1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
22 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
24 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
33 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
34 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
35 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
36 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
38 use util::logger::Logger;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
40 use util::{byte_utils, events};
42 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
48 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
49 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
52 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
53 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
54 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
55 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
56 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
58 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
59 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
60 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
64 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
65 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
66 self.update_id.write(w)?;
67 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
68 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
69 update_step.write(w)?;
74 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
75 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
76 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
77 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
80 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
82 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
86 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
88 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
89 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
90 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
92 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
93 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
94 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
95 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
97 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
98 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
99 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
101 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
102 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
103 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
104 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
105 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
106 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
109 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
110 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
113 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
114 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
115 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
116 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
117 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
120 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
121 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
122 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
124 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
125 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
126 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
127 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
129 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
134 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
135 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
136 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
138 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
140 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
142 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
143 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
144 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
145 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
146 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
147 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
148 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
150 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
152 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
153 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
155 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
157 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
158 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
159 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
161 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
162 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
163 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref>
164 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
165 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
167 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
169 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
170 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
172 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
179 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send>
180 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
181 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
182 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
184 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
186 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
187 let mut reentered = true;
189 let matched_indexes = self.chain_monitor.filter_block(header, txdata);
190 let matched_txn: Vec<_> = matched_indexes.iter().map(|index| txdata[*index]).collect();
191 let last_seen = self.chain_monitor.reentered();
193 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
194 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
195 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, &matched_txn, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
197 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
198 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
199 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
204 reentered = last_seen != self.chain_monitor.reentered();
208 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
209 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
210 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
211 monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
216 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
217 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
220 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
222 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
223 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
224 pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C> {
225 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
226 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
230 fee_estimator: feeest,
236 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
237 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
238 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
239 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
244 let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
246 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
247 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as u32), &funding_txo.1);
248 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
249 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
250 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
254 entry.insert(monitor);
258 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
259 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
260 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
261 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
262 Some(orig_monitor) => {
263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
264 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
266 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
271 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
272 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
273 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
275 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
277 type Keys = ChanSigner;
279 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
280 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
282 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
286 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
287 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
289 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
293 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
294 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
295 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
296 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
298 pending_htlcs_updated
302 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
303 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
304 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
306 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
308 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
309 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
310 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
311 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
317 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
318 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
319 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
320 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
321 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
322 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
323 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
324 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
325 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
326 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
327 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
328 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
329 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
330 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
331 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
332 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
333 /// accurate block height.
334 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
335 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
336 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
337 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
338 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
339 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
340 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
341 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
342 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
343 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
344 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
345 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
346 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
348 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
349 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
350 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
352 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
353 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
354 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
355 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
357 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
358 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
360 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
361 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
362 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
364 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
365 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
366 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
368 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
369 struct LocalSignedTx {
370 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
372 revocation_key: PublicKey,
373 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
374 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
375 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
376 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
378 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
381 /// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
382 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
384 struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
385 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
386 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
387 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
388 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
391 impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
392 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
393 self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
394 self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
395 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?;
396 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
397 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
398 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
399 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
400 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
407 impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
408 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
409 let remote_commitment_transaction = {
410 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
411 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
412 let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
413 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
414 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
415 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
416 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
417 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
418 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
419 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
420 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
423 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
424 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
427 RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
428 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
429 remote_htlc_base_key,
434 Ok(remote_commitment_transaction)
438 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
439 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
440 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
441 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
442 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
444 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
445 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
446 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
447 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
448 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
450 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
451 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
454 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
455 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
456 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
457 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
458 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
461 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
465 funding_redeemscript: Script,
469 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
470 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
472 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => {
473 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
474 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
475 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
476 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
477 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
478 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
479 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
481 on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
483 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
484 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
485 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
486 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
487 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
488 preimage.write(writer)?;
491 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
492 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
493 preimage.write(writer)?;
494 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
496 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
497 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
498 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
505 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
506 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
507 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
509 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
510 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
511 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
512 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
513 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
514 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
515 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
516 let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
517 InputMaterial::Revoked {
518 per_commitment_point,
519 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
520 remote_htlc_base_key,
529 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
530 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
531 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
532 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
533 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
534 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
535 per_commitment_point,
536 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
537 remote_htlc_base_key,
543 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
544 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
545 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
551 InputMaterial::Funding {
552 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
555 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
561 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
562 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
563 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
564 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
565 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
566 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
567 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
568 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
569 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
570 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
571 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
572 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
573 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
574 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
575 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
576 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
577 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
578 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
579 // and satisfy witness program.
