 output: vec![TxOut {
2823 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2828 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2829 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2831 let mut used_feerate;
2832 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2833 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2834 let mut value = $amount;
2835 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2836 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2839 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2842 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2844 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2846 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2852 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2853 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2854 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2855 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2856 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2857 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2858 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2862 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2867 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2868 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2870 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2871 match per_outp_material {
2872 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2873 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { &[] });
2876 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2877 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2880 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2884 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2886 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2887 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2889 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2891 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2893 new_feerate = feerate;
2897 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2899 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2900 match per_outp_material {
2901 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2902 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2903 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2904 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2905 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2906 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2908 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2910 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2912 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2913 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2915 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2916 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2917 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2918 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2919 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2920 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2921 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2922 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
2923 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
2925 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
2927 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2928 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2930 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
2931 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
2932 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
2933 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
2938 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
2939 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
2943 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2945 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2946 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2947 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2948 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2952 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2957 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2958 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2959 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2960 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2963 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2965 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2967 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2968 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2969 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2970 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2971 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2972 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2973 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2974 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2975 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2976 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2977 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2978 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2980 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2981 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2982 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2984 revocation_base_key,
2986 delayed_payment_base_key,
2989 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2990 latest_per_commitment_point,
2992 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2993 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2996 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2999 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3000 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3001 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3002 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3004 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3005 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3009 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3010 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3011 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3012 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3014 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3019 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3020 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3022 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
3023 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
3024 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
3025 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3028 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3031 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3032 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3033 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3034 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3035 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3037 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3038 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3044 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3045 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3046 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3047 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3048 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3049 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3050 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3051 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3053 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3054 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3058 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3059 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3060 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3061 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3062 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3063 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3064 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3065 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3066 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3068 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3069 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3073 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3074 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3075 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3076 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3077 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3078 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3079 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3083 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3086 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
3089 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
3090 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3094 if tx.input.is_empty() {
3095 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
3096 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3099 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3100 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3101 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3102 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3103 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3105 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3106 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3107 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3108 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3109 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3111 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3112 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3114 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3119 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
3126 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3129 Some(read_local_tx!())
3131 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3134 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3137 Some(read_local_tx!())
3139 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3142 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3144 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3145 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3146 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3147 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3148 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3149 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3150 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3154 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3155 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3156 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3159 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3160 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3161 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3163 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3166 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3167 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3168 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3169 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3172 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3173 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3174 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3175 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3176 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3177 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3181 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3182 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3183 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3184 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3185 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3186 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3187 for _ in 0..events_len {
3188 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3190 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3191 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3196 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3197 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3198 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3199 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3203 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3204 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3205 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3210 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3214 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3217 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3218 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3221 their_htlc_base_key,
3222 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3223 funding_redeemscript,
3224 channel_value_satoshis,
3225 their_cur_revocation_points,
3228 their_to_self_delay,
3231 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3232 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3233 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3235 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3236 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3237 current_remote_commitment_number,
3244 pending_claim_requests,
3246 claimable_outpoints,
3248 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3260 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3261 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3262 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3263 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3264 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3265 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3266 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3267 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3268 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3270 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3271 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3273 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
3274 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3275 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3276 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3277 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3281 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3282 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3283 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3284 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
3285 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3286 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3288 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3290 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3291 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3292 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3295 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3296 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3301 // insert_secret correct sequence
3302 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3305 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3306 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3307 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3310 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3311 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3312 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3315 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3316 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3317 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3320 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3321 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3322 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3325 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3326 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3327 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3330 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3331 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3332 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3335 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3336 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3337 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3340 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3341 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3342 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3347 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3348 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3351 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3352 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3353 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3356 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3357 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3358 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3359 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3363 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3364 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3367 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3368 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3369 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3372 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3373 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3374 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3377 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3378 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3379 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3382 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3383 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3384 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3385 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3389 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3390 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3393 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3394 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3395 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3398 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3399 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3400 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3403 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3404 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3405 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3408 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3409 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3410 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3411 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3415 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3416 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3419 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3420 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3421 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3424 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3425 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3426 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3429 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3430 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3431 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3434 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3435 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3436 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3439 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3440 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3441 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3444 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3445 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3446 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3449 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3450 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3451 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3454 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3455 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3456 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3457 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3461 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3462 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3465 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3466 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3467 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3470 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3471 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3472 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3475 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3476 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3477 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3480 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3481 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3482 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3485 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3486 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3487 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3490 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3491 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3492 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3493 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3497 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3498 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3501 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3502 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3503 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3506 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3507 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3508 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3511 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3512 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3513 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3516 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3517 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3518 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3521 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3522 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3523 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3526 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3527 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3528 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3531 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3532 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3533 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3536 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3537 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3538 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3539 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3543 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3544 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3547 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3548 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3549 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3552 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3553 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3554 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3557 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3558 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3559 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3562 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3563 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3564 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3567 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3568 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3569 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3572 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3573 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3574 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3577 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3578 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3579 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3582 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3583 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3584 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3585 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3589 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3590 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3593 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3594 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3595 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3598 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3599 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3600 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3603 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3604 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3605 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3608 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3609 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3610 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3613 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3614 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3615 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3618 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3619 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3620 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3623 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3624 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3625 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3628 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3629 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3630 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3631 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3636 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3638 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3640 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3641 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3645 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3646 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3647 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3648 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3649 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3650 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3655 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3657 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3659 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3661 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3662 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3663 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3664 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3668 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3669 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3671 let mut res = Vec::new();
3672 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3673 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3677 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3678 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3685 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3686 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3688 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3689 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3695 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3696 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3697 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3698 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3703 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3705 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3706 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3708 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3709 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3710 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3711 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3712 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3713 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3714 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3717 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3718 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3719 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3720 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3721 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3722 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3723 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3725 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3726 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3727 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3728 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3729 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3730 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3732 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3733 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3734 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3735 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3736 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3737 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3738 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3739 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3741 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3742 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3743 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3744 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3745 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3746 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3750 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3751 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3752 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3754 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3755 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3756 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3757 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3759 macro_rules! sign_input {
3760 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3761 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3762 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3764 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3765 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3766 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3768 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3769 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3770 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3771 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3772 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3773 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3774 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3775 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3776 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3777 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3778 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3779 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3781 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3783 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3784 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3785 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3786 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3790 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3791 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3793 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3794 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3796 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3797 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3801 script_sig: Script::new(),
3802 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3803 witness: Vec::new(),
3806 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3807 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3810 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3811 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3812 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3813 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3814 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3816 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3818 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3819 claim_tx.input.clear();
3820 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3822 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3823 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3827 script_sig: Script::new(),
3828 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3829 witness: Vec::new(),
3832 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3833 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3834 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3835 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3836 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3838 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3840 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3841 claim_tx.input.clear();
3842 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3843 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3844 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3848 script_sig: Script::new(),
3849 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3850 witness: Vec::new(),
3852 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3853 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3854 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3855 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3856 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3858 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3861 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.