_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 179                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 180                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 181                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 182                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 183                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 184                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 185         }
 186
 187         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 188         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 189         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 190
 191         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 192         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 193         if send_from_initiator {
 194                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 195                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 196                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 197                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 198                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 199         } else {
 200                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 201         }
 202 }
 203
 204 #[test]
 205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 206         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 208 }
 209
 210 #[test]
 211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 215         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 217
 218         // balancing
 219         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 220
 221         // A                                        B
 222         // update_fee                            ->
 223         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 224         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 225         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 226         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 227         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 228         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 229         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 230         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 231         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 232         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 233         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 234         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 235         //                                       <- RAA
 236         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 237
 238         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 239         {
 240                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 241                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 242         }
 243         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 245
 246         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 247         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 248         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 249                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 250                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 251                 },
 252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 253         };
 254
 255         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 256
 257         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 258         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 259         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 260                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262
 263         let payment_event = {
 264                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 265                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 266                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 267         };
 268         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 270
 271         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 272         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 274         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 277
 278         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 279         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 280         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 281         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 283
 284         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 285         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 292
 293         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 294         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 295         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 296         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 301
 302         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 303         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 304         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 308         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 310
 311         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 315         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 316         match events_2[0] {
 317                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 319         }
 320
 321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323 }
 324
 325 #[test]
 326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 327         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 328         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 334
 335         // balancing
 336         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 337
 338         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 339         {
 340                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 341                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 342         }
 343         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 345
 346         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 347         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 348         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 349                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 350                         update_fee.as_ref()
 351                 },
 352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 353         };
 354
 355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 356
 357         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 358         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 359         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 360                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 362
 363         let payment_event = {
 364                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 365                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 366                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 367         };
 368         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 369         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 370
 371         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 372         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 373         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 374         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 375         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 377
 378         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 380
 381         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 382 }
 383
 384 #[test]
 385 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 386         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 387         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 389         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 390         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 391
 392         // A                                        B
 393         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 394         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 395         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 396         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 397         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 398         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 399         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 400         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 401         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 402         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 403         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 404         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 405         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 406         //                                          B should send no response here
 407         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 408         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 409         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 410
 411         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 412         let initial_feerate;
 413         {
 414                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 415                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 416                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 417         }
 418         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 420
 421         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 422         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 423         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 424                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 425                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 426                 },
 427                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 428         };
 429
 430         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 431         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 432         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 433         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 435
 436         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 437         // transaction:
 438         {
 439                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 440                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 441         }
 442         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 444         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 445
 446         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 447         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 448                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 449                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 450         };
 451
 452         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 453
 454         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 455         // Deliver (3)
 456         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 457
 458         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 459         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 460         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 466         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 467         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 468         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 469
 470         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 471         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 472         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 474         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 475
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 477         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         // Delever (4)
 481         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 482         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 484
 485         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 486         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 490         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 491         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 493
 494         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 495         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 497 }
 498
 499 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 500         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 501         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 502         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 503         // Node objects.
 504
 505         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 508         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 509
 510         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 511                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 512                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 513                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 514         }
 515
 516         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 517         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 518         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 521         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 522         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 523
 524         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 525         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 526
 527         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 528
 529         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 530         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 532         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 535         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 536         {
 537                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 538                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 540                 added_monitors.clear();
 541         }
 542         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 545
 546         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 547         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 548         {
 549                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 550                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 551                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 552                 added_monitors.clear();
 553         }
 554
 555         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 556         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 557         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 558
 559         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 561
 562         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 563         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 565         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 566         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 567 }
 568
 569 #[test]
 570 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 589 }
 590
 591 #[test]
 592 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 598
 599         {
 600                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 601                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 602         }
 603         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 605
 606         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 607         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 608         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 609                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 610                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 611                 },
 612                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 613         };
 614         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 615
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 617         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 619
 620         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 621         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 625         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 626         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 628
 629         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 630         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 632 }
 633
 634 #[test]
 635 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 636         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 639         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 640         let channel_value = 5000;
 641         let push_sats = 700;
 642         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 643         let channel_id = chan.2;
 644         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 645         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 646         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 647
 648         let opt_anchors = false;
 649
 650         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 651         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 652         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 653         // remote limit.
 654         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 655         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 656         {
 657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 658                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 659         }
 660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 665
 666         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 667
 668         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 669         {
 670                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 671
 672                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 673                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 674                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 675                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 676                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 677                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 678         }
 679
 680         {
 681                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 682                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 683                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 684         }
 685         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 686         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 688
 689         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 690
 691         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 692         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 693         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 694                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 695                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 696                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 697                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 698                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 699                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 700                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 701         };
 702         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 703                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 704                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 705                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 706                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 707                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 708                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 709                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 710                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 711         };
 712
 713         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 714         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 715                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 716
 717         let res = {
 718                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 719                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 720                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 721                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 722                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 723                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 724                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 725                         push_sats,
 726                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 727                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 728                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 729                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 730                         &mut htlcs,
 731                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 732                 );
 733                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 734         };
 735
 736         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 737                 channel_id: chan.2,
 738                 signature: res.0,
 739                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 740                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 741                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 742         };
 743
 744         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 745                 channel_id: chan.2,
 746                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 747         };
 748
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 750
 751         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 752         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 753         //Should produce and error.
 754         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 755         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 757         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 758         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 759 }
 760
 761 #[test]
 762 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 766         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 767         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 768
 769         // balancing
 770         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 771
 772         {
 773                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 774                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 775         }
 776         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 778
 779         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 780         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 781         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 782                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 783                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 784                 },
 785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 786         };
 787         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 789         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 791
 792         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 793
 794         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 795         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 796                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 797         {
 798                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 799                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 800                 added_monitors.clear();
 801         }
 802         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 803         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 804         // node[1] has nothing to do
 805
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 807         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 809
 810         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 811         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 812         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 814         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 816         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 817
 818         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 819         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 820         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 821         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 822         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 823         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 824
 825         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 826         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 828         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829
 830         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 832         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 833
 834         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 836         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 837         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 838
 839         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 841         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 842
 843         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 844
 845         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 846         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 847         match events[0] {
 848                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 850         };
 851
 852         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 853
 854         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 855         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 856         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 857         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 858         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 859 }
 860
 861 #[test]
 862 fn test_update_fee() {
 863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 864         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 865         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 866         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 867         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 868         let channel_id = chan.2;
 869
 870         // A                                        B
 871         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 872         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 873         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 874         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 875         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 876         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 877         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 878         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 879         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 880         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 881         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 882         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 883
 884         // Create and deliver (1)...
 885         let feerate;
 886         {
 887                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 888                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 889                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 890         }
 891         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 893
 894         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 895         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 896         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 897                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 898                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 899                 },
 900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 901         };
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 903
 904         // Generate (2) and (3):
 905         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 906         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 908
 909         // Deliver (2):
 910         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 913
 914         // Create and deliver (4)...
 915         {
 916                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 917                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 918         }
 919         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 921         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 922         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 923         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 924                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 925                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 926                 },
 927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 928         };
 929
 930         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 931         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 933         // ... creating (5)
 934         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 936
 937         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 938         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 940         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 941         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 942
 943         // Deliver (5):
 944         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 945         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 947
 948         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 949         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 950         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 952         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 953         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 954         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 955         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 957
 958         // Deliver (7)
 959         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 961         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 962         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 963
 964         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 966         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 967
 968         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 969         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 970         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 971         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 973 }
 974
 975 #[test]
 976 fn fake_network_test() {
 977         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 978         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 979         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 980         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 981         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 982         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 983
 984         // Create some initial channels
 985         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 986         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 987         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 988
 989         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994
 995         // Send some more payments
 996         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 999
1000         // Test failure packets
1001         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1002         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1003
1004         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1005         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1006
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1014
1015         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1016         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1017         hops.push(RouteHop {
1018                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1019                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1020                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1021                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1022                 fee_msat: 0,
1023                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1024         });
1025         hops.push(RouteHop {
1026                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1027                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1028                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1029                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1030                 fee_msat: 0,
1031                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1032         });
1033         hops.push(RouteHop {
1034                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1035                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1036                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1037                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1038                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1039                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1040         });
1041         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1042         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1043         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1044
1045         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1046         hops.push(RouteHop {
1047                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1048                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1049                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1050                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1051                 fee_msat: 0,
1052                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1053         });
1054         hops.push(RouteHop {
1055                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1056                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1057                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1058                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1059                 fee_msat: 0,
1060                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1061         });
1062         hops.push(RouteHop {
1063                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1064                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1065                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1066                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1067                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1068                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1069         });
1070         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1071         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1072         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1073
1074         // Claim the rebalances...
1075         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1077
1078         // Close down the channels...
1079         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 }
1092
1093 #[test]
1094 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1095         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1096         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1097         // commitment dance rounds.
1098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1101         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1102         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1103         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1104
1105         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1106         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1107
1108         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109         for _ in 0..50 {
1110                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1112                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1113                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114         }
1115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116
1117         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121
1122         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1123         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124         // another HTLC.
1125         {
1126                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1127                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1128                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1129                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1130         }
1131
1132         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1134         {
1135                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1136                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1137                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1138         }
1139
1140         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1141         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1142         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1143         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1144
1145         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1147         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1148         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152
1153         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1154         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1155         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1156
1157         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1158
1159         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163
1164         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1165         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1167         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1174                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1175         }
1176         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1178         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1187
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1192
1193         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1194         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1195         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1196                 match event {
1197                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1198                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1199                         },
1200                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1201                 };
1202         }
1203
1204         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1205                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1206         }
1207
1208         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1209 }
1210
1211 #[test]
1212 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1213         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1214         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1218         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1219
1220         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1226
1227         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1228
1229         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1230         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231
1232         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1233         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234
1235         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1236         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1237         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1238 }
1239
1240 #[test]
1241 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1242         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1243         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1244         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1248         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1249
1250         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1251
1252         // balancing
1253         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1254
1255         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1256
1257         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1258         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1259         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1260
1261         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1262         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1263         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1265
1266         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1267         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1268
1269         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1270         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1271         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1272                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1273                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1274                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1275                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276                 }
1277         }
1278         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1279
1280         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1282         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1283         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1284
1285         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1286         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1287
1288         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1289         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1291         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1292         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1293                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1294         } else {
1295                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1296         };
1297
1298         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1299         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1300
1301         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1302         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1303         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1304
1305         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1306         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1307         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1308         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1309
1310         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1311         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1312         for e in events {
1313                 match e {
1314                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1315                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1316                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1317                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1318                         },
1319                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1320                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1321                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1322                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1323                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1324                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1325                         },
1326                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1327                 }
1328         }
1329 }
1330
1331 #[test]
1332 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1333         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1334         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1335         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1336         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1337         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1338
1339         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1340         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1341
1342         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1343         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1344         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1345         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1346                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1347         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1348         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1349                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1350         match err {
1351                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1352                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1353                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1354                 },
1355                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1356         }
1357         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1358
1359         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1360 }
1361
1362 #[test]
1363 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1364         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1365         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1366         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1367         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1368         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1369
1370         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1371                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1372         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1373         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1374         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1375         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1376
1377         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1378
1379         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1380         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1381                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1382         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1383         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1384                 channel_id: chan.2,
1385                 htlc_id: 0,
1386                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1387                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1388                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1389                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1390         };
1391
1392         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1393
1394         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1395         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1396         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1397
1398         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1399
1400         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1401
1402         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1403         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1404         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1405                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1406                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1407                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1408                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1409                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1410                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1411
1412                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1413                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1414                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1415                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1416                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1417         };
1418         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1419                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1420                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1421                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1422                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1423                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1424                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1425                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1426                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427         };
1428
1429         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1430         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1431                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1432
1433         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1434         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1435         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1436
1437         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1438                 offered: false,
1439                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1440                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1441                 payment_hash,
1442                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1443         };
1444
1445         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1446
1447         let res = {
1448                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1449                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1450                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1451                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1452                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1453                         commitment_number,
1454                         95000,
1455                         local_chan_balance,
1456                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1457                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1458                         feerate_per_kw,
1459                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1460                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1461                 );
1462                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1463         };
1464
1465         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1466                 channel_id: chan.2,
1467                 signature: res.0,
1468                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1469                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1470                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1471         };
1472
1473         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1474         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1475         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1476
1477         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1478         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1479                 channel_id: chan.2,
1480                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1481                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1482                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1483                 next_local_nonce: None,
1484         };
1485         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1486
1487         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1489         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1490         match events[0] {
1491                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1492                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1493                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1494                 },
1495                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1496         };
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1498                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1499
1500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1501 }
1502
1503 #[test]
1504 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1505         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1506         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1507         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1508         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1509         // this situation.