580 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
583 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
584 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
585 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
587 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
588 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
589 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
591 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
594 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
598 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
599 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
601 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
603 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
604 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
605 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
606 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
608 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
609 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
610 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
611 commitment_number: u64,
612 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
615 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
621 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
622 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
624 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
625 /// think we've fallen behind!
626 should_broadcast: bool,
630 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
631 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
633 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
635 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
636 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
637 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
643 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
645 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
646 commitment_number.write(w)?;
647 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
648 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
649 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
651 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
654 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
656 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
658 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
663 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
665 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
671 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
672 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
673 match Readable::read(r)? {
675 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
676 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
678 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
679 let mut res = Vec::new();
681 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
688 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
689 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
690 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
691 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
693 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
694 let mut res = Vec::new();
696 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
703 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
704 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
708 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
709 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
710 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
714 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
715 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
718 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
723 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
724 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
726 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
727 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
729 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
730 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
731 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
732 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
733 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
734 latest_update_id: u64,
735 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
737 destination_script: Script,
738 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
739 remote_payment_script: Script,
740 shutdown_script: Script,
743 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
744 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
745 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
747 remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction,
748 funding_redeemscript: Script,
749 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
750 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
751 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
753 on_local_tx_csv: u16,
755 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
756 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
757 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
758 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
759 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
760 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
761 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
762 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
763 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
764 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
765 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
766 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
767 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
769 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
770 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
771 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
772 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
773 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
774 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
776 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
778 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
779 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
781 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
783 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
785 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
786 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
788 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
789 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
790 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
791 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
793 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
794 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
795 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
796 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
797 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
800 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
802 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
804 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
805 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
806 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
807 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
809 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
810 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
811 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
812 local_tx_signed: bool,
814 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
815 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
816 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
817 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
818 // the full block_connected).
819 pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
820 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
823 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
824 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
825 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
828 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
829 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
830 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
831 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
832 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
833 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
835 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
836 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
837 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
838 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
840 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
841 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
842 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
843 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
844 /// all registered listeners in one go.
845 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
846 /// The concrete type which signs for transactions and provides access to our channel public
848 type Keys: ChannelKeys;
850 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
852 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
853 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
854 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
856 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
857 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
858 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
860 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
861 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
862 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<Self::Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
864 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
866 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
867 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
868 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
870 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
871 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
872 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
874 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
875 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
876 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
878 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
879 /// with success or failure.
881 /// You should probably just call through to
882 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
884 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
887 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
888 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
889 /// underlying object
890 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
891 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
892 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
893 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
894 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
895 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
896 self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script ||
897 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
898 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
899 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
900 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
901 self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache ||
902 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
903 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
904 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
905 self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv ||
906 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
907 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
908 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
909 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
910 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
911 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
912 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
913 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
914 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
915 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
916 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
917 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
918 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
919 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
920 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
929 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
930 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
932 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
933 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
934 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
935 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
936 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
937 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
938 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
939 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
940 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
941 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
943 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
945 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
946 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
948 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
949 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
950 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
951 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
952 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
953 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
955 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
958 self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?;
959 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
961 self.keys.write(writer)?;
962 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
963 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
964 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
965 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
966 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
968 self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
969 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
970 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
972 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
973 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
974 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
975 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
976 match second_option {
977 Some(second_pubkey) => {
978 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
981 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
986 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
990 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?;
992 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
994 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
995 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
996 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
997 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
998 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
999 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1000 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1004 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1005 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1006 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1007 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1008 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1009 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1010 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1014 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1015 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1016 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1018 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1019 for script in txouts.iter() {
1020 script.write(writer)?;
1024 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1025 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1026 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1027 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1030 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1031 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1032 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
1033 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1034 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1035 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1036 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1037 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1039 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1040 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1041 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1042 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1043 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1045 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1049 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
1054 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1055 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1056 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1058 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1061 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1063 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1064 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
1066 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1067 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1068 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1071 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1072 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1073 data.write(writer)?;
1076 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1077 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1078 event.write(writer)?;
1081 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1083 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1084 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1085 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1086 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1087 for ev in events.iter() {
1089 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1091 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1092 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1094 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1096 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1102 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1103 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1104 txid.write(writer)?;
1105 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1106 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1107 script.write(writer)?;
1110 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1112 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1113 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1119 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1120 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1121 on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1122 remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1123 on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1124 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1125 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1127 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1128 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1129 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1130 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1131 let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1133 let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1135 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv);
1137 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1138 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1139 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1140 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1141 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1142 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1143 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1144 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1145 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1146 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1147 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1149 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1150 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1151 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1152 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1153 // now but we should consider it later.