1510         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1512         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1513         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1514         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1515         let opt_anchors = false;
1516
1517         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1518         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1519
1520         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1521
1522         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1523
1524         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1525         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1526         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1527         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1528                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1529         }
1530
1531         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1532         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1533                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1534                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1535         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1536 }
1537
1538 #[test]
1539 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1540         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1541         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1544         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1545         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1546         let opt_anchors = false;
1547
1548         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1549         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1550         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1551         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1552         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1553         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1554         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1555
1556         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1557         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1558                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1559         }
1560
1561         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1562                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1563         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1564         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1565         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1566         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1567         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1568         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1569         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1570                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1571         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1572         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1573                 channel_id: chan.2,
1574                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1575                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1576                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1577                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1578                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1579         };
1580
1581         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1582         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1583         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1584         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1585         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1586         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1588         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1589 }
1590
1591 #[test]
1592 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1593         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1594         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1595         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1596         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1597
1598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1600         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1601         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1602         let opt_anchors = false;
1603
1604         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1605         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1606         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1607         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1608         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1609         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1610         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1611
1612         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1613                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1614         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1615         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1616         // commitment transaction fee.
1617         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1618
1619         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1620         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1621                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1622         }
1623
1624         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1625         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1626                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1627         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1628         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1629                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1630                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1631 }
1632
1633 #[test]
1634 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1635         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1636         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1637         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1638         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1641         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1642         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1643         let opt_anchors = false;
1644
1645         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1646         // HTLC.
1647         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1648         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1649         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1650                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1651
1652         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1653         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1654         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1655         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1656         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1657         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1658         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1659
1660         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1661         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1662         match msg_events[0] {
1663                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1664                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1665                 },
1666                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1667         }
1668 }
1669
1670 #[test]
1671 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1672         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1673         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1679
1680         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1681         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1682         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1683         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686
1687         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1688         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1692         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693
1694         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1695         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1696         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1697         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1698 }
1699
1700 #[test]
1701 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1705         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1706         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1707         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1708
1709         let feemsat = 239;
1710         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1711         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1712         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1713         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1714
1715         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1716         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1717         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1718         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719
1720         // Add a pending HTLC.
1721         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1722         let payment_event_1 = {
1723                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1724                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1725                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1726
1727                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1728                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1729                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1730         };
1731         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1732
1733         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1734         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1735         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1736         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1737         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1738         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1739
1740         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1741         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1742         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1743         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1744         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1745         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1746                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1747         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1748         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1749                 channel_id: chan.2,
1750                 htlc_id: 1,
1751                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1752                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1753                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1754                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1755         };
1756
1757         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1758         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1759         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1760         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1761         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1762         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1764         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1765 }
1766
1767 #[test]
1768 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1769         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1770         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1772         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1773         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1774         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1775         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1776         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1777         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1778         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1779
1780         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1781         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1782         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1783
1784         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1785         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1786 }
1787
1788 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1789         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1790 }
1791
1792 #[test]
1793 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1794         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1795         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1796         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1797         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1798         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1799         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1801         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1802         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1803         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1804
1805         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1806         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1807
1808         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1809         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1810
1811         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1812                 ($node: expr) => {{
1813                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1814                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1815                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1816                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1817                         payment_event
1818                 }}
1819         }
1820
1821         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1822         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1823         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1824         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1825
1826         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1827
1828         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1829         {
1830                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1831                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1832                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1833                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1834                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1835
1836                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1837                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1838                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1839                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1840         }
1841
1842         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1843         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1844         loop {
1845                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1846                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1847                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1848                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1849                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1850                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1851                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1852                         break;
1853                 }
1854
1855                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1856                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1857                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1858                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1859                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1860
1861                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1862                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1863                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1864                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1865                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1866                 );
1867
1868                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1869                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1870                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1871                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1872                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1873         }
1874
1875         // adding pending output.
1876         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1877         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1878         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1879         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1880         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1881         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1882         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1883         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1884         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1885         // policy.
1886         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1887         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1888         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1889
1890         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1891         let payment_event_1 = {
1892                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1893                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1894                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1895
1896                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1897                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1898                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1899         };
1900         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1901
1902         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1903         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1904         {
1905                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1906                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1907                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1908                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1909                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1910                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1911                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912         }
1913
1914         // split the rest to test holding cell
1915         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1916         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1917         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1918         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1919         {
1920                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1921                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1922         }
1923
1924         // now see if they go through on both sides
1925         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1926         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1927         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1928                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1930         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1931         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1932
1933         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1934         {
1935                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1936                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1937                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1938                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1939                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1940                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1941                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1942         }
1943
1944         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1945         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1946         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1947                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1949         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1950         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1951
1952         // flush the pending htlc
1953         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1954         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1956
1957         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1958         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1960         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1961
1962         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1963         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1964         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966
1967         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1968         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1970
1971         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1972
1973         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1974         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1975         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1976
1977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1978         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1979
1980         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1981         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1982         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1983         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1984         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1985         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1986
1987         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1988         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1989         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1990         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1991
1992         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1993         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1994
1995         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1996         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1997         match events[0] {
1998                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
1999                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2000                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2001                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2002                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2003                         match &purpose {
2004                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2005                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2006                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2007                                 },
2008                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2009                         }
2010                 },
2011                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2012         }
2013         match events[1] {
2014                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2015                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2016                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2017                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2018                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2019                         match &purpose {
2020                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2021                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2022                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2023                                 },
2024                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2025                         }
2026                 },
2027                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2028         }
2029
2030         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2031         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2033
2034         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2035         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2036         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2037
2038         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2039         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2040         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2041         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2042         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2043
2044         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2045         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2046 }
2047
2048 #[test]
2049 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2050         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2051         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2052         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2053         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2054         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2055         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2056         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2057         // To test this we:
2058         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2059         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2060         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2061         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2062         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2063         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2064         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2065         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2066         //    claim,
2067         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2068         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2069         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2070         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2071         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2072         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2073         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2074         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2075         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2076         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2077
2078         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2079         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2080         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2081         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2082         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2083
2084         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2085         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2086         let send_1 = {
2087                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2088                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2089                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2090                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2091                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2092                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2093         };
2094
2095         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2096         // initial fulfill/CS.
2097         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2098         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2100         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2101
2102         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2103         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2104         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2105         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2107         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2108
2109         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2110         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2112         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2114
2115         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2119         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2120
2121         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2123         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2124
2125         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2127         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2128
2129         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2132
2133         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2134         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2135         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2136         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2137         // on-chain as necessary).
2138         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2139         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2143
2144         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2147
2148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2149         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2150
2151         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2152         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2153         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2155         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2156         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2157
2158         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2159         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2160         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2161         let send_2 = {
2162                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2165                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2166                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2167                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2168         };
2169
2170         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2171         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2173         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2174
2175         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2176
2177         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2179         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2180
2181         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183
2184         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2186         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2187         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2188
2189         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2191         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2192
2193         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195
2196         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2197         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2198
2199         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2200         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2201 }
2202
2203 #[test]
2204 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2205         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2206         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2210         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2211
2212         // Create some initial channels
2213         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2214         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2215         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2216         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2217
2218         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2219         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2220         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2221         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2222         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2223         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2224
2225         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2226         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2227         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2228         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2229         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2230
2231         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2232         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2234         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2235         {
2236                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2237                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2238                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2239                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2240                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2241         }
2242         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2243         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2244         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2245         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2246         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2247
2248         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2249         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2250
2251         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2252         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2253         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2254         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2256         {
2257                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2258                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2259                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2260                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2262                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2263         }
2264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2265         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269
2270         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2271                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2272                         {
2273                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2274                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2275                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2276
2277                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2278                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2279                                 match events[0] {
2280                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2281                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2282                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2283                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2284                                         },
2285                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2286                                 };
2287                         }
2288                 }
2289         }
2290
2291         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2292         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2293         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2295         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2296         let node2_commitment_txid;
2297         {
2298                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2299                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2300                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2301                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2302
2303                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2304                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2305                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2308         }
2309         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2310         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2311         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2312         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2313         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2314
2315         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2316         // confusing us in the following tests.
2317         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2318
2319         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2320         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2321         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2322         // buffer space).
2323
2324         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2325                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2326                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2327                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2328                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2329                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2330                                 msg.clone()
2331                         },
2332                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2333                 };
2334                 match events[1] {
2335                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2336                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2337                         },
2338                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2339                 }
2340                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2341
2342                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2343                 {
2344                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2345                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2346                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2347                                         false
2348                                 } else { true }
2349                         });
2350                 }
2351
2352                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2353
2354                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2355                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2356
2357                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2358                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2359                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2360                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2361                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2362                                 msg.clone()
2363                         },
2364                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2365                 };
2366                 match events[1] {
2367                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2368                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2369                         },
2370                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2371                 }
2372                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2373                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2374
2375                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2376                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2377                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2378         };
2379         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2380         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2381         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2382         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2383
2384         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2385                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2386         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2387         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2388 }
2389
2390 #[test]
2391 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2392         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2393         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2394         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2395         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2396         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2397         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2398         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2399         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2400         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2401         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2402         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2403         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2404         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2406         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2407         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2408         // Create some new channels:
2409         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2410
2411         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2412         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2413         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2414         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2416         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2417         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2418         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2419         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2422         // Revoke the old state
2423         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2424
2425         {
2426                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2427                 {
2428                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2430                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2431                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2433                 }
2434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2435                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2436                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2437
2438                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2439                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2440                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2441                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2442                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2445                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2446                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2447         }
2448         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2449         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2450         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451 }
2452
2453 #[test]
2454 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2455         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2456         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2457         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2458         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2459         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2460         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2461         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2462         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2463         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2464         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2465         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2466         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2467         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2470         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2471         // Create some new channels:
2472         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2473
2474         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2475         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2476         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2477         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2479         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2480         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2481         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2482         // Revoke the old state
2483         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2484         {
2485                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2486                 {
2487                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2488                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2489                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2490
2491                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2493                 }
2494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2495                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2496
2497                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2498                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2499                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2500                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2501                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2502                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2503                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2504         }
2505         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2506         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2507         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2508 }
2509
2510 #[test]
2511 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2512         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2513         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2517         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2518         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2520         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2521         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2522         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2523         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2524         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2525         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2526
2527         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2528         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2530         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2531         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2532         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2533
2534         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535
2536         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2537         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2540         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2541 }
2542
2543 #[test]
2544 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2545         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2546         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2547         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2548         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2549         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2550         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2551
2552         // Create some new channel:
2553         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2554
2555         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2556         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2557         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2558         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2559         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2560
2561         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2562         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2563         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2564         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2565         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2566         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2567         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2568         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2569         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2570
2571         //Revoke the old state
2572         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2573
2574         {
2575                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2576                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2577                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2578                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2579                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2580                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2581                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2582                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2583
2584                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2585                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2586
2587                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2588                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2589
2590                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2591                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2592                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2593                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2594                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2595                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2596                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2597                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2598
2599                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2600                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2601                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2602                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2603                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2604         }
2605         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2606         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2607         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2608 }
2609
2610 #[test]
2611 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2612         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2613         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2614         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2615         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2616         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2617         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2618
2619         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2620
2621         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2622         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2623         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2624         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2625         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2626         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2627
2628         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2629         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2630
2631         //Revoke the old state
2632         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2633
2634         {
2635                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2636                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2638                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2639                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2640                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2641                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2642                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2643                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2644                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2645                 }
2646
2647                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2648                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2649
2650                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2651
2652                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2653                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2654                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2655                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2656                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2657                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2658                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2659
2660                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2661                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2662                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2663
2664                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2665                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2666                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2667
2668                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2669                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2670                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2671
2672                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2673                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2674                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2675                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2676                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2677                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2678                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2679                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2680
2681                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2682                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2683                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2684                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2685                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2686                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2687                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2688         }
2689         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2690         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2691         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2692 }
2693
2694 #[test]
2695 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2696         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2697         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2698         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2699         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2700         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2701         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2702         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2703         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2704         // towards B.
2705         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2706         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2707         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2708         // PaymentSent event).