1154 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1157 latest_update_id: 0,
1158 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1160 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1161 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1162 remote_payment_script,
1167 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1168 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1171 funding_redeemscript,
1172 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1173 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1177 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1178 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1179 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1180 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1182 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1183 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1184 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1185 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1187 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1188 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1189 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1191 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1192 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1196 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1197 local_tx_signed: false,
1199 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1200 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1204 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1205 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1206 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1207 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1208 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1209 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1212 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1213 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1214 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1215 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1220 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1221 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1222 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1223 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1224 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1226 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1227 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1228 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1232 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1233 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1234 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1239 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1246 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1255 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1256 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1257 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1258 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1259 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1260 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1261 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1262 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1264 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1265 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1268 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1269 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1270 log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1271 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1272 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1273 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1274 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1275 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1276 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1277 Some(old_points) => {
1278 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1279 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1280 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1281 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1282 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1284 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1287 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1291 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1294 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1295 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1296 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1300 self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1303 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1304 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1305 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1306 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1307 /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called.
1308 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1309 if self.local_tx_signed {
1310 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1312 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1313 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1314 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1315 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1317 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1318 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1319 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1320 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1321 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1322 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1323 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1325 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1326 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1327 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1328 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1329 // now but we should consider it later.
1330 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1331 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1333 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1334 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1335 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1339 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1340 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1341 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1342 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1345 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1346 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1349 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1350 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1354 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1355 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
1356 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1358 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1359 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1360 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1362 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1363 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1364 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1365 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1366 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1367 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1368 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1371 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1375 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1378 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1379 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1380 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1383 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1384 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1386 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1388 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1389 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1390 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1392 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1393 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1394 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1395 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1396 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1397 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1398 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1399 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1400 if should_broadcast {
1401 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1403 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1408 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1412 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1414 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1415 self.latest_update_id
1418 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1419 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1423 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1424 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1425 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1426 &self.outputs_to_watch
1429 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1430 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1431 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1432 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1433 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1434 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1435 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1436 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1437 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1443 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1444 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1445 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1446 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1447 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1451 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1454 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1455 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1456 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1457 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1458 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1459 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1463 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1464 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1465 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1468 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1469 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1472 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1473 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1476 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1477 self.current_local_commitment_number
1480 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1481 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1482 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1483 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1484 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1485 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1486 fn check_spend_remote_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1487 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1488 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1489 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1490 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1492 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1493 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1495 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1496 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1499 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1504 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1505 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1506 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1507 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1508 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1509 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1510 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key));
1512 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1513 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1515 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1516 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1517 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1518 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1519 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1523 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1524 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1525 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1526 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1527 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1528 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1529 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1531 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1532 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1537 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1538 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1539 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1540 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1541 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1542 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1544 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1545 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1546 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1547 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1548 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1549 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1550 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1552 let e = entry.get_mut();
1553 e.retain(|ref event| {
1555 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1556 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1561 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1564 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1572 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1573 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1575 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1576 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1578 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1580 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1581 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1582 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1583 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1584 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1585 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1586 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1588 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1589 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1591 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1593 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1594 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1595 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1596 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1597 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1598 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1599 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1600 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1601 // payment_preimage.