2709
2710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2713         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2714
2715         // Create some initial channels
2716         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2717         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2718
2719         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2720         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2721         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2722         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2723         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2724
2725         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2726         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2727         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2728
2729         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2730         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2731
2732         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2733         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2734         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2735         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2736         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2737         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2738         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2739         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2740         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2742         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2743         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2744         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2745         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2746         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2747
2748         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2749         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2751         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2752         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2753         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2754         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2755         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2756         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2757         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2758         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2759         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2760         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2761         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2762
2763         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2764         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2765         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2766         {
2767                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2768                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2769                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2770                 added_monitors.clear();
2771         }
2772         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2773         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2774         match forwarded_events[0] {
2775                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2776                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2777         }
2778         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2779         match forwarded_events[1] {
2780                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2781                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2782                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2783                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2784                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2785                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2786                 },
2787                 _ => panic!()
2788         }
2789         match forwarded_events[2] {
2790                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2791                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2792                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2793                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2794                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2795                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2796                 },
2797                 _ => panic!()
2798         }
2799         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2800         {
2801                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2802                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2803                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2804                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2805                 added_monitors.clear();
2806         }
2807         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2808
2809         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2810         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2811
2812         match nodes_2_event {
2813                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2814                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2815         }
2816
2817         match nodes_0_event {
2818                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2819                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2820                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2821                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2822                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2823                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2824                 },
2825                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2826         };
2827
2828         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2829         match events[0] {
2830                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2831                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2832         }
2833
2834         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2835                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2836                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2837                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2838                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2839                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2840                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2841                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2842                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2843                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2844                         if $htlc_offered {
2845                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2846                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2847                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2848                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2849                         } else {
2850                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2851                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2852                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2853                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2854                         }
2855                         node_txn.clear();
2856                 } }
2857         }
2858         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2859         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2860
2861         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2862         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2863         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2864         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2865         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2866         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2868         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2869         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2870         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2871         let commitment_spend =
2872                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2873                         &node_txn[0]
2874                 } else {
2875                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2876                         // FullBlockViaListen
2877                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2878                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2879                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2880                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2881                                 &node_txn[0]
2882                         } else {
2883                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2884                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2885                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2886                                 &node_txn[2]
2887                         }
2888                 };
2889
2890         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2891         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2892         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2893         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2894         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2895         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2896         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2897         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2898
2899         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2900         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2901         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2902         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2904         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2905         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2906         let mut first_claimed = false;
2907         for event in events {
2908                 match event {
2909                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2910                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2911                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2912                                         first_claimed = true;
2913                                 } else {
2914                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2915                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2916                                 }
2917                         },
2918                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2919                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2920                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2921                 }
2922         }
2923         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2924 }
2925
2926 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2927         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2928         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2929         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2930         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2931         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2932         //            \                                  \
2933         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2934
2935         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2936         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2938         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2939         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2940         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2941         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2942
2943         // Create some intial channels
2944         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2945         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2946
2947         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2948         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2949         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2950
2951         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2952
2953         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2954         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2955         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2956         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2958         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2960
2961         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2962         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2963         match events[0] {
2964                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2965                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2966                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2967                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2968                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2969                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2970                 },
2971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2972         };
2973         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2974         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2976         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2977         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2978         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2979
2980         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2981         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2982         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2983         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
2984         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2985         let timeout_tx = {
2986                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2987                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2988                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2989                 } else {
2990                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
2991                 }
2992                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
2993                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2994                 txn.remove(0)
2995         };
2996
2997         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2999         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3000
3001         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3002
3003         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3005         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3006         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3007         match events[0] {
3008                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3009                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3010                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3011                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3012                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3013                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3014                 },
3015                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3016         };
3017
3018         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3019         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3020         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3021
3022         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3023         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3024
3025         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3027         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3028         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3029         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3030         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3031         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3032 }
3033
3034 #[test]
3035 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3036         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3037         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3038         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3039 }
3040
3041 #[test]
3042 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3043         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3044         // and fail backward accordingly.
3045
3046         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3047         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3048         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3049         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3050
3051         // Create some initial channels
3052         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3053         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3054
3055         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3056         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3057         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3058         // Revoke the old state
3059         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3060
3061         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3062
3063         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3064         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3065         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3067         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3068
3069         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3071         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3072         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3073         match events[0] {
3074                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3075                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3076                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3077                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3078                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3079                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3080
3081                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3082                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3083                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3084                 },
3085                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3086         }
3087 }
3088
3089 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3090         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3091         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3092         // commitment transaction anymore.
3093         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3094         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3095         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3096         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3097         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3098         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3099         // transactions:
3100         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3101         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3102         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3103         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3104         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3105         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3106         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3108         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3109
3110         // Create some initial channels
3111         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3112         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3113
3114         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3115         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3116         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3117         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3118         // Revoke the old state
3119         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3120
3121         let value = if use_dust {
3122                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3123                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3124                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3125                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3126         } else { 3000000 };
3127
3128         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3129         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3130         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3131
3132         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3133         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3135         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3136         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3137         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3138         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3139         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3140         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3141         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3142         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3143         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3144
3145         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3146         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3148         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3149         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3150         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3151         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3152         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3153         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3154         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3155         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3157         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3158         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3159         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3161
3162         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3163         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3165         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3166         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3167         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3168         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3169         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3170         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3171         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3172         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3173         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3174         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3176         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3177         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3178         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3180
3181         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3182         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3183         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3184         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3185                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3186         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3187         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3189
3190         if deliver_bs_raa {
3191                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3192                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3193                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3195                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3196                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3197                 match events[0] {
3198                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3199                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200                 };
3201                 match events[1] {
3202                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3203                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3204                 }
3205                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3206                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3207         }
3208
3209         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3210         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3211
3212         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3214         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3215
3216         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3217         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3218         match events[0] {
3219                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3220                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3221         }
3222         match events[1] {
3223                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3224                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3225                 },
3226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3227         }
3228         match events[2] {
3229                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3230                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3231                 },
3232                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3233         }
3234
3235         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3237
3238         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3239         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3240
3241         if deliver_bs_raa {
3242                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3243                 match nodes_2_event {
3244                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3245                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3246                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3247                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3248                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3249                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3250                         },
3251                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3252                 }
3253         }
3254
3255         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3256         match nodes_2_event {
3257                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3258                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3259                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3260                 },
3261                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262         }
3263
3264         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3265         match nodes_0_event {
3266                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3267                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3268                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3269                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3270                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3271                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3272
3273                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3274                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3275                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3276
3277                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3278
3279                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3280                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3281                         match events[0] {
3282                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3283                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3284                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3285                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3286                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3287                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3288                                         }
3289                                 },
3290                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3291                         }
3292                         match events[1] {
3293                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3294                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3295                                 },
3296                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3297                         }
3298                         match events[2] {
3299                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3300                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3301                                 },
3302                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3303                         }
3304                         match events[3] {
3305                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3306                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3307                                 },
3308                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3309                         }
3310                         match events[4] {
3311                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3312                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3313                                 },
3314                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3315                         }
3316                         match events[5] {
3317                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3318                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3319                                 },
3320                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3321                         }
3322                 },
3323                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3324         }
3325
3326         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3327         match events[0] {
3328                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3329                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3330         }
3331
3332         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3333         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3334         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3335 }
3336
3337 #[test]
3338 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3339         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3340         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3341         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3342         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3343 }
3344
3345 #[test]
3346 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3347         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3348         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3349         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3350         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3351 }
3352
3353 #[test]
3354 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3355         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3358         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3359         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3360
3361         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3362         {
3363                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3364                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3365                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3367
3368                 let payment_event = {
3369                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3370                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3371                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3372                 };
3373                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3374                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3375         }
3376
3377         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3378         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3379         {
3380                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3381                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3382                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3383
3384                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3385         }
3386
3387         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3388         {
3389                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3390
3391                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3392                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3393                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3394                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3395                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3396                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3397                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3398
3399                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3400                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3401                         channel_id: chan.2,
3402                         htlc_id: 0,
3403                         amount_msat: 0,
3404                         payment_hash,
3405                         cltv_expiry,
3406                         onion_routing_packet,
3407                 };
3408                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3409         }
3410         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3411         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3412         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3413         match events[0] {
3414                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3415                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3416                 },
3417                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3418         }
3419         match events[1] {
3420                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3421                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3422                 },
3423                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3424         }
3425         match events[2] {
3426                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3427                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3428                 },
3429                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3430         }
3431         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3433 }
3434
3435 #[test]
3436 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3437         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3438         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3439         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3440         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3441         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3442         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3443         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3444                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3445                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3446                 // connect_style.
3447                 return;
3448         }
3449         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3450
3451         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3452         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3453         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3454         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3456         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3457
3458         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3459         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3460         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3461
3462         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3463         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3464         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3466         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3467
3468         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3469         // registering new transactions
3470         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3471 }
3472
3473 #[test]
3474 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3475         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3479         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3480         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3481         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3482
3483         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3484
3485         let mut payment_event = {
3486                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3487                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3489
3490                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3491                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3492                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3493         };
3494
3495         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3496         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3497
3498         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3499
3500         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3501         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3502         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3503         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3504
3505         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3506         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3507         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3509         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3510
3511         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3512         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3513         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3514
3515         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3516         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3518         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3519         let tx = {
3520                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3521                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3522                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3523                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3524                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3525                 node_txn.remove(0)
3526         };
3527
3528         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3529
3530         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3531         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3533         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3534
3535         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3536         {
3537                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3538                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3539         }
3540         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3541         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3542         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3543         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3544         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3545         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3546         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3547
3548         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3549 }
3550
3551 #[test]
3552 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3553         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3554         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3555         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3556         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3557
3558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3561         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3563
3564         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3565
3566         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3567         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3569         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3570         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3571         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3572
3573         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3574         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3575
3576         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3577         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3578 }
3579
3580 #[test]
3581 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3582         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3583         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3584         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3585         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3586         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3587         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3588
3589         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3590         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3591         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3592         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3593         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3594         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3595         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3596
3597         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3598         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3599
3600         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3601
3602         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3603         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3604
3605         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3606         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3607         // broadcasted.
3608         {
3609                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3610         }
3611
3612         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3613         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3614         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3615         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3616
3617         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3618         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3619 }
3620
3621 #[test]
3622 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3623         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3624         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3627         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3628         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3629         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3630
3631         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3632         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3633         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3634
3635         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3636         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3637         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3638         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3639
3640         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3641         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3642         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3643
3644         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3645         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3646         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3647         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3648
3649         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3650         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3651
3652         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3653         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3654
3655         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3656         {
3657                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3658                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3659                 match events[0] {
3660                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3661                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3662                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3663                         },
3664                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3665                 }
3666                 match events[1] {
3667                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3668                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3669                 }
3670                 match events[2] {
3671                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3672                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3673                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3674                         },
3675                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3676                 }
3677                 match events[3] {
3678                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3679                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3680                         },
3681                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3682                 }
3683         }
3684
3685         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3686         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3687 }
3688
3689 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3690         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3691         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3692         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3693         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3694         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3695
3696         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3697         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3698                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3699                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3700                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3701                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3702                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3703                 chan_id
3704         } else {
3705                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3706         };
3707
3708         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3709
3710         let payment_event = {
3711                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3712                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3713                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3714
3715                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3716                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3717                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3718         };
3719         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3720
3721         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3722                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3723         } else {
3724                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3725                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3726                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3727                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3728                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3729
3730                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3731                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3732                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3733                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3734
3735                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3736                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3737                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3738                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3739                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3740
3741                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3742                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3743                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3744                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3745                                         }
3746                                 }
3747                         }
3748                 }
3749         }
3750
3751         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3752         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3753         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3754                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3755                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3756                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3757                         //
3758                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3759                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3760                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3761                         //
3762                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3763                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3764                 }
3765                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3766                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3767                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3768         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3769                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3770                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3771         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3772                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3773                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3774         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3775                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3776                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3777         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3778                 // Everything was delivered...
3779                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3780         }
3781
3782         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3783         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3784                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3785                 match events_1[0] {
3786                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3787                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3788                 };
3789                 match events_1[1] {
3790                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3791                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3792                 };
3793         } else {
3794                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3795                 match events_1[0] {
3796                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3797                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798                 };
3799         }
3800
3801         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3802         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3803         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3804
3805         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3806
3807         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3808         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3809         match events_2[0] {
3810                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3811                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3812                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3813                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3814                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3815                         match &purpose {
3816                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3817                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3818                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3819                                 },
3820                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3821                         }
3822                 },
3823                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3824         }
3825
3826         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3828         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3829
3830         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3831         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3832         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3833                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3834                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3835                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3836                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3837                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3838                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3839                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3840                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3841                 },
3842                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3843         };
3844
3845         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3846                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3847
3848                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3849                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3850                 match events_4[0] {
3851                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3852                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3853                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3854                         },
3855                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3856                 }
3857
3858                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3859                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3860                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3861                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3862
3863                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3864                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3865                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3866                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3867
3868                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3869                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3870                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3871                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3872                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3873
3874                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3875                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3876                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3877                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3878                                         }
3879                                 }
3880                         }
3881                 }
3882         }
3883
3884         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3885         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3886         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3887                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3888                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3889                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3890                 } else {
3891                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3892                 }
3893         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3894                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3895                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3896         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3897                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3898                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3899         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3900                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3901                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3902         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3903                 // Everything was delivered...
3904                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3905         }
3906
3907         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3908                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3909         }
3910         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3911                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3912                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3913         }
3914         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3915
3916         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3917                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3918         }
3919
3920         // Channel should still work fine...
3921         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3922         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3923         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3924 }
3925
3926 #[test]
3927 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3928         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3929         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3930         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3931         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3932 }
3933
3934 #[test]
3935 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3936         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3937         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3938         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3939         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3940 }
3941
3942 #[test]
3943 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3944         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3945         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3946         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3947         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3948         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3949         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3950         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3951         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3952         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3953
3954         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3955
3956         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3957         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3958         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3959         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3960         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3961         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3962
3963         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3964         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3965         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3966 }
3967
3968 #[test]
3969 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3970         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3971         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3972         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3973         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3974         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3975         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3976         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3977
3978         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3979
3980         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3981         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3982         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3983                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3985
3986         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3987         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3988         match events_1[0] {
3989                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3991         }
3992
3993         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3994         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3996
3997         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3998         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3999         match events_2[0] {
4000                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4001                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4002                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4003                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4004                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4005                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4006                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4007
4008                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4009                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4010                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4011                         match events_3[0] {
4012                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4013                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4014                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4015                                 },
4016                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4017                         }
4018
4019                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4020                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4021                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4022                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4023                 },
4024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4025         }
4026
4027         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4028         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4029
4030         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4031                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4032         }, true).unwrap();
4033         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4034         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4035         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4036                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4037         }, false).unwrap();
4038         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4039         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4040
4041         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4042         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4043         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4044         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4045
4046         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4047         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4048
4049         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4050         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4051
4052         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4053
4054         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4055         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4056         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4057         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4058         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4059         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4060         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4061         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4062         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4064
4065         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4066         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4067         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4068         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4069         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4070         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4071         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4073
4074         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4075         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4076         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4077         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4078         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4079         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4080         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4082
4083         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4084         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4085         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4087
4088         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4089         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4090         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4092
4093         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4094         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4096
4097         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4098
4099         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4100         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4101         match events_5[0] {
4102                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4103                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4104                         match &purpose {
4105                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4106                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4107                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4108                                 },
4109                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4110                         }
4111                 },
4112                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4113         }
4114
4115         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4116         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4118
4119         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4120         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4121 }
4122
4123 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4124         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4125         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4126         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4127         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4129         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4130
4131         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4132
4133         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4134                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4135                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4136                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4137                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4138                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4139                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4140                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4141                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4142                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4143                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4144                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4145                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4146                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4147                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4148                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4149                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4150                 our_payment_hash
4151         } else {
4152                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4153         };
4154
4155         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4156         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4157         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4158         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4159         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4160                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4161                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4162                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4163         }
4164
4165         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4166
4167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4168         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4169         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4170         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4171         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4172         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4173
4174         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4175         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4176         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4177         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4178         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4179         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4180 }
4181
4182 #[test]
4183 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4184         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4185         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4186 }
4187
4188 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4189         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4190         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4191         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4192         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4193         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4194         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4195         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4196
4197         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4198         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4199         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4200         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4201
4202         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4203         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4204         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4205                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4206         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4208
4209         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4210         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4211         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4212         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4213                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4214         if forwarded_htlc {
4215                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4216                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4217                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4218                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4219                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4220         }
4221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4222
4223         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4224         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4225         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4226         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4227
4228         if forwarded_htlc {
4229                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4230                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4231                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4232                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4233                 match fail_commit[0] {
4234                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4235                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4236                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4237                         },
4238                         _ => unreachable!(),
4239                 }
4240                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4241         } else {
4242                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4243         }
4244 }
4245
4246 #[test]
4247 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4248         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4249         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4250 }
4251
4252 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4253         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4254                 {
4255                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4256                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4257                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4258                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4259                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4260                                 match event {
4261                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4262                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4263                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4264                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4265                                                 }
4266                                         },
4267                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4268                                 };
4269                         }
4270                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4271                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4272                                         txn.push(tx);
4273                                 }
4274                         }
4275                         txn
4276                 }
4277         }
4278 }
4279
4280 #[test]
4281 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4282         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4283         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4286         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4287
4288         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4289         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4290         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4292         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4293         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4294         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4295         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4296         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4297
4298         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4299         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4300
4301         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4302         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4303         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4304         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4305         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4306 }
4307
4308 #[test]
4309 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4310         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4311         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4312         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4313         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4314         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4315         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4316
4317         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4318         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4319         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4321         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4322
4323         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4324         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4325         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4326         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4327
4328         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4329         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4331         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4332         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4333
4334         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4335         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4336         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4337 }
4338
4339 #[test]
4340 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4341         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4342         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4343
4344         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4345         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4346         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4347         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4348
4349         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4350         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4351         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4352         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4353         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4354
4355         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4356         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4357         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4359         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4360
4361         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4362         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4363         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4364
4365         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4366         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4367         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4368         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4369         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4370 }
4371
4372 #[test]
4373 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4377         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4378
4379         // Create some initial channels
4380         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4381
4382         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4383
4384         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4385         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4386         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4387
4388         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4389         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4390         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4392         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4394         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4395         match events[0] {
4396                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4397                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4398         }
4399         match events[1] {
4400                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4401                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4402         }
4403
4404         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4405         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4406         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4407         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4408         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4409
4410         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4411         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4412         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4413
4414         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4415         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4416         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4417 }
4418
4419 #[test]
4420 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4421         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4422         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4423         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4424         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4425
4426         // Create some initial channels
4427         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4428
4429         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4430         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4431
4432         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4433
4434         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4435         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4436         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4437
4438         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4439         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4441         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4442         match events[0] {
4443                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4444                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4445         }
4446         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4447
4448         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4449         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4450         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4451         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4452         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4453
4454         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4455         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4456         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4457         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4458
4459         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4460         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4461         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4462         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4463         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4464 }
4465
4466 #[test]
4467 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4471         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4472
4473         // Create some initial channels
4474         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4475
4476         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4477         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4479         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4480
4481         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4482
4483         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4484         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4486         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4487
4488         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4489         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4490         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4491         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4492
4493         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4494         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4495
4496         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4497         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4498         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4499 }
4500
4501 #[test]
4502 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4503         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4504         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4505         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4506         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4507         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4508
4509         // Create some initial channels
4510         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4511
4512         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4513         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4515         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4516
4517         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4518
4519         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4520         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4521         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4523         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4524         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4525
4526         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4527         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4528         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4529         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4530         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4531         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4532
4533         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4534         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4535         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4537         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4538
4539         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4540         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4541         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4542         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4543         // transactions next...
4544         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4545         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4546
4547         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4548         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4549         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4550                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4551         } else {
4552                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4553                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4554         }
4555
4556         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4557         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4558
4559         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4560         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4561         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4562         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4563         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4564 }
4565
4566 #[test]
4567 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4568         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4569         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4572         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4573
4574         // Create some initial channels
4575         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4576
4577         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4578         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4579         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4580         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4581
4582         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4583         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4584
4585         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4586
4587         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4588         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4589         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4591         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4592         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4593
4594         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4595         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4596         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4597         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4598
4599         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4600         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4601         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4602
4603         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4604         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4605         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4607         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4608
4609         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4610         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4611
4612         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4613         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4614         // transactions next...
4615         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4616         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4617         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4618                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4619         } else {
4620                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4621                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4622         }
4623
4624         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4625         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4626
4627         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4628         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4629
4630         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4631         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4632
4633         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4634         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4635         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4636         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4637         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4638         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4639         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4640         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4641 }
4642
4643 #[test]
4644 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4645         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4646         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4647         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4648         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4649         // channel.
4650         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4651         // gets broadcast.
4652
4653         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4654         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4655         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4656         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4657
4658         // Create some initial channels
4659         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4660         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4661
4662         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4663         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4664         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4665         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4666         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4667
4668         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4669         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4670         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4671
4672         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4673         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4674         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4675         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4676         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4678         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4679         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4680         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4681         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4682         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4683
4684         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4685         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4687         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4688
4689         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4690         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4691         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4692         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4693         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4694         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4695
4696         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4697         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4699         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4700         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4701         match events[0] {
4702                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4703                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4704         }
4705         match events[1] {
4706                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4707                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4708                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4709                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4710                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4711                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4712                 },
4713                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4714         }
4715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4716         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4717         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4718         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4719         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4720
4721         match nodes_2_event {
4722                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4723                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4724         }
4725
4726         match nodes_0_event {
4727                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4728                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4729                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4730                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4731                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4732                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4733                 },
4734                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4735         };
4736
4737         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4738         match msg_events[0] {
4739                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4740                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4741         }
4742
4743         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4744         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4745         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4746         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4747         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4748         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4749         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4750         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4751         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4752         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4753         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4754
4755         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757 }
4758
4759 #[test]
4760 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4761         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4762         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4763         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4764         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4765         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4766         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4767         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4768         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4769         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4770         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4771         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4772                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4773         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4774
4775         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4776         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4777         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4778
4779         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4780         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4781         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4782         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4783         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4784
4785         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4786
4787         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4788         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4789         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4790         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4791         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4792                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4793         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4794         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4795
4796         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4797         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4798         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4799
4800         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4801         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4803         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4804         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4805
4806         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4807         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4808                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4809                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4810                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4811
4812                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4813                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4814                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4815
4816                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4817                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4818                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4819                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4820                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4821
4822                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4823                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4824                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4825                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4826                 } else {
4827                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4828                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4829                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4830                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4831                 }
4832
4833                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4834                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4835                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4836                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4837                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4838                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4839                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4840                 } else {
4841                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4842                 }
4843         }
4844
4845         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4846         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4847
4848         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4850         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4851         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4852         match events[0] {
4853                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4854                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4855         }
4856         match events[1] {
4857                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4858                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4859         }
4860         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4861         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4862         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4863         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4864         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4865         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4866         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4867         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4868         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4869         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4870
4871         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4872         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4873         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4874         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4875         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4876         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4877         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4878         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4879         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4881
4882         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4883         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4884         {
4885                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4886         }
4887         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4888
4889         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4890         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4891         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4892         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4893         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4894         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4895         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4896         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4897         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4899
4900         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4901         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4902         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true);
4903 }
4904
4905 #[test]
4906 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4907         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4908         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4909         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4910         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4911
4912         // Create some initial channels
4913         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4914
4915         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4916         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4917         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4918         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4919         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4920
4921         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4922         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4923         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4925
4926         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4928         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4929         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4930         match events[0] {
4931                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4933         }
4934         match events[1] {
4935                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4936                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4937         }
4938         let node_tx = {
4939                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4940                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4941                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4942                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4943                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4944                 node_txn[0].clone()
4945         };
4946
4947         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4948         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4949
4950         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4951         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4952         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4953         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4954         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4955         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4956 }
4957
4958 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4959         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4960         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4961         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4962         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4963         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4964         // use the same payment hashes.
4965         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4966         //
4967         // A \         / E
4968         //    - C - D -
4969         // B /         \ F
4970         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4973         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4974         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4975         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4976         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4978                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4979         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4980
4981         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4982         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4983         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4984         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4985         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4986
4987         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4988         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4989         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4990         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4991
4992         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4993                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4994         // 0th HTLC:
4995         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4996         // 1st HTLC:
4997         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4998         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4999         // 2nd HTLC:
5000         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5001         // 3rd HTLC:
5002         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5003         // 4th HTLC:
5004         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5005         // 5th HTLC:
5006         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5007         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5008         // 6th HTLC:
5009         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5010         // 7th HTLC:
5011         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5012
5013         // 8th HTLC:
5014         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5015         // 9th HTLC:
5016         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5017         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5018
5019         // 10th HTLC:
5020         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5021         // 11th HTLC:
5022         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5023         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5024
5025         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5026         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5027         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5028         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5029         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5030
5031         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5032         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5033         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5034         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5035         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5036         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5038
5039         let failed_destinations = vec![
5040                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5041                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5042                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5043                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5044         ];
5045         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5047
5048         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5049         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5050         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5051         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5052         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5053         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5054
5055         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5056         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5057         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5059
5060         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5061                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5062                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5063         ];
5064         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5066
5067         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5068         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5069         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5070         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5071
5072         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5073
5074         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5075         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5076                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5077                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5078                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5079                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5080                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5081                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5082         ];
5083         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5085         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5086         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5087         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5088         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5089         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5090         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5091         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5092         if deliver_last_raa {
5093                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5094         } else {
5095                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5096         }
5097
5098         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5099         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5100         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5101         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5102         //
5103         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5104         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5105         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5106         //
5107         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5108         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5109         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5110
5111         if announce_latest {
5112                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5113         } else {
5114                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5115         }
5116         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5117         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5118                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5119                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5120         } else {
5121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5122                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5123         };
5124         match close_event {
5125                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5126                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5127         }
5128
5129         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5130         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5131         if deliver_last_raa {
5132                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5133
5134                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5135                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5136         } else {
5137                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5138                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5139                 } else {
5140                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5141                 };
5142
5143                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5144         }
5145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5146
5147         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5148         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5149         let mut a_done = false;
5150         for msg in cs_msgs {
5151                 match msg {
5152                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5153                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5154                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5155                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5156                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5157                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5158                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5159                                         }
5160                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5161                                         assert!(!a_done);
5162                                         a_done = true;
5163                                         &nodes[0]
5164                                 } else {
5165                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5166                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5167                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5168                                         }
5169                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5170                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5171                                         &nodes[1]
5172                                 };
5173                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5174                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5175                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5176                                 if announce_latest {
5177                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5178                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5179                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5180                                         }
5181                                 }
5182                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5183                         },
5184                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5185                 }
5186         }
5187
5188         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5189         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5190         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5191         let mut as_updates = 0;
5192         for event in as_events.iter() {
5193                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5194                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5195                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5196                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5197                         } else {
5198                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5199                         }
5200                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5201                                 as_updates += 1;
5202                         }
5203                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5204                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5205         }
5206         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5207         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5208         if announce_latest {
5209                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5210                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5211         }
5212         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5213
5214         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5215         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5216         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5217         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5218         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5219                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5220                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5221                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5222                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5223                         } else {
5224                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5225                         }
5226                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5227                                 bs_updates += 1;
5228                         }
5229                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5230                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5231         }
5232         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5233         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5234         if announce_latest {
5235                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5236         }
5237         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5238
5239         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5240         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5241         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5242         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5243         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5244         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5245 }
5246
5247 #[test]
5248 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5249         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5250 }
5251
5252 #[test]
5253 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5254         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5255 }
5256
5257 #[test]
5258 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5259         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5260         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5261         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5262 }
5263
5264 #[test]
5265 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5266         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5267         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5269         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5270
5271         // Create some initial channels
5272         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5273
5274         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5275         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5276         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5277         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5278
5279         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5280         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5281         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5283         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5284         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5285
5286         let htlc_timeout = {
5287                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5288                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5289                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5290                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5291                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5292                 node_txn[0].clone()
5293         };
5294
5295         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5296         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5297         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5298
5299         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5300         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5301         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5302         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5303         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5304         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5305         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5306         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5307         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5308         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5309                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5310 }
5311
5312 #[test]
5313 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5314         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5315         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5316         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5317         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5318
5319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5320
5321         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5322         let seed = [42; 32];
5323         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5324         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5325         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5326         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5327         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5328         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5329         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5330         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5331         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5332
5333         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5334         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5335
5336         // Create some initial channels
5337         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5338         // for node 0
5339         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5340         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5341         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5342
5343         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5344         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5345         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5346         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5347         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5348
5349         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5350         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5351         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5352         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5353         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5354
5355         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5356         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5357         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5358         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5359             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5360             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5361             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5362                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5363         }
5364
5365         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5366         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5367         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5368         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5370         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5371
5372         let htlc_timeout = {
5373                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5374                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5375                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5376                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5377                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5378                 node_txn[0].clone()
5379         };
5380
5381         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5382         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5383         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5384
5385         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5386         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5387         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5388         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5389         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5390         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5391         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5392         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5393         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5394         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5395         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5396                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5397 }
5398
5399 #[test]
5400 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5401         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5402         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5403         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5404         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5405
5406         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5407
5408         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5409         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5410
5411         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5412         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5413         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5414
5415         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5416         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5417         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5418
5419         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5420         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5421         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5422
5423         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5424         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5425         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5426 }
5427
5428 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5429         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5430         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5431         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5432         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5433         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5434
5435         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5436
5437         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5438         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5439         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5441         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5442
5443         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5444         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5445         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5446
5447         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5449         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5450         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5452
5453         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5454         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5455         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5456                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5457                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5458         }
5459         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5460         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5462         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5463 }
5464
5465 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5469         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5470         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5471
5472         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5473         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5474                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5476
5477         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5478
5479         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5480         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5481         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5482
5483         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5484         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5485
5486         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5487                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5488                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5489         }
5490         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5491         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5493         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5494 }
5495
5496 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5497         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5500         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5501         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5502
5503         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5504         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5505         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5506         // actually revoked.