1602 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1603 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1604 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1605 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1607 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1608 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1612 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1613 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1615 let e = entry.get_mut();
1616 e.retain(|ref event| {
1618 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1619 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1624 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1627 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1635 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1636 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1638 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1639 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1642 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1643 let revocation_point_option =
1644 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1645 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1646 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1648 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1649 self.remote_payment_script = {
1650 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1651 // script_pubkey version
1652 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1653 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1656 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1657 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1658 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1659 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1660 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1661 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1663 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1664 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1665 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1666 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1667 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1674 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1677 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1678 fn check_spend_remote_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1679 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1680 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1681 return (Vec::new(), None)
1684 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1685 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1688 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1693 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1694 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1695 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1697 log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1698 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv };
1699 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1700 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1703 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1704 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1705 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1707 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1708 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1710 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1711 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1712 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1713 witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
1714 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1715 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1716 Some(preimage.clone())
1718 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1722 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1724 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1728 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1731 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1732 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1733 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1734 fn check_spend_local_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1735 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1736 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1737 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1739 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1740 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1741 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1742 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1744 let e = entry.get_mut();
1745 e.retain(|ref event| {
1747 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1748 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1753 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1756 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1762 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1763 ($updates: expr) => {
1764 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1765 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1766 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1770 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1771 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1773 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1775 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1776 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1777 append_onchain_update!(res);
1778 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1779 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1781 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1782 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1783 append_onchain_update!(res);
1787 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1788 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1789 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1790 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1791 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1792 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1800 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1801 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1802 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1806 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1809 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1810 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1811 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1812 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1813 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1814 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1815 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1816 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1817 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1818 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1819 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1820 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1821 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1822 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1823 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1824 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1825 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1826 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1827 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1828 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1832 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1833 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1838 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1839 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1845 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1846 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1847 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1849 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1850 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1851 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1852 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1853 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1854 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1855 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1856 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1857 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1858 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1862 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1863 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1873 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
1874 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
1875 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
1876 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
1878 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txn_matched: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1879 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1883 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1884 let mut output_val = 0;
1885 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1886 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1887 output_val += out.value;
1888 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1892 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1893 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1895 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1896 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1897 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1898 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1899 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1900 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1901 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1903 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1904 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1905 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1906 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1907 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1908 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1910 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1911 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1912 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1913 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1915 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1917 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1920 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1921 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1922 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1923 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1924 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1929 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1930 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1931 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1932 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1934 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1936 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1937 if should_broadcast {
1938 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1940 if should_broadcast {
1941 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1942 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1943 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1944 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1946 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1949 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1952 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1953 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1954 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1955 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1956 payment_preimage: None,
1957 source: htlc_update.0,
1960 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1961 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1962 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1963 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1969 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1971 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1972 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1973 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1979 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1980 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1981 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1984 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1985 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1987 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1989 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1990 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1993 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1995 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1998 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1999 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2000 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2001 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2002 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2003 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2004 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2005 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2006 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2007 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2008 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2009 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2010 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2011 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2012 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2013 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2014 // time out the HTLC first.
2015 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2016 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2017 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2018 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2019 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2020 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2021 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2022 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2023 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2024 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2025 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2026 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2027 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2028 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2029 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2030 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2031 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2032 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2033 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2034 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2035 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2036 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2037 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2038 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2045 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2047 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
2048 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2049 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2052 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2053 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2054 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2061 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2062 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2063 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2064 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2065 let mut payment_data = None;
2066 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2067 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2068 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2069 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2071 macro_rules! log_claim {
2072 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2073 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2074 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2075 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2076 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2077 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2078 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2079 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2080 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2081 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2082 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2083 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2085 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2086 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2087 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2088 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2093 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2094 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2095 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2096 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2097 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2098 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2099 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2100 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2109 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2110 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2111 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2112 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2113 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2114 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2115 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2116 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2117 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2118 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2119 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2120 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2121 } else if !$local_tx {
2122 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2123 if payment_data.is_none() {
2124 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2127 if payment_data.is_none() {
2128 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2129 continue 'outer_loop;
2136 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2137 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2138 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2140 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2141 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2142 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2143 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2146 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2147 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2148 "remote commitment tx", false);
2151 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2152 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2153 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2154 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2155 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2156 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2157 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2158 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2160 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2164 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2165 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2166 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2167 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2169 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2174 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2175 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2177 let e = entry.get_mut();
2178 e.retain(|ref event| {
2180 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2181 return htlc_update.0 != source
2186 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2189 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2197 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2198 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2199 let mut spendable_output = None;
2200 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2201 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2202 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2203 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2204 output: outp.clone(),
2207 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2208 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2209 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2210 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2211 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2212 to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv,
2213 output: outp.clone(),
2214 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2215 remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2219 } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2220 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
2221 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2222 output: outp.clone(),
2223 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2226 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2227 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2228 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2229 output: outp.clone(),
2233 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2234 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2235 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2237 let e = entry.get_mut();
2238 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2241 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2248 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2250 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2251 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2252 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2256 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2261 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2262 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2263 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2264 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2267 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2268 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2270 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2271 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2273 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2274 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2275 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2276 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2279 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2281 let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2282 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2284 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2285 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2286 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2287 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2288 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2289 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2291 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2292 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2293 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2295 let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2296 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2297 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2299 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2300 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2304 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2305 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2306 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2307 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2309 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2314 let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2316 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2318 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2321 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2322 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2323 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2324 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2325 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2327 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2328 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2334 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2335 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2336 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2337 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2338 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2339 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2340 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2341 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2343 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2344 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2348 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2349 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2350 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2351 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2352 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2353 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2354 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2355 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2356 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2358 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2359 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2363 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2364 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2365 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2366 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2367 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2368 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2373 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2376 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2377 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2378 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2379 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2380 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2381 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2382 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2384 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2385 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2386 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2387 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2388 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2390 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2391 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2393 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2398 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2405 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2408 Some(read_local_tx!())
2410 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2412 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2414 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2415 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2417 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2418 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2419 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2420 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2421 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2422 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2423 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2427 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2428 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2429 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2430 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2433 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2434 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2435 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2436 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2437 pending_events.push(event);
2441 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2443 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2444 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2445 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2446 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2447 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2448 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2449 for _ in 0..events_len {
2450 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2452 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2453 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2454 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2455 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2459 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2460 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2464 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2468 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2471 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2472 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2473 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2474 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2475 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2476 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2477 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2478 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2480 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2481 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2484 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2486 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2487 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2489 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2491 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2494 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2495 remote_payment_script,
2500 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2501 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2504 funding_redeemscript,
2505 channel_value_satoshis,
2506 their_cur_revocation_points,
2511 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2512 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2513 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2515 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2516 current_local_commitment_tx,
2517 current_remote_commitment_number,
2518 current_local_commitment_number,
2521 pending_htlcs_updated,
2524 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2529 lockdown_from_offchain,
2533 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2540 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2541 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2542 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2543 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2544 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2545 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2546 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2547 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2548 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2550 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2551 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2552 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2553 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2555 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2556 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2557 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2558 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2560 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2563 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2564 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2565 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2567 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2568 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2570 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2573 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2574 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2575 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2579 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2580 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2582 let mut res = Vec::new();
2583 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2584 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2588 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2589 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2596 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2597 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2599 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2600 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2606 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2607 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2608 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2609 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2614 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2616 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2617 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2618 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2619 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2620 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2626 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2628 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2629 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2630 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2631 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2632 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2633 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2635 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2636 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2637 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2638 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2639 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2640 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2641 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2644 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2645 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2646 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2647 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2648 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2649 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2650 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2652 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2653 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2654 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2655 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2656 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2657 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2659 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2660 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2661 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2662 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2663 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2664 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2665 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2666 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2668 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2669 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2670 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2671 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2672 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2673 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2677 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2678 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2679 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2681 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2682 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2683 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2684 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2686 macro_rules! sign_input {
2687 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2688 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2689 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2691 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2692 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2693 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2695 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2696 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2697 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2698 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2699 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2700 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2701 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2702 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2703 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2704 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2705 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2706 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2708 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2710 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2711 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2712 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2713 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2717 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2718 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2720 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2721 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2723 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2724 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2728 script_sig: Script::new(),
2729 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2730 witness: Vec::new(),
2733 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2734 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2737 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2738 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2739 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2740 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2741 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2743 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2745 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2746 claim_tx.input.clear();
2747 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2749 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2750 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2754 script_sig: Script::new(),
2755 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2756 witness: Vec::new(),
2759 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2760 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2761 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2762 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2763 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2765 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2767 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2768 claim_tx.input.clear();
2769 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2770 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2771 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2775 script_sig: Script::new(),
2776 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2777 witness: Vec::new(),
2779 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2780 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2781 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2782 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2783 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2785 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2788 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.