5507         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5508         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5509         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5510         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5512
5513         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5514         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5515         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5517         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5518         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5520         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5522         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5523
5524         if check_revoke_no_close {
5525                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5526                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5527         }
5528
5529         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5530         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5531         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5532                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5533                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5534         }
5535         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5536                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5537                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5539                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5540         } else {
5541                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5542         }
5543 }
5544
5545 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5546 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5547 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5548 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5549 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5550 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5551 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5552 // non-dust HTLCs.
5553 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5554 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5555 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5556 #[test]
5557 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5558         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5559         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5560
5561         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5562         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5563 }
5564
5565 #[test]
5566 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5567         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5568         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5569         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5570         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5571 }
5572
5573 #[test]
5574 #[should_panic]
5575 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5576         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5579         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5580         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5581         for node in nodes.iter() {
5582                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5583         }
5584
5585         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5586         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5587         let push_msat=10001;
5588         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5589         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5590         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5591         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5592
5593         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5594         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5595         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5596 }
5597
5598 #[test]
5599 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5601         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5602         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5603         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5604
5605         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5606         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5607         let push_msat=10001;
5608         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5609
5610         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5611         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5612         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5613         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5614         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5615
5616         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5617         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5618         let push_msat=10001;
5619         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5620         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5621         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5622
5623         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5624         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5625         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5626
5627         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5628         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5629         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5630
5631         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5632         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5633         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5634
5635         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5636         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5637         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5638         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5639         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5640         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5641 }
5642
5643 #[test]
5644 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5648         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5649
5650         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5651         let push_msat=10001;
5652         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5653         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5654         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5655         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5656
5657         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5658         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5659         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5660                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5661                         msg.clone()
5662                 },
5663                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5664         };
5665         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5666 }
5667
5668 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5669 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5670 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5671 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5672 #[test]
5673 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5677         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5678         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5679
5680         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5681         // pending_update_fee.
5682         {
5683                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5684                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5685         }
5686         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5688
5689         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5690         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5691         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5692                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5693                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5694                 },
5695                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5696         };
5697
5698         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5699
5700         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5701         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5702         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5703         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5704
5705         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5706         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5707         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5708
5709         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5710         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5711                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5712         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5713         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5714
5715         // Flush the pending fee update.
5716         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5717         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5719         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5721
5722         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5723         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5724         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5725         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5726         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5727         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5728
5729         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5730         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5731         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5732         match &events[0] {
5733                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5734                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5735                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5736                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5737                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5738                 },
5739                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5740         }
5741         match &events[1] {
5742                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5743                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5744                 },
5745                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5746         }
5747 }
5748
5749 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5750 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5751 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5752 #[test]
5753 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5754         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5755         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5756         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5757         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5758         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5759
5760         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5761         // pending_update_fee.
5762         {
5763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5764                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5765         }
5766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5768
5769         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5770         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5772                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5774                 },
5775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5776         };
5777
5778         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5779
5780         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5781         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5782         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5783         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5784
5785         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5786         let amt_1 = 20000;
5787         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5788         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5789         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5790
5791         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5792         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5793                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5794         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5795         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5796         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5797         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5798                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5799         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5800         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5801
5802         // Flush the pending fee update.
5803         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5804         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5806         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5807         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5809
5810         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5811         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5812         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5813         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5814         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5815         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5816
5817         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5818         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5819         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5820         match &events[0] {
5821                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5822                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5823                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5824                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5825                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5826                 },
5827                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5828         }
5829         match &events[1] {
5830                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5831                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5832                 },
5833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5834         }
5835
5836         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5837         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5838                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5839                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5840                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5841         };
5842         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5843                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5844                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5845         };
5846         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5848         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5849         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5850         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5851         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5852         match events[0] {
5853                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5854                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5855         }
5856         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5857         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5858         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5859         match events[0] {
5860                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5861                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5862         }
5863         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5865         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5866
5867         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5868         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5869         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5870         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5871 }
5872
5873 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5874 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5875 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5876 // once it's freed.
5877 #[test]
5878 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5879         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5880         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5881         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
5882         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5883         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
5884         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
5885         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5886         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5887         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5888         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5889
5890         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5891         // pending_update_fee.
5892         {
5893                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5894                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5895         }
5896         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5898
5899         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5900         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5901         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5902                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5903                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5904                 },
5905                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5906         };
5907
5908         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5909
5910         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5911         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5912         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5913         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5914
5915         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5916         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5917         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5918         let payment_event = {
5919                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5920                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5921                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5922
5923                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5924                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5925
5926                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5927         };
5928         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5930         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5931         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5932
5933         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5934         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5935
5936         // Flush the pending fee update.
5937         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5938         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5940         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5941         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5943
5944         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5945         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5946         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5947
5948         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5949                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5950                         msg.clone()
5951                 },
5952                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5953         };
5954
5955         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5957         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5958
5959         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5960         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5961         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5962         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5963                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5965         }
5966
5967         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5968         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5970
5971         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5972         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5973         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5974         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5975                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5976                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5977                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5978                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5979                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5980                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5981                 },
5982                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5983         };
5984
5985         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5986         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5987         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5988
5989         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5990         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5992         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5993         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5995         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5996         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5997         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5998                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5999                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6000         };
6001         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6002         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6004 }
6005
6006 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6007 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6008 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6009
6010 #[test]
6011 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6012         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6013         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6016         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6017         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6018
6019         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6020         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6021
6022         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6023                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6024                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6025         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6026 }
6027
6028 #[test]
6029 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6030         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6031         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6032         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6033         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6034         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6035         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6036
6037         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6038         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6039         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6040                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6041                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6042                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6043
6044         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6045         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6046 }
6047
6048 #[test]
6049 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6050         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6054         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6055         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6056
6057         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6058         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6059                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6061         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6062         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6063
6064         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6065         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6066         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6068         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6069 }
6070
6071 #[test]
6072 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6073         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6074         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6075         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6076         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6077         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6078         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6079         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6080
6081         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6082                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6083         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6084         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6085         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6086                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6087                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6088                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6089 }
6090
6091 #[test]
6092 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6093         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6094         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6095         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6096         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6097         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6098         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6099         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6100         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6101         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6102                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6103
6104         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6105         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6106         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6107                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6108                 let payment_event = {
6109                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6110                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6111                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6112
6113                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6114                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6115                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6116                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6117                         } else {
6118                                 assert!(false);
6119                         }
6120                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6121                 };
6122                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6123                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6124                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6125
6126                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6127                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6128         }
6129         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6130                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6131                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6132
6133         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6134 }
6135
6136 #[test]
6137 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6138         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6139         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6140         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6141         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6142         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6143         let channel_value = 100000;
6144         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6145         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6146
6147         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6148
6149         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6150         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6151         // limits us to.
6152         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6153         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6154                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6155                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6156         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6157
6158         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6159 }
6160
6161 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6162 #[test]
6163 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6164         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6168         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6169         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6170         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6171         {
6172                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6173                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6174                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6175                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6176         }
6177
6178         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6179         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6180                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6182         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6183         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6184         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6185         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6186         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6187         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6189         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6190 }
6191
6192 #[test]
6193 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6194         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6195         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6198         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6199         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6200
6201         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6202         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6203         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6204         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6205         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6206         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6207
6208         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6209         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6210         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6211                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6213         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6214
6215         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6216         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6217         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6218         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6219         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6220
6221         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6222         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6223         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6224         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6225         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6226 }
6227
6228 #[test]
6229 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6230         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6231         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6232         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6233         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6234         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6235         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6236         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6237
6238         let send_amt = 3999999;
6239         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6240                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6241         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6242         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6243         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6244         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6245         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6246                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6247         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6248
6249         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6250                 channel_id: chan.2,
6251                 htlc_id: 0,
6252                 amount_msat: 1000,
6253                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6254                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6255                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6256         };
6257
6258         for i in 0..50 {
6259                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6260                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6261         }
6262         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6263         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6264
6265         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6266         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6267         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6269         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6270 }
6271
6272 #[test]
6273 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6274         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6275         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6276         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6277         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6278         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6279         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6280
6281         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6282         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6283                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6285         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6286         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6287         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6288
6289         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6290         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6291         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6293         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6294 }
6295
6296 #[test]
6297 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6298         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6299         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6302         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6303
6304         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6305         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6306         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6307                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6309         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6310         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6311         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6312
6313         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6314         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6315         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6318 }
6319
6320 #[test]
6321 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6322         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6323         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6324         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329
6330         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6331         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6332         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6333                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6334         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6335         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6336         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6337
6338         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6339         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6340         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6341         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6342                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6343         }, true).unwrap();
6344         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6345         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6346         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6347                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6348         }, false).unwrap();
6349         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6350         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6351         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6352         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6353         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6354         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6355
6356         //Resend HTLC
6357         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6358         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6359         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6361         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6362
6363         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6364
6365         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6366         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6367         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6369         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6370 }
6371
6372 #[test]
6373 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6374         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6375
6376         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6377         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6379         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6380         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6381         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6382         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6383                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6384
6385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6386         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6387         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6388
6389         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6390                 channel_id: chan.2,
6391                 htlc_id: 0,
6392                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6393         };
6394
6395         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6396
6397         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6398         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6399         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6401         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6402 }
6403
6404 #[test]
6405 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6406         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6407
6408         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6409         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6410         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6411         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6412         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6413
6414         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6415         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6416                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6418         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6420
6421         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6422                 channel_id: chan.2,
6423                 htlc_id: 0,
6424                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6425         };
6426
6427         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6428
6429         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6430         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6431         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6433         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6434 }
6435
6436 #[test]
6437 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6438         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6439
6440         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6441         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6442         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6443         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6444         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6445
6446         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6447         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6448                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6450         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6452         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6453                 channel_id: chan.2,
6454                 htlc_id: 0,
6455                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6456                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6457         };
6458
6459         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6460
6461         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6462         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6463         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6465         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6466 }
6467
6468 #[test]
6469 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6470         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6471
6472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6475         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6476         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6477
6478         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6479
6480         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6482         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6483
6484         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6485         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6486         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6487                 match events[0] {
6488                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6489                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6490                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6491                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6492                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6493                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6494                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6495                         },
6496                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6497                 }
6498         };
6499
6500         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6501
6502         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6503
6504         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6505         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6506         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6508         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6509 }
6510
6511 #[test]
6512 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6513         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6514
6515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6518         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6519         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6520
6521         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6522
6523         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6525         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6526
6527         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6528         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6529         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6530                 match events[0] {
6531                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6532                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6533                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6534                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6535                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6536                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6537                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6538                         },
6539                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6540                 }
6541         };
6542
6543         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6544
6545         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6546
6547         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6548         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6549         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6550         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6551         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6552 }
6553
6554 #[test]
6555 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6556         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6557
6558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6561         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6563
6564         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6565         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6566                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6568
6569         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6570         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6571
6572         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6574         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6575
6576         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6577
6578         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6579                 match events[0] {
6580                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6581                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6582                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6583                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6584                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6585                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6586                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6587                         },
6588                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6589                 }
6590         };
6591         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6592         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6593
6594         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6595         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6596         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6598         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6599 }
6600
6601 #[test]
6602 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6603         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6604         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6605
6606         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6607         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6608         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6609         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6610         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6611         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6612
6613         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6614
6615         //First hop
6616         let mut payment_event = {
6617                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6618                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6620                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6621                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6622                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6623         };
6624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6626         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6627         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6628         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6629         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6631         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6632         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6633
6634         //Second Hop
6635         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6636         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6638         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6639
6640         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6641         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6642         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6643                 match events_3[0] {
6644                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6645                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6646                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6647                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6648                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6649                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6650                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6651                         },
6652                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6653                 }
6654         };
6655
6656         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6657
6658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6659         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6660         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6661         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6662         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6663
6664         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6665         match events_4[0] {
6666                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6667                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6668                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6669                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6670                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6671                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6672                 },
6673                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6674         };
6675
6676         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6677 }
6678
6679 #[test]
6680 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6684         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6685         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6686         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6687
6688         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6689
6690         // First hop
6691         let mut payment_event = {
6692                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6693                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6694                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6695                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6696         };
6697
6698         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6699         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6700         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6702         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6703         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6704
6705         // Second Hop
6706         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6707         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6709         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6710
6711         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6712         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6713         match events_3[0] {
6714                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6715                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6716                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6717                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6718
6719                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6720                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6721                 },
6722                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6723         }
6724
6725         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6726                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6727                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6728         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6729         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6731
6732         match events_4[0] {
6733                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6734                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6735                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6736                 },
6737                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6738         }
6739
6740         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6741         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6742
6743         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6744         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6745         match events_5[0] {
6746                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6747                 } => {
6748                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6749                         assert!(is_permanent);
6750                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6751                 },
6752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6753         }
6754         match events_5[1] {
6755                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6756                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6757                 },
6758                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6759         }
6760
6761         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6762 }
6763
6764 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6765         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6766         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6767         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6768
6769         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6770         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6774         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6775
6776         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6777                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6778
6779         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6780         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6781         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6782         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6783
6784         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6785         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6786
6787         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6788         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6790         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6792
6793         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6794         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6795         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797
6798         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6799         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6800
6801         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6802         match events[0] {
6803                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6804                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6805                 },
6806                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6807         }
6808         match events[1] {
6809                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6810                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6811                 },
6812                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6813         }
6814
6815         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6816         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6817         if announce_latest {
6818                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6819         } else {
6820                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6821         }
6822
6823         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6825         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6826
6827         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6828         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6829         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6830         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6831         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6832         let mut first_failed = false;
6833         for event in events {
6834                 match event {
6835                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6836                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6837                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6838                                         first_failed = true;
6839                                 } else {
6840                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6841                                 }
6842                         },
6843                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6844                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6845                 }
6846         }
6847 }
6848
6849 #[test]
6850 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6851         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6852         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6853 }
6854
6855 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6856         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6857         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6858         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6859         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6860         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6861         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6862
6863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6864         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6865         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6866         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6867         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6868
6869         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6870                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6871
6872         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6873         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6874
6875         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6876         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6877
6878         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6879         if revoked {
6880                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6881                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6882         }
6883
6884         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6885         if local {
6886                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6887                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6888                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6889                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6890                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6891
6892                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6893                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6894                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6895                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6896                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6897                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6898                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6899                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6900                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6901                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6902                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6903         } else {
6904                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6905                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6906                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6907                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6908                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6909                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6910
6911                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6912                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6913                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6914                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6915                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6916                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6917                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6918
6919                 if !revoked {
6920                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6921                 } else {
6922                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
6923                 }
6924                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6925                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6926                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6927                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6928                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6929         }
6930 }
6931
6932 #[test]
6933 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6934         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6935         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6936         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6937 }
6938
6939 #[test]
6940 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6941         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6942
6943         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6944         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6945         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6946         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6947         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6948         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6949         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6950         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6951         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6952
6953         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6954         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6955                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6956                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6957         {
6958                 match error {
6959                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6960                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961                 }
6962         } else { assert!(false) }
6963
6964         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6965         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6966         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6967         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6968         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6969                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6970                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6971         {
6972                 match error {
6973                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6974                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6975                 }
6976         } else { assert!(false); }
6977
6978         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6979         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6980         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6981         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6982         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6983         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6984         let reason_msg;
6985         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6986                 match action {
6987                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6988                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6989                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6990                         },
6991                         _ => { panic!(); }
6992                 }
6993         } else { panic!(); }
6994         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6995
6996         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6997         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6998         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6999         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7000         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7001                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7002                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7003         {
7004                 match error {
7005                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7006                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7007                 }
7008         } else { assert!(false); }
7009 }
7010
7011 #[test]
7012 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7013         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7014         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7015         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7016
7017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7020         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7021
7022         // Create some initial channels
7023         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7024
7025         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7026         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7027         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7028         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7029         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7030         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7031         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7032                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7034
7035         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7036         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7037         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7038         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7039         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7040
7041         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7042         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7043         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7044         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7045
7046         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7047         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7048         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7049
7050         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7051         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7052         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7053                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7054                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7055                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7056                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7057                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7058                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7059                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7060                 },
7061                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7062         };
7063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7064
7065         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7066         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7067
7068         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7069         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7070         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7071         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7072 }
7073
7074 #[test]
7075 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7076         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7077         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7078
7079         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7080         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7081         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7082         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7083
7084         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7085         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7086         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7087
7088         // Disconnect peers
7089         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7090         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7091
7092         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7093                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7094         }
7095         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7096         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7097         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7098         for e in msg_events {
7099                 match e {
7100                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7101                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7102                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7103                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7104                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7105                                 }
7106                         },
7107                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7108                 }
7109         }
7110         // Reconnect peers
7111         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7112                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7113         }, true).unwrap();
7114         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7115         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7116         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7117                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7118         }, false).unwrap();
7119         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7120         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7121
7122         // Reestablish chan_1
7123         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7124         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7125         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7126         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7127         // Reestablish chan_2
7128         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7129         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7130         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7131         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7132         // Reestablish chan_3
7133         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7134         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7135         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7136         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7137
7138         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7139                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7140         }
7141         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7142         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7143         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7144         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7145         for e in msg_events {
7146                 match e {
7147                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7148                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7149                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7150                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7151                                         // the old one.
7152                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7153                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7154                                 }
7155                         },
7156                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7157                 }
7158         }
7159         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7160         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7161 }
7162
7163 #[test]
7164 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7165         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7166         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7167
7168         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7169         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7170         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7171         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7172
7173         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7174
7175         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7176         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7177                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7178         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7179         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7180
7181         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7182         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7183         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7184         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7185         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7186         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7187
7188         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7189         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7190                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7191                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7192                 }
7193         }
7194
7195         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7196         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7197
7198         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7199         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7200         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7202
7203         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7204         let penalty_1;
7205         let feerate_1;
7206         {
7207                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7208                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7209                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7210                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7211                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7212                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7213                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7214                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7215                 node_txn.clear();
7216         };
7217
7218         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7219         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7220         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7221         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7222         {
7223                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7224                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7225                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7226                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7227                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7228                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7229                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7230                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7231                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7232                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7233                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7234                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7235                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7236                         node_txn.clear();
7237                 }
7238         }
7239         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7240
7241         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7242         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7243         let penalty_3;
7244         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7245         {
7246                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7247                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7248                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7249                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7250                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7251                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7252                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7253                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7254                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7255                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7256                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7257                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7258                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7259                         node_txn.clear();
7260                 }
7261         }
7262         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7263
7264         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7265         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7266 }
7267
7268 #[test]
7269 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7270         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7271         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7272
7273         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7274         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7277         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7278
7279         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7280         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7281         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7282         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7283         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7284         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7285                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7286         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7287         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7288         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7289                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7290         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7291
7292         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7293         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7294         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7295
7296         // Revoke local commitment tx
7297         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7298
7299         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7300         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7301         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7303         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7304         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7305
7306         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7307                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7308                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7309
7310                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7311                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7312                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7313
7314                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7315                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7316                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7317                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7318
7319                 txn
7320         };
7321
7322         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7323         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7324         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7325         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7326         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7327         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7328         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7329         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7330         match events.last().unwrap() {
7331                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7332                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7333         }
7334         let first;
7335         let feerate_1;
7336         let penalty_txn;
7337         {
7338                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7339                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7340                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7341
7342                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7343                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7344                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7345                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7346                 // future).
7347                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7348                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7349                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7350                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7351                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7352                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7353
7354                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7355                 // available, which we check here:
7356                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7357                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7358                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7359
7360                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7361                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7362
7363                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7364                 // output, checked above).
7365                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7366                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7367                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7368
7369                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7370                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7371                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7372                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7373                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7374                 node_txn.clear();
7375         }
7376
7377         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7378         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7379         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7380         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7381         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7382
7383         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7384         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7385         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7386         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7387         let node_txn = {
7388                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7389                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7390
7391                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7392                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7393                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7394                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7395                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7396                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7397                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7398                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7399                 node_txn.clear();
7400                 txn
7401         };
7402         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7403         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7404         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7405         {
7406                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7407                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7408                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7409                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7410                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7411                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7412                 // up bumped justice generation.
7413                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7414                 node_txn.clear();
7415         }
7416         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7418 }
7419
7420 #[test]
7421 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7422         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7423         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7424
7425         // Create 2 HTLCs
7426         // Provide preimage for one
7427         // Check aggregation
7428
7429         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7430         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7431         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7432         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7433
7434         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7435         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7436         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7437
7438         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7439         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7440         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7441         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7442         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7443
7444         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7445         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7446         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7447         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7449         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7450
7451         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7452         let timeout;
7453         let preimage;
7454         let preimage_bump;
7455         let feerate_timeout;
7456         let feerate_preimage;
7457         {
7458                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7459                 // 3 transactions including:
7460                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7461                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7462                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7463                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7464                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7465                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7466                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7467                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7468
7469                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7470                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7471                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7472                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7473
7474                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7475                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7476                 } else {
7477                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7478                 };
7479
7480                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7481                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7482                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7483
7484                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7485                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7486                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7487                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7488
7489                 node_txn.clear();
7490         };
7491         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7492         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7493
7494         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7495         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7496         {
7497                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7498                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7499                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7500                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7501                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7502                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7503
7504                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7505                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7506                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7507                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7508                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7509
7510                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7511                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7512                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7513                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7514                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7515
7516                 node_txn.clear();
7517         }
7518
7519         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7520         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7521 }
7522
7523 #[test]
7524 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7525         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7526         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7527         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7528         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7529         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7530         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7531         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7532         // implement that).
7533         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7534         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7535         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7536         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7537         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7538
7539         let per_commitment_secret;
7540         let next_per_commitment_point;
7541         {
7542                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7543                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7544                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7545
7546                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7547
7548                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7549                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7550                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7551
7552                 // Must revoke without gaps
7553                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7554                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7555
7556                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7557                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7558                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7559         }
7560
7561         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7562                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7563                         channel_id,
7564                         per_commitment_secret,
7565                         next_per_commitment_point,
7566                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7567                         next_local_nonce: None,
7568                 });
7569         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7571         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7572 }
7573
7574 #[test]
7575 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7576         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7577         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7578
7579         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7582         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7583
7584         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7585         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7586         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7587         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7588
7589         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7590         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7591         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7592
7593         // Revoke local commitment tx
7594         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7595
7596         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7597         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7598         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7599         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7600
7601         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7602         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7604         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7605         let penalty_txn = {
7606                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7607                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7608                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7609                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7610                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7611                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7612                 node_txn.clear();
7613                 penalty_txn
7614         };
7615         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7616         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7617         {
7618                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7619                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7620                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7621         }
7622 }
7623
7624 #[test]
7625 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7626         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7627         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7628         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7629         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7630         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7631         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7632
7633         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7634
7635         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7636         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7637         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7638         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7639         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7640
7641         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7642         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7644         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7645
7646         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7648         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7649         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7650         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7651         match close_ev[0] {
7652                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7653                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7654                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7655                 },
7656                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7657         }
7658 }
7659
7660 #[test]
7661 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7662         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7663         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7664         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7665         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7666
7667         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7668         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7669         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7670
7671         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7672
7673         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7674         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7675         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7676         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7677 }
7678
7679 #[test]
7680 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7681         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7682         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7686         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7687
7688         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7689         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7690         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7691
7692         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7693         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7694         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7695 }
7696
7697 #[test]
7698 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7699         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7700         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7701         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7702         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7703         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7704
7705         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7706         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7707         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7708         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7709         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7710         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7711         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7712         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7713         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7714         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7715         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7716         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7717
7718         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7719         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7720         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7721         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7722
7723         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7724         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7725         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7726         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7727         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7728
7729         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7730         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7731
7732         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7733         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7734         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7735         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7736         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7737         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7738
7739         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7740         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7741         // `channel_value`.
7742         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7743         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7744         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7745         // `channel_value`.
7746         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7747 }
7748
7749 #[test]
7750 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7751         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7752         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7756         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7757
7758         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7759         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7760
7761         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7762
7763         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7764         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7765         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7766
7767         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7768         match events[0] {
7769                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7770                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7771                 }
7772                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7773         }
7774
7775         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7776         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7777
7778         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7779                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7780                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7781                 }
7782                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7783         }
7784
7785         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7786
7787         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7788         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7789
7790         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7791         match events[0] {
7792                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7793                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7794                 }
7795                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7796         }
7797 }
7798
7799 #[test]
7800 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7801         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7802         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7803         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7804         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7805         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7806         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7807
7808         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7809         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7810
7811         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7812
7813         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7814         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7815         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7816
7817         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7818         match events[0] {
7819                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7820                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7821                 }
7822                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7823         }
7824
7825         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7826         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7827
7828         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7829                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7830                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7831                 }
7832                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7833         }
7834         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7835 }
7836
7837 #[test]
7838 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7839         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7840         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7841         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7842         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7843         // and the channel should be closed.
7844         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7845         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7846         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7847         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7848         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7849         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7850
7851         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7852         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7853         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7854
7855         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7856
7857         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7858         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7859
7860         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7861         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7862
7863         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7864         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7865         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7866         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7867         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7868         let accept_chan_msg = {
7869                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7870                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7871                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7872                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7873         };
7874         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7875
7876         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7877
7878         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7879         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7880
7881         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7882         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7883
7884         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7885         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7886
7887         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7888         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7889                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7890                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7891                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7892                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7893                 }
7894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7895         }
7896
7897         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7898 }
7899
7900 #[test]
7901 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7902         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7903         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7904         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7905         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7906         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7907         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7908
7909         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7910         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7911
7912         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7913
7914         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7915         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7916         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7917
7918         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7919         match events[0] {
7920                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7921                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7922                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7923                         match api_res {
7924                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7925                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7926                                 },
7927                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7928                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7929                         }
7930                 }
7931                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7932         }
7933
7934         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7935         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7936         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7937
7938         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7939                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7940                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7941                 }
7942                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7943         }
7944 }
7945
7946 #[test]
7947 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7948         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7949         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7950         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7951         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7952
7953         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7954         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7955         match api_res {
7956                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7957                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7958                 },
7959                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7960                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7961         }
7962 }
7963
7964 #[test]
7965 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7966         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7967         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7968         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7969         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7970         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7971         let node_count = 4;
7972         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7973         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7974         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7975         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7976
7977         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7978         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7979         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7980         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7981
7982         let total_msat = 100_000;
7983         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7984         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7985         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7986
7987         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7988         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7989         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7990         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7991         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7992         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
7993         route.paths.push(path_1);
7994
7995         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
7996         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7997         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7998         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7999         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8000         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8001         route.paths.push(path_2);
8002
8003         // Send payment
8004         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8005         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8006                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8007         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8008                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8010
8011         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8012         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8013
8014         // First path
8015         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8016         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8017         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8018
8019         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8020                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8021
8022                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8023                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8024                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8025                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8026                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8027                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8028                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8029                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8030                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8031                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8032                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8033                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8034                 }
8035
8036                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8037                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8038                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8039                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8040
8041                 if idx == 0 {
8042                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8043                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8044                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8045                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8046                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8047                 } else {
8048                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8049                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8050                 }
8051
8052                 prev_node = node;
8053         }
8054
8055         // Second path
8056         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8057         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8058
8059         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8060 }
8061
8062 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8063
8064         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8065         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8066
8067         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8068         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8069         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8070         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8071
8072         let src_idx = 0;
8073         let dst_idx = 1;
8074
8075         // Create channels for each amount
8076         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8077         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8078         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8079         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8080                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8081                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8082                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8083                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8084                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8085                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8086                 expected_paths.push(path);
8087         }
8088         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8089
8090         // Create a route for each amount
8091         let example_amount = 100000;
8092         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8093         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8094         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8095                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8096                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8097                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8098                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8099                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8100                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8101                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8102                 route.paths.push(path);
8103         }
8104
8105         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8106         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8107         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8108                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8109         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8110                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8112
8113         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8114         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8115         let mut amount_received = 0;
8116         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8117                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8118
8119                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8120                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8121                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8122                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8123         }
8124
8125         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8126 }
8127
8128 #[test]
8129 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8130         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8131         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8132 }
8133
8134 #[test]
8135 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8136         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8137         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8138         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8139         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8140         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8141
8142         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8143         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8144         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8145         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8146
8147         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8148         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8149         route.paths.push(path);
8150         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8151         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8152         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8153         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8154         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8155         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8156         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8157         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8158 }
8159
8160 #[test]
8161 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8162         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8166         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8167
8168         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8169
8170         {
8171                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8172                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8173                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8174                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8175                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8176                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8177                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8178                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8179                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8180         }
8181         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8182         // values from previous calls.
8183         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8184         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8185         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8186         match events[0] {
8187                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8188                         match &purpose {
8189                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8190                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8191                                 },
8192                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8193                         }
8194                 },
8195                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8196         }
8197 }
8198
8199 #[test]
8200 #[allow(deprecated)]
8201 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8202         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8203         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8204         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8205         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8206         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8207         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8208
8209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8210
8211         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8212
8213         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8214         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8215         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8216                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8217         } else { panic!(); }
8218         let mut block = {
8219                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8220                 create_dummy_block(node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(), node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, Vec::new())
8221         };
8222         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8223         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8224                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8225         } else { panic!(); }
8226
8227         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8228         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8229         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8230         block.header.time += 1;
8231         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8232         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8233         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8234
8235         {
8236                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8237                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8238                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8239                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8240                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8241                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8242                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8243                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8244         }
8245         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8246         // values from previous calls.
8247         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8248         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8249         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8250         match events[0] {
8251                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8252                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8253                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8254                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8255                 },
8256                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8257         }
8258 }
8259
8260 #[test]
8261 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8262         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8263         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8264         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8265         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8266         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8267
8268         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8269
8270         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8271         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8272         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8273         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8274
8275         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8276         // resulting events.
8277         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8278                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8279                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8280                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8281                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8282                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8283                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8284
8285                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8286                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8287                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8288                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8289                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8290
8291                         // We should fail the payment back
8292                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8293                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8294                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8295                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8296                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8297                                 },
8298                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8299                         }
8300                 }
8301         }
8302
8303         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8304         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8305         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8306
8307         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8308         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8309                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8310         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8311         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8312
8313         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8314         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8315                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8316         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8317         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8318
8319         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8320         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8321                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8322         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8323         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8324 }
8325
8326 #[test]
8327 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8328         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8329         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8330         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8331         // error.
8332         //
8333         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8334         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8335         // commitment at same time.
8336
8337         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8338         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8339         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8340         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8341
8342         // Create some initial channel
8343         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8344         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8345
8346         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8347         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8348
8349         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8350         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8351
8352         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8353         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8354         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8355         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8356         let watchtower = {
8357                 let new_monitor = {
8358                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8359                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8360                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8361                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8362                         new_monitor
8363                 };
8364                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8365                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8366                 watchtower
8367         };
8368         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8369         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8370         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8371         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8372         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8373
8374         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8375         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8377         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8378
8379         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8380         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8381         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8382         {
8383                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8384                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8385                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8386                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8387                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8388                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8389                 } else { assert!(false); }
8390         }
8391         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8393         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8394         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8395 }
8396
8397 #[test]
8398 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8399         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8400         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8401         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8402         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8403
8404         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8406         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8407         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8408
8409         // Create some initial channel
8410         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8411         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8412
8413         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8414         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8415
8416         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8417         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8418
8419         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8420         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8421         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8422         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8423         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8424                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8425         );
8426         let watchtower_alice = {
8427                 let new_monitor = {
8428                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8429                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8430                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8431                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8432                         new_monitor
8433                 };
8434                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8435                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8436                 watchtower
8437         };
8438         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8439         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8440         // requirements here.
8441         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8442         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8443         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8444
8445         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8446         let alice_state = {
8447                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8448                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8449                 txn.remove(0)
8450         };
8451
8452         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8453         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8454         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8455         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8456         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8457         let watchtower_bob = {
8458                 let new_monitor = {
8459                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8460                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8461                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8462                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8463                         new_monitor
8464                 };
8465                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8466                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8467                 watchtower
8468         };
8469         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8470
8471         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8472         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8473         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8474                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8476
8477         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8478         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8479         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8480         {
8481                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8482                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8483                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8484                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8485                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8486                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8487                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8488                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8489                 } else { assert!(false); }
8490         }
8491         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8493
8494         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8495         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8496
8497         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8498         let bob_state_y;
8499         {
8500                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8501                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8502                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8503         };
8504
8505         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8506         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8507         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8508         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8509         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
8510         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8511         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8512         {
8513                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8514                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8515                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8516                 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8517                 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8518                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8519         }
8520 }
8521
8522 #[test]
8523 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8524         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8525         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8526         // message).
8527         //
8528         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8529         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8530         //
8531         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8532         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8533         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8534         // before receiving funding_signed.
8535         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8536         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8537         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8538         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8539
8540         // Create an initial channel
8541         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8542         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8543         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8544         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8545         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8546
8547         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8548         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8549
8550         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8552
8553         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8554         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8555         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8556         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8557         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8558 }
8559
8560 #[test]
8561 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8562         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8563         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8564         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8565         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8566         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8567         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8568
8569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8572         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8573
8574         // Create some initial channels
8575         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8576
8577         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8578         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8579         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8580         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8581         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8582         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8583
8584         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8585         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8586         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8587         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8588         // this test before #653 fix.
8589         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8590         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8592         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8593         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8594
8595         let htlc_timeout = {
8596                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8597                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8598                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8600                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8601                 node_txn[0].clone()
8602         };
8603
8604         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8605         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8606         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8607 }
8608
8609 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8610         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8611         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8612         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8613         //
8614         // Steps of the test:
8615         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8616         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8617         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8618         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8619         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8620         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8621         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8622         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8626         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8627
8628         // Create some initial channels
8629         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8630         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8631
8632         // Steps (1) and (2):
8633         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8634         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8635
8636         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8637         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8638         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8639         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8640         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8641         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8642         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8643
8644         // Steps (3) and (4):
8645         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8646         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8647         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8648         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8649
8650         // Bob force-closes
8651         if !broadcast_alice {
8652                 force_closing_node = 1;
8653                 counterparty_node = 0;
8654         }
8655         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8656         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8658         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8659         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8660                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8661                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8662                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8663                 };
8664                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8665                 if broadcast_alice {
8666                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8667                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8668                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8669                 }
8670         }
8671
8672         // Step (5):
8673         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8674         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8675         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8676         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8677         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8678
8679         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8680         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8681         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8682         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8683         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8684         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8685
8686         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8687         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8688         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8689         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8690                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8691                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8692                 match events[0] {
8693                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8694                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8695                         },
8696                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8697                 };
8698         }
8699         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8700         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8701         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8703
8704         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8705         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8706         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8707                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8708                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8709                         (*msg).clone()
8710                 },
8711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8712         };
8713         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8714                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8715                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8716                         (*updates).clone()
8717                 },
8718                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8719         };
8720
8721         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8723         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8725
8726         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8727         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8728         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8729                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8730                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8731                         (*msg).clone()
8732                 },
8733                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8734         };
8735         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8737
8738         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8739         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8740         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8741         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8742         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8743                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8744                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8745                 if broadcast_alice {
8746                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8747                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8748                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8749                 }
8750                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8751                 if broadcast_alice {
8752                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8753                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8754                 } else {
8755                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8756                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8757                 }
8758         }
8759
8760         // Step (6):
8761         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8762         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8763         {
8764                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8765                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8766                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8767                 };
8768                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8769                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8770                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8771                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8772                 if broadcast_alice {
8773                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8774                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8775                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8776                 } else {
8777                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8778                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8779                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8780                 }
8781         }
8782 }
8783
8784 #[test]
8785 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8786         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8787         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8788         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8789         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8790 }
8791
8792 #[test]
8793 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8794         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8795         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8796         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8799         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8800
8801         // Create an first channel channel
8802         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8803         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8804
8805         // Create an second channel
8806         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8807         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8808
8809         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8810         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8811         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8812
8813         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8814         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8815         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8816         {
8817                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8818                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8819                 match &events[0] {
8820                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8821                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8822                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8823                         },
8824                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8825                 }
8826         }
8827
8828         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8829         {
8830                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8831                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8832                 match &events[0] {
8833                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8834                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8835                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8836                         },
8837                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8838                 }
8839         }
8840 }
8841
8842 #[test]
8843 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8844         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8845         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8846         //
8847         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8848         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8849         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8850         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8851         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8852         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8853         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8854         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8855
8856         // Create an initial channel
8857         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8858         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8859         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8860         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8861
8862         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8863         // that it is rejected.
8864         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8865         {
8866                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8867                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8868                 match events[0] {
8869                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8870                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8871                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8872                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8873                                 // move forward with it.
8874                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8875                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8876                         },
8877                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8878                 }
8879         }
8880
8881         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8882         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8883
8884         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8886
8887         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8888         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8889         {
8890                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8891                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8892                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8893                 added_monitors.clear();
8894         }
8895         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8896
8897         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8898
8899         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8900         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8901
8902         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8903         // temporary one).
8904
8905         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8906         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8907         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8908         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8909         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8910         {
8911                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8912                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8913                 match events[0] {
8914                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8915                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8916                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8917                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8918                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8919                         },
8920                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8921                 }
8922         }
8923
8924         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8925         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8926         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8927         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8928         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8929         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8930
8931         let funding_created = {
8932                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8933                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8934                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8935                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8936                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8937                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8938                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8939                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8940                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8941         };
8942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8943         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8944         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8945         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8947
8948         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8949         {
8950                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8951                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8952                 match events[0] {
8953                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8954                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8955                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8956                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8957                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8958                         },
8959                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8960                 }
8961         }
8962
8963         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8964         // everything is functional.
8965         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8966         {
8967                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8968                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8969                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8970                 added_monitors.clear();
8971         }
8972         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8973
8974         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8975         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8976         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8977         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8978
8979         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8980         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8981         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8982
8983         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8984 }
8985
8986 #[test]
8987 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8988         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8989         //
8990         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8991         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8992         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8993         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8994         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8995         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8996         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8997
8998         // Create some initial channels
8999         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9000         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9001         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9002
9003         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9004         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9005         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9006
9007         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9008         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9009         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9010
9011         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9012         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9014         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9015         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9016         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9017         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9018         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9019         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9020
9021         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9022         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9023         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9025         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9026         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9027         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9028         match events[0] {
9029                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9030                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9031                 },
9032                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9033         }
9034         match events[1] {
9035                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9036                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9037                 },
9038                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9039         }
9040         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9041         // peer_disconnected.
9042         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9043         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9044
9045         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9046         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9047         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9048 }
9049
9050 #[test]
9051 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9052         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9053         //
9054         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9055         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9056         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9057         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9058         //
9059         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9060         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9061         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9062         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9063         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9064         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9065         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9066
9067         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9068         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9069         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9070
9071         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9072
9073         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9074         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9075         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9076         // its length.
9077         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9078         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9079         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9080                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9081                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9082         }
9083
9084         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9085         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9087         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9088
9089         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9091         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9092
9093         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9094         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9095
9096         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9097         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9098         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9099
9100         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9101         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9102         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9104         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9105         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9106         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9107                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9108                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9109                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9110                 } else { panic!(); }
9111         } else { panic!(); }
9112         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9113
9114         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9115         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9116         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9117         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9118                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9119                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9120                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9121                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9122                                 vout: idx as u32,
9123                         },
9124                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9125                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9126                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9127                 }).collect(),
9128                 output: vec![TxOut {
9129                         value: 1000,
9130                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9131                 }]
9132         };
9133         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9134         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9135 }
9136
9137 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9138         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9139         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9140         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9141         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9142         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9143         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9144         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9145         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9146         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9147         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9148         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9149         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9150         // until we learned about an additional block.
9151         //
9152         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9153         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9154         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9155         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9156         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9157         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9158         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9159
9160         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9161         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9162         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9163         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9164         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9165
9166         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9167         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9168         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9170         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9171         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9172
9173         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9174         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9175                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9176         }
9177         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9178                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9179         if test_height_before_timelock {
9180                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9181                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9182                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9183                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9184         } else {
9185                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9186                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9187                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9188                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9189                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9190                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9191                 // timelock is up).
9192                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9193                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9194
9195                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9196                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9197                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9198                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9199                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9200                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9201                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9202
9203                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9204                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9205                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9206                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9207                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9208                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9209                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9210                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9211                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9212         }
9213 }
9214
9215 #[test]
9216 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9217         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9218         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9219 }
9220
9221 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9225         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9226
9227         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9228
9229         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9230                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9231         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9232
9233         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9234
9235         {
9236                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9237                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9238                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9239                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9240                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9241                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9242                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9243                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9244         }
9245         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9246         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9247
9248         {
9249                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9250                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9251                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9252                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9253                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9254                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9255                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9256                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9257                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9258                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9259                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9260                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9261                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9262         }
9263
9264         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9265         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9266
9267         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9268                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9269                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9270
9271                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9272                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9273                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9274                 ];
9275                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9276                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9277
9278                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9279                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9280                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9281
9282                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9283                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9284                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9285
9286                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9287                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9288                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9289                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9290                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9291                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9292         } else {
9293                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9294                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9295                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9296
9297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9298                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9299                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9300                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9301
9302                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9303
9304                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9305         }
9306 }
9307
9308 #[test]
9309 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9310         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9311         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9312         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9313         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9314         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9315 }
9316
9317 #[test]
9318 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9319         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9320         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9321         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9322 }
9323
9324 #[test]
9325 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9326         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9327         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9331         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9332
9333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9334         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9335         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9336         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9337
9338         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9339                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9340         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9341         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9342         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9343                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9344                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9345                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9346         });
9347
9348         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9349
9350         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9351         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9352
9353         let session_privs = {
9354                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9355                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9356                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9357                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9358                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9359                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9360         };
9361         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9362                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9363                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9364         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9365
9366         {
9367                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9368                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9369                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9370         }
9371         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9372
9373         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9374                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9376
9377         {
9378                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9379                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9380                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9381
9382                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9383                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9384
9385                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9387
9388                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9389                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9390                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9391
9392                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9393                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9394                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9395
9396                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9397                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9398                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9399         }
9400         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9401         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9402         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9403         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9404
9405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9406
9407         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9408         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9409         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9410
9411         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9413
9414         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9415         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9416         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9417
9418         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9419
9420         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9421                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9422                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9424
9425         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9426         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9427         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9428
9429         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9430         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true);
9431 }
9432
9433 #[test]
9434 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9435         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9436         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9437         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9438         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9439
9440         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9441         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9442         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9443         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9444         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9445                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9446                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9447         };
9448         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9449         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9450         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9451
9452         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9453         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9454                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9456         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9457         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9458         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9459         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9460         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9461         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9462 }
9463
9464 #[test]
9465 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9469         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9470
9471         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9472         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9473
9474         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9475         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9476                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9477                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9478         };
9479         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9480         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9481         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9482         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9483         let route = find_route(
9484                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9485                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9486         ).unwrap();
9487
9488         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9489         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9490                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9492         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9493         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9494         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9495         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9496         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9497         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9498 }
9499
9500 #[test]
9501 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9502         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9503         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9504         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9505         // amount.
9506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9509         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9510
9511         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9512         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9513         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9514         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9515
9516         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9517         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9518         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9519                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9520                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9521                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9522         });
9523
9524         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9525         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9526         // amount of time to respond to.
9527
9528         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9529         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9530         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9531
9532         let failed_destinations = vec![
9533                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9534                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9535         ];
9536         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9537
9538         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9539
9540         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9541         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9542                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9544
9545         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9546         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9547         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9548         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9549
9550         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9551         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9552         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9554         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9555 }
9556
9557 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9558 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9559 enum ExposureEvent {
9560         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9561         AtHTLCForward,
9562         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9563         AtHTLCReception,
9564         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9565         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9566 }
9567
9568 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9569         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9570         // policy.
9571         //
9572         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9573         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9574         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9575         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9576         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9577         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9578         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9579         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9580
9581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9582         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9583         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9586         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9587
9588         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9589         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9590         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9591         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9592         if on_holder_tx {
9593                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9594         }
9595         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9596         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9597         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9598
9599         let opt_anchors = false;
9600
9601         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9602
9603         if on_holder_tx {
9604                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9605                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9606                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9607                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9608         }
9609
9610         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9611         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9613         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9614
9615         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9617         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9618
9619         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9620         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9621         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9622
9623         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9624         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9625                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9626
9627         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9628                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9629                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9630                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9631                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9632         };
9633         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9634         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9635
9636         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9637         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9638
9639         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9640         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9641
9642         if on_holder_tx {
9643                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9644                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9645                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9646                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9647                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9648                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9649                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9650                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9651                         }
9652                 } else {
9653                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9654                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9655                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9656                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9657                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9658                         }
9659                 }
9660         } else {
9661                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9662                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9663                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9664                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9665                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9666                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9667                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9668                         }
9669                 } else {
9670                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9671                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9672                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9673                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9674                         }
9675                 }
9676         }
9677
9678         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9679                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9680                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9681                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9682                 if on_holder_tx {
9683                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9684                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9685                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9686                 } else {
9687                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9688                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9689                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9690                 }
9691         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9692                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 });
9693                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9694                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9695                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9696                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9697                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9698                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9699                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9700                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9701                 if on_holder_tx {
9702                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9703                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9704                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9705                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9706                 } else {
9707                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9708                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9709                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9710                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1,
9711                                         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9712                 }
9713         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9714                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9715                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9716                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9717                 {
9718                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9719                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9720                 }
9721                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9723                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9724         }
9725
9726         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9727         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9728         added_monitors.clear();
9729 }
9730
9731 #[test]
9732 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9733         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9734         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9735         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9736         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9737         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9738         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9739         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9740         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9741         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9742         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9743         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9744         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9745 }
9746
9747 #[test]
9748 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9752         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9753
9754         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9755         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9756         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9757         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9758         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9759
9760         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9761
9762         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9763         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9764         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9765         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9766         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9767                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9768                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9769                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9770                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9771                         }]}
9772                 },
9773                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9774         };
9775         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9776         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9777                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9778                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9779                 },
9780                 _ => panic!()
9781         }
9782
9783         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9784         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9785         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9786         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9787 }
9788
9789 #[test]
9790 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9791         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9792         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9793         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9794         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9795         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9796         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9797         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9798
9799         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9800
9801         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9802         {
9803                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9804                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9805         }
9806
9807         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9808         {
9809                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9810                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9811         }
9812         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9814
9815         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9816         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9817         match events[0] {
9818                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9819                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9820                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9821                 },
9822                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9823         };
9824
9825         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9826         // it.
9827         {
9828                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9829                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9830         }
9831         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9833
9834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9836         match events[0] {
9837                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9838                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9839                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9840                 },
9841                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9842         };
9843
9844         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9845         // channel.
9846         {
9847                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9848                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9849         }
9850         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9852
9853         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9854         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9855         match events[0] {
9856                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9857                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9858                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9859                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9860                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9861                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9862                 },
9863                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9864         };
9865 }
9866
9867 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9868         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9869         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9870         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9871         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9872         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9873         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9874                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9875         let recv_value = 100_000;
9876
9877         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9878
9879         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9880         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9881                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9882                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9883                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9884         } else {
9885                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9886                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9887         };
9888         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9889         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9890                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9892         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9893         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9894         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9895         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9896         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9897         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9898
9899         if valid_delta {
9900                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9901                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9902
9903                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9904         } else {
9905                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9906
9907                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9908
9909                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9910                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9911                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9912
9913                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9914         }
9915 }
9916
9917 #[test]
9918 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9919         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9920         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9921         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9922         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9923 }
9924
9925 #[test]
9926 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
9927         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
9928         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9929         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9930         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9931         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9932         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9933
9934         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
9935         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
9936                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9937                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
9938                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
9939                                         Some(())
9940                                 } else {
9941                                         None
9942                                 }
9943                         } else {
9944                                 None
9945                         }
9946                 );
9947                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
9948         };
9949
9950         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
9951         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9952         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
9953                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
9954                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9955
9956                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
9957                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
9958                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9959                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9960                 }
9961
9962                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
9963                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9964                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9965
9966                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
9967                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9968                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9969         };
9970
9971         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9972
9973         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
9974         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
9975         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9976         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9977         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9978         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9979         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
9980         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9981
9982         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
9983         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9984         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
9985         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9986         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
9987         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
9988
9989         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
9990         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
9991         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9992         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9993         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
9994
9995         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
9996         //
9997         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
9998         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
9999         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10000         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10001         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10002                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10003         };
10004         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10005         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10006                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10007         };
10008         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10009
10010         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10011         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10012         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10013         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10014                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10015         );
10016         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10017         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10018
10019         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10020         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10021                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10022                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10023                         Some(msg.clone())
10024                 } else {
10025                         None
10026                 }
10027         ).unwrap();
10028         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10029
10030         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10031         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10032                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10033                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10034         }
10035
10036         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10037         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10038         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10039
10040         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10041         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10042         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10043
10044         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10045         // waiting on any messages.
10046         for node in &nodes {
10047                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10048                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10049                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10050                 }
10051         }
10052 